John, During your repeated debates with Jon an experience I had as a freshman philosophy kept knocking at my doors of perception. It was the first meeting in which each of the students had to read a passage of Hegels logic. I was the first to read and started with the first alinea in which logic is defined as being concerned with the idea in the formal element. Just having had my first course in logic, I relied on what I learned and started talking about that, i.e. as logic trying to lay down the rules of formal thought, the formal element. And met with serious opposition from the teachers present. I recall that it took them some time to get me to realize that the emphazis is on "'idea' in the formal element" and not on the formal element severed from any actuality. It is a line of thought I can see leading to what Jon wrote.
Jon A. wrote: In this particular case, my purpose is the same as Peirce's--analyzing reasoning into its most fundamental and irreducible elements. Even more specifically, I am currently exploring intuitionistic/constructive/synechistic logic using EGs, consistent with Peirce's own skepticism of excluded middle. John can speak for himself, but it is clear by now that he does not share these same objectives. -- Logical positivism could restrict itself to logic regarded sub species eternitate (Tractatus), we know for certain that Peirce was not of like opinion. His view on logic is multi-facetted. He is not just concerned with, I cite: John wrote: For mathematicians and logicians, clarity and precision are essential. The formal structure is everything, and the words are of minor interest. The fewer, the better. -- For him, as far as I understood his thought, the formal structure is not everything. It only is "the formal structure as it operates in a living intelligence". It did not prevent him from focussing exclusively on the formal structure, as his formal work shows. But he was aware of the limitations. You seem to be less so. It is in this light that I find the negation - ilation debate of interest. Kant gives the erroneous view that ideas are presented separated and then thought together by the mind. This is his doctrine that a mental synthesis precedes every analysis. What really happens is that something is presented which in itself has no parts, but which nevertheless is analyzed by the mind, that is to say, its having parts consists in this that the mind afterward recognizes those parts in it. Those partial ideas are really not in the 1rst idea, in itself, though they are separated out from it. It is a case of destructive distillation. CP 1.384 I think that this quote backs up Jon's approach from a systematic perspective. Systematic here to be taken in the philosophical sense, not the logical. Best, Auke > Op 29 januari 2021 om 5:51 schreef "John F. Sowa" <s...@bestweb.net>: > > Auke> I was thinking in terms of goals, i.e. what is the object you > try to understand, not credentials. I can connect Jon's answer to my > question with his line of reasoning and I did like that. There might > be differences in the goals and then it is always better to asses and > value the differences, instead of fighting about who is right. > > I have been doing research and teaching in logic, computer science, > computational linguistics, and artificial intelligence for many > years. In 1976, I had published an article on Conceptual Graphs in > the IBM Journal of Research and Development. > > Then in 1978, I came across Don Roberts' book on EGs, and it was > exactly what I was looking for. Peirce's EGs were far more elegant > and powerful than the AI research in the 1970s. (including my own). > I immediatetly adopted it as the foundation for the book I published > in 1984. I continued reading Peirce's other writings and various > publications about Peirce since then. > > Then in 2001, I came across Michel Balat's transcription of a first > draft of L231 (mistakenly classified as R514). I realized that it > was an excellent introduction to EGs, and I posted a copy with > commentary on my web site: http://jfsowa.com/peirce/ms514.htm . > > I also realized that this version was far superior to Peirce's > earlier versions. In particular, I used it to solve a previously > unsolved research problem from 1988. I published the solution in > Semiotca in 2011: http://jfsowa.com/pubs/egtut.pdf . > > In April 2015, I presented a lecture on related issues at a Peirce > Session at the APA conference in Vancouver. In December of 2015, I > presented an extended version at a workshop that Zalamea sponsored in > Bogota. And in 2018, I publishted a 76-page version that spelled out > all the details. > > The following slides are minor revisions of the 2015 version: > http://jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf . Slide 2 has a link to the 2018 > publication in the Journal of Applied Logics. > > The workshop in Bogota included leading experts in existential > graphs. Nobody raised any objection or even any comment about my > use of the 1911 version of EGs. For mathematicians and logicians, > clarity and precision are essential. The formal structure is > everything, and the words are of minor interest. The fewer, the > better. > > As for Jon's comments about earlier versions, any quotations prior > to June 1911 are irrelevant. But I found Jon's comments useful for > pointing out issues that I decided to restate more clearly. > > John >
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