Re: Auguson Farms emergency food supplies at walmart
On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 12:34 PM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi In preparation for the coming weimar-type economy collapse, where a loaf of bread will cost you $100 or more, I'm going up to Germantown to buy Auguson Farms emergency food pails at walmart. The 30 day pails of emergency food will keep for 25 years, run from $80 to $160 for 30 days. Maybe 6 months to begin with. http://www.dilbert.com/dyn/str_strip/0//000/10/2/6000/100/126195/126195.strip.zoom.gif Dr. Roger B Clough NIST (ret.) [1/1/2000] See my Leibniz site at http://independent.academia.edu/RogerClough -- http://www.avast.com/ This email is free from viruses and malware because avast! Antivirushttp://www.avast.com/protection is active. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?
On 12 Dec 2013, at 22:10, meekerdb wrote: On 12/12/2013 12:57 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Dec 12, 2013, at 11:00 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/12/2013 1:36 AM, LizR wrote: On 12 December 2013 17:00, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: Liz, In forking MWI worlds, your ID is constantly changing as it depends on various quantum states. Your detailed nature is never duplicated. Every fork is a change from your previous state. If comp supports MWI, why should your ID ever stay the same since you are constantly forking with or without the doctor. Rich Yes, I wondered about that. However you look at it, digital consciousness involves constant state changes, at the substitution level and below. You end up with something like David Deutsch's snapshots or Fred Hoyle's pigeon holes, or someone, not sure who's capsule model of identity. It's all very Heraclitean! Of course in a (gasp!) materialist model, there are no snapshots. The computations that produce consciousness are distributed in space and time and one thought overlaps another. That isn't obvious to me. Are you saying the brain manufactures 10^43 thoughts per second? Would we know if the brain only made ~30 thoughts per second? No, I'm saying, roughly, the latter. And those thoughts have extension in both space and time (in the brain) as physically realized, so they can overlap. The overlapping times them together and provides an ordering, corresponding to the experience of consciousness and time. I really do not understand this. I don't see overlap possible, with a continuum, nor do I see how a discrete machine can distinguish a primary physical continuum from a FPI recoverable continuum. It looks like you assume a non-computationalist hypothesis. I might miss something. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The Yes-Doctor Experiment for real
On 12 Dec 2013, at 22:17, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno: Please tell me if above helped. Richard: Yes. Very much so. We being celestial, divine creatures, if you want. We (first person) are already in heaven, or Platonia, is completely consistent with my thinking OK. Bruno: To get non-comp, you need to install some function, which should be shown neither computable, nor FPI recoverable. If someone can provide an evidence that such a thing exists, he/she would provide evidence against digital mechanism. Richard: What I have to offer is a finite array of perhaps distinguishable, perhaps enumerable, 6d particles of string-theory spacetime sometimes called the Calabi-Yau compact manifolds. Where do that comes from? You seem to assume a primary world, made of those compact manifold (which needs arithmetic or Turing equivalent to be defined) These may be computable and emulate the ontology of comp if Robinson Arithmetic can be manifested by them; amounting perhaps to a finite mod/comp. Biological organism emulates easily Robinson Arithmetic, as all computers do. Universal system are everywhere, and string theory is such a system. To get a toe with comp, we shopuld start by the simpler one (needed the fewest K bits description). It seems to me. Bruno On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 12:21 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 12 Dec 2013, at 12:00, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno: So, indeterminacy, non-locality, and non-cloning, are, qualitatively, consequence of the comp hypothesis. [if the sub level is above the quantum level, which you say is empirically likely] Richard: So if non-cloning is a consequence of comp, how is duplication possible? It is avery good and important question, which admits a very simple answer, which works because we use a very weak form of comp: we *bet* that there is a level of description where we can be coded into a number and emulated by a Turing universal machine, or equivalently, emulated in arithmetic. (it turing universal part, or its sigma_1 complete part). Let me give you two quite different substitution levels, to illustrate the weakness of the comp hypothesis I work with. 1) the higher level: the description of your brain at the molecular level, with a classical average on elementary interaction between the 'particles'. 2) the lower level: the description of the Heisenberg matrix state of the entire (quantum observable) state of the entire local cluster of galaxies, (including dark matter!) and all this at the level of the right fields, or at the level of elementary strings and branes, and this with 10^(10^10) decimals. Use the Schroedinger picture if you prefer. No collapse! Both are, by default, Turing emulable. The first one is simpler to use in the step 1-6 thought experiences. To get the training before jumping into UD* at step 7. Indeed, at step seven, we see that the precise level, as far as it exists, is irrelevant: the UD will emulate all finite levels, with all oracles, infinitely often. Comp is a self-truncation hypothesis, even if it is at a very low level. Molecular Biology illustrates plausibly a successful digital encoding of our bodies (the DNA), and both the existence of the brain and of evolving species, involves stability by redundancy of many slight variants, making the theory working through some digital encodings. Non cloning concerns the apparent matter, which in comp should be defined by an indeterminacy involving all computations, involving all universal numbers, and their infinite works: something hardly clonable. But the point of comp is that we are not our bodies. We borrow bodies. We borrow them with respect to our most probable histories (the 1p view in the computations where you survive). We are celestial, divine creatures, if you want. We (first person) are already in heaven, or Platonia, or in the arithmetical true relations in between possible universal numbers and other (arithmetical) entities. If you think that the brain or the body is a quantum object, you have still the choice between a quantum brain (quantum computer, quantum mind) or not. The very weak comp I use remains valid in both case. This comes from the fact that 1) classical Turing machine can emulate quantum computers (albeit very slowly) 2) the first person experience remains unchanged whatever big are the delays of virtual reconstitution in the UD* (the run of the UD). I read your paragraphs over and over and still come to the same question. Please tell me if above helped. In step 1-6 I imagine a high level, to simplify the reasoning, but I step 7, we are in front of a non stopping UD run, and this defined the indeterminacy whatever is your level. If you feel like you have a quantum brain, just consult a quantum doctor. Saying yes, might everything more complex, but does not change the
Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?
On 12 Dec 2013, at 22:27, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 6:45 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: In Everett it's always obvious who I'm talking about when I use the personal pronoun you, it's the only other fellow in the room with me; but in Bruno's thought experiment there is a man standing to the right of the duplicating machine and a identical looking man standing to the left of the duplicating machine and they both have a equal right to use the grand title you. But they know pretty well who they are in the first person way, No they do not, not in a world with duplicating machines; This is ridiculous. Here who they are means who among the W and M guy they are, and both know pretty well which city they are seeing, and that is the real city, given the protocol (we don't fake them in a virtual lie, by construction). and by insisting that they do you're assuming the most important part of the very thing you're trying to prove. Mr. You doesn't know if he's the copy or the original. Ridiculous, see above. Mr. You doesn't know if he's 40 years old or 40 seconds old. We have a precise protocol and default hypotheses. You make distracting (correct) remark which have no relevance. You are playing game. Mr. You does know that he's the guy who is having this thought right now, but in a worjd of duplicating machines that is insufficient information to make a differentiation because that fellow over there (or is it a mirror) could be having the exact same thought at the exact same time. Not when they have looked to which city they are confronted with, which is the precise object of the experiment. One told me: I see in my diary that I predicted (in Helsinki) that I would be at both places, but I see now that this was wrong I predicted? In such a situation that would only be a half truth, it would be much more accurate to say the Helsinki man predicted or Bruno Marchal predicted. A pronoun has raised its ugly head yet again. Because you have already agreed that both copy are instantiation of the Helsinki person. They say I remember having made that prediction, for the same reason the guy survive the simple brain transplant (it is the comp hyp.). Then you can't say that you will survive anything. We die at each instant OK, but then you can't say that survival is important, or that the word means much of anything at all. That was my point. Indeed. Comp would lost his meaning. At last we agree on something, comp has lost it's meaning. You play with words. You know what comp is, and you just fail finding a flaw in step 3. 'Comp is not trivial, comp is a gibberish word made up by you that is almost as meaningless as free will. Comp is the mechanist thesis. You confuse axioms and theorems. It's the erroneous theorems that you claim to have derived from the sound axioms of computationalism that I object to. Exactly. But you fail in showing us what is erroneous. And that's the difference between comp and computationalism, and that is why you insist on using your homemade silly little word rather than the standard term. comp is just shorter than computationalism. But it my comp, is only a weaker version which imply all the one existing in the literature, and thus the consequences applies to all of them. your preceding argument was shown to confuse the 1-view and the 3- view For several years now Bruno Marchal has accused John Clark of that, but John Clark would maintain that there is not a single person on the face of the earth who is confused by the difference between the first person and the third person. I doubt this. In the duplicating machine frame, *you* do that confusion when predicting W and M. Clearly. You might be the only one, indeed. why do you keep emphasizing what the various copies will predict about their future and how accurate those predictions turn out to be? The point is that we need only a notion of first person self I think therefore I am. and thrid person self I know what a third person is, but what the hell is the third person self? Your body, or the Gödel number of your body, or the instantaneous comp state that the doctor is handling. Likewise, the third person self of PA is the description of PA in PA. The third person self is the one studied in the Gödel-Löb mathematical self-reference. It is the Bp, as opposed to the first person self which is well captured by Bp p. I honestly don't give a damn about comp You said that you believe in comp. I NEVER said I believe in comp, Stop playing with word. There was no quote around comp. I don't even know what your homemade word means, For the billionth time: it is sum up by Church thesis + yes doctor, and you know that. you claim it's just short for computationalism but that is clearly untrue. For years I've tried to infer
Re: The Yes-Doctor Experiment for real
On 12 Dec 2013, at 22:30, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno: If our subst level is far above the quantum level, then QM can still be derivable from arithmetic, but some constants can be geographical (and thus variable in the whole of the physical reality). Richard: Astronomical observations/measurements of the structure constant across nearly the whole visible universe indicates that the constants are to-first-order approximately monotonically variable as a function of space, but not time. So the substitution level may be far above the quantum level and that is a hypothesis in my model, to have the 6d particles of space, at a density of 10^90/cc, emulate RA.and the comp ontology. Why do you want emulate RA? Simple animals emulates RA, billiard ball, Gàc gas, your computer, yourself, all emulate RA. The interesting thing would be to not only show that RA emulates the particles and waves in the mind of PA, ZF, you and me and other observers in RA, but to show that such an emulation is statistical stable with respect to the FPI (which is the difficult task) to do). Bruno On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 4:17 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: Bruno: Please tell me if above helped. Richard: Yes. Very much so. We being celestial, divine creatures, if you want. We (first person) are already in heaven, or Platonia, is completely consistent with my thinking Bruno: To get non-comp, you need to install some function, which should be shown neither computable, nor FPI recoverable. If someone can provide an evidence that such a thing exists, he/she would provide evidence against digital mechanism. Richard: What I have to offer is a finite array of perhaps distinguishable, perhaps enumerable, 6d particles of string-theory spacetime sometimes called the Calabi-Yau compact manifolds. These may be computable and emulate the ontology of comp if Robinson Arithmetic can be manifested by them; amounting perhaps to a finite mod/comp. On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 12:21 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 12 Dec 2013, at 12:00, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno: So, indeterminacy, non-locality, and non-cloning, are, qualitatively, consequence of the comp hypothesis. [if the sub level is above the quantum level, which you say is empirically likely] Richard: So if non-cloning is a consequence of comp, how is duplication possible? It is avery good and important question, which admits a very simple answer, which works because we use a very weak form of comp: we *bet* that there is a level of description where we can be coded into a number and emulated by a Turing universal machine, or equivalently, emulated in arithmetic. (it turing universal part, or its sigma_1 complete part). Let me give you two quite different substitution levels, to illustrate the weakness of the comp hypothesis I work with. 1) the higher level: the description of your brain at the molecular level, with a classical average on elementary interaction between the 'particles'. 2) the lower level: the description of the Heisenberg matrix state of the entire (quantum observable) state of the entire local cluster of galaxies, (including dark matter!) and all this at the level of the right fields, or at the level of elementary strings and branes, and this with 10^(10^10) decimals. Use the Schroedinger picture if you prefer. No collapse! Both are, by default, Turing emulable. The first one is simpler to use in the step 1-6 thought experiences. To get the training before jumping into UD* at step 7. Indeed, at step seven, we see that the precise level, as far as it exists, is irrelevant: the UD will emulate all finite levels, with all oracles, infinitely often. Comp is a self-truncation hypothesis, even if it is at a very low level. Molecular Biology illustrates plausibly a successful digital encoding of our bodies (the DNA), and both the existence of the brain and of evolving species, involves stability by redundancy of many slight variants, making the theory working through some digital encodings. Non cloning concerns the apparent matter, which in comp should be defined by an indeterminacy involving all computations, involving all universal numbers, and their infinite works: something hardly clonable. But the point of comp is that we are not our bodies. We borrow bodies. We borrow them with respect to our most probable histories (the 1p view in the computations where you survive). We are celestial, divine creatures, if you want. We (first person) are already in heaven, or Platonia, or in the arithmetical true relations in between possible universal numbers and other (arithmetical) entities. If you think that the brain or the body is a quantum object, you have still the choice between a quantum brain (quantum computer, quantum mind) or not. The very weak comp I use remains valid in both case. This comes from
Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?
On 12 Dec 2013, at 22:45, Jason Resch wrote: Any time John Clark pretends that he does not understand or believe in first-person indeterminancy, refer him to his own post where he admitts to understanding it and believing in it: https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/5PR1FXp_CSU/PnuTSn_82PwJ John Clark: So yes, subjectively the intelligence would have no way of knowing if A was true or B, or to put it another way subjectively it would make no difference. Note: In case A the inputs to the mind are controlled by a random number generator and in case B, the mind is duplicated and shown different results. So by accepting there is no subjective difference, John Clark accepts that true randomness is subjectively indistinguishable from duplication and bifurcation. In other words, John Clark knows that duplication and bifurcation can yield the appearance of randomness. Yes. the problem is that he then consider this not original, and by a curious use of logic, that seems enough for him to not look at the importance of the fact, and to proceed at the next step. I think John is too much aware that the FPI is original, after all, and he does not one to concede the logical point for unknown personal agenda (let us say). It looks like he is aware that if he accept step 3, he will be forced to accept the other steps, and conclude that comp implies comp (in his wording). It is obvious that John Clark has seen the point, but use bad philosophy and rhetorical tricks to hide his understanding and to avoid to proceed. Too bad for him. It is sad, but there is nothing we can do, apparently. It is not that we are not trying, though. Bruno Jason On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 3:27 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 6:45 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: In Everett it's always obvious who I'm talking about when I use the personal pronoun you, it's the only other fellow in the room with me; but in Bruno's thought experiment there is a man standing to the right of the duplicating machine and a identical looking man standing to the left of the duplicating machine and they both have a equal right to use the grand title you. But they know pretty well who they are in the first person way, No they do not, not in a world with duplicating machines; and by insisting that they do you're assuming the most important part of the very thing you're trying to prove. Mr. You doesn't know if he's the copy or the original. Mr. You doesn't know if he's 40 years old or 40 seconds old. Mr. You does know that he's the guy who is having this thought right now, but in a worjd of duplicating machines that is insufficient information to make a differentiation because that fellow over there (or is it a mirror) could be having the exact same thought at the exact same time. One told me: I see in my diary that I predicted (in Helsinki) that I would be at both places, but I see now that this was wrong I predicted? In such a situation that would only be a half truth, it would be much more accurate to say the Helsinki man predicted or Bruno Marchal predicted. A pronoun has raised its ugly head yet again. Then you can't say that you will survive anything. We die at each instant OK, but then you can't say that survival is important, or that the word means much of anything at all. That was my point. Indeed. Comp would lost his meaning. At last we agree on something, comp has lost it's meaning. 'Comp is not trivial, comp is a gibberish word made up by you that is almost as meaningless as free will. Comp is the mechanist thesis. You confuse axioms and theorems. It's the erroneous theorems that you claim to have derived from the sound axioms of computationalism that I object to. And that's the difference between comp and computationalism, and that is why you insist on using your homemade silly little word rather than the standard term. your preceding argument was shown to confuse the 1-view and the 3- view For several years now Bruno Marchal has accused John Clark of that, but John Clark would maintain that there is not a single person on the face of the earth who is confused by the difference between the first person and the third person. why do you keep emphasizing what the various copies will predict about their future and how accurate those predictions turn out to be? The point is that we need only a notion of first person self I think therefore I am. and thrid person self I know what a third person is, but what the hell is the third person self? I honestly don't give a damn about comp You said that you believe in comp. I NEVER said I believe in comp, I don't even know what your homemade word means, you claim it's just short for computationalism but that is clearly untrue. For years I've tried to infer its meaning from your usage but have been
Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?
On 12 Dec 2013, at 23:58, LizR wrote: On 13 December 2013 10:27, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 6:45 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: In Everett it's always obvious who I'm talking about when I use the personal pronoun you, it's the only other fellow in the room with me; but in Bruno's thought experiment there is a man standing to the right of the duplicating machine and a identical looking man standing to the left of the duplicating machine and they both have a equal right to use the grand title you. But they know pretty well who they are in the first person way, No they do not, not in a world with duplicating machines; and by insisting that they do you're assuming the most important part of the very thing you're trying to prove. Mr. You doesn't know if he's the copy or the original. Mr. You doesn't know if he's 40 years old or 40 seconds old. Mr. You does know that he's the guy who is having this thought right now, but in a worjd of duplicating machines that is insufficient information to make a differentiation because that fellow over there (or is it a mirror) could be having the exact same thought at the exact same time. But I do know who I am in the first person, regardless of my personal history, and regardless of the existence of duplicating machines. Right. In fact, even after the duplication and reconstitution, and before looking at which city, both copies know who they are in the 1p. They just don't know yet where there are. And I see that this is what you say below, and the mention of Dennett where I am is quite apt. John is just ridiculous on this. His point is close to sheer nonsense. Eventually he illustrates how big the hand waving need to be to avoid the comp consequence. I still don't know if he want save primitive matter, or if it is only a personal psychological or social problem. We could make further extensions to the above scenario - say I'm really a digital copy, stored in a computer in Daniel Dennett's secret laboratory, but linked to the senses of an android which seems to be human - it appears human when it looks at itself in the mirror, etc. As far as I can tell I am that android, and unless it strays so far from my computer that there are appreciable delays in communication, or its batteries run out or something, I will never know otherwise. But even so, I am still correct about who I am. Exactly. I think you're mixing up my first person knowledge of who am I with the third person knowledge required to know about the history of my body. Indeed. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Uruguay
On 13 Dec 2013, at 00:51, LizR wrote: On 13 December 2013 07:04, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 12 Dec 2013, at 18:31, meekerdb wrote: Is it true that you're transferring to the University of Uruguay, Bruno? Yes, but not exactly. Apparently I will be triplicated in Washington, Colorado, *and* Uruguay. And Amsterdam? I will be read and annihilated in Amsterdam. :) But note that in Amsterdam, cannabis is illegal, completely illegal. It is just tolerated and decriminalized. And that's bad, because it makes the coffee-shop owners sill in relation with the criminals. It does not solve the root problem. They do progress, as they allow more farmers to grow it, but only exceptionally, and still under tolerance, not law. I am not sure for Portugal, perhaps Telmo know better. I think they tolerate all drugs, but don't have the full legalization, like in Uruguay (and in Washington and in Colorado, except for the feds!). We are still a long way from the understanding that prohibition benefits only to bandits and terrorists, and that its harms a lot individuals and the whole society at all levels. Why? because it is the criminals who got the power, simply. Probably after Kennedy assassination. The world is governed by Al Capone, and it will look like more and more a big Chicago (as it arguably already seems to be). But Amsterdam and all cities in the Netherlands are very lovely, and it is nice we can buy salvia and cannabis, medical or recreative, without much trouble. Note that Uruguay violates an international decision(*). That is good, and the time has come to doubt on the sanity of that international decision. We should internationally condemn all form of drugs and food prohibition, which is the most unhealthy thing possible to do. I think that such arbitrary nonsense has been made possible by the mentality which accepted the abandon of doing theology in the scientific (interrogative) way. Science is not yet born again. The Enlighten period was just a tiny concession for the most exact sciences, not for the very spirit of science, which allows *all* doubts, and encourage the critical mind in *all* directions. All certainties, when made public, are a form of madness. Bruno (*) The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) said the legislation in Uruguay contravenes the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, to which it said Uruguay is a party. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/11/uruguay-marijuana-breaks-international-treaty -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Uruguay
On Fri, Dec 13, 2013 at 11:35 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 13 Dec 2013, at 00:51, LizR wrote: On 13 December 2013 07:04, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 12 Dec 2013, at 18:31, meekerdb wrote: Is it true that you're transferring to the University of Uruguay, Bruno? Yes, but not exactly. Apparently I will be triplicated in Washington, Colorado, *and* Uruguay. And Amsterdam? I will be read and annihilated in Amsterdam. :) But note that in Amsterdam, cannabis is illegal, completely illegal. It is just tolerated and decriminalized. And that's bad, because it makes the coffee-shop owners sill in relation with the criminals. It does not solve the root problem. They do progress, as they allow more farmers to grow it, but only exceptionally, and still under tolerance, not law. I am not sure for Portugal, perhaps Telmo know better. I think they tolerate all drugs, but don't have the full legalization, In Portugal drug use is fully decriminalizes, as well as possession of small quantities. This applies to all drugs, even heroin and so on. In fact, you can go to a pharmacy and ask for syringes. Sellin like in Uruguay (and in Washington and in Colorado, except for the feds!). We are still a long way from the understanding that prohibition benefits only to bandits and terrorists, and that its harms a lot individuals and the whole society at all levels. Why? because it is the criminals who got the power, simply. Probably after Kennedy assassination. The world is governed by Al Capone, and it will look like more and more a big Chicago (as it arguably already seems to be). But Amsterdam and all cities in the Netherlands are very lovely, and it is nice we can buy salvia and cannabis, medical or recreative, without much trouble. Note that Uruguay violates an international decision(*). That is good, and the time has come to doubt on the sanity of that international decision. We should internationally condemn all form of drugs and food prohibition, which is the most unhealthy thing possible to do. I think that such arbitrary nonsense has been made possible by the mentality which accepted the abandon of doing theology in the scientific (interrogative) way. Science is not yet born again. The Enlighten period was just a tiny concession for the most exact sciences, not for the very spirit of science, which allows *all* doubts, and encourage the critical mind in *all* directions. All certainties, when made public, are a form of madness. Bruno (*) The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) said the legislation in Uruguay contravenes the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, to which it said Uruguay is a party. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/11/uruguay-marijuana-breaks-international-treaty -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Uruguay
On Fri, Dec 13, 2013 at 11:35 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 13 Dec 2013, at 00:51, LizR wrote: On 13 December 2013 07:04, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 12 Dec 2013, at 18:31, meekerdb wrote: Is it true that you're transferring to the University of Uruguay, Bruno? Yes, but not exactly. Apparently I will be triplicated in Washington, Colorado, *and* Uruguay. And Amsterdam? I will be read and annihilated in Amsterdam. :) But note that in Amsterdam, cannabis is illegal, completely illegal. It is just tolerated and decriminalized. And that's bad, because it makes the coffee-shop owners sill in relation with the criminals. It does not solve the root problem. They do progress, as they allow more farmers to grow it, but only exceptionally, and still under tolerance, not law. I am not sure for Portugal, perhaps Telmo know better. I think they tolerate all drugs, but don't have the full legalization, (sorry I pressed some key by mistake and it sent the incomplete email) In Portugal drug use is fully decriminalized, as well as possession of small quantities. This applies to all drugs, even heroin and so on. In fact, you can go to a pharmacy and ask for syringes. Selling is still a crime and people go to jail for it -- although Portugal is very lenient on crime overall -- it is unlikely that a person will go to jail for their first criminal offense, unless it's something really serious (murder or armed robbery). I agree with Bruno, it's not enough, but it already provides strong empirical evidence: after one decade of decreminalization, hard drug use is significantly reduced (heroin was a big problem before decreminalization). I remember the political debate around this, and the conservatives were arguing that Portugal would become a destination for drug tourism, and that drug use would be rampant and destroy society. None of that happened, and even the conservatives don't talk about it anymore -- drugs simply ceased to be a political topic at all. Here in Berlin some progress is being made too: http://www.dw.de/cannabis-cafes-could-set-up-shop-in-berlin/a-17089498 We'll see. Telmo. like in Uruguay (and in Washington and in Colorado, except for the feds!). We are still a long way from the understanding that prohibition benefits only to bandits and terrorists, and that its harms a lot individuals and the whole society at all levels. Why? because it is the criminals who got the power, simply. Probably after Kennedy assassination. The world is governed by Al Capone, and it will look like more and more a big Chicago (as it arguably already seems to be). But Amsterdam and all cities in the Netherlands are very lovely, and it is nice we can buy salvia and cannabis, medical or recreative, without much trouble. Note that Uruguay violates an international decision(*). That is good, and the time has come to doubt on the sanity of that international decision. We should internationally condemn all form of drugs and food prohibition, which is the most unhealthy thing possible to do. I think that such arbitrary nonsense has been made possible by the mentality which accepted the abandon of doing theology in the scientific (interrogative) way. Science is not yet born again. The Enlighten period was just a tiny concession for the most exact sciences, not for the very spirit of science, which allows *all* doubts, and encourage the critical mind in *all* directions. All certainties, when made public, are a form of madness. Bruno (*) The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) said the legislation in Uruguay contravenes the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, to which it said Uruguay is a party. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/11/uruguay-marijuana-breaks-international-treaty -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To
Re: The Yes-Doctor Experiment for real
Bruno: Where do that [Calabi-Yau Compact manifolds] comes from? Richard: There are the most immediate consequence of all string theories where the extra dimensions beyond 4D spacetime must precipitate out of 3D space. Harvard physics Prof. Vafa describes the Big Bang as 2 dimensions folding up in splines as 1 dimension expands. Prof Yau, Head of the Harvard Math Dept, is famed for his verification of Calabi's conjecture of compact manifolds and Yau proposed these manifolds as the answer to where the extra dimensions went for about a decade before it was accepted by string theorists. But I must admit that I have never seen any string theory math that predicts how the dimensions fold up. On Fri, Dec 13, 2013 at 4:24 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 12 Dec 2013, at 22:17, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno: Please tell me if above helped. Richard: Yes. Very much so. We being celestial, divine creatures, if you want. We (first person) are already in heaven, or Platonia, is completely consistent with my thinking OK. Bruno: To get non-comp, you need to install some function, which should be shown neither computable, nor FPI recoverable. If someone can provide an evidence that such a thing exists, he/she would provide evidence against digital mechanism. Richard: What I have to offer is a finite array of perhaps distinguishable, perhaps enumerable, 6d particles of string-theory spacetime sometimes called the Calabi-Yau compact manifolds. Where do that comes from? You seem to assume a primary world, made of those compact manifold (which needs arithmetic or Turing equivalent to be defined) These may be computable and emulate the ontology of comp if Robinson Arithmetic can be manifested by them; amounting perhaps to a finite mod/comp. Biological organism emulates easily Robinson Arithmetic, as all computers do. Universal system are everywhere, and string theory is such a system. To get a toe with comp, we shopuld start by the simpler one (needed the fewest K bits description). It seems to me. Bruno On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 12:21 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 12 Dec 2013, at 12:00, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno: So, indeterminacy, non-locality, and non-cloning, are, qualitatively, consequence of the comp hypothesis. [if the sub level is above the quantum level, which you say is empirically likely] Richard: So if non-cloning is a consequence of comp, how is duplication possible? It is avery good and important question, which admits a very simple answer, which works because we use a very weak form of comp: we *bet* that there is a level of description where we can be coded into a number and emulated by a Turing universal machine, or equivalently, emulated in arithmetic. (it turing universal part, or its sigma_1 complete part). Let me give you two quite different substitution levels, to illustrate the weakness of the comp hypothesis I work with. 1) the higher level: the description of your brain at the molecular level, with a classical average on elementary interaction between the 'particles'. 2) the lower level: the description of the Heisenberg matrix state of the entire (quantum observable) state of the entire local cluster of galaxies, (including dark matter!) and all this at the level of the right fields, or at the level of elementary strings and branes, and this with 10^(10^10) decimals. Use the Schroedinger picture if you prefer. No collapse! Both are, by default, Turing emulable. The first one is simpler to use in the step 1-6 thought experiences. To get the training before jumping into UD* at step 7. Indeed, at step seven, we see that the precise level, as far as it exists, is irrelevant: the UD will emulate all finite levels, with all oracles, infinitely often. Comp is a self-truncation hypothesis, even if it is at a very low level. Molecular Biology illustrates plausibly a successful digital encoding of our bodies (the DNA), and both the existence of the brain and of evolving species, involves stability by redundancy of many slight variants, making the theory working through some digital encodings. Non cloning concerns the apparent matter, which in comp should be defined by an indeterminacy involving all computations, involving all universal numbers, and their infinite works: something hardly clonable. But the point of comp is that we are not our bodies. We borrow bodies. We borrow them with respect to our most probable histories (the 1p view in the computations where you survive). We are celestial, divine creatures, if you want. We (first person) are already in heaven, or Platonia, or in the arithmetical true relations in between possible universal numbers and other (arithmetical) entities. If you think that the brain or the body is a quantum object, you have still the choice between a quantum brain (quantum computer, quantum mind) or not. The very weak comp I use
Re: The Yes-Doctor Experiment for real
Bruno: Why do you want emulate RA? Simple animals emulates RA, billiard ball, Gàc gas, your computer, yourself, all emulate RA. Richard: I am proposing that the finite 3D array of 10^90/cc compact space particles are a computer for implementing RA. I must have used the word emulation improperly. On Fri, Dec 13, 2013 at 4:47 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 12 Dec 2013, at 22:30, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno: If our subst level is far above the quantum level, then QM can still be derivable from arithmetic, but some constants can be geographical (and thus variable in the whole of the physical reality). Richard: Astronomical observations/measurements of the structure constant across nearly the whole visible universe indicates that the constants are to-first-order approximately monotonically variable as a function of space, but not time. So the substitution level may be far above the quantum level and that is a hypothesis in my model, to have the 6d particles of space, at a density of 10^90/cc, emulate RA.and the comp ontology. Why do you want emulate RA? Simple animals emulates RA, billiard ball, Gàc gas, your computer, yourself, all emulate RA. The interesting thing would be to not only show that RA emulates the particles and waves in the mind of PA, ZF, you and me and other observers in RA, but to show that such an emulation is statistical stable with respect to the FPI (which is the difficult task) to do). Bruno On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 4:17 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.comwrote: Bruno: Please tell me if above helped. Richard: Yes. Very much so. We being celestial, divine creatures, if you want. We (first person) are already in heaven, or Platonia, is completely consistent with my thinking Bruno: To get non-comp, you need to install some function, which should be shown neither computable, nor FPI recoverable. If someone can provide an evidence that such a thing exists, he/she would provide evidence against digital mechanism. Richard: What I have to offer is a finite array of perhaps distinguishable, perhaps enumerable, 6d particles of string-theory spacetime sometimes called the Calabi-Yau compact manifolds. These may be computable and emulate the ontology of comp if Robinson Arithmetic can be manifested by them; amounting perhaps to a finite mod/comp. On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 12:21 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.bewrote: On 12 Dec 2013, at 12:00, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno: So, indeterminacy, non-locality, and non-cloning, are, qualitatively, consequence of the comp hypothesis. [if the sub level is above the quantum level, which you say is empirically likely] Richard: So if non-cloning is a consequence of comp, how is duplication possible? It is avery good and important question, which admits a very simple answer, which works because we use a very weak form of comp: we *bet* that there is a level of description where we can be coded into a number and emulated by a Turing universal machine, or equivalently, emulated in arithmetic. (it turing universal part, or its sigma_1 complete part). Let me give you two quite different substitution levels, to illustrate the weakness of the comp hypothesis I work with. 1) the higher level: the description of your brain at the molecular level, with a classical average on elementary interaction between the 'particles'. 2) the lower level: the description of the Heisenberg matrix state of the entire (quantum observable) state of the entire local cluster of galaxies, (including dark matter!) and all this at the level of the right fields, or at the level of elementary strings and branes, and this with 10^(10^10) decimals. Use the Schroedinger picture if you prefer. No collapse! Both are, by default, Turing emulable. The first one is simpler to use in the step 1-6 thought experiences. To get the training before jumping into UD* at step 7. Indeed, at step seven, we see that the precise level, as far as it exists, is irrelevant: the UD will emulate all finite levels, with all oracles, infinitely often. Comp is a self-truncation hypothesis, even if it is at a very low level. Molecular Biology illustrates plausibly a successful digital encoding of our bodies (the DNA), and both the existence of the brain and of evolving species, involves stability by redundancy of many slight variants, making the theory working through some digital encodings. Non cloning concerns the apparent matter, which in comp should be defined by an indeterminacy involving all computations, involving all universal numbers, and their infinite works: something hardly clonable. But the point of comp is that we are not our bodies. We borrow bodies. We borrow them with respect to our most probable histories (the 1p view in the computations where you survive). We are celestial, divine creatures, if you want. We (first person) are already in heaven, or Platonia, or in the
You can order Augason Farms 30 day supply of food from Walmart online at
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Walmart 30 Day Emergency Food Storage Pail Augason Farms Review
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Re: Uruguay
Of course, tolerance is better than nothing. But most implementations still ignore MPI (Merchant Person Indeterminacy), and so even in environments where possession is tolerated, anybody engaging in a commercial transaction or anybody on the production side is still fair game... which you can interpret as still anybody, users included technically when some transaction is proven. This kind of law allows more fuzzy, inconsistent application, in that no quality control is established, no user knows what they're getting at which potency, and leaves the authorities and legal system a completely free hand in determining whether some street user just went commercial by sharing or purchasing, and whether some charge against somebody who paid off local authorities is just a user possessing, financing his habit. Netherlands still forbids commercial growing with its tolerance policy, so what ends up in the legendary coffee shops is still legally magical, and with the total amount limits for coffee shop premisses set very low, in practice they can just raid anybody they like (there were times and regions where this was taken seriously and you actually had the bar owner have to jump across the street to somewhere over the rainbow of legal lands to refresh stock every hour or so). So they have raids at times and find surprise: this shop is over the legal limit allowed on premises, going to have to pull the license. And since they are not issuing new licenses for coffee shops, with a string of conservative governments in the last years, it's noteworthy how some groups seem very immune to raids while others do not. Basically they obviously raid whoever is being too criminal in practice. In short: Fuzzy laws just make things more complex through MPI :-) Basically we do what we want, we don't even have to be consistent anymore. Hope the US and Uruguay take this into more consideration. Seizures of 6-7 figure amounts of cash and product, do represent conflict of interest, for first officers on the scene, before they've been counted. Officers have bills to pay too and lack of seizure oversight is a huge blind spot for corrupting government officials. PGC On Fri, Dec 13, 2013 at 12:54 PM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.comwrote: On Fri, Dec 13, 2013 at 11:35 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 13 Dec 2013, at 00:51, LizR wrote: On 13 December 2013 07:04, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 12 Dec 2013, at 18:31, meekerdb wrote: Is it true that you're transferring to the University of Uruguay, Bruno? Yes, but not exactly. Apparently I will be triplicated in Washington, Colorado, *and* Uruguay. And Amsterdam? I will be read and annihilated in Amsterdam. :) But note that in Amsterdam, cannabis is illegal, completely illegal. It is just tolerated and decriminalized. And that's bad, because it makes the coffee-shop owners sill in relation with the criminals. It does not solve the root problem. They do progress, as they allow more farmers to grow it, but only exceptionally, and still under tolerance, not law. I am not sure for Portugal, perhaps Telmo know better. I think they tolerate all drugs, but don't have the full legalization, (sorry I pressed some key by mistake and it sent the incomplete email) In Portugal drug use is fully decriminalized, as well as possession of small quantities. This applies to all drugs, even heroin and so on. In fact, you can go to a pharmacy and ask for syringes. Selling is still a crime and people go to jail for it -- although Portugal is very lenient on crime overall -- it is unlikely that a person will go to jail for their first criminal offense, unless it's something really serious (murder or armed robbery). I agree with Bruno, it's not enough, but it already provides strong empirical evidence: after one decade of decreminalization, hard drug use is significantly reduced (heroin was a big problem before decreminalization). I remember the political debate around this, and the conservatives were arguing that Portugal would become a destination for drug tourism, and that drug use would be rampant and destroy society. None of that happened, and even the conservatives don't talk about it anymore -- drugs simply ceased to be a political topic at all. Here in Berlin some progress is being made too: http://www.dw.de/cannabis-cafes-could-set-up-shop-in-berlin/a-17089498 We'll see. Telmo. like in Uruguay (and in Washington and in Colorado, except for the feds!). We are still a long way from the understanding that prohibition benefits only to bandits and terrorists, and that its harms a lot individuals and the whole society at all levels. Why? because it is the criminals who got the power, simply. Probably after Kennedy assassination. The world is governed by Al Capone, and it will look like more and more a big Chicago (as it arguably already seems to be). But
Re: The Yes-Doctor Experiment for real
On 13 Dec 2013, at 13:17, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno: Why do you want emulate RA? Simple animals emulates RA, billiard ball, Gàc gas, your computer, yourself, all emulate RA. Richard: I am proposing that the finite 3D array of 10^90/cc compact space particles are a computer for implementing RA. I must have used the word emulation improperly. You were correct. But the question remains. String theory is a theory inferred from observation. With computationalism, if string theory is the correct physics, we must show how to deduce it from RA, and we must justify why it win the measure battle in between all universal machines below our substitution level. String theory might be the answer, but it has yet to be extracted from its arithmetical subpart, to solve the mind-body problem. Indeed by UDA we have to do that, and the advantage is that we will get both the scientific communicable parts (through G and its intensional variants), and the scientifically not scientific incommunicable (+ the inexpressible) parts (through G* and its intensional variant). Bruno On Fri, Dec 13, 2013 at 4:47 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 12 Dec 2013, at 22:30, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno: If our subst level is far above the quantum level, then QM can still be derivable from arithmetic, but some constants can be geographical (and thus variable in the whole of the physical reality). Richard: Astronomical observations/measurements of the structure constant across nearly the whole visible universe indicates that the constants are to-first-order approximately monotonically variable as a function of space, but not time. So the substitution level may be far above the quantum level and that is a hypothesis in my model, to have the 6d particles of space, at a density of 10^90/cc, emulate RA.and the comp ontology. Why do you want emulate RA? Simple animals emulates RA, billiard ball, Gàc gas, your computer, yourself, all emulate RA. The interesting thing would be to not only show that RA emulates the particles and waves in the mind of PA, ZF, you and me and other observers in RA, but to show that such an emulation is statistical stable with respect to the FPI (which is the difficult task) to do). Bruno On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 4:17 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: Bruno: Please tell me if above helped. Richard: Yes. Very much so. We being celestial, divine creatures, if you want. We (first person) are already in heaven, or Platonia, is completely consistent with my thinking Bruno: To get non-comp, you need to install some function, which should be shown neither computable, nor FPI recoverable. If someone can provide an evidence that such a thing exists, he/she would provide evidence against digital mechanism. Richard: What I have to offer is a finite array of perhaps distinguishable, perhaps enumerable, 6d particles of string-theory spacetime sometimes called the Calabi-Yau compact manifolds. These may be computable and emulate the ontology of comp if Robinson Arithmetic can be manifested by them; amounting perhaps to a finite mod/comp. On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 12:21 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 12 Dec 2013, at 12:00, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno: So, indeterminacy, non-locality, and non-cloning, are, qualitatively, consequence of the comp hypothesis. [if the sub level is above the quantum level, which you say is empirically likely] Richard: So if non-cloning is a consequence of comp, how is duplication possible? It is avery good and important question, which admits a very simple answer, which works because we use a very weak form of comp: we *bet* that there is a level of description where we can be coded into a number and emulated by a Turing universal machine, or equivalently, emulated in arithmetic. (it turing universal part, or its sigma_1 complete part). Let me give you two quite different substitution levels, to illustrate the weakness of the comp hypothesis I work with. 1) the higher level: the description of your brain at the molecular level, with a classical average on elementary interaction between the 'particles'. 2) the lower level: the description of the Heisenberg matrix state of the entire (quantum observable) state of the entire local cluster of galaxies, (including dark matter!) and all this at the level of the right fields, or at the level of elementary strings and branes, and this with 10^(10^10) decimals. Use the Schroedinger picture if you prefer. No collapse! Both are, by default, Turing emulable. The first one is simpler to use in the step 1-6 thought experiences. To get the training before jumping into UD* at step 7. Indeed, at step seven, we see that the precise level, as far as it exists, is irrelevant: the UD will emulate all finite levels, with all oracles, infinitely often. Comp is a
Global warming ?
Hi Chris, According to the Vostok data, we're in for another ice age, in say 10,000 years or so. jcs-online,theoretical_physics_board,- mindbr...@yahoogroups.com,everything-list,4dworldx Dr. Roger B Clough NIST (ret.) [1/1/2000] See my Leibniz site at http://independent.academia.edu/RogerClough --- This email is free from viruses and malware because avast! Antivirus protection is active. http://www.avast.com -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. attachment: vostok_IceCores1.gif
A great place for hackers to start to be an identity imposter
Hi Hans Dieter Franke A great place for hackers to start to be an identity imposter is www.healthcare.gov (if that's the right address). No or little security. Dr. Roger B Clough NIST (ret.) [1/1/2000] See my Leibniz site at http://independent.academia.edu/RogerClough --- This email is free from viruses and malware because avast! Antivirus protection is active. http://www.avast.com -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The Yes-Doctor Experiment for real
On 13 Dec 2013, at 13:17, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno: Why do you want emulate RA? Simple animals emulates RA, billiard ball, Gàc gas, your computer, yourself, all emulate RA. Richard: I am proposing that the finite 3D array of 10^90/cc compact space particles are a computer for implementing RA. I must have used the word emulation improperly. Bruno: You were correct. But the question remains. String theory is a theory inferred from observation. With computationalism, if string theory is the correct physics, we must show how to deduce it from RA, and we must justify why it win the measure battle in between all universal machines below our substitution level. String theory might be the answer, but it has yet to be extracted from its arithmetical subpart, to solve the mind-body problem. Indeed by UDA we have to do that, and the advantage is that we will get both the scientific communicable parts (through G and its intensional variants), and the scientifically not scientific incommunicable (+ the inexpressible) parts (through G* and its intensional variant). Richard: First of all, I do not think string theory comes from observationa, but that is beside the point. I agree that we have to deduce string theory from RA. But that inclueds deducing that a 3D array of 6d particles results. This array of particles may then become a universal machine that can deduce itself. Is not that something that you say machines do with comp? On Fri, Dec 13, 2013 at 9:52 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 13 Dec 2013, at 13:17, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno: Why do you want emulate RA? Simple animals emulates RA, billiard ball, Gàc gas, your computer, yourself, all emulate RA. Richard: I am proposing that the finite 3D array of 10^90/cc compact space particles are a computer for implementing RA. I must have used the word emulation improperly. You were correct. But the question remains. String theory is a theory inferred from observation. With computationalism, if string theory is the correct physics, we must show how to deduce it from RA, and we must justify why it win the measure battle in between all universal machines below our substitution level. String theory might be the answer, but it has yet to be extracted from its arithmetical subpart, to solve the mind-body problem. Indeed by UDA we have to do that, and the advantage is that we will get both the scientific communicable parts (through G and its intensional variants), and the scientifically not scientific incommunicable (+ the inexpressible) parts (through G* and its intensional variant). Bruno On Fri, Dec 13, 2013 at 4:47 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 12 Dec 2013, at 22:30, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno: If our subst level is far above the quantum level, then QM can still be derivable from arithmetic, but some constants can be geographical (and thus variable in the whole of the physical reality). Richard: Astronomical observations/measurements of the structure constant across nearly the whole visible universe indicates that the constants are to-first-order approximately monotonically variable as a function of space, but not time. So the substitution level may be far above the quantum level and that is a hypothesis in my model, to have the 6d particles of space, at a density of 10^90/cc, emulate RA.and the comp ontology. Why do you want emulate RA? Simple animals emulates RA, billiard ball, Gàc gas, your computer, yourself, all emulate RA. The interesting thing would be to not only show that RA emulates the particles and waves in the mind of PA, ZF, you and me and other observers in RA, but to show that such an emulation is statistical stable with respect to the FPI (which is the difficult task) to do). Bruno On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 4:17 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.comwrote: Bruno: Please tell me if above helped. Richard: Yes. Very much so. We being celestial, divine creatures, if you want. We (first person) are already in heaven, or Platonia, is completely consistent with my thinking Bruno: To get non-comp, you need to install some function, which should be shown neither computable, nor FPI recoverable. If someone can provide an evidence that such a thing exists, he/she would provide evidence against digital mechanism. Richard: What I have to offer is a finite array of perhaps distinguishable, perhaps enumerable, 6d particles of string-theory spacetime sometimes called the Calabi-Yau compact manifolds. These may be computable and emulate the ontology of comp if Robinson Arithmetic can be manifested by them; amounting perhaps to a finite mod/comp. On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 12:21 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.bewrote: On 12 Dec 2013, at 12:00, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno: So, indeterminacy, non-locality, and non-cloning, are, qualitatively, consequence of the comp hypothesis. [if the sub level is above the quantum level, which you say
Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?
On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 4:45 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Any time John Clark pretends that he does not understand or believe in first-person indeterminancy, But I do believe in and understand first-person indeterminacy, in fact it was without question the very first thing that I ever understood in my life; even as a infant I realized that I didn't know what I would see next, and even if I did I didn't know what I would do next. refer him to his own post where he admitts to understanding it and believing in it: https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/5PR1FXp_CSU/PnuTSn_82PwJ John Clark: So yes, subjectively the intelligence would have no way of knowing if A was true or B, or to put it another way subjectively it would make no difference. I stand by every word I wrote, especially subjectively it would make no difference; but if you're going to quote me quote the entire paragraph: Both A and B are identical in that the intelligence doesn't know what it is going to see next; but increasingly convoluted thought experiments are not needed to demonstrate that everyday fact. The only difference is that in A lots of copies are made of the intelligence and in B they are not; but as the intelligence would have no way of knowing if a copy had been made of itself or not nor would it have any way of knowing if it was the original or the copy, subjectively it doesn't matter if A or B is true. So yes, subjectively the intelligence would have no way of knowing if A was true or B, or to put it another way subjectively it would make no difference. And I concluded that post with: the conclusion is the same, and that is the not very profound conclusion that you never know what you're going to see next, and Bruno's grand discovery of First Person Indeterminacy is just regular old dull as dishwater indeterminacy first discovered by Og the caveman. After the big buildup it's a bit of a letdown actually. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?
On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 5:58 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: I *do *know who I am in the first person, But there is no reason to believe that the knowledge you're talking about is in principle unique; the copying machine can duplicate the first person view just as easily as anything else. That person over there who looks just like you also knows who she is in the first person, and the funny thing is it's exactly precisely the same first person. We could make further extensions to the above scenario - say I'm really a digital copy, stored in a computer in Daniel Dennett's secret laboratory, but linked to the senses of an android which seems to be human - it appears human when it looks at itself in the mirror But that's not a extension that's the way things actually are, except that the computer isn't in Daniel Dennett's secret laboratory, it's in a box made of bone sitting on your shoulders. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?
On Fri, Dec 13, 2013 at 5:22 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 4:45 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Any time John Clark pretends that he does not understand or believe in first-person indeterminancy, But I do believe in and understand first-person indeterminacy, in fact it was without question the very first thing that I ever understood in my life; even as a infant I realized that I didn't know what I would see next, and even if I did I didn't know what I would do next. refer him to his own post where he admitts to understanding it and believing in it: https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/5PR1FXp_CSU/PnuTSn_82PwJ John Clark: So yes, subjectively the intelligence would have no way of knowing if A was true or B, or to put it another way subjectively it would make no difference. I stand by every word I wrote, especially subjectively it would make no difference; but if you're going to quote me quote the entire paragraph: Both A and B are identical in that the intelligence doesn't know what it is going to see next; but increasingly convoluted thought experiments are not needed to demonstrate that everyday fact. The only difference is that in A lots of copies are made of the intelligence and in B they are not; but as the intelligence would have no way of knowing if a copy had been made of itself or not nor would it have any way of knowing if it was the original or the copy, subjectively it doesn't matter if A or B is true. So yes, subjectively the intelligence would have no way of knowing if A was true or B, or to put it another way subjectively it would make no difference. And I concluded that post with: the conclusion is the same, and that is the not very profound conclusion that you never know what you're going to see next, and Bruno's grand discovery of First Person Indeterminacy is just regular old dull as dishwater indeterminacy first discovered by Og the caveman. After the big buildup it's a bit of a letdown actually. The thought experiment and conclusion also bears on the question of identity, in that a possibility, that Bruno, John, and Og are just some UD distributed, locally and subjectively disconnected instantiations of the same person, instead of different boxes made of bone sitting on their individual physical shoulders, is given. This possibility could help explain why John remains crude, impolite, intolerant and repeats himself again and again; like Og trying to square a circle and why Bruno would keep trying to help Og see that that's impossible. But Og is obsessed by squared circles (e.g. Head = Box) and will not let go... which is why the Bruno John-Og discussion looks like it would never halt... but since we can't be sure, Og can keep taking advantage. Og can keep trolling, which is what others on this list have repeatedly pointed out, because the possibility that he raises a new, and interesting point is real. But after 3 years of reading this, I'm starting to think lottery is a better idea. Indeed Og, this is trivial: so stop or make a point once every few years. PGC John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The Yes-Doctor Experiment for real
Hi Bruno, Why does an entire universe need to be simulated? Could not just finite portions of some universe be simulated, that which is perceived by the observers (however such might be defined). Why does it seem that a god's eye view needs to be simulated? BTW, David Albert's argument against the narratability of the universe is a very strong case against any concept of a god's eye view, IMHO. On Thursday, December 12, 2013 1:39:33 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 12 Dec 2013, at 19:06, meekerdb wrote: On 12/12/2013 9:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 2) the lower level: the description of the Heisenberg matrix state of the entire (quantum observable) state of the entire local cluster of galaxies, (including dark matter!) and all this at the level of the right fields, or at the level of elementary strings and branes, and this with 10^(10^10) decimals. Use the Schroedinger picture if you prefer. No collapse! But in this case the doctor doing the substitution is included in the substitution. I think this produces a contradiction. That happens all the time with universal machines. They can simulate another machine simulating themselves, and the UD brought this in the picture. With the phi_i and the W_i, many apparent contradictions are resolved through the fact that we are confronted with non stopping machines. Of course, as I said, it would make the thought experience difficult, for no reason, in the first six steps. In this list, the first presentation of the UD was a presentation in 15 steps, where I made explicit the neuro-high level assumption used in step 1-6 and show explicitly at step 7 how the UD* (the complete running of the UD) discharge that assumption. The mathematical reason why we escape the contradiction is related to the closure of diagonalization, and to Kleene's second recursion theorem, which allows machine to invoke machines invoking them. It is standard in theoretical computer science. Judson Webb explains well how Gödel's theorem protect Church thesis, which protect mechanism. In fact Gödel's theorem and the whole of G*-G, create the points of view (by the machine distinction between Bp and Bp p, etc.), and protect the whole machine's theology, by splitting the communicable part from the non communicable one. Mathematical logic distinguish also what is expressible by the machine, and what is not expressible, yet known or produces as true in many possible ways. The UD even run dreams in dreams in dreams in a completely circular way. We cannot impeach it to dig in the absurd, once it is computable. That would be like trying to eliminate the number 13 from the integers. Obviously, if the level is so low you need to simulate the entire universal wave, in practice you will say NO to the doctor, but at step seven, even if the level is that low, the main consequences remain unchanged. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The Yes-Doctor Experiment for real
2013/12/13 Stephen Paul King stephe...@charter.net Hi Bruno, Why does an entire universe need to be simulated? It does not... it is an example showing that the substitution level could be arbitrarily low... anyway as I said some years ago, if the level is that low, I don't see how computationalism (the idea that consciousness is a sort of computation) should be still be seen as a possible theory of mind, I would see that as a refutation (a level that low is equivalent with sollipsims). Quentin Could not just finite portions of some universe be simulated, that which is perceived by the observers (however such might be defined). Why does it seem that a god's eye view needs to be simulated? BTW, David Albert's argument against the narratability of the universe is a very strong case against any concept of a god's eye view, IMHO. On Thursday, December 12, 2013 1:39:33 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 12 Dec 2013, at 19:06, meekerdb wrote: On 12/12/2013 9:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 2) the lower level: the description of the Heisenberg matrix state of the entire (quantum observable) state of the entire local cluster of galaxies, (including dark matter!) and all this at the level of the right fields, or at the level of elementary strings and branes, and this with 10^(10^10) decimals. Use the Schroedinger picture if you prefer. No collapse! But in this case the doctor doing the substitution is included in the substitution. I think this produces a contradiction. That happens all the time with universal machines. They can simulate another machine simulating themselves, and the UD brought this in the picture. With the phi_i and the W_i, many apparent contradictions are resolved through the fact that we are confronted with non stopping machines. Of course, as I said, it would make the thought experience difficult, for no reason, in the first six steps. In this list, the first presentation of the UD was a presentation in 15 steps, where I made explicit the neuro-high level assumption used in step 1-6 and show explicitly at step 7 how the UD* (the complete running of the UD) discharge that assumption. The mathematical reason why we escape the contradiction is related to the closure of diagonalization, and to Kleene's second recursion theorem, which allows machine to invoke machines invoking them. It is standard in theoretical computer science. Judson Webb explains well how Gödel's theorem protect Church thesis, which protect mechanism. In fact Gödel's theorem and the whole of G*-G, create the points of view (by the machine distinction between Bp and Bp p, etc.), and protect the whole machine's theology, by splitting the communicable part from the non communicable one. Mathematical logic distinguish also what is expressible by the machine, and what is not expressible, yet known or produces as true in many possible ways. The UD even run dreams in dreams in dreams in a completely circular way. We cannot impeach it to dig in the absurd, once it is computable. That would be like trying to eliminate the number 13 from the integers. Obviously, if the level is so low you need to simulate the entire universal wave, in practice you will say NO to the doctor, but at step seven, even if the level is that low, the main consequences remain unchanged. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?
On Dec 13, 2013, at 10:22 AM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 4:45 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Any time John Clark pretends that he does not understand or believe in first-person indeterminancy, But I do believe in and understand first-person indeterminacy, in fact it was without question the very first thing that I ever understood in my life; even as a infant I realized that I didn't know what I would see next, and even if I did I didn't know what I would do next. So you agree with step three. It's time to admit you have found no flaw in it and proceed to the next steps. refer him to his own post where he admitts to understanding it and believing in it: https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/5PR1FXp_CSU/PnuTSn_82PwJ John Clark: So yes, subjectively the intelligence would have no way of knowing if A was true or B, or to put it another way subjectively it would make no difference. I stand by every word I wrote, especially subjectively it would make no difference; but if you're going to quote me quote the entire paragraph: Both A and B are identical in that the intelligence doesn't know what it is going to see next; but increasingly convoluted thought experiments are not needed to demonstrate that everyday fact. The only difference is that in A lots of copies are made of the intelligence and in B they are not; but as the intelligence would have no way of knowing if a copy had been made of itself or not nor would it have any way of knowing if it was the original or the copy, subjectively it doesn't matter if A or B is true. So yes, subjectively the intelligence would have no way of knowing if A was true or B, or to put it another way subjectively it would make no difference. And I concluded that post with: the conclusion is the same, and that is the not very profound conclusion that you never know what you're going to see next, and Bruno's grand discovery of First Person Indeterminacy is just regular old dull as dishwater indeterminacy first discovered by Og the caveman. After the big buildup it's a bit of a letdown actually. John K Clark As liz summarized, you went from that's wrong! to that's obvious! Which is it? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Uruguay
On 12/13/2013 5:51 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: Hope the US and Uruguay take this into more consideration. Seizures of 6-7 figure amounts of cash and product, do represent conflict of interest, for first officers on the scene, before they've been counted. Officers have bills to pay too and lack of seizure oversight is a huge blind spot for corrupting government officials. PGC Even *with* oversight, it's a big conflict of interest because the assets obtained in a crime are usually forfeited to the government and they often go to the local law enforcement that seized them. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The Yes-Doctor Experiment for real
On 13 Dec 2013, at 19:37, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Bruno, Why does an entire universe need to be simulated? ? If I (third person self-reference) is Turing emulable, then the entire universe is certainly not emulable, nor even well definable. Could not just finite portions of some universe be simulated, that which is perceived by the observers (however such might be defined). Yes, that is what the UD does, all computations going through your comp state, below (and above) your substitution level. The physical universe is an epistemological relative (indexical) view from inside, and the FPI makes it a priori not computable, below the substitution level. Keep in mind I only translate a problem in arithmetic. That is a miracle made possible by the conjunction of the Church-Post-Turing thesis and the yes doctor bet/assumption. (You know the details). Why does it seem that a god's eye view needs to be simulated? Stephen, you make me anxious. I have never said such a ridiculous thing. Even a first person point of view of a machine, cannot be simulated or even defined by that machine, or other machines. The ONE of comp is Arithmetical Truth (or the set of Gödel numbers of true arithmetical sentences). That is not Turing emulable at all. Arithmetical truth is the union of all sigma_i, all pi_i, sentences, and that's the God of the machine (in a first approximation, in the meta-theology of simple machines). The simulable = the sigma_1 truth = the universal machine (a finite being) = the man (Plotinus) = us (in our local terrestrial context or relative universal machines (and that follows from the assumption). BTW, David Albert's argument against the narratability of the universe is a very strong case against any concept of a god's eye view, IMHO. For a physical universe appearance that is an easy consequence of computationalism. If Albert derives this from QM, that confirms the type of thing a universe can be with computationalism. Don't confuse arithmetical, and computable. The computable is the tiny sigma_1 part of the arithmetical (which contains the pi_1, sigma_2, etc. sentences. Many machine's attribute are not computable, especially her relation with Truth, which are quite NOT computable, and physics inherit some of those non computable parts. (a priori too many, reducing the mind body problem in an arithmetical justification of physics problem). Keep in mind: sigma_1 truth = simulable = equivalent to proving a sigma_1 sentence EnP(n) in RA or in any universal system. Arithmetical-truth is the much vaster set union of all sigma_i and pi_i. It contains very complex sentences, like a Pi_3 sentence AxEyAzP(x, y, z). The Riemann hypothesis is only Pi_1, that is a negation of a sigma_1 sentence, they have the shape AxP(x), with P decidable. For any correct Löbian machine his consistency (or existence of a model/reality), that is Dt, or t, is a true pi_1 sentence, yet unprovable by the machine. No worry, the god of the machine is not Turing emulable, God's eyes is not Turing emulable, not computable. And the complete Noùs, the second hypostases (with the quantified modal logic), qG*, is worse. Even God cannot emulate it. At the propositional level, yet, by Solovay, those theories are decidable, even about the undecidable. G cannot prove Dt reflects that the correct machine cannot prove its consistency, and G* (decidable, even nicely representable in G) proves Dt, and all similar unprovable propositions. They are trivial for us because the little machine is kept simple and rational. The result is irreversible or essential, in the sense it will remain true for any effective or mechanical extension of the machine. The arithmetical clothes of B can change and develop, but as long as the machine keep self-referential correctness, its science will obey G, and its theology will obey G*, and its soul obey S4Grz. (and the three physics are qS4Grz1, qZ1*, qX1* where in Z: []p = Bp Dt. In X, []p = Bp Dt p. And 1 means we add p - Bp to G, to restrict the atomic sentences to the computable. Bruno On Thursday, December 12, 2013 1:39:33 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 12 Dec 2013, at 19:06, meekerdb wrote: On 12/12/2013 9:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 2) the lower level: the description of the Heisenberg matrix state of the entire (quantum observable) state of the entire local cluster of galaxies, (including dark matter!) and all this at the level of the right fields, or at the level of elementary strings and branes, and this with 10^(10^10) decimals. Use the Schroedinger picture if you prefer. No collapse! But in this case the doctor doing the substitution is included in the substitution. I think this produces a contradiction. That happens all the time with universal machines. They can simulate another machine simulating themselves, and the UD
Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?
On Fri, Dec 13, 2013 at 4:41 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: One told me: I see in my diary that I predicted (in Helsinki) that I would be at both places, but I see now that this was wrong I predicted? In such a situation that would only be a half truth, it would be much more accurate to say the Helsinki man predicted or Bruno Marchal predicted. A pronoun has raised its ugly head yet again. Because you have already agreed that both copy are instantiation of the Helsinki person. So the Moscow man's assertion that he sees Moscow and only Moscow is only half the information needed to invalidate the prediction that the Helsinki Man would see both Moscow and Washington; not that I can see what prediction has to do with personal identity that's the difference between comp and computationalism, and that is why you insist on using your homemade silly little word rather than the standard term. For the billionth time: it is sum up by Church thesis + yes doctor, That is computationalism not comp. comp is just shorter than computationalism. There is simply no way that could be true because I've heard you say a billion times if comp is true then X where X is something very odd that in no way follows from computationalism; so the only thing I know for sure about comp is it doesn't mean computationalism. I NEVER said I believe in comp, Stop playing with word. There was no quote around comp. I always put quotes around comp; I may mention the word but as I don't know what it means I have no way to use it, as a logician you of all people should know of the use/mention distinction, in was a key element in Godel's proof. you are stuck in the 1p/3p confusion. For several years now Bruno Marchal has accused John Clark of that, but John Clark would maintain that there is not a single person on the face of the earth who is confused by the difference between the first person and the third person. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The Yes-Doctor Experiment for real
On Fri, Dec 13, 2013 at 3:42 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 13 Dec 2013, at 19:37, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Bruno, Why does an entire universe need to be simulated? ? If I (third person self-reference) is Turing emulable, then the entire universe is certainly not emulable, nor even well definable. OK, cool. Could not just finite portions of some universe be simulated, that which is perceived by the observers (however such might be defined). Yes, that is what the UD does, all computations going through your comp state, below (and above) your substitution level. The physical universe is an epistemological relative (indexical) view from inside, and the FPI makes it a priori not computable, below the substitution level. Keep in mind I only translate a problem in arithmetic. That is a miracle made possible by the conjunction of the Church-Post-Turing thesis and the yes doctor bet/assumption. (You know the details). I suspect that Yes Doctor is a cheat. It assumes a plurality of minds that share a common reality in order to define a level of substitution. I think that the commonality *is* the physical reality and that the ability replacing parts is merely the side effect. We agree that there is no primitive material world, we disagree that there is a primitive mathematical world. Arithmetic realism is not neutral monism as I see things. Why does it seem that a god's eye view needs to be simulated? Stephen, you make me anxious. I have never said such a ridiculous thing. Even a first person point of view of a machine, cannot be simulated or even defined by that machine, or other machines. My apologies. I didn't mean to put words in your mouth. My comment about a god's eye view was not aimed at you. I simply find the very idea of a god's eye view and its related Laplacean material Universe to be absurd and contradicted by facts. The ONE of comp is Arithmetical Truth (or the set of Gödel numbers of true arithmetical sentences). That is not Turing emulable at all. Arithmetical truth is the union of all sigma_i, all pi_i, sentences, and that's the God of the machine (in a first approximation, in the meta-theology of simple machines). The simulable = the sigma_1 truth = the universal machine (a finite being) = the man (Plotinus) = us (in our local terrestrial context or relative universal machines (and that follows from the assumption). Sure! I concur, but I suspect that this view is a bit too Platonic. BTW, David Albert's argument against the narratability of the universe is a very strong case against any concept of a god's eye view, IMHO. For a physical universe appearance that is an easy consequence of computationalism. If Albert derives this from QM, that confirms the type of thing a universe can be with computationalism. Don't confuse arithmetical, and computable. The computable is the tiny sigma_1 part of the arithmetical (which contains the pi_1, sigma_2, etc. sentences. Ah, I do often confuse these two. yes, thank you for the correction. Many machine's attribute are not computable, especially her relation with Truth, which are quite NOT computable, and physics inherit some of those non computable parts. (a priori too many, reducing the mind body problem in an arithmetical justification of physics problem). Keep in mind: sigma_1 truth = simulable = equivalent to proving a sigma_1 sentence EnP(n) in RA or in any universal system. Arithmetical-truth is the much vaster set union of all sigma_i and pi_i. It contains very complex sentences, like a Pi_3 sentence AxEyAzP(x, y, z). The Riemann hypothesis is only Pi_1, that is a negation of a sigma_1 sentence, they have the shape AxP(x), with P decidable. For any correct Löbian machine his consistency (or existence of a model/reality), that is Dt, or t, is a true pi_1 sentence, yet unprovable by the machine. No worry, the god of the machine is not Turing emulable, God's eyes is not Turing emulable, not computable. I agree! I wish more people understood that, Bruno! It is a very deep and important result! And the complete Noùs, the second hypostases (with the quantified modal logic), qG*, is worse. Even God cannot emulate it. At the propositional level, yet, by Solovay, those theories are decidable, even about the undecidable. G cannot prove Dt reflects that the correct machine cannot prove its consistency, and G* (decidable, even nicely representable in G) proves Dt, and all similar unprovable propositions. They are trivial for us because the little machine is kept simple and rational. The result is irreversible or essential, in the sense it will remain true for any effective or mechanical extension of the machine. The arithmetical clothes of B can change and develop, but as long as the machine keep self-referential correctness, its science will obey G, and its theology will obey G*, and its soul obey S4Grz. (and the three
Re: The Yes-Doctor Experiment for real
I must admit I'm more likely to say yes if the Doctor in question is Matt Smith :) On 14 December 2013 11:09, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote: On Fri, Dec 13, 2013 at 3:42 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 13 Dec 2013, at 19:37, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Bruno, Why does an entire universe need to be simulated? ? If I (third person self-reference) is Turing emulable, then the entire universe is certainly not emulable, nor even well definable. OK, cool. Could not just finite portions of some universe be simulated, that which is perceived by the observers (however such might be defined). Yes, that is what the UD does, all computations going through your comp state, below (and above) your substitution level. The physical universe is an epistemological relative (indexical) view from inside, and the FPI makes it a priori not computable, below the substitution level. Keep in mind I only translate a problem in arithmetic. That is a miracle made possible by the conjunction of the Church-Post-Turing thesis and the yes doctor bet/assumption. (You know the details). I suspect that Yes Doctor is a cheat. It assumes a plurality of minds that share a common reality in order to define a level of substitution. I think that the commonality *is* the physical reality and that the ability replacing parts is merely the side effect. We agree that there is no primitive material world, we disagree that there is a primitive mathematical world. Arithmetic realism is not neutral monism as I see things. Why does it seem that a god's eye view needs to be simulated? Stephen, you make me anxious. I have never said such a ridiculous thing. Even a first person point of view of a machine, cannot be simulated or even defined by that machine, or other machines. My apologies. I didn't mean to put words in your mouth. My comment about a god's eye view was not aimed at you. I simply find the very idea of a god's eye view and its related Laplacean material Universe to be absurd and contradicted by facts. The ONE of comp is Arithmetical Truth (or the set of Gödel numbers of true arithmetical sentences). That is not Turing emulable at all. Arithmetical truth is the union of all sigma_i, all pi_i, sentences, and that's the God of the machine (in a first approximation, in the meta-theology of simple machines). The simulable = the sigma_1 truth = the universal machine (a finite being) = the man (Plotinus) = us (in our local terrestrial context or relative universal machines (and that follows from the assumption). Sure! I concur, but I suspect that this view is a bit too Platonic. BTW, David Albert's argument against the narratability of the universe is a very strong case against any concept of a god's eye view, IMHO. For a physical universe appearance that is an easy consequence of computationalism. If Albert derives this from QM, that confirms the type of thing a universe can be with computationalism. Don't confuse arithmetical, and computable. The computable is the tiny sigma_1 part of the arithmetical (which contains the pi_1, sigma_2, etc. sentences. Ah, I do often confuse these two. yes, thank you for the correction. Many machine's attribute are not computable, especially her relation with Truth, which are quite NOT computable, and physics inherit some of those non computable parts. (a priori too many, reducing the mind body problem in an arithmetical justification of physics problem). Keep in mind: sigma_1 truth = simulable = equivalent to proving a sigma_1 sentence EnP(n) in RA or in any universal system. Arithmetical-truth is the much vaster set union of all sigma_i and pi_i. It contains very complex sentences, like a Pi_3 sentence AxEyAzP(x, y, z). The Riemann hypothesis is only Pi_1, that is a negation of a sigma_1 sentence, they have the shape AxP(x), with P decidable. For any correct Löbian machine his consistency (or existence of a model/reality), that is Dt, or t, is a true pi_1 sentence, yet unprovable by the machine. No worry, the god of the machine is not Turing emulable, God's eyes is not Turing emulable, not computable. I agree! I wish more people understood that, Bruno! It is a very deep and important result! And the complete Noùs, the second hypostases (with the quantified modal logic), qG*, is worse. Even God cannot emulate it. At the propositional level, yet, by Solovay, those theories are decidable, even about the undecidable. G cannot prove Dt reflects that the correct machine cannot prove its consistency, and G* (decidable, even nicely representable in G) proves Dt, and all similar unprovable propositions. They are trivial for us because the little machine is kept simple and rational. The result is irreversible or essential, in the sense it will remain true for any effective or mechanical extension of the machine. The arithmetical clothes of
Re: Global warming ?
Seems to be a tiny CO2 spike at the right hand end. The resolution on that graph is too low to really see a mere 50 or 100 years I guess. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
