date:20120908


On 07.09.2012 20:30 meekerdb said the following:

On 9/7/2012 1:11 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 06.09.2012 21:03 meekerdb said the following:

On 9/6/2012 11:52 AM, Brian Tenneson wrote:



A too much powerful God leads to inconsistency.



What if reality does not always obey the laws of logic?  What
if reality is sometimes inconsistent?


This is a confusion of levels. Logic is rules about truth
preservation in declarative sentences.  Not 'obeying the laws of
logic' just means declaring inconsistent sentences. We try to
avoid this because such utterances would have no determinate
meaning.  So a *descriptions* of reality may be inconsistent (and
therefore useless) but reality is just whatever it is.  It can't
be inconsistent because it's not assertions.

Brent



This could work provided we could separate the world into mental
and physical states. The question remains though if under
physicalism one says that mental states are actually physical
states. Then I do not know how to employ such a consideration in
this case.


I don't see the problem?  Are you saying that two statements cannot
be contradictory because they are both part of reality (which would
not depend on them being physical)?

Brent


Let us try to employ this statement according to the physicalism 
expressed by Hawking in Grand Design. Everything is determined by the 
M-theory and a human being is just a biological machine. Then we find 
two states both described by the M-theory, one corresponding to a 
consistent statement made by a human being and another to an 
inconsistent one. What is difference between consistent and inconsistent 
in this context?


If we use Hawking's analogy from Grand Design with the Game of Life, 
then the question is as follows. In the Game of Life we have many very 
complex structures emerging during the game. Why would we call one 
structure consistent and another inconsistent?


Evgenii

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Re: The All


On 07.09.2012 22:22 Stephen P. King said the following:

...


Hi Evgenii,

Consider the mental image that a person suffering from anorexia has
of themselves. It is distorted and false. How does this happen?
Consider the Placebo effect and its complement, the Nocebo effect.
Are they not examples of mental states acting on physical states? How
does this happen if the mental states are just illusions (ala
materialism) or the physical states are just illusions (ala
Immaterialism)? Somehow they must be correlated with each other in
some way and which ever way that is it is one that is not always a
one to one and onto map.



Hi Stephen,

I am taking place right now in a discussion in a Russian forum on 
philosophy. There was a good point there that when we say that Descartes 
was a dualist (res cogitans and res extensa), it is actually wrong. By 
Descartes there was also God and as a result everything was quite 
consistent by him. Problems start when we consider res cogitans and res 
extensa without God. Just FYI, I personally have enjoyed such a comment.


I have to read Pratt yet, sorry. Just a small note now. I do not see how 
res cogitans and res extensa allow us to explain a three-dimensional 
world that I observe. When we say ideas, then it could work but it is 
unclear to me what to do with a visual world.


Say I see my image behind the mirror (I have written behind instead of 
in the mirror just to better describe my experience). How could you 
describe this phenomenon by means of res cogitans and res extensa?


Evgenii
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Re: Why the Church-Turing thesis?



On 07 Sep 2012, at 12:24, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 28 Aug 2012, at 21:57, benjayk wrote:



It seems that the Church-Turing thesis, that states that an
universal turing
machine can compute everything that is intuitively computable, has
near
universal acceptance among computer scientists.


Yes indeed. I think there are two strong arguments for this.

The empirical one: all attempts to define the set of computable
functions have led to the same class of functions, and this despite
the quite independent path leading to the definitions (from Church
lambda terms, Post production systems, von Neumann machine, billiard
ball, combinators, cellular automata ... up to modular functor,
quantum topologies, quantum computers, etc.).

OK, now I understand it better. Apparently if we express a  
computation in
terms of a computable function we can always arrive at the same  
computable

function using a different computation of an abitrary turing universal
machine. That seems right to me.

But in this case I don't get why it is often claimed that CT thesis  
claims
that all computations can be done by a universal turing machine, not  
merely
that they lead to the same class of computable functions (if  
converted

appriopiately).


This is due to a theorem applying to all universal programming  
language, or universal system. They all contain a universal machine.  
This makes CT equivalent with the thesis that there is a universal  
machine with respect to (intuitive) computability.


It entails also an intensional Church thesis. Not only all universal  
system can compute what each others can compute, but they can compute  
the function in the same manner. This comes from the fact that a game  
of life pattern (say) can exist and compute the universal function of  
some other universal system, like a lisp interpreter for example. This  
makes all result on computations working also on the notions of  
simulation and emulation.







The latter is a far weaker statement, since computable functions  
abstract

from many relevant things about the machine.

And even this weaker statement doesn't seem true with regards to more
powerful models like super-recursive functions, as computable  
functions just

give finite results, while super-recursive machine can give
infinite/unlimited results.


Computability concerns finite or infinite generable things.
Then you can weaken comp indeed, and many results remains valid, but  
are longer to prove. I use comp and numbers as it is easier.








Bruno Marchal wrote:


The conceptual one: the class of computable functions is closed for
the most transcendental operation in math: diagonalization. This is
not the case for the notions of definability, provability,
cardinality, etc.

I don't really know what this means. Do you mean that there are just
countable many computations? If yes, what has this do with whether all
universal turing machines are equivalent?


It means that the notion of computability, despite being epistemic, is  
well defined in math. It is the only such notion. The diagnonalization  
cannot been applied to find a new computable function already not in  
the class of the one given by any universal machine.
It makes comp far more explanatively close than any concept in math  
and physics.









Bruno Marchal wrote:




I really wonder why this is so, given that there are simple cases
where we
can compute something that an abitrary turing machine can not
compute using
a notion of computation that is not extraordinary at all (and quite
relevant
in reality).
For example, given you have a universal turing machine A that uses  
the
alphabet {1,0} and a universal turing machine B that uses the  
alphabet

{-1,0,1}.
Now it is quite clear that the machine A cannot directly answer any
questions that relates to -1. For example it cannot directly compute
-1*-1=1. Machine A can only be used to use an encoded input value  
and

encoded description of machine B, and give an output that is correct
given
the right decoding scheme.
But for me this already makes clear that machine A is less
computationally
powerful than machine B.


Church thesis concerns only the class of computable functions.
Hm, maybe the wikipedia article is a bad one, since it mentioned  
computable
functions just as means of explaining it, not as part of its  
definition.



Bruno Marchal wrote:


The  alphabet used by the Turing machine, having 1, 2, or enumerable
alphabet does not change the class. If you dovetail on the works of 1
letter Turing machine, you will unavoidably emulate all Turing
machines on all finite and enumerable letters alphabets. This can be
proved. Nor does the number of tapes, and/or  parallelism change that
class.
Of course, some machine can be very inefficient, but this, by
definition, does not concern Church thesis.
Even so, CT thesis makes a claim about the equivalence of machines,  
not of

emulability.


It does, by the intensional CT, which follows

Re: being conscious in a completely atemporal mode

On 07 Sep 2012, at 13:24, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 9/7/2012 2:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
It is a recent suggestion, corroborated by the salvia reports and
experiences. I was used to agree with Brouwer that consciousness
and subjective time are not separable, like the 1p logic
examplifies (S4Grz is both a temporal logic, and the machine's 1p
logic), but I am open to change my mind on this. We can hallucinate
being conscious in a completely atemporal mode. I would not have
believed this without living it, as it seems indeed to be a
contradiction from the usual mundane state of consciousness.
But it makes sense in arithmetic, or for the consciousness of the
universal non Löbian machine. Apparently, subjective time might be
a result of self-consciousness, and not just consciousness. This
makes consciousness a bit more primitive than I thought indeed.

Dear Bruno,

Could you explain a bit more what the experience of being
conscious in a completely atemporal mode was like? Where you aware
of any kind of change in your environment? Was one's internal
narrative (of external events) silent?

Unfortunately I cannot explain. In that state the notion of
environment does not make sense, and there are no narrative possible,
as you don't even know what is language, words, persons, ... It might
be like being a two days old embryo. You are conscious, and that's
all. You are not conscious of something, just conscious, and nothing
else exists or make sense.

I have always suspected that subjective time might be a result
of self-consciousness but have not had any way of discussing the
idea coherently. If we stipulate that subjective time is a form of
noticing that one is noticing changes (a second order aspect) in
one's environment, then this would fall into being a result of self-
consciousness (which is obviously a second order effect at least to
me).

OK. Here Bp p is nice as it provides simultaneously a theory of the
first person logic, and a temporal logic, so the idea of time might be
a product of the self. But consciousness might still be something
deeper.

Bruno

I have debated this idea before on this List with Russell Standish
but we didn't seem to reach any definite conclusion.

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Re: Sane2004 Step One



On 07 Sep 2012, at 13:39, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 9/7/2012 3:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



But you claim that too, as matter is not primitive. or you lost me  
again.
I need matter to communicate with you, but that matter is explained  
in comp as a a persistent relational entity, so I don't see the  
problem. It is necessary in the sense that it is implied by the  
comp hypothesis, even constructively (making comp testable). It is  
even more stable and solid than anything we might extrapolate  
from observation, as we might be dreaming. Indeed it comes from the  
atemporal ultra-stable relations between numbers, that you recently  
mention as not created by man (I am very glad :).


Bruno

Dear Bruno,

Matter is not primitive as it is not irreducible. My claim is  
that matter is, explained very crudely, patterns of invariances for  
some collection of inter-communicating observers (where an observer  
can be merely a photon detector that records its states).


OK, except that we have no photon at the start.



This is not contradictory to your explanation of it as persistent  
relational entity, but my definition is very explicit about the  
requirements that give rise to the persistent relations.  I  
believe that these might be second order relations between  
computational streams. and can be defined in terms of bisimulation  
relations between streams.


You might try to relate this with the UDA consequences.



I question the very idea of atemporal ultra-stable relations  
between numbers since numbers cannot be considered consistently as  
just entities that correspond to 0, 1, 2, 3, ... We have to consider  
all possible denotations of the signified.


I think this is deeply flawed. Notion of denotations and set of  
denotations, are more complex that the notion of numbers.






See http://www.aber.ac.uk/media/Documents/S4B/sem02.html#signified  
for an explanation. Additionally, there are not just a single type  
of number as there is a dependence on the model of arithmetic that  
one is using.


Outside arithmetic. This use the intuitive notion of numbers, even  
second order arithmetic. This is explained, through comp, as construct  
of numbers.




For example Robinson Arithmetic and Peano Arithmetic do not define  
the same numbers.


Of course they do. RA has more model than PA, but we use the theory  
with the intended model in mind, relying on our intuition of numbers,  
not on any theory. No one ever interpret a number in the sense of a  
non standard numbers.  That would make comp quite fuzzy. Nobody would  
say yes to a doctor if he believe that he is a non standard machine/ 
number. You can't code them in any finite (in the standard sense!) ways.





So we have multiple signified and multiple signifiers and cannot  
assume a single mapping scheme between them. I suppose that a  
canonical map exists in terms of the Tennebaum theorem, but I need  
to discuss this more with you to resolve my understanding of this  
question.


You do at the absic level what I suspect you to do in many post.  
Escaping forward in the complexity. But to get the technical results  
all you need is assessing your intuition of finite, and things like  
the sequence 0, s(0), s(s(0)), etc.
Then if you agree with the definition of addition and multiplication,  
everything will be OK. If not you would be like a neuroscientist  
trying to define a neuron by the activity of a brain thinking about a  
neuron, and you will get a complexity catastrophe.


This remark is very important. Your critics here apply to all papers  
you cite. We have to agree on simple things at the start,  
independently of the fact that we can't define them by simpler notion.  
For the numbers, or programs, finite strings, hereditarily finite  
objects,  the miracle is that we do share the standard notion of it,  
unlike for any other notions like set, real number, etc.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Can experiences be teleported ?



On 07 Sep 2012, at 13:08, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal

Eventually you will have to answer the question of what is  
teleportable.
I have no doubt that someday matter can be transported, even  
information.

Even energy.

But the more important question to me is whether or not experiences
(the stuff of life or consciousness) can be transported.


It cannot as it is in Platonia. But Stathis just give a good answer,  
as it applies to the local relative manifestation of consciousness.  
When I study for an exam, I will relatively transported my local  
knowledge through the bus I will take.


Comp makes matter itself not teletransportable, and QM confirms this:  
you cannot teleport matter in the quantum way, you still have to  
transport classically an irreductible set of classical bits.


Bruno








Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/7/2012
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-06, 13:44:55
Subject: Re: Sane2004 Step One


On 05 Sep 2012, at 08:38, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 9/5/2012 2:03 AM, meekerdb wrote:

On 9/4/2012 10:07 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 9/5/2012 12:38 AM, meekerdb wrote:

On 9/4/2012 8:59 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:


Notice that both the duplication and the teleportation, as  
discussed, assume that the information content is exactly  
copyable.


Not exactly. Only sufficiently accurately to maintain your  
consciousness.


If the copy is not exact then functional equivalence is not  
exact either and this is fatal for the model.


Then you should mourn the Stephen P. King of and hour ago.  He's  
been fatally changed.


Never, I am not the impermanent image on the world stage. I am  
the fire that casts the images.








This is not qubits that are involved... The point here is that  
this comp model assume that Reality is, at is ground level,  
classical.


It doesn't assume that.  A fully quantum computation can be  
performed on a classical, i.e. Turing,   computer.   
Bruno would just say it just takes a lower level of substitution.


Yes, a classical computer can emulate a finite quantum  
computation given sufficient resources. This is not the same  
thing as the EPR effect that I am considering. The idea that I am  
considering is more like this:


Consider the visible physical universe. We know from observation  
that not only is it open on one end and that it's expansion is  
accelerating. People want to put this off on some Dark Energy.  
I think that it is something else, driving it. Consider a  
classical computer that needs to emulate a quantum computation.  
It has to have even increasing resources to keep up with the QC  
if the QC is modeling an expanding universe. It we take Bruno's  
AR literally, where are these resources coming from?


They are computations.  They exist in Platonia. He's trying to  
explain matter, so he can't very well assume material resources.   
The world is made out of arithmetic, an infinite resource.


Sure, but the explanation of the idea requires matter to be  
communicated. A slight oversight perhaps.


But there is matter, in the comp theory. That is all what UDA  
explains, and what the Z and X logics axiomatizes.








Let's turn the tables and make Reality Quantum in its  
essence. The classical computation may just be something that the  
QC is running.


There's not difference as computations.


You are correct but only in the absence of considerations of  
inputs and outputs and their concurrency. Abstract theory leaves  
out the obvious, but when it pretends to toss out the obvious, that  
is going to far.


Matter is not obvious.








What is most interesting is that the QC can run an arbitrary  
number of classical computations, all at the same time. The CC  
can only barely compute the emulation of a single QC.


You are talking about QC and CC as though they were material  
computers with finite resources.  Once you've assumed material  
resources you've lost any non-circular possibility of explaining  
them.


No, I am pointing out that real computations require real  
resources. Only when we ignore this fact we can get away with  
floating castles in midair.


Brent just point out that arithmetic contains infinite resource.
What do you mean by real computations? Do you mean physical  
computations? Why would they lack resources?


Bruno





What if we have an infinite and eternal QC running infinitely  
many finite CCs and each of these CC's is trying to emulate a  
single QC. Map this idea out and look at the nice self- 
referential loop that this   defines!


You're confused.


Maybe. I can handle being wrong. I learn from mistakes.



Brent
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Re: The Unprivacy of Information



On 07 Sep 2012, at 13:49, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Craig Weinberg

Although I don't follow Dawking's views on life and God,
I think his idea of semes, which are like genes but ideas instead,
is a very good one. If the logic follows through, then
man is the semes' way of propagating itself through society.


semes? is it not the memes?

Bruno





Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/7/2012
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content -
From: Craig Weinberg
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-06, 13:39:10
Subject: The Unprivacy of Information

(reposting from my blog)

If I抦 right, then the slogan 搃nformation wants to be free� is  
not just an intuition about social policy, but rather an insight  
into the ontological roots of information itself. To be more  
precise, it isn抰 that information wants to be free, it is that it  
can抰 want to be anything, and that ownership itself is predicated  
on want and familiarity. Information, by contrast, is the exact  
opposite of want and familiarity, it is the empty and generic syntax  
of strangers talking to strangers about anything.


I propose that information or data is inherently public such that it  
lacks the possibility of privacy. Information cannot be secret, it  
can only be kept a secret through voluntary participation in extra- 
informational social contracts. It is only the access to information  
that we can control - the i/o, we cannot become information or live  
in information or as information.*




Information spreads only as controlled changes in matter, not  
independently in space or non-space vacuum. Information is how stuff  
seems to other stuff. Computation exploits the universality of how  
many kinds of stuff make sense in the same basic ways. It is to make  
modular or 慸igital� collections of   objectified changes which  
can be inscribed on any sufficiently controllable substance. Not  
live hamsters or fog. They make terrible computers.


To copyright information or to encrypt it is to discourage  
unauthorized control of information access. This underscores the  
fact that information control supervenes on (requires) capacities of  
perception and intent rather than the capacities of information  
itself. We have to be shamed or frightened or tempted into agreeing  
to treat information as proprietary on behalf of the proprietor抯  
interests.We can抰 train information not to talk to strangers.






The data itself doesn抰 care if you publish it to the world or take  
credit for writing Shakespeare抯 entire catalog. This is not merely  
a strange property of information, this is the defining property of  
information in direct contradistinction to both experience and  
matter. I maintain however, that this doesn抰 indicate that  
information is a neutral monism (singular ground of being from which  
matter, energy, and awareness emerge), but rather it is the neutral  
nihilism - the shadow, if you will, of sensorimotive participation  
divisible by spacetime. It抯 a protocol that bridges the gaps  
between participants (selves, monads, agents, experiences), but it  
is not itself a participant. This is important because if we don抰  
understand this (and we are nowhere near understanding this yet),  
then we will proceed to exterminate our quality of life to a hybrid  
of Frankenstein neuro-materialism and HAL cyberfunction-idealism.




To understand why information is really not consciousness but the  
evacuated forms of consciousness, consider that matter is  
proprietary relative to the body and experience is proprietary  
relative to the self, but information is proprietary to nothing.  
Information, if it did exist, would be nothing but the essence of a- 
proprietary manifestation. It has no dimension of subjectivity  
(privacy, ownership, selfhood) at all. It is qualitatively flat.  
Information as a word is a mis-attribution of what is actually,  
ontologically, 揻ormations   to be interpreted� as code, to be  
unpacked, reconstituted, and reconstituted as a private experience.


*Who and what we are is sensorimotive matter (or materialized  
participation if you prefer卼here are a lot of fancy ways to  
describe it: Meta-juxtaposing afferent-efferent phenomenal realism,  
or private algebraic/public-geometric phenomenal realism,  
orthogonally involuted experiential syzygy, etc.)


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Re: The All



On 07 Sep 2012, at 13:53, Roger Clough wrote:




A too much powerful God leads to inconsistency. 

All-powerful does not mean unlawful.


Apparently all-powerful does mean worst than unlawful. It means that  
0 = 1.
You might look at the book by Grim on the impossibility of  
omniscience. Google on grim and omniscience. It is (again) a  
diagonal argument.


Bruno







Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/7/2012
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content -
From: meekerdb
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-06, 15:03:44
Subject: Re: The All

On 9/6/2012 11:52 AM, Brian Tenneson wrote:



A too much powerful God leads to inconsistency.



What if reality does not always obey the laws of logic?  What if  
reality is sometimes inconsistent?


This is a confusion of levels. Logic is rules about truth  
preservation in declarative sentences.  Not 'obeying the laws of  
logic' just means declaring inconsistent sentences.  We try to avoid  
this because such utterances would have no determinate meaning.  So  
a *descriptions* of reality may be inconsistent (and therefore  
useless) but reality is just whatever it is.  It can't be  
inconsistent because it's not assertions.


Brent

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers



On 07 Sep 2012, at 14:19, benjayk wrote:



You always refer to studying some paper,


Always the same.




even though the paper actually
doesn't even begin to adress the question.


Which question? The paper mainly just formulate a question, shows how  
comp makes it possible to translate the question in math, and show  
that the general shape of the possible solution is more close to Plato  
than to Aristotle.




How am I supposed to argue with
that?

There is no point of studying Gödel if we have a false assumption  
about what

the proof even is about. It is never, at no point, about numbers as
axiomatic systems. It is just about what we can express with them on a
meta-level.


On the contrary. The whole Gödel's thing relies on the fact that the  
meta-level can be embedded at the level.
Feferman fundamental papers extending Gödel is arithmetization of  
metamathematics. It is the main point: the meta can be done at the  
lower level. Machines can refer to themselves in the 3p way, and by  
using the Theatetus' definition we get a notion of 1p which provides  
some light on the 1//3 issue.





Ther is no point of studying your paper, if all it presents are more
abstractions about points of view, without ever showing how to get  
from 3-p

descriptions to an actual 1-p of view (of course, since this is
meaningless).


The miracle here is that Gödel's incompleteness renders consistent one  
of the definition of knowledge (first person) given by Theaetetus. It  
refutes Socrate's refutation of the definition. Of course Socrate  
could'nt be aware of CT and Gödel.





You just use fancy words to obfuscate that.
It is like saying  study the bible for scientific education (you  
just don't

understand how it adresses scientific questiosn yet).


No reason to be angry. It is the second time you make an ad hominem  
remark. I try to ignore that. I work in a theory and I do my best to  
help making things clear. You don't like comp, but the liking or not  
is another topic.


Bruno










Bruno Marchal wrote:






Bruno Marchal wrote:




In which way does one thing substitute another thing if actually
the
correct
interpretation of the substitution requires the original? It is
like
saying
No you don't need the calculator to calculate 24,3^12. You can
substitute
it with pen and pencil, where you write down 24,3^12=X and then
insert the
result of the calculation (using your calculator) as X.
If COMP does imply that interpreting a digital einstein needs a
real
einstein (or more) than it contradicts itself (because in this
case
we can't
*always* say YES doctor, because then there would be no original
left to
interpret the emulation).
Really it is quite a simple point. If you substitute the whole
universe with
an emulation (which is possible according to COMP)


It is not.

You are right, it is not, if we take the conclusions of your
reasoning into
account. Yet COMP itself strongly seems to suggest it. That's the
contradiction.


? Comp is it exists a level such that I survive an emulation of  
it.

Then it makes the whole of the observable reality, including
consciousness not Turing emulable. It might seems weird, but I  
don't

see a contradiction yet.

If observable reality as a whole is not emulable, there can't be a
level at
which there is a correct emulation, because we can't even
instantiate an
abstract digital emulation into reality (because observable reality
is not
digital).




Contradiction: ... abstract DIGITAL emulation into reality (because
observable reality is not
DIGITAL).
We can emulate digital features in a non digital reality.
But not purely digitally. We have to connect and instantiate the  
digital
features in the non-digital reality. And in doing this we  
necessarily need
something beyond the digital, and thus the reasoning about us being  
digital

is not valid.
We can't put a digital computer into our brains. But a real computer  
(and

its requires I/O) is not a digital abstract computer, and thus your
reasoning fails.




But
not only that, it can't exist, because the notion of digital
substitution is
meaningless in a non-digital universe.


I see no reason for that.
Because every digital substitution is bound to be ultimately non- 
digital.







Bruno Marchal wrote:




Of course we could engage in stretching the meaning of words and
argue that
COMP says functionally correct substitution, meaning that it  
also

has to
be correctly materially implementened. But in this case we can't
derive
anything from this, because a correct implementation may  
actually

require
a biological brain or even something more.


The consequences will go through as long as a level of substitution
exist.
But there can't, unless your assumption is taken as a vague  
statement,

meaning kinda digital substitution.


? If I have a MAC in the head, I am 100% digital. If I survive in a
virtual environment with it, I am 100% digital.
No. A MAC + your head isn't 100% digital. Both your MAC and the rest

Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

On 07 Sep 2012, at 14:22, benjayk wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 06 Sep 2012, at 13:31, benjayk wrote:

Quantum effects beyond individual brains (suggested by psi) can't be
computed as well: No matter what I compute in my brain, this doesn't
entangle it with other brains since computation is classical.

The UD emulates all quantum computer, as they do not violate Church
Thesis.
I am not talking about quantum computers, which are not entangled
with their

surroundings.
I am talking about systems that are entangled to other systems.

This is just lowering the comp level of substitution. It does not
change the reasoning, thanks to the use of the notion of generalized
brain.

The computational model just doesn't describe that, because it in it
there
is no way for one computation to affect another computation (or
something

else) without using input/output.

Yet in QM this is possible through entanglement.

I don't assume QM. And comp confirms the existence of entanglement,
even if quantitively many open problems subsist. My goal was to make
this precise, or more precise.

No matter how good your simulation is, it is never going to change its
surroundings without using I/O.

QM does not allows this, unless you bring by the collapse of the wave.
With comp and QM-without-collapse (MW), entanglement are partitioning
of the multi-dreams.

Bruno

benjayk

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Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence



On 07 Sep 2012, at 14:53, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal

Any time I use the word God, I always mean IMHO God.

I am actually thinking instead of Cosmic Intelligence
or Cosmnic Mind.

I try not to use that  word (God) but sometimes forget.


I can see that. No problem if it is an accepted fuzzy pointer on our  
ignorance. Big problem if you reify it into a final explanation. I  
like the term cosmic, but only as poetry. The cosmos existence is  
an open problem for me.


Bruno





Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/7/2012
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-06, 14:06:49
Subject: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit  
intelligence



On 05 Sep 2012, at 17:34, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal

God also created time, and anyway eternity is timeless,
not sure if spacless.


I can accept this as a rough sum up of some theory (= hypothesis; +  
consequences), not as an explanation per se. As an explanation, it  
is equivalent with don't ask for more understanding, and you fall  
in the authoritative trap.


Bruno






Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/5/2012
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-05, 09:51:40
Subject: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit  
intelligence



On 04 Sep 2012, at 18:42, John Clark wrote:


On Tue, Sep 4, 2012  Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote:

 God created the human race.

And when God asks Himself the question Why have I always existed,  
why haven't I always not existed? what answer in his omniscience  
does He come up with?



The neoplatonist conception of God does not allow It to ask such a  
question.


Nor does Arithmetical Truth.

God has no self-reference power at all, as this would make it  
inconsistent.


Still defending the Christian God, aren't you?

Bruno





 God is the uncreated infinite intelligence

There was once a patent issued for a combination rat trap and  
potato peeler and people laugh about that, but using the exact  
same organ for both excretory and reproductive purposes does not  
seem very intelligent to me either, much less infinitely  
intelligent. And putting the blood vessels and nerves for the  
retina of the eye in front not in the back so the light must pass  
through them to get to the light sensitive cells also does not  
seem very smart; no engineer in his right mind would place the  
gears to move the film in a camera so that the light must pass  
through the gears before hitting the film. That's not the sort of  
thing you'd expect God to do, but it's exactly what you'd expect  
Evolution to do.


 John K Clark


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Re: Racism ? How's that implied ?



On 07 Sep 2012, at 15:00, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal

Racism ? How's that implied ?


Do you accept that your daughter marry a man who has undergone an  
artificial brain transplant?






But I do agree that perception and Cs are
not understandable with materialistic concepts
at least as they are commonly used.
Instead they are what the mind can sense,


OK.



as a sixth sense.


Hmm...




The mind is similar to driving a car through
Platoville and watching the static events
in passing.


OK.

Bruno






Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/7/2012
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-06, 14:12:37
Subject: Re: Sane2004 Step One


On 05 Sep 2012, at 18:12, Roger Clough wrote:



I don't think that life or mind or intelligence
can be teleported. Especially since nobody knows what
they are.

I also don't believe that you can download
the contents of somebody's brain.



This is just restating that you don't believe in comp.

OK, develop your theory, and predict something testable, and we will  
better understand what you mean.

If not it looks just  like a form of racism based on magic.

Bruno





Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/5/2012
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-05, 11:04:53
Subject: Re: Sane2004 Step One

On 05 Sep 2012, at 06:14, meekerdb wrote:

 On 9/4/2012 7:19 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
 On Tue, Sep 04, 2012 at 06:48:58PM -0700, Craig Weinberg wrote:
 I have problems with all three of the comp assumptions:

 *yes, doctor*: This is really the sleight of hand that props up
 the entire
 thought experiment. If you agree that you are nothing but your  
brain

 function and that your brain function can be replaced by the
 functioning of
 non-brain devices, then you have already agreed that human
 individuality is
 a universal commodity.
 Calling it a sleight of hand is a bit rough. It is the meat of the
 comp assumption, and spelling it out this way makes it very
 explicit. Either you agree you can be copied (without feeling a
 thing), or you don't. If you do, you must face up to the  
consequences

 of the argument, if you don't, then you do not accept
 computationalism, and the consequences of the UDA do not apply to
 your
 worldview.

 I suppose I can be copied. But does it follow that I am just the
 computations in my brain. It seems likely that I also require an
 outside environment/world with which I interact in order to remain
 conscious. Bruno passes this off by saying it's just a matter of
 the level of substitution, perhaps your local environment or even
 the whole galaxy must be replaced by a digital representation in
 order to maintain your consciousness unchanged. But this bothers
 me. Suppose it is the whole galaxy, or the whole observed
 universe. Does it really mean anything then to say your brain has
 been replaced ALONG WITH EVERYTHING ELSE? It's just the assertion
 that everything is computable.

That's a good argument for saying that the level of substitution is
not that low. But the reasoning would still go through, and we would
lead to a unique computable universe. That is the only way to make a
digital physics consistent (as I forget to say sometimes). Then you
get a more complex other mind problem, and something like David
Nyman- Hoyle beam would be needed, and would need to be separate from
the physical reality, making the big physical whole incomplete, etc.
yes this bothers me too. Needless to say, I tend to believe that if
comp is true, the level is much higher.





 *Church thesis*: Views computation in isolation, irrespective of
 resources,
 supervenience on object-formed computing elements, etc. This is a
 theoretical theory of computation, completely divorced from
 realism from
 the start. What is it that does the computing? How and why does
 data enter
 or exit a computation?
 It is necessarily an abstract mathematical thesis. The latter two
 questions simply are relevant.

 *Arithmetical Realism*: The idea that truth values are self
 justifying
 independently of subjectivity or physics is literally a shot in
 the dark.
 Like yes, doctor, this is really swallowing the cow whole from  
the

 beginning and saying that the internal consistency of arithmetic
 constitutes universal supremacy without any real indication of
 that.
 AR is not just about internal consistency of mathematics, it is an
 ontological commitment about the natural numbers. Whatever  
primitive
 reality is, AR implies that the primitive reality models the  
natural

 numbers.

 ISTM that Bruno rejects any reality behind the natural numbers (or
 other system of computation). If often argues that the natural
 numbers exist, because they satisfy true

Re: Brains and time, subjectivity vs objectivity



On 07 Sep 2012, at 16:06, Roger Clough wrote:




Theres is some duplication in the propositions below which I have  
not bothered

to clear up, sorry.

1) Mind, being inextended, is outside of the brain, which is  
extended.

Mind (shared and the general, Platonia) is the subjective realm.
Brain (personal, private, the particular, materialistic) is in  
the objective realm.


Mind does not even belong to the category of things capable of being  
extended or not extended.






2) So Mind is beyond spacetime (Platonic) , but each brain is in  
spacetime

 (materialistic), and only brains can access the Platonic*.


Only persons, using brains.




3) Brains are in time, as are all materialistic things, including  
computers.

Mind is timeless*.


OK.




4) Objective time is in spacetime, so can be measured.


OK. Note that objective = capable of being doubted, or capable of  
being an illusion or a dream.







5) Subjective time is outside of spacetime, so only sensible by the  
brain.


By the person. My brain does no more thinking than my stomach do  
tasting. The brain is just a local tool.






* So I think of our brains as racing through Mind in an auto
while looking at the passing landscape of Mind.


Except that eventually, the brain is only a construct of the mind too.  
The persons are in Platonia.


Bruno







Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/7/2012
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content -
From: Craig Weinberg
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-06, 15:25:14
Subject: Re: Sane2004 Step One



On Thursday, September 6, 2012 2:02:02 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 05 Sep 2012, at 17:27, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Wednesday, September 5, 2012 10:50:02 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 05 Sep 2012, at 03:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:

Taking another look at Sane2004. This isn't so much as a challenge  
to Bruno, just sharing my notes of why I disagree. Not sure how  
far I will get this time, but here are my objections to the first  
step and the stipulated assumptions of comp. I understand that the  
point is to accept the given definition of comp, and in that  
respect, I have no reason to doubt that Bruno has accomplished  
what he sets out to as far as making a good theory within comp,  
and if he has not, I wouldn't be qualified to comment on it  
anyhow. From my perspective however, this is all beside the point,  
since the only point that matters is the actual truth of what  
consciousness actually is, and what is it's actual relation to  
physics and information. Given the fragile and precious nature of  
our own survival, I think that implications for teleportation and  
AI simulation/personhood which are derived from pure theory rather  
than thorough consideration of realism would be reckless to say  
the least.


Step one talks about teleportation in terms of being reconstructed  
with ambient organic materials. If comp were true though, no  
organic materials or reconstructions would be necessary.
The scanning into a universal machine would be sufficient.



That is step 6.

I haven't even gotten to step 2 yet. I'm reading In the figure the  
teleported individual is represented by a black box. Its  
annihilation is
represented by a white box appearing at the left of the arrow from  
1.




Taking this to the China Brain level, the universal machine could  
be a trillion people with notebooks, pencils, paper, and erasers,  
talking to each other over cell phones. This activity would have  
to collectively result in the teleported person now being conjured  
as if by incantation as a consequence of...what? The writing and  
erasing on paper? The calling and speaking on cell phones? Where  
does the experience of the now disembodied person come in?


As you illustrate here, plausibly not on the physical means used by  
the brain. Step 8 shows that indeed the physical has nothing to do  
with consciousness, except as a content of consciousness. Keeping  
comp here, we associate consciousness with the logical abstract  
computations.




So the person's consciousness arises spontaneously through the  
overall effort-ness behind the writing, erasing, and calling, or  
does it gradually constellate from lesser fragments of disconnected  
effort-ness?


Consciousness does not arise. It is not in space, nor in time. Its  
local content, obtained by differentiation, internally can refer to  
time and space, but that's particular content of an atemporal  
consciousness. I would say (no need of this in UDA).


If you exclude space and time, what kind of locality do you refer  
to? In my example, a quintillion people call each other on the phone  
and write down numbers that they get from each other and perform  
arithmetic functions on them (which in turn may inform them on how  
to process subsequent arithmetic instructions, etc). Ok. So where  
does the

Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence



On 07 Sep 2012, at 15:45, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal

What is UD ?


Universal Dovetailer.

Bruno






Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/7/2012
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-06, 15:56:55
Subject: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit  
intelligence



On 06 Sep 2012, at 13:31, benjayk wrote:


Quantum effects beyond individual brains (suggested by psi) can't be
computed as well: No matter what I compute in my brain, this doesn't
entangle it with other brains since computation is classical.


The UD emulates all quantum computer, as they do not violate Church  
Thesis.





A computational description of the brain is just a relative,  
approximate
description, nothing more. It doesn't actually reflect what the  
brain is or

what it does.


The bet the computationalists do, is that nature has already build  
an emulator, through the brain, and that's why a computer might be  
able to emulate its programming, by nature, evolution, etc. And we  
can copy it without understanding, like a virus can copy a file  
without understanding of its content.


Molecular biology is already digital relatively to chemistry. Don't  
take this as argument for comp, but as showing your argument against  
is not valid.


Bruno



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Re: A Sherlock Holmes computer



On 07 Sep 2012, at 16:20, Roger Clough wrote:




There is a quote by Sherlock Holmes that suggests a way to possibly  
filter out

solid truth from a comp (?)

List all of the possibilities or possible solutions. Then remove  
all from that list
that are impossible (now or ever, I would add).   Whatever is left  
over is the

(rational or necesssary) truth.


This is akin to proof of p = proof that (not p) leads to an  
impossibility.  Sherlock was good in logic :)


Bruno





Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/7/2012
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content -
From: Craig Weinberg
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-06, 19:59:11
Subject: Re: Why a bacterium has more intelligence than a computer



On Thursday, September 6, 2012 7:37:38 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King  
wrote:

On 9/5/2012 11:50 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Wednesday, September 5, 2012 6:38:07 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:
Hi Stephen P. King

No, the stuff in our skulls  is alive, has intelligence, and a 1p.
Computers don't and can't. Big sdifference.

Hi Roger,

锟斤拷 Please leave magic out of this, as any sufficiently advanced  
technology is indistinguishable from magic. The trouble is that  
the stuff in our skulls does not appear to be that much different  
from a bunch of diodes and transistors.


锟斤拷 Our brains obey the very same physical laws! What makes the  
brain special? I suspect that the brain uses quantum entanglement  
effects to both synchronize and update sense content in ways that  
cannot obtain from purely classical physical methods. Our  
mechanical machines lack the ability to report on their 1p content  
thus we are using their disability to argue against their possible  
abilities. A computer that could both generate an internal self- 
model and report on it would lead us to very different conclusions!


I think you are both right. Computers qua computers don't feel  
anything because they aren't anything. The physical material that  
you are using to execute computations on does however have  
experiences - just not experiences that we associated with our own.  
There is a concrete experience associated with the production of  
these pixels on your screen - many experiences on many levels, of  
molecules that make up the wires etc., but those experiences don't  
seem to lead to anything we would consider significant. It's pretty  
straightforward to me. A stuffed animal that looks like a bear is  
not a bear. A picture of a person is not a person, even if it is a  
fancy interactive picture.


Craig
--


Hi Craig,

I think that the difference that makes a difference here is the  
identity that emerges between matching of the experience *of* object  
and experience *by* object. Ranulph Glanville has, with others in  
the Cybernetics community, written masterfully on this in his Same  
is Different paper.



Hi Stephen,

How does the of/by distinction compare with map-territory and use- 
mention distinctions?


Craig

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Re: Sane2004 Step One



On 07 Sep 2012, at 17:11, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 9/7/2012 3:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 06 Sep 2012, at 21:25, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Thursday, September 6, 2012 2:02:02 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:



If you exclude space and time, what kind of locality do you refer  
to?


The computational locality used in the local universal system.


Dear Bruno,

Could you elaborate a bit more on this remark? How do you define  
a  local universal system? What is local for you?


All universal system are local. Here I meant a universal system that I  
can handle in my neighborhood, like my brain or my laptop. Local means  
that action exerts influence on their most probable universal  
neighborhood.











In my example, a quintillion people call each other on the phone  
and write down numbers that they get from each other and perform  
arithmetic functions on them (which in turn may inform them on how  
to process subsequent arithmetic instructions, etc). Ok. So where  
does the interpretation of these trillion events per second come  
in? What knows what all of the computations add up to be? At what  
point does the 'local content' begin to itch and turn blue? Even  
if it could, why should it do such a thing?


Because it concerns a machine looking at herself and its probable  
environment.


As I think of it, a machine cannot literally look at herself;  
it can only look at an image of herself and that image could be  
subject to errors. This allows me to relate an image that a machine  
might have of itself with the image the machine might have of  
another machine and thus I found the concept of bisimulation.  
Additionally, we can define cases where the image and the machine  
itself are identical in every possible way and thus are one and the  
same thing (via principle of identity of indiscernibles).
It seems to me that most of our disagreements flow from your  
assumption that the image of a machine and the machine are strictly  
isomorphic, while I assume such only in certain special cases.


To get physics, you can (and should) restrict yourself to ideally  
correct machine.






Then the logic shows that it is unavoidable that the machine get  
non justifiable truth.


I agree. But what is Truth?


Arithmetical truth. You can define it in second order logic, or in set  
theory, but of course this does not really define it. You can  
represent it by the set of Gödel number of the true arithmetical  
sentences. It is a highly complex set not even nameable or describable  
by the machine.






I see truth to be a parameter of the degree of matching between an  
object and its image. It is not confined to some single spectrum for  
all things. Different types of objects require different kinds of  
spectra for their truth valuations and thus are not always  
commensurable.


In everyday life, but we reason in a theory.





You can see that informally with thought experiment, like in UDA,  
or formally in the logics of self-reference.


I have problems with the technical aspects of the UDA in almost  
every step.


Then you have to make that precise.



My problem is that I do not have your set of definitions and  
intuitions in my mind as I read your material.


UDA is simpler to 14 years old, than graduates. UDA is rather easy,  
and I think that is what people misses. It is simple. Of course the  
MGA (step 8) is a bit harder, but you can have all the gist of it by  
UDA1-7, already.


Some people, like Jason today, can even pass the step 8, by just  
rejecting the notion of virtual or arithmetical zombie. Step 8 just  
address the Ptere Jones (and sometimes Brent) critics that we need a  
real computer for having a real consciousness, but this introduce non  
Turing emulability in the mind (by step 8).






I see holes and blind spots and tacit assumptions everywhere,


Without specific remarks, I can't help.



but this holds true of the material of most people that I read and  
so I an not upset with you for this appearance. It could be the beam  
in my eye that i see as a mote in your eye... Thus I ask you many  
many questions, to lern to see what you see the way that you see it.  
SO far I cannot understand how it is that you do not see the  
necessity of physical implementation of computations.


They are necessary only locally, and this is provided in arithmetic.  
Then step 8 explains why reifying matter cannot relate consciousness  
to it, making primitive matter epinomenal.





I am studying the work of C.S. Peirce and others int eh area of  
semiotics to learn if it might help me explain the problem that I see.
















Step one talks about annihilation as well, but it is not clear  
what role this actually plays in the process, except to make it  
seem more like teleportation and less like what it actually  
would be, which is duplication. If I scan an original document  
and email the scan, I have sent a duplicate, not teleported

Re: The poverty of computers



On 07 Sep 2012, at 19:12, John Clark wrote:


On Fri, Sep 7 2012, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote:

 machines, even computers, IMHO in practice have no intellectual or  
feeling facilities, are no more than dumb rocks.


Computers may or may not have feelings but that is of no concern to  
us, if they don't it's their problem not ours;


It might concerns you if the doctor intents to replace your brain by a  
digital device, or if your daughter want marry a man who did that.





however those dumb rocks can and do outsmart us on a regular basis  
and the list of things they are superior at gets longer every day.  
The very title of this thread just screams whistling past the  
graveyard.


 So there is no more communication with God possible than there  
would be with an abacus.


Now that I agree with 100%, computers are no better at talking to  
God than a abacus is.


Indeed. Abacus are Turing universal, and so have the same ability than  
us (assuming comp).


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The poverty of computers

On 08 Sep 2012, at 06:19, meekerdb wrote:

On 9/7/2012 8:43 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
Platonism (or mathematical realism) is the majority viewpoint of
modern mathematicians.

In a survey of mathematicians I know it is an even division. Of
course they are all methodological Platonists, but not necessarily
philosophical ones.

Computationalism (or functionalism) is the majority viewpoint of
cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind. Thus the scientific
consensus is that infinite (mathematical) truth

Except mathematical truth is just a marker, T, whose value is
preserved by the rules of logic. Whether a proposition that has T
corresponds with any fact is another question.

Be careful to distinguish a true sentence (like T) with the notion of
truth or of arithmetical true sentence, which is not even definable in
arithmetic, and can be meta-defined in some set theory or second order
arithmetic, at the meta-level. God can be arithmetical truth, but God
can't be just T.

is the self-existent cause and reason for our existence.

That is very far from a scientific consensus. I'd say majority the
opinion among scientists who are philosophically inclined is that
mathematics and logic are languages in which we create models that
represent what we think about reality. This explains why there can
be contradictory mathematical models and even mutually inconsistent
sets of axioms and rules of inference.

Yes, but this makes sense only for people agreeing on elementary
arithmetical truth. If not, the notion of axioms and rules of
inference don't make sense.

Nobody serious disagree on elementary arithmetic. I have never seen
someone doubting the meaning of (N, +, *), except philosophers. Bad
philosophers, I would say, when they are in desperate needs to
demolish some argument, or to look original or something. We need
assess arithmetic to make sense of doubting arithmetic, and so,
doubting arithmetic does not make sense, in fact.

Bruno

Few people today have realized that this is inevitable conclusion
of these two commonly held beliefs.

Not only that a few people have rejected it.

Brent

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Re: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

Hi John Clark 

God is outside of spacetime (in uncreated) , so your actions were imaginary.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/8/2012 
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content - 
From: John Clark 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-09-07, 16:10:00
Subject: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence


On Thu, Sep 6, 2012 at 1:21 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:



 I was addressing John Clark, who confirmed my feeling that atheists are the 
 number one defender of the Christian's conception of God. 

OK I see the error of my ways and now believe that God exists.

Incidentally when I went out to my car today I found that I that a flat God, so 
I jacked up the car, got a spare God out of my trunk and took the punctured God 
off the axle and put on the spare God. I think the old God has a nail in it so 
I'm going to take it to the God repair shop to see if they can remove it and 
put a patch on the old God so I'll still have a spare God.? 

?ohn K Clark
?
?

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fairness and sustainability

Hi John Mikes 

Here's the dilemma: 

Unfortunately, any system -- with the exception of the oil-rich countries
(where fairness would seem to be hard to define) -- 
that is completely fair is unsustainable. Capitalism,
like it or not, is the only known way to increase a 
country's wealth. Fairness decreases a country's capacity
to grow. Darwin would agree.

Cuba and the former soviet union and now europe
are good examples. They all failed in trying to be completely fair
or are in the process of failing.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/8/2012 
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content - 
From: John Mikes 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-09-07, 14:44:26
Subject: Re: There is no such thing as cause and effect


Brent, 
?
I believe there is a difference between (adj) 'fair' or 'unjust' and the (noun) 
'fairness', or 'consciousness'. 
While the nouns (IMO)?re not adequately identified the adverbs refer to the 
applied system of correspondence. 
E.g.: Fair to the unjust system. (I don't think we may use the opposite: 
unjust to a 'fair' system in our discussion). 
As I tried to explain in another post: the 'rich' consume MORE of the 
country-supplied services than the not-so-rich and pay less taxes (unfair and 
unjust). Certain big corporations also pay 'less' than the system would require 
(in all fairness - proverbially said) ordinarily. 
Semantix, OOH!
?
John M


On Tue, Sep 4, 2012 at 4:18 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 9/4/2012 1:12 PM, John Mikes wrote: 


?
It is a 'trap' to falsify the adequate taxing of the 'rich' as a leftist 
attempt to distributing richness. It does not include more than a requirement 
for THEM to pay their FAIR share - maybe more than the not-so-rich layers (e.g. 
higher use of transportation, foreign connections, financial means, etc. - all 
costing money to the country) in spite of their lower share in the present 
unjust?axation-scheme.
.. 


And PLEASE, Brent, do not even utter in econo-political discussion the word 
FAIRNESS!


So is it OK if I use FAIR and unjust?

Brent


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Re: The All


On 9/8/2012 3:50 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 07.09.2012 22:22 Stephen P. King said the following:

...


Hi Evgenii,

Consider the mental image that a person suffering from anorexia has
of themselves. It is distorted and false. How does this happen?
Consider the Placebo effect and its complement, the Nocebo effect.
Are they not examples of mental states acting on physical states? How
does this happen if the mental states are just illusions (ala
materialism) or the physical states are just illusions (ala
Immaterialism)? Somehow they must be correlated with each other in
some way and which ever way that is it is one that is not always a
one to one and onto map.



Hi Stephen,

I am taking place right now in a discussion in a Russian forum on 
philosophy. There was a good point there that when we say that 
Descartes was a dualist (res cogitans and res extensa), it is actually 
wrong. By Descartes there was also God and as a result everything was 
quite consistent by him. Problems start when we consider res cogitans 
and res extensa without God. Just FYI, I personally have enjoyed such 
a comment.


I have to read Pratt yet, sorry. Just a small note now. I do not see 
how res cogitans and res extensa allow us to explain a 
three-dimensional world that I observe. When we say ideas, then it 
could work but it is unclear to me what to do with a visual world.


Say I see my image behind the mirror (I have written behind instead of 
in the mirror just to better describe my experience). How could you 
describe this phenomenon by means of res cogitans and res extensa?


Evgenii
--
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/05/brain-and-world.html


Hi Evgenii,

I would not, and neither Pratt, use the notion of substance as did 
Descartes. Pratt explains himself well: 
http://boole.stanford.edu/pub/ratmech.pdf


From the abstract:

This paper addresses the chief stumbling block for Descartes’ 17thcentury
philosophy of mind-body dualism, how can the fundamentally
dissimilar mental and physical planes causally interact with each other?
We apply Cartesian logic to reject not only divine intervention, 
preordained

synchronization, and the eventual mass retreat to monism, but also
an assumption Descartes himself somehow neglected to reject, that causal
interaction within these planes is an easier problem than between. We use
Chu spaces and residuation to derive all causal interaction, both between
and within the two planes, from a uniform and algebraically rich theory of
between-plane interaction alone. Lifting the two-valued Boolean logic of
binary relations to the complex-valued fuzzy logic of quantum mechanics
transforms residuation into a natural generalization of the inner product
operation of a Hilbert space and demonstrates that this account of causal
interaction is of essentially the same form as the Heisenberg-Schr¨odinger
quantum-mechanical solution to analogous problems of causal interaction
in physics.

The duality between mind in body is defined in terms of the relation 
that is known in mathematics to exist between Boolean algebras and 
certain topological spaces. Pratt presents a step-wise variational 
calculus to model both body -body and mind-mind interactions.


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Re: Sane2004 Step One


On 9/8/2012 4:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 07 Sep 2012, at 13:39, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 9/7/2012 3:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



But you claim that too, as matter is not primitive. or you lost me 
again.
I need matter to communicate with you, but that matter is explained 
in comp as a a persistent relational entity, so I don't see the 
problem. It is necessary in the sense that it is implied by the comp 
hypothesis, even constructively (making comp testable). It is even 
more stable and solid than anything we might extrapolate from 
observation, as we might be dreaming. Indeed it comes from the 
atemporal ultra-stable relations between numbers, that you recently 
mention as not created by man (I am very glad :).


Bruno

Dear Bruno,

Matter is not primitive as it is not irreducible. My claim is 
that matter is, explained very crudely, patterns of invariances for 
some collection of inter-communicating observers (where an observer 
can be merely a photon detector that records its states).


OK, except that we have no photon at the start.



This is not contradictory to your explanation of it as persistent 
relational entity, but my definition is very explicit about the 
requirements that give rise to the persistent relations.  I believe 
that these might be second order relations between computational 
streams. and can be defined in terms of bisimulation relations 
between streams.


You might try to relate this with the UDA consequences.



I question the very idea of atemporal ultra-stable relations 
between numbers since numbers cannot be considered consistently as 
just entities that correspond to 0, 1, 2, 3, ... We have to consider 
all possible denotations of the signified.


I think this is deeply flawed. Notion of denotations and set of 
denotations, are more complex that the notion of numbers.






See http://www.aber.ac.uk/media/Documents/S4B/sem02.html#signified 
for an explanation. Additionally, there are not just a single type of 
number as there is a dependence on the model of arithmetic that one 
is using.


Outside arithmetic. This use the intuitive notion of numbers, even 
second order arithmetic. This is explained, through comp, as construct 
of numbers.




For example Robinson Arithmetic and Peano Arithmetic do not define 
the same numbers.


Of course they do. RA has more model than PA, but we use the theory 
with the intended model in mind, relying on our intuition of numbers, 
not on any theory. No one ever interpret a number in the sense of a 
non standard numbers.  That would make comp quite fuzzy. Nobody would 
say yes to a doctor if he believe that he is a non standard 
machine/number. You can't code them in any finite (in the standard 
sense!) ways.





So we have multiple signified and multiple signifiers and cannot 
assume a single mapping scheme between them. I suppose that a 
canonical map exists in terms of the Tennebaum theorem, but I need to 
discuss this more with you to resolve my understanding of this question.


You do at the absic level what I suspect you to do in many post. 
Escaping forward in the complexity. But to get the technical results 
all you need is assessing your intuition of finite, and things like 
the sequence 0, s(0), s(s(0)), etc.
Then if you agree with the definition of addition and multiplication, 
everything will be OK. If not you would be like a neuroscientist 
trying to define a neuron by the activity of a brain thinking about a 
neuron, and you will get a complexity catastrophe.


This remark is very important. Your critics here apply to all papers 
you cite. We have to agree on simple things at the start, 
independently of the fact that we can't define them by simpler notion. 
For the numbers, or programs, finite strings, hereditarily finite 
objects,  the miracle is that we do share the standard notion of it, 
unlike for any other notions like set, real number, etc.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/



Dear Bruno,

I wish I could motivate you to study a bit about Semiotics and how 
it approaches the relation between a representation and its referent. 
You seem to think them as identical for numbers. We seem to just talk 
past each other.


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Re: fairness and sustainability


On 08.09.2012 12:35 Roger Clough said the following:

Hi John Mikes

Here's the dilemma:

Unfortunately, any system -- with the exception of the oil-rich
countries (where fairness would seem to be hard to define) -- that is
completely fair is unsustainable. Capitalism, like it or not, is the
only known way to increase a country's wealth. Fairness decreases a
country's capacity to grow. Darwin would agree.

Cuba and the former soviet union and now europe are good examples.
They all failed in trying to be completely fair or are in the process
of failing.


Soviet Union is a pretty bad example for fairness.

As for Europe, I am not that sure. You may want to compare Germany and 
the USA. It is not evident for me, which will fail the first.


Evgenii

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Re: Re: The poverty of computers

Hi Roberto Szabo 

You don't need much evolution to arrive at a being that can feel
and has at least some intellectual capacity. Any living
entity has to know friend from foe, pain from pleasure, and
so forth. But rocks, like computers, have no need for such abilities,
because they are both dead. And the dead do not evolve.



Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/8/2012 
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content - 
From: Roberto Szabo 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-09-07, 11:17:29
Subject: Re: The poverty of computers


Hi Roger,


Brains some years ago had no intellectual or feeling facilities too. It came 
by evolution.


Roberto Szabo


2012/9/7 Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net

Hi Stephen P. King 
?
No, machines, even computers,?MHO in practice have no intellectual or feeling
facilities, are no more than dumb rocks. So there is no more communication with 
God possible
than there would be with an abacus.
?
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/7/2012 
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content - 
From: Stephen P. King 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-09-06, 19:39:10
Subject: Re: The All


On 9/5/2012 12:14 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Hi Roger, 


On 05 Sep 2012, at 17:23, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal 
?
No, the supreme Monad can see everything even
though the monads have no windows.
?
Also the closeness to God issue depends
on your clarity of vision and feeling.?nd perhaps appetites.
So everybody's different.?
?


I agree. But my point was that everybody includes possibly machines, and that 
we are not supposed to dictate God which creatures he can look through.?


Bruno

Hi Bruno,

?? I agree with you here 100%!

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Re: The All


On 08.09.2012 12:37 Stephen P. King said the following:

On 9/8/2012 3:50 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:



Say I see my image behind the mirror (I have written behind instead
of in the mirror just to better describe my experience). How could
you describe this phenomenon by means of res cogitans and res
extensa?

Evgenii -- http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/05/brain-and-world.html


Hi Evgenii,

I would not, and neither Pratt, use the notion of substance as did
Descartes. Pratt explains himself well:
http://boole.stanford.edu/pub/ratmech.pdf



...



The duality between mind in body is defined in terms of the relation
 that is known in mathematics to exist between Boolean algebras and
certain topological spaces. Pratt presents a step-wise variational
calculus to model both body -body and mind-mind interactions.



How would Pratt describe the phenomenon of the image behind the mirror 
in his representation?


Evgenii

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Re: Re: The universe as a collection of an infinite number ofpointscalledmonads

Hi Stephen P. King 

I must be missing something.

Overlapping was just a rhetorical word since monads 
are beyond spacetime. 

Inextended beings such as mind don't need code to function.
Does a daisy run on code ?

Size and number do not seem to be to be limits for 
monads to do what they do. Certainly Platonia can contain infinities.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/8/2012 
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content - 
From: Stephen P. King 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-09-07, 11:18:15
Subject: Re: The universe as a collection of an infinite number 
ofpointscalledmonads


On 9/7/2012 10:43 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King 

As I see it, if there is an infinite collection of (monadic) points,
all future things foreseen (as in pre-established harmony)
then nothing new can ever be created or destroyed, things
(including thoughts and people)  just blossom like plants from 
seeds and eventually die, but always in the same monad.

Hi Roger,

Here is the problem: a point has no extension therefore it cannot code 
anything other than its presence or non-presence by its absence. To think of 
all future things foreseen (as in pre-established harmony) there must be a 
capacity of each and every monad to have an image of some sort of things, 
future, past, present, distant, close, whatever. It must have the equivalent of 
potentially infinite memory. This cannot occur for a point. Therefore, a monad 
cannot be defined as a point, but it can be similar to a point in having no 
exterior extensions; it only has internal aspects. All considerations of things 
exterior to a monad are merely defined in terms of relations within, between 
and among its internal aspects.



Notice that the phrase pre-established harmony just popped 
naturally into my mind when I visualized the points as overlaid.
Studying Leibniz is like that, it is so logical that it will allow you 
to explore without a guide.

It seems likely that you are merely parroting words without fully 
comprehending their use or meaning.




Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/7/2012 
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content - 
From: Stephen P. King 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-09-07, 10:22:37
Subject: Re: The universe as a collection of an infinite number of 
pointscalledmonads


On 9/7/2012 8:32 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King 

I solved this problem my own way by simply asssuming that the universe
from the beginning and  before, as well as now and forever,
exists as an infinite collection of points (monads). 


Hi Roger,

I agree with this.



So no problem
with the creation of new things.

No, novelty is not a priori definable, by its very definition it cannot be 
considered to be given from the beginning! OTOH, we could stipulate that 
novelty is a concept that only individual monads that are not identical to each 
other can have, then novelty and creation of new things in general can be 
seen in a logically consistent  fashion as local transient aspects and not 
pre-ordained  or essence.


In principle they always were
and simply grow or unfold when the time calls for it, then
roll or fold up or whatever at the end of their useful lives.

Surely!



In this veiw of reality, all of reality always consists in monadic space
as an overlapping infinite set of points.

No, that is a contradiction of terms. Monads cannot be defined as an 
overlapping infinite set of points because points by definition have no 
extension and therefore can never overlap with each other. There is no such 
thing as a  monadic space which might act as a container of multiple and 
distinct monads. Monads, as L defined them, cannot act or exist in that manner. 
Frankly, L's speculations about the exterior aspects of Monads, found later 
on in his Monadology, papers, may be the consequence of drinking too much wine 
as they are completely inconsistent with his careful initial definitions of 
monads. We are all finite and fallible, even geniuses like Leibniz. :-( 


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Re: Re: The universe as a collection of an infinite number ofpointscalledmonads

Hi Stephen P. King 

OK I missed the intelligence issue. 
Platonia spills out of the All, which is
intelligence itself. Since monads are operated
by the All, intelligence is not an issue.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/8/2012 
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content - 
From: Stephen P. King 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-09-07, 11:18:15
Subject: Re: The universe as a collection of an infinite number 
ofpointscalledmonads


On 9/7/2012 10:43 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King 

As I see it, if there is an infinite collection of (monadic) points,
all future things foreseen (as in pre-established harmony)
then nothing new can ever be created or destroyed, things
(including thoughts and people)  just blossom like plants from 
seeds and eventually die, but always in the same monad.

Hi Roger,

Here is the problem: a point has no extension therefore it cannot code 
anything other than its presence or non-presence by its absence. To think of 
all future things foreseen (as in pre-established harmony) there must be a 
capacity of each and every monad to have an image of some sort of things, 
future, past, present, distant, close, whatever. It must have the equivalent of 
potentially infinite memory. This cannot occur for a point. Therefore, a monad 
cannot be defined as a point, but it can be similar to a point in having no 
exterior extensions; it only has internal aspects. All considerations of things 
exterior to a monad are merely defined in terms of relations within, between 
and among its internal aspects.



Notice that the phrase pre-established harmony just popped 
naturally into my mind when I visualized the points as overlaid.
Studying Leibniz is like that, it is so logical that it will allow you 
to explore without a guide.

It seems likely that you are merely parroting words without fully 
comprehending their use or meaning.




Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/7/2012 
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content - 
From: Stephen P. King 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-09-07, 10:22:37
Subject: Re: The universe as a collection of an infinite number of 
pointscalledmonads


On 9/7/2012 8:32 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King 

I solved this problem my own way by simply asssuming that the universe
from the beginning and  before, as well as now and forever,
exists as an infinite collection of points (monads). 


Hi Roger,

I agree with this.



So no problem
with the creation of new things.

No, novelty is not a priori definable, by its very definition it cannot be 
considered to be given from the beginning! OTOH, we could stipulate that 
novelty is a concept that only individual monads that are not identical to each 
other can have, then novelty and creation of new things in general can be 
seen in a logically consistent  fashion as local transient aspects and not 
pre-ordained  or essence.


In principle they always were
and simply grow or unfold when the time calls for it, then
roll or fold up or whatever at the end of their useful lives.

Surely!



In this veiw of reality, all of reality always consists in monadic space
as an overlapping infinite set of points.

No, that is a contradiction of terms. Monads cannot be defined as an 
overlapping infinite set of points because points by definition have no 
extension and therefore can never overlap with each other. There is no such 
thing as a  monadic space which might act as a container of multiple and 
distinct monads. Monads, as L defined them, cannot act or exist in that manner. 
Frankly, L's speculations about the exterior aspects of Monads, found later 
on in his Monadology, papers, may be the consequence of drinking too much wine 
as they are completely inconsistent with his careful initial definitions of 
monads. We are all finite and fallible, even geniuses like Leibniz. :-( 


-- 
Onward!

Stephen

http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html
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Onward!

Stephen

http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html

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Re: Sane2004 Step One



On 08 Sep 2012, at 12:45, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 9/8/2012 4:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 07 Sep 2012, at 13:39, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 9/7/2012 3:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



But you claim that too, as matter is not primitive. or you lost  
me again.
I need matter to communicate with you, but that matter is  
explained in comp as a a persistent relational entity, so I don't  
see the problem. It is necessary in the sense that it is implied  
by the comp hypothesis, even constructively (making comp  
testable). It is even more stable and solid than anything we  
might extrapolate from observation, as we might be dreaming.  
Indeed it comes from the atemporal ultra-stable relations between  
numbers, that you recently mention as not created by man (I am  
very glad :).


Bruno

Dear Bruno,

Matter is not primitive as it is not irreducible. My claim is  
that matter is, explained very crudely, patterns of invariances  
for some collection of inter-communicating observers (where an  
observer can be merely a photon detector that records its states).


OK, except that we have no photon at the start.



This is not contradictory to your explanation of it as persistent  
relational entity, but my definition is very explicit about the  
requirements that give rise to the persistent relations.  I  
believe that these might be second order relations between  
computational streams. and can be defined in terms of bisimulation  
relations between streams.


You might try to relate this with the UDA consequences.



I question the very idea of atemporal ultra-stable relations  
between numbers since numbers cannot be considered consistently  
as just entities that correspond to 0, 1, 2, 3, ... We have to  
consider all possible denotations of the signified.


I think this is deeply flawed. Notion of denotations and set of  
denotations, are more complex that the notion of numbers.






See http://www.aber.ac.uk/media/Documents/S4B/sem02.html#signified  
for an explanation. Additionally, there are not just a single type  
of number as there is a dependence on the model of arithmetic that  
one is using.


Outside arithmetic. This use the intuitive notion of numbers, even  
second order arithmetic. This is explained, through comp, as  
construct of numbers.




For example Robinson Arithmetic and Peano Arithmetic do not define  
the same numbers.


Of course they do. RA has more model than PA, but we use the theory  
with the intended model in mind, relying on our intuition of  
numbers, not on any theory. No one ever interpret a number in the  
sense of a non standard numbers.  That would make comp quite fuzzy.  
Nobody would say yes to a doctor if he believe that he is a non  
standard machine/number. You can't code them in any finite (in the  
standard sense!) ways.





So we have multiple signified and multiple signifiers and  
cannot assume a single mapping scheme between them. I suppose that  
a canonical map exists in terms of the Tennebaum theorem, but I  
need to discuss this more with you to resolve my understanding of  
this question.


You do at the absic level what I suspect you to do in many post.  
Escaping forward in the complexity. But to get the technical  
results all you need is assessing your intuition of finite, and  
things like the sequence 0, s(0), s(s(0)), etc.
Then if you agree with the definition of addition and  
multiplication, everything will be OK. If not you would be like a  
neuroscientist trying to define a neuron by the activity of a brain  
thinking about a neuron, and you will get a complexity catastrophe.


This remark is very important. Your critics here apply to all  
papers you cite. We have to agree on simple things at the start,  
independently of the fact that we can't define them by simpler  
notion. For the numbers, or programs, finite strings, hereditarily  
finite objects,  the miracle is that we do share the standard  
notion of it, unlike for any other notions like set, real number,  
etc.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



Dear Bruno,

I wish I could motivate you to study a bit about Semiotics and  
how it approaches the relation between a representation and its  
referent. You seem to think them as identical for numbers.


?

I do not. I don't see why you think so. A number is not his  
representation, nor more than a brain is a person.


What I did here is just to accept the notion of natural numbers as a  
technical base, as we can agree on simple statements on them, and that  
is all we need.


In the development, I use model theory instead of semiotics as it is  
more clear for me, and more known by scientists.





We seem to just talk past each other.


It is normal because you do philosophy, and I do not. No problem if  
you keep that in mind.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Spinoza, Descartes and Leibniz on the mind/body problem

Hi Stephen P. King 

He left out Spinoza and Leibniz, and didn't do a very good job on Descartes. 
The inconsistencies
with Cartesian mind and body theory didn't bother the materialists, but 
stimulated Leibniz to create his 
Idealistic metaphysics, where mind and body are both mind, so no firewall 
between.

It is enlightening to understand all three solutions to the mind/body problem:

 http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20091010010606AAaFv8o

Substance is whatever is essentially underlying types of things. 

Descartes: Mind (spirit, soul, thinking) is one subject that is distinguished 
by its non-spatial ability to think. 
The other is bodies, being spatial and non-thinking. Flaw: substances are such 
that they do not share common 
features, thus how is the body to be presented to thought (non-spatial to grasp 
the spatial?)

Spinoza: Single substance. If substance has nothing to do with another 
substance, then it can only find its limits within
 itself (to limit is to have something to do with). if substance can only be 
limited by itself, then it must be infinite (the limit of 
the substance is itself part of the substance, which in turn must keep going or 
be limited by another of the same substance to infinite). 
If infinite, it cannot be limited to any other substance, thus only one 
infinite substance. Problem: freedom is lost. 

Leibniz: Simplicity defines substance. Substances only have one part. Thus ever 
complex (many parts) is itself made up of 
multiple substances (think atoms)*. God, being perfect, created the most amount 
of diversity in substances while creating the best possible world. 
Problem: Subs. are self coherent meaning they need no other contact except for 
God and themselves. They thus never contact the other substances.

A lot of steps skipped and even more ignored but it was a quick brief answer.

--
*In my view, since atoms are divisible they cannot be substances.
That leaves the fundamental particles as candidates, but
I class them not to be (specifiable) substances by the uncertainy principle of 
Heisenberg.
So nothing extended can be a substance, leaving the inextended to be the only
substances, and hence complete concepts, and if singular, then they are monads.

Treating both mind and body thusly as substances, monads (substances wiuthout 
parts) 
can act on each other (eg as mind and body) indirectly through gthe Supreme 
monad.  You might call that Cosmic Mind.
Fine, I secretly think of it as God.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/8/2012 
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content - 
From: Stephen P. King 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-09-08, 06:37:06
Subject: Re: The All


On 9/8/2012 3:50 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
 On 07.09.2012 22:22 Stephen P. King said the following:

 ...

 Hi Evgenii,

 Consider the mental image that a person suffering from anorexia has
 of themselves. It is distorted and false. How does this happen?
 Consider the Placebo effect and its complement, the Nocebo effect.
 Are they not examples of mental states acting on physical states? How
 does this happen if the mental states are just illusions (ala
 materialism) or the physical states are just illusions (ala
 Immaterialism)? Somehow they must be correlated with each other in
 some way and which ever way that is it is one that is not always a
 one to one and onto map.


 Hi Stephen,

 I am taking place right now in a discussion in a Russian forum on 
 philosophy. There was a good point there that when we say that 
 Descartes was a dualist (res cogitans and res extensa), it is actually 
 wrong. By Descartes there was also God and as a result everything was 
 quite consistent by him. Problems start when we consider res cogitans 
 and res extensa without God. Just FYI, I personally have enjoyed such 
 a comment.

 I have to read Pratt yet, sorry. Just a small note now. I do not see 
 how res cogitans and res extensa allow us to explain a 
 three-dimensional world that I observe. When we say ideas, then it 
 could work but it is unclear to me what to do with a visual world.

 Say I see my image behind the mirror (I have written behind instead of 
 in the mirror just to better describe my experience). How could you 
 describe this phenomenon by means of res cogitans and res extensa?

 Evgenii
 -- 
 http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/05/brain-and-world.html

Hi Evgenii,

I would not, and neither Pratt, use the notion of substance as did 
Descartes. Pratt explains himself well: 
http://boole.stanford.edu/pub/ratmech.pdf

 From the abstract:

This paper addresses the chief stumbling block for Descartes? 17thcentury
philosophy of mind-body dualism, how can the fundamentally
dissimilar mental and physical planes causally interact with each other?
We apply Cartesian logic

Re: Re: The All

Hi Stephen P. King 

It is those problems with interactions between mind and body
that drove me to study Leibniz. Initially difficult,  but
eventually self-teaching. 


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/8/2012 
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content - 
From: Stephen P. King 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-09-07, 16:22:41
Subject: Re: The All


On 9/7/2012 2:03 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
 On 07.09.2012 13:43 Stephen P. King said the following:
 On 9/7/2012 4:11 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
 On 06.09.2012 21:03 meekerdb said the following:
 On 9/6/2012 11:52 AM, Brian Tenneson wrote:


 A too much powerful God leads to inconsistency.



 What if reality does not always obey the laws of logic? What
 if reality is sometimes inconsistent?

 This is a confusion of levels. Logic is rules about truth
 preservation in declarative sentences. Not 'obeying the laws of
 logic' just means declaring inconsistent sentences. We try to
 avoid this because such utterances would have no determinate
 meaning. So a *descriptions* of reality may be inconsistent (and
 therefore useless) but reality is just whatever it is. It can't
 be inconsistent because it's not assertions.

 Brent


 This could work provided we could separate the world into mental
 and physical states. The question remains though if under
 physicalism one says that mental states are actually physical
 states. Then I do not know how to employ such a consideration in
 this case.

 Evgenii

 Dear Evgenii,

 What do you imagine would be the consequence of what may be a pair of
 sets of mental states and physical states for one entity does not
 match up exactly or even at all with a pair of mental and physical
 states for another?


 This was a question. I have no idea how to answer it.

 Evgenii

Hi Evgenii,

 Consider the mental image that a person suffering from anorexia has 
of themselves. It is distorted and false. How does this happen? Consider 
the Placebo effect and its complement, the Nocebo effect. Are they not 
examples of mental states acting on physical states? How does this 
happen if the mental states are just illusions (ala materialism) or the 
physical states are just illusions (ala Immaterialism)? Somehow they 
must be correlated with each other in some way and which ever way that 
is it is one that is not always a one to one and onto map.

-- 
Onward!

Stephen

http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html


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Re: fairness and sustainability

2012-09-08 Thread Richard Ruquist

But Roger, capitalism can go both ways
as witnessed by the Great depression
and the Great Recession.
Richard

On Sat, Sep 8, 2012 at 6:35 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote:
 Hi John Mikes

 Here's the dilemma:

 Unfortunately, any system -- with the exception of the oil-rich countries
 (where fairness would seem to be hard to define) --
 that is completely fair is unsustainable. Capitalism,
 like it or not, is the only known way to increase a
 country's wealth. Fairness decreases a country's capacity
 to grow. Darwin would agree.

 Cuba and the former soviet union and now europe
 are good examples. They all failed in trying to be completely fair
 or are in the process of failing.


 Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
 9/8/2012
 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
 so that everything could function.

 - Receiving the following content -
 From: John Mikes
 Receiver: everything-list
 Time: 2012-09-07, 14:44:26
 Subject: Re: There is no such thing as cause and effect

 Brent,
 �
 I believe there is a difference between (adj) 'fair' or 'unjust' and the
 (noun) 'fairness', or 'consciousness'.
 While the nouns (IMO)燼re not adequately identified the adverbs refer to the
 applied system of correspondence.
 E.g.: Fair to the unjust system. (I don't think we may use the opposite:
 unjust to a 'fair' system in our discussion).
 As I tried to explain in another post: the 'rich' consume MORE of the
 country-supplied services than the not-so-rich and pay less taxes (unfair
 and unjust). Certain big corporations also pay 'less' than the system would
 require
 (in all fairness - proverbially said) ordinarily.
 Semantix, OOH!
 �
 John M

 On Tue, Sep 4, 2012 at 4:18 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 On 9/4/2012 1:12 PM, John Mikes wrote:


 �
 It is a 'trap' to falsify the adequate taxing of the 'rich' as a leftist
 attempt to distributing richness. It does not include more than a
 requirement for THEM to pay their FAIR share - maybe more than the
 not-so-rich layers (e.g. higher use of transportation, foreign connections,
 financial means, etc. - all costing money to the country) in spite of their
 lower share in the present unjust爐axation-scheme.
 ...

 And PLEASE, Brent, do not even utter in econo-political discussion the
 word FAIRNESS!


 So is it OK if I use FAIR and unjust?

 Brent

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Re: Re: Why a bacterium has more intelligence than a computer

Hi Jason Resch 

IMHO life is essentially intelligence (mind), where intelligence is the ability 
to make one's own choices,
not from software or hardware or anything in nature. I hypothesize that life is 
undefinable because
to define it would limit its choices. Some limitation of course would be 
permissible, so this is
an imperfect hypothesis.

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/8/2012 
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content - 
From: Jason Resch 
Receiver: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
Time: 2012-09-05, 10:35:45
Subject: Re: Why a bacterium has more intelligence than a computer




On Sep 5, 2012, at 7:00 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote:


Hi Craig Weinberg 

IMHO the burden to show that computers are alive and
have intelligence lies on the scientists.  

I see no evidence of life  or real  intelligence
in computers.




Roger,


What is the difference between something that is alive and something that is 
not?


Afterall, everything in this world is quarks and electrons.  Computers, rocks, 
life, they are all made of the same stuff: quarks and electrons.


I don't know what you believe; you haven't answered my questions to you.  But I 
believe what separates a living thing from an unliving thing, or a thinking 
thing from a non thinking thing lies in the organziation of those things.


Do you believe that a collection of hydrogen atoms, properly combined and put 
together in the right way could create roger clough?  If not please explain why 
not.  Without a dialog we cannot progress in understanding eachother's views.


Jason




Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/5/2012 
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content - 
From: Craig Weinberg 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-09-04, 20:39:55
Subject: Re: Why a bacterium has more intelligence than a computer




On Tuesday, September 4, 2012 4:06:06 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: 



The point that I am making is that our brain seems to be continuously 
generating a virtual reality model of the world that includes our body and what 
we are conscious of is that model.

I like this description of a brain: that of a dreaming / reality creating 
machine.


What is it the brain creating this dream/reality out of? Non-reality? 
Intangible mathematical essences? The problem with representational qualia is 
that in order to represent something, there has to be something there to begin 
with to represent. Why would the brain need to represent the data that it 
already has to itself in some fictional layer of abstraction? Why convert the 
quantitative data of the universe into made up qualities and then hide that 
conversion process from itself?
 


Does a machine made up of gears, springs and levers do this? Could one made 
of diodes and transistors do it? Maybe... 

No one has shown me a cogent argument that they could not.


They question isn't why they could, it is why they would. What possible 
function would be served by a cuckoo clock having an experience of being a 
flying turnip?

Craig
 


Jason

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Re: fairness and sustainability



On Saturday, September 8, 2012 6:36:26 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:

  Hi John Mikes 
  
 Here's the dilemma: 
  
 Unfortunately, any system -- with the exception of the oil-rich countries
 (where fairness would seem to be hard to define) -- 
 that is completely fair is unsustainable. Capitalism,
 like it or not, is the only known way to increase a 
 country's wealth. Fairness decreases a country's capacity
 to grow. Darwin would agree.
  
 Cuba and the former soviet union and now europe
 are good examples. They all failed in trying to be completely fair
 or are in the process of failing.


It sounds like you are defining wealth as capitalism in the first place. 
Historically, there have been other ways of increasing a country's wealth. 
Conquest. Agriculture. Slavery. There are examples of redistributive 
economies in Polynesia...the idea of 'the Big Man' who gains influence and 
glory by throwing the biggest parties for everyone. As the poverty of many 
capitalist economies today shows (aren't most sub-Saharan economies 
capitalist?), it is really the history of exploitation of natural and human 
resources (or being the target of exploitation thereof) which seems to 
relate to the ability of the nation to increase its wealth.

What is happening now though is that capitalist countries are seeing their 
capitalist elites become independent of the country. ExxonMobil makes 
history with its obscenely high profits while the country debates yet more 
cutbacks on basic human services. This isn't the fault of capitalism, since 
it only values economic considerations, if human beings overproduce their 
numbers and reduce their demand, the corporate leader is put in the 
position where if they don't exploit that condition, then somebody else 
will. Technology amplifies this. What globalization means is eventually we 
will have a tiny group of international insiders and a disposable 
population of potential employees all competing for the lowest possible 
wage. Capitalism is building glass bank towers that stay empty all night 
while more and more people sleep in the streets, prisons, squat in 
foreclosed houses, etc.

Unrestrained social Darwinism is not the only alternative to 'trying to be 
completely fair'. Parts of the Soviet Union and Cuba are doing much better 
than parts of New Orleans and Detroit. It's really very simplistic to try 
to draw a line from a single economic proposition and the complex reality 
of the fate of a nation. What would Cuba be like without the revolution? 
Maybe Monte Carlo, maybe Haiti...neither...both? It's all speculation. All 
I can see is that whatever we are doing in the US, is making everything 
worse - here and around the world. I see the quality of life stagnating and 
dropping for most people, for lack of money that is flowing into the bank 
accounts of people who have no way to tell the difference except in their 
imagination. 

Craig

 

  
  
 Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net javascript:
 9/8/2012 
 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 
 so that everything could function.

 - Receiving the following content - 
 *From:* John Mikes javascript: 
 *Receiver:* everything-list javascript: 
 *Time:* 2012-09-07, 14:44:26
 *Subject:* Re: There is no such thing as cause and effect

   Brent, 
 �
 I believe there is a difference between (adj) 'fair' or 'unjust' and the 
 (noun) 'fairness', or 'consciousness'. 
 While the nouns (IMO)锟�re not adequately identified the adverbs refer to 
 the applied system of correspondence. 
 E.g.: Fair to the unjust system. (I don't think we may use the opposite: 
 unjust to a 'fair' system in our discussion). 
 As I tried to explain in another post: the 'rich' consume MORE of the 
 country-supplied services than the not-so-rich and pay less taxes (unfair 
 and unjust). Certain big corporations also pay 'less' than the system would 
 require 
 (*in all fairness* - proverbially said) ordinarily. 
 Semantix, OOH!
 �
 John M

 On Tue, Sep 4, 2012 at 4:18 PM, meekerdb meek...@verizon.netjavascript:
  wrote:

  On 9/4/2012 1:12 PM, John Mikes wrote: 


 **�
 It is a 'trap' to falsify the adequate taxing of the 'rich' as a *leftist 
 attempt to distributing richness*. It does not include more than a 
 requirement for THEM to pay their FAIR share - maybe more than the 
 not-so-rich layers (e.g. higher use of transportation, foreign connections, 
 financial means, etc. - all costing money to the country) in spite of their 
 lower share in the present unjust锟�axation-scheme.
 ... 

 And PLEASE, Brent, do not even utter in econo-political discussion the 
 word *FAIRNESS!*


 So is it OK if I use FAIR and unjust?

 Brent

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Re: Re: The All

Hi Evgenii Rudnyi 

Pratt has no tools with which to understand subjectivity,
which is not objective . The objective world is all that materialism
believes exists. So dead in the water.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/8/2012 
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content - 
From: Evgenii Rudnyi 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-09-08, 06:51:21
Subject: Re: The All


On 08.09.2012 12:37 Stephen P. King said the following:
 On 9/8/2012 3:50 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

 Say I see my image behind the mirror (I have written behind instead
 of in the mirror just to better describe my experience). How could
 you describe this phenomenon by means of res cogitans and res
 extensa?

 Evgenii -- http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/05/brain-and-world.html

 Hi Evgenii,

 I would not, and neither Pratt, use the notion of substance as did
 Descartes. Pratt explains himself well:
 http://boole.stanford.edu/pub/ratmech.pdf


..


 The duality between mind in body is defined in terms of the relation
 that is known in mathematics to exist between Boolean algebras and
 certain topological spaces. Pratt presents a step-wise variational
 calculus to model both body -body and mind-mind interactions.


How would Pratt describe the phenomenon of the image behind the mirror 
in his representation?

Evgenii

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Re: fairness and sustainability



On 08 Sep 2012, at 12:35, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi John Mikes

Here's the dilemma:

Unfortunately, any system -- with the exception of the oil-rich  
countries

(where fairness would seem to be hard to define) --
that is completely fair is unsustainable. Capitalism,
like it or not, is the only known way to increase a
country's wealth. Fairness decreases a country's capacity
to grow. Darwin would agree.

Cuba and the former soviet union and now europe
are good examples. They all failed in trying to be completely fair
or are in the process of failing.



I think that capitalism + democracy is the most fair system.

Today, unfortunately, capitalism has been perverted by minorities  
which build money on fears, lies and catastrophes, and that is very bad.


They are clever, and have succeeded in mixing the black and non black  
money, so that the middle class and the banking systems have become  
hostages.  Those liars are transforming the planet economy into a a  
pyramidal con.


Lying is part of nature, like cancers and diseases. Defending  
ourselves against liars is part of nature too.


Bruno









Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/8/2012
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content -
From: John Mikes
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-07, 14:44:26
Subject: Re: There is no such thing as cause and effect

Brent,
�
I believe there is a difference between (adj) 'fair' or 'unjust' and  
the (noun) 'fairness', or 'consciousness'.
While the nouns (IMO)燼re not adequately identified the adverbs  
refer to the applied system of correspondence.
E.g.: Fair to the unjust system. (I don't think we may use the  
opposite: unjust to a 'fair' system in our discussion).
As I tried to explain in another post: the 'rich' consume MORE of  
the country-supplied services than the not-so-rich and pay less  
taxes (unfair and unjust). Certain big corporations also pay 'less'  
than the system would require

(in all fairness - proverbially said) ordinarily.
Semantix, OOH!
�
John M

On Tue, Sep 4, 2012 at 4:18 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 9/4/2012 1:12 PM, John Mikes wrote:


�
It is a 'trap' to falsify the adequate taxing of the 'rich' as a  
leftist attempt to distributing richness. It does not include more  
than a requirement for THEM to pay their FAIR share - maybe more  
than the not-so-rich layers (e.g. higher use of transportation,  
foreign connections, financial means, etc. - all costing money to  
the country) in spite of their lower share in the present unjust爐 
axation-scheme.

...

And PLEASE, Brent, do not even utter in econo-political discussion  
the word FAIRNESS!


So is it OK if I use FAIR and unjust?

Brent


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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The All


On 9/8/2012 6:51 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 08.09.2012 12:37 Stephen P. King said the following:

On 9/8/2012 3:50 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:



Say I see my image behind the mirror (I have written behind instead
of in the mirror just to better describe my experience). How could
you describe this phenomenon by means of res cogitans and res
extensa?

Evgenii -- http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/05/brain-and-world.html


Hi Evgenii,

I would not, and neither Pratt, use the notion of substance as did
Descartes. Pratt explains himself well:
http://boole.stanford.edu/pub/ratmech.pdf



...



The duality between mind in body is defined in terms of the relation
 that is known in mathematics to exist between Boolean algebras and
certain topological spaces. Pratt presents a step-wise variational
calculus to model both body -body and mind-mind interactions.



How would Pratt describe the phenomenon of the image behind the mirror 
in his representation?


Evgenii


Hi Evgenii,

The image in the mirror is a simple transformation of coordinates, 
but Pratt is not considering that aspect.


--
Onward!

Stephen

http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html


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Re: Re: The Unprivacy of Information

Hi Bruno Marchal 

They're close in mneaning, but a seme emphasizes meaning more than information( 
a meme)  I think.

Seme

(sem)
n.1.(Linguistics) A linguistic sign.
2.(Linguistics) A basic component of meaning of a morpheme, especially one 
which cannot be decomposed into more basic components; a primitive concept.


Meme
meme  (mm)
n.
A unit of cultural information, such as a cultural practice or idea, that is 
transmitted verbally or by repeated action from one mind to another.



Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/8/2012 
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content - 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-09-08, 04:23:38
Subject: Re: The Unprivacy of Information




On 07 Sep 2012, at 13:49, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Craig Weinberg 

Although I don't follow Dawking's views on life and God, 
I think his idea of semes, which are like genes but ideas instead,
is a very good one. If the logic follows through, then
man is the semes' way of propagating itself through society.


semes? is it not the memes?


Bruno






Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/7/2012 
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content - 
From: Craig Weinberg 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-09-06, 13:39:10
Subject: The Unprivacy of Information


(reposting from my blog)

If I? right, then the slogan ?nformation wants to be free is not just an 
intuition about social policy, but rather an insight into the ontological roots 
of information itself. To be more precise, it isn? that information wants to be 
free, it is that it can? want to be anything, and that ownership itself is 
predicated on want and familiarity. Information, by contrast, is the exact 
opposite of want and familiarity, it is the empty and generic syntax of 
strangers talking to strangers about anything.
I propose that information or data is inherently public such that it lacks the 
possibility of privacy. Information cannot be secret, it can only be kept a 
secret through voluntary participation in extra-informational social contracts. 
It is only the access to information that we can control - the i/o, we cannot 
become information or live in information or as information.*

Information spreads only as controlled changes in matter, not independently in 
space or non-space vacuum. Information is how stuff seems to other stuff. 
Computation exploits the universality of how many kinds of stuff make sense in 
the same basic ways. It is to make modular or ?igital collections of 
objectified changes which can be inscribed on any sufficiently controllable 
substance. Not live hamsters or fog. They make terrible computers.
To copyright information or to encrypt it is to discourage unauthorized control 
of information access. This underscores the fact that information control 
supervenes on (requires) capacities of perception and intent rather than the 
capacities of information itself. We have to be shamed or frightened or tempted 
into agreeing to treat information as proprietary on behalf of the proprietor? 
interests.We can? train information not to talk to strangers.


The data itself doesn? care if you publish it to the world or take credit for 
writing Shakespeare? entire catalog. This is not merely a strange property of 
information, this is the defining property of information in direct 
contradistinction to both experience and matter. I maintain however, that this 
doesn? indicate that information is a neutral monism (singular ground of being 
from which matter, energy, and awareness emerge), but rather it is the neutral 
nihilism - the shadow, if you will, of sensorimotive participation divisible by 
spacetime. It? a protocol that bridges the gaps between participants (selves, 
monads, agents, experiences), but it is not itself a participant. This is 
important because if we don? understand this (and we are nowhere near 
understanding this yet), then we will proceed to exterminate our quality of 
life to a hybrid of Frankenstein neuro-materialism and HAL 
cyberfunction-idealism.

To understand why information is really not consciousness but the evacuated 
forms of consciousness, consider that matter is proprietary relative to the 
body and experience is proprietary relative to the self, but information is 
proprietary to nothing. Information, if it did exist, would be nothing but the 
essence of a-proprietary manifestation. It has no dimension of subjectivity 
(privacy, ownership, selfhood) at all. It is qualitatively flat. Information as 
a word is a mis-attribution of what is actually, ontologically, ?ormations to 
be interpreted as code, to be unpacked, reconstituted, and reconstituted as a 
private experience.
*Who and what we are is sensorimotive matter (or materialized participation if 
you prefer?here are a lot of fancy ways to describe it:

Re: Re: The All

Hi Bruno Marchal 

Apparently Grim has an argument somewhat similar to Godel's that there can be 
no complete set of all truths
(that we can know, it doesn't mention God).  


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/8/2012 
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content - 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-09-08, 04:25:49
Subject: Re: The All




On 07 Sep 2012, at 13:53, Roger Clough wrote:




A too much powerful God leads to inconsistency. 

All-powerful does not mean unlawful. 


Apparently all-powerful does mean worst than unlawful. It means that 0 = 1.
You might look at the book by Grim on the impossibility of omniscience. 
Google on grim and omniscience. It is (again) a diagonal argument.


Bruno









Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/7/2012 
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content - 
From: meekerdb 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-09-06, 15:03:44
Subject: Re: The All


On 9/6/2012 11:52 AM, Brian Tenneson wrote: 


A too much powerful God leads to inconsistency. 





What if reality does not always obey the laws of logic?  What if reality is 
sometimes inconsistent?


This is a confusion of levels. Logic is rules about truth preservation in 
declarative sentences.  Not 'obeying the laws of logic' just means declaring 
inconsistent sentences.  We try to avoid this because such utterances would 
have no determinate meaning.  So a *descriptions* of reality may be 
inconsistent (and therefore useless) but reality is just whatever it is.  It 
can't be inconsistent because it's not assertions.

Brent



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Alice and Wittgenstein: Materialism, Functionalism, and Comp

Here I present another metaphor to encapsulate by view of the relation 
between consciousness, information, and physicality by demonstrating the 
inadequacy of functionalist, computationalist, and materialist models and 
how they paint over the hard problem of consciousness with a choice of two 
flavors of the easy problem.

I came up with this thought exercise in response to this lecture: 
http://backdoorbroadcasting.net/2012/05/zoe-drayson-the-autonomy-of-the-mental-and-the-personalsubpersonal-distinction/

Consider Alice in Wonderland

Let's say that Alice is trying to decide whether she can describe herself 
in terms of being composed of the syntax of the letters, words, and 
sentences of the story from which she emerges, or whether she is composed 
of the bleached and pressed wood pulp and ink that are considered page 
parts of the whole book.

The former I would say corresponds to the functionalist view of Alice as 
roles and realizers, while the materialist view of Alice corresponds to 
the mereological parts and wholes. To extend the metaphor to 
computationalism I would make the distinction between functionalism and 
computationalism as the difference between the string of English words 
being equivalent to the story of Alice (functionalism) and the same thing 
but with the capacity for the string of words to translate themselves into 
any language. 


   - Materialism = pages in a book, 
   - Functionalism = English words in sentences (literature), 
   - Computationalism / Digital Functionalism = Amazon Kindle that 
   translates literature into any language (customized literature).


Although this distinction between comp and functionalism does, I think, 
make comp superior to either functionalism or materialism, it is still 
ultimately the wrong approach as it takes the story and characters for 
granted as an unexplained precipitate of linguistic roles and grammatical 
realizers. This is Searle, etc. The symbol grounding problem. In this 
respect, comp and functionalism are equivalent - both wrong in the same way 
and in the way that is orthogonal/perpendicular to the way that materialism 
is the wrong approach.

What must be understood about consciousness, and about Alice, is that 
nothing means anything without the possibility of perception and 
participation to begin with in the universe. There is, to my way of 
thinking, zero possibility of perception or participation experiences 
emerging from either as that relies on a free lunch where either the paper 
and ink, the words and sentences, or the bits and bytes can spontaneously 
illustrate Alice and her world, as well as spontaneously invent the concept 
of illustration itself - of color and shape, of the lilt of her voice, the 
relation of those things to each other and how they are presented not as 
separate aspects being related but as a whole character.

If we want to understand Alice as she is, not as she thinks of herself in 
terms of the pages, words, or bytes of her story, then I think we need to 
begin with the reality of Alice as 'the given'. We don’t have to believe 
that she is anything more than a character or that her life is anything 
other than a story, but if the character and story were really the ground 
of being for Alice, then the book of pages (brain hardware) and the 
language typed through those pages (cognitive software) both make sense as 
ways of stabilizing, controlling, and reproducing aspects of the story. The 
book is what makes Alice in Wonderland a publicly accessible artifact and 
the words are what mediate from the public spatial sense to the private 
temporal sense. 

To extend this a bit more, we could say that the private *motive* to open 
the book, read the words, and imagine the characters and scenes in the 
story are what bind the symbols to the private sense experience. *Body 
needs the book, mind needs the words, but story needs the willing self*. 
The story is not bytes or words or turning pages, it is intentionalized 
interior sensorimotive experience and nothing else. The map is not the 
territory. 

What this means is that all of the levels discussed in the lecture are not 
personal or sub-personal at all, but rather they are different aspects of 
the impersonal: impersonal (surface-topological) and impersonal 
(syntactic-operational). I propose a whole other indispensable half of this 
picture of consciousness and experience of which to paraphrase 
Wittgenstein, we cannot speak, thereof we must remain silent. *We can 
however, listen*.

We cannot speak about the personal, but we can know what it is to be a 
person. We can realize ourselves directly, as an autonomous presence 
without converting ourselves into an external appearance or function. We 
can let human experience be human experience on it's native level, in it's 
native language, and nothing less. We are not merely aggregates of bytes 
and cells nor fragments of inevitable evolutionary algorithms of 
speciation, we are also

Re: The All


On 08.09.2012 14:37 Stephen P. King said the following:

On 9/8/2012 6:51 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 08.09.2012 12:37 Stephen P. King said the following:

On 9/8/2012 3:50 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:



Say I see my image behind the mirror (I have written behind
instead of in the mirror just to better describe my
experience). How could you describe this phenomenon by means of
res cogitans and res extensa?

Evgenii -- http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/05/brain-and-world.html


Hi Evgenii,

I would not, and neither Pratt, use the notion of substance as
did Descartes. Pratt explains himself well:
http://boole.stanford.edu/pub/ratmech.pdf



...



The duality between mind in body is defined in terms of the
relation that is known in mathematics to exist between Boolean
algebras and certain topological spaces. Pratt presents a
step-wise variational calculus to model both body -body and
mind-mind interactions.



How would Pratt describe the phenomenon of the image behind the
mirror in his representation?

Evgenii


Hi Evgenii,

The image in the mirror is a simple transformation of coordinates,
but Pratt is not considering that aspect.



I would say that the image in the mirror is a visual illusion created 
presumably by the brain. Don't you agree? Then it is exactly a 
relationship between mental and physical states but not in the form of 
ideas but rather images.


Evgenii

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Re: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

Hi Bruno Marchal 

Nobody has to believe anything I say.
I thought that was a given.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/8/2012 
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content - 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-09-08, 04:44:44
Subject: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence




On 07 Sep 2012, at 14:53, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal 

Any time I use the word God, I always mean IMHO God.

I am actually thinking instead of Cosmic Intelligence
or Cosmnic Mind.

I try not to use that  word (God) but sometimes forget. 


I can see that. No problem if it is an accepted fuzzy pointer on our ignorance. 
Big problem if you reify it into a final explanation. I like the term cosmic, 
but only as poetry. The cosmos existence is an open problem for me.


Bruno






Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/7/2012 
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content - 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-09-06, 14:06:49
Subject: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence




On 05 Sep 2012, at 17:34, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal 

God also created time, and anyway eternity is timeless,
not sure if spacless.


I can accept this as a rough sum up of some theory (= hypothesis; + 
consequences), not as an explanation per se. As an explanation, it is 
equivalent with don't ask for more understanding, and you fall in the 
authoritative trap.


Bruno








Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/5/2012 
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content - 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-09-05, 09:51:40
Subject: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence




On 04 Sep 2012, at 18:42, John Clark wrote:


On Tue, Sep 4, 2012  Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote:



 God created the human race.

And when God asks Himself the question Why have I always existed, why haven't 
I always not existed? what answer in his omniscience does He come up with?





The neoplatonist conception of God does not allow It to ask such a question. 


Nor does Arithmetical Truth. 


God has no self-reference power at all, as this would make it inconsistent.


Still defending the Christian God, aren't you?


Bruno








 God is the uncreated infinite intelligence 

There was once a patent issued for a combination rat trap and potato peeler and 
people laugh about that, but using the exact same organ for both excretory and 
reproductive purposes does not seem very intelligent to me either, much less 
infinitely intelligent. And putting the blood vessels and nerves for the retina 
of the eye in front not in the back so the light must pass through them to get 
to the light sensitive cells also does not seem very smart; no engineer in his 
right mind would place the gears to move the film in a camera so that the light 
must pass through the gears before hitting the film. That's not the sort of 
thing you'd expect God to do, but it's exactly what you'd expect Evolution to 
do.

 John K Clark




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Re: The All


On 9/8/2012 9:12 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 08.09.2012 14:37 Stephen P. King said the following:

On 9/8/2012 6:51 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 08.09.2012 12:37 Stephen P. King said the following:

On 9/8/2012 3:50 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:



Say I see my image behind the mirror (I have written behind
instead of in the mirror just to better describe my
experience). How could you describe this phenomenon by means of
res cogitans and res extensa?

Evgenii -- http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/05/brain-and-world.html


Hi Evgenii,

I would not, and neither Pratt, use the notion of substance as
did Descartes. Pratt explains himself well:
http://boole.stanford.edu/pub/ratmech.pdf



...



The duality between mind in body is defined in terms of the
relation that is known in mathematics to exist between Boolean
algebras and certain topological spaces. Pratt presents a
step-wise variational calculus to model both body -body and
mind-mind interactions.



How would Pratt describe the phenomenon of the image behind the
mirror in his representation?

Evgenii


Hi Evgenii,

The image in the mirror is a simple transformation of coordinates,
but Pratt is not considering that aspect.



I would say that the image in the mirror is a visual illusion created 
presumably by the brain. Don't you agree? Then it is exactly a 
relationship between mental and physical states but not in the form of 
ideas but rather images.


Evgenii


Hi Evgenii,

Yes I agree. What essential difference is there between ideas and 
images?


--
Onward!

Stephen

http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html


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Re: Re: Racism ? How's that implied ?

Hi Bruno Marchal  

OK, I see, you think I judge the abilities of people
by the color of their skin.  So you call me a racist.
 
You might be a liberal, because ironically and
paradoxically they see the world in terms of race.
Conservatives attempt to live by facts. I never
saw racism in what what I wrote until you brought
the subject up. 

I don't mean to offend you with this talk of politics.
Conservatives are not perfect either.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
9/8/2012  
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him  
so that everything could function. 
- Receiving the following content -  
From: Bruno Marchal  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-09-08, 04:46:38 
Subject: Re: Racism ? How's that implied ? 




On 07 Sep 2012, at 15:00, Roger Clough wrote: 


Hi Bruno Marchal  

Racism ? How's that implied ? 


Do you accept that your daughter marry a man who has undergone an artificial 
brain transplant? 







But I do agree that perception and Cs are  
not understandable with materialistic concepts 
at least as they are commonly used. 
Instead they are what the mind can sense, 


OK. 




as a sixth sense. 


Hmm... 





The mind is similar to driving a car through 
Platoville and watching the static events 
in passing. 


OK. 


Bruno 







Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
9/7/2012  
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him  
so that everything could function. 
- Receiving the following content -  
From: Bruno Marchal  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-09-06, 14:12:37 
Subject: Re: Sane2004 Step One 




On 05 Sep 2012, at 18:12, Roger Clough wrote: 



I don't think that life or mind or intelligence 
can be teleported. Especially since nobody knows what 
they are. 

I also don't believe that you can download 
the contents of somebody's brain. 




This is just restating that you don't believe in comp.  


OK, develop your theory, and predict something testable, and we will better 
understand what you mean. 
If not it looks just  like a form of racism based on magic. 


Bruno 






Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
9/5/2012  
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him  
so that everything could function. 
- Receiving the following content -  
From: Bruno Marchal  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-09-05, 11:04:53 
Subject: Re: Sane2004 Step One 


On 05 Sep 2012, at 06:14, meekerdb wrote: 

 On 9/4/2012 7:19 PM, Russell Standish wrote: 
 On Tue, Sep 04, 2012 at 06:48:58PM -0700, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
 I have problems with all three of the comp assumptions: 
 
 *yes, doctor*: This is really the sleight of hand that props up  
 the entire 
 thought experiment. If you agree that you are nothing but your brain 
 function and that your brain function can be replaced by the  
 functioning of 
 non-brain devices, then you have already agreed that human  
 individuality is 
 a universal commodity. 
 Calling it a sleight of hand is a bit rough. It is the meat of the 
 comp assumption, and spelling it out this way makes it very 
 explicit. Either you agree you can be copied (without feeling a 
 thing), or you don't. If you do, you must face up to the consequences 
 of the argument, if you don't, then you do not accept 
 computationalism, and the consequences of the UDA do not apply to  
 your 
 worldview. 
 
 I suppose I can be copied. But does it follow that I am just the  
 computations in my brain. It seems likely that I also require an  
 outside environment/world with which I interact in order to remain  
 conscious. Bruno passes this off by saying it's just a matter of  
 the level of substitution, perhaps your local environment or even  
 the whole galaxy must be replaced by a digital representation in  
 order to maintain your consciousness unchanged. But this bothers  
 me. Suppose it is the whole galaxy, or the whole observed  
 universe. Does it really mean anything then to say your brain has  
 been replaced ALONG WITH EVERYTHING ELSE? It's just the assertion  
 that everything is computable. 

That's a good argument for saying that the level of substitution is  
not that low. But the reasoning would still go through, and we would  
lead to a unique computable universe. That is the only way to make a  
digital physics consistent (as I forget to say sometimes). Then you  
get a more complex other mind problem, and something like David  
Nyman- Hoyle beam would be needed, and would need to be separate from  
the physical reality, making the big physical whole incomplete, etc.  
yes this bothers me too. Needless to say, I tend to believe that if  
comp is true, the level is much higher. 



 
 
 *Church thesis*: Views computation in isolation, irrespective of  
 resources, 
 supervenience on object-formed computing elements, etc. This is a 
 theoretical theory of computation, completely divorced from  
 realism from 
 the start. What is it that does the computing? How and why does  
 data

Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

Bruno Marchal wrote:

even though the paper actually
doesn't even begin to adress the question.

Which question? The paper mainly just formulate a question, shows how
comp makes it possible to translate the question in math, and show
that the general shape of the possible solution is more close to Plato
than to Aristotle.
The problem is that the paper is taking the most fundamental issue for
granted, and it does not actually show anything if the main assumption is
not true and at the end presents a conclusion that is mainly just what is
being taken for granted (we are abstractly digital, and computations can
lead to a 1p of view).

You say assuming COMP, but COMP is either impossible with respect to its
own conclusion (truly, purely digital substitutions are not possible due to
matter being non-digital), or it is too vague to allow for any conclusion
(kinda digital, digital at some level are not enough for a strict
reasoning).

You also say that a 1p view can be recovered by incompleteness, but actually
you always present *abstractions* of points of view, not the point of view.

Bruno Marchal wrote:

How am I supposed to argue with
that?

There is no point of studying Gödel if we have a false assumption
about what
the proof even is about. It is never, at no point, about numbers as
axiomatic systems. It is just about what we can express with them on a
meta-level.

On the contrary. The whole Gödel's thing relies on the fact that the
meta-level can be embedded at the level.
Feferman fundamental papers extending Gödel is arithmetization of
metamathematics. It is the main point: the meta can be done at the
lower level. Machines can refer to themselves in the 3p way, and by
using the Theatetus' definition we get a notion of 1p which provides
some light on the 1//3 issue.
But Gödel does not show this. The meta-level can only be embedded at that
level on the *meta-level*. Apart from this level, we can't even formulate
representation or embedding (using the axioms of N - except on another
meta-level).

You act like Gödel eliminates the meta-level, but he does not do this and
indeed the notion of doing that doesn't make sense (because otherwise the
whole reasoning ceases to make sense).

Bruno Marchal wrote:

You just use fancy words to obfuscate that.
It i#s like saying study the bible for scientific education (you
just don't
understand how it adresses scientific questiosn yet).

No reason to be angry. It is the second time you make an ad hominem
remark. I try to ignore that.
I am not angry, just a little frustrated that you don't see how you ignore
the main issue (both in our discussions and you paer), while acting like you
are only showing rational consequences of some belief.

I have said nothing about you, actually you seem to be a genuine, open and
nice person to me. I am just being honest about what you appear to be doing
in your paper and on this list. It is probably not even intentional at all.
So, sorry if I offended you, but I'd rather be frank than to argue with your
points which don't even adress the issue (which is what perceive as being
obfuscation).

Bruno Marchal wrote:

I work in a theory and I do my best to
help making things clear. You don't like comp, but the liking or not
is another topic.
Well, I am not saying your being *intentionally* misleading or avoiding, but
it certainly appears to me that you are avoiding the issue - perhaps because
you just don't see it.
You are defending your reasoning, while always avoiding the main point that
your reasoning does either depend on unstated assumption (we are already
digital, or only the digital part of a substitution can matter), or rely on
a vague (practically digital substitution) or contradictory (purely digital
substitution, which is not possible, because purely digital is nonsense with
regards to matter) premise.
The same goes for the derivation of points of view. You just derive
abstractions, while not adressing that abstractions of points of view don't
necessarily have anything to do with an actual point of view (thus confusing
your reader which thinks that you actually showed a relation between
*actual* points of view and arithmetics).

It doesn't matter whether I like COMP or not. I don't find it a very
fruitful assumption, but that's not the issue.

benjayk

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Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 07 Sep 2012, at 14:22, benjayk wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 06 Sep 2012, at 13:31, benjayk wrote:

Quantum effects beyond individual brains (suggested by psi) can't be
computed as well: No matter what I compute in my brain, this doesn't
entangle it with other brains since computation is classical.

The UD emulates all quantum computer, as they do not violate Church
Thesis.
I am not talking about quantum computers, which are not entangled
with their
surroundings.
I am talking about systems that are entangled to other systems.

This is just lowering the comp level of substitution. It does not
change the reasoning, thanks to the use of the notion of generalized
brain.
It does, because you can't simulate indefinite entanglement. No matter how
many entangled systems you simulate, you are always missing the entanglement
of this combined system to another (which may be as crucial as the system
itself, because it may lead to a very different unfoldment of events).
A practically digital substitution (which is assumed in COMP) could be
entangled with its surroundings, which may be very different than the
entanglement of a brain (or a generalized brain) with its surroundings. The
substitution may not only fail because the person itself is not preserved,
but also because the world was not preserved (the person would certainly
complain to the doctor if the world suddenly is substantially different - if
there is still a doctor left, that is).
And if you say that we can simulate this entanglement as well, the
entanglement of this system to outside systems may again lead to the
emulation to be not correct at all from a broader view (etc...). At every
step the emulation may actually become more false, because more of the
multiverse/universe is changed.

We can argue that all these things may not be relevant (though I think they
are), but in any case it makes the reasoning shaky.

Bruno Marchal wrote:

No matter how good your simulation is, it is never going to change its
surroundings without using I/O.

QM does not allows this, unless you bring by the collapse of the wave.
Clearly QM does allow that measurement in one object changes another
object (we can argue with the word change, because the effect is
non-causal). This is even experimentally verified.
MW doesn't change this, it is the same with regards to correlations between
classically non-interacting objects.

benjayk
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Re: Re: Brains and time, subjectivity vs objectivity

Hi Bruno Marchal 

1) Mind is nonphysical, the nopnphysical by definition
is not extended.

2) The All in Platonia is the end-all and be-all of everything,
being to my mind Universal Intelligence, including human or computers. 
So not just persons. All of existence swims in the All. Living and dead.
It is the why the what the when* and the how.
-
*Presumably the All created the physical world so that physical
time could exist. The subjective view of physical time is a
minimal definition of consciousness.
--
3) The brain was constructed to ciommunicate with Mind like
a cell phone. The brain cannot itself do anythig, the mind
does all  because it is Platonia, intelligence itself.

4) As to doubt and subjective time, yes, but no to/fro
objective time.  Subjective time would be comparable
to the perception of some event in physical time.



Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/8/2012 
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content - 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-09-08, 05:01:02
Subject: Re: Brains and time, subjectivity vs objectivity




On 07 Sep 2012, at 16:06, Roger Clough wrote:




Theres is some duplication in the propositions below which I have not bothered
to clear up, sorry.

1) Mind, being inextended, is outside of the brain, which is extended.
Mind (shared and the general, Platonia) is the subjective realm. 
Brain (personal, private, the particular, materialistic) is in the 
objective realm.


Mind does not even belong to the category of things capable of being extended 
or not extended.







2) So Mind is beyond spacetime (Platonic) , but each brain is in spacetime
 (materialistic), and only brains can access the Platonic*.


Only persons, using brains.





3) Brains are in time, as are all materialistic things, including computers.
Mind is timeless*. 


OK.





4) Objective time is in spacetime, so can be measured.


OK. Note that objective = capable of being doubted, or capable of being an 
illusion or a dream.









5) Subjective time is outside of spacetime, so only sensible by the brain.


By the person. My brain does no more thinking than my stomach do tasting. The 
brain is just a local tool.






* So I think of our brains as racing through Mind in an auto
while looking at the passing landscape of Mind.


Except that eventually, the brain is only a construct of the mind too. The 
persons are in Platonia.


Bruno









Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/7/2012 
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content - 
From: Craig Weinberg 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-09-06, 15:25:14
Subject: Re: Sane2004 Step One




On Thursday, September 6, 2012 2:02:02 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: 


On 05 Sep 2012, at 17:27, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Wednesday, September 5, 2012 10:50:02 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: 


On 05 Sep 2012, at 03:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:


Taking another look at Sane2004. This isn't so much as a challenge to Bruno, 
just sharing my notes of why I disagree. Not sure how far I will get this time, 
but here are my objections to the first step and the stipulated assumptions of 
comp. I understand that the point is to accept the given definition of comp, 
and in that respect, I have no reason to doubt that Bruno has accomplished what 
he sets out to as far as making a good theory within comp, and if he has not, I 
wouldn't be qualified to comment on it anyhow. From my perspective however, 
this is all beside the point, since the only point that matters is the actual 
truth of what consciousness actually is, and what is it's actual relation to 
physics and information. Given the fragile and precious nature of our own 
survival, I think that implications for teleportation and AI 
simulation/personhood which are derived from pure theory rather than thorough 
consideration of realism would be reckless to say the least.


Step one talks about teleportation in terms of being reconstructed with ambient 
organic materials. If comp were true though, no organic materials or 
reconstructions would be necessary. The scanning into a universal machine would 
be sufficient.
That is step 6.

I haven't even gotten to step 2 yet. I'm reading In the figure the teleported 
individual is represented by a black box. Its annihilation is
represented by a white box appearing at the left of the arrow from 1.
 





Taking this to the China Brain level, the universal machine could be a trillion 
people with notebooks, pencils, paper, and erasers, talking to each other over 
cell phones. This activity would have to collectively result in the teleported 
person now being conjured as if by incantation as a consequence of...what? The

Re: Re: The poverty of computers

Hi Bruno Marchal 

IMHO Digital devices can interface with living systems,
but they must always ultimately be slaves to the self,
the nonphysical governor (mind), just as the supreme 
monad (the All) is the governor of the universe. So transplant
of a physical brain seems a bit impossible as of yet.

And rocks have no intelligence so are governed purely by
physical laws.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/8/2012 
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content - 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-09-08, 05:35:00
Subject: Re: The poverty of computers




On 07 Sep 2012, at 19:12, John Clark wrote:


On Fri, Sep 7 2012, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: 



 machines, even computers, IMHO in practice have no intellectual or feeling 
 facilities, are no more than dumb rocks.

Computers may or may not have feelings but that is of no concern to us, if they 
don't it's their problem not ours; 


It might concerns you if the doctor intents to replace your brain by a digital 
device, or if your daughter want marry a man who did that.








however those dumb rocks can and do outsmart us on a regular basis and the 
list of things they are superior at gets longer every day. The very title of 
this thread just screams whistling past the graveyard.



 So there is no more communication with God possible than there would be with 
 an abacus.

Now that I agree with 100%, computers are no better at talking to God than a 
abacus is. 



Indeed. Abacus are Turing universal, and so have the same ability than us 
(assuming comp).


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: Re: The poverty of computers

Hi Bruno Marchal 

IMHO Sorry, perhaps I am growing tired and grumpy, 
but the issue about about the lack of a T
Logical truth has its uses, but it has no provision for self or feelings or 
indeed life, no meaning, no aesthetics, no morality, no intelligence, 
just the gears of logic. No Bach, no Beethoven, no Vermeer.

No sex.

These are functions of the metaphorical right brain,
logic being a function of the left brain.

So to me logic it is like the shadows that the deluded men in 
Plato's cave thought was reality itself.

Besides Truth, Beauty and Goodness have their roles to 
play in this shakey allegory called Life..


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/8/2012 
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content - 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-09-08, 05:43:55
Subject: Re: The poverty of computers


On 08 Sep 2012, at 06:19, meekerdb wrote:

 On 9/7/2012 8:43 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
 Platonism (or mathematical realism) is the majority viewpoint of 
 modern mathematicians.

 In a survey of mathematicians I know it is an even division. Of 
 course they are all methodological Platonists, but not necessarily 
 philosophical ones.

 Computationalism (or functionalism) is the majority viewpoint of 
 cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind. Thus the scientific 
 consensus is that infinite (mathematical) truth

 Except mathematical truth is just a marker, T, whose value is 
 preserved by the rules of logic. Whether a proposition that has T 
 corresponds with any fact is another question.


Be careful to distinguish a true sentence (like T) with the notion of 
truth or of arithmetical true sentence, which is not even definable in 
arithmetic, and can be meta-defined in some set theory or second order 
arithmetic, at the meta-level. God can be arithmetical truth, but God 
can't be just T.




 is the self-existent cause and reason for our existence.

 That is very far from a scientific consensus. I'd say majority the 
 opinion among scientists who are philosophically inclined is that 
 mathematics and logic are languages in which we create models that 
 represent what we think about reality. This explains why there can 
 be contradictory mathematical models and even mutually inconsistent 
 sets of axioms and rules of inference.

Yes, but this makes sense only for people agreeing on elementary 
arithmetical truth. If not, the notion of axioms and rules of 
inference don't make sense.

Nobody serious disagree on elementary arithmetic. I have never seen 
someone doubting the meaning of (N, +, *), except philosophers. Bad 
philosophers, I would say, when they are in desperate needs to 
demolish some argument, or to look original or something. We need 
assess arithmetic to make sense of doubting arithmetic, and so, 
doubting arithmetic does not make sense, in fact.

Bruno



 Few people today have realized that this is inevitable conclusion 
 of these two commonly held beliefs.

 Not only that a few people have rejected it.

 Brent

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Re: Re: fairness and sustainability

Hi Bruno Marchal 

Indeed, we are all sinners.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/8/2012 
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content - 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-09-08, 08:37:30
Subject: Re: fairness and sustainability




On 08 Sep 2012, at 12:35, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi John Mikes 

Here's the dilemma: 

Unfortunately, any system -- with the exception of the oil-rich countries
(where fairness would seem to be hard to define) -- 
that is completely fair is unsustainable. Capitalism,
like it or not, is the only known way to increase a 
country's wealth. Fairness decreases a country's capacity
to grow. Darwin would agree.

Cuba and the former soviet union and now europe
are good examples. They all failed in trying to be completely fair
or are in the process of failing.




I think that capitalism + democracy is the most fair system.


Today, unfortunately, capitalism has been perverted by minorities which build 
money on fears, lies and catastrophes, and that is very bad.


They are clever, and have succeeded in mixing the black and non black money, so 
that the middle class and the banking systems have become hostages.  Those 
liars are transforming the planet economy into a a pyramidal con.


Lying is part of nature, like cancers and diseases. Defending ourselves against 
liars is part of nature too.


Bruno














Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/8/2012 
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content - 
From: John Mikes 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-09-07, 14:44:26
Subject: Re: There is no such thing as cause and effect


Brent, 
I believe there is a difference between (adj) 'fair' or 'unjust' and the (noun) 
'fairness', or 'consciousness'. 
While the nouns (IMO)?re not adequately identified the adverbs refer to the 
applied system of correspondence. 
E.g.: Fair to the unjust system. (I don't think we may use the opposite: 
unjust to a 'fair' system in our discussion). 
As I tried to explain in another post: the 'rich' consume MORE of the 
country-supplied services than the not-so-rich and pay less taxes (unfair and 
unjust). Certain big corporations also pay 'less' than the system would require 
(in all fairness - proverbially said) ordinarily. 
Semantix, OOH!
John M


On Tue, Sep 4, 2012 at 4:18 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 9/4/2012 1:12 PM, John Mikes wrote: 


It is a 'trap' to falsify the adequate taxing of the 'rich' as a leftist 
attempt to distributing richness. It does not include more than a requirement 
for THEM to pay their FAIR share - maybe more than the not-so-rich layers (e.g. 
higher use of transportation, foreign connections, financial means, etc. - all 
costing money to the country) in spite of their lower share in the present 
unjust?axation-scheme.
.. 


And PLEASE, Brent, do not even utter in econo-political discussion the word 
FAIRNESS!


So is it OK if I use FAIR and unjust?

Brent




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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: Re: fairness and sustainability

Hi Craig Weinberg 

Indeed, we are all sinners.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/8/2012 
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content - 
From: Craig Weinberg 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-09-08, 08:14:26
Subject: Re: fairness and sustainability




On Saturday, September 8, 2012 6:36:26 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:
Hi John Mikes 

Here's the dilemma: 

Unfortunately, any system -- with the exception of the oil-rich countries
(where fairness would seem to be hard to define) -- 
that is completely fair is unsustainable. Capitalism,
like it or not, is the only known way to increase a 
country's wealth. Fairness decreases a country's capacity
to grow. Darwin would agree.

Cuba and the former soviet union and now europe
are good examples. They all failed in trying to be completely fair
or are in the process of failing.

It sounds like you are defining wealth as capitalism in the first place. 
Historically, there have been other ways of increasing a country's wealth. 
Conquest. Agriculture. Slavery. There are examples of redistributive economies 
in Polynesia...the idea of 'the Big Man' who gains influence and glory by 
throwing the biggest parties for everyone. As the poverty of many capitalist 
economies today shows (aren't most sub-Saharan economies capitalist?), it is 
really the history of exploitation of natural and human resources (or being the 
target of exploitation thereof) which seems to relate to the ability of the 
nation to increase its wealth.

What is happening now though is that capitalist countries are seeing their 
capitalist elites become independent of the country. ExxonMobil makes history 
with its obscenely high profits while the country debates yet more cutbacks on 
basic human services. This isn't the fault of capitalism, since it only values 
economic considerations, if human beings overproduce their numbers and reduce 
their demand, the corporate leader is put in the position where if they don't 
exploit that condition, then somebody else will. Technology amplifies this. 
What globalization means is eventually we will have a tiny group of 
international insiders and a disposable population of potential employees all 
competing for the lowest possible wage. Capitalism is building glass bank 
towers that stay empty all night while more and more people sleep in the 
streets, prisons, squat in foreclosed houses, etc.

Unrestrained social Darwinism is not the only alternative to 'trying to be 
completely fair'. Parts of the Soviet Union and Cuba are doing much better than 
parts of New Orleans and Detroit. It's really very simplistic to try to draw a 
line from a single economic proposition and the complex reality of the fate of 
a nation. What would Cuba be like without the revolution? Maybe Monte Carlo, 
maybe Haiti...neither...both? It's all speculation. All I can see is that 
whatever we are doing in the US, is making everything worse - here and around 
the world. I see the quality of life stagnating and dropping for most people, 
for lack of money that is flowing into the bank accounts of people who have no 
way to tell the difference except in their imagination. 

Craig

 



Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net
9/8/2012 
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content - 
From: John Mikes 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-09-07, 14:44:26
Subject: Re: There is no such thing as cause and effect


Brent, 
I believe there is a difference between (adj) 'fair' or 'unjust' and the (noun) 
'fairness', or 'consciousness'. 
While the nouns (IMO)? re not adequately identified the adverbs refer to the 
applied system of correspondence. 
E.g.: Fair to the unjust system. (I don't think we may use the opposite: 
unjust to a 'fair' system in our discussion). 
As I tried to explain in another post: the 'rich' consume MORE of the 
country-supplied services than the not-so-rich and pay less taxes (unfair and 
unjust). Certain big corporations also pay 'less' than the system would require 
(in all fairness - proverbially said) ordinarily. 
Semantix, OOH!
John M


On Tue, Sep 4, 2012 at 4:18 PM, meekerdb meek...@verizon.net wrote:

On 9/4/2012 1:12 PM, John Mikes wrote: 


It is a 'trap' to falsify the adequate taxing of the 'rich' as a leftist 
attempt to distributing richness. It does not include more than a requirement 
for THEM to pay their FAIR share - maybe more than the not-so-rich layers (e.g. 
higher use of transportation, foreign connections, financial means, etc. - all 
costing money to the country) in spite of their lower share in the present 
unjust? axation-scheme.
.. 


And PLEASE, Brent, do not even utter in econo-political discussion the word 
FAIRNESS!


So is it OK if I use FAIR and unjust?

Brent


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Re: Alice and Wittgenstein: Materialism, Functionalism, and Comp

Hi Craig Weinberg 

I seem to be a voice crying in the wilderness. So be it, but...

When you say Here I present , how or where does the I fit into your 
philosophy ?

You cannot have thinking or consciousness or intelligence or perception withut 
it.



Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/8/2012 
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content - 
From: Craig Weinberg 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-09-08, 09:10:48
Subject: Alice and Wittgenstein: Materialism, Functionalism, and Comp


Here I present another metaphor to encapsulate by view of the relation between 
consciousness, information, and physicality by demonstrating the inadequacy of 
functionalist, computationalist, and materialist models and how they paint over 
the hard problem of consciousness with a choice of two flavors of the easy 
problem.

I came up with this thought exercise in response to this lecture: 
http://backdoorbroadcasting.net/2012/05/zoe-drayson-the-autonomy-of-the-mental-and-the-personalsubpersonal-distinction/

Consider Alice in Wonderland

Let's say that Alice is trying to decide whether she can describe herself in 
terms of being composed of the syntax of the letters, words, and sentences of 
the story from which she emerges, or whether she is composed of the bleached 
and pressed wood pulp and ink that are considered page parts of the whole book.

The former I would say corresponds to the functionalist view of Alice as roles 
and realizers, while the materialist view of Alice corresponds to the 
mereological parts and wholes. To extend the metaphor to computationalism I 
would make the distinction between functionalism and computationalism as the 
difference between the string of English words being equivalent to the story of 
Alice (functionalism) and the same thing but with the capacity for the string 
of words to translate themselves into any language. 


Materialism = pages in a book, 
Functionalism = English words in sentences (literature), 
Computationalism / Digital Functionalism = Amazon Kindle that translates 
literature into any language (customized literature).


Although this distinction between comp and functionalism does, I think, make 
comp superior to either functionalism or materialism, it is still ultimately 
the wrong approach as it takes the story and characters for granted as an 
unexplained precipitate of linguistic roles and grammatical realizers. This is 
Searle, etc. The symbol grounding problem. In this respect, comp and 
functionalism are equivalent - both wrong in the same way and in the way that 
is orthogonal/perpendicular to the way that materialism is the wrong approach.

What must be understood about consciousness, and about Alice, is that nothing 
means anything without the possibility of perception and participation to begin 
with in the universe. There is, to my way of thinking, zero possibility of 
perception or participation experiences emerging from either as that relies on 
a free lunch where either the paper and ink, the words and sentences, or the 
bits and bytes can spontaneously illustrate Alice and her world, as well as 
spontaneously invent the concept of illustration itself - of color and shape, 
of the lilt of her voice, the relation of those things to each other and how 
they are presented not as separate aspects being related but as a whole 
character.
If we want to understand Alice as she is, not as she thinks of herself in terms 
of the pages, words, or bytes of her story, then I think we need to begin with 
the reality of Alice as 'the given'. We don? have to believe that she is 
anything more than a character or that her life is anything other than a story, 
but if the character and story were really the ground of being for Alice, then 
the book of pages (brain hardware) and the language typed through those pages 
(cognitive software) both make sense as ways of stabilizing, controlling, and 
reproducing aspects of the story. The book is what makes Alice in Wonderland a 
publicly accessible artifact and the words are what mediate from the public 
spatial sense to the private temporal sense. 

To extend this a bit more, we could say that the private motive to open the 
book, read the words, and imagine the characters and scenes in the story are 
what bind the symbols to the private sense experience. Body needs the book, 
mind needs the words, but story needs the willing self. The story is not bytes 
or words or turning pages, it is intentionalized interior sensorimotive 
experience and nothing else. The map is not the territory. 
What this means is that all of the levels discussed in the lecture are not 
personal or sub-personal at all, but rather they are different aspects of the 
impersonal: impersonal (surface-topological) and impersonal 
(syntactic-operational). I propose a whole other indispensable half of this 
picture of consciousness and experience of which to

Re: Why the Church-Turing thesis?


I just respond to some parts of your posts, because I'd rather discuss the
main points than get sidetracked with issues that are less fundamental.


Jason Resch-2 wrote:
 

 I admit that for numbers this is not so relevant because number relations
 can be quite clearly expressed using numerous symbols (they have very few
 and simple relations), but it is much more relevant for more complex
 relations.

 
 Complex relation can be expressed in terms of a series of interrelated
 simpler relations (addition, multiplication, comparison, etc.).  You are
 focused on the very lowest level and it is no wonder you cannot see the
 higher-level possibilities for meaning, relations, intelligence,
 consciousness, etc. that a machine can create.
The complex relations can often only be expressed as simple relations on a
meta-level (which is a very big step of abstraction). You can express
rational numbers using natural numbers, but only using an additional layer
of interpretation (which is a *huge* abstraction - it's the difference
between description and what is being described).

The natural numbers itself don't lead to the rational numbers (except by
adding additional relations, like the inverse of multiplication).


Jason Resch-2 wrote:
 
 The relation of hot vs. cold as experienced by you is also the
 production of a long series of multiplications, additions, comparisons,
 and
 other operations. 
You assume reductionism or emergentism here. Of course you can defend the CT
thesis if you assume that the lowest level can magically lead to higher
levels (or the higher levels are not real in the first place).
The problem is that this magic would precisely be the higher levels that you
wanted to derive.


Jason Resch-2 wrote:
 


 Jason Resch-2 wrote:
 
  For example it cannot directly compute
   -1*-1=1. Machine A can only be used to use an encoded input value
 and
   encoded description of machine B, and give an output that is
 correct
   given
   the right decoding scheme.
  
  
   1's or 0's, X's or O's, what the symbols are don't have any bearing
 on
   what
   they can compute.
  
  That's just an assertion of the belief I am trying to question here.
  In reality, it *does* matter which symbols/things we use to compute. A
  computer that only uses one symbol (for example a computer that adds
  using
  marbles) would be pretty useless.
  It does matter in many different ways: Speed of computations,
 effciency
  of
  computation, amount of memory, efficiency of memory, ease of
 programming,
  size of programs, ease of interpreting the result, amount of layers of
  programming to interpret the result and to program efficiently, ease
 of
  introspecting into the state of a computer...
 
 
  Practically they might matter but not theoretically.
 In the right theoretical model, it does matter. I am precisely doubting
 the
 value of adhering to our simplistic theoretical model of computation as
 the
 essence of what computation means.


 What model do you propose to replace it?
 
 The Church-Turing thesis plays a similar role in computer science as the
 fundamental theorem of arithmetic does in number theory.
None. There is no one correct model of computations. There are infinite
models that express different facets of what computation is. Different
turing machines express different things, super-recursive turing machines
express another thing, etc...
I think computer scientists just don't want to accept it, because it takes
their bible away. We like to have an easy answer, even if it is the wrong
one.


Jason Resch-2 wrote:
 

 Jason Resch-2 wrote:
 
 
  Why would we abstract from all that and then reduce computation to our
  one
  very abstract and imcomplete model of computation?
  If we do this we could as well abstract from the process of
 computation
  and
  say every string can be used to emulate any machine, because if you
 know
  what program it expresses, you know what it would compute (if
 correctly
  interpreted). There's no fundamental difference. Strings need to be
  interpreted to make sense as a program, and a turing machine without
  negative numbers needs to be interpreted to make sense as a program
  computing the result of an equation using negative numbers.
 
 
  I agree, strings need to be interpreted.  This is what the Turing
 machine
  does.  The symbols on the tape become interrelated in the context of
 the
  machine that interprets the symbols and it is these relations that
 become
  equivalent.
 That is like postulating some magic in the turing machine. It just
 manipulates symbols.

 
 No, it is not magic.  It is equivalent to saying the laws of physics
 interrelate every electron and quark to each other.
It is more like saying that the laws of physics show how to create humans
from atoms.
This is not the case. Nothing in the laws of nature says that some atoms
form a human. Still it is evidently the case that there are humans, meaning
that the laws of nature just don't describe the higher

Re: Why the Church-Turing thesis?


As far as I see, we mostly agree on content. 

I just can't make sense of reducing computation to emulability.
For me the intuitive sene of computation is much more rich than this.

But still, as I think about it, we can also create a model of computation
(in the sense of being intuitively computational and being implementable on
a computer) where there are computations that can't be emulated by universal
turing machine, using level breaking languages (which explicitly refer to
what is being computed on the base level). I'll write another post on this.

benjayk
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Re: The All


On 08.09.2012 15:27 Stephen P. King said the following:

On 9/8/2012 9:12 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


...


I would say that the image in the mirror is a visual illusion
created presumably by the brain. Don't you agree? Then it is
exactly a relationship between mental and physical states but not
in the form of ideas but rather images.

Evgenii


Hi Evgenii,

Yes I agree. What essential difference is there between ideas and
images?



An idea could be red for example. Yet, I am not sure how to describe 
the three dimensional world with spatial extension to the perceived 
horizon and dome of the sky that I observe as an idea.


Evgenii

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Re: Why the Church-Turing thesis?

2012-09-08 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2012/9/8 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com


 I just respond to some parts of your posts, because I'd rather discuss the
 main points than get sidetracked with issues that are less fundamental.


 Jason Resch-2 wrote:
 
 
  I admit that for numbers this is not so relevant because number
 relations
  can be quite clearly expressed using numerous symbols (they have very
 few
  and simple relations), but it is much more relevant for more complex
  relations.
 
 
  Complex relation can be expressed in terms of a series of interrelated
  simpler relations (addition, multiplication, comparison, etc.).  You are
  focused on the very lowest level and it is no wonder you cannot see the
  higher-level possibilities for meaning, relations, intelligence,
  consciousness, etc. that a machine can create.
 The complex relations can often only be expressed as simple relations on a
 meta-level (which is a very big step of abstraction). You can express
 rational numbers using natural numbers, but only using an additional layer
 of interpretation (which is a *huge* abstraction - it's the difference
 between description and what is being described).

 The natural numbers itself don't lead to the rational numbers (except by
 adding additional relations, like the inverse of multiplication).


 Jason Resch-2 wrote:
 
  The relation of hot vs. cold as experienced by you is also the
  production of a long series of multiplications, additions, comparisons,
  and
  other operations.
 You assume reductionism or emergentism here. Of course you can defend the
 CT
 thesis if you assume that the lowest level can magically lead to higher
 levels (or the higher levels are not real in the first place).
 The problem is that this magic would precisely be the higher levels that
 you
 wanted to derive.


 Jason Resch-2 wrote:
 
 
 
  Jason Resch-2 wrote:
  
   For example it cannot directly compute
-1*-1=1. Machine A can only be used to use an encoded input value
  and
encoded description of machine B, and give an output that is
  correct
given
the right decoding scheme.
   
   
1's or 0's, X's or O's, what the symbols are don't have any bearing
  on
what
they can compute.
   
   That's just an assertion of the belief I am trying to question here.
   In reality, it *does* matter which symbols/things we use to compute.
 A
   computer that only uses one symbol (for example a computer that adds
   using
   marbles) would be pretty useless.
   It does matter in many different ways: Speed of computations,
  effciency
   of
   computation, amount of memory, efficiency of memory, ease of
  programming,
   size of programs, ease of interpreting the result, amount of layers
 of
   programming to interpret the result and to program efficiently, ease
  of
   introspecting into the state of a computer...
  
  
   Practically they might matter but not theoretically.
  In the right theoretical model, it does matter. I am precisely doubting
  the
  value of adhering to our simplistic theoretical model of computation as
  the
  essence of what computation means.
 
 
  What model do you propose to replace it?
 
  The Church-Turing thesis plays a similar role in computer science as the
  fundamental theorem of arithmetic does in number theory.
 None. There is no one correct model of computations. There are infinite
 models that express different facets of what computation is. Different
 turing machines express different things, super-recursive turing machines
 express another thing, etc...
 I think computer scientists just don't want to accept it, because it takes
 their bible away. We like to have an easy answer, even if it is the wrong
 one.


 Jason Resch-2 wrote:
 
 
  Jason Resch-2 wrote:
  
  
   Why would we abstract from all that and then reduce computation to
 our
   one
   very abstract and imcomplete model of computation?
   If we do this we could as well abstract from the process of
  computation
   and
   say every string can be used to emulate any machine, because if you
  know
   what program it expresses, you know what it would compute (if
  correctly
   interpreted). There's no fundamental difference. Strings need to be
   interpreted to make sense as a program, and a turing machine without
   negative numbers needs to be interpreted to make sense as a program
   computing the result of an equation using negative numbers.
  
  
   I agree, strings need to be interpreted.  This is what the Turing
  machine
   does.  The symbols on the tape become interrelated in the context of
  the
   machine that interprets the symbols and it is these relations that
  become
   equivalent.
  That is like postulating some magic in the turing machine. It just
  manipulates symbols.
 
 
  No, it is not magic.  It is equivalent to saying the laws of physics
  interrelate every electron and quark to each other.
 It is more like saying that the laws of physics show how to create humans
 from atoms.
 This is not the case. Nothing in

Re: The All

2012-09-08 Thread meekerdb


On 9/8/2012 12:38 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 07.09.2012 20:30 meekerdb said the following:

On 9/7/2012 1:11 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 06.09.2012 21:03 meekerdb said the following:

On 9/6/2012 11:52 AM, Brian Tenneson wrote:



A too much powerful God leads to inconsistency.



What if reality does not always obey the laws of logic?  What
if reality is sometimes inconsistent?


This is a confusion of levels. Logic is rules about truth
preservation in declarative sentences.  Not 'obeying the laws of
logic' just means declaring inconsistent sentences. We try to
avoid this because such utterances would have no determinate
meaning.  So a *descriptions* of reality may be inconsistent (and
therefore useless) but reality is just whatever it is.  It can't
be inconsistent because it's not assertions.

Brent



This could work provided we could separate the world into mental
and physical states. The question remains though if under
physicalism one says that mental states are actually physical
states. Then I do not know how to employ such a consideration in
this case.


I don't see the problem?  Are you saying that two statements cannot
be contradictory because they are both part of reality (which would
not depend on them being physical)?

Brent


Let us try to employ this statement according to the physicalism expressed by Hawking in 
Grand Design. Everything is determined by the M-theory and a human being is just a 
biological machine. Then we find two states both described by the M-theory, one 
corresponding to a consistent statement made by a human being and another to an 
inconsistent one. What is difference between consistent and inconsistent in this context?


The statements can be inconsistent with one another and still both consistent with 
M-theory.  I still dont' see the problem?


Brent



If we use Hawking's analogy from Grand Design with the Game of Life, then the question 
is as follows. In the Game of Life we have many very complex structures emerging during 
the game. Why would we call one structure consistent and another inconsistent?


Evgenii



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Re: The poverty of computers

2012-09-08 Thread John Clark

On Fri, Sep 7, 2012 at 11:43 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:

 Bruno makes a valid point, that you attack only the weakest, most ill
 conceived, notion(s) of God.


It is my habit to attack only the weakest parts of ideas, attacking the
strongest parts seems rather counterproductive because they may actually be
true.

 Perhaps you have never bothered to investigate deeply the true claims of
 various religions.


I've had 13 years of formal religious training. How much have you had?

 Judaism:
God is an absolute one indivisible incomparable being who is the
 ultimate cause of all existence.


Now that is a excellent definition of God, and a jolly fat man who delivers
presents to all the children of the world on Christmas eve is a excellent
definition of Santa Claus. I don't believe either of them exist.


  Christianity:
   The book of John begins: In the beginning was the λόγος, and the λόγος
 was with God, and the λόγος was God.


The following sentence has identical informational content: in the
beginning was stuff, and the stuff was with stuff, and stuff was stuff.
Funny ASCII characters do not make things more profound.

 Philo of Alexandria, a Jewish of the first-century, taught that the logos
 was both the agent of creation and the agent through which the human mind
 can apprehend and comprehend God.


This human mind can not  comprehend God, so I guess God does not exist.

   To all of us who hold the Christian belief that God is truth


Only a fool would say truth does not exist so with that definition God
certainly exists.  This is a excellent example of something I mentioned
before, somebody willing to abandon the idea of God but not the word
G-O-D.

   Geometry existed before the creation; is co-eternal with the mind of
 God; is God himself -- Johannes Kepler


Yet another example of the same thing because Geometry certainly exists.

  In the Bhagavad Gita, You are the Supreme Brahman


A Brahman is a subset of beings and if there are a finite number of beings
in the universe then logically there is a supreme being, but that doesn't
mean he had anything to do with creating the Universe or us. In fact the
supreme being could be working right now at The Institute for Advanced
Study in Princeton New Jersey and in the morning he puts his pants on one
leg at a time just like I do.

  the greatest.


I believe Muhammad Ali exists.

   In the Sri Brahma-samhita, the indivisible, infinite, limitless, truth.


Yet more people interested in words but not ideas.

 I would say with those who say 'God is Love', God is Love.  But deep
 down in me I used to say that though God may be Love, God is Truth above
 all.


And more.

 I have come to the conclusion that God is Truth.


And more.

 God alone is and nothing else exists


Something certainly exists so God exists. Do you really think this sort of
crap is deep?

 It may be easy to dismiss some people's definitions of God


I don't dismiss definitions I just want to know what the hell people are
talking about. You can define God as the thing you use to brush your teeth
if you like, and if so then I believe in God.

 the scientific consensus is that infinite (mathematical) truth is the
 self-existent cause and reason for our existence.


There is no scientific consensus that the Universe needs infinity to
operate, but let's assume that it does; it doesn't take a genius to see
where this sort of word play is leading, God is infinity. The integers
are infinite and they exist so God is the integer numbers. And this is
wonderful news for people who just want to say I believe in God but don't
care what God means, they just want to be able to say the words.


  you might easily have missed some of the deeper meanings of God


I guess I have missed them, you should have mentioned some of those deeper
meanings of God in your post.

  John K Clark

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Re: The All


On 08.09.2012 18:10 meekerdb said the following:

On 9/8/2012 12:38 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 07.09.2012 20:30 meekerdb said the following:

On 9/7/2012 1:11 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


...


This could work provided we could separate the world into
mental and physical states. The question remains though if
under physicalism one says that mental states are actually
physical states. Then I do not know how to employ such a
consideration in this case.


I don't see the problem?  Are you saying that two statements
cannot be contradictory because they are both part of reality
(which would not depend on them being physical)?

Brent


Let us try to employ this statement according to the physicalism
expressed by Hawking in Grand Design. Everything is determined by
the M-theory and a human being is just a biological machine. Then
we find two states both described by the M-theory, one
corresponding to a consistent statement made by a human being and
another to an inconsistent one. What is difference between
consistent and inconsistent in this context?


The statements can be inconsistent with one another and still both
consistent with M-theory.  I still dont' see the problem?


I do not know if this is a real problem. Yet it is unclear to me how 
inconsistency could emerge in the framework of the M-theory.


Evgenii

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Re: Re: The Unprivacy of Information

Consciousness isn't conceptual. It conceives but it isn't limited to 
detached modalities of instruction. Consciousness is carnal and terrifying, 
awe-inducing, excruciating, dull, silly. Concepts, semes, memes, are all 
second order arrangements and modulations of directly experienced and 
irreducible qualia.

On Saturday, September 8, 2012 8:56:10 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:

  Hi Bruno Marchal 
  
 They're close in mneaning, but a seme emphasizes meaning more than 
 information( a meme)  I think.
  
 Seme
  
 (s锟斤拷m)
   *n.* *1.* *(Linguistics)* A linguistic sign.  *2.* *(Linguistics)* A 
 basic component of *meaning *of a morpheme, especially one which cannot 
 be decomposed into more basic components; a primitive concept.
  
 Meme

 http://app.thefreedictionary.com/AdFeedback.aspx?bnr=Um9zMTYweDYwMEdvb2dsZURmcFVT
  
meme  (mm) 
 *n.* 
 A unit of cultural information, such as a cultural practice or idea, that 
 is transmitted verbally or by repeated action from one mind to another.
  
 Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net javascript:
 9/8/2012 
 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 
 so that everything could function.

 - Receiving the following content - 
 *From:* Bruno Marchal javascript: 
 *Receiver:* everything-list javascript: 
 *Time:* 2012-09-08, 04:23:38
 *Subject:* Re: The Unprivacy of Information

  
  On 07 Sep 2012, at 13:49, Roger Clough wrote:

  Hi Craig Weinberg 
  
 Although I don't follow Dawking's views on life and God, 
 I think his idea of semes, which are like genes but ideas instead,
 is a very good one. If the logic follows through, then
 man is the semes' way of propagating itself through society.


 semes? is it not the memes?

 Bruno


   
  
 Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net javascript:
 9/7/2012 
 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 
 so that everything could function.

 - Receiving the following content - 
 *From:* Craig Weinberg javascript: 
 *Receiver:* everything-list javascript: 
 *Time:* 2012-09-06, 13:39:10
 *Subject:* The Unprivacy of Information

   (reposting from my blog http://s33light.org/post/31001294447)

 If I锟� right, then the slogan 锟�nformation wants to be free is not just an 
 intuition about social policy, but rather an insight into the ontological 
 roots of information itself. To be more precise, it isn锟� that information 
 wants to be free, it is that it can锟� want to be anything, and that 
 ownership itself is predicated on want and familiarity. Information, by 
 contrast, is the exact opposite of want and familiarity, it is the empty 
 and generic syntax of strangers talking to strangers about anything.

 I propose that information or data is inherently public such that it lacks 
 the possibility of privacy. Information cannot be secret, it can only be 
 kept a secret through voluntary participation in extra-informational social 
 contracts. It is only the access to information that we can control - the 
 i/o, we cannot become information or live *in* information or as 
 information.*

 Information spreads only as controlled changes in matter, not 
 independently in space or non-space vacuum. Information is how stuff seems 
 to other stuff. Computation exploits the universality of how many kinds of 
 stuff make sense in the same basic ways. It is to make modular or 锟�igital 
 collections of objectified changes which can be inscribed on any 
 sufficiently controllable substance. Not live hamsters or fog. They make 
 terrible computers.

 To copyright information or to encrypt it is to discourage unauthorized 
 control of information access. This underscores the fact that information 
 control supervenes on (requires) capacities of perception and intent rather 
 than the capacities of information itself. We have to be shamed or 
 frightened or tempted into agreeing to treat information as proprietary on 
 behalf of the proprietor锟� interests.*We can锟� train information not to 
 talk to strangers*.

  The data itself doesn锟� care if you publish it to the world or take 
 credit for writing Shakespeare锟� entire catalog. This is not merely a 
 strange property of information, this is the defining property of 
 information in direct contradistinction to both experience and matter. I 
 maintain however, that this doesn锟� indicate that information is a neutral 
 monism (singular ground of being from which matter, energy, and awareness 
 emerge), but rather it is the neutral nihilism - the shadow, if you will, 
 of sensorimotive participation divisible by spacetime. It锟� a protocol that 
 bridges the gaps between participants (selves, monads, agents, 
 experiences), but it is not itself a participant. This is important because 
 if we don锟� understand this (and we are nowhere near understanding this 
 yet), then we will proceed to exterminate our quality of life to a hybrid 
 of Frankenstein neuro-materialism and HAL cyberfunction-idealism.

 To understand why information is really not

Re: Re: fairness and sustainability

Does that mean there is no difference between maximizing sin and minimizing 
it?

On Saturday, September 8, 2012 10:44:43 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:

  Hi Craig Weinberg 
  
 Indeed, we are all sinners.
  
  
 Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net javascript:
 9/8/2012 
 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 
 so that everything could function.

 - Receiving the following content - 
 *From:* Craig Weinberg javascript: 
 *Receiver:* everything-list javascript: 
 *Time:* 2012-09-08, 08:14:26
 *Subject:* Re: fairness and sustainability

  

 On Saturday, September 8, 2012 6:36:26 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: 

  Hi John Mikes 
  
 Here's the dilemma: 
  
 Unfortunately, any system -- with the exception of the oil-rich countries
 (where fairness would seem to be hard to define) -- 
 that is completely fair is unsustainable. Capitalism,
 like it or not, is the only known way to increase a 
 country's wealth. Fairness decreases a country's capacity
 to grow. Darwin would agree.
  
 Cuba and the former soviet union and now europe
 are good examples. They all failed in trying to be completely fair
 or are in the process of failing.


 It sounds like you are defining wealth as capitalism in the first place. 
 Historically, there have been other ways of increasing a country's wealth. 
 Conquest. Agriculture. Slavery. There are examples of redistributive 
 economies in Polynesia...the idea of 'the Big Man' who gains influence and 
 glory by throwing the biggest parties for everyone. As the poverty of many 
 capitalist economies today shows (aren't most sub-Saharan economies 
 capitalist?), it is really the history of exploitation of natural and human 
 resources (or being the target of exploitation thereof) which seems to 
 relate to the ability of the nation to increase its wealth.

 What is happening now though is that capitalist countries are seeing their 
 capitalist elites become independent of the country. ExxonMobil makes 
 history with its obscenely high profits while the country debates yet more 
 cutbacks on basic human services. This isn't the fault of capitalism, since 
 it only values economic considerations, if human beings overproduce their 
 numbers and reduce their demand, the corporate leader is put in the 
 position where if they don't exploit that condition, then somebody else 
 will. Technology amplifies this. What globalization means is eventually we 
 will have a tiny group of international insiders and a disposable 
 population of potential employees all competing for the lowest possible 
 wage. Capitalism is building glass bank towers that stay empty all night 
 while more and more people sleep in the streets, prisons, squat in 
 foreclosed houses, etc.

 Unrestrained social Darwinism is not the only alternative to 'trying to be 
 completely fair'. Parts of the Soviet Union and Cuba are doing much better 
 than parts of New Orleans and Detroit. It's really very simplistic to try 
 to draw a line from a single economic proposition and the complex reality 
 of the fate of a nation. What would Cuba be like without the revolution? 
 Maybe Monte Carlo, maybe Haiti...neither...both? It's all speculation. All 
 I can see is that whatever we are doing in the US, is making everything 
 worse - here and around the world. I see the quality of life stagnating and 
 dropping for most people, for lack of money that is flowing into the bank 
 accounts of people who have no way to tell the difference except in their 
 imagination. 

 Craig

  

   
  
 Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net
 9/8/2012 
 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 
 so that everything could function.

 - Receiving the following content - 
 *From:* John Mikes 
 *Receiver:* everything-list 
 *Time:* 2012-09-07, 14:44:26
 *Subject:* Re: There is no such thing as cause and effect

   Brent, 
  I believe there is a difference between (adj) 'fair' or 'unjust' and 
 the (noun) 'fairness', or 'consciousness'. 
 While the nouns (IMO)锟�re not adequately identified the adverbs refer to 
 the applied system of correspondence. 
 E.g.: Fair to the unjust system. (I don't think we may use the 
 opposite: unjust to a 'fair' system in our discussion). 
 As I tried to explain in another post: the 'rich' consume MORE of the 
 country-supplied services than the not-so-rich and pay less taxes (unfair 
 and unjust). Certain big corporations also pay 'less' than the system would 
 require 
 (*in all fairness* - proverbially said) ordinarily. 
 Semantix, OOH!
  John M

 On Tue, Sep 4, 2012 at 4:18 PM, meekerdb meek...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 9/4/2012 1:12 PM, John Mikes wrote: 


 **
 It is a 'trap' to falsify the adequate taxing of the 'rich' as a *leftist 
 attempt to distributing richness*. It does not include more than a 
 requirement for THEM to pay their FAIR share - maybe more than the 
 not-so-rich layers (e.g. higher use of transportation, foreign connections, 
 financial means, etc. - all costing

Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence


On 9/8/2012 10:08 AM, benjayk wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 07 Sep 2012, at 14:22, benjayk wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 06 Sep 2012, at 13:31, benjayk wrote:


Quantum effects beyond individual brains (suggested by psi) can't be
computed as well: No matter what I compute in my brain, this doesn't
entangle it with other brains since computation is classical.

The UD emulates all quantum computer, as they do not violate Church
Thesis.

I am not talking about quantum computers, which are not entangled
with their
surroundings.
I am talking about systems that are entangled to other systems.

This is just lowering the comp level of substitution. It does not
change the reasoning, thanks to the use of the notion of generalized
brain.

It does, because you can't simulate indefinite entanglement. No matter how
many entangled systems you simulate, you are always missing the entanglement
of this combined system to another (which may be as crucial as the system
itself, because it may lead to a very different unfoldment of events).
A practically digital substitution (which is assumed in COMP) could be
entangled with its surroundings, which may be very different than the
entanglement of a brain (or a generalized brain) with its surroundings. The
substitution may not only fail because the person itself is not preserved,
but also because the world was not preserved (the person would certainly
complain to the doctor if the world suddenly is substantially different - if
there is still a doctor left, that is).
And if you say that we can simulate this entanglement as well, the
entanglement of this system to outside systems may again lead to the
emulation to be not correct at all from a broader view (etc...). At every
step the emulation may actually become more false, because more of the
multiverse/universe is changed.

We can argue that all these things may not be relevant (though I think they
are), but in any case it makes the reasoning shaky.


Hi,

Does not entanglement not look like a form of diagonalization?



Bruno Marchal wrote:

No matter how good your simulation is, it is never going to change its
surroundings without using I/O.

QM does not allows this, unless you bring by the collapse of the wave.

Clearly QM does allow that measurement in one object changes another
object (we can argue with the word change, because the effect is
non-causal). This is even experimentally verified.
MW doesn't change this, it is the same with regards to correlations between
classically non-interacting objects.

benjayk



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Stephen

http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html


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Re: Re: Racism ? How's that implied ?



On Saturday, September 8, 2012 9:34:45 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:

  because ironically and 
 paradoxically they see the world in terms of race. 
 Conservatives attempt to live by facts. I never 
 saw racism in what what I wrote until you brought 
 the subject up. 


Are you familiar with the KKK? The John Birch Society? Would you call those 
liberal organizations? I don't want to get into a political flame war, but 
just so you know, liberals do not see the world in terms of race, but they 
are prejudiced against conservatives because they see them as people who 
are unaware of their own ignorance of the facts and uncaring of the 
consequences of that ignorance. Of course that may not be the case, but any 
of the hundreds of millions of liberals who might read what you have 
written there will interpret it in precisely that way.

Personally, my theory is that people generally imitate or contradict the 
political orientation of the first strongly political person they are 
exposed to in their life. Usually a parent or older sibling - if they like 
them, they see the political world through their eyes, if they dislike 
them, they seek to prove themselves unlike them. It's really that simple. 
Very few people research politics methodically and impartially and 
formulate a set of opinions based on 'facts'.

Craig

Craig

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Re: The All


On 9/8/2012 11:34 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 08.09.2012 15:27 Stephen P. King said the following:

On 9/8/2012 9:12 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


...


I would say that the image in the mirror is a visual illusion
created presumably by the brain. Don't you agree? Then it is
exactly a relationship between mental and physical states but not
in the form of ideas but rather images.

Evgenii


Hi Evgenii,

Yes I agree. What essential difference is there between ideas and
images?



An idea could be red for example. Yet, I am not sure how to describe 
the three dimensional world with spatial extension to the perceived 
horizon and dome of the sky that I observe as an idea.


Evgenii


Hi Evgenii,

I will try to explain. An idea is an abstract image, IMHO. For 
example, consider all possible objects that have some thing that could 
be recognized as being red. We form an equivalence class from this 
with the equivalence relation red. Thus Red is the equivalence 
relation on the equivalence class of all possible objects that have some 
thing that could be recognized as being red. This should hold for 
*any* abstract and shows a fundamental relationship between the concrete 
and the abstract. Category theory offers a wonderful set of tools to 
analyze these kind of concepts.


--
Onward!

Stephen

http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html


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Re: Computing with water droplets

Cool. I think this shows how computation applies when water behaves like 
objects (billiard balls) but does not apply when it remains in a fluid 
state. Computation in this case relies on the superhydrophobic or 
non-hydrophiliac state of water. The phobic-philiac distinction is not 
trivial, as it recapitulates the inner-outer dialectic of self and other.

On Friday, September 7, 2012 11:19:37 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:

 An amusing example of computation 


 --- http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2012/09/120907082027.htm 

 Towards Computing With Water Droplets: Superhydrophobic Droplet Logic 
 ScienceDaily (Sep. 
 7, 2012) ? Researchers in Aalto University have developed a new concept 
 for computing, 
 using water droplets as bits of digital information. This was enabled by 
 the discovery 
 that upon collision with each other on a highly water-repellent surface, 
 two water 
 droplets rebound like billiard balls. 

   http://www.geekosystem.com/water-drop-computing/ 

 [an ad-heavy page, but includes a decent video of a 1-bit counter] 

 Brent 


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Re: fairness and sustainability





On 08 Sep 2012, at 16:41, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal

Indeed, we are all sinners.




Hi Roger,

Saying this can only dilute the responsibility and helps the sinners.

I am not sure at all we are all sinners, unless you are using a so  
weak sense that it is making every baby already sinning.


I am not sure about the notion of sin. It looks too much like an easy  
way to explain suffering, and it makes many people feeling guilty for  
no reason that they can see, and sometimes it can act as a self- 
prophecy: given that I have already sin why not sin again?


I think that there is only one sin: hurting others without legitimate  
concern.


And most people don't sin, I think,

Bruno






Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/8/2012
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-08, 08:37:30
Subject: Re: fairness and sustainability


On 08 Sep 2012, at 12:35, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi John Mikes

Here's the dilemma:

Unfortunately, any system -- with the exception of the oil-rich  
countries

(where fairness would seem to be hard to define) --
that is completely fair is unsustainable. Capitalism,
like it or not, is the only known way to increase a
country's wealth. Fairness decreases a country's capacity
to grow. Darwin would agree.

Cuba and the former soviet union and now europe
are good examples. They all failed in trying to be completely fair
or are in the process of failing.



I think that capitalism + democracy is the most fair system.

Today, unfortunately, capitalism has been perverted by minorities  
which build money on fears, lies and catastrophes, and that is very  
bad.


They are clever, and have succeeded in mixing the black and non  
black money, so that the middle class and the banking systems have  
become hostages.  Those liars are transforming the planet economy  
into a a pyramidal con.


Lying is part of nature, like cancers and diseases. Defending  
ourselves against liars is part of nature too.


Bruno









Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/8/2012
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content -
From: John Mikes
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-07, 14:44:26
Subject: Re: There is no such thing as cause and effect

Brent,
I believe there is a difference between (adj) 'fair' or 'unjust'  
and the (noun) 'fairness', or 'consciousness'.
While the nouns (IMO)燼re not adequately identified the adverbs  
refer to the applied system of correspondence.
E.g.: Fair to the unjust system. (I don't think we may use the  
opposite: unjust to a 'fair' system in our discussion).
As I tried to explain in another post: the 'rich' consume MORE of  
the country-supplied services than the not-so-rich and pay less  
taxes (unfair and unjust). Certain big corporations also pay 'less'  
than the system would require

(in all fairness - proverbially said) ordinarily.
Semantix, OOH!
John M

On Tue, Sep 4, 2012 at 4:18 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net  
wrote:

On 9/4/2012 1:12 PM, John Mikes wrote:


It is a 'trap' to falsify the adequate taxing of the 'rich' as a  
leftist attempt to distributing richness. It does not include more  
than a requirement for THEM to pay their FAIR share - maybe more  
than the not-so-rich layers (e.g. higher use of transportation,  
foreign connections, financial means, etc. - all costing money to  
the country) in spite of their lower share in the present unjust爐 
axation-scheme.

...

And PLEASE, Brent, do not even utter in econo-political discussion  
the word FAIRNESS!


So is it OK if I use FAIR and unjust?

Brent


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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: The All


On 08.09.2012 19:32 Stephen P. King said the following:

On 9/8/2012 11:34 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 08.09.2012 15:27 Stephen P. King said the following:

On 9/8/2012 9:12 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


...


I would say that the image in the mirror is a visual illusion
created presumably by the brain. Don't you agree? Then it is
exactly a relationship between mental and physical states but
not in the form of ideas but rather images.

Evgenii


Hi Evgenii,

Yes I agree. What essential difference is there between ideas
and images?



An idea could be red for example. Yet, I am not sure how to
describe the three dimensional world with spatial extension to the
perceived horizon and dome of the sky that I observe as an idea.

Evgenii


Hi Evgenii,

I will try to explain. An idea is an abstract image, IMHO. For
example, consider all possible objects that have some thing that
could be recognized as being red. We form an equivalence class from
this with the equivalence relation red. Thus Red is the equivalence
 relation on the equivalence class of all possible objects that have
some thing that could be recognized as being red. This should hold
for *any* abstract and shows a fundamental relationship between the
concrete and the abstract. Category theory offers a wonderful set of
tools to analyze these kind of concepts.



Sorry, I do not understand how the 3D visual world that I observe is 
formed based on this theory.


Evgenii

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Re: Racism ? How's that implied ?



On 08 Sep 2012, at 15:33, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal

OK, I see, you think I judge the abilities of people
by the color of their skin.  So you call me a racist.



I was thinking only you might judge someone by the constitution of its  
body.


You don't answer the question: can your daughter marry a man which  
body is 100% machine?





You might be a liberal, because ironically and
paradoxically they see the world in terms of race.
Conservatives attempt to live by facts. I never
saw racism in what what I wrote until you brought
the subject up.

I don't mean to offend you with this talk of politics.
Conservatives are not perfect either.


Sure. I tend to be rather conservative, in principle.

I think that today the liberal/conservative division makes no sense.  
The division is more bastards/ victim of bastards, like Romney and  
Obama against Ron Paul, Gary Johnson or Norman Solomon, or those who  
understand that the human rights apply to everybody and those who does  
not, or between the fear sellers and the constitutionalists.


The republicans betrayed themselves by not attacking Obama on the NDAA  
notes. Thanks to the existence of a many years long drug and food  
prohibition I am hardly astonished.


As long as prohibition continue, there are no politics, only well- 
disguised form of mafias, which are succeeding to get the whole  
financial system into hostage.  The individual human is in danger.


Bruno




Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/8/2012
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-08, 04:46:38
Subject: Re: Racism ? How's that implied ?




On 07 Sep 2012, at 15:00, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal

Racism ? How's that implied ?


Do you accept that your daughter marry a man who has undergone an  
artificial brain transplant?








But I do agree that perception and Cs are
not understandable with materialistic concepts
at least as they are commonly used.
Instead they are what the mind can sense,


OK.




as a sixth sense.


Hmm...





The mind is similar to driving a car through
Platoville and watching the static events
in passing.


OK.


Bruno







Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/7/2012
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-06, 14:12:37
Subject: Re: Sane2004 Step One




On 05 Sep 2012, at 18:12, Roger Clough wrote:



I don't think that life or mind or intelligence
can be teleported. Especially since nobody knows what
they are.

I also don't believe that you can download
the contents of somebody's brain.




This is just restating that you don't believe in comp.


OK, develop your theory, and predict something testable, and we will  
better understand what you mean.

If not it looks just  like a form of racism based on magic.


Bruno






Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/5/2012
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-05, 11:04:53
Subject: Re: Sane2004 Step One


On 05 Sep 2012, at 06:14, meekerdb wrote:


On 9/4/2012 7:19 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Tue, Sep 04, 2012 at 06:48:58PM -0700, Craig Weinberg wrote:

I have problems with all three of the comp assumptions:

*yes, doctor*: This is really the sleight of hand that props up
the entire
thought experiment. If you agree that you are nothing but your  
brain

function and that your brain function can be replaced by the
functioning of
non-brain devices, then you have already agreed that human
individuality is
a universal commodity.

Calling it a sleight of hand is a bit rough. It is the meat of the
comp assumption, and spelling it out this way makes it very
explicit. Either you agree you can be copied (without feeling a
thing), or you don't. If you do, you must face up to the  
consequences

of the argument, if you don't, then you do not accept
computationalism, and the consequences of the UDA do not apply to
your
worldview.


I suppose I can be copied. But does it follow that I am just the
computations in my brain. It seems likely that I also require an
outside environment/world with which I interact in order to remain
conscious. Bruno passes this off by saying it's just a matter of
the level of substitution, perhaps your local environment or even
the whole galaxy must be replaced by a digital representation in
order to maintain your consciousness unchanged. But this bothers
me. Suppose it is the whole galaxy, or the whole observed
universe. Does it really mean anything then to say your brain has
been replaced ALONG WITH EVERYTHING ELSE? It's just the assertion
that everything is computable.


That's a good argument for

Re: Why a bacterium has more intelligence than a computer

2012-09-08 Thread Jason Resch




On Sep 8, 2012, at 7:09 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote:


Hi Jason Resch

IMHO life is essentially intelligence (mind), where intelligence is  
the ability to make one's own choices,

not from software or hardware or anything in nature.


Then from where do you suppose the choices come from?  Even if they  
come from souls on some ethereal plane do those souls not follow some  
pattern or rules?  If not, then they are random then they are not  
choices at all.  If they do, then in theory there is some description  
of them.


Jason


I hypothesize that life is undefinable because
to define it would limit its choices. Some limitation of course  
would be permissible, so this is

an imperfect hypothesis.

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/8/2012
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content -
From: Jason Resch
Receiver: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Time: 2012-09-05, 10:35:45
Subject: Re: Why a bacterium has more intelligence than a computer



On Sep 5, 2012, at 7:00 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net  
wrote:



Hi Craig Weinberg

IMHO the burden to show that computers are alive and
have intelligence lies on the scientists.

I see no evidence of life  or real  intelligence
in computers.



Roger,

What is the difference between something that is alive and something  
that is not?


Afterall, everything in this world is quarks and electrons.   
Computers, rocks, life, they are all made of the same stuff: quarks  
and electrons.


I don't know what you believe; you haven't answered my questions to  
you.  But I believe what separates a living thing from an unliving  
thing, or a thinking thing from a non thinking thing lies in the  
organziation of those things.


Do you believe that a collection of hydrogen atoms, properly  
combined and put together in the right way could create roger  
clough?  If not please explain why not.  Without a dialog we cannot  
progress in understanding eachother's views.


Jason




Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/5/2012
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content -
From: Craig Weinberg
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-04, 20:39:55
Subject: Re: Why a bacterium has more intelligence than a computer



On Tuesday, September 4, 2012 4:06:06 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:


The point that I am making is that our brain seems to be  
continuously generating a virtual reality model of the world that  
includes our body and whatwe are conscious of is that  
model.


I like this description of a brain: that of a dreaming / reality  
creating machine.


What is it the brain creating this dream/reality out of? Non- 
reality? Intangible mathematical essences? The problem with  
representational qualia is that in order to represent something,  
there has to be something there to begin with to represent. Why  
would the brain need to represent the data that it already has to  
itself in some fictional layer of abstraction? Why convert the  
quantitative data of the universe into made up qualities and then  
hide that conversion process from itself?



Does a machine made up of gears, springs and levers do this?  
Could one made of diodes and transistors do it? Maybe...


No one has shown me a cogent argument that they could not.

They question isn't why they could, it is why they would. What  
possible function would be served by a cuckoo clock having an  
experience of being a flying turnip?


Craig


Jason
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To

Re: The poverty of computers

2012-09-08 Thread meekerdb


On 9/8/2012 10:17 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sat, Sep 8, 2012 at 11:12 AM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com 
mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:


On Fri, Sep 7, 2012 at 11:43 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com
mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:

 Bruno makes a valid point, that you attack only the weakest, most ill
conceived, notion(s) of God.


It is my habit to attack only the weakest parts of ideas, attacking the 
strongest
parts seems rather counterproductive because they may actually be true.


You call yourself an atheist, which means you reject every notion of God, of any 
religion, does it not?


A-theist means not believing a theist god exists; one that's an extremely powerful person 
who wants to be worshipped and is extremely concerned with how we behave, especially while 
nude.  An atheist might believe in a deist god; one who created the world and then just 
left it alone and isn't concerned with us.


Brent

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Re: The poverty of computers

2012-09-08 Thread Jason Resch

On Sat, Sep 8, 2012 at 2:58 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 9/8/2012 10:17 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Sat, Sep 8, 2012 at 11:12 AM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Fri, Sep 7, 2012 at 11:43 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.comwrote:

   Bruno makes a valid point, that you attack only the weakest, most ill
 conceived, notion(s) of God.


 It is my habit to attack only the weakest parts of ideas, attacking the
 strongest parts seems rather counterproductive because they may actually be
 true.


  You call yourself an atheist, which means you reject every notion of
 God, of any religion, does it not?


 A-theist means not believing a theist god exists;


Interesting, I was not aware that this level of distinction existed, but it
seems implied in first definition of theist here:
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/theist?s=t

However, the definition for atheist in the world English dictionary
(lower on the page here: http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/atheist?s=t
 )

Simply says A person who does not believe in God or gods.

Is there any word for someone who rejects both theism and deism?


 one that's an extremely powerful person who wants to be worshipped and is
 extremely concerned with how we behave, especially while nude.  An atheist
 might believe in a deist god; one who created the world and then just left
 it alone and isn't concerned with us.


I think such a person would more rightly label himself a deist in that
case, but we might be digressing too deeply into the subtleties of language.

Jason

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Re: The poverty of computers


On 9/8/2012 3:58 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 9/8/2012 10:17 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sat, Sep 8, 2012 at 11:12 AM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com 
mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:


On Fri, Sep 7, 2012 at 11:43 PM, Jason Resch
jasonre...@gmail.com mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:

 Bruno makes a valid point, that you attack only the
weakest, most ill conceived, notion(s) of God.


It is my habit to attack only the weakest parts of ideas,
attacking the strongest parts seems rather counterproductive
because they may actually be true.


You call yourself an atheist, which means you reject every notion of 
God, of any religion, does it not?


A-theist means not believing a theist god exists; one that's an 
extremely powerful person who wants to be worshipped and is extremely 
concerned with how we behave, especially while nude. An atheist might 
believe in a deist god; one who created the world and then just left 
it alone and isn't concerned with us.


Brent
--


Hear Hear! Well said, Brent!

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Onward!

Stephen

http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html

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A non turing-emulable meta-program