Edwina, Jon S, List, Edwina wrote:
But what about: ."the interpretant of a proposition is its predicate" 5.474. This moves the laws, so to speak, which I have located in the Representamen - to the Interpretant! So- I have no idea...for I tend to see the Interpretant as a result of the actions of the Laws. But as Jay Zeman comments in "Peirce's Theory of Signs," http://users.clas.ufl.edu/jzeman/peirces_theory_of_signs.htm it is important to remember that the interpretant is itself a sign. Zeman quotes Peirce (here considering only human semiosis), then comments: "A sign," Peirce tells us, . . . is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, *creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign*. *That sign which it creates *I call the *interpretant* of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its *object* (2.228 emphasis added by GR). Peirce here is discussing the sign as it participates in semiosis, the sign relation. There are a number of ways of subdividing the matter of Peirce’s semiotic; one of them is based on the fact that we may identify three *relata* in the semiosical relation as understood by Peirce: these are the sign itself, and the above-mentioned object and interpretant. *The interpretant itself is a sign *(2.228) which Peirce calls the "proper significate effect" of the original sign (5.475, emphasis added GR) And later in the paper he comments: A major thrust of Peirce’s speculative grammar is a detailed and complex classification of signs. In a definite sense, even the most basic part of speculative grammar, the description of the semiosical relation itself, is a classification of signs. *The interpretant is a sign (2. 228), and the object is, at least often, a sign. So the description of semiosis gives us a triple viewpoint from which to observe signs in action: signs functioning as signs properly so called, signs as objects of semiosis, and signs as effects of semiosis (interpretants) *(emphasis added, GR)*.* The above makes me once again question whether there are in semiosis three relations rather than one triadic relation, and that the analysis into three relations is, at best, essentially analytic. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Wed, Apr 12, 2017 at 2:19 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > see my comments > > -- > This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's > largest alternative telecommunications provider. > > http://www.primus.ca > > On Wed 12/04/17 1:59 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: > > Edwina, List: > > 1) ET: BUT - to be clear, I still see this internal triad as ONE SET of > three irreducible Relations. I suspect that you don't see this internal > triad as made up of Relations, while I still see it that way - although the > bond is so tight that none of the three can be seen as 'individual > relations'; i.e., not as THREE Relations. > > > Peirce ultimately did not distinguish between the Immediate > Object/Interpretant and their relations to the Representamen when making > the longer lists of trichotomies for Sign classification, and we now agree > that the three of them together (as a triad) constitute the Sign. As such, > I am inclined to think of them as more analytic than actual; specifically, > as constraints on how the Sign can represent its Dynamic Object and > determine a Dynamic Interpretant. > > EDWINA: Agreed - more analytic than actual. And agreed, acting as > constraints on HOW the Sign [that internal triad] represents the DO and > determines the DI. But, as constraints - isn't there an aspect of ACTUAL > force/behaviour - within the constraint? > > 2) ET: As to your last question - I think I see what you are talking > about - but, I think the term 'relation' needs more unpacking. > > > Probably so. Peirce seems to have used "relation" as a close synonym of > "predicate," but I would welcome further suggestions for what it means to > say that a law of nature is a relation and/or that a relation is a Sign. > > EDWINA: A law is a habit; i.e., operative in Thirdness. I can see this as > a predicate, for 'a proposition can have any number of subjects but can > have but one predicate which is invariably general" 5.151..But what about: > ."the interpretant of a proposition is its predicate" 5.474. This moves the > laws, so to speak, which I have located in the Representamen - to the > Interpretant! So- I have no idea...for I tend to see the Interpretant as a > result of the actions of the Laws. > > > > > Thanks, > > Jon S. > > On Wed, Apr 12, 2017 at 11:32 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> Jon, list >> >> 1) The Representamen does carry the general habits; that is, where are >> these generals located in a 'thing'? I'll take the example of a cell; its >> habits, which function to mould its material content and its interactions >> with other cells - are, as I understand it, operative within Thirdness and >> carried within the Representamen. >> >> So- I see this action as a Relation . But -agreed, we'll leave it for now. >> >> 2) I agree with your second paragraph. - just a few quibbles.. >> >> JON> "My understanding of our recent agreement on terminology was that >> going forward, we would always use "Sign" to refer to the (internal) triad >> of Immediate Object, Representamen, and Immediate Interpretant; and we >> would always characterize a Sign in this sense as the first correlate of a >> triadic >> relation in which the Dynamic Object and Dynamic Intepretant are the >> other two (external) correlates, such that every Sign must be determined >> by a Dynamic Object, and every Sign is capable of determining a Dynamic >> Interpretant (but might never actually do so). Are we still on the same >> page here?" >> >> EDWINA: BUT - to be clear, I still see this internal triad as ONE SET of >> three irreducible Relations. I suspect that you don't see this internal >> triad as made up of Relations, while I still see it that way - although the >> bond is so tight that none of the three can be seen as 'individual >> relations'; i.e., not as THREE Relations. I agree with its being the first >> correlate of a larger triadic Set, made up of the other two external >> correlates in addition to this basic Internal triad. These two external >> correlates are not bonded within the triad, as the interactions are within >> the Internal Triad. That leaves them open. I agree with the necessary >> determination of the DO, and the Sign [that internal triad] being capable >> of determining a DI - but not necessarily doing so. >> >> So- most of your outline I agree with; I'm just still having trouble with >> that Internal Triad - which although I agree is ONE set - and probably >> operates within ONE modal category - I still want to be able to >> differentiate each 'node' so to speak - even though none of the three >> 'nodes' [ Immediate Object-Representamen-Immediate Interpretant] can have >> any actuality except within that internal bond. >> >> 3) As to your last question - I think I see what you are talking about - >> but, I think the term 'relation' needs more unpacking. >> >> Edwina >> >> -- >> This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's >> largest alternative telecommunications provider. >> >> http://www.primus.ca >> >> On Wed 12/04/17 12:12 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com >> sent: >> >> Edwina, List: >> >> I remain uncomfortable with calling the Representamen a "relation" and >> associating it with habits, but we can set that aside for now. >> >> My understanding of our recent agreement on terminology was that going >> forward, we would always use "Sign" to refer to the (internal) triad of >> Immediate Object, Representamen, and Immediate Interpretant; and we would >> always characterize a Sign in this sense as the first correlate of a triadic >> relation in which the Dynamic Object and Dynamic Intepretant are the >> other two (external) correlates, such that every Sign must be determined >> by a Dynamic Object, and every Sign is capable of determining a Dynamic >> Interpretant (but might never actually do so). Are we still on the same >> page here? >> >> My question comes up because we (or at least I) typically think of a Sign >> from a logical standpoint as a subject, rather than a relation. Every >> Sign has relations, of course, both internal (Oi-R-Ii) and external >> (Od-S-Id). We also sometimes talk about "the Sign relation," usually >> meaning the triadic relation of which the Sign, Dynamic Object, and Dynamic >> Interpretant are the three correlates. What I am asking now is whether >> there is such a thing as a Sign that is itself a relation. >> >> Thanks, >> >> Jon S. >> >> On Wed, Apr 12, 2017 at 9:56 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >> wrote: >> >>> Jon - This is part of an argument we've had before. It depends on the >>> terminology. >>> >>> For you, the term sign refers to what I term the Representamen, which I >>> consider the Relation of Mediation - and, which holds the habits developed >>> within Thirdness [it can, of course, be in a mode of Firstness or >>> Secondness]. >>> >>> I consider the triad, Sign [capital S] - to be the triad of >>> Object-Representamen-Interpretant - and acknowledge that the Object can >>> be the Immediate Object and the Interpretant can be potential. But, it >>> remains a triad. >>> >>> And - what does the term relation mean? >>> >>> So- "can a relation be a Sign'? It depends what you mean by each term. >>> >>> For me - the interactions, i.e., relations, are vital within the >>> semiosic process [which I see as an active process anyway]. I consider that >>> there are three key relations within the triad; that between the R-O; >>> between the R-I, and the Representamen in itself. The Representamen >>> -in-itself is, in my view, a Relation, seeking out its habits of >>> organization and linking them to the object and transforming them into the >>> interpretant. >>> >>> So- at first thought, I'd say that A single relation can't be a Sign, >>> since the Sign requires a networked set of triadic Relations. >>> >>> But - is a law of Nature a Relation I'd say, yes, since the Law of >>> Nature operates as the Representamen, in a mode of Thirdness. >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>> -- >>> This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's >>> largest alternative telecommunications provider. >>> >>> http://www.primus.ca >>> >>> On Wed 12/04/17 10:14 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com >>> sent: >>> >>> List: >>> >>> I was finally able to borrow Aaron Bruce Wilson's new book, Peirce's >>> Empiricism: Its Roots and Its Originality, via interlibrary loan this >>> week. Previously I could only access the Google preview, but from that I >>> could tell that the whole thing would be well worth reading. He points out >>> in chapter 2 that a law of nature is a relation, which leads me to pose >>> a new question--can a relation be a Sign? Again, I am referring to the >>> relation itself, not its representation in verbal, diagrammatic, or >>> other form. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>> >>> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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