On Thursday, February 27, 2014 7:30:22 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>
> On 28 February 2014 12:36, Craig Weinberg
> > wrote:
>
>> Identity isn't self contained in MSR. All identity is leased within some
>> perspective. The more common the perspective, the longer the lease, and the
>> more 'seems lik
On 28 February 2014 12:36, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> Identity isn't self contained in MSR. All identity is leased within some
> perspective. The more common the perspective, the longer the lease, and the
> more 'seems like' or 'has a similar quality' appears stabilized as 'is
> equal'.
>
> What is
On Thursday, February 27, 2014 12:52:41 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 25 Feb 2014, at 23:30, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> 0 doesn't = 0 in my theory.
>
>
Identity isn't self contained in MSR. All identity is leased within some
perspective. The more common the perspective, the longer the
On 25 Feb 2014, at 23:30, Craig Weinberg wrote:
0 doesn't = 0 in my theory.
I was beginning suspecting this.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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On 25 Feb 2014, at 18:44, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/25/2014 7:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Feb 2014, at 20:38, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/23/2014 4:35 AM, David Nyman wrote:
Not "my" consciousness, no. I'm just suggesting that CTM
ultimately relies on some transcendent notion of perspective
i
On 25 Feb 2014, at 18:36, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/25/2014 7:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
admitting simply that indexical notion are modal notion, and thus
don't need to obey to Leibniz identity rule.
I don't understand that remark. Are you saying that there is some
modal notion that makes id
On Thursday, February 27, 2014 9:38:05 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 24 Feb 2014, at 17:31, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 9:13:26 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>> On 24 February 2014 02:43, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>> How do you turn your desire to move your
On 24 Feb 2014, at 17:31, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Monday, February 24, 2014 9:13:26 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
On 24 February 2014 02:43, Craig Weinberg wrote:
How do you turn your desire to move your hand into the neurological
changes which move them? The neurological change is the expr
On 2/25/2014 7:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Feb 2014, at 20:38, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/23/2014 4:35 AM, David Nyman wrote:
Not "my" consciousness, no. I'm just suggesting that CTM ultimately relies on some
transcendent notion of perspective itself. IOW, the sensible world is conceived as t
On 2/25/2014 7:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
admitting simply that indexical notion are modal notion, and thus don't need to obey to
Leibniz identity rule.
I don't understand that remark. Are you saying that there is some modal notion that makes
identity of indiscernibles wrong? I think of ind
On 24 Feb 2014, at 04:23, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Sunday, February 23, 2014 11:50:57 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 Feb 2014, at 18:36, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Saturday, February 22, 2014 11:27:45 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 22 Feb 2014, at 15:25, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On 23 Feb 2014, at 20:57, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sunday, February 23, 2014 7:07:21 PM UTC, Brent wrote:
On 2/23/2014 1:13 AM, LizR wrote:
On 23 February 2014 20:48, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/22/2014 9:21 PM, LizR wrote:
On 23 February 2014 17:40, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/22/2014 5:49 PM, David
On 23 Feb 2014, at 20:38, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/23/2014 4:35 AM, David Nyman wrote:
Not "my" consciousness, no. I'm just suggesting that CTM ultimately
relies on some transcendent notion of perspective itself. IOW, the
sensible world is conceived as the resultant of the inter-
subjective ag
On 23 Feb 2014, at 20:07, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/23/2014 1:13 AM, LizR wrote:
On 23 February 2014 20:48, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/22/2014 9:21 PM, LizR wrote:
On 23 February 2014 17:40, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/22/2014 5:49 PM, David Nyman wrote:
No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continu
On 23 Feb 2014, at 13:54, David Nyman wrote:
On 23 February 2014 09:22, LizR wrote:
On 23 February 2014 20:48, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/22/2014 9:21 PM, LizR wrote:
On 23 February 2014 17:40, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/22/2014 5:49 PM, David Nyman wrote:
No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite
On Monday, February 24, 2014 3:32:03 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 24 February 2014 16:31, Craig Weinberg
> > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 9:13:26 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>>> On 24 February 2014 02:43, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>> How do you turn your desire to
On 24 February 2014 16:31, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 9:13:26 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> On 24 February 2014 02:43, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>> How do you turn your desire to move your hand into the neurological
>>> changes which move them? The neurological c
On Monday, February 24, 2014 9:13:26 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 24 February 2014 02:43, Craig Weinberg
> > wrote:
>
> How do you turn your desire to move your hand into the neurological
>> changes which move them? The neurological change is the expression of what
>> you actually are.
On 24 February 2014 02:43, Craig Weinberg wrote:
How do you turn your desire to move your hand into the neurological changes
> which move them? The neurological change is the expression of what you
> actually are. These primitive levels of sense are beyond the question of
> 'how', they are more i
On Sunday, February 23, 2014 11:50:57 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 22 Feb 2014, at 18:36, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 11:27:45 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 22 Feb 2014, at 15:25, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>> > If you say yes to the doctor,
On 24 February 2014 15:04, meekerdb wrote:
> On 2/23/2014 4:57 PM, LizR wrote:
>
>
>> But it raises the question, given complete amnesia and then growing up
>> with different experiences and memories in what sense could you be the same
>> person. I John Clark and Bruno's back and forth, the one
On Sunday, February 23, 2014 6:51:21 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 23 February 2014 19:04, Craig Weinberg
> > wrote:
>
>>
>> After all, the standard objection to starting from the putative
>>> universality of consciousness is why does it appear that so much of the
>>> world of appearanc
On 2/23/2014 4:57 PM, LizR wrote:
But it raises the question, given complete amnesia and then growing up with
different experiences and memories in what sense could you be the same
person. I
John Clark and Bruno's back and forth, the one thing they always agree on
is that as
On 24 February 2014 08:07, meekerdb wrote:
> I wrote "no reason to assume" that consciousness is not the content of
> consciousness. The premise I took is "everyone's on their first
> consciousness". For which you offered the explanation of amnesia; and I
> offered a different one. If you're go
On 23 February 2014 19:04, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I like that. Not sure about being *an* iron man, I have to be *the* iron
> man (for my money there is only one iron man, and its the Ozzy one).
This one?
".. The story of a man who time travels into the future, and sees the
apocalypse. In the pr
On 24 February 2014 00:05, meekerdb wrote:
The point I was getting at was whether you're supposing there are
> *insensible^ parts to the world, which we may infer from the sensible part
> or from mathematics?
In short, yes.
David
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On 2/23/2014 2:45 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 23 February 2014 19:38, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>
wrote:
On 2/23/2014 4:35 AM, David Nyman wrote:
Not "my" consciousness, no. I'm just suggesting that CTM ultimately relies
on some
transcendent notion of perspective itself.
On 23 February 2014 19:04, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> After all, the standard objection to starting from the putative
>> universality of consciousness is why does it appear that so much of the
>> world of appearance is *unconscious*?
>>
>
> That is the only criticism that I have come up with so f
On 23 February 2014 19:38, meekerdb wrote:
> On 2/23/2014 4:35 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>
> Not "my" consciousness, no. I'm just suggesting that CTM ultimately relies
> on some transcendent notion of perspective itself. IOW, the sensible world
> is conceived as the resultant of the inter-subjectiv
On Sunday, February 23, 2014 7:07:21 PM UTC, Brent wrote:
>
> On 2/23/2014 1:13 AM, LizR wrote:
>
> On 23 February 2014 20:48, meekerdb >wrote:
>
>> On 2/22/2014 9:21 PM, LizR wrote:
>>
>> On 23 February 2014 17:40, meekerdb > >wrote:
>>
>>> On 2/22/2014 5:49 PM, David Nyman wrote:
>>>
On 2/23/2014 4:35 AM, David Nyman wrote:
Not "my" consciousness, no. I'm just suggesting that CTM ultimately relies on some
transcendent notion of perspective itself. IOW, the sensible world is conceived as the
resultant of the inter-subjective agreement of its possible observers, each of which
On 2/23/2014 1:13 AM, LizR wrote:
On 23 February 2014 20:48, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>
wrote:
On 2/22/2014 9:21 PM, LizR wrote:
On 23 February 2014 17:40, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
On 2/22/2014 5:49 PM, David Nyman wrote:
No, I don't t
On 22 Feb 2014, at 18:36, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Saturday, February 22, 2014 11:27:45 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 Feb 2014, at 15:25, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> If you say yes to the doctor, you are saying that originality is an
> illusion
Not at all. Your 1p-originality is preser
On 23 February 2014 03:12, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 8:49:33 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> On 23 February 2014 00:27, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 4:06:39 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>>>
On 22 February 2014 15:09
On 23 February 2014 09:22, LizR wrote:
> On 23 February 2014 20:48, meekerdb wrote:
>
>> On 2/22/2014 9:21 PM, LizR wrote:
>>
>> On 23 February 2014 17:40, meekerdb wrote:
>>
>>> On 2/22/2014 5:49 PM, David Nyman wrote:
>>>
>>> No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of
>
On 23 February 2014 04:40, meekerdb wrote:
> No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of
> consciousness is directly entailed by CTM. In fact it is equivalent to the
> continuing existence of the sensible world (i.e. per comp, the world is
> what is observed). Hence any observe
On 23 February 2014 20:48, meekerdb wrote:
> On 2/22/2014 9:21 PM, LizR wrote:
>
> On 23 February 2014 17:40, meekerdb wrote:
>
>> On 2/22/2014 5:49 PM, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>> No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of
>> consciousness is directly entailed by CTM. In fac
On 23 February 2014 20:48, meekerdb wrote:
> On 2/22/2014 9:21 PM, LizR wrote:
>
> On 23 February 2014 17:40, meekerdb wrote:
>
>> On 2/22/2014 5:49 PM, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>> No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of
>> consciousness is directly entailed by CTM. In fac
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of LizR
Sent: Friday, February 21, 2014 11:37 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
"I wouldn't ride in the damn thing!" -- Larry Niven,
On 2/22/2014 9:21 PM, LizR wrote:
On 23 February 2014 17:40, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>
wrote:
On 2/22/2014 5:49 PM, David Nyman wrote:
No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of
consciousness is
directly entailed by CTM. In fact it is equivalent to
On 23 Feb 2014, at 06:21, LizR wrote:
On 23 February 2014 17:40, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/22/2014 5:49 PM, David Nyman wrote:
No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of
consciousness is directly entailed by CTM. In fact it is equivalent
to the continuing existence of the se
On 23 February 2014 17:40, meekerdb wrote:
> On 2/22/2014 5:49 PM, David Nyman wrote:
>
> No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of
> consciousness is directly entailed by CTM. In fact it is equivalent to the
> continuing existence of the sensible world (i.e. per comp, the w
On 2/22/2014 5:49 PM, David Nyman wrote:
No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of consciousness is directly
entailed by CTM. In fact it is equivalent to the continuing existence of the sensible
world (i.e. per comp, the world is what is observed). Hence any observer can exp
On Saturday, February 22, 2014 8:49:33 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 23 February 2014 00:27, Craig Weinberg
> > wrote:
>
>
>
>>
>> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 4:06:39 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>>> On 22 February 2014 15:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
On Saturday, Fe
On 23 February 2014 00:27, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 4:06:39 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> On 22 February 2014 15:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 9:34:08 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>>>
On 22 February 2014 14:25,
On Saturday, February 22, 2014 4:06:39 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 22 February 2014 15:09, Craig Weinberg
> > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 9:34:08 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>>> On 22 February 2014 14:25, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>> If you say yes to the docto
On 22 February 2014 15:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 9:34:08 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> On 22 February 2014 14:25, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>> If you say yes to the doctor, you are saying that originality is an
>>> illusion
>>>
>>
>> Not an illusion, an in
On Saturday, February 22, 2014 11:27:45 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 22 Feb 2014, at 15:25, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > If you say yes to the doctor, you are saying that originality is an
> > illusion
>
>
> Not at all. Your 1p-originality is preserved all the time.
I'm not think
On 22 Feb 2014, at 15:25, Craig Weinberg wrote:
If you say yes to the doctor, you are saying that originality is an
illusion
Not at all. Your 1p-originality is preserved all the time. In the H-WM
duplication experience, the experiencers get all a unique experience
of the type
I am the
On 22 Feb 2014, at 02:39, David Nyman wrote:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pdxucpPq6Lc
Ha ha! I love when he shows the identity cards!
Note that this is among the thought experiences that I call
"forbidden" on this list, some years ago.
They are shortcuts, and can also provide "arguments
On Saturday, February 22, 2014 9:34:08 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 22 February 2014 14:25, Craig Weinberg
> > wrote:
>
> If you say yes to the doctor, you are saying that originality is an
>> illusion
>>
>
> Not an illusion, an invariant.
>
If it is invariant then it can't be original.
On 22 February 2014 14:25, Craig Weinberg wrote:
If you say yes to the doctor, you are saying that originality is an illusion
>
Not an illusion, an invariant.
> and simulation is absolute.
>
Not absolute, but hopefully sufficient (i.e. the idea of a level of
substitution).
Hope that helps.
If you say yes to the doctor, you are saying that originality is an
illusion and simulation is absolute. Arithmetic can do so many things, but
it can't do something that can only be done once. Think of consciousness as
not only that which can't be done more than once, it is that which cannot
ev
"I wouldn't ride in the damn thing!" -- Larry Niven, "The theory and
practice of teleportation" (from memory, I may not have got that quote 100%
right)
On 22 February 2014 14:39, David Nyman wrote:
> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pdxucpPq6Lc
>
>
> --
> You received this message because you ar
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