Gary F., List: I acknowledge that I may be confused here, but how can a sign that is general have an object that is *not *general? My understanding is that all concepts are legisigns/types, which requires that all of their objects are collectives. Are you suggesting that some concepts are qualisigns/marks or sinsigns/tokens? According to Peirce, the Universe of Necessitants "includes whatever we can know by logically valid reasoning" (EP 2:479; 1908). I take this as encompassing all real objects of concepts, since Peirce held that there is nothing real that we cannot (in principle) come to know. Aaron Bruce Wilson makes a similar point in his recent book, *Peirce's Empiricism: Its Roots and Its Originality*.
ABW: ... if knowledge of reality is possible, then there must be real generals. [Peirce] argues: "[S]ince no cognition of ours is absolutely determinate, generals must have a real existence" (5.312/W2:239). By "no cognition of ours is absolutely determinate" I take him to mean that no *object of cognition* is absolutely determinate ... Peirce argues that we can cognize or represent only things possessing some indeterminate qualities because if one were to cognize something determinate in *every* respect, one would "have the material in each such representation for an infinite amount of conscious cognition, which we yet never become aware of" (5.305/W2:236). For any given property, it seems that there is always some further property that is a further determination of it ... At some point, our minds simply fail to be powerful enough to represent any further determination, and must leave some property indeterminate ... either the properties of objects that we actually perceive are *not* real--and we have no empirical knowledge of reality--or they are *real indeterminate properties* or qualities and, thus, real generals. (pp. 63-64) Regards, Jon On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 10:55 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > Jon, > > > > Yes, all *conceptions* are general. Conceptions are signs. But that > doesn’t mean that their *objects* are all general. An object is general > to the degree that it is itself a conception. The truth of a proposition > “essentially depends upon that proposition's not professing to be exactly > true,” as Peirce said in *Baldwin’s Dictionary*. But again, that does not > entail that the *object* of the proposition is general, only that its > determination of the sign is incomplete. In these passages you’ve been > quoting, Peirce does not say that the *object* of every sign is “ideal.” > You seem to be confusing the necessary generality of the sign with the > *possible* generality of the object. > > > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] > *Sent:* 24-Jan-17 11:09 > *To:* Gary Fuhrman <g...@gnusystems.ca> > *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and > Particular//Singular/Individual > > > > Gary F., List: > > > > I had in mind Peirce's contention that the *absolute *individual--something > determinate in *every *conceivable respect--is an ideal limit, rather > than a reality. > > > > CSP: The logical atom, or term not capable of logical division, must be > one of which every predicate may be universally affirmed or denied ... Such > a term can be realized neither in thought nor in sense ... A logical atom, > then, like a point in space, would involve for its precise determination an > endless process. We can only say, in a general way, that a term, however > determinate, may be made more determinate still, but not that it can be > made absolutely determinate ... as those who have used the word *individual > *have not been aware that absolute individuality is merely ideal, it has > come to be used in a more general sense. (CP 3.93; 1870) > > > > CSP: The absolute individual can not only not be realized in sense or > thought, but cannot exist, properly speaking. For whatever lasts for any > time, however short, is capable of logical division, because in that time > it will undergo some change in its relations. But what does not exist for > any time, however short, does not exist at all. *All, therefore, that we > perceive or think, or that exists, is general.* So far there is truth in > the doctrine of scholastic realism. *But all that exists is infinitely > determinate, and the infinitely determinate is the absolutely individual.* > This seems paradoxical, but the contradiction is easily resolved. That > which exists is the object of a true conception. This conception may be > made more determinate than any assignable conception; and therefore it is > never so determinate that it is capable of no further determination. (CP > 3.93fn, emphasis added; 1870) > > > > The first bolded sentence affirms that every object of cognition is > general to *some *degree. As you wrote in chapter 4 of *Turning Signs*, > "All concepts are general – that is, every concept is a sign applicable to > many individual instances or members – but some are more general than > others" (http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/bdy.htm). If all concepts are > general (legisigns/types), then all of their objects must also be general > (collectives) in accordance with the rule of determination (EP 2:481; > 1908). The second bolded sentence explains in what sense "the totality of > all real objects" is singular; it is "infinitely determinate," but this > means that any assignable (i.e., actual) conception is always capable of > further determination--again, general to *some *degree. > > > > Regards, > > > > Jon > > > > On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 9:07 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > > Jon, you’ve acknowledged the point that Gary R. made about your post > (below) but I see another problem with it. You wrote, “If all objects of > cognition are general, but no generals are real, then we can have no > knowledge of anything real.” But Peirce does not say that all objects of > cognition are general. All thought is in signs which, if factual, have the > structure of a proposition, as he says in “New Elements.” All propositions > include *predicates* which are general, but the *objects* of those signs > (and thus of cognition) are not all general. In fact, as I quoted earlier, > Peirce says that “the totality of all real objects” is a singular, not a > general (EP2:209, CP 5:152), even though some of them (such as “second > intentions”) may be generals. > > > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] > *Sent:* 23-Jan-17 21:01 > *To:* Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> > *Cc:* kirst...@saunalahti.fi; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and > Particular//Singular/Individual > > > > Helmut, List: > > > > Peirce had a tendency, especially late in his life, to label any > philosophical stance with which he disagreed as "nominalistic." However, > my understanding is that the fundamental issue was (and presumably still > is) whether there are any real generals--or as Peirce once put it, any real > continua. This includes both qualities (1ns) and habits (3ns); i.e., both > "may-bes" and "would-bes." Peirce was especially concerned about any > approach that would posit something as real yet incognizable, or as > inexplicable; he saw both of these moves as blocking the way of inquiry. > If all objects of cognition are general, but no generals are real, then we > can have no knowledge of anything real. If there are no real laws of > nature, then predictable regularities are just brute facts. > > > > Regards, > > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > >
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