Jon,
Yes, all conceptions are general. Conceptions are signs. But that doesn’t mean that their objects are all general. An object is general to the degree that it is itself a conception. The truth of a proposition “essentially depends upon that proposition's not professing to be exactly true,” as Peirce said in Baldwin’s Dictionary. But again, that does not entail that the object of the proposition is general, only that its determination of the sign is incomplete. In these passages you’ve been quoting, Peirce does not say that the object of every sign is “ideal.” You seem to be confusing the necessary generality of the sign with the possible generality of the object. Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] Sent: 24-Jan-17 11:09 To: Gary Fuhrman <g...@gnusystems.ca> Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual Gary F., List: I had in mind Peirce's contention that the absolute individual--something determinate in every conceivable respect--is an ideal limit, rather than a reality. CSP: The logical atom, or term not capable of logical division, must be one of which every predicate may be universally affirmed or denied ... Such a term can be realized neither in thought nor in sense ... A logical atom, then, like a point in space, would involve for its precise determination an endless process. We can only say, in a general way, that a term, however determinate, may be made more determinate still, but not that it can be made absolutely determinate ... as those who have used the word individual have not been aware that absolute individuality is merely ideal, it has come to be used in a more general sense. (CP 3.93; 1870) CSP: The absolute individual can not only not be realized in sense or thought, but cannot exist, properly speaking. For whatever lasts for any time, however short, is capable of logical division, because in that time it will undergo some change in its relations. But what does not exist for any time, however short, does not exist at all. All, therefore, that we perceive or think, or that exists, is general. So far there is truth in the doctrine of scholastic realism. But all that exists is infinitely determinate, and the infinitely determinate is the absolutely individual. This seems paradoxical, but the contradiction is easily resolved. That which exists is the object of a true conception. This conception may be made more determinate than any assignable conception; and therefore it is never so determinate that it is capable of no further determination. (CP 3.93fn, emphasis added; 1870) The first bolded sentence affirms that every object of cognition is general to some degree. As you wrote in chapter 4 of Turning Signs, "All concepts are general – that is, every concept is a sign applicable to many individual instances or members – but some are more general than others" (http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/bdy.htm). If all concepts are general (legisigns/types), then all of their objects must also be general (collectives) in accordance with the rule of determination (EP 2:481; 1908). The second bolded sentence explains in what sense "the totality of all real objects" is singular; it is "infinitely determinate," but this means that any assignable (i.e., actual) conception is always capable of further determination--again, general to some degree. Regards, Jon On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 9:07 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> > wrote: Jon, you’ve acknowledged the point that Gary R. made about your post (below) but I see another problem with it. You wrote, “If all objects of cognition are general, but no generals are real, then we can have no knowledge of anything real.” But Peirce does not say that all objects of cognition are general. All thought is in signs which, if factual, have the structure of a proposition, as he says in “New Elements.” All propositions include predicates which are general, but the objects of those signs (and thus of cognition) are not all general. In fact, as I quoted earlier, Peirce says that “the totality of all real objects” is a singular, not a general (EP2:209, CP 5:152), even though some of them (such as “second intentions”) may be generals. Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com> ] Sent: 23-Jan-17 21:01 To: Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de <mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de> > Cc: kirst...@saunalahti.fi <mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi> ; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual Helmut, List: Peirce had a tendency, especially late in his life, to label any philosophical stance with which he disagreed as "nominalistic." However, my understanding is that the fundamental issue was (and presumably still is) whether there are any real generals--or as Peirce once put it, any real continua. This includes both qualities (1ns) and habits (3ns); i.e., both "may-bes" and "would-bes." Peirce was especially concerned about any approach that would posit something as real yet incognizable, or as inexplicable; he saw both of these moves as blocking the way of inquiry. If all objects of cognition are general, but no generals are real, then we can have no knowledge of anything real. If there are no real laws of nature, then predictable regularities are just brute facts. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
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