Jeff, list
A very interesting post - I have time now for only a few perhaps
sidelining comments.
1] I'm pleased that you refer to both the representamen and the
relation between it and the DO, and between it and the interpretants.
Peirce himself uses the term of 'relation' [see 8.335, 337] - and I
use the term though I've often been chastised on this list for so
doing, as I've been told that there is ''no such thing and the
correct term is 'correlate'. A relation, to me, is the correct term,
as it suggests a deeper interaction than a mere correlate.
2] I obviously agree with the suggestion that the definition of a
Sign can't be restricted to only those that include a Representamen
as a Legisign. The power of semiosis as an adaptive and evolutionary
pragmatic function is that it operates when a system is developing
generals [before they are even functioning as such] and operates when
a system is entropically changing its nature [outside of the
constraints of generals].
3] Accidents or freedom or deviations-from-the-norm are, I think,
vital in a complex adaptive system [CAS]- and, my view is that
semiosis is an integral agent in a CAS.
Edwina
On Thu 09/08/18 12:38 PM , Jeffrey Brian Downard
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu sent:
Jon S, Gary R, Gary F, List,
It appears that I may be missing something when it comes to
understanding the suggestion Jon S is making with respect to
interpreting the claim that "a sign is not a real thing" (EP 2:303;
1904). As such, let me raise some straightforward questions about the
thesis that Peirce revised his definition of the sign in the hopes of
getting clearer about the suggestion. For the sake of generalizing the
point, let's state it in the following way: "all signs have the
character of a general rule, and only things that have the character
of a general rule are signs."
1. Is the interpretative hypothesis being restricted only to the
classification of signs based on the manner of the apprehension of
the sign itself? That is, does it apply only to representamens that
are apprehended as general types?
2. Or, should one go further and say that the interpretative
hypothesis applies to other ways of classifying signs, including:
(a) the nature of the dynamical object,
(b) the nature of the dynamical interpretant,
(c) the relation that holds between the representamen and the
dynamical object,
(d) the relation that holds between the representamen and the final
interpretant.
If the interpretative hypothesis is applied across the board to the
10 respects in which signs are being classified in the mature theory
(circa the later letters to Lady Welby), then it would appear that
there is really only one class of signs, all of which have the
following character: copulative, relative, collective, type, usual,
indicative, logical, symbolic, argument, form. This is at odds with
Peirce's general approach in his later writings in semiotics, which
is to provide a classification of 66 different natural classes of
signs.
If the interpretative hypothesis is restricted in some way, such as
to the manner in which the representamen is apprehended and to the
relation that holds between the representamen and the dynamical
object, then all signs are symbolic types, but (admittedly) there
would be several classes of such signs. I don't see a reason to
restrict the application of the interpretative hypothesis to these
two respects without making it seem like an arbitrary restriction.
What is more, the number of different classes of signs--while larger
than one--still seems unduly restricted as an interpretation of
Peirce's late writings in semiotics.
Having raised these questions about the apparent lack of fit between
the interpretative hypothesis and the character of Peirce's mature
classification of 66 different classes of signs, let me make a quick
reply to the general suggestion that only representamens that are
symbolic are really signs, because all signs must be related to their
dynamical objects via some general rule that governs the relation.
Consider cases involving what might be called an "accidental index."
Here is one that I have fabricated. Suppose a person is walking down
the sidewalk and a bird dropping lands on his right shoulder. As he
stops to see what has happened, he notices a bicyclist veering out
of control and he sees that the bicyclist has just missed him--and
only because he had stopped to take a look. To the extent that the
bird's dropping did draw his attention to his good fortune in
stopping just in time to be missed by the bike, is it an accidental
indexical sign?
Let's take the example a step further and suppose that the fortunate
event had such an impact on this fellow that in future instances when
a bird dropping landed on his shoulder, he would stop and look for
bicyclists--even if only to chuckle for a moment in memory of his
past good luck. Is the bird dropping now something of an indexical
legisign (a general type of sign) for this fellow, even if it is an
erroneous sign in some respects?
I raise this somewhat fanciful example because Peirce clearly holds
that most of the relations that hold between the facts in this world
are, to some degree, accidental in character. This is true even if
there is much that is governed by general laws. As such, I'm
wondering about the role of accidents in the semiotic
theory--especially when it comes to noticing surprising phenomena
that are more accidental in character.
Yours,
Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
-------------------------
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: Wednesday, August 8, 2018 6:08 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing Gary R.,
List:
GR: ... imagining that the word 'the' was once first spoken (or
written, but more likely I think, spoken), what was the type that that
first spoken "the" was token of, where does one locate its reality?
Where does one "locate" the Reality of any general Type? Every
Instance of the word "the"--first, last, and each one in between--is
a Replica of the same Sign. The Type is not dependent on its
Tokens--past, present, or future--any more than the hardness of a
diamond is dependent on its ever actually being scratched. Such is
the nature of a Real "would-be."
GR: Yes, symbols grow, but what is the soil upon which they are
rooted?
What does it mean in this context to say that "symbols grow"? In
order for them to get "larger," we must have a way to "measure" their
size. Conveniently, Peirce provided one with the concept of
Information as "area"--the product of a Sign's Logical Breadth and
Depth. I am reminded again of Eco's comment that I quoted last
week--"from interpretant to interpretant, the sign is more and more
determined both in its breadth and in its depth." In other words,
although every Sign (as a general) is indeterminate to some degree,
it can "grow"--i.e., approach (however distantly) the ideal state of
Substantial Information--by becoming more determinate.
CSP: If we are to explain the universe, we must assume that there
was in the beginning a state of things in which there was nothing ...
Not determinately nothing ... Utter indetermination. But a symbol
alone is indeterminate. Therefore, Nothing, the indeterminate of the
absolute beginning, is a symbol. That is the way in which the
beginning of things can alone be understood. What logically follows?
... A symbol is essentially a purpose, that is to say, is a
representation that seeks to make itself definite, or seeks to
produce an interpretant more definite than itself ...
... the interpretant aims at the object more than at the original
replica and may be truer and fuller than the latter. The very
entelechy of being lies in being representable ... A symbol is an
embryonic reality endowed with power of growth into the very truth,
the very entelechy of reality. (EP 2:322-324; 1904)
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer,
Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Wed, Aug 8, 2018 at 3:32 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
Jon AS, Gary f,
Jon wrote:
JAS: I am currently adopting the specific point of view that all
Signs are Types and seeing how far I can get with that interpretative
hypothesis.
I am tending to find myself more and more disposed toward your line
of thinking, Jon, especially as articulated in your last several
posts.
However, some questions remain for me. For example, imagining that
the word 'the' was once first spoken (or written, but more likely I
think, spoken), what was the type that that first spoken "the" was
token of, where does one locate its reality?
Despite this and a few other reservations which I'll comment on
below, I found your argument refuting Gary f's examples of what he
saw as signs which were not types rather convincing. As you
summarized your position near the end of your post:
JS: No one ever actually speaks, writes, hears, reads, or thinks a
word (the Sign itself); we only actually speak, write, hear, read,
and think Instances thereof. . . . when we do [such things], we
usually say that we speak, write, hear, read, or think the word/Sign
(not the Instance). This is the problematic inconsistency, in my
view--not so much a criticism of Peirce as of our everyday colloquial
usage of such terminology. I am basically advocating greater
precision in logical/semeiotic inquiry by carefully distinguishing
(individual) Instances of Signs from (general) Signs themselves
(emphasis added).
This may be leaping a bit ahead, but the thought occurred to me
that if all Signs are legislative types which are expressed (i.e.,
find their being) as existential tokens (with attached qualitative
tones), and if "The entire universe is perfused, if it is not
composed exclusively of signs" ("The Basis of Pragmaticism,"
footnote, CP 5.448, 1906), then the deepest and, as it were, most
necessary Reality being, shall we say, universal legislative types
(3ns), this Reality would seem to find its being in that Mind which
underlies existential reality, manifests.
As I noted, however, some questions remain for me regarding this
view, perhaps the most important relating to the nature and purpose
of semiotic evolution. Yes, symbols grow, but what is the soil upon
which they are rooted?
Symbols grow. They come into being by development out of other
signs, particularly from likenesses or from mixed signs partaking of
the nature of likenesses and symbols. . . . So it is only out of
symbols that a new symbol can grow. Omne symbolum de symbolo (What Is
a Sign?, 1894)
This quotation now strikes me as perhaps more akin to Hegelian
dialectical "evolution", than to Peirce's involution where indices
and indexes are always-already involved in symbols. But on the other
hand, Peirce wrote that, for example, biological evolution begins
with "sporting" with 1ns (see, "A Guess at the Riddle." Admittedly
both this and "What Is a Sign?" were written earlier than the late
semeiotic material we've been reflecting on. Anyhow, this is just to
point to the kinds of questions that have been coming to mind in
light of your "interpretive hypothesis" that all signs are types.
Enough for now. Suffice it to say that I am finding this a most
interesting and valuable inquiry.
Best,
Gary R
PS You were correct about the two proof-reading errors you found in
my post of yesterday. I hurriedly threw it together just before a
medical appointment with scarcely time to read it over once.
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia
College of the City University of New York 718 482-5690
Links:
------
[1]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'gary.richm...@gmail.com\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
