That's a _great_ counterfactual suggestion, to imagine science without
language. The way I see it, science consists of transpersonal behaviors.
I know this definition is (almost) peculiar to me. Sorry about that.
But science is unrelated to thought at all.  It's all about methods and
getting other people to do what you do.

And if we can imagine that language is somehow related to grooming, e.g.
the reason humans usually don't lick their fingers and wipe smudges from
each others' faces on a regular basis is because our language has
obviated most of that behavior.  We've replaced grooming with moving our
jaws up and down and emitting complex sequences of grunts.

If we can imagine that, and temporarily accept that science is unrelated
to thought, then perhaps we can imagine a language-less science?  I
suspect it would be similar to the apprenticeship model for education.
It might also be similar to the ritualistic oral traditions of people
like the Celts.

But the problem I'm having imagining it comes down to the definition of
language.  To what extent is abstraction (symbol manipulation) necessary
for us to call something a "language"?  At bottom, I think it boils down
to the ability to _point_ at things, which requires the ability to see,
an appendage with which to point, and the neurological structures to
empathize (put yourself in the pointer's shoes).  This strikes me as the
root of language.  If so, a harder counterfactual is:

Can we imagine science without the ability to point at things?

I think the answer to that is, "No."  But as long as we have that root,
regardless of the structure and dynamic that might grow from that root,
I think the answer is "Yes, science can exist without the implementation
details of what we now call language."


John Kennison wrote at 04/22/2013 06:49 AM:
> My first thought was that we would first need language –without
> language it is hard to imagine what consensus would look like and
> hard to imagine science. How could we say that an experiment
> disproved a hypothesis, or even that one experiment is a repetition
> of another? But without consensus, how do we get language? Maybe
> science and language develop in tandem, --assuming we are programmed
> to believe that gestures and vocal sounds mean something --which can
> be determined through experimentation. This would explain why science
> seems to start with unsophisticated statements such as "Objects tend
> to fall in a downward direction." And why it seems necessary, when
> grappling with new, abstract scientific (and mathematical) ideas to
> reduce them to simpler statements involving ideas we are already
> comfortable with.  And Russ's question might be part of what is
> needed to understand abstract concepts of modern Physics. In 1962 I
> had a grad course in quantum mechanics (given by the Math Dept). It
> started with a discussion of motion in the physical world and a look
> at some of the questions we would ask. But very soon we adopted the
> axiom that the set of all questions was isomorphic to the set of all
> closed subspaces of a Hilbert space. Even the instructor admitted
> that this was a bit hard to swallow, but once we swallowed all would
> eventually become clear. I learned a lot about operators on a Hilbert
> space and even got an A in the course, but I never connected it to
> any ideas I had about the physical world.


-- 
glen e. p. ropella, 971-255-2847, http://tempusdictum.com
There is all the difference in the world between treating people equally
and attempting to make them equal. -- F.A. Hayek


-- 
=><= glen e. p. ropella
The suckers giving up their souls


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