Supplement:
Edwina, List,
Now I have an easier explanation of what I was meaning, based on topology and temporality regarding "internal" and "external".
If sign A is the spatiotemporal supersign, sign B the spatiotemporal subsign, meaning: Sign B is located inside sign A or spatially identi
Edwina,
ok, but a concept which has been formed by the individual who thinks about it, or by the two people who are talking about this concept, is even more a work in progress, or, as you wrote, anticipatory, like an immediate interpretant. But it is a funny thing, self referentiality, a creative
;
> Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
>
> http://web.ncf.ca/collier
>
>
>
> From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
> Sent: Thursday, 30 March 2017 9:23 PM
> To: John Collier
> Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> Subject: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic pr
Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier [1]
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: Thursday, 30 March 2017 9:23 PM
To: John Collier
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem
M
> *To:* John Collier
> *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term
>
>
>
> John - thanks for the quotation.
>
> I fully agree. The Peircean framework is irreducibly triadic. As he
> writes, "Every
]
Sent: Thursday, 30 March 2017 9:23 PM
To: John Collier
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term
John - thanks for the quotation.
I fully agree. The Peircean framework is irreducibly triadic. As he writes,
"Every sign has an object&qu
John - thanks for the quotation.
I fully agree. The Peircean framework is irreducibly triadic. As he
writes, "Every sign has an object" and it is "essential to the
function of a sign that it should determine an Interpretant".
Therefore - the sign is, even to exist as such, tr
Jeff, List:
Thanks for once again giving all of us this important reminder. It
probably goes without saying that my focus tends to be on #1; after all,
how can we claim that something we advocate is genuinely Peircean, without
first carefully ascertaining what Peirce's own considered views were?
Jon, List,
Thank you. So this was another semantic problem, this time with the term "would"!
30. März 2017 um 20:04 Uhr
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt"
Helmut, List:
HR: Eg. he wrote, that the dynamical object is real, and that it also is the object as a final study would show it to be.
ofessor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
-
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: Thursday, March 30, 2017 6:52 AM
To: tabor...@primus.ca
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term
Edwin
Helmut, List:
HR: Eg. he wrote, that the dynamical object is real, and that it also is
the object as a final study would show it to be.
I think that the key word here is *would*. The idea is that the real is
that which *would *come to be known by an infinite community after
indefinite inquiry,
23-8354
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: Thursday, March 30, 2017 6:52 AM
To: tabor...@primus.ca
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term
Edwina, List:
Just one (hopefully last) comment here.
ET: But a thing that bothers me about
_
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: Thursday, March 30, 2017 6:52 AM
To: tabor...@primus.ca
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term
Edwina, List:
Just one (hopefully last) comment here.
ET: But a thing that bothers me about some of the focus of this
Edwina, List:
Just one (hopefully last) comment here.
ET: But a thing that bothers me about some of the focus of this list is
its isolation from reality; that is, it's all about words and definitions.
But Peirce wasn't focused on that.
Peirce was certainly not *only *focused on words and defin
John, list - yes, I agree with your comments.
But a thing that bothers me about some of the focus of this list is
its isolation from reality; that is, it's all about words and
definitions. But Peirce wasn't focused on that. As John points out,
he used his terms in a variety of w
Helmut - the point to remember about Peircean semiosis is that it is
dynamic; it sets up an active process of informational transformation.
This is non-linear, so it is an error, I feel, to view Peircean
semiosis as a step-by-step action, i.e., a linear movement from
Object to Representa
Edwina,
I agree. By "the sign" (and farer down "subsign") I didnt mean any sign or the phaneron, but the sign of which the dynamical object is a dynamical object.
Best,
Helmut
29. März 2017 um 01:57 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky"
Helmut - it depends what you mean by 'sign'. The Dynami
Helmut - it depends what you mean by 'sign'. The Dynamic Object is
external to another Dynamic Object! But, in my view, since
'everything is in Signs' then, everything functions within a triadic
set of relations: the Object-Representamen-Interpretant.
The Dynamic Object is, whe
Jon, Edwina, List,
I think, the dynamical object must be external from the sign, because all other parts, or, less mechanicallly spoken, aspects, of it are internal of it. And, if nothing at all would be external from the sign, the sign would have no connection to other signs and be idiosyncratic
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That's what I mean by your arrogance, Jon. Instead of speaking just
for yourself - you have to insist that you speak for Peirce. Or that
you speak for all and 'anyone else'. I have backed up my views of
Peirce repeatedl
Edwina, List:
I knew that I could count on you! As usual, you offer no evidence to back
up your assertions, so I have no reason to take them seriously--and neither
does anyone else.
Cheers,
Jon S.
On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 1:51 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
> Jon - I of course reject your views o
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Jon - I of course reject your views of Peirce and your insistence
that yours is the correct interpretation. I find such a claim to be
unscientific and arrogant. You are too literal and you don't, in my
view, absorb the f
Helmut, List:
Actually, your first quote below *does not* corroborate what Edwina wrote.
Rather, in context Peirce was saying there that the Dynamic Object is
not *necessarily
*something that is outside the mind; it might be another thought, or a
fictional character, or a command, as just a few ex
Edwina,
Here are four quotes from the Commens Dictionary. The first corrobates what you wrote, that the d.o. is not outside of the mind and its experience, the second quote says that it is a part of reality, the third says, it is in itself, and the fourth says it is what final study would show it
Helmut - in my view, ALL material and conceptual existences are
Signs. They ALL function within the triadic set of Relations:
Object-Representamen-Interpretant.
Therefore, there is no such thing as a Dynamic Object 'in itself',
i.e., which exists outside of this interactive proc
List,
Edwina, I think, that there are four kinds of dynamical objects, two of which do not change, one that may change, also due to the sign, and one that changes for sure with every sign that has it for dynamical object: Metaphysical laws and axioms (given they exist) do not change, events and c
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