Ha! Nick, you DO understand computer science: Duck Typing has been popular as a way of describing loosely typed dynamic languages. I guess to be fair I'll start calling it Peirce Typing.
-- Owen On Mon, Apr 22, 2013 at 10:41 AM, Nicholas Thompson < nickthomp...@earthlink.net> wrote: > Glen, John, > > A really interesting exchange. It feeds into my conversation with my > Peirce > Mentor about science being at its root experimentation and experimentation > being, at its root, poking the world with a stick. ("It walks like a duck, > it quacks like a duck. Does it squawk like a duck? [poke!] Yes. It's a > duck!") I render this in language, but the whole thing could be done > without language at all, unless one is one of those people who insists that > all thought is in language. > > -----Original Message----- > From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of glen > Sent: Monday, April 22, 2013 9:42 AM > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group > Subject: [FRIAM] science and language (was How do forces work?) > > > That's a _great_ counterfactual suggestion, to imagine science without > language. The way I see it, science consists of transpersonal behaviors. > I know this definition is (almost) peculiar to me. Sorry about that. > But science is unrelated to thought at all. It's all about methods and > getting other people to do what you do. > > And if we can imagine that language is somehow related to grooming, e.g. > the reason humans usually don't lick their fingers and wipe smudges from > each others' faces on a regular basis is because our language has obviated > most of that behavior. We've replaced grooming with moving our jaws up and > down and emitting complex sequences of grunts. > > If we can imagine that, and temporarily accept that science is unrelated to > thought, then perhaps we can imagine a language-less science? I suspect it > would be similar to the apprenticeship model for education. > It might also be similar to the ritualistic oral traditions of people like > the Celts. > > But the problem I'm having imagining it comes down to the definition of > language. To what extent is abstraction (symbol manipulation) necessary > for > us to call something a "language"? At bottom, I think it boils down to the > ability to _point_ at things, which requires the ability to see, an > appendage with which to point, and the neurological structures to empathize > (put yourself in the pointer's shoes). This strikes me as the root of > language. If so, a harder counterfactual is: > > Can we imagine science without the ability to point at things? > > I think the answer to that is, "No." But as long as we have that root, > regardless of the structure and dynamic that might grow from that root, I > think the answer is "Yes, science can exist without the implementation > details of what we now call language." > > > > John Kennison wrote at 04/22/2013 06:49 AM: > > My first thought was that we would first need language -without > > language it is hard to imagine what consensus would look like and hard > > to imagine science. How could we say that an experiment disproved a > > hypothesis, or even that one experiment is a repetition of another? > > But without consensus, how do we get language? Maybe science and > > language develop in tandem, --assuming we are programmed to believe > > that gestures and vocal sounds mean something --which can be > > determined through experimentation. This would explain why science > > seems to start with unsophisticated statements such as "Objects tend > > to fall in a downward direction." And why it seems necessary, when > > grappling with new, abstract scientific (and mathematical) ideas to > > reduce them to simpler statements involving ideas we are already > > comfortable with. And Russ's question might be part of what is needed > > to understand abstract concepts of modern Physics. In 1962 I had a > > grad course in quantum mechanics (given by the Math Dept). It started > > with a discussion of motion in the physical world and a look at some > > of the questions we would ask. But very soon we adopted the axiom that > > the set of all questions was isomorphic to the set of all closed > > subspaces of a Hilbert space. Even the instructor admitted that this > > was a bit hard to swallow, but once we swallowed all would eventually > > become clear. I learned a lot about operators on a Hilbert space and > > even got an A in the course, but I never connected it to any ideas I > > had about the physical world. > > > -- > glen e. p. ropella, 971-255-2847, http://tempusdictum.com There is all the > difference in the world between treating people equally and attempting to > make them equal. -- F.A. Hayek > > > -- > =><= glen e. p. ropella > The suckers giving up their souls > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >
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