On Tue, May 16, 2017 at 9:45 AM, Doug Beattie <[email protected]> wrote:
> Ryan, > > If you look at the wide range of user agents accessing google.com today > you'd see many legacy applications and older versions of browsers and > custom browsers built from variants of the commercial browsers. By the > time all/most users upgraded to new browsers, it would be time to change > the roots out again and this will impact the ability for web site operators > to enable TLS for all visitors. > No, it won't. Perhaps you missed the scenario where the old root (e.g. what these legacy devices use) cross-signs the new root. From the perspective of these old clients, there's always a contiguous path of trust. You can see this, of course, simply by looking at Google.com - which already shows this happening, because GIAG2 is signed by GeoTrust Global CA (a root in new clients), which is signed by Equifax Secure Certificate Authority (a root in older clients) As you can see, this is the most commonly practiced form of deployment. GlobalSign itself regularly does this - old roots sign new roots, new roots are included for new clients, but the path to the old root is continued for ubiquity. This is literally nothing new :) The only thing that changes is that Mozilla could require that, on some cadence (e.g. every 3 years), new roots are rolled. This allows another cadence (e.g. 5 years) of removing the 'old' roots and only keeping the 'new' roots. _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

