>
> Eugene
>
>
>
> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
> [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of b...@jmcenter.org
> Sent: Wednesday, July 10, 2013 8:35 PM
> To: Scarberry, Mark; Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> Subject: R
Could the procreation argument carried to the extreme result in a requirement
that the marriage applicants be required to certify under oath that they intend
to have children (biologically) and that to the best of their knowledge they are
capable of having children? And that if either answer is che
Len,
Given the extreme overpopulation of the U.S. and the world, the state does
indeed have a substantial interest -- at least in the number of children parents
produce. (The current population footprint is not environmentally sustainable.)
Bob Ritter
> On July 3, 2013 at 10:17 PM Len wrote:
>
Sandy,
I'm 63 and have an 8 year old daughter, making me 55 when my wife and I had her.
I'm not sure that the state can come to your "rational suggestion."
Bob Ritter
> On July 3, 2013 at 9:49 PM "Levinson, Sanford V"
> wrote:
>
>
> I realize that my following question gets into another hot-
Perhaps the student's right to privacy can be found in the "penumbra" as was
contraception and abortion. And as a separate right from the student's parents.
Students don't leave their rights at the schoolhouse gate (except when the
Supreme Court looks the other way as it did in Morse v. Frederick (
Doug and Chris,
Thank you for the historical perspectives regarding the origin of "substantial
burden." Glad to get to the heart of the pivital issue.
>From the case development, I believe that "unduly burdens" (Yoder) and
"substantial pressure ... burden ... substantial" (Hobbie and Thomas) are
Chris, I respectfully disagree with the ipso facto view that a plaintiff is
substantially burdened when ever compelled to do something their religion
forbids. Burdened yes, substantially burdened maybe. This may sound cold, but
"it's business." I would suggest to people who oppose the mandate to "m
Doug,
Would your view -- expressed in the third paragraph of your post -- be different
if the HHS mandated contraceptive coverage, preventive care, etc. actually saved
the employer money rather than cost the employer money? Would saving money
(i.e., reduced insurance premium) be a substantial burd
Guys, I had to repeat the obvious but mere "burden" is not the legal standard
for a violation of RFRA. "Substantial burden" is. Thus, some burden is
permissible and, quite frankly, we all suffer burdens all day long but as the
saying goes: "There's no use complaining."
Bob Ritter
On September 30,
Alan, can the harm to religious feelings really be measured -- whether its a
commercial employer who has religious scruples about the contraceptive mandate
or someone like myself who (with Mike Newdow) sued the Chief Justice for
inserting "under God" in the presidential oath? I say this in sincerit
The beliefs can be serious and strong. But that alone is not sufficient to make
the burden substantial.
Reminds me of taxpayer standing cases. A federal taxpayer generally doesn't have
standing to challenge appropriations because his or her tax dollars cannot be
specifically traced to the objectio
About 45 years ago I left the Catholic Church and don't keep up with its
teachings. This being said, it is my understanding that the Catholic Church has
not always opposed abortion. If this true, is "long tradition" true?
I also take exception to characterizing the Affordable Care Act and/or the
c
Mark,
Barnette is direct and we can agree that compelled recitation violated
Barnette's Free Exercise of religion (and I hope we could agree that the current
Pledge with "under God" violates the Establishment Clause).
However, I believe that the court was correct in noting that once employment is
Steve -- I agree with what you've said. I would point out that you used the term
"burden," not "substantial burden." My point is that I the contraceptive mandate
burden's an employer's free exercise if they are opposed to the mandate for
religious reasons -- but, importantly, they are not substanti
Howard Friedman has reported on Margaret Smith v. State of Arizona -- a case in
Phoenix, AZ, involving an instructor substituting her theology and that of the
Westminster Fellowship for a study of good and evil of the great philosophers
from Plato to present. The instructor is also using the Christ
Douglas,
I am having difficulty with your first scenario and would appreciate some
clarification please.
Assume for the sake of argument that the pastor's denomination (or the hierarchy
of a hierarchical church) said that the same-sex marriage is consistent with the
teachings of the church and
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33314
> Nova Southeastern University 954.262.6151 (voice)
> masin...@nova.edu954.262.3835 (fax)
>
>
>
> Quoting "b...@jmcenter.org" :
>
> > Marc, you state: "no employer with any choice at all will hire such a
&
Mike,
Why isn't the failure to disclose incapacity to perform essential duties of the
job a form of fraud by the applicant upon the prospective employer (putting
aside the fact that employers aren't allowed to ask the candidate his/her
religion)?
Bob Ritter
On July 26, 2012 at 4:31 PM Michael M
Marc, you state: "no employer with any choice at all will hire such a person"
and call it discrimination. If an applicant cannot fulfill the responsibilities
of the job, the employer shouldn't hire the candidate. That's not
discrimination, rather its sound judgment. I'm sorry if the idiosyncrasies
This is precisely why I have argued on this listserve that "accommodation" of
religion violates the First Amendment (particularly where third parties are
caused to suffer a harm) -- as in situations where it gives a unfair, indeed, an
unreasonable preference to religion.
Also have to wonder wher
I totally agree that moles and foreskins are not like kidneys, lungs or limbs.
I've had three moles removed -- one when I was a child to test if it was
cancerous. And twice adult (to test if it was cancerous and another because it
was a small nuisance). Nature is not perfect. To keep an imperfe
mewhat, and that the Court would probably agree. But has it ever been
> different? =)
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Chris
>
>
>
> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
> [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of b...@jmcenter.org
> Sent: Monday, Ju
fined or prosecuted, I
> assume. So the rationale for exemption, I think, depends heavily on the idea
> that in such cases of mostly expressive harm, the government shouldn’t be
> overriding the religious interest.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Chris
>
>
>
> Fr
accepted), and wouldn’t be particularly helpful as to
> claimed exemptions from common carrier obligations or professional
> regulations.
>
>
>
> Eugene
>
>
>
> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
> [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.
Chris,
While you would be willing to grant a child safety exception to appease Marci, I
presume that in your view (and correct me if I'm wrong) that "burden" type RFRAs
(like the North Dakota proposal) would permit the following examples of
discrimination?
1. A pharmacist refusing to dispense Plan
I think that the divisions caused by religion that Madison foresaw are glowing
or perhaps just louder since the "nones" are growing.
As Marc noted, there is substantial tension between two basic values -- free
exercise of religion and equality -- WHEN religion enters the public sphere. In
our sy
Eugene,
Just to follow up on your point that some discrimination in the name of religion
would possibly be tolerated under Measure 3 such as . . .
1. A pharmacist refusing to dispense Plan B.
2. A taxi cab driver refusing to transport a person with the smell of alcohol on
his breath.
3. A professi
Eric,
Glad to see you focusing on the claims made with respect to Measure 3. I've been
counseling a nontheistic North Dakota group for over a year on Measure 3 and its
predecessor. My primary concern has been the potential use of Measure 3 to
legalize discrimination against atheists, members of mi
Joel, I'm not clear what your point is other than an Orthodox Jew was fired
because he did not follow regulations. The article that you linked states:
"Today there are at least two dozen Orthodox-Jewish police officers working for
the NYPD." However, it doesn't mention whether any of those police o
Catholics have gone from being persecuted in the U.S. (early years of our
nation) to their hey day in the 1950's when the Knights of Columbus pushed
for inserting "under god" * into the Pledge of Allegiance (1954) to being
in today's melting pot (pluralistic society) -- one of many. The Conference
Marty,
I'm very curious about your reference to "analogous secular interests" in
your recent accommodation and pork post. I would appreciate some
elaboration.
#1 - This concept occasionally came up at the American Humanist Association
during the three years that I served as staff attorney. The bi
Rick, Smith did not gut free exercise for any one. Rather, it recognized
that equality, rather than privilege, is the core American value. To
"accommodate" one group (or person) typically results in inconveniencing
others. The proper solution under the First Amendment, it seems to me, is
to schedul
Paul,
How is the enlistment option any different than the AA or church option as an
alternative to jail time? All three have a strong element of coercion and,
consequently, none of three options is truly voluntary.
Bob Ritter
Founder & President
Jefferson Madison Center for Religious Liberty
F
A good article appeared on this subject on Verdict (Justia) two days ago.
See"Can Public School Students Constitutionally Be Punished for Their Off-Campus
Comments on Social-Networking Sites or Blogs?" at
[http://verdict.justia.com/2011/08/17/can-public-school-students-constitutionally-be-punished
Vance,
I'm not sure that I understand your comment on Originalism.
The principle of separation of church and state is a bona fide original intent
view of the Establishment Clause, notwithstanding David Barton's revisonist book
Original Intent: The Courts, the Constitution, & Religion, 3rd., 200
Eugene,
Most interesting and thank you for the reference. Many of the Christian Right
believe that principle of separation of church and state didn't apply to the
states until Everson v. Bd. of Educ. (1947). It's too bad that the Zorach Court
didn't get the memo.
Freedom From Religion Foundati
Eugene,
The validity or ridiculousness of the accomplice theory seems to depend not on
the theory but (1) the claim and (2) the viewer.
Can a cabbie justifiably refuse to take a customer a grocery store where meats
can be purchased (assuming the cabbie has a sincerely held belief that it is
wro
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