Edwina, List: Any word with "act" as its root implies *actuality*, which is 2ns.
CSP: Let us begin with considering actuality, and try to make out just what it consists in. If I ask you what the actuality of an event consists in, you will tell me that it consists in its happening *then* and *there*. The specifications *then* and *there* involve all its relations to other existents. The actuality of the event seems to lie in its relations to the universe of existents ... We have a two-sided consciousness of effort and resistance, which seems to me to come tolerably near to a pure sense of actuality. On the whole, I think we have here a mode of being of one thing which consists in how a second object is. I call that Secondness. (CP 1.24; 1903) CSP: That conception of Aristotle which is embodied for us in the cognate origin of the terms *actuality *and *activity* is one of the most deeply illuminating products of Greek thinking. Activity implies a generalization of *effort*; and effort is a two-sided idea, effort and resistance being inseparable, and therefore the idea of Actuality has also a dyadic form. (CP 4.542; 1906) CSP: The second Universe is that of the Brute Actuality of things and facts. I am confident that their Being consists in reactions against Brute forces ... (CP 6.455, EP 2:435; 1908) CSP: Another Universe is that of, first, Objects whose Being consists in their Brute reactions, and of, second, the facts (reactions, events, qualities, etc.) concerning those Objects, all of which facts, in the last analysis, consist in their reactions. I call the Objects, Things, or more unambiguously, *Existents*, and the facts about them I call *Facts*. (EP 2:479; 1908) *Only *Existents (2ns)--including Tokens--act, react, or interact; and they do so *only *on/with other Existents. For Peirce, this was literally the *defining attribute *of existence. CSP: The modern philosophers ... recognize but one mode of being, the being of an individual thing or fact, the being which consists in the object’s crowding out a place for itself in the universe, so to speak, and reacting by brute force of fact, against all other things. I call that Existence. (CP 1.21; 1903) CSP: The *existent *is that which reacts against other things. (CP 8.191; c. 1904) CSP: Whatever exists, *ex-sists*, that is, really acts upon other existents, so obtains a self-identity, and is definitely individual. (CP 5.429, EP 2:342; 1905) CSP: ... I myself always use *exist *in its strict philosophical sense of "react with the other like things in the environment." (CP 6.495; c. 1906) >From such a standpoint, strictly speaking, Possibles (1ns) and Necessitants (3ns)--including Tones and Types, respectively--*do not* act, react, or interact on/with *anything*. That is why any *Dynamic *Interpretant (Experiential Information)--an *actual *feeling, effort, or further Sign-Replica--is always the result of a "then-and-there" Instance of the Sign (Token), while the *Final *Interpretant (Substantial Information) pertains to the non-temporal/non-spatial Sign itself (Type), and the *Immediate *Interpretant (Essential Information) pertains to the qualities/characters of its expression within a given system of Signs (Tone). Consequently, I do not see how anything except Tokens could "interact informationally" or engage in "informational action." Regards, Jon S. On Thu, Aug 9, 2018 at 8:26 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > JAS, list > > I wasn't referring at all to the difference between reality and existence > - and as I said in my post, I was indeed talking about Thirdness as > mediation in a Legisign role. Obviously, then, I agree that the > Representamen in a mode of Thirdness within the triadic semiosic process > does not 'exist but governs existents'....So- I'm unsure of the reason for > your comment. > > With reference to your problem with my use of the word 'interaction', > which you confine to a mode of Secondness - I guess we'll just have to each > agree to differ in our use of the word. I don't agree that it implies that > the "Type exists apart from its Tokens'. My view is that both are > informationally functional and interact informationally - and this doesn't > imply a separate individual existence for each. Informational action > between information encoded as a general and information encoded as a > particular is, in my view, quite possible. > > Edwina > > On Thu 09/08/18 9:11 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: > > Edwina, List: > > I suppose we can say that a Type depends on its Tokens for its existence, > but certainly not for its Reality, because the mode of Being of a Type is > not reaction (2ns) but mediation (3ns). Consequently, I still think we > should avoid saying that a Type "interacts" with its Tokens, because this > implies that the Type exists apart from its Tokens, such that it can react > with them. As the quote below from Peirce states, a Type "does not exist > but governs existents" (CP 8.313; 1905, emphasis added); the Sign's > unchanging ideal Final Interpretant logically/semiotically determines > (constrains) its various actual Dynamic Interpretants, not the other way > around. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Wed, Aug 8, 2018 at 8:39 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> Gary R, JAS, list >> >> 1] I question the claim that "The Type is not dependent on its >> Tokens--past, present, or future--any more than the hardness of a diamond >> is dependent on its ever actually being scratched. Such is the nature >> of a Real "would-be." >> >> My view is that the Type - which I understand as a general, as laws, is >> most certainly dependent on being articulated as a Token, for generals do >> not exist except as articulated within/as the particular. And it is the >> experiences of the particular instantiation that can affect the Types and >> enable adaptation and evolution of the general/laws.since, as we know, >> growth and increasing complexity is 'the rule' [can't remember section..] >> >> "I do not mean any existing individual object, but a type, a general, >> which does not exist but governs existents, to which individuals conform" >> 8.313. >> >> That is - I think the relation between the law/general and the >> instantiation is intimate and interactive [there's that terrible word >> again!]. >> >> 2] Symbols grow' - which to me, means that they become more complex in >> their laws and their networked connections with other Signs. But I will >> also suggest that symbols must have the capacity to implode as well! >> >> Edwina >> >
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