Jon AS and Jerry LRC,
There is nothing contradictory about the following paragraph:
If parts of a proposition be erased so as to leave blanks in their
places, and if these blanks are of such a nature that if each of
them be filled by a proper name the result will be a proposition,
then the blan
List, Gary
> On Jul 5, 2018, at 4:18 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
>
> [[ I do not, for my part, regard the usages of language as forming a
> satisfactory basis for logical doctrine. Logic, for me, is the study of the
> essential conditions to which signs must conform in order to function as
>
List:
> On Jul 5, 2018, at 4:18 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
>
> [[ Nothing can be more preposterous than to base that grammatica speculativa
> which forms the first part of logic upon the usages of language. ] Harvard
> Lecture 6 (Turrisi p. 235)]
A very strange abuse of the history of the te
List, Gary:
> On Jul 5, 2018, at 4:18 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
>
> [ I, therefore, take a position quite similar to that of the English
> logicians, beginning with Scotus himself, in regarding this introductory part
> of logic as nothing but an analysis of what kinds of signs are absolutel
> On Jul 5, 2018, at 4:18 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
>
> Jerry,
>
> It seems you were only able to find one quote from Peirce on the subject;
> here are a few more.
>
Gary: You are correct. I am not a CSP scholar so no further search was made.
Indeed, as my work on the logic of life progr
Jon, List:
> On Jul 5, 2018, at 4:59 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>
> Jerry C., List:
>
> What would be some examples of medad Rhemes that are not Propositions? If
> there are any, why did Peirce explicitly affirm (at least twice) that a medad
> Rheme is a Proposition? Or is there an import
Jerry C., List:
What would be some examples of medad Rhemes that are not Propositions? If
there are any, why did Peirce explicitly affirm (at least twice) that a
medad Rheme *is *a Proposition? Or is there an important distinction
between a Rheme and a rhema that I am overlooking?
Thanks,
Jon
JAS, List
> On Jul 5, 2018, at 4:06 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>
> According as the number of blanks in a rheme is 0, 1, 2, 3, etc., it may be
> termed a medad (from {méden}, nothing), monad, dyad, triad, etc., rheme. (CP
> 2.272, EP 2:299; 1903)
>
> The first sentence requires at least one p
:309]
Gary f.
From: Jerry LR Chandler
Sent: 5-Jul-18 15:38
To: Gary Fuhrman ; Peirce List
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's late classification of signs
List:
It may be of interest to some to look at the meaning of speculative grammar
from two other views, Commens quote an
Gary F., List:
Do you happen to know whether that definition of "signification" appeared
in the 1901-2 version of Baldwin's *Dictionary*, or only the 1911 version?
Notice that it never once mentions the Interpretant, but it does include
the statement, "The ‘signification’ of a term is all the qual
I mean that signs are prior to language and thus are closer to reality and
thus transcend in that sense. Peirce seems to place emphasis of the
amorphousness, vagueness and essential independence of signs untol they are
named in which case we have entered the picture and created signs. I
suppose whe
List, Stephen
> On Jul 5, 2018, at 2:59 PM, Stephen Curtiss Rose wrote:
>
> One good reason for semiotics is its transcending of language.
Are you placing the cart before the horse?
Historically, the opposite appears to be the case.
The very constrained meaning of any sign motivates the genesis
Sounds a bit like semantic populism. One good reason for semiotics is its
transcending of language. But there is no cure for our individual
insistence on knowing what we are seeing, reading or hearing. I think
Peirce was best at insisting on some form of communal assent to truth at
which point he w
List:
It may be of interest to some to look at the meaning of speculative grammar
from two other views, Commens quote and the Modistae. IN particular, the
concept of the “mirror” is critical to the art of scientific representations /
representamens.
> On Jul 5, 2018, at 9:30 AM, g...@gnusyst
eers
Jerry
>
>
> From: Jerry LR Chandler
> Sent: 5-Jul-18 09:59
> To: Peirce List
> Cc: Gary Fuhrman
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's late classification of signs
>
> List:
>> On Jul 5, 2018, at 7:38 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems
] Peirce's late classification of signs
List:
On Jul 5, 2018, at 7:38 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>
wrote:
In your other post, you wrote, “A Rheme not only must have at least one blank
empty, but also at least one blank filled; it must have either breadth or
List:
> On Jul 5, 2018, at 7:38 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
>
> In your other post, you wrote, “A Rheme not only must have at least one blank
> empty, but also at least one blank filled; it must have either breadth or
> depth, just not both.” I don’t know where you get this idea … A rheme with
-L] Peirce's late classification of signs
Gary F., List:
As I have acknowledged previously, Peirce evidently changed his mind about what
a Sign signifies.
In 1904, "every sign sufficiently complete signifies characters, or
qualities"--i.e., "Aristotelian Form"--such
List:
> On Jul 4, 2018, at 12:27 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
>
> [[ If we take any proposition, say
>
> A sinner kills a saint
>
> and if we erase portions of it, so as to leave it a blank form of
> proposition, the blanks being such that if every one of them is filled with a
> proper nam
Gary F., List:
As I have acknowledged previously, Peirce evidently changed his mind about
what a Sign *signifies*.
In 1904, "every sign sufficiently complete *signifies characters*, or
qualities"--i.e., "Aristotelian *Form*"--such that "The totality of the
predicates of a sign, and also the total
Gary F., List:
GF: Is the continuous predicate still a *rheme* when all the ‘matter’ has
been extracted from its ‘form’, so that nothing is left but an infinitely
recursive “is in the relation to”?
I would say no. A Rheme not only must have at least one blank *empty*, but
also at least one bl
from what?
Gary f.
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 4-Jul-18 12:07
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's late classification of signs
Gary F., List:
As if my previous post were not long enough already, last night I read through
"Prolegomena" (1
Jon, you asked,
“How would you spell out the difference between a Rheme and a Seme? What would
be an example of something that is a Seme, but not a Rheme?”
I think Bellucci gives a very lucid explanation of the two-stage process of
generalization that went from term/proposition/argument to
rh
Gary F., List:
As if my previous post were not long enough already, last night I read
through "Prolegomena" (1906) in its entirety and came across two other
passages that struck me as worth mentioning.
CSP: A common mode of estimating the amount of matter in a MS. or printed
book is to count the
Gary F., List:
I apologize in advance for the lengthy reply, but there is a lot of ground
to cover.
GF: I think it’s because *determination* in that realm [of dynamics] has a
causal force which takes time and only works in one direction, namely
*forward* in time ... I don’t think the concept of
Jon,
I have no particular problem with your “amendment” (and agree with at least
part of it) so my inserted comments begin further down. I’ve changed the
subject line to better reflect what we’re talking about.
Gary f.
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 29-Jun-18 21:05
Gary F., List:
I woul
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