Peircers,
Some filaments of this thread appear to be tangled
in a non-terminating loop -- I remain ever hopeful
that the whole nine yards is not utterly hopeless.
Since I look to be away from the loom for a while
I'll just leave this memo to mark how far I got.
Regards,
Jon
o~o
List, Jon:
On Jan 17, 2015, at 3:32 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
> But I can assure you that mathematicians as a rule, including Peirce, regard
> mathematical objects as “having properties”, which makes them “real”
> according to the technical Scholastic definition of “real” that Peirce always
> use
bor...@primus.ca
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions : Chapter 8
But seriously, Folks, I think it's fairly clear that Howard is using “real” in
the sense of physical reality, as Peirce did when he wrote “real world”, and as
all of us do when that's what we mean. But I
But seriously, Folks, I think it's fairly clear that Howard is using “real” in
the sense of physical reality, as Peirce did when he wrote “real world”, and as
all of us do when that's what we mean. But I can assure you that mathematicians
as a rule, including Peirce, regard mathematical objects
relational theory of "logic as formal semiotics" from the
get-go.
Regards,
Jon
On 1/17/2015 9:56 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
Jon,
We have no conception of incognizable consequences. But surely
there is a real possibility that a scientific
intelligence can come to know facts in the futu
have no conception of incognizable consequences. But surely there is a
>>> real possibility that a scientific
>>> intelligence can come to know facts in the future which are inconceivable
>>> in the present. Semiosis t
ceivability is not a pragmatic or pragmaticistically
meaningful concept.
gary f.
From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net] Sent: 17-Jan-15 7:35 AM To:
Howard Pattee Cc: Peirce List Subject:
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions : Chapter 8
Re: Gary Fuhrman
At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gma
onceivability is not a pragmatic or pragmaticistically meaningful
concept.
gary f.
From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net] Sent: 17-Jan-15 7:35 AM To: Howard
Pattee Cc: Peirce List Subject:
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions : Chapter 8
Re: Gary Fuhrman
At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gm
difference between
corollarial and theorematic deduction. Eternal conceivability is not a
pragmatic or pragmaticistically meaningful concept.
gary f.
From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net]
Sent: 17-Jan-15 7:35 AM
To: Howard Pattee
Cc: Peirce List
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions
Re: Gary Fuhrman
At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15405
But we have no conception of inconceivable consequences.
Jon
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com
> On Jan 16, 2015, at 9:16 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
>
> Howard,
>
> There has historically been a lot of confusion abo
At 09:16 PM 1/16/2015, Jon wrote:
Mathematics is about possible existence. What exists in mathematics
is what is possible, what is not inconsistent in the properties
predicated of it. Real possibles are simply part of the territory.
As a mathematician Peirce was a realist of this stripe from b
Howard,
There has historically been a lot of confusion about this issue. The lion's
share of it comes I think from two different ways of viewing logic in general
and conditionals in particular. For lack of better names I'll refer to them as
the Mathematical and the Linguistic views.
Mathematic
Gary, List,
We've been through these issues so many times before
that I can't think of anything new to say right off.
Pragmatic Maxim (PORT, Ontology, Peirce, SemioCom Lists : April-June 2002)
☞
http://web.archive.org/web/20070705085032/http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/thrd25.html#04226
☞
http://w
Re: Gary Richmond
At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15362
Gary, List,
Just off-hand I would have to say that the most important criterion in regard
to iconicity is
"relevant iconicity". The analogy, the icon, and the morphism are of
imagination all compact.
The an
Gary R, lists,
Regarding your point about simplicity, which is well taken: What I had in
mind was the tendency of people (unaccustomed to Peircean perspectives on
iconicity) to think of the typical "icon" as something like a stop sign, or
the sign on a washroom door, or the mini-graphics on our
Re: Gary Fuhrman
At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15312
Peircers,
There are times when Peirce writes in a technical vein
and there are times when Peirce writes in a popular vein.
He is without question a master of both styles of writing
and yet the two veins yield o
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