It's more than a bit outdated, but I did write an article a few years ago
trying to answer the specific question Eugene asks in his post. See Gays, Jews,
and Other strangers in a Strange Land. It is about the model or analogy to use
in discussing claims for accommodation for religious objectors
As Marty notes, this is a different issue, although it is still an important
one. I take Eugene’s most recent post to focus not on whether audience members
are being coerced, but whether they are coerced into engaging in religious
exercise.
There are situations where one stands for secular reas
us symbol that is not ours diminishes our dignity, and so I think we
should stay well clear of the concept of "dignitary rights."
Jon
On 2014-07-07 12:55, Alan Brownstein wrote:
> I agree with most of what Marty says here. Commercial corporations do
the thread) why many amicus groups could both oppose
actual legal commands as in Hobby Lobby, but not the potential subtle pressure
present in Town of Greece.
Eugene
From:
religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu>
[mailto:religionlaw-boun..
I take it that the authors of those briefs saw a law requiring
someone to do something that they thought was sinful as different from a
practice under which people end up hearing things from the government that they
might find offensive or alienating.
Eugene
Fr
I agree with most of what Marty says here. Commercial corporations do not have
dignitary rights such as the right to exercise religion. Human persons have
these rights and one can argue as Alito often but not always does that they
should not be held to have waived those rights because they elect
A few quick thoughts on Marty's second question. At least some of us saw value
in religious liberty legislation employing an intermediate level scrutiny
standard of review rather than strict scrutiny years ago. I worked with a group
trying to get a state religious land use bill adopted in Califo
When people are asking government officials to exercise their discretion in a
way that seriously impacts their important interests in a courtroom, at an
administrative proceeding, in a government bureaucrat's office, in a classroom
, or at the town hall meeting in a small town, I think it is int
I think Chip"s and Doug's key points in their posts are worth emphasizing. Many
briefs supporting the town of Greece and the Court's opinion in that case
treated the religious liberty arguments of plaintiffs with complete distain.
The authors of many of those briefs and the same justices who wro
Very interesting and helpful post, Marty. I found one point particularly
intriguing. Are you suggesting that RFRA authorizes the expenditure of
government funds to avoid substantially burdening religious liberty without any
further authorization from Congress?
Alan
__
I wonder if an implicit part of the Court's concern about underinclusion in O
Centro is that there are constitutional concerns about religious equality and
religious favoritism if the government grants an accommodation for one faith
but denies it to another, arguably similarly situated, faith. O
Chip,
This link doesn’t work (at least it doesn’t work on my computer.) Is there
another way to access your post. I would like to read it.
Alan
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Ira Lupu
Sent: Wednesday, July 02, 2014 11:00 AM
To:
Eugene read my mind and wrote exactly what I was going to write. Maybe gross
underinclusion isn't entirely irrelevant, but standing alone it has little
bearing on whether the state's interest is compelling or not for religious
liberty exemption purposes.
Alan
I think Steve is right that in the there is a difference between challenging
the legitimacy or religiosity of plaintiffs beliefs and holding that as a legal
matter at some point we will draw the line on extending the protection provided
to beliefs that are grounded in complicity with other peopl
completely
clear after Hobby Lobby, how this case should come out?
Alan
Alan Brownstein
Professor of Law
UC Davis School of Law
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Douglas Laycock
Sent: Monday, June 30, 2014 12:29 PM
To: 'Law &
icity with employees' use of
contraception, then it's not obvious to me why the state should afford them an
exemption that will redound to the significant detriment of their employees.
On Sun, Jun 15, 2014 at 5:59 PM, Alan Brownstein
mailto:aebrownst...@ucdavis.edu>> wrote:
One issue
ions of the Justices -- without regard to whether that
imaginary world bears any resemblance to the world in which people actually
live, make business decision, and exercise religion.
Alan Brownstein
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...
@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-
> boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Alan Brownstein
> Sent: Sunday, June 08, 2014 7:37 PM
> To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> Subject: RE: "Divisiveness"
>
> If divisive means that people will be upset by a subst
And, of course, the government could pick up the additional costs to the
insurer. That would spread the costs of protecting religious liberty so that it
would not fall exclusively (and heavily) on the employees of religiously exempt
employers.
Alan
From
the scope of
political decision-making by subjecting it to constitutional constraints
avoided (or at least mitigated) these kinds of political/religious divisions.
There is probably a better term for this concern than divisiveness.
Alan Brownstein
Whoops. My apologies to the list. I intended the prior e-mail to go to Paul
directly, not to the list.
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Alan Brownstein
Sent: Monday, May 12, 2014 9:58 AM
To: Paul Finkelman; Law & Religion is
ingerlands, NY 12159
____
From: Alan Brownstein
mailto:aebrownst...@ucdavis.edu>>
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
mailto:religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu>>
Sent: Monday, May 12, 2014 12:37 PM
Subject: RE: case book needed
It is intended more as
It is intended more as a supplement to a domestic law course rather than the
text for a comparative law course, but Leslie Jacobs and I co-authored Global
Issues in Freedom of Speech and Religion in 2009. About 160 pages are law and
religion materials. West is the publisher.
Alan Brownstein
I think Marty's second point below about the Court's somewhat positive
reception to the least restrictive means argument is important because it
provides a basis for resolving this case in Hobby Lobby's favor that is
relatively limited in its application. Clement argues that this is a unique
ca
My dad had a hardware/housewares store in the Bronx. He was not an observant
Jew. Everyone was closed on Sunday. He was open on Saturday. He told me he did
half of the week's business on Saturday and that it was impossible to be in
business and be closed both days.
Alan
_
Another narrow and limited opinion ruling in favor of Hobby Lobby might
describe this case as a relatively unique controversy in which the religious
claimant is required to supply an intangible, fungible good (insurance
coverage) that can be efficiently supplied by the public sector with minimal
back to these other kinds of claims.
Best,
Chris
____
From: "Alan Brownstein"
To: "Law & Religion issues for Law Academics"
Sent: Tuesday, March 11, 2014 3:47:04 PM
Subject: RE: letter opposing Mississippi RFRA
Well, of course, one o
Well, of course, one of the reasons that RFRA was originally supported by a
broad coalition and RLUIPA received broad support as well was that not everyone
thought that religious accommodations on a case-by-case basis worked reasonably
well. Obtaining accommodations politically case-by-case req
Thanks, Eugene! I think your advice is well taken. I certainly intend to spend
more time breathing deeply over the next few days since I don't think I can
contribute anything thoughtful or useful to the list given the current tenor of
the discussion.
Alan
Fro
Let me try to respond to Chip's post. He asks two basic questions. (1) Why
should we be any more willing to accommodate religious objectors to same-sex
marriage than we are willing to accommodate religious objectors to inter-racial
marriages. (Or more broadly why accommodate discrimination again
Chip,
I think your post about bigotry v. sincere religious beliefs does raise core
issues in a thoughtful way and I intend to respond. But other commitments may
delay my doing so for a while. I don't want you to think that your post doesn't
merit a response - it does - or that other list member
List members who have not had the chance to read Tom and Doug’s brief in
Windsor/Perry should do so. It is a powerful statement in support of same-sex
couples right to marry while urging some accommodation of religious objectors
who consider same-sex marriage to be unacceptable for religious rea
At least under the New Mexico Supreme Court’s analysis in Elane Photography, I
believe the discrimination claim would be rejected.
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Marc Stern
Sent: Wednesday, February 26, 2014 4:20 PM
To: religionl
y fight in the civil rights movement. (Not endorsing these
viewpoints, just observing them)
-Kevin Chen, Esq.
On Feb 26, 2014 1:03 PM, "Alan Brownstein"
mailto:aebrownst...@ucdavis.edu>> wrote:
I have been struck by the intensity of the blowback against both bills, but
particular
I have been struck by the intensity of the blowback against both bills, but
particularly the reaction to the Arizona bill. I think there are several
possible rationales for the power of the reaction.
The breadth of the bill is one factor.
Another factor is that the business community is increas
alid RFRA claim does not require accepting Derek's argument
below.
Alan Brownstein
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Marty Lederman
Sent: Friday, February 21, 2014 3:20 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
S
n employees and employers re: how much cost each can impose on
the other. (Alan, you might prefer the Title VII standard for religious
accommodation to be more generous to employees than "de minimis." But that's
not the law.)
Chip
On Thu, Feb 20, 2014 at 4:26 PM, Alan Brownstei
With regard to Jim's post (and Chip and Bob's piece), I appreciate the argument
that in employment cases RFRA should be interpreted the same way that Title VII
has been interpreted --- essentially denying all RFRA claims that would impose
more than de minimis costs on third parties or the publ
ND's case)
imposes an unnecessary and substantial burden on religious exercise within the
meaning of RFRA (I think the RFRA claims are strong) makes me think that the
following blog post, by our colleague Alan Brownstein, is well worth a read and
reflection:
http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com
I thought there was a great deal of merit in Mark Scarberry's earlier post and
I appreciate the distinctions that Marty draws between lack of sincerity and
lack of depth and substantiality of religious belief. I have three thoughts.
First, since I know very little about Catholic theology or th
I think Marty and I are on the same page with point 4. below. If the ACA as
originally enacted explicitly carved out an exemption for religious employers
so that their employees would not receive an insurance benefit that everyone
else received for free (regardless of what that benefit might be)
While I am sympathetic to several of the arguments raised on Hobby Lobby's (and
Notre Dame's) behalf in these various cases, the argument that people are not
burdened in a legally cognizable way if they lose benefits to which they would
otherwise be entitled is not persuasive to me. As a general
If I remember correctly (and I might not), California has at least a couple of
statutes that require state courts to apply rigorous free speech doctrine in
circumstances where the doctrine would not apply under the Court's decisions.
One law prohibits private colleges (and perhaps high schools)
odations or the unequal treatment of different
faiths. I do not believe that the Constitution requires such a result.
Alan Brownstein
Happy New Year to all. (And if you are going the AALS convention, you might
consider attending the Law and Religion section program on Complicity with Evil
on Saturda
stipulation, Colorado did.
sandy
-Original Message-
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Alan Brownstein
Sent: Thursday, December 19, 2013 12:19 AM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Two kinds of re
ligionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Alan Brownstein
Sent: Wednesday, December 18, 2013 2:18 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Two kinds of religious exemption arguments
Eugene writes,
“Now i
David's correct that there may be a discrepancy here --- and the greater the
discrepancy the greater the cost to government and the public of providing the
accommodation.
I think the discrepancy is likely to be smaller rather than larger in cases
involving government mandates requiring third pa
Eugene writes,
"Now it seems to me -- though of course others disagree -- that the normative
case for a right to impose costs on others through conduct simply because you
think God requires that conduct is not an appealing case. Your God is your
God, not mine; why should I lose s
Rick asks an important question. We can step back from the constraints of the
current litigation and think about how this issue should be resolved on a clean
slate, (This analysis also requires ignoring the polarized and dysfunctional
governments that exist at the national level and in many stat
ry service. But those questions do not undercut the foundation of
his argument.
Alan Brownstein
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Monday, December 16, 2013 12:03 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academi
Wow! Allowing local groups with longstanding ties to the community preferential
access to non-public forums (or denying access or providing less favorable
access to outside groups or local groups without longstanding ties to the
community.) What a great way to mask viewpoint discrimination and n
to:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Alan Brownstein
Sent: Wednesday, December 04, 2013 8:35 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: The clergy-penitent privilege and burdens on third parties
Much of free speech law involves protecting speech that burdens third par
Much of free speech law involves protecting speech that burdens third parties;
for example, the victims of hate speech suffer emotional distress as do the
mourners at funerals tormented by the Westboro Church, and speech that does not
quite violate Brandenburg can incite violence. Further, the c
I wonder if one factor that distinguishes the clergy-penitent privilege from
some other accommodations of religion that go too far and violate the
Establishment Clause is that the burden created by this accommodation will be
shared by persons who are of the same faith as the penitent and the mem
Marty's post focuses the discussion particularly well here. However, if we
construe RFRA to provide that avoiding significant third-party harms is a
compelling state interest, we are still left with the least restrictive means
part of rigorous review. How does the least restrictive means analysi
Micah,
I guess the question for me is whether the fact that the government has not
offered to provide coverage to the employees of exempt organizations constrains
permissive accommodations under a statute like RFRA. If the provision of
coverage to the employees of exempt organizations is a less
Micah, if the issue is diffusing the burden so that it doesn't fall on a
limited class of identifiable individuals, why isn't that problem solved by the
government taking over the task of providing insurance coverage for the
employees of exempt organizations. Isn't the government a sufficiently
Thanks for the kind comment, Nelson. While the contraceptive coverage in this
case may not cost the employer anything, and the Court could limit its holding
in this case to those particular facts, I think there is a somewhat broader,
but still fairly limited, way to conceptualize this case. Here
did not call on courts to “take adequate
account of the burden.”
Eugene
Alan Brownstein writes:
Eugene, are you arguing that an exemption that effectively denies a class of
individuals a government-mandated benefit that there are otherwise entitled to
receive can never violate
A thoughtful response, Nelson and Micah, to an equally thoughtful post, Tom.
So here are my questions, Nelson (and Micah and Marci etc.)
Let's assume the cost of medical contraceptive coverage is $300 per year (a
totally made up number).
1. If a religious employer (individual or corporation)
The answer has to lie somewhere in between these two stark alternatives,
doesn't it? It can't be that the cost to the government (the public) in
mitigating or avoiding the harm caused by granting an exemption can never be
high enough to be compelling. But it also can't (or shouldn't) be that any
I think there is considerable force to Eugene's argument about closely held
corporations (although I'm not sure if the size of the enterprise needs to be
taken into account too -- I'm still thinking about that.) Do I take it from
your argument that you believe a publicly traded corporation would
they go too far.
Alan Brownstein
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Tuesday, November 26, 2013 2:52 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Contraception Mandate
I don’t
ptive coverage toward some
other government identified public good?
I am inclined to agree with Tom that there are important arguments on both
sides of this case.
Alan Brownstein
-Original Message-
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Be
itary interests, but also
because it tells us something about the impact of extending free speech
protection to these individuals' activities.
Alan Brownstein
UC Davis School of Law
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of James Oleske
ubstantial
burden on individuals who for religious reasons do not eat pork -- even though
I could just refuse to use the vouchers.
I'm not sure that my hypo can be reasonably analogized to the ACA, but if it
can, then I think the substantial burden analysis might be different.
this free speech conundrum might be
relevant to the contraceptive mandate cases, but these posts reminded me of the
issue. Any thoughts, James?
Alan Brownstein
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of James Oleske
Sent: Thursday, Ju
Interesting indeed. I've given some thought to the question of whether courts
should distinguish two cases. 1. Speakers target young children with messages
(words or images) arguably relating to matters of public concern that the
speaker understands will cause the child audience significant emot
To follow up on Doug's point, in some cases whether a religious person is
relieved of an obligation because of duress might depend on the kind and
magnitude of the duress. Obligations may be excused if compliance places the
individual's life at risk, for example. Under Marty's analysis, would th
A couple of quick thoughts regarding your points, Chris.
1. If we are talking about existing laws such as RFRA or other laws that
require strict scrutiny review, there may be a dilution problem (although like
you I have seen strict scrutiny diluted in state RFRA cases and in RLUIPA cases
I admire the way that Marc addresses this issue. Very thoughtful post.
There are no easy answers here, as Marc recognizes.
Many religious obligations involve material sacrifices by believers. What
material loss do I incur if the government forces me work on Yom Kippur? It
can't mean that this
I think Marty's point about alternative payments in lieu of purchasing
insurance with the required coverage is an important one. I don't know how this
alternative is structured or characterized in the challenged regulations. But
as an abstract matter when we are talking about regulations that re
Thanks for your post, Marty. Rick, of course, will have to speak for himself.
But I don't believe that the independent choice of parents as to how they will
spend education vouchers should end the Establishment Clause inquiry. And I
also believe that the government's use of taxes to engage in ac
Marci,
Would you object if the government created an exemption package that did three
things.
It exempted the religious employer from a regulation requiring employers to pay
for health insurance that covered blood transfusions.
It provided insurance coverage for employees working for exempt re
Steve's post makes it clear where some of the areas of disagreement are on this
issue.
If I understand his argument correctly, Steve believes there is a difference
between stopping a religious person from doing something his religion requires
him to do and requiring a religious person to do som
s identified is too rigorous and
confining and will not allow the kind of contextual balancing that some cases
deserve. If I had my druthers, I would give up strict scrutiny in return for a
more expansive understanding of what constitutes a substantial burden.
third parties suggests that this is a
problematic construction of Title VII.
Alan Brownstein
-Original Message-
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Michael Masinter
Sent: Wednesday, July 25, 2012 7:40 AM
To: religionlaw@lists.ucl
Chris, I think your answer goes beyond Marty's point. There is a difference
between experiencing regret and being a member of a minority faith. If Jews and
Muslims who circumcise their infant sons make up 2% of the population in a
country, the rest of the population may think this practice is od
I agree with most of what Chip says about hybrid rights and religious
accommodation of rights protected activity. As a general principle, religious
people should not receive preferential accommodations when exercising
fundamental rights such as freedom of speech, or voting, or the right to marry
If we could categorize all state action into these three categories, life would
be a lot easier. But the parameters of case 2 are incredibly unclear as to what
constitutes due care regarding the risk of harm. Say a state enacts a law
prohibiting adults from providing minors alcoholic beverages.
I thought we were long past the argument that the only basis for protecting
religious liberty was that the state had a favorable perspective on the
religious belief and practice at issue -- whether it is saving a child's soul
through baptism or fulfilling the obligation to circumcise an 8 day ol
Fair question, Eugene. I recognize that the state does intervene to protect
children from some parental decisions that cause them physical or psychological
harm or risk causing them physical or psychological harm. But I think the list
of harm causing or potentially harm causing decisions which t
I agree with almost of all of Marty's thoughtful post -- except that I do not
see this as a difficult case. When an attempt was made to place this issue on
the ballot in San Francisco, some people argued medical and health concerns
(although as Marty and Paul point out, the evidence here is inde
I agree with Eugene's concern about discrimination and the concern of other
list members about release time programs that subject non-participants to dead
time at public school. My daughter experienced the latter when she attended
public school in Nova Scotia. There was no release time program o
n
whatever the statute says.
Alan Brownstein
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu]
on behalf of Christopher Lund [l...@wayne.edu]
Sent: Sunday, June 17, 2012 1:36 PM
To: 'Law & Religion issues for Law Academ
Very well stated, Eugene. My compliments.
Alan
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu]
on behalf of Volokh, Eugene [vol...@law.ucla.edu]
Sent: Thursday, June 14, 2012 7:24 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subj
burg exception has been seen as so narrow. Am I mistaken on that?
Eugene
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Alan Brownstein
Sent: Sunday, May 13, 2012 8:40 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subjec
general propriety of
illegal conduct can be criminalized, so long as the illegal conduct would take
place relatively often?
Eugene
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Alan Brownstein
Sent: Sunday, May 13, 2012 4:53 PM
To:
The news story doesn't give us a lot of detail as to exactly what the pastor
said in this case nor does it tell us much about his parishioners. But if the
pastor's instructions to his parishioners are to do something unlawful if a
certain pre-condition is satisfied and the pre-condition is suffi
would prefer to avoid whichever rule we accept.
Alan Brownstein
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Friday, April 20, 2012 1:40 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Mothers leaving ultra-
In my judgment, Balkanization is much more likely to occur when religious
minorities are told that the only way that the can obtain accommodations of
their religious practices is by living in a community in which there are enough
members of their faith to exercise significant political power.
R
Eugene, I'm not sure I understand why the motive or purpose of the actor
controls whether the result of the actor's conduct should be viewed as a burden
on religious liberty or not. I might assign much less weight to the
discriminating actor's interest and consider his conduct more morally
repr
Doug's distinction between exemptions and accommodations is helpful, but the
cause of the problem isn't limited to free exercise cases. If we are talking
about freedom of speech, for example, many people would describe the decision
of a bookstore to reject a request to carry particular books in
itality or kindness
or application of the Golden Rule or some such. But I think that talk of
"liberty" here is not very helpful.
Eugene
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu]
On Behalf Of Alan Brownstein [aebrown
he exclusion and isolation of
religious minorities, we should take accommodation problems seriously --
although that does not mean that the accommodation will always be granted.
Alan Brownstein
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@list
v. Bd. Of
Educ., 334 Or. 487 (2008)
Alan Brownstein
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Douglas Laycock
Sent: Friday, March 02, 2012 11:48 AM
To: 'Law & Religion issues for Law Academics'
Subject: Basketball tour
s share of the premium, which I
don't believe would be compelled by federal law, in any event) at all -- not
worth the dime, so to speak.
On Mon, Feb 13, 2012 at 1:26 PM, Alan Brownstein
mailto:aebrownst...@ucdavis.edu>> wrote:
I have to admit that as long as we are talking about priva
nscription (although it is clearly not a complete quid quo pro.)
If the secular value of the exemption has to be reallocated to other public
goods, that would discourage sham exemptions in many cases.
Alan Brownstein
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.uc
s unworthy of recognition substantially reduces the
state's need to evaluate the importance of its interest and the means it has
chosen to further that interest.
Alan Brownstein
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eug
I can see why the costs to the religious claimant of avoiding the burden on
religious liberty may be relevant to the substantiality of the burden. But I
don't see why the costs to the government or third parties in avoiding the
burden is relevant to the substantiality of the burden. The latter g
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