Auke,
I support your decision, for the same reasons I wrote in my
response to Edwina:
AvB> As a consequence of a suitable dash
of indifference on both sides, we didn't get into outright conflict, but
we also did not reach agreement on the goal, and thus also not about the
means in reaching it.
Jon Alen,
AvB: So, in the end we proved not to communicate.
JAS: I am sincerely sorry that you see it that way. I personally found it to
be a stimulating discussion and appreciate the dialogue.
--
No need to feel sorry. I make a distinction between monologue, dialogue and
communication.
Auke, List:
AvB: Do you think we discussed speculative grammar or Peirce's text on
speculative grammar?
I think we discussed *both*, including how our different approaches
to speculative grammar *diverge *from strict application of Peirce's
relevant texts.
AvB: Lots of other names are to be
Jon Alan,
You wrote:
Why would you say that? We have not been talking about a series of
interpretant signs within the continuous process of semeiosis [
-
No, we only dealt with the sign, sign interpretation, interpretant sign segment
of such a process, And on top of tbhat only in an
Auke, List:
AvB: You seem to forget that 'the interpretant of a sign' differs from the
'interpretant sign', which in itself is a full blown sign, in need of its
own qualisign, sinsign, etc, etc, and interpretant aspects.
Why would you say that? We have not been talking about a series of
Jon Allen,
You seem to forget that 'the interpretant of a sign' differs from the
'interpretant sign', which in itself is a full blown sign, in need of its own
qualisign, sinsign, etc, etc, and interpretant aspects. In the page
Auke, Jon, List,
I guess "categories" means a way of generalisation. So, if the subdivision of any secondness into two, and of any thirdness into three is possible for sign classes (for subsecond-and -thirdnesses too), why should that not be so for S, O, I?
So, as in sign classes, there are,
Auke, List:
AvB: You state that Peirce maintains that there are exactly three
interpretants and your proof seems to be that you nowhere found more than
three *names* for interpretants in the same passage.
Indeed, I believe that if Peirce had held that there were more than three
interpretants,
Jon Alan,
This is a highly curious way of thinking of yours. You state that Peirce
maintains that there are exactly three interpretants and your proof seems to be
that you nowhere found more than three names for interpretants in the same
passage.
It is nice to find that we agree upon at
Auke, List:
JAS: Peirce consistently maintains that there are exactly three
interpretants.
AvB: This sentence most certainly is not true.
Please provide a citation or quote where Peirce assigns specific names to
more than three interpretants in the same passage. Unless you can do that,
I
Jon,
You wrote:
Peirce consistently maintains that there are exactly three interpretants.
-
This sentence most certainly is not true. In the alpha part of semiotics it may
seem so, but not in the beta part (see my other mail) where he deals with the
interprtetation of the sign. lets do the
Auke, List:
AvB: I read these quotes as indicating two concepts, as the terms choosen
already suggest, i.e. 'eventual' and 'normal'.
Understood, but by contrast I read "eventual interpretant" and "normal
interpretant" as two *tentative *terms (with *tentative *definitions) for
the *same
Edwina, John, List:
I do not agree with a linear view of Peirce, either, and strongly concur
that one must take his entire vast corpus into account. What I have said
is that I generally assume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
that his later writings reflect his *more considered*
Auke - thanks for your clear differentiation of two quite different
semiosic processes - regardless of their terms/names.
That is, as I see it, there IS such a thing as 'Truth' and there IS
such a thing as natural evolution. Both are semiosic actions and both
have different
Jon Alen,
This comment probably does not come as a surprise.
> CSP: The Eventual Interpretant of [a] Sign is all that General Truth that it
> destines, in view of the other general truths of the universe, conditionally
> upon its full acceptance. It is the sum and substance of all the real
>
Edwina and Jon,
Throughout his life, Peirce maintained a
consistent fallibilism. He insisted that many of the things that we
believe are true are indeed true to the extent that they have been
tested. It's even possible that some of them may be absolutely true. But
we can never be certain
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS - as usual, you and I, each in our personal opinions of Peirce,
have great differences.
I don't agree with a linear view of Peirce [early->late]; I think
one has to take his whole works into consideration,
Edwina, List:
It should go without saying for all my posts, but the following is an
expression of my personal opinions based on my interpretations of Peirce's
writings.
I always include the year of publication or composition whenever I cite
them, because I believe that it is very important to
Auke- I have a different view of the Final Interpretant - I see it
as a means of 'changing habits'.
My view of the Final Interpretant is that it is a continuous and
infinite process of generalization, vital to the formation of habits.
That is, the Logical or Final or Destinate
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