date:20150504

2015-05-05 8:09 GMT+02:00 meekerdb :

> On 5/4/2015 11:00 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>>
>> > And under the "closest continuation" theory
>>
>> Again it's not relevant, FPI bears on all valid continuation of your
>> current moment, not just the closest one. Of course a next moment to be
>> considered a valid continuation, must have memories of the current moment,
>> if not, in what sense could it be next.
>>
>>
> But Stathis objected that you might be transported while unconscious and
> then you wouldn't have a memory of "the current moment". You'd have a gap
> in your memory.

A gap is different than no memory... obviously if you have memory of your
identity (even if just to wake up from a dream and find out you have
another identity than the one you thought), your current moment is a next
moment of the last moment you remember before being in this moment.
Assigning a measure is different, I have no theory how it could be done,
obviously such next moment should have lower measure than "normal"
continuation moment.

> And even if you don't have gap, your memory may be more or less veridical,
> more or less complete.  So how different can the two copies be from each
> other and from he Helsinki man and still be "valid"?

That's asking for a theory of measure, which I don't have, so I can't
answer that, IMO the more memories of it the more likely, but that's just a
hunch, not a theory. If computationalism is true, such measure must exists,
what it is, is another question, and I don't have the answer to it.

>
>
>  If you want a probability on your continuations, then you should have a
>> measure theory who can assign such.
>>
>>
> It's not what I want.

That's you who's asking for it...

> It's not my theory.

It's not mine either... do we have to have everything sort out before
discussing ? You can't have any theory, because one sure thing I can say
about any theory, it's that it is incomplete, and therefore false.

> But if it's going to be successful explanation it needs to show that our
> world, as some class, is not too improbable.

That's a sure thing, and if computationalism cannot, it would be a failure.
So yes, we should have a theory of measure, the fact we don't have it, is
not a problem for the discussion of the consequences. It would be a
problem, if you could show such measure problem cannot be solvable...

>
>
>  Bruno never claimed he has one, just that it has to be extracted and must
>> exist.
>>
>>
> But that "must" means "otherwise my theory fails".

Yes, if there is no measure in accordance with what we live, the theory
fails... that's part of the fact you can prove computationalism to be
false... If in fact, this become intractable... well it would not be
falsifiable with that in practice...

Quentin

>
>
> Brent
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>

-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
Batty/Rutger Hauer)

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled

On 5 May 2015 at 09:25, meekerdb  wrote:
> On 5/4/2015 3:31 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On 5 May 2015 at 08:07, meekerdb  wrote:
>
> On 5/4/2015 11:21 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, meekerdb  wrote:
>
> If you take the theory of consciousness that says it is just a stream of
> experiences which are related by some internal similarities, then it's
> impossible that you find yourself on some distant planet so long as there's
> the much more similar experience of finding yourself where you were a moment
> ago.  The FPI of Everett's relative state only arises where there are nearly
> equal degrees of similarity.
>
> Consciousness survives change in environment without any problem; for
> example, if you are transported somewhere while asleep.
>
>
> What does that mean?  Memories survive...so are you identifying
> consciousness with memories?  They certainly contribute a lot to the
> similarities of successive experiences.  In the above example "you" is
> ambiguous.  In ordinary discourse it would refer to my body.  But on
> Everett's (and Bruno's theory) if the decision whether to transport my body
> were based on some quantum event, "I" would end up in two different places.
>
> Suppose you were copied at home while asleep and the original
> transported to a park, then copy and original both woke up. Would you
> say that you should expect to find yourself waking up at home rather
> than the park?
>
> Ask John Clark. :-)
>
> Seriously, one can only talk about what "you" expect given a definition of
> "you".  If "you" means your closest continuation then waking up at home is
> closer than waking up in the park.  We tend to think of this as uncertainty
> because all the similarities of body and memory mean that the difference
> between the park and home is almost neglegible compared to the similarities.
> But suppose we push the point and you are copied, except into the body of an
> eighty year old black woman with one leg.  Would you still find yourself
> waking up in the park?

This sort of thing actually happens on a daily basis: people are
injured in serious accidents and wake up with parts of their body
missing and major changes in memories, cognitive abilities and
personality.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled

On 5/4/2015 11:00 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

> And under the "closest continuation" theory

Again it's not relevant, FPI bears on all valid continuation of your current moment, not
just the closest one. Of course a next moment to be considered a valid continuation,
must have memories of the current moment, if not, in what sense could it be next.

But Stathis objected that you might be transported while unconscious and then you wouldn't
have a memory of "the current moment". You'd have a gap in your memory. And even if you
don't have gap, your memory may be more or less veridical, more or less complete. So how
different can the two copies be from each other and from he Helsinki man and still be "valid"?

If you want a probability on your continuations, then you should have a measure theory
who can assign such.

It's not what I want. It's not my theory. But if it's going to be successful explanation
it needs to show that our world, as some class, is not too improbable.

Bruno never claimed he has one, just that it has to be extracted and must exist.

But that "must" means "otherwise my theory fails".

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled

Le 5 mai 2015 07:38, "meekerdb"  a écrit :
>
> On 5/4/2015 10:30 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>> Le 5 mai 2015 07:26, "meekerdb"  a écrit :
>> >
>> > On 5/4/2015 10:17 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Le 5 mai 2015 01:17, "meekerdb"  a écrit :
>> >> >
>> >> > On 5/4/2015 3:29 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Le 5 mai 2015 00:08, "meekerdb"  a écrit :
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > On 5/4/2015 11:24 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, meekerdb  wrote:
>> >> >> >>>
>> >> >> >>> On 5/4/2015 12:31 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>> >> >> 
>> >> >> 
>> >> >> 
>> >> >>  2015-05-04 9:26 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett <
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>:
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> On 4 May 2015 at 17:14, Bruce Kellett <
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>> >> >> >>>
>> >> >> >>>
>> >> >> >>> The initial point that we were making was that copying at
the quantum level
>> >> >> >>> of substitution is not possible, in principle. Accidental
copies in another
>> >> >> >>> universe are not "deliberate but surreptitious" copies.
They are irrelevant
>> >> >> >>> to the argument.
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> You implied that if you did not know about the copy because
it was not
>> >> >> >> prepared deliberately that would make a difference, but I
don't see
>> >> >> >> why it should.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > The point of Step 3, as I understand it, is that we know the
set-up: we know that we are to be copied at the appropriate substitution
level and duplicated -- at two different locations. Chance duplicates do
not fit the criteria and are irrelevant to the comp hypothesis.
>> >> >> 
>> >> >> 
>> >> >>  It's a though experiment... so the duplicates do fit the
criteria by definition.. you even gave it here "we are to be copied at the
appropriate substitution level and duplicated"... step 0 again, is that it
is possible... so, if you reject step 0, there is no point to use that as
an argument against further steps... you already have rejected the premiss,
so any deductive steps based on it have already been rejected by you as you
reject step 0.
>> >> >> >>>
>> >> >> >>>
>> >> >> >>> Unknown (and unknowable) copies would not produce any first
person indeterminancy.  FPI requires that you know there is a duplicate
that you could be.
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> Why?
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > Otherwise you are certain where you will end up.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> If they are more than one continuation, weither you know it or not
is irrelevant.
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > Then that's third person indeterminancy.
>> >>
>> >> What? It's first person indeterminacy, because you have more than one
future first person perspective. Are you playing with words now?
>> >
>> >
>> > Dunno, seems like a semantic quirk.  What does first person
indeterminancy mean except that one is uncertain about one's future.
>>
>> It's not something about the knowledge of it. It just means that you
have more than one future *first person* perspective. Under an unique
universe theory, there's obviously no FPI at all, just randomness.
>
>
> And under the "closest continuation" theory

Again it's not relevant, FPI bears on all valid continuation of your
current moment, not just the closest one. Of course a next moment to be
considered a valid continuation, must have memories of the current moment,
if not, in what sense could it be next. If you want a probability on your
continuations, then you should have a measure theory who can assign such.
Bruno never claimed he has one, just that it has to be extracted and must
exist.

Quentin

of "you" it does make a difference what knowledge you have.   So is "you"
to be based only on memory?
>
> Brent
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled


On 5/4/2015 10:30 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



Le 5 mai 2015 07:26, "meekerdb" mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> a 
écrit :

>
> On 5/4/2015 10:17 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>> Le 5 mai 2015 01:17, "meekerdb" mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> 
a écrit :

>> >
>> > On 5/4/2015 3:29 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Le 5 mai 2015 00:08, "meekerdb" > a écrit :

>> >> >
>> >> > On 5/4/2015 11:24 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >> On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, meekerdb > wrote:

>> >> >>>
>> >> >>> On 5/4/2015 12:31 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >>  2015-05-04 9:26 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett >:

>> >> >
>> >> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> >> >>
>> >> >> On 4 May 2015 at 17:14, Bruce Kellett > wrote:

>> >> >>>
>> >> >>>
>> >> >>> The initial point that we were making was that copying at the 
quantum level
>> >> >>> of substitution is not possible, in principle. Accidental copies 
in another
>> >> >>> universe are not "deliberate but surreptitious" copies. They are 
irrelevant
>> >> >>> to the argument.
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >> You implied that if you did not know about the copy because it was 
not
>> >> >> prepared deliberately that would make a difference, but I don't see
>> >> >> why it should.
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > The point of Step 3, as I understand it, is that we know the set-up: we know 
that we are to be copied at the appropriate substitution level and duplicated -- at two 
different locations. Chance duplicates do not fit the criteria and are irrelevant to the 
comp hypothesis.

>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >>  It's a though experiment... so the duplicates do fit the criteria by 
definition.. you even gave it here "we are to be copied at the appropriate substitution 
level and duplicated"... step 0 again, is that it is possible... so, if you reject step 
0, there is no point to use that as an argument against further steps... you already 
have rejected the premiss, so any deductive steps based on it have already been rejected 
by you as you reject step 0.

>> >> >>>
>> >> >>>
>> >> >>> Unknown (and unknowable) copies would not produce any first person 
indeterminancy.  FPI requires that you know there is a duplicate that you could be.

>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Why?
>> >> >>
>> >> >
>> >> > Otherwise you are certain where you will end up.
>> >>
>> >> If they are more than one continuation, weither you know it or not is 
irrelevant.
>> >
>> >
>> > Then that's third person indeterminancy.
>>
>> What? It's first person indeterminacy, because you have more than one future first 
person perspective. Are you playing with words now?

>
>
> Dunno, seems like a semantic quirk.  What does first person indeterminancy mean except 
that one is uncertain about one's future.


It's not something about the knowledge of it. It just means that you have more than one 
future *first person* perspective. Under an unique universe theory, there's obviously no 
FPI at all, just randomness.




And under the "closest continuation" theory of "you" it does make a difference what 
knowledge you have.   So is "you" to be based only on memory?


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled

On 5/4/2015 10:23 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

LizR wrote:

On 5 May 2015 at 16:15, Bruce Kellett Strong AI and "Yes Doctor" both follow from the assumption that consciousness is the
result of computation. I have used strong AI a few times on this list in an effort to
persuade people who are hung up on the feasibility of duplicating machines, pronouns
and similar irrelevancies to actually address the arguments Bruno is making.

In any case, even starting from the assumption that only /human/ consciousness is
computational, Bruno still reaches strong AI by about step 5.

If you believe in Platonia, then the computation that
instantiates the consciousness (and everyone else's
consciousness) is a mathematical object and hence "exists"
independent of its particular physical instantiation. All the
physical world is inferred from conscious experience (I find
this dubious too) and so the computations in Platonia that
instantiate conscious thoughts, also instantiate the physical
world those thoughts refer to.

Like strong AI in a virtual world. I think that is what comp is
actually saying -- we are just that, nothing more. Whether this
emerges from arithmetic, or is basically physical, remains
unknowable in comp.

It can only be physical if the universe is robust. I think the ponit of comp is more
that there is no /need/ to bring in the "physical hypothesis" if the UDA is correct -
it becomes superfluous, since we can explain the appearance of a physical world without
requiring it.

Actually, strong AI in a virtual world does not need the dovetailer or a robust
universe. If one can make use of the existing physical world and the laws it displays,
we do not need to extract these from arithmetic and the infinity of computations of the
UD. It is the UD which is superfluous.

This is, after all, the simpler hypothesis.

If there is a UD then the implication is that it instantiates all possible experiences and
some of these thread together to instantiate the stream of consciousness of persons and
some sets of these persons have experiences that instantiate "living together in a
physical" and you are one of those persons. But there's a lot of hopeful speculation in
that. It seems very unlikely that a world like ours can be shown to be typical or
probable, even among worlds with conscious beings.

Brent

Re: The dovetailer disassembled

Le 5 mai 2015 07:26, "meekerdb"  a écrit :
>
> On 5/4/2015 10:17 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>> Le 5 mai 2015 01:17, "meekerdb"  a écrit :
>> >
>> > On 5/4/2015 3:29 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Le 5 mai 2015 00:08, "meekerdb"  a écrit :
>> >> >
>> >> > On 5/4/2015 11:24 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >> On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, meekerdb  wrote:
>> >> >>>
>> >> >>> On 5/4/2015 12:31 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >>  2015-05-04 9:26 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett <
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>:
>> >> >
>> >> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> >> >>
>> >> >> On 4 May 2015 at 17:14, Bruce Kellett <
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>> >> >>>
>> >> >>>
>> >> >>> The initial point that we were making was that copying at the
quantum level
>> >> >>> of substitution is not possible, in principle. Accidental
copies in another
>> >> >>> universe are not "deliberate but surreptitious" copies. They
are irrelevant
>> >> >>> to the argument.
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >> You implied that if you did not know about the copy because it
was not
>> >> >> prepared deliberately that would make a difference, but I
don't see
>> >> >> why it should.
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > The point of Step 3, as I understand it, is that we know the
set-up: we know that we are to be copied at the appropriate substitution
level and duplicated -- at two different locations. Chance duplicates do
not fit the criteria and are irrelevant to the comp hypothesis.
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >>  It's a though experiment... so the duplicates do fit the
criteria by definition.. you even gave it here "we are to be copied at the
appropriate substitution level and duplicated"... step 0 again, is that it
is possible... so, if you reject step 0, there is no point to use that as
an argument against further steps... you already have rejected the premiss,
so any deductive steps based on it have already been rejected by you as you
reject step 0.
>> >> >>>
>> >> >>>
>> >> >>> Unknown (and unknowable) copies would not produce any first
person indeterminancy.  FPI requires that you know there is a duplicate
that you could be.
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Why?
>> >> >>
>> >> >
>> >> > Otherwise you are certain where you will end up.
>> >>
>> >> If they are more than one continuation, weither you know it or not is
irrelevant.
>> >
>> >
>> > Then that's third person indeterminancy.
>>
>> What? It's first person indeterminacy, because you have more than one
future first person perspective. Are you playing with words now?
>
>
> Dunno, seems like a semantic quirk.  What does first person
indeterminancy mean except that one is uncertain about one's future.

It's not something about the knowledge of it. It just means that you have
more than one future *first person* perspective. Under an unique universe
theory, there's obviously no FPI at all, just randomness.

Quentin

The fact that someone else knows there's a copy seems to me to be the
definition of third person indeterminancy.
>
> Brent
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled


On 5/4/2015 10:17 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



Le 5 mai 2015 01:17, "meekerdb" mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> a 
écrit :

>
> On 5/4/2015 3:29 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>> Le 5 mai 2015 00:08, "meekerdb" mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> 
a écrit :

>> >
>> > On 5/4/2015 11:24 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, meekerdb > wrote:

>> >>>
>> >>> On 5/4/2015 12:31 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>  2015-05-04 9:26 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett >:

>> >
>> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> >>
>> >> On 4 May 2015 at 17:14, Bruce Kellett > wrote:

>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>> The initial point that we were making was that copying at the 
quantum level
>> >>> of substitution is not possible, in principle. Accidental copies in 
another
>> >>> universe are not "deliberate but surreptitious" copies. They are 
irrelevant
>> >>> to the argument.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> You implied that if you did not know about the copy because it was not
>> >> prepared deliberately that would make a difference, but I don't see
>> >> why it should.
>> >
>> >
>> > The point of Step 3, as I understand it, is that we know the set-up: we know 
that we are to be copied at the appropriate substitution level and duplicated -- at two 
different locations. Chance duplicates do not fit the criteria and are irrelevant to the 
comp hypothesis.

>> 
>> 
>>  It's a though experiment... so the duplicates do fit the criteria by 
definition.. you even gave it here "we are to be copied at the appropriate substitution 
level and duplicated"... step 0 again, is that it is possible... so, if you reject step 
0, there is no point to use that as an argument against further steps... you already 
have rejected the premiss, so any deductive steps based on it have already been rejected 
by you as you reject step 0.

>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>> Unknown (and unknowable) copies would not produce any first person 
indeterminancy.  FPI requires that you know there is a duplicate that you could be.

>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Why?
>> >>
>> >
>> > Otherwise you are certain where you will end up.
>>
>> If they are more than one continuation, weither you know it or not is 
irrelevant.
>
>
> Then that's third person indeterminancy.

What? It's first person indeterminacy, because you have more than one future first 
person perspective. Are you playing with words now?




Dunno, seems like a semantic quirk.  What does first person indeterminancy mean except 
that one is uncertain about one's future.  The fact that someone else knows there's a copy 
seems to me to be the definition of third person indeterminancy.


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled


LizR wrote:
On 5 May 2015 at 16:15, Bruce Kellett 

I agree. In fact, I think it is a weakness of Bruno's argument that
he starts from the "yes doctor" scenario rather than from a simple
assumption of strong AI. The problem might be that *we* cannot have
first person experience of being a 'strong AI being'.

Strong AI and "Yes Doctor" both follow from the assumption that 
consciousness is the result of computation. I have used strong AI a few 
times on this list in an effort to persuade people who are hung up on 
the feasibility of duplicating machines, pronouns and similar 
irrelevancies to actually address the arguments Bruno is making.


In any case, even starting from the assumption that only /human/ 
consciousness is computational, Bruno still reaches strong AI by about 
step 5.


If you believe in Platonia, then the computation that
instantiates the consciousness (and everyone else's
consciousness) is a mathematical object and hence "exists"
independent of its particular physical instantiation.  All the
physical world is inferred from conscious experience (I find
this dubious too) and so the computations in Platonia that
instantiate conscious thoughts, also instantiate the physical
world those thoughts refer to.

Like strong AI in a virtual world. I think that is what comp is
actually saying -- we are just that, nothing more. Whether this
emerges from arithmetic, or is basically physical, remains
unknowable in comp.

It can only be physical if the universe is robust. I think the ponit of 
comp is more that there is no /need/ to bring in the "physical 
hypothesis" if the UDA is correct - it becomes superfluous, since we can 
explain the appearance of a physical world without requiring it.


Actually, strong AI in a virtual world does not need the dovetailer or a 
robust universe. If one can make use of the existing physical world and 
the laws it displays, we do not need to extract these from arithmetic 
and the infinity of computations of the UD. It is the UD which is 
superfluous.


This is, after all, the simpler hypothesis.

Bruce

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled

Le 5 mai 2015 01:17, "meekerdb"  a écrit :
>
> On 5/4/2015 3:29 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>> Le 5 mai 2015 00:08, "meekerdb"  a écrit :
>> >
>> > On 5/4/2015 11:24 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, meekerdb  wrote:
>> >>>
>> >>> On 5/4/2015 12:31 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>  2015-05-04 9:26 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett :
>> >
>> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> >>
>> >> On 4 May 2015 at 17:14, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>> The initial point that we were making was that copying at the
quantum level
>> >>> of substitution is not possible, in principle. Accidental copies
in another
>> >>> universe are not "deliberate but surreptitious" copies. They are
irrelevant
>> >>> to the argument.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> You implied that if you did not know about the copy because it
was not
>> >> prepared deliberately that would make a difference, but I don't
see
>> >> why it should.
>> >
>> >
>> > The point of Step 3, as I understand it, is that we know the
set-up: we know that we are to be copied at the appropriate substitution
level and duplicated -- at two different locations. Chance duplicates do
not fit the criteria and are irrelevant to the comp hypothesis.
>> 
>> 
>>  It's a though experiment... so the duplicates do fit the criteria
by definition.. you even gave it here "we are to be copied at the
appropriate substitution level and duplicated"... step 0 again, is that it
is possible... so, if you reject step 0, there is no point to use that as
an argument against further steps... you already have rejected the premiss,
so any deductive steps based on it have already been rejected by you as you
reject step 0.
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>> Unknown (and unknowable) copies would not produce any first person
indeterminancy.  FPI requires that you know there is a duplicate that you
could be.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Why?
>> >>
>> >
>> > Otherwise you are certain where you will end up.
>>
>> If they are more than one continuation, weither you know it or not is
irrelevant.
>
>
> Then that's third person indeterminancy.

What? It's first person indeterminacy, because you have more than one
future first person perspective. Are you playing with words now?

Quentin

>
> Brent
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled


On 5/4/2015 9:26 PM, LizR wrote:
On 5 May 2015 at 16:15, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


meekerdb wrote:

On 5/4/2015 8:14 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:


We have evidence of the sort you mention that quantum 
superpositions of the
type need for a quantum computer decohere rapidly in the brain 
environment.
But decoherence affects only superpositions in non-robust bases. 
You could
have an eigenstate of some relevant quantum operator in a basis 
that is
robust against decoherence.


Isn't that just a (quasi) classical variable, a pointer state?

If we do not know that state (or the associated operator) we could 
not
achieve an adequate copy.


I don't think any of this is relevant to Bruno's argument though. 
Instead of
talking about copying people, the argument could just start with the 
assumption
of strong AI: A digital computer of sufficient power, with the right 
program,
and adequate input/output can instantiate human-like consciousness.  It 
is
something that can be copied, including its state. And it can experience
uncertainty and surprise.


I agree. In fact, I think it is a weakness of Bruno's argument that he 
starts from
the "yes doctor" scenario rather than from a simple assumption of strong 
AI. The
problem might be that *we* cannot have first person experience of being a 
'strong AI
being'.


Strong AI and "Yes Doctor" both follow from the assumption that consciousness is the 
result of computation. I have used strong AI a few times on this list in an effort to 
persuade people who are hung up on the feasibility of duplicating machines, pronouns and 
similar irrelevancies to actually address the arguments Bruno is making.


In any case, even starting from the assumption that only /human/ consciousness is 
computational, Bruno still reaches strong AI by about step 5.



If you believe in Platonia, then the computation that instantiates the
consciousness (and everyone else's consciousness) is a mathematical 
object and
hence "exists" independent of its particular physical instantiation.  
All the
physical world is inferred from conscious experience (I find this 
dubious too)
and so the computations in Platonia that instantiate conscious 
thoughts, also
instantiate the physical world those thoughts refer to.


Like strong AI in a virtual world. I think that is what comp is actually 
saying --
we are just that, nothing more. Whether this emerges from arithmetic, or is
basically physical, remains unknowable in comp.

It can only be physical if the universe is robust. I think the ponit of comp is more 
that there is no /need/ to bring in the "physical hypothesis" if the UDA is correct - it 
becomes superfluous, since we can explain the appearance of a physical world without 
requiring it.


But we haven't explained it just by showing that it must be in there somewhere among the 
infinitely many computations.   That's like saying the proverbial 100 monkeys with 
typewriters prove that the "Shakespeare hypothesis" is superfluous.


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled

On 5 May 2015 at 16:15, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> meekerdb wrote:
>
>> On 5/4/2015 8:14 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> We have evidence of the sort you mention that quantum superpositions of
>>> the type need for a quantum computer decohere rapidly in the brain
>>> environment. But decoherence affects only superpositions in non-robust
>>> bases. You could have an eigenstate of some relevant quantum operator in a
>>> basis that is robust against decoherence.
>>>
>>
>> Isn't that just a (quasi) classical variable, a pointer state?
>>
>>  If we do not know that state (or the associated operator) we could not
>>> achieve an adequate copy.
>>>
>>
>> I don't think any of this is relevant to Bruno's argument though. Instead
>> of talking about copying people, the argument could just start with the
>> assumption of strong AI: A digital computer of sufficient power, with the
>> right program, and adequate input/output can instantiate human-like
>> consciousness.  It is something that can be copied, including its state.
>> And it can experience uncertainty and surprise.
>>
>
> I agree. In fact, I think it is a weakness of Bruno's argument that he
> starts from the "yes doctor" scenario rather than from a simple assumption
> of strong AI. The problem might be that *we* cannot have first person
> experience of being a 'strong AI being'.


Strong AI and "Yes Doctor" both follow from the assumption that
consciousness is the result of computation. I have used strong AI a few
times on this list in an effort to persuade people who are hung up on the
feasibility of duplicating machines, pronouns and similar irrelevancies to
actually address the arguments Bruno is making.

In any case, even starting from the assumption that only *human*
consciousness is computational, Bruno still reaches strong AI by about step
5.

>
>  If you believe in Platonia, then the computation that instantiates the
>> consciousness (and everyone else's consciousness) is a mathematical object
>> and hence "exists" independent of its particular physical instantiation.
>> All the physical world is inferred from conscious experience (I find this
>> dubious too) and so the computations in Platonia that instantiate conscious
>> thoughts, also instantiate the physical world those thoughts refer to.
>>
>
> Like strong AI in a virtual world. I think that is what comp is actually
> saying -- we are just that, nothing more. Whether this emerges from
> arithmetic, or is basically physical, remains unknowable in comp.
>
> It can only be physical if the universe is robust. I think the ponit of
comp is more that there is no *need* to bring in the "physical hypothesis"
if the UDA is correct - it becomes superfluous, since we can explain the
appearance of a physical world without requiring it.

Like Laplace with God (supposedly).

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled


meekerdb wrote:

On 5/4/2015 8:14 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:


We have evidence of the sort you mention that quantum superpositions 
of the type need for a quantum computer decohere rapidly in the brain 
environment. But decoherence affects only superpositions in non-robust 
bases. You could have an eigenstate of some relevant quantum operator 
in a basis that is robust against decoherence. 


Isn't that just a (quasi) classical variable, a pointer state?

If we do not know that state (or the associated operator) we could not 
achieve an adequate copy.


I don't think any of this is relevant to Bruno's argument though. 
Instead of talking about copying people, the argument could just start 
with the assumption of strong AI: A digital computer of sufficient 
power, with the right program, and adequate input/output can instantiate 
human-like consciousness.  It is something that can be copied, including 
its state. And it can experience uncertainty and surprise.


I agree. In fact, I think it is a weakness of Bruno's argument that he 
starts from the "yes doctor" scenario rather than from a simple 
assumption of strong AI. The problem might be that *we* cannot have 
first person experience of being a 'strong AI being'.


If you believe in Platonia, then the computation that instantiates the 
consciousness (and everyone else's consciousness) is a mathematical 
object and hence "exists" independent of its particular physical 
instantiation.  All the physical world is inferred from conscious 
experience (I find this dubious too) and so the computations in Platonia 
that instantiate conscious thoughts, also instantiate the physical world 
those thoughts refer to.


Like strong AI in a virtual world. I think that is what comp is actually 
saying -- we are just that, nothing more. Whether this emerges from 
arithmetic, or is basically physical, remains unknowable in comp.


Bruce

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, Bruce Kellett 

A quantum computer is not the issue here. I know that any UTM can
perform any calculation doable of a quantum computer, although the
quantum computer might make a rather poor desk calculator or word
processor.

The point I was making was that *if* the substitution level for
duplication of consciousness is at the quantum level, then the
quantum no-cloning theorem rules out duplication. We cannot
duplicate an unknown quantum state, and the quantum state of the
brain is such an unknown quantum state, or involves such unknown
(unknowable) quantum states.

But you haven't addressed the point Bruno made that the UD will 
duplicate your quantum state, without "knowing" it. The universe will 
also duplicate your quantum state without knowing it provided it is 
large enough, or infinite.


That might be the case, but it is beside the point, which concerned 
deliberate duplicating and dispatching to Washington or Moscow. The UD 
duplicates do not do this -- they must have a high degree of uniformity 
since physics is supposed to come from these duplicates.


Bruce

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled

On 5/4/2015 8:14 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

meekerdb wrote:

On 5/4/2015 5:53 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:

A classical computer can emulate a quantum computer, even if possibly with a
necessary slow down. So the UD, even if written in LISP, and executed by a LISP
interpreter, itself computed by some extendible boolean graph, will execute all
quantum computation, and if that is relevant, let it be.

So the no quantum cloning does not prevent the UD to "prepare" your relative quantum
state, and this infinitely often. The invariance of the 1P for delays makes the "run
time" of the UD irrelevant, as time is an internal parameter or an indexical gauge.

The quantum machine might be the "physical winner", but that can only be judged from
comp, when we assume comp. That is the point of the reasoning.

A quantum computer is not the issue here. I know that any UTM can perform any
calculation doable of a quantum computer, although the quantum computer might make a
rather poor desk calculator or word processor.

The point I was making was that *if* the substitution level for duplication of
consciousness is at the quantum level, then the quantum no-cloning theorem rules out
duplication. We cannot duplicate an unknown quantum state, and the quantum state of
the brain is such an unknown quantum state, or involves such unknown (unknowable)
quantum states.

The fact that the duplication level must be higher than this (essentially classical)
*might* render duplication possible in principle. We have no evidence that a quantum
level of duplication is necessary but, likewise, we have no evidence that it is not.

I think we some evidence it is not. First, there's Tegmark's (and Vic's) estimation of
decoherence time for various neural processes which all come out many orders of
magnitude shorter than neural signal times. Second, evolution would certainly favor
quasi-classical performance of the brain as computer. A little bit of randomness could
be useful, but only a little bit.

We have evidence of the sort you mention that quantum superpositions of the type need
for a quantum computer decohere rapidly in the brain environment. But decoherence
affects only superpositions in non-robust bases. You could have an eigenstate of some
relevant quantum operator in a basis that is robust against decoherence.

Isn't that just a (quasi) classical variable, a pointer state?

If we do not know that state (or the associated operator) we could not achieve an
adequate copy.

I don't think any of this is relevant to Bruno's argument though. Instead of talking about
copying people, the argument could just start with the assumption of strong AI: A digital
computer of sufficient power, with the right program, and adequate input/output can
instantiate human-like consciousness. It is something that can be copied, including its
state. And it can experience uncertainty and surprise.

If you believe in Platonia, then the computation that instantiates the consciousness (and
everyone else's consciousness) is a mathematical object and hence "exists" independent of
its particular physical instantiation. All the physical world is inferred from conscious
experience (I find this dubious too) and so the computations in Platonia that instantiate
conscious thoughts, also instantiate the physical world those thoughts refer to.

Brent

We have no real evidence one way or the other. People assume lots of things, but in the
absence of hard evidence, I prefer an agnostic stance.

Bruce

Re: The dovetailer disassembled

2015-05-04 Thread Russell Standish

On Mon, May 04, 2015 at 09:08:13PM -0400, John Clark wrote:
> On Mon, May 4, 2015  Russell Standish  wrote:
> 
> >
> >> Given the magnitude of the blunder made in step 3 and the fact that it
> > never even seems to have occurred to Bruno that in a "proof" that claims so
> > say something about the nature of personal identity it might be a good idea
> > to be very very careful about how personal pronouns are used I really don't
> > care what steps 4-7 say.
> >
> > > So you say. You haven't convinced me of the "error", however,
> 
> 
> Interesting, so Russell Standish believes that the nature of personal
> identity is so obvious that a proof about the nature of personal identity
> need not take special precautions about how person pronouns, which
> symbolize a personal identity, are used.

It doesn't seem an important issue to me (ie you haven't convince me
it is), although in Bruce's recent posting about the "closer
continuer" identity theory, I can see that the "closer continuer"
doesn't make sense under the assumption of computationalism. This is
largely the subject of step 4 of the UDA.

> 
> 
> > > It is described in much more detail in my eprint "MGA revisited".
> 
> 
> John Clark has no idea what "MGA revisited" is, but John Clark would be

It is located at http://www.hpcoders.com.au/blog/?p=73. This was
mentioned earlier on this this IIRC.

> willing to bet money that whatever it is it's stuffed full of personal
> pronouns with no clear referent.
> 

I doubt it, as the MGA doesn't depend on personal pronouns.

>   John K Clark

> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled


meekerdb wrote:

On 5/4/2015 5:53 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:


A classical computer can emulate a quantum computer, even if possibly 
with a necessary slow down. So the UD, even if written in LISP, and 
executed by a LISP interpreter, itself computed by some extendible 
boolean graph, will execute all quantum computation, and if that is 
relevant, let it be.


So the no quantum cloning does not prevent the UD to "prepare" your 
relative quantum state, and this infinitely often. The invariance of 
the 1P for delays makes the "run time" of the UD irrelevant, as time 
is an internal parameter or an indexical gauge.


The quantum machine might be the "physical winner", but that can only 
be judged from comp, when we assume comp. That is the point of the 
reasoning.


A quantum computer is not the issue here. I know that any UTM can 
perform any calculation doable of a quantum computer, although the 
quantum computer might make a rather poor desk calculator or word 
processor.


The point I was making was that *if* the substitution level for 
duplication of consciousness is at the quantum level, then the quantum 
no-cloning theorem rules out duplication. We cannot duplicate an 
unknown quantum state, and the quantum state of the brain is such an 
unknown quantum state, or involves such unknown (unknowable) quantum 
states.


The fact that the duplication level must be higher than this 
(essentially classical) *might* render duplication possible in 
principle. We have no evidence that a quantum level of duplication is 
necessary but, likewise, we have no evidence that it is not.


I think we some evidence it is not.  First, there's Tegmark's (and 
Vic's) estimation of decoherence time for various neural processes which 
all come out many orders of magnitude shorter than neural signal times.  
Second, evolution would certainly favor quasi-classical performance of 
the brain as computer.  A little bit of randomness could be useful, but 
only a little bit.


We have evidence of the sort you mention that quantum superpositions of 
the type need for a quantum computer decohere rapidly in the brain 
environment. But decoherence affects only superpositions in non-robust 
bases. You could have an eigenstate of some relevant quantum operator in 
a basis that is robust against decoherence. If we do not know that state 
(or the associated operator) we could not achieve an adequate copy.


We have no real evidence one way or the other. People assume lots of 
things, but in the absence of hard evidence, I prefer an agnostic stance.


Bruce

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled

On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 04 May 2015, at 07:57, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>>  Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>
 On 4 May 2015 at 14:38, LizR  wrote:

> Yes. I've mentioned occasionally that if the substitution level is
> quantum,
> then no-cloning may be a problem, at least in principle. The usual
> answer is
> that the subst level is WAY above quantum - that our experiences and
> hence
> the famous "observer moments" aren't anywhere near to the Planck time
> or
> length.
>
 If the substitution level is quantum then no-cloning may be a problem
 in practice, but not in principle.

>>>
>>> ??
>>> The no-cloning theorem would rule out quantum level substitution *in
>>> principle* as far as I can tell.
>>>
>>
>> A classical computer can emulate a quantum computer, even if possibly
>> with a necessary slow down. So the UD, even if written in LISP, and
>> executed by a LISP interpreter, itself computed by some extendible boolean
>> graph, will execute all quantum computation, and if that is relevant, let
>> it be.
>>
>> So the no quantum cloning does not prevent the UD to "prepare" your
>> relative quantum state, and this infinitely often. The invariance of the 1P
>> for delays makes the "run time" of the UD irrelevant, as time is an
>> internal parameter or an indexical gauge.
>>
>> The quantum machine might be the "physical winner", but that can only be
>> judged from comp, when we assume comp. That is the point of the reasoning.
>>
>
> A quantum computer is not the issue here. I know that any UTM can perform
> any calculation doable of a quantum computer, although the quantum computer
> might make a rather poor desk calculator or word processor.
>
> The point I was making was that *if* the substitution level for
> duplication of consciousness is at the quantum level, then the quantum
> no-cloning theorem rules out duplication. We cannot duplicate an unknown
> quantum state, and the quantum state of the brain is such an unknown
> quantum state, or involves such unknown (unknowable) quantum states.


But you haven't addressed the point Bruno made that the UD will
duplicate your quantum state, without "knowing" it. The universe will also
duplicate your quantum state without knowing it provided it is large
enough, or infinite.


> The fact that the duplication level must be higher than this (essentially
> classical) *might* render duplication impossible in principle. We have no
> evidence that a quantum level of duplication is necessary but, likewise, we
> have no evidence that it is not.
>
> Bruce
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled


John Clark wrote:
On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 8:53 PM, Bruce Kellett   
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au > wrote:
 
 > We have no evidence that a quantum level of duplication is

necessary but, likewise, we have no evidence that it is not.

Nonsense, we have a ASTRONOMICAL  amount of evidence that is not 
necessary! Your quantum state changes well over a million billion times 
every nanosecond and yet you continue to feel like the same person.   


Of course personal identity is retained under internal changes. But why 
are you so confident that the persistent quantum state of some molecules 
is not important for some memories or functions?


Bruce

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled

On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 8:53 PM, Bruce Kellett   bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>
wrote:

> > We have no evidence that a quantum level of duplication is necessary
> but, likewise, we have no evidence that it is not.

Nonsense, we have a ASTRONOMICAL  amount of evidence that is not necessary!
Your quantum state changes well over a million billion times every
nanosecond and yet you continue to feel like the same person.

  John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled

On 5/4/2015 5:53 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 04 May 2015, at 07:57, Bruce Kellett wrote:

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 4 May 2015 at 14:38, LizR wrote:

Yes. I've mentioned occasionally that if the substitution level is quantum,
then no-cloning may be a problem, at least in principle. The usual answer is
that the subst level is WAY above quantum - that our experiences and hence
the famous "observer moments" aren't anywhere near to the Planck time or
length.

If the substitution level is quantum then no-cloning may be a problem
in practice, but not in principle.

??
The no-cloning theorem would rule out quantum level substitution *in principle* as far
as I can tell.

A classical computer can emulate a quantum computer, even if possibly with a necessary
slow down. So the UD, even if written in LISP, and executed by a LISP interpreter,
itself computed by some extendible boolean graph, will execute all quantum computation,
and if that is relevant, let it be.

The quantum machine might be the "physical winner", but that can only be judged from
comp, when we assume comp. That is the point of the reasoning.

The point I was making was that *if* the substitution level for duplication of
consciousness is at the quantum level, then the quantum no-cloning theorem rules out
duplication. We cannot duplicate an unknown quantum state, and the quantum state of the
brain is such an unknown quantum state, or involves such unknown (unknowable) quantum
states.

The fact that the duplication level must be higher than this (essentially classical)
*might* render duplication impossible in principle. We have no evidence that a quantum
level of duplication is necessary but, likewise, we have no evidence that it is not.

I think we some evidence it is not. First, there's Tegmark's (and Vic's) estimation of
decoherence time for various neural processes which all come out many orders of magnitude
shorter than neural signal times. Second, evolution would certainly favor quasi-classical
performance of the brain as computer. A little bit of randomness could be useful, but
only a little bit.

Brent

Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!


On 5/4/2015 7:08 PM, LizR wrote:

On 5 May 2015 at 12:01, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

On 5/4/2015 11:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 04 May 2015, at 15:08, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 1:08 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List
mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:

I sure did, Telmo. Scroll to the bottom and you shall view my last, 
number
26th, the last one.


Ah there you are! And you are not the only one from this list commenting 
there,
it's a small world.

My bet on computational after-lives is that we are in one already (an 
infinity of
times), but this is completely transparent to us.

This kind of thing is interesting to me. I tend toward the materialist 
stuff
since it seems to have potential. The mentalist stuff seems unreliable 
because
people who have NDE's or trances have not come back with information. 



I would say that the important distinction is between communicable and
non-communicable stuff. Science is about communicable stuff, but there is 
personal
value in exploring the internal world -- although it won't get you a nobel 
prize
or even any sort of recognition.

This is because there is no Nobel Prize in Mathematics (not mentioning 
Theology).

But you can have the Nobel prize of literature, and some text does indeed
quasi-succeed, perhaps, in communication a bit of the uncommunicable. Then 
you can
communicate a part conditionally, like if I am consistent then I can't 
justify that
I am consistent, and the inetnsional variants.

Bruno

You can get a Templeton, which is for merging science and religion and is 
worth more
than a Nobel.


Do you mean it's worth more in monetary terms, or in terms of kudos, 
respectability, etc?


$$  It's actually specified in the grant establishing the Templeton foundation that the 
prize shall be bigger than the Nobel prize.


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!

On 5 May 2015 at 12:01, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 5/4/2015 11:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 04 May 2015, at 15:08, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
> On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 1:08 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>> I sure did, Telmo. Scroll to the bottom and you shall view my last,
>> number 26th, the last one.
>
>
>  Ah there you are! And you are not the only one from this list commenting
> there, it's a small world.
>
>  My bet on computational after-lives is that we are in one already (an
> infinity of times), but this is completely transparent to us.
>
>
>> This kind of thing is interesting to me. I tend toward the materialist
>> stuff since it seems to have potential. The mentalist stuff seems
>> unreliable because people who have NDE's or trances have not come back with
>> information.
>
>
>  I would say that the important distinction is between communicable and
> non-communicable stuff. Science is about communicable stuff, but there is
> personal value in exploring the internal world -- although it won't get you
> a nobel prize or even any sort of recognition.
>
> This is because there is no Nobel Prize in Mathematics (not mentioning
> Theology).
>
>  But you can have the Nobel prize of literature, and some text does
> indeed quasi-succeed, perhaps, in communication a bit of the
> uncommunicable. Then you can communicate a part conditionally, like if I am
> consistent then I can't justify that I am consistent, and the inetnsional
> variants.
>
>  Bruno
>
> You can get a Templeton, which is for merging science and religion and is
> worth more than a Nobel.
>

Do you mean it's worth more in monetary terms, or in terms of kudos,
respectability, etc?

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!

Stathis, in a tv interview on Closer To the Truth from a few years ago, 
Steinhart said that this would be an improved version of you, but no memories 
passing. So a new and better you, with a longer life, and more wealth would 
surpass this life, this universe, from its inception, with no knowledge of what 
came before. Revision seems to be reincarnation, with gradual improvements, but 
perhaps to both of us, its sort of wasteful to begin a new universe, just to 
recreate better, different, taller, versions of Stathis and Mitch. I feel this 
was why Steinhart came up with Promotion as a successor theory, that did 
include the movement of memories and indentities, so the next version of 
ourselves, can make better use of our learnings and mistakes. Promotion 
Steinhart seems to bundle in with Uploading to a terrarium, in our universe, 
along with destructive Teleportation, also to a virtual terrarium. I do agree 
with your statement that a Revised you, need never exclude your past life. In 
fact you could better capitalize on your knowledge to make better choices in 
the new world.

Steinharts's philosophy has been educated, by his former computer science 
background, which, as you can tell gave birth to his Promotion theory.

Sent from AOL Mobile Mail


-Original Message-
From: Stathis Papaioannou 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Mon, May 4, 2015 05:47 PM
Subject: Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!





 

 
On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, spudboy100 via Everything List <
 mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com";>everything-list@googlegroups.com>
 wrote:
 

 
  Stathis, probably, 
Steinhart would agree with you regarding revision, for me, with the loss of 
contiguous identity, the succeeding person is merely a clone, as if you could 
magically clone a person in some of the fantasy films, or even like a clone 
generated by the Everett-De Witt-Wheeler interpretation of quantum mechanics. 
It's an copy, but a different person. Now, if either of these processes 
possessed psychological continuity of the individual, then initially at least, 
we'd have identical iterations of the same, identical, persons. But this is 
different than Revision (an earlier proposal). 
 
 
  

 
 

My reading of "revision" from the extract is that you would be a copy with 
improvements, so there would be psychological continuity.
 
 

 
 
 
   What seems to be a 
better, more satisfying theory, is Steinhart's Promotion Theory, which entails 
higher intelligences, especially God (The operating system and hypercomputer of 
this universe), performing moves, via pipelines, to a higher universe, in 
essence, Promotion of processes like us. Steinhart is sort of a polytheist, and 
see's God or God's evolving, Dawkin's - style from a very, very, simple 
universe. So the whole personality-memory, gets promoted to a different 
universe. At that point the person is in an improved circumstance, and then 
because of new experiences, begins to diverge from his or her, old self. We do 
this now. it's called life. 
 
 Back to identity, Steinhart also includes Uploading and Teleportation as 
different means to the same destination to VR environments. Steinhart, calls VR 
environments, terrariums. And, the Engineers can move, either through 
Promotion, Uploading, or Teleportation to multiple environments, with multiple 
copies of You to each new space. So Stathis 1, goes to Middle Earth, 2 goes to 
Star Trekville, 3 goes to The New Republic, 4, goes to the Age of the Greek 
Gods, 5, etc... This, collection of You's that diverge to each environment, 
Steinhart calls a Span. 
 
 What's the solution to so many versions of us?? Eventually, it could be 
resolved by Tipler's Omega Point (an idea) in the far, far, future. Copies 
exist via MWI, so why not a few million more added to the pot? Steinhart 
definitely, does not endorse this fix, but I am tweaking his work to 
suit myself and emotions. 
 
 
 

  

 
 

 

 
-- 
 
Stathis Papaioannou
 
 
  -- 
 
 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
 
 To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
email to 
 mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com";>everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
 
 To post to this group, send email to 
 mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com";>everything-list@googlegroups.com.
 
 Visit this group at 
 http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list";>http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
 
 For more options, visit 
 https://groups.google.com/d/optout";>https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
 
 




-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everyt

Re: The dovetailer disassembled

On Mon, May 4, 2015  Russell Standish  wrote:

>
>> Given the magnitude of the blunder made in step 3 and the fact that it
> never even seems to have occurred to Bruno that in a "proof" that claims so
> say something about the nature of personal identity it might be a good idea
> to be very very careful about how personal pronouns are used I really don't
> care what steps 4-7 say.
>
> > So you say. You haven't convinced me of the "error", however,

Interesting, so Russell Standish believes that the nature of personal
identity is so obvious that a proof about the nature of personal identity
need not take special precautions about how person pronouns, which
symbolize a personal identity, are used.

> > It is described in much more detail in my eprint "MGA revisited".

John Clark has no idea what "MGA revisited" is, but John Clark would be
willing to bet money that whatever it is it's stuffed full of personal
pronouns with no clear referent.

  John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 04 May 2015, at 07:57, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 4 May 2015 at 14:38, LizR  wrote:
Yes. I've mentioned occasionally that if the substitution level is 
quantum,
then no-cloning may be a problem, at least in principle. The usual 
answer is
that the subst level is WAY above quantum - that our experiences and 
hence
the famous "observer moments" aren't anywhere near to the Planck 
time or

length.

If the substitution level is quantum then no-cloning may be a problem
in practice, but not in principle.


??
The no-cloning theorem would rule out quantum level substitution *in 
principle* as far as I can tell.


A classical computer can emulate a quantum computer, even if possibly 
with a necessary slow down. So the UD, even if written in LISP, and 
executed by a LISP interpreter, itself computed by some extendible 
boolean graph, will execute all quantum computation, and if that is 
relevant, let it be.


So the no quantum cloning does not prevent the UD to "prepare" your 
relative quantum state, and this infinitely often. The invariance of the 
1P for delays makes the "run time" of the UD irrelevant, as time is an 
internal parameter or an indexical gauge.


The quantum machine might be the "physical winner", but that can only be 
judged from comp, when we assume comp. That is the point of the reasoning.


A quantum computer is not the issue here. I know that any UTM can 
perform any calculation doable of a quantum computer, although the 
quantum computer might make a rather poor desk calculator or word processor.


The point I was making was that *if* the substitution level for 
duplication of consciousness is at the quantum level, then the quantum 
no-cloning theorem rules out duplication. We cannot duplicate an unknown 
quantum state, and the quantum state of the brain is such an unknown 
quantum state, or involves such unknown (unknowable) quantum states.


The fact that the duplication level must be higher than this 
(essentially classical) *might* render duplication impossible in 
principle. We have no evidence that a quantum level of duplication is 
necessary but, likewise, we have no evidence that it is not.


Bruce

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!


On 5/4/2015 11:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 04 May 2015, at 15:08, Telmo Menezes wrote:




On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 1:08 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List 
mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:


I sure did, Telmo. Scroll to the bottom and you shall view my last, number 
26th,
the last one.


Ah there you are! And you are not the only one from this list commenting there, it's a 
small world.


My bet on computational after-lives is that we are in one already (an infinity of 
times), but this is completely transparent to us.


This kind of thing is interesting to me. I tend toward the materialist 
stuff since
it seems to have potential. The mentalist stuff seems unreliable because 
people who
have NDE's or trances have not come back with information. 



I would say that the important distinction is between communicable and non-communicable 
stuff. Science is about communicable stuff, but there is personal value in exploring 
the internal world -- although it won't get you a nobel prize or even any sort of 
recognition.


This is because there is no Nobel Prize in Mathematics (not mentioning 
Theology).

But you can have the Nobel prize of literature, and some text does indeed quasi-succeed, 
perhaps, in communication a bit of the uncommunicable. Then you can communicate a part 
conditionally, like if I am consistent then I can't justify that I am consistent, and 
the inetnsional variants.


Bruno


You can get a Templeton, which is for merging science and religion and is worth more than 
a Nobel.


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: God

On 4/29/2015 4:15 AM, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:
Brent, each person is of course different, but if you want me to be picky picky picky, I
can.

So not committing logical fallacies is your idea of being picky? It makes it so
inconvenient to smear whomever you dislike.

Dawkins's hates all religious fanaticism, and has spoken out against Islamic fanaticism,
so he's kind of a hero. An anti-religious one, but a hero none the less.

Hitchens was another hero of mine, trading punches with Islamists, and yes, even the
Syrian Nazi party. He was a great guy.

And he was also a big promoter of invading Iraq.

Stenger, who knows? He was a crusty, sci dude, who opposed religion, but apparently
Christianity.

Vic attacked all theisms, religions that worshipped a personal, prayer answering,
commandment giving god.

Penn Jillette and Teller were talented illusionists, but caved on Islamic radicalism
some years back. No kudos for cowardice--IT Takes Nothing to attack the
Christians-NOTHING! Ah, but with the Jihadists, well, see, they're 3rd worlders and...

Von Mises, hell no! Ayn Rand, no she hated commies, as do I.

Larry Krauss. another clever physicist with a personality like a Gila Monster.

You must have met a different Larry Krauss. I've found him quite gracious. Maybe you
shouldn't have started by attacking him as a Marxist.

Let me ask these rhetorical questions back at you.
Why are the so-called liberals so sympathetic to the old soviets,

Which liberals? Hitchens, Stenger, Krauss, Dawkins, Dennett...who the hell are you
talking about? Strawman Obama? Liberal Hilary? Let's see you quote anything anyone of
them has said in favor of the Soviet political or economic system.

to the new Islamists,

Quote?

to censorship of competing ideas.

Quote?

These are rhetorical questions, because we all know why.

No. They're rhetorical questions because you make up the answers with zero
facts.

We all know who the progressives see as their chief enemy. Ain't Putin, ain't China,
ain't Iran, ain't ISIS. It's the middle class of the US, and the world.

So now it's the progressives. What happened to the atheist/marxists? Didn't work so well
did it when it came down to actually having names.

Thus, the McCarthyite/Alinsky tactic that I use for the "Liberals" rings true because
it's true. Now about the Atheist thing. I am really good with atheism as long as it's
not wedded to the progressive (Neocom) ideology. What's neocomm? Glad you asked. It's
the marriage of crony capitalists to progressive politicians. Notice how silent the
antiwar types are when it comes to what Russia, or China, or Iran does, militarily, but
howl like dogs when its US troops?

You don't suppose that has anything to do with the fact that they are U.S. citizens and so
suppose that the U.S. military should be responsive to their wishes, whereas there's no
reason for them to suppose Russia or China will be.

Twas this way during Nam. Do the say, Republicans have this as well? Absolutely. Which
is _off topic_ on atheism, but explains why things are so badly screwed up. Witness
Baltimore, and Ferguson as Americans future. Check your news today.

What's your point? Where are your Tea Party friends when the police are the
thugs?

Brent

Re: The dovetailer disassembled


On 5/4/2015 4:13 PM, LizR wrote:

On 5 May 2015 at 11:01, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

On 5/4/2015 2:50 PM, LizR wrote:


On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

On 5/4/2015 12:31 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2015-05-04 9:26 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett :

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 4 May 2015 at 17:14, Bruce Kellett 

wrote:


The initial point that we were making was that copying 
at the
quantum level
of substitution is not possible, in principle. 
Accidental
copies in another
universe are not "deliberate but surreptitious" copies. 
They
are irrelevant
to the argument.


You implied that if you did not know about the copy because 
it was not
prepared deliberately that would make a difference, but I 
don't see
why it should.


The point of Step 3, as I understand it, is that we know the 
set-up:
we know that we are to be copied at the appropriate 
substitution level
and duplicated -- at two different locations. Chance duplicates 
do not
fit the criteria and are irrelevant to the comp hypothesis.


It's a though experiment... so the duplicates do fit the criteria by
definition.. you even gave it here "we are to be copied at the 
appropriate
substitution level and duplicated"... step 0 again, is that it is
possible... so, if you reject step 0, there is no point to use that 
as an
argument against further steps... you already have rejected the 
premiss,
so any deductive steps based on it have already been rejected by 
you as
you reject step 0.


Unknown (and unknowable) copies would not produce any first person
indeterminancy.  FPI requires that you know there is a duplicate 
that you
could be.


This implies that pre-Everett quantum experiments would have produced 
deterministic
results, since no one would have realised they were being split.

Or that there was randomness instead of FPI.


Obviously, but so what? You stated that "FPI requires that you know there is a duplicate 
you could be" - see above. This implies that if the MWI is correct, you have to know 
about it before its form of FPI operates.


Yes, it implies that MWI is not correct.  I thought that was clear.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled


On 5/4/2015 4:06 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 5 May 2015 at 08:08, meekerdb  wrote:

On 5/4/2015 11:24 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

Unknown (and unknowable) copies would not produce any first person
indeterminancy.  FPI requires that you know there is a duplicate that you
could be.


Why?


Otherwise you are certain where you will end up.

So an ignorant person going through these duplication experiments
would know where he would end up, but not someone who was aware of
what was going on?


He would by the definition of "you"=a sequence of closest continuations.  Suppose I enter 
the duplication booth supposing that it is transporter to Washington.  Then the copy that 
arrives in Washington is obviously a closer continuation than the one that arrives in Moscow.


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled

On 5 May 2015 at 11:13, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> LizR wrote:
>
>> On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, meekerdb >
>> Unknown (and unknowable) copies would not produce any first
>> person indeterminancy.  FPI requires that you know there is a
>> duplicate that you could be.
>>
>> This implies that pre-Everett quantum experiments would have produced
>> deterministic results, since no one would have realised they were being
>> split.
>>
>
> You overlook the very real possibility of ontological randomness.

I would have done, except I assumed my audience would realise that my
comment was only intended on the basis that the MWI was correct. Given that
assumption, Brent is saying that the MWI wouldn't have the observed results
(the MWI version of FPI) *unless* the experimenter knew about it, which
strikes me, at least, as unlikely to be correct (unless he was suggesting
some "mind affects physics" scenario akin to consciousness collapsing the
wavefunction, I suppose).

I did consider spelling all this out, but I assumed anyone reading my post
would be able to contextualise what I'd said. *Obviously *I'm overlooking
ontological randomness, because obviously ontological randomness is not the
form of FPI we're discussing.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled


On 5/4/2015 3:31 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 5 May 2015 at 08:07, meekerdb  wrote:

On 5/4/2015 11:21 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, meekerdb  wrote:


If you take the theory of consciousness that says it is just a stream of
experiences which are related by some internal similarities, then it's
impossible that you find yourself on some distant planet so long as there's
the much more similar experience of finding yourself where you were a moment
ago.  The FPI of Everett's relative state only arises where there are nearly
equal degrees of similarity.


Consciousness survives change in environment without any problem; for
example, if you are transported somewhere while asleep.


What does that mean?  Memories survive...so are you identifying
consciousness with memories?  They certainly contribute a lot to the
similarities of successive experiences.  In the above example "you" is
ambiguous.  In ordinary discourse it would refer to my body.  But on
Everett's (and Bruno's theory) if the decision whether to transport my body
were based on some quantum event, "I" would end up in two different places.

Suppose you were copied at home while asleep and the original
transported to a park, then copy and original both woke up. Would you
say that you should expect to find yourself waking up at home rather
than the park?

Ask John Clark. :-)

Seriously, one can only talk about what "you" expect given a definition of "you".  If 
"you" means your closest continuation then waking up at home is closer than waking up in 
the park.  We tend to think of this as uncertainty because all the similarities of body 
and memory mean that the difference between the park and home is almost neglegible 
compared to the similarities.  But suppose we push the point and you are copied, except 
into the body of an eighty year old black woman with one leg.  Would you still find 
yourself waking up in the park?


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled


On 5/4/2015 3:29 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



Le 5 mai 2015 00:08, "meekerdb" mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> a 
écrit :

>
> On 5/4/2015 11:24 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, meekerdb > wrote:

>>>
>>> On 5/4/2015 12:31 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



 2015-05-04 9:26 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett >:

>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On 4 May 2015 at 17:14, Bruce Kellett > wrote:

>>>
>>>
>>> The initial point that we were making was that copying at the quantum 
level
>>> of substitution is not possible, in principle. Accidental copies in 
another
>>> universe are not "deliberate but surreptitious" copies. They are 
irrelevant
>>> to the argument.
>>
>>
>> You implied that if you did not know about the copy because it was not
>> prepared deliberately that would make a difference, but I don't see
>> why it should.
>
>
> The point of Step 3, as I understand it, is that we know the set-up: we know that 
we are to be copied at the appropriate substitution level and duplicated -- at two 
different locations. Chance duplicates do not fit the criteria and are irrelevant to the 
comp hypothesis.



 It's a though experiment... so the duplicates do fit the criteria by definition.. 
you even gave it here "we are to be copied at the appropriate substitution level and 
duplicated"... step 0 again, is that it is possible... so, if you reject step 0, there 
is no point to use that as an argument against further steps... you already have 
rejected the premiss, so any deductive steps based on it have already been rejected by 
you as you reject step 0.

>>>
>>>
>>> Unknown (and unknowable) copies would not produce any first person indeterminancy.  
FPI requires that you know there is a duplicate that you could be.

>>
>>
>> Why?
>>
>
> Otherwise you are certain where you will end up.

If they are more than one continuation, weither you know it or not is 
irrelevant.



Then that's third person indeterminancy.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled

On 5 May 2015 at 11:01, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 5/4/2015 2:50 PM, LizR wrote:
>
>   On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, meekerdb  wrote:
>>
>>>  On 5/4/2015 12:31 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>
>>>  2015-05-04 9:26 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett :
>>>
 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

> On 4 May 2015 at 17:14, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>>
>> The initial point that we were making was that copying at the quantum
>> level
>> of substitution is not possible, in principle. Accidental copies in
>> another
>> universe are not "deliberate but surreptitious" copies. They are
>> irrelevant
>> to the argument.
>>
>
> You implied that if you did not know about the copy because it was not
> prepared deliberately that would make a difference, but I don't see
> why it should.
>

 The point of Step 3, as I understand it, is that we know the set-up: we
 know that we are to be copied at the appropriate substitution level and
 duplicated -- at two different locations. Chance duplicates do not fit the
 criteria and are irrelevant to the comp hypothesis.
>>>
>>>
>>>  It's a though experiment... so the duplicates do fit the criteria by
>>> definition.. you even gave it here "we are to be copied at the appropriate
>>> substitution level and duplicated"... step 0 again, is that it is
>>> possible... so, if you reject step 0, there is no point to use that as an
>>> argument against further steps... you already have rejected the premiss, so
>>> any deductive steps based on it have already been rejected by you as you
>>> reject step 0.
>>>
>>>
>>> Unknown (and unknowable) copies would not produce any first person
>>> indeterminancy.  FPI requires that you know there is a duplicate that you
>>> could be.
>>>
>>
>>  This implies that pre-Everett quantum experiments would have produced
> deterministic results, since no one would have realised they were being
> split.
>
> Or that there was randomness instead of FPI.
>

Obviously, but so what? You stated that "FPI requires that you know there
is a duplicate you could be" - see above. This implies that if the MWI is
correct, you have to know about it before its form of FPI operates.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled


LizR wrote:

On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, meekerdb This implies that pre-Everett quantum experiments would have produced 
deterministic results, since no one would have realised they were being 
split.


You overlook the very real possibility of ontological randomness.

Bruce

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: quadratic voting

On 5/4/2015 2:54 PM, LizR wrote:
On 5 May 2015 at 00:12, Telmo Menezes > wrote:

On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 1:03 PM, LizR mailto:lizj...@gmail.com>>
wrote:

Yes, very. I haven't read the paper yet but I hope when they say you
pay for
votes that isn't meaning a plutocracy, but from some share of equally
distributed "voting capital" or something similar? So people can spend
their
voting power on whatever they're concerned about?

The idea is very simple. You can buy x votes for (x * c)^2 dollars. In the
end, all
the money that was spent on buying votes is equally distributed by the
voters. So
the more the plutocracy spends its financial capital to influence policy,
the more
wealth equality you get. The author proposes a mathematical proof that such
a system
would stabilize on an equal distribution of political power.

Of course, there are many real world details that could make this idea fail
miserably, but it's fun to think about.

Yes, if it's real money being spent it's kind of similar to the current system, at least
in countries where unlimited pre-election spending is allowed. A lot of the time the
rich - who own the media and so on - buy the result they want, as per Mark Twain's comment.

Where does the money go once it's bought votes?

It's redistributed. So after the Koch brothers spend $889,000,000 in the next election to
cast 29,816 votes, each of the 129 million voters will get back $6.88 (plus the $1 they
put in plus a share of whatever other big spenders put in). Actually I think the Bros
will be better off buying attack ads with their billion.

Brent

Re: The dovetailer disassembled

On 5 May 2015 at 08:08, meekerdb  wrote:
> On 5/4/2015 11:24 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

>> Unknown (and unknowable) copies would not produce any first person
>> indeterminancy.  FPI requires that you know there is a duplicate that you
>> could be.
>
>
> Why?
>
>
> Otherwise you are certain where you will end up.

So an ignorant person going through these duplication experiments
would know where he would end up, but not someone who was aware of
what was going on?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled


On 5/4/2015 2:50 PM, LizR wrote:


On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

On 5/4/2015 12:31 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2015-05-04 9:26 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett :

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 4 May 2015 at 17:14, Bruce Kellett 
 wrote:


The initial point that we were making was that copying at 
the
quantum level
of substitution is not possible, in principle. Accidental 
copies in
another
universe are not "deliberate but surreptitious" copies. 
They are
irrelevant
to the argument.


You implied that if you did not know about the copy because it 
was not
prepared deliberately that would make a difference, but I don't 
see
why it should.


The point of Step 3, as I understand it, is that we know the 
set-up: we
know that we are to be copied at the appropriate substitution level 
and
duplicated -- at two different locations. Chance duplicates do not 
fit the
criteria and are irrelevant to the comp hypothesis.


It's a though experiment... so the duplicates do fit the criteria by
definition.. you even gave it here "we are to be copied at the 
appropriate
substitution level and duplicated"... step 0 again, is that it is 
possible...
so, if you reject step 0, there is no point to use that as an argument 
against
further steps... you already have rejected the premiss, so any 
deductive steps
based on it have already been rejected by you as you reject step 0.


Unknown (and unknowable) copies would not produce any first person
indeterminancy.  FPI requires that you know there is a duplicate that 
you could be.


This implies that pre-Everett quantum experiments would have produced deterministic 
results, since no one would have realised they were being split.


Or that there was randomness instead of FPI.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled

2015-05-04 Thread Russell Standish

On Mon, May 04, 2015 at 05:52:29PM -0400, John Clark wrote:
> On Sun, May 3, 2015  Russell Standish  wrote:
> 
> >UDA 1-7 shows that whatever made mathematics, it cannot be the
> > physical world.
> 
> 
> Given the magnitude of the blunder made in step 3 and the fact that it
> never even seems to have occurred to Bruno that in a "proof" that claims so
> say something about the nature of personal identity it might be a good idea
> to be very very careful about how personal pronouns are used I really don't
> care what steps 4-7 say.
> 

So you say. You haven't convinced me of the "error", however, nor anyone
else, it seems.

> 
> 
> > > One cannot simultaneously accept the MWI and physicalist supervenience
> > thesis you state above.
> >
> 
> Let me guess, you have found a truly marvelous proof of this but
> unfortunately the margin of your post is too small to contain it.
> 

It is described in much more detail in my eprint "MGA revisited". No
need to regurgitate it here.


-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled

2015-05-04 Thread Russell Standish

On Mon, May 04, 2015 at 09:11:27PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> I see that some people still believe that a movie of a computation
> is a computation. Hmm...
> 
> Bruno
> 

It's the replaying of the movie that is a computation. The movie
itself is just the program.

Anyway, this is just a side issue. What the MGA really involves around is
the intuition that a counterfactually incorrect program, ie one that
cannot respond to the environment in which it is embedded, cannot
instantiate a conscious moment.

Cheers
-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!

On 5/4/2015 11:32 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 04 May 2015, at 10:23, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Sun, May 3, 2015 at 10:08 PM, LizR mailto:lizj...@gmail.com>> wrote:

On 4 May 2015 at 06:45, Telmo Menezes mailto:te...@telmomenezes.com>> wrote:

Of course believing in the supernatural is absurd -- what does that
even mean?
If, for example, ghosts were real, then this would just mean that
current
scientific theories are incomplete or wrong.

That would just mean the terminology isn't very good. It would be more
accurate to
say you do (or don't) believe in ghosts.

That's a good point.
Of course the non-materialist deals with ontological problems. Do entities perceived
under the influence of psychoactive drugs exist in some sense?

At Iridia, there has been a talk and demo of Virtual Reality. I have been very often
disappointed, but this time I have been quite impressed. They have solved the main
problems, and the immersion feeling was quite realist, in all direction where you
looked, without any screen border, and perfect real time synchronization for any type of
the move of your head or eyes.

Does this involve wearing 3D display goggles such as Occulus Rift?

https://www.oculus.com/

My son has created a video game, "Homesick", of the exploration/puzzle genre, which will
be available for Occulus. I tried out their goggles and the experience is quite realistic
in terms of looking around. In a test at a video game exhibition many people trying them
could not bring themselves to step off a virtual cliff.

Brent

In one demo there was a creature, was it real? Those things are relatively real. Like in
personal nocturnal dream, or when reading a novel, and with comp, like with physicalism,
there is a physical reality, which is a priori different from a machine (as it is a sum
of the work of all machine) "acting" below our substitution level. In arithmetic, one
virtual reality is less virtual than all the others, as it has the "correct" comp
bottom. That define a notion of "physically real", and most entities perceived in
inebriated state are very often not physically real. But they might still be images of
important routine operating in the brain of a large class of possible subject, and be
entities living on alternate reality planes, but still there by Turing-Universal + FPI.

Virtual reality might help people for the thought experiences, and many (new)
things.

But in the long run, we have to be careful, as the poor might one day not afford
visiting a non virtual reality. If we don't think a bit, we might end up all in brains
in vats.

Bruno

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups

"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
email to
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything
List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything
List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled

On 5 May 2015 at 08:07, meekerdb  wrote:
> On 5/4/2015 11:21 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>> If you take the theory of consciousness that says it is just a stream of
>> experiences which are related by some internal similarities, then it's
>> impossible that you find yourself on some distant planet so long as there's
>> the much more similar experience of finding yourself where you were a moment
>> ago.  The FPI of Everett's relative state only arises where there are nearly
>> equal degrees of similarity.
>
>
> Consciousness survives change in environment without any problem; for
> example, if you are transported somewhere while asleep.
>
>
> What does that mean?  Memories survive...so are you identifying
> consciousness with memories?  They certainly contribute a lot to the
> similarities of successive experiences.  In the above example "you" is
> ambiguous.  In ordinary discourse it would refer to my body.  But on
> Everett's (and Bruno's theory) if the decision whether to transport my body
> were based on some quantum event, "I" would end up in two different places.

Suppose you were copied at home while asleep and the original
transported to a park, then copy and original both woke up. Would you
say that you should expect to find yourself waking up at home rather
than the park?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled

Le 5 mai 2015 00:08, "meekerdb"  a écrit :
>
> On 5/4/2015 11:24 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, meekerdb  wrote:
>>>
>>> On 5/4/2015 12:31 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



 2015-05-04 9:26 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett :
>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On 4 May 2015 at 17:14, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> The initial point that we were making was that copying at the
quantum level
>>> of substitution is not possible, in principle. Accidental copies in
another
>>> universe are not "deliberate but surreptitious" copies. They are
irrelevant
>>> to the argument.
>>
>>
>> You implied that if you did not know about the copy because it was
not
>> prepared deliberately that would make a difference, but I don't see
>> why it should.
>
>
> The point of Step 3, as I understand it, is that we know the set-up:
we know that we are to be copied at the appropriate substitution level and
duplicated -- at two different locations. Chance duplicates do not fit the
criteria and are irrelevant to the comp hypothesis.


 It's a though experiment... so the duplicates do fit the criteria by
definition.. you even gave it here "we are to be copied at the appropriate
substitution level and duplicated"... step 0 again, is that it is
possible... so, if you reject step 0, there is no point to use that as an
argument against further steps... you already have rejected the premiss, so
any deductive steps based on it have already been rejected by you as you
reject step 0.
>>>
>>>
>>> Unknown (and unknowable) copies would not produce any first person
indeterminancy.  FPI requires that you know there is a duplicate that you
could be.
>>
>>
>> Why?
>>
>
> Otherwise you are certain where you will end up.

If they are more than one continuation, weither you know it or not is
irrelevant.

Quentin
>
> Brent
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled


On 5/4/2015 11:24 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> 
wrote:


On 5/4/2015 12:31 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



2015-05-04 9:26 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett >:

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 4 May 2015 at 17:14, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


The initial point that we were making was that copying at the 
quantum level
of substitution is not possible, in principle. Accidental 
copies in another
universe are not "deliberate but surreptitious" copies. They 
are irrelevant
to the argument.


You implied that if you did not know about the copy because it was 
not
prepared deliberately that would make a difference, but I don't see
why it should.


The point of Step 3, as I understand it, is that we know the set-up: we 
know
that we are to be copied at the appropriate substitution level and 
duplicated
-- at two different locations. Chance duplicates do not fit the 
criteria and
are irrelevant to the comp hypothesis.


It's a though experiment... so the duplicates do fit the criteria by 
definition..
you even gave it here "we are to be copied at the appropriate substitution 
level
and duplicated"... step 0 again, is that it is possible... so, if you 
reject step
0, there is no point to use that as an argument against further steps... you
already have rejected the premiss, so any deductive steps based on it have 
already
been rejected by you as you reject step 0.


Unknown (and unknowable) copies would not produce any first person indeterminancy. 
FPI requires that you know there is a duplicate that you could be.



Why?



Otherwise you are certain where you will end up.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled


On 5/4/2015 11:21 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> 
wrote:


If you take the theory of consciousness that says it is just a stream of 
experiences
which are related by some internal similarities, then it's impossible that 
you find
yourself on some distant planet so long as there's the much more similar 
experience
of finding yourself where you were a moment ago. The FPI of Everett's 
relative state
only arises where there are nearly equal degrees of similarity.


Consciousness survives change in environment without any problem; for example, if you 
are transported somewhere while asleep.


What does that mean?  Memories survive...so are you identifying consciousness with 
memories?  They certainly contribute a lot to the similarities of successive experiences.  
In the above example "you" is ambiguous.  In ordinary discourse it would refer to my 
body.  But on Everett's (and Bruno's theory) if the decision whether to transport my body 
were based on some quantum event, "I" would end up in two different places.


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: quadratic voting

On 5 May 2015 at 00:12, Telmo Menezes  wrote:

> On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 1:03 PM, LizR  wrote:
>
>> Yes, very. I haven't read the paper yet but I hope when they say you pay
>> for votes that isn't meaning a plutocracy, but from some share of equally
>> distributed "voting capital" or something similar? So people can spend
>> their voting power on whatever they're concerned about?
>>
>
> The idea is very simple. You can buy x votes for (x * c)^2 dollars. In the
> end, all the money that was spent on buying votes is equally distributed by
> the voters. So the more the plutocracy spends its financial capital to
> influence policy, the more wealth equality you get. The author proposes a
> mathematical proof that such a system would stabilize on an equal
> distribution of political power.
>
> Of course, there are many real world details that could make this idea
> fail miserably, but it's fun to think about.
>
> Yes, if it's real money being spent it's kind of similar to the current
system, at least in countries where unlimited pre-election spending is
allowed. A lot of the time the rich - who own the media and so on - buy the
result they want, as per Mark Twain's comment.

Where does the money go once it's bought votes?

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled

On Sun, May 3, 2015  Russell Standish  wrote:

>UDA 1-7 shows that whatever made mathematics, it cannot be the
> physical world.

Given the magnitude of the blunder made in step 3 and the fact that it
never even seems to have occurred to Bruno that in a "proof" that claims so
say something about the nature of personal identity it might be a good idea
to be very very careful about how personal pronouns are used I really don't
care what steps 4-7 say.

> > One cannot simultaneously accept the MWI and physicalist supervenience
> thesis you state above.
>

Let me guess, you have found a truly marvelous proof of this but
unfortunately the margin of your post is too small to contain it.

  John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled

>
> On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>>  On 5/4/2015 12:31 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>> 2015-05-04 9:26 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett :
>>
>>> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>
 On 4 May 2015 at 17:14, Bruce Kellett 
 wrote:

>
> The initial point that we were making was that copying at the quantum
> level
> of substitution is not possible, in principle. Accidental copies in
> another
> universe are not "deliberate but surreptitious" copies. They are
> irrelevant
> to the argument.
>

 You implied that if you did not know about the copy because it was not
 prepared deliberately that would make a difference, but I don't see
 why it should.

>>>
>>> The point of Step 3, as I understand it, is that we know the set-up: we
>>> know that we are to be copied at the appropriate substitution level and
>>> duplicated -- at two different locations. Chance duplicates do not fit the
>>> criteria and are irrelevant to the comp hypothesis.
>>
>>
>>  It's a though experiment... so the duplicates do fit the criteria by
>> definition.. you even gave it here "we are to be copied at the appropriate
>> substitution level and duplicated"... step 0 again, is that it is
>> possible... so, if you reject step 0, there is no point to use that as an
>> argument against further steps... you already have rejected the premiss, so
>> any deductive steps based on it have already been rejected by you as you
>> reject step 0.
>>
>>
>> Unknown (and unknowable) copies would not produce any first person
>> indeterminancy.  FPI requires that you know there is a duplicate that you
>> could be.
>>
>
> This implies that pre-Everett quantum experiments would have produced
deterministic results, since no one would have realised they were being
split.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled

On 5 May 2015 at 06:21, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:

> On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>> If you take the theory of consciousness that says it is just a stream of
>> experiences which are related by some internal similarities, then it's
>> impossible that you find yourself on some distant planet so long as there's
>> the much more similar experience of finding yourself where you were a
>> moment ago.  The FPI of Everett's relative state only arises where there
>> are nearly equal degrees of similarity.
>>
>
> Consciousness survives change in environment without any problem; for
> example, if you are transported somewhere while asleep.
>

Indeed, life is full of surprises. We quite often don't have similar
experiences to the ones of a moment ago. (I believe this is even the
definition of how much information we're receiving from the environment.)

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!

On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, spudboy100 via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> Stathis, probably, Steinhart would agree with you regarding revision, for
> me, with the loss of contiguous identity, the succeeding person is merely a
> clone, as if you could magically clone a person in some of the fantasy
> films, or even like a clone generated by the Everett-De Witt-Wheeler
> interpretation of quantum mechanics. It's an copy, but a different person.
> Now, if either of these processes possessed psychological continuity of the
> individual, then initially at least, we'd have identical iterations of the
> same, identical, persons. But this is different than Revision (an earlier
> proposal).


My reading of "revision" from the extract is that you would be a copy with
improvements, so there would be psychological continuity.


> What seems to be a better, more satisfying theory, is Steinhart's
> Promotion Theory, which entails higher intelligences, especially God (The
> operating system and hypercomputer of this universe), performing moves, via
> pipelines, to a higher universe, in essence, Promotion of processes like
> us. Steinhart is sort of a polytheist, and see's God or God's evolving,
> Dawkin's - style from a very, very, simple universe. So the whole
> personality-memory, gets promoted to a different universe. At that point
> the person is in an improved circumstance, and then because of new
> experiences, begins to diverge from his or her, old self. We do this now.
> it's called life.
>
> Back to identity, Steinhart also includes Uploading and Teleportation as
> different means to the same destination to VR environments. Steinhart,
> calls VR environments, terrariums. And, the Engineers can move, either
> through Promotion, Uploading, or Teleportation to multiple environments,
> with multiple copies of You to each new space. So Stathis 1, goes to Middle
> Earth, 2 goes to Star Trekville, 3 goes to The New Republic, 4, goes to the
> Age of the Greek Gods, 5, etc... This, collection of You's that diverge to
> each environment, Steinhart calls a Span.
>
> What's the solution to so many versions of us?? Eventually, it could be
> resolved by Tipler's Omega Point (an idea) in the far, far, future. Copies
> exist via MWI, so why not a few million more added to the pot? Steinhart
> definitely, *does not endorse this fix*, but I am tweaking his work to
> suit myself and emotions.
>




-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled

On 5 May 2015 at 06:09, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> OK. I guess you mean only that it means there is no true randomness
> playing a role in a physical law.
>
> Yes, that is exactly what I was trying to say. I see my original was
embarrassingly badly phrased...

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The Prestige (Spoiler Alert) and First Person Indeterminacy

On Mon, May 4, 2015  Jason Resch  wrote:

> Yes to what? It wasn't a yes or no question.
>

Given the way the personal pronoun was used I think it was a yes or no
question.

John K Clark




>
> Jason
>
> On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 11:49 AM, John Clark  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 10:48 AM, Jason Resch 
>> wrote:
>>
>> > John Clark, you have often praised the movie "The Prestige" on this
>>> list.  I am curious to know, how did you interpret the line:
>>>
>>> "Would I be the man in the box or the prestige?"
>>>
>>
>> I would answer "yes".
>>
>>   John K Clark
>>
>>  --
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>>
>
>  --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: quadratic voting


On 5/4/2015 5:12 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:



On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 1:03 PM, LizR mailto:lizj...@gmail.com>> wrote:

Yes, very. I haven't read the paper yet but I hope when they say you pay 
for votes
that isn't meaning a plutocracy, but from some share of equally distributed 
"voting
capital" or something similar? So people can spend their voting power on 
whatever
they're concerned about?


The idea is very simple. You can buy x votes for (x * c)^2 dollars. In the end, all the 
money that was spent on buying votes is equally distributed by the voters. So the more 
the plutocracy spends its financial capital to influence policy, the more wealth 
equality you get. The author proposes a mathematical proof that such a system would 
stabilize on an equal distribution of political power.


Of course, there are many real world details that could make this idea fail 
miserably,


Like voting a subsidy for your industry.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: God

On Mon, May 4, 2015 Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> It does follow if what you said was true, if "the physical hardware
>> makes possible to incarnate or implement universal numbers relatively to
>> us".
>
>
> > It still does not follow.  We can have both
> 1) "the physical universe makes possible to incarnate or implement
> universal numbers relatively to us".
>

So the physical universe can make possible something that would be
impossible with just mathematical reality

> 2) the mathematical reality is responsible for the existence of the
> physical universe.
>

Even if that is true, and we don't know that it is, it's irrelevant; quarks
are responsible for DNA's existence but quarks can not pass hereditary
information to the next generation, DNA can.

>> Since nobody knows all of physics you can't know if mathematics can
>> describe everything in physics or not, I suspect that it can but I don't
>> know that for a fact.
>
>
> > But we are working in the computationalist frame. If there was something
> in the physical reality which is such that my experience of it is not
> Turing emulable, nor FPI recoverable, then computationalism would be false.
> Not all experience would be Turing emulable.
>

Yes, that's why I said I suspected mathematics can describe everything in
physics, but I have no proof of that. I believe that computationalism is
true but I have no proof and as a logician you should know that it's a good
idea to remember that what one believes and what is true is not necessarily
the same thing.

>>> A universal Turing machine cannot distinguish locally a physical
>>> reality from an arithmetical reality.
>>
>>
>>  >> Actually it can, if a Turing machine finds that it can't do anything,
>> absolutely nothing at all then it knows it is not made of matter.
>
>
>  > the expression "a Turing machine finds that it can't do anything at
> all" is self-contradictory.

I tend to agree, therefore we must conclude that a Turing machine that is
not made of matter and that does not follow the laws of physics is
self-contradictory.

> > Here you assume a primitive physical universe
>

I'm not assuming anything I'm playing devil's advocate. For every argument
you have that mathematics is the more primitive I can provide a argument of
at least equal strength that physics fills role not mathematics although
neither of us has a proof.

> > and a magical role in matter for its magical role in consciousness.
>

I was talking about the fact that as far as we know you need a computer
constructed out of matter that obeys the laws of physics to make a
computation; I didn't say anything about consciousness, or magic.

>> Explain to me exactly how to separate truth from falsehood, or how to do
>> anything at all, in a non effective (non-mechanical ) way.
>
>
> > I have given the most famous example more than one. For example by
> showing that IF Church's thesis is true, it is a matter of just one
> (double) diagonalization to show that the code of total functions is non
> algorithmically distributed in the phi_i.
>

How is diagonalization non-mechanical? And "to show" something in logic or
mathematics means to provide an algorithm to produce a result. How is a
algorithm non-mechanical?

> The method is described in two words: excluded middle.

How can anything exclude anything if neither matter nor energy nor any of
the laws of physics are involved? And don't tell me you thought about it in
your head because the neurons in your brain are made of matter and they
obey the laws of physics just like everything else.

> >> Church's thesis is about what is and is not computable, but nothing is
>> computable if you don't have a computer and nobody has ever seen a computer
>> that didn't use matter.
>
>

> Read Turing, Church, etc. Or any textbook in computability. You will find
> many example of universal computer which not does not use matter,
>

No you will not! In those textbooks you will find examples of ink printed
on paper that computes absolutely positively NOTHING.

> > some argue that physical computer does not exist,
>

And some argue that they are Napoleon, I hope the attendants make sure that
neither get access to sharp objects.

> > that physical computer are approximation of the one existing in
> arithmetic.
>

Maybe. Or maybe the computer existing in arithmetic is just an
approximation of the physical computer; after all the physical computer has
a size and a mass and a color and many other attributes besides the ones
enumerated by Turing.

> > I think you confuse unsolvability and decidability.
>

In one case you can not solve a problem and in the other case you pick
something for a reason or for no reason at all.

> so saying that a truth is well defined is not the same as saying that we
> can prove it.
>

That is what I said in my previous post, except that it's not just us that
doesn't know, perhaps nothing knows.

> if you agree that 2+2=4 is true independently of you and me, then
>

It may be independent

Re: quadratic voting

>
>
>  Interesting idea:
>> http://ericposner.com/quadratic-voting/
>>
>
> I see it's claimed to be "more efficient" and I can certainly see that. It
> will allow the Koch brothers to directly buy the laws they want without
> having to buy Congressmen.
>

That is better, no? It means that their money is directly distributed
amongst the voters instead of staying within the plutocracy. In the next
round, the other voters will have more voting power and the Koch brothers
less. The quadratic function leads to a situation where, if the Koch
brothers wish to make an autocratic decision, they give all their power for
the people to use in the next round.


>
> The statement,"Majority rule based on one-person-one-vote notoriously
> results in tyranny of the majority–a large number of people who care only a
> little about an outcome prevail over a minority that cares passionately,
> resulting in a reduction of aggregate welfare." is ridiculous.  How is it
> tyranny of the majority that women are allowed abortions inspite of a
> passionate minority that doesn't want them to?  Having passionate
> minorities decide public policy sounds like a definition of Hell to me.
>

I agree that the statement makes a weak case. I think it is mixing two
things and not arguing for any of them properly:

1) That an uninformed majority can prevent the adoption of better policies
for the whole, because it overpowers a minority of experts (a common claim
of environmentalists, for example)

2) That the majority can use its power to interfere on private sphere of
members of minorities (example: outlawing sexual relationships between
people of the same gender)

Telmo.


>
> Brent
>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!

Stathis, probably, Steinhart would agree with you regarding revision, for me, 
with the loss of contiguous identity, the succeeding person is merely a clone, 
as if you could magically clone a person in some of the fantasy films, or even 
like a clone generated by the Everett-De Witt-Wheeler interpretation of quantum 
mechanics. It's an copy, but a different person. Now, if either of these 
processes possessed psychological continuity of the individual, then initially 
at least, we'd have identical iterations of the same, identical, persons. But 
this is different than Revision (an earlier proposal). 

What seems to be a better, more satisfying theory, is Steinhart's Promotion 
Theory, which entails higher intelligences, especially God (The operating 
system and hypercomputer of this universe), performing moves, via pipelines, to 
a higher universe, in essence, Promotion of processes like us. Steinhart is 
sort of a polytheist, and see's God or God's evolving, Dawkin's - style from a 
very, very, simple universe. So the whole personality-memory, gets promoted to 
a different universe. At that point the person is in an improved circumstance, 
and then because of new experiences, begins to diverge from his or her, old 
self. We do this now. it's called life. 

Back to identity, Steinhart also includes Uploading and Teleportation as 
different means to the same destination to VR environments. Steinhart, calls VR 
environments, terrariums. And, the Engineers can move, either through 
Promotion, Uploading, or Teleportation to multiple environments, with multiple 
copies of You to each new space. So Stathis 1, goes to Middle Earth, 2 goes to 
Star Trekville, 3 goes to The New Republic, 4, goes to the Age of the Greek 
Gods, 5, etc... This, collection of You's that diverge to each environment, 
Steinhart calls a Span. 

What's the solution to so many versions of us?? Eventually, it could be 
resolved by Tipler's Omega Point (an idea) in the far, far, future. Copies 
exist via MWI, so why not a few million more added to the pot? Steinhart 
definitely, does not endorse this fix, but I am tweaking his work to suit 
myself and emotions. 

 

 

 

-Original Message-
From: Stathis Papaioannou 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Mon, May 4, 2015 2:15 pm
Subject: Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!


 
 
On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, spudboy100 via Everything List < 
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: 
 
  Totally agree, Telmo, regarding communication. On the Bostrom concept of Sims 
and, by extension, our reality being a sim, I like the concept, but in a way, 
it seems too simple, Rather than life being an illusion, let us conceive that 
its the result of a great program running and producing us as a result. 
Moreover, our program can be either revised, copied, or both, etc. This is one 
reason professor, Eric Steinhart's work seems compelling to me. The following 
summary is available from his book, Your Digital Afterlives, but here is a 
taste, from Steinhart's website-
 
 
 http://ericsteinhart.com/FLESH/flesh-chabs.html
 
 The best of these theories is Promotion, but Steinhart views his own idea as 
flawed, because he wants it to be progressive rather then regressive. I don't 
see the logical regression he seemed concerned about, He did come up with 
Revision theory, as workable, however, these are merely, better-off clones of 
ourselves, and miss the continuity, that infers identity. Promotion is better, 
because it does exactly this, via pipelines, processes, data transfers, as well 
as uploading and teleportation. This is one reason I want to see if Ben Goetzel 
has an afterlife-resurrection theory, because they both appeared to have come 
to the same conclusions, independently,  on several other concepts. 
 
 Steinhart, like Goetzel, is a computationalist (digitalist) - (5 minute video)
 
 https://youtube.com/devicesupport
 
 Please let me know if you uncover anything concerning Ben Goetzel's views. 
Thanks.
   
   
 
 
  
 
 
"Revision" in this schema is copying with improvements. Provided that the 
changes don't remove big chunks of your memory and personality, why should that 
affect continuity? 
 
 
--  
Stathis Papaioannou 
  
 --  
 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group. 
 To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
email to  everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. 
 To post to this group, send email to  everything-list@googlegroups.com. 
 Visit this group at  http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. 
 For more options, visit  https://groups.google.com/d/optout. 
 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit th

Re: The Prestige (Spoiler Alert) and First Person Indeterminacy

2015-05-04 Thread Jason Resch

Yes to what? It wasn't a yes or no question.

Jason

On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 11:49 AM, John Clark  wrote:

>
>
> On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 10:48 AM, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> > John Clark, you have often praised the movie "The Prestige" on this
>> list.  I am curious to know, how did you interpret the line:
>>
>> "Would I be the man in the box or the prestige?"
>>
>
> I would answer "yes".
>
>   John K Clark
>
>  --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled



On 04 May 2015, at 07:57, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 4 May 2015 at 14:38, LizR  wrote:
Yes. I've mentioned occasionally that if the substitution level is  
quantum,
then no-cloning may be a problem, at least in principle. The usual  
answer is
that the subst level is WAY above quantum - that our experiences  
and hence
the famous "observer moments" aren't anywhere near to the Planck  
time or

length.

If the substitution level is quantum then no-cloning may be a problem
in practice, but not in principle.


??
The no-cloning theorem would rule out quantum level substitution *in  
principle* as far as I can tell.


A classical computer can emulate a quantum computer, even if possibly  
with a necessary slow down. So the UD, even if written in LISP, and  
executed by a LISP interpreter, itself computed by some extendible  
boolean graph, will execute all quantum computation, and if that is  
relevant, let it be.


So the no quantum cloning does not prevent the UD to "prepare" your  
relative quantum state, and this infinitely often. The invariance of  
the 1P for delays makes the "run time" of the UD irrelevant, as time  
is an internal parameter or an indexical gauge.


The quantum machine might be the "physical winner", but that can only  
be judged from comp, when we assume comp. That is the point of the  
reasoning.


I have to go. Might comment or not on the long conversation.

I see that some people still believe that a movie of a computation is  
a computation. Hmm...


Bruno






Bruce

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!



On 04 May 2015, at 10:23, Telmo Menezes wrote:




On Sun, May 3, 2015 at 10:08 PM, LizR  wrote:
On 4 May 2015 at 06:45, Telmo Menezes  wrote:

Of course believing in the supernatural is absurd -- what does that  
even mean? If, for example, ghosts were real, then this would just  
mean that current scientific theories are incomplete or wrong.


That would just mean the terminology isn't very good. It would be  
more accurate to say you do (or don't) believe in ghosts.


That's a good point.
Of course the non-materialist deals with ontological problems. Do  
entities perceived under the influence of psychoactive drugs exist  
in some sense?



At Iridia, there has been a talk and demo of Virtual Reality. I have  
been very often disappointed, but this time I have been quite  
impressed. They have solved the main problems, and the immersion  
feeling was quite realist, in all direction where you looked, without  
any screen border, and perfect real time synchronization for any type  
of the move of your head or eyes. In one demo there was a creature,  
was it real? Those things are relatively real. Like in personal  
nocturnal dream, or when reading a novel, and with comp, like with  
physicalism, there is a physical reality, which is a priori different  
from a machine (as it is a sum of the work of all machine) "acting"  
below our substitution level. In arithmetic, one virtual reality is  
less virtual than all the others, as it has the "correct" comp bottom.  
That define a notion of "physically real", and most entities perceived  
in inebriated state are very often not physically real. But they might  
still be images of important routine operating in the brain of a large  
class of possible subject, and be entities living on alternate reality  
planes, but still there by Turing-Universal + FPI.


Virtual reality might help people for the thought experiences, and  
many (new) things.


But in the long run, we have to be careful, as the poor might one day  
not afford visiting a non virtual reality. If we don't think a bit, we  
might end up all in brains in vats.


Bruno






--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled

On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 5/4/2015 12:31 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
> 2015-05-04 9:26 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett  >:
>
>> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>> On 4 May 2015 at 17:14, Bruce Kellett >> > wrote:
>>>

 The initial point that we were making was that copying at the quantum
 level
 of substitution is not possible, in principle. Accidental copies in
 another
 universe are not "deliberate but surreptitious" copies. They are
 irrelevant
 to the argument.

>>>
>>> You implied that if you did not know about the copy because it was not
>>> prepared deliberately that would make a difference, but I don't see
>>> why it should.
>>>
>>
>> The point of Step 3, as I understand it, is that we know the set-up: we
>> know that we are to be copied at the appropriate substitution level and
>> duplicated -- at two different locations. Chance duplicates do not fit the
>> criteria and are irrelevant to the comp hypothesis.
>
>
>  It's a though experiment... so the duplicates do fit the criteria by
> definition.. you even gave it here "we are to be copied at the appropriate
> substitution level and duplicated"... step 0 again, is that it is
> possible... so, if you reject step 0, there is no point to use that as an
> argument against further steps... you already have rejected the premiss, so
> any deductive steps based on it have already been rejected by you as you
> reject step 0.
>
>
> Unknown (and unknowable) copies would not produce any first person
> indeterminancy.  FPI requires that you know there is a duplicate that you
> could be.
>

Why?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled

On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, meekerdb  wrote:

If you take the theory of consciousness that says it is just a stream of
> experiences which are related by some internal similarities, then it's
> impossible that you find yourself on some distant planet so long as there's
> the much more similar experience of finding yourself where you were a
> moment ago.  The FPI of Everett's relative state only arises where there
> are nearly equal degrees of similarity.
>

Consciousness survives change in environment without any problem; for
example, if you are transported somewhere while asleep.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!



On 04 May 2015, at 15:08, Telmo Menezes wrote:




On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 1:08 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List > wrote:
I sure did, Telmo. Scroll to the bottom and you shall view my last,  
number 26th, the last one.


Ah there you are! And you are not the only one from this list  
commenting there, it's a small world.


My bet on computational after-lives is that we are in one already  
(an infinity of times), but this is completely transparent to us.


This kind of thing is interesting to me. I tend toward the  
materialist stuff since it seems to have potential. The mentalist  
stuff seems unreliable because people who have NDE's or trances have  
not come back with information.


I would say that the important distinction is between communicable  
and non-communicable stuff. Science is about communicable stuff, but  
there is personal value in exploring the internal world -- although  
it won't get you a nobel prize or even any sort of recognition.


This is because there is no Nobel Prize in Mathematics (not mentioning  
Theology).


But you can have the Nobel prize of literature, and some text does  
indeed quasi-succeed, perhaps, in communication a bit of the  
uncommunicable. Then you can communicate a part conditionally, like if  
I am consistent then I can't justify that I am consistent, and the  
inetnsional variants.


Bruno







-Original Message-
From: Telmo Menezes 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Mon, May 4, 2015 4:19 am
Subject: Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!



On Sun, May 3, 2015 at 9:19 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List > wrote:

Hi Telmo,

I have tried the Other Side stuff for a bit, and found it wanting.

Not so surprising... The topic is a string attractor for quacks, for  
sure.


Steinhart, said he had some experiences but decided they were not  
that significant to himself. He is more buzzed, he said, but the  
beauty of mathematics, emotionally. Here is a crowd funded 3D  
augmented reality game, due out next year, called Night Terrors, so  
much for the paranormal, yes? We maybe, could, have the paranormal  
adventure any time we choose.


http://www.ign.com/articles/2015/05/01/survival-horror-augmented-reality-game-night-terrors-maps-your-house

Wow, this is a brilliant/terrifying idea!



I cross-posted a message to Ben Goetzel on his "Multiverse" website,  
as well as on Guilio Prisco's Turing-Church website sight concerning  
Goetzel's non-response, to my question to him, about afterlife  
ideas, if any?  He seemed to touch on this in a recent article, as  
well as his 2006, The Hidden Pattern, which I had downloaded, a  
couple of months ago. Any data or opinion on Goetzel's view on all  
this?


Have you seen this?
http://multiverseaccordingtoben.blogspot.de/2015/03/paranormal-phenomena-nonlocal-mind-and.html

Telmo.


Mitch


-Original Message-
From: Telmo Menezes 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Sun, May 3, 2015 2:45 pm
Subject: Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!

Hi spudboy,

I follow Ben Goetzel and have some of the books he recommends on the  
topic on my to-read list.


I remain agnostic on this stuff, and just try to consider the  
simplest explanation, even if it's boring. In the case of this  
story, this sounds a lot like the event was staged by some nice  
person who cares about the bride. This doesn't mean that is the  
correct explanation, of course.


What I am more curious about are replicable laboratory experiments.  
Some people, like Goetzel, are claiming that results with  
statistical significance are known. Maybe this is a nice opportunity  
for amateur science, because dealing with this topics would still  
career suicide for many people -- even if to find negative results.


Of course believing in the supernatural is absurd -- what does that  
even mean? If, for example, ghosts were real, then this would just  
mean that current scientific theories are incomplete or wrong.


Cheers,
Telmo.

On Sun, May 3, 2015 at 6:09 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List > wrote:
If you know of Ben Goetzel, and Damien Broderick, as well as Eric  
Steinhart, they have claimed Psi experiences, or spiritual  
experiences, but are split on the true significance? At the end of  
the day, it either works for us, or it doesn't.




-Original Message-
From: LizR < lizj...@gmail.com>
To: everything-list < everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Sun, May 3, 2015 7:03 am
Subject: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!

Michael Shermer is the publisher of "Skeptic" magazine, which I used  
to subscribe to - but I could only take so many debunkings, lectures  
on science, and so on, and eventually I cancelled the sub,  
reasonably well convinced that I had by now obtained all the  
wherewithal I was ever going to need to give 123 reasons to explain  
any apparently supernatural event...


http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/anomalous-events-that-can-shake-one-s-skepticism-to-the-core/

It's also

Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!

On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, spudboy100 via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> Totally agree, Telmo, regarding communication. On the Bostrom concept of
> Sims and, by extension, our reality being a sim, I like the concept, but in
> a way, it seems too simple, Rather than life being an illusion, let us
> conceive that its the result of a great program running and producing us as
> a result. Moreover, our program can be either revised, copied, or both,
> etc. This is one reason professor, Eric Steinhart's work seems compelling
> to me. The following summary is available from his book, Your Digital
> Afterlives, but here is a taste, from Steinhart's website-
>
>  http://ericsteinhart.com/FLESH/flesh-chabs.html
>
> The best of these theories is Promotion, but Steinhart views his own idea
> as flawed, because he wants it to be progressive rather then regressive. I
> don't see the logical regression he seemed concerned about, He did come up
> with Revision theory, as workable, however, these are merely, *better-off
> clones* of ourselves, and miss the continuity, that infers identity.
> Promotion is better, because it does exactly this, via pipelines,
> processes, data transfers, as well as uploading and teleportation. This is
> one reason I want to see if Ben Goetzel has an afterlife-resurrection
> theory, because they both appeared to have come to the same conclusions,
> independently,  on several other concepts.
>
> Steinhart, like Goetzel, is a computationalist (digitalist) - (5 minute
> video)
>
> https://youtube.com/devicesupport
> 
>
> Please let me know if you uncover anything concerning Ben Goetzel's views.
> Thanks.
>

"Revision" in this schema is copying with improvements. Provided that the
changes don't remove big chunks of your memory and personality, why should
that affect continuity?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled



On 04 May 2015, at 04:08, LizR wrote:


On 4 May 2015 at 09:41, Dennis Ochei  wrote:
Err "God created the natural numbers" is a rather meaningless  
proposition in my mind. What does that even mean? God just decided  
that there were such things as numbers? The existence of numbers  
depends on the whim of God?


I think Bruno was (mis) quoting Kroenecker ("God created the  
integers, all else is the work of man").


Yes. A volontary misquoting, which simplifies the theory :)


I don't think either of them means literally that God sat down and  
decide to invent numbers, just that these types of numbers and their  
properties exist irrespective of whether there is anyone to know  
about them (e.g. maths would still have worked during the big bang).


Yes.


This would give numbers a form of existence logically prior to  
matter etc,


Indeed, if only because if you ask a physicist what is matter, at some  
point it points on theories unifying the predictions on measurable  
numbers, and those theories *assume* the arithmetical laws. Some  
string theorists where relieved to know that "zeta(-1)= "1+2+3+4+..."  
= -1/12" is a theorem of PA.




hence they are using "God" is roughly in the same sort of sense as  
"God doesn't play dice" meaning "I don't believe the laws of physics  
are ultimately random".


OK. I guess you mean only that it means there is no true randomness  
playing a role in a physical law. I mean that if some law involve  
randomness, that does not imply that the laws of physics are  
ultimately random. God plays dice does not imply that God does not  
play chess sometimes. (Not that I think that God plays dice, of  
course, although I could argue that he does that, also, when  
contemplating the distribution of primes, or of the intensional number  
(the programs). There are many sort of randomness in arithmetic.


Bruno






--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: quadratic voting


On 5/4/2015 1:50 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

Interesting idea:
http://ericposner.com/quadratic-voting/


I see it's claimed to be "more efficient" and I can certainly see that. It will allow the 
Koch brothers to directly buy the laws they want without having to buy Congressmen.


The statement,"Majority rule based on one-person-one-vote notoriously results in tyranny 
of the majority–a large number of people who care only a little about an outcome prevail 
over a minority that cares passionately, resulting in a reduction of aggregate welfare." 
is ridiculous.  How is it tyranny of the majority that women are allowed abortions inspite 
of a passionate minority that doesn't want them to?  Having passionate minorities decide 
public policy sounds like a definition of Hell to me.


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled



On 03 May 2015, at 23:41, Dennis Ochei wrote:

Err "God created the natural numbers" is a rather meaningless  
proposition in my mind. What does that even mean? God just decided  
that there were such things as numbers? The existence of numbers  
depends on the whim of God?


It was a parody of a "famous" statement made by Kronecker: "God  
created the integers, all the rest are human inventions".
You can interpret it by "we have no clues at all where the natural  
numbers comes from, but we can explain all the math using only them".


Kronecker said it in the context of his conflict with Cantor, which  
assumed actual infinite sets, real numbers, and more, and which  
shocked the more constructivist, proto-intuitionist Kronecker.


With computationalism, I like to parody that senetence and repalce  
human by number, which explains shortly the TOE-character of arithmetic.







I can imagine someone inventing unary, or a system based on powers  
of 10, or a positional number system, or the atrocity that is the  
roman numeral system. But inventing numbers themselves? Did he  
create zero and the successor operation and call it a day? (In the  
beginning God said, "Zero, One, Two, yada yada yada, I'm going back  
to sleep") Does zero even have to be created? It seems like zero was  
around long before God was.


I can agree. It is not so obvious. Before Gödel, some people thought  
that elementary arithmetic was a consequence of logic. Russell &  
Whitehead still believed this in their Principia Mathematica. But they  
were shown to be wrong on this, and that signed the failure of  
Logicism in the foundation of math and philosophy.


Today, we know that we cannot represent and prove elementary  
propositions of arithmetic with logic alone, and we need to assume  
some axioms to be able to talk about them, or to assume another Turing- 
complete system of axioms.


Of course number are not physical notion, they are atemporal. It makes  
not much sense to say that 0 existed before the dinosaur, or before  
God made the universe, except by saying that the formula Ex(x=0) is  
true independently of you, me, the universe, God, etc.


With comp, the notion of arithmetical truth, which is highly not  
mechanical, plays the role of God (in the sense of Plato, Plotinus),  
and you can understand the poetry of "God created the numbers, all the  
rest is in the numbers dream" by "we start from the (sigma_1)  
arithmetical truth, and derive everything from that.






I think God creating the numbers is an order of magnitude more  
incomprensible than God creating the physical world.


Taken literally, I think that both are incomprehensible. God create  
the integers is only a way to say that we don't know how they came,  
nor what they are. But we can agree on some axioms and derive things  
on them from there.
More recently Stephen Hawking edited a book with the title "God  
created the integers". (It is a rather nice collection of excellent  
papers by Archimedes, Euclid, Diophantus up to Turing and Gödel).


What is nice is that with comp, we can explain why the numbers (or  
Turing equivalent) are necessarily mysterious. No machine at all can  
ever understand where they come from. But, by assuming comp, we can  
explain all the rest without adding further assumption in the ontology  
(but we have still to interview numbers having stronger beliefs).


So arithmetic is an excellent place to start. It is not the only one:  
combinators are very cute, and more simple (somehow), and of course,  
provide many nice realizations of number and arithmetical relations.  
It is just that all universal numbers reflect all the other, and the  
arithmetical reality is faithfully realized in the combinators  
reality, and vice versa.


The real question is who is the "physical winner", or which better  
collection of them, and what is its (their) relation(s) with the  
"theological winner". An answer to that question provides a tools for  
the study of the first person experience of relative death.


Only bad faiths fear reason,
Only bad reasons fear faith.

My faith is that 0 is different of all successor s(x), or that the  
kestrel bird K is the projection on first coordinate Kxy = x. It is  
the CAR of LISP.

The arithmetical reality kicks transfinitely back.
I can understand people find the subject frightening, but this fear  
makes theology still at the level of the three years old, with fairy  
tales.


Of course we have only fairy tales. The question is to find the one  
which explains the most with the simplest idea, and which gives the  
less incorrect expectations in the bigger set of situations.

Without eliminating consciousness.

3p machines can *know* that their 1p is not a machine, from her  
correct 1p view. God (G*) knows that the machine is ... correct. There  
is no paradox, it is enough to distinguish []p and []p & p, and taking  
into account incompleteness.


You must study Boolos 79, and Gödel 1931. Smu

Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!


On 5/4/2015 1:23 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:



On Sun, May 3, 2015 at 10:08 PM, LizR mailto:lizj...@gmail.com>> wrote:

On 4 May 2015 at 06:45, Telmo Menezes mailto:te...@telmomenezes.com>> wrote:


Of course believing in the supernatural is absurd -- what does that 
even mean?
If, for example, ghosts were real, then this would just mean that 
current
scientific theories are incomplete or wrong.

That would just mean the terminology isn't very good. It would be more 
accurate to
say you do (or don't) believe in ghosts.


That's a good point.
Of course the non-materialist deals with ontological problems. Do entities perceived 
under the influence of psychoactive drugs exist in some sense?


In the same sense as mathematics.  :-)

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled

2015-05-04 19:12 GMT+02:00 meekerdb :

>  On 5/4/2015 12:31 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
> 2015-05-04 9:26 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett :
>
>> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>> On 4 May 2015 at 17:14, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>>>

 The initial point that we were making was that copying at the quantum
 level
 of substitution is not possible, in principle. Accidental copies in
 another
 universe are not "deliberate but surreptitious" copies. They are
 irrelevant
 to the argument.

>>>
>>> You implied that if you did not know about the copy because it was not
>>> prepared deliberately that would make a difference, but I don't see
>>> why it should.
>>>
>>
>> The point of Step 3, as I understand it, is that we know the set-up: we
>> know that we are to be copied at the appropriate substitution level and
>> duplicated -- at two different locations. Chance duplicates do not fit the
>> criteria and are irrelevant to the comp hypothesis.
>
>
>  It's a though experiment... so the duplicates do fit the criteria by
> definition.. you even gave it here "we are to be copied at the appropriate
> substitution level and duplicated"... step 0 again, is that it is
> possible... so, if you reject step 0, there is no point to use that as an
> argument against further steps... you already have rejected the premiss, so
> any deductive steps based on it have already been rejected by you as you
> reject step 0.
>
>
> Unknown (and unknowable) copies would not produce any first person
> indeterminancy.  FPI requires that you know there is a duplicate that you
> could be.
>

?

That makes no sense... FPI requires that there is more than one
continuation of your current moment, that you know it or not doesn't change
anything.

Quentin

>
> Brent
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>



-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
Batty/Rutger Hauer)

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled


On 5/4/2015 12:48 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

Quentin Anciaux wrote:



2015-05-04 9:26 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett >:


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 4 May 2015 at 17:14, Bruce Kellett mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:


The initial point that we were making was that copying at
the quantum level
of substitution is not possible, in principle. Accidental
copies in another
universe are not "deliberate but surreptitious" copies. They
are irrelevant
to the argument.


You implied that if you did not know about the copy because it
was not
prepared deliberately that would make a difference, but I don't see
why it should.


The point of Step 3, as I understand it, is that we know the set-up:
we know that we are to be copied at the appropriate substitution
level and duplicated -- at two different locations. Chance
duplicates do not fit the criteria and are irrelevant to the comp
hypothesis.


It's a though experiment... so the duplicates do fit the criteria by definition.. you 
even gave it here "we are to be copied at the appropriate substitution level and 
duplicated"... step 0 again, is that it is possible... so, if you reject step 0, there 
is no point to use that as an argument against further steps... you already have 
rejected the premiss, so any deductive steps based on it have already been rejected by 
you as you reject step 0.


The point being made is that deliberate copying at the quantum level is impossible in 
principle. That is what is required for "yes doctor" at step 0, so the whole argument 
collapses if the substitution level has to be that low. The argument only has a chance 
of going through is that if the appropriate substitution level is classical, and capable 
of accurate digital simulation. Anything else and comp fails to get off the ground.


Now I am not saying that quantum level substitution is necessary, just that *if it is', 
the argument fails.


You might still say yes to the doctor.  The inability to copy a quantum state would just 
mean that there would be a gap or discontinuity in your consciousness.  I'm not sure how 
that impacts the argument.  It might affect its analogy to Everett's relative state FPI, 
since in that case it is assumed there is continuity of consciousness.  But even there 
does "continuity of consciousness" really mean something like mathematical continuity or 
does it just mean a gap you don't notice?


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled

On 5/4/2015 12:46 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 4 May 2015 at 17:19, Bruce Kellett wrote:

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 4 May 2015 at 17:07, Bruce Kellett wrote:

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 4 May 2015 at 17:01, Bruce Kellett wrote:

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 4 May 2015 at 16:45, LizR wrote:

On 4 May 2015 at 17:40, Stathis Papaioannou
wrote:

On 4 May 2015 at 14:38, LizR wrote:

Yes. I've mentioned occasionally that if the substitution level is
quantum,
then no-cloning may be a problem, at least in principle. The usual
answer is
that the subst level is WAY above quantum - that our experiences
and
hence
the famous "observer moments" aren't anywhere near to the Planck
time
or
length.

If the substitution level is quantum then no-cloning may be a
problem
in practice, but not in principle.

It could be a problem in principle - in the sense that it's logically
impossible for some reason. Without a TOE we can't say, surely?

But the no-clone theorem does not say that it is impossible to make a
copy, just that it is impossible to make one at will.

making a copy implies making one at will. Otherwise it is just chance
and
you do not know you have a copy.

But the copy knows!

What does the copy know?

A moment ago I was sitting on the no. 3 tram to East Malvern, now I'm
crawling out of a swamp on a planet in the Andromeda galaxy.

Do you assume that you are a chance copy, complete with all memories, or do
you assume that you are hallucinating?

I am not sure I am not hallucinating now, though I assume I am not.

There is still you sitting on the No. 3 tram, after all. Why go to
Andromeda? Why not just consider the very remote chance that all the atoms
in your body suddenly moved to the left a couple of metres, and you are in
the middle of the road, not on the tram? The chances of this are much higher
than that of a chance copy on a hostile planet in Andromeda.

Sure, it's possible that the atoms all move, probably more likely than
my Andromeda example, but less likely than that I be created in a
galaxy far, far beyond Andromeda. In any case, if I am copied there is
a chance that I will find myself there. If I don't know I am copied I
will be surprised, but that will be the only difference.

If you take the theory of consciousness that says it is just a stream of experiences which
are related by some internal similarities, then it's impossible that you find yourself on
some distant planet so long as there's the much more similar experience of finding
yourself where you were a moment ago. The FPI of Everett's relative state only arises
where there are nearly equal degrees of similarity.

Brent

Re: The dovetailer disassembled


On 5/4/2015 12:44 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



2015-05-04 9:31 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett >:


Quentin Anciaux wrote:


For each computation, there exist an infinity of valid
equivalent implementations, they're all computing the same
thing, that class of equivalent implementations is what
realize the conscious moment. For 1st POV, you only live a
moment once... be it run a million times, it wouldn't change
that from your POV, you'll only ever live it once. If all of
them (the infinity of equivalent implementation) compute the
exact same thing that thing from itself is unique... we have
the starting hypothesis that consciousness emerges from
computations, so if it's the exact same moment, it's the
exact same moment computed an infinity of time, but from the
POV of you of the "owner" of that moment, that moment only
exists *once* will always be unique from his POV (that's the
1st person point of view, that point of view is always
singular and unique).

So exact copies are also part of that computed moment. So the
MGA fails.

? I do not follow... what is failing ?

MGA and Olympia's from Maudlin, are just showing Physical Supervenience 
is
failing... so what do you mean by MGA fails ?


The copy on the film, as it is replayed, is just another computation in the 
infinity
of valid implementations of that conscious moment. 



Yes

So the argument does not go through. 



It goes through to show that it isn't one particular implementation that must be taken 
into account, but all the equivalent class...


Besides, it was only ever an argument from incredulity, never a logical 
argument.


Yes and no, I  can agree for the MGA, but in Maudlin's case both olympia and olympia + 
the klaras have the exact same activity... in what sense of computing (if you want to 
stick with computation) can you say olympia is "computing" ? As you can remove 
everything, what's left to keep computationalism as a valid hypothesis and at the same 
time keeping physical supervenience... only the presence or absence of the Klaras which 
don't do *anything* differentiate both case... but computationally speaking olympia 
alone and olympias + klaras are not equivalent computation, they are only incidentally 
identical on one input... they're in the equivalence class *for that inputs only*. Do 
you still feel both computationalism and physical supervenience are compatible and still 
keep them and be meaningful ?


In quantum mechanics it does make a difference whether some other physical process could 
have happened, even when it doesn't.


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled


On 5/4/2015 12:31 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



2015-05-04 9:26 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett >:


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 4 May 2015 at 17:14, Bruce Kellett mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:


The initial point that we were making was that copying at the 
quantum level
of substitution is not possible, in principle. Accidental copies in 
another
universe are not "deliberate but surreptitious" copies. They are 
irrelevant
to the argument.


You implied that if you did not know about the copy because it was not
prepared deliberately that would make a difference, but I don't see
why it should.


The point of Step 3, as I understand it, is that we know the set-up: we 
know that we
are to be copied at the appropriate substitution level and duplicated -- at 
two
different locations. Chance duplicates do not fit the criteria and are 
irrelevant to
the comp hypothesis.


It's a though experiment... so the duplicates do fit the criteria by definition.. you 
even gave it here "we are to be copied at the appropriate substitution level and 
duplicated"... step 0 again, is that it is possible... so, if you reject step 0, there 
is no point to use that as an argument against further steps... you already have 
rejected the premiss, so any deductive steps based on it have already been rejected by 
you as you reject step 0.


Unknown (and unknowable) copies would not produce any first person indeterminancy.  FPI 
requires that you know there is a duplicate that you could be.


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The Prestige (Spoiler Alert) and First Person Indeterminacy

On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 10:48 AM, Jason Resch  wrote:

> John Clark, you have often praised the movie "The Prestige" on this
> list.  I am curious to know, how did you interpret the line:
>
> "Would I be the man in the box or the prestige?"
>

I would answer "yes".

  John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: God

On 03 May 2015, at 19:39, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, May 3, 2015 at 2:02 AM, Dennis Ochei  
 wrote:

> Hmmm... I don't think Godel's result implies that mathematical  
truth isn't "out there" in Platonia

Oh mathematical truth is out there in Platonia alright, but so is  
mathematical falsehood because there is no way to totally separate  
the two.

This is ridiculous.All we need is that 2+2=4 is true independently of  
you, and that 2+2=5 is false independently of you.

We don't have 2+2=5 is true independently of you.
I suspect you confuse (like some others) the truth of statement, and  
the truth that statement exists. "2+2=5" can exist as a statement  
uttered by some machine or entity, but that does not make the  
statement "2+2=5" true somewhere.

Jorge Luis Borges wrote a very good short story in 1941 called "The  
Library of Babel" that contained every book of 410 pages that not  
just have been written but could be written. Some of the books are  
written in English, some in other languages, most are just gibberish  
but some only appear to be gibberish because if you use another book  
in the library (but which one?) as a one time pad you can decrypt  
the gibberish so it's readable and maybe profound, or maybe just  
more bullshit. This astronomically huge library contained all the  
wisdom and secrets of the universe but contained all the nonsense in  
the universe too, and so the entire thing turned out to be utterly  
useless.

This confirms that you confuse a statement and the truth or falsehood  
of that statement.

Arithmetical realism means that we believe that all arithmetical  
statements are either true or false, independently of our ability to  
know it or not. It means that either the machine k will stop, or that  
if will not stop.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Library_of_Babel

> in fact the very idea of inprovable truth implies mathematical  
realism,

Godel certainly thought mathematical truth existed

This phrasing can be misleading. I say and use only the truth of an  
arithmetical proposition (and thus of an arithmetical sentence) does  
not depend on me, you or a physical universe.

and so do I, but what Godel said is that whatever finite set of axioms

Or RE set of axioms. There is no finite set for any theory as rich as  
PA, unless it is a theory of set (and classes). RE = recursively  
Enumerable (generable by a (immaterial, mathematical) machine)

you choose for your logical system there will be statements, a  
infinite number of them, where you cannot produce a proof to show it  
is true and cannot produce a counterexample to show it is false.

All mathematicians does that. We use group, sets, numbers, with  
intended model which contains more truth than we can prove.

Unless you defend intuitionism. But you don't as you seem to agree  
with Gödel that the truth is out there.

> Godel showed that all the truths in Platonia simply cannot be  
gathered under one roof.

It's easy to put all truth under one roof, but what you can't do is  
put all truth under one roof and no falsehoods, not even under the  
roof of Platonia.

That is non sense. (and you are not replying to me).What is the  
difference between the theory and platonia then? By the excluded  
middle principle, once you have put all truth under one roof, the  
falsehood is automatically under the other roof. You don't need a  
machine able to do that. just use the axiom A v ~A.

Computability theory is manly used to structured our ignorance. It  
study the degrees of unsolvability. It shows that even with oracle  
(more powerful than any machine) there are problem which are still non  
solvable. If you have an oracle for the machine-halting problem, you  
still cannot solve the totality problem.

> Perhaps God, (let's make believe in the Sky Daddy for a second)  
ventured into Platonia and choose one structure to imbue with light,  
forging and implementing it in the formless void, and that is what  
we find ourselves in.

Unless you can explain how He did that God is a useless fifth wheel  
that just complicates things and adds nothing to our understanding  
of anything.

You are not replying to me again.

In science God cannot be used to explain anything. In comp, God is  
more a problem to solve than something to use. And we can't avoid it,  
(using the greek definition), once we are realist on the numbers,  
which we need to just explain Church's thesis, incompleteness, etc.

Bruno

  John K Clark

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

http://iridia.ulb.a

Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!

2015-05-04 Thread PGC

On Monday, May 4, 2015 at 4:03:50 PM UTC+2, telmo_menezes wrote:
>
>
>
> On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 3:41 PM, Alberto G. Corona  > wrote:
>
>> Of course believing in the supernatural is absurd -- what does that even 
>>> mean? If, for example, ghosts were real, then this would just mean that 
>>> current scientific theories are incomplete or wrong.
>>>
>>
>> So what?
>>
>
> No problem, my only dogma is that reality is intelligible -- i.e. it is 
> possible to discover laws that approximate how things work. Beyond the 
> empirical successes of science, I choose this belief because I see no point 
> in believing otherwise (if it's wrong, there is really no point in 
> believing anything).
>
> Choosing things to disbelief a priori is unscientific, but of course we 
> are mortal so we guide ourselves by some heuristic. I go in the direction 
> of the things I find more likely to be true and I'm sure you do the same.
>

Not necessarily. I find discovery of universal machine to be more 
unbelievable than strangeness that is cited in the esoteric-unexplained 
category, which is close in terms of content to children's fantasies and 
Star Wars. And yet the latter remains unsupported conjecture while the 
former is a number relation which exists provably as consequence of 
arithmetic. I'm not convinced by arguments like "I see pattern in this 
strangeness and can categorize them; and we can see these patterns in 
science or in the work of so-and-so"

I need evidence and clear algorithm. If say a Shulgin lays out how 
precisely to modify some molecule to ingest something that will result in 
mystical experience with paranormal content, than this is "reasonable": If 
subject x ingest function of some molecule => fuzzy experience with 
features a,b,c, mystical union or whatever etc.  

But citing strangeness of unknown without being able to repeat the result 
or make it repeatable to skeptics is probably advertising again, which 
tries to sell itself as truth regardless whether in respected journal, 
obscure blog, TV... Advertising without being genuine about it and masking 
it as science, without properly situating it in tenable hypothesis => I can 
find "interesting patterns in dog shit and the mud". Don't feel the need to 
post about it because I feel that too often basic rationality is left at 
the door for hidden reasons of self-glory of authors. 

And I like reasoning about the craziest shit. But I'm too often 
disappointed by barrages of cheap psychological tricks playing to the 
"unknown", instead of clear reasoning where somebody states a clean, 
discrete ontology clearly. That's why I think a lot of this stuff can be 
ignored. We're not in realm of explanation and basic rationality is left at 
the door... which is profitable and self-fulfilling (there will be more 
weird patterns in the mud to "substantiate" what I'm saying). With Shulgin 
type approach as contrast (he also carries extraordinary claim and is 
attacked as crackpot), we can verify mystical propositions for ourselves 
because the algorithms of how to get there and build such molecule are 
accessible and precise enough. PGC

>
> Telmo.
>  
>
>>
>> -- 
>> Alberto.
>>  
>> -- 
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
>> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com .
>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com 
>> .
>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>>
>
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: God

On 04 May 2015, at 01:39, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, May 3, 2015 , Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>>> The physical hardware makes possible to incarnate or implement  
universal numbers relatively to us,

>> If that's true then physical reality can do something that would  
be impossible for mere mathematical reality to do.

> This does not follow.

It does follow if what you said was true, if "the physical hardware  
makes possible to incarnate or implement universal numbers  
relatively to us".

It still does not follow.  We can have both

1) "the physical universe makes possible to incarnate or implement  
universal numbers relatively to us".

2) the mathematical reality is responsible for the existence of the  
physical universe.

> there is nothing in physics that your brain can analyse that a  
universal number cannot approximate so well that you could not see  
the difference.

Since nobody knows all of physics you can't know if mathematics can  
describe everything in physics or not, I suspect that it can but I  
don't know that for a fact.

But we are working in the computationalist frame. If there was  
something in the physical reality which is such that my experience of  
it is not Turing emulable, nor FPI recoverable, then computationalism  
would be false. Not all experience would be Turing emulable.

> A universal Turing machine cannot distinguish locally a physical  
reality from an arithmetical reality.

Actually it can, if a Turing machine finds that it can't do  
anything, absolutely nothing at all then it knows it is not made of  
matter.

Here you beg the question, and avoid to explain me how a Turing  
emulable entity can see the difference.
Also, the expression "a Turing machine finds that it can't do anything  
at all" is self-contradictory.
Here you assume a primitive physical universe, and a magical role in  
matter for its magical role in consciousness.

>>As far as we know the observable universe is only capable of  
performing a finite number of calculations, so the information on  
what the 10^100^100 digit of pi is can not exist in our universe  
even in principle and digit that can not effect our universe..

> So you do assume a physical primitive universe.

I assume nothing, I am saying I don't know if physics or mathematics  
is more primitive, and I'm showing why your "proof"  that  
mathematics is the more primitive is bogus. You don't know and I  
don't either, but at least I know I don't know.

You attribute me things that I have never said. I don't know either.  
My proof is only that IF we are machine then the notion of primitive  
matter, and physicalism, are senseless, without adding ad hoc magic.

You refutation stops at step 3, and has been debunked many times.

>>>  I accept the natural idea that the 10^100^100 digit of pi is  
either 0, or 1, or 2, or 3, or 4, or 5, or 6, or 7, or 8, or 9.

>> I accept the idea that the 10^100^100 digit of pi exists,

> So where is the problem?

The problem is that although the digit probably exists I don't know  
what it is

That is the whole point of the difference between truth and proof, or  
between truth and knowledge. It extends far beyond our proof and our  
knowledge.

and neither do you and neither does Plato, and I'm willing to  
entertain the possibility that physics doesn't know and even the  
digit doesn't know that it's the 10^100^100 digit of pi. It could be  
no one and no thing knows what that digit is.

But in the theory, we don't use that digit. We use only that it exists.

>>> Gödel shows that the theories are incomplete with respect to the  
mathematical truth,

>> Then Platonia contains both mathematical truth and mathematical  
falsehood because there is no way to completely separate the two,

> By a theory. But the models do the separation. In a non effective  
way,

Explain to me exactly how to separate truth from falsehood, or how  
to do anything at all, in a non effective (non-mechanical ) way.

I have given the most famous example more than one. For example by  
showing that IF Church's thesis is true, it is a matter of just one  
(double) diagonalization to show that the code of total functions is  
non algorithmically distributed in the phi_i.

I gave also the example of how to find a solution of this problem:

Prove that it exists x and it exists y such that  x is irrational & y  
is irational & x^y is rational.

The method is described in two words: excluded middle.

If you agree with the excluded middle principle, you can prove  
existence and disjunction without being able to effectively construct  
the object that you prove the existence of.

In this case just assume that the number sqrt(2) ^sqrt(2) is rational  
or ... irrational (excluded middle).

If  sqrt(2)^sqrt(2) is rational, we are done. x = sqrt(2) and y =  
sqrt(2)
If sqrt(2)^sqrt(2) is irrational, we have also a solution:  
(sqrt(2)^sqrt(2))^sqrt(2) = 2, so x = sqrt(2)^sqrt(2)

So, by using

The Prestige (Spoiler Alert) and First Person Indeterminacy

2015-05-04 Thread Jason Resch

John Clark, you have often praised the movie "The Prestige" on this list.
I am curious to know, how did you interpret the line:

"Would I be the man in the box or the prestige?" (Spoken/Thought by the
magician Robert Angier, prior to duplicating himself to two locations: a
box filled with water and on to a stage before an applauding audience)

Jason

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!

On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 3:41 PM, Alberto G. Corona 
wrote:

> Of course believing in the supernatural is absurd -- what does that even
>> mean? If, for example, ghosts were real, then this would just mean that
>> current scientific theories are incomplete or wrong.
>>
>
> So what?
>

No problem, my only dogma is that reality is intelligible -- i.e. it is
possible to discover laws that approximate how things work. Beyond the
empirical successes of science, I choose this belief because I see no point
in believing otherwise (if it's wrong, there is really no point in
believing anything).

Choosing things to disbelief a priori is unscientific, but of course we are
mortal so we guide ourselves by some heuristic. I go in the direction of
the things I find more likely to be true and I'm sure you do the same.

Telmo.

>
> --
> Alberto.
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!

Totally agree, Telmo, regarding communication. On the Bostrom concept of Sims 
and, by extension, our reality being a sim, I like the concept, but in a way, 
it seems too simple, Rather than life being an illusion, let us conceive that 
its the result of a great program running and producing us as a result. 
Moreover, our program can be either revised, copied, or both, etc. This is one 
reason professor, Eric Steinhart's work seems compelling to me. The following 
summary is available from his book, Your Digital Afterlives, but here is a 
taste, from Steinhart's website-


 http://ericsteinhart.com/FLESH/flesh-chabs.html

The best of these theories is Promotion, but Steinhart views his own idea as 
flawed, because he wants it to be progressive rather then regressive. I don't 
see the logical regression he seemed concerned about, He did come up with 
Revision theory, as workable, however, these are merely, better-off clones of 
ourselves, and miss the continuity, that infers identity. Promotion is better, 
because it does exactly this, via pipelines, processes, data transfers, as well 
as uploading and teleportation. This is one reason I want to see if Ben Goetzel 
has an afterlife-resurrection theory, because they both appeared to have come 
to the same conclusions, independently,  on several other concepts. 

Steinhart, like Goetzel, is a computationalist (digitalist) - (5 minute video)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JfDB35y-5Z0

Please let me know if you uncover anything concerning Ben Goetzel's views. 
Thanks.

Mitch

 

 

-Original Message-
From: Telmo Menezes 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Mon, May 4, 2015 9:08 am
Subject: Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!


 
  
  
   
   
On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 1:08 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List 
 wrote:

 I sure did, Telmo. Scroll to the bottom and you shall view my last, number 
26th, the last one.

 


Ah there you are! And you are not the only one from this list commenting there, 
it's a small world.

 


My bet on computational after-lives is that we are in one already (an infinity 
of times), but this is completely transparent to us.

 

  This kind of thing is interesting to me. I tend toward the materialist 
stuff since it seems to have potential. The mentalist stuff seems unreliable 
because people who have NDE's or trances have not come back with information.   
  

 


I would say that the important distinction is between communicable and 
non-communicable stuff. Science is about communicable stuff, but there is 
personal value in exploring the internal world -- although it won't get you a 
nobel prize or even any sort of recognition.

 



   
   

   
   

   
   
   -Original Message-
 From: Telmo Menezes 
 To: everything-list 
   

 Sent: Mon, May 4, 2015 4:19 am 
 Subject: Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism! 
  
  
   


 
 
 On Sun, May 3, 2015 at 9:19 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List  
 wrote:  
  
   
 Hi Telmo,
 
 I have tried the Other Side stuff for a bit, and found it wanting. 
   
   
  
   
  
  
 Not so surprising... The topic is a string attractor for quacks, for sure. 
 
  

  
   
  Steinhart, said he had some experiences but decided they were 
not that significant to himself. He is more buzzed, he said, but the beauty of 
mathematics, emotionally. Here is a crowd funded 3D augmented reality game, due 
out next year, called Night Terrors, so much for the paranormal, yes? We maybe, 
could, have the paranormal adventure any time we choose. 
 
 

 
http://www.ign.com/articles/2015/05/01/survival-horror-augmented-reality-game-night-terrors-maps-your-house

   
  
   
  
  
 Wow, this is a brilliant/terrifying idea!  
  

  
   
 
 
 I cross-posted a message to Ben Goetzel on his "Multiverse" 
website, as well as on Guilio Prisco's Turing-Church website sight concerning 
Goetzel's non-response, to my question to him, about afterlife ideas, if any?  
He seemed to touch on this in a recent article, as well as his 2006, The Hidden 
Pattern, which I had downloaded, a couple of months ago. Any data or opinion on 
Goetzel's view on all this?

Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!

2015-05-04 Thread Alberto G. Corona

>
> Of course believing in the supernatural is absurd -- what does that even
> mean? If, for example, ghosts were real, then this would just mean that
> current scientific theories are incomplete or wrong.
>

So what?

-- 
Alberto.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!

On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 1:08 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> I sure did, Telmo. Scroll to the bottom and you shall view my last,
> number 26th, the last one.


Ah there you are! And you are not the only one from this list commenting
there, it's a small world.

My bet on computational after-lives is that we are in one already (an
infinity of times), but this is completely transparent to us.


> This kind of thing is interesting to me. I tend toward the materialist
> stuff since it seems to have potential. The mentalist stuff seems
> unreliable because people who have NDE's or trances have not come back with
> information.


I would say that the important distinction is between communicable and
non-communicable stuff. Science is about communicable stuff, but there is
personal value in exploring the internal world -- although it won't get you
a nobel prize or even any sort of recognition.


>
>
>
>  -Original Message-
> From: Telmo Menezes 
> To: everything-list 
> Sent: Mon, May 4, 2015 4:19 am
> Subject: Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!
>
>
>
>  On Sun, May 3, 2015 at 9:19 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>>  Hi Telmo,
>>
>> I have tried the Other Side stuff for a bit, and found it wanting.
>>
>
>  Not so surprising... The topic is a string attractor for quacks, for
> sure.
>
>
>>   Steinhart, said he had some experiences but decided they were not that
>> significant to himself. He is more buzzed, he said, but the beauty of
>> mathematics, emotionally. Here is a crowd funded 3D augmented reality game,
>> due out next year, called Night Terrors, so much for the paranormal, yes?
>> We maybe, could, have the paranormal adventure any time we choose.
>>
>>
>> http://www.ign.com/articles/2015/05/01/survival-horror-augmented-reality-game-night-terrors-maps-your-house
>>
>
>  Wow, this is a brilliant/terrifying idea!
>
>
>>
>>
>> I cross-posted a message to Ben Goetzel on his "Multiverse" website, as
>> well as on Guilio Prisco's Turing-Church website sight concerning Goetzel's
>> non-response, to my question to him, about afterlife ideas, if any?  He
>> seemed to touch on this in a recent article, as well as his 2006, The
>> Hidden Pattern, which I had downloaded, a couple of months ago. Any data or
>> opinion on Goetzel's view on all this?
>>
>
>  Have you seen this?
>
> http://multiverseaccordingtoben.blogspot.de/2015/03/paranormal-phenomena-nonlocal-mind-and.html
>
>  Telmo.
>
>
>>
>> Mitch
>>
>>
>>  -Original Message-
>> From: Telmo Menezes 
>> To: everything-list 
>>   Sent: Sun, May 3, 2015 2:45 pm
>> Subject: Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!
>>
>>  Hi spudboy,
>>
>>  I follow Ben Goetzel and have some of the books he recommends on the
>> topic on my to-read list.
>>
>>  I remain agnostic on this stuff, and just try to consider the simplest
>> explanation, even if it's boring. In the case of this story, this sounds a
>> lot like the event was staged by some nice person who cares about the
>> bride. This doesn't mean that is the correct explanation, of course.
>>
>>  What I am more curious about are replicable laboratory experiments.
>> Some people, like Goetzel, are claiming that results with statistical
>> significance are known. Maybe this is a nice opportunity for amateur
>> science, because dealing with this topics would still career suicide for
>> many people -- even if to find negative results.
>>
>>  Of course believing in the supernatural is absurd -- what does that
>> even mean? If, for example, ghosts were real, then this would just mean
>> that current scientific theories are incomplete or wrong.
>>
>>  Cheers,
>>  Telmo.
>>
>>  On Sun, May 3, 2015 at 6:09 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List <
>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>
>>> If you know of Ben Goetzel, and Damien Broderick, as well as Eric
>>> Steinhart, they have claimed Psi experiences, or spiritual experiences, but
>>> are split on the true significance? At the end of the day, it either works
>>> for us, or it doesn't.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  -Original Message-
>>> From: LizR < lizj...@gmail.com>
>>> To: everything-list < everything-list@googlegroups.com>
>>> Sent: Sun, May 3, 2015 7:03 am
>>> Subject: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!
>>>
>>>   Michael Shermer is the publisher of "Skeptic" magazine, which I used
>>> to subscribe to - but I could only take so many debunkings, lectures on
>>> science, and so on, and eventually I cancelled the sub, reasonably well
>>> convinced that I had by now obtained all the wherewithal I was ever going
>>> to need to give 123 reasons to explain any apparently supernatural event...
>>>
>>>
>>> http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/anomalous-events-that-can-shake-one-s-skepticism-to-the-core/
>>>
>>>  It's also a rather nice story.
>>>  --
>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
>>>

Re: quadratic voting

On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 1:03 PM, LizR  wrote:

> Yes, very. I haven't read the paper yet but I hope when they say you pay
> for votes that isn't meaning a plutocracy, but from some share of equally
> distributed "voting capital" or something similar? So people can spend
> their voting power on whatever they're concerned about?
>

The idea is very simple. You can buy x votes for (x * c)^2 dollars. In the
end, all the money that was spent on buying votes is equally distributed by
the voters. So the more the plutocracy spends its financial capital to
influence policy, the more wealth equality you get. The author proposes a
mathematical proof that such a system would stabilize on an equal
distribution of political power.

Of course, there are many real world details that could make this idea fail
miserably, but it's fun to think about.


>
> On 4 May 2015 at 20:50, Telmo Menezes  wrote:
>
>> Interesting idea:
>> http://ericposner.com/quadratic-voting/
>>
>> --
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>>
>
>  --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled

On 4 May 2015 at 17:55, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

>> Sure, it's possible that the atoms all move, probably more likely than
>> my Andromeda example, but less likely than that I be created in a
>> galaxy far, far beyond Andromeda. In any case, if I am copied there is
>> a chance that I will find myself there. If I don't know I am copied I
>> will be surprised, but that will be the only difference.
>
>
> I thought it was part of Bruno's case that the machine cannot know this from
> the 1p perspective. Only the external 3p observer knows there is a copy. So
> in the cases we we are discussing, there is no way to distinguish between
> being a chance copy and being the same copy moved sideways by chance. Chance
> copies do not work for the comp argument.

The subject cannot know where he will end up, and he cannot know from
introspection if he is the copy or the original. The thought
experiments we have been discussing involve copies being made under
controlled circumstances, since that is generally the nature of
experiments, but that has nothing to do with the actual effect.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled

On 4 May 2015 at 17:26, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On 4 May 2015 at 17:14, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> The initial point that we were making was that copying at the quantum
>>> level
>>> of substitution is not possible, in principle. Accidental copies in
>>> another
>>> universe are not "deliberate but surreptitious" copies. They are
>>> irrelevant
>>> to the argument.
>>
>>
>> You implied that if you did not know about the copy because it was not
>> prepared deliberately that would make a difference, but I don't see
>> why it should.
>
>
> The point of Step 3, as I understand it, is that we know the set-up: we know
> that we are to be copied at the appropriate substitution level and
> duplicated -- at two different locations. Chance duplicates do not fit the
> criteria and are irrelevant to the comp hypothesis.

In the UDA the subject is aware of the setup so that he can reason
about it, but this isn't necessary for the claimed effect.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!

I sure did, Telmo. Scroll to the bottom and you shall view my last, number 
26th, the last one. This kind of thing is interesting to me. I tend toward the 
materialist stuff since it seems to have potential. The mentalist stuff seems 
unreliable because people who have NDE's or trances have not come back with 
information. 
 

 

 

-Original Message-
From: Telmo Menezes 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Mon, May 4, 2015 4:19 am
Subject: Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!


 
  
  
   
   
On Sun, May 3, 2015 at 9:19 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List 
 wrote:


Hi Telmo,
 
 I have tried the Other Side stuff for a bit, and found it wanting.  


 


Not so surprising... The topic is a string attractor for quacks, for sure.

 

   
Steinhart, said he had some experiences but decided they were not that 
significant to himself. He is more buzzed, he said, but the beauty of 
mathematics, emotionally. Here is a crowd funded 3D augmented reality game, due 
out next year, called Night Terrors, so much for the paranormal, yes? We maybe, 
could, have the paranormal adventure any time we choose. 
 

   

http://www.ign.com/articles/2015/05/01/survival-horror-augmented-reality-game-night-terrors-maps-your-house
  


 


Wow, this is a brilliant/terrifying idea!

 

   
   

I cross-posted a message to Ben Goetzel on his "Multiverse" website, as 
well as on Guilio Prisco's Turing-Church website sight concerning Goetzel's 
non-response, to my question to him, about afterlife ideas, if any?  He seemed 
to touch on this in a recent article, as well as his 2006, The Hidden Pattern, 
which I had downloaded, a couple of months ago. Any data or opinion on 
Goetzel's view on all this?
  


 


Have you seen this?

 
http://multiverseaccordingtoben.blogspot.de/2015/03/paranormal-phenomena-nonlocal-mind-and.html
 


 


Telmo.

 

   

 Mitch
 

   

   
   
   -Original Message-
 From: Telmo Menezes 
 To: everything-list 
   

 Sent: Sun, May 3, 2015 2:45 pm 
 Subject: Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism! 
  
  
   
 Hi spudboy,
 


 I follow Ben Goetzel and have some of the books he recommends on the topic on 
my to-read list.

 


 I remain agnostic on this stuff, and just try to consider the simplest 
explanation, even if it's boring. In the case of this story, this sounds a lot 
like the event was staged by some nice person who cares about the bride. This 
doesn't mean that is the correct explanation, of course.

 


 What I am more curious about are replicable laboratory experiments. Some 
people, like Goetzel, are claiming that results with statistical significance 
are known. Maybe this is a nice opportunity for amateur science, because 
dealing with this topics would still career suicide for many people -- even if 
to find negative results.

 


 Of course believing in the supernatural is absurd -- what does that even mean? 
If, for example, ghosts were real, then this would just mean that current 
scientific theories are incomplete or wrong.

 


 Cheers,

 Telmo. 
 
  
  
 On Sun, May 3, 2015 at 6:09 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List   
 wrote:   
   
If you know of Ben Goetzel, and Damien Broderick, as well as 
Eric Steinhart, they have claimed Psi experiences, or spiritual experiences, 
but are split on the true significance? At the end of the day, it either works 
for us, or it doesn't.  
  
   

   
   

   
   

   
   
 -Original Message-
 From: LizR 
 To: everything-list  
   
 Sent: Sun, May 3, 2015 7:03 am
 Subject: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!   
 


 
  
 Michael Shermer is the publisher of "Skeptic" magazine, which I used to 
subscribe to - but I could only take so many debunkings, lectures on science, 
and so on, an

Re: quadratic voting

Yes, very. I haven't read the paper yet but I hope when they say you pay
for votes that isn't meaning a plutocracy, but from some share of equally
distributed "voting capital" or something similar? So people can spend
their voting power on whatever they're concerned about?

On 4 May 2015 at 20:50, Telmo Menezes  wrote:

> Interesting idea:
> http://ericposner.com/quadratic-voting/
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: God

By the way you might particularly like 29 across :)

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: God

On 4 May 2015 at 06:12, Dennis Ochei  wrote:

> My external hard drive is named "The Book of Sand" :)


Ooh!!

Mine is "Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius" !

I also constructed a cryptic crossword themed around Borges (insofar as
cryptic crosswords can be themed). For your possible amusement, it is
here...

https://crossswords.wordpress.com/2015/01/08/the-circular-ruins/

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled

2015-05-04 12:53 GMT+02:00 Quentin Anciaux :

>
>
> 2015-05-04 12:04 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett :
>
>> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>> 2015-05-04 10:24 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett >>  Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>
>>> But then again... you reject step 0, so why bother saying
>>> because of that step N is invalid... well ok, if step 0 is
>>> invalid, any further deduction from it is also invalid. Either
>>> just for the argument, you go as if step 0 is valid and try to
>>> show an error, meaning to show that step N is not deductively
>>> valid from the steps 0 to N-1 so as to demonstrate that the
>>> argument as a whole is invalid (and so is not deductively valid
>>> from step 0)... that's not what you do, you start with 0 is
>>> invalid... so well, yes the rest doesn't follow, no need for you
>>> to attack a special particular step after that. But if the
>>> argument is deductively valid, then if step 0 is true, the rest
>>> follows.
>>>
>>> You haven't followed the twists and turns of the discussion. I
>>> rejected step 0 (in this particular discussion) because substitution
>>> at the quantum level is impossible. But comp probably only needs
>>> classical digital substitution. In that case, one can go on and
>>> criticize the rest of the argument.
>>>
>>> Yes but not by saying step 3 is invalid because you can't make copy at
>>> that level... because what you're saying is step 0 is false so step 3 is
>>> false... If you want to critic step N, you have to say it is false because
>>> it does not follow deductively step N-1... if not, then it was step N-1 you
>>> should have critized. So I've lost your point, what's your critic if you
>>> accept steps 0,1,2 against step 3 ?
>>>
>>
>> The point I was making about step 3 was that if quantum level
>> substitution was necessary, then deliberate copying was out.
>
>
> Deliberate copying as I said, is not the argument, it does not hinge on
> our ability to do it... considering the copying occurs through type 1->4
> universe/multiverse is enough...
>
> In fact, if you believe step 0, you believe in strong AI, so replace the
> person by an AI that you're currently running, and so copying is possible.
> As step 0 is I recall, that consciousness is emulable on a turing machine
> at some level... the thought experiment is to go into the consequences of
> that, not to imagine if a duplication machine is feasible. If consciousness
> is emulable on a turing machine (step 0) by definition it is duplicable...
> so no, your point is invalid... your point is step 0 os famse
>
read: is false


> hence well if it is false, we stop at step 0 and go no further, no
> need to go to step 3 because if you do, that means you validate that
> consciousness is emulable on a turing machine and by definition duplicable.
>
> Quentin
>
>
>> People then claimed that chance duplicates would do as well. I rejected
>> this by point out that it violated step 3 where the duplication is
>> explicitly deliberate, and known to the subject. Chance copies fail to fit
>> these criteria.
>>
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>> --
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>>
>
>
>
> --
> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
> Batty/Rutger Hauer)
>



-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
Batty/Rutger Hauer)

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled

2015-05-04 12:04 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett :

> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>> 2015-05-04 10:24 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett >  Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>> But then again... you reject step 0, so why bother saying
>> because of that step N is invalid... well ok, if step 0 is
>> invalid, any further deduction from it is also invalid. Either
>> just for the argument, you go as if step 0 is valid and try to
>> show an error, meaning to show that step N is not deductively
>> valid from the steps 0 to N-1 so as to demonstrate that the
>> argument as a whole is invalid (and so is not deductively valid
>> from step 0)... that's not what you do, you start with 0 is
>> invalid... so well, yes the rest doesn't follow, no need for you
>> to attack a special particular step after that. But if the
>> argument is deductively valid, then if step 0 is true, the rest
>> follows.
>>
>> You haven't followed the twists and turns of the discussion. I
>> rejected step 0 (in this particular discussion) because substitution
>> at the quantum level is impossible. But comp probably only needs
>> classical digital substitution. In that case, one can go on and
>> criticize the rest of the argument.
>>
>> Yes but not by saying step 3 is invalid because you can't make copy at
>> that level... because what you're saying is step 0 is false so step 3 is
>> false... If you want to critic step N, you have to say it is false because
>> it does not follow deductively step N-1... if not, then it was step N-1 you
>> should have critized. So I've lost your point, what's your critic if you
>> accept steps 0,1,2 against step 3 ?
>>
>
> The point I was making about step 3 was that if quantum level substitution
> was necessary, then deliberate copying was out.


Deliberate copying as I said, is not the argument, it does not hinge on our
ability to do it... considering the copying occurs through type 1->4
universe/multiverse is enough...

In fact, if you believe step 0, you believe in strong AI, so replace the
person by an AI that you're currently running, and so copying is possible.
As step 0 is I recall, that consciousness is emulable on a turing machine
at some level... the thought experiment is to go into the consequences of
that, not to imagine if a duplication machine is feasible. If consciousness
is emulable on a turing machine (step 0) by definition it is duplicable...
so no, your point is invalid... your point is step 0 os famse hence
well if it is false, we stop at step 0 and go no further, no need to go to
step 3 because if you do, that means you validate that consciousness is
emulable on a turing machine and by definition duplicable.

Quentin


> People then claimed that chance duplicates would do as well. I rejected
> this by point out that it violated step 3 where the duplication is
> explicitly deliberate, and known to the subject. Chance copies fail to fit
> these criteria.
>
>
> Bruce
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>



-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
Batty/Rutger Hauer)

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!

That looks like a game I wouldn't play even if I played computer games...!

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled

On 4 May 2015 at 19:06, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>> On 4 May 2015 at 16:19, Bruce Kellett >
>>>
>>>
>>> What is the point of two identical quantum states if you don't know which
>>> two are identical? It seems to me that copying at will is what is
>>> required.
>>> We are not talking about a copy by random chance, or about an incidental
>>> copy in some other (disjoint) portion of the multiverse.
>>>
>>
>> A copy of you would be no less a copy if it popped up somewhere in the
>> universe by chance than if it were deliberately created.
>>
>
> If it is outside my Hubble volume then I can know nothing about it and it
> does not matter to me in the least. The point of the copying argument was
> to implement FPI. If it is not the here-and-now me that is copied, but a
> chance duplicate outside my Hubble volume, I couldn't care less.
>

According to QM a copy of the quantum state is a fungible object -
effectively identical. At least that's the argument Max Tegmark used in his
SciAm article on parallel universes.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled


Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-05-04 10:24 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett Quentin Anciaux wrote:


But then again... you reject step 0, so why bother saying
because of that step N is invalid... well ok, if step 0 is
invalid, any further deduction from it is also invalid. Either
just for the argument, you go as if step 0 is valid and try to
show an error, meaning to show that step N is not deductively
valid from the steps 0 to N-1 so as to demonstrate that the
argument as a whole is invalid (and so is not deductively valid
from step 0)... that's not what you do, you start with 0 is
invalid... so well, yes the rest doesn't follow, no need for you
to attack a special particular step after that. But if the
argument is deductively valid, then if step 0 is true, the rest
follows.

You haven't followed the twists and turns of the discussion. I
rejected step 0 (in this particular discussion) because substitution
at the quantum level is impossible. But comp probably only needs
classical digital substitution. In that case, one can go on and
criticize the rest of the argument.

Yes but not by saying step 3 is invalid because you can't make copy at 
that level... because what you're saying is step 0 is false so step 3 is 
false... If you want to critic step N, you have to say it is false 
because it does not follow deductively step N-1... if not, then it was 
step N-1 you should have critized. So I've lost your point, what's your 
critic if you accept steps 0,1,2 against step 3 ?


The point I was making about step 3 was that if quantum level 
substitution was necessary, then deliberate copying was out. People then 
claimed that chance duplicates would do as well. I rejected this by 
point out that it violated step 3 where the duplication is explicitly 
deliberate, and known to the subject. Chance copies fail to fit these 
criteria.


Bruce

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled

Step 3 just shows that duplication leads to first person uncertainty, the
same thing Everett showed (although there is some argument over how, or if,
this works in cases where the probability is represented by a real number).
The duplication can be in any of the available types of multiverse, or via
a hypothetical duplicating machine operating at or below the substitution
level.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

quadratic voting

Interesting idea:
http://ericposner.com/quadratic-voting/

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled

2015-05-04 10:27 GMT+02:00 Quentin Anciaux :

>
>
> 2015-05-04 10:24 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett :
>
>> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>> 2015-05-04 10:11 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett >> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>
>>> 2015-05-04 9:51 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett
>>> mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>
>>> The film is still physical, still running through a physical
>>> projector, so the physical supervenience thesis is not
>>> affected by
>>> the MGA. You have merely removed one physical substrate and
>>> replaced
>>> it by another, equivalent, physical substrate.
>>>
>>> No it does not, because the record and the valid computations
>>> *are not* on the same equivalence class, they are *only*
>>> equivalent for that peculliar input... why burden yourself with
>>> the computationalist hypothesis then ?
>>>
>>> But I don't!
>>>
>>> But then again... you reject step 0, so why bother saying because of
>>> that step N is invalid... well ok, if step 0 is invalid, any further
>>> deduction from it is also invalid. Either just for the argument, you go as
>>> if step 0 is valid and try to show an error, meaning to show that step N is
>>> not deductively valid from the steps 0 to N-1 so as to demonstrate that the
>>> argument as a whole is invalid (and so is not deductively valid from step
>>> 0)... that's not what you do, you start with 0 is invalid... so well, yes
>>> the rest doesn't follow, no need for you to attack a special particular
>>> step after that. But if the argument is deductively valid, then if step 0
>>> is true, the rest follows.
>>>
>>
>> You haven't followed the twists and turns of the discussion. I rejected
>> step 0 (in this particular discussion) because substitution at the quantum
>> level is impossible. But comp probably only needs classical digital
>> substitution. In that case, one can go on and criticize the rest of the
>> argument.
>
>
> Yes but not by saying step 3 is invalid because you can't make copy at
> that level... because what you're saying is step 0 is false so step 3 is
> false... If you want to critic step N, you have to say it is false because
> it does not follow deductively step N-1... if not, then it was step N-1 you
> should have critized. So I've lost your point, what's your critic if you
> accept steps 0,1,2 against step 3 ?
>
>
And also, again you've not shown even that the quantum state duplications
is impossible per se, type 1 tegmark infinite universe has an infinity of
exact duplicates... so you should reject type 1->4 universes/multiverses at
the same time to reject that duplication. (the argument does not hinge on
the fact that we do or can do the duplication ourselves).


> Quentin
>
>
>>
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>> --
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>>
>
>
>
> --
> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
> Batty/Rutger Hauer)
>



-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
Batty/Rutger Hauer)

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled

2015-05-04 10:24 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett :

> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>> 2015-05-04 10:11 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett > Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>> 2015-05-04 9:51 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett
>> mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>
>> The film is still physical, still running through a physical
>> projector, so the physical supervenience thesis is not
>> affected by
>> the MGA. You have merely removed one physical substrate and
>> replaced
>> it by another, equivalent, physical substrate.
>>
>> No it does not, because the record and the valid computations
>> *are not* on the same equivalence class, they are *only*
>> equivalent for that peculliar input... why burden yourself with
>> the computationalist hypothesis then ?
>>
>> But I don't!
>>
>> But then again... you reject step 0, so why bother saying because of that
>> step N is invalid... well ok, if step 0 is invalid, any further deduction
>> from it is also invalid. Either just for the argument, you go as if step 0
>> is valid and try to show an error, meaning to show that step N is not
>> deductively valid from the steps 0 to N-1 so as to demonstrate that the
>> argument as a whole is invalid (and so is not deductively valid from step
>> 0)... that's not what you do, you start with 0 is invalid... so well, yes
>> the rest doesn't follow, no need for you to attack a special particular
>> step after that. But if the argument is deductively valid, then if step 0
>> is true, the rest follows.
>>
>
> You haven't followed the twists and turns of the discussion. I rejected
> step 0 (in this particular discussion) because substitution at the quantum
> level is impossible. But comp probably only needs classical digital
> substitution. In that case, one can go on and criticize the rest of the
> argument.


Yes but not by saying step 3 is invalid because you can't make copy at that
level... because what you're saying is step 0 is false so step 3 is
false... If you want to critic step N, you have to say it is false because
it does not follow deductively step N-1... if not, then it was step N-1 you
should have critized. So I've lost your point, what's your critic if you
accept steps 0,1,2 against step 3 ?

Quentin


>
>
> Bruce
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>



-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
Batty/Rutger Hauer)

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The dovetailer disassembled


Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-05-04 10:11 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett 

Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2015-05-04 9:51 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>
The film is still physical, still running through a physical
projector, so the physical supervenience thesis is not
affected by
the MGA. You have merely removed one physical substrate and
replaced
it by another, equivalent, physical substrate.

No it does not, because the record and the valid computations
*are not* on the same equivalence class, they are *only*
equivalent for that peculliar input... why burden yourself with
the computationalist hypothesis then ?

But I don't!

But then again... you reject step 0, so why bother saying because of 
that step N is invalid... well ok, if step 0 is invalid, any further 
deduction from it is also invalid. Either just for the argument, you go 
as if step 0 is valid and try to show an error, meaning to show that 
step N is not deductively valid from the steps 0 to N-1 so as to 
demonstrate that the argument as a whole is invalid (and so is not 
deductively valid from step 0)... that's not what you do, you start with 
0 is invalid... so well, yes the rest doesn't follow, no need for you to 
attack a special particular step after that. But if the argument is 
deductively valid, then if step 0 is true, the rest follows.


You haven't followed the twists and turns of the discussion. I rejected 
step 0 (in this particular discussion) because substitution at the 
quantum level is impossible. But comp probably only needs classical 
digital substitution. In that case, one can go on and criticize the rest 
of the argument.


Bruce

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Michael Shermer becomes sceptical about scepticism!