Better Than the Chinese Room

[Craig Weinberg]

Here then is simpler and more familiar example of how computation can 
differ from natural understanding which is not susceptible to any 
mereological Systems argument. 

If any of you have use passwords which are based on a pattern of keystrokes 
rather than the letters on the keys, you know that you can enter your 
password every day without ever knowing what it is you are typing 
(something with a #r5f^ in it…?). 

I think this is a good analogy for machine intelligence. By storing and 
copying procedures, a pseudo-semantic analysis can be performed, but it is 
an instrumental logic that has no way to access the letters of the ‘human 
keyboard’. The universal machine’s keyboard is blank and consists only of 
theoretical x,y coordinates where keys would be. No matter how good or 
sophisticated the machine is, it will still have no way to understand what 
the particular keystrokes "mean" to a person, only how they fit in with 
whatever set of fixed possibilities has been defined.

Taking the analogy further, the human keyboard only applies to public 
communication. Privately, we have no keys to strike, and entire paragraphs 
or books can be represented by a single thought. Unlike computers, we do 
not have to build our ideas up from syntactic digits. Instead the 
public-facing computation follows from the experienced sense of what is to 
be communicated in general, from the top down, and the inside out.

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Better Than the Chinese Room

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 26 January 2014 01:35, Craig Weinberg >
wrote:

>> But that doesn't answer the question: do you think (or understand, or
>> whatever you think the appropriate term is) that the Chinese Room
>> COULD POSSIBLY be conscious or do you think that it COULD NOT POSSIBLY
>> be conscious?
>
>
> NO ROOM CAN BE CONSCIOUS. NO BODY CAN BE CONSCIOUS. NO FORM CAN BE
> CONSCIOUS.*
>
> *Except within the fictional narrative of a conscious experience. Puppets
> can seem conscious. Doors, door-knobs, and Chinese rooms can SEEM to be
> conscious.

Do you think Barack Obama is conscious? If you do, then in whatever sense
you understand that, can the Chinese Room also be conscious? Or do you
think that is impossible?

>> Or do you claim that the question is meaningless, a
>> category error (which ironically is a term beloved of positivists)? If
>> the latter, how is it that the question can be meaningfully asked
>> about humans but not the Chinese Room?
>
>
> Because humans are not human bodies. We don't have to doubt that humans
are
> conscious, as to do so would be to admit that we humans are the ones
> choosing to do the doubting and therefore are a priori certainly
conscious.
> Bodies do not deserve the benefit of the doubt, since they remain when we
> are personally unconscious or dear. That does not mean, however, that our
> body is not itself composed on lower and lower levels by microphenomenal
> experiences which only seem to us at the macro level to be forms and
> functionsthey are forms and functions relative to our
> perceptual-relativistic distance from their level of description. Since
> there is no distance between our experience and ourselves, we experience
> ourselves in every way that it can be experienced without being outside of
> itself, and are therefore not limited to mathematical descriptions. The
sole
> purpose of mathematical descriptions are to generalize measurements - to
> make phenomena distant and quantified.

Wouldn't the Chinese Room also say the same things, i.e. "We Chinese Rooms
don't have to doubt that we are
conscious, as to do so would be to admit that we are the ones
choosing to do the doubting and therefore are a priori certainly conscious."

>> > I like my examples better than the Chinese Room, because they are
>> > simpler:
>> >
>> > 1. I can type a password based on the keystrokes instead of the letters
>> > on
>> > the keys. This way no part of the "system" needs to know the letters,
>> > indeed, they could be removed altogether, thereby showing that data
>> > processing does not require all of the qualia that can be associated
>> > with
>> > it, and therefore it follows that data processing does not necessarily
>> > produce any or all qualia.
>> >
>> > 2. The functional aspects of playing cards are unrelated to the suits,
>> > their
>> > colors, the pictures of the royal cards, and the participation of the
>> > players. No digital simulation of playing card games requires any
>> > aesthetic
>> > qualities to simulate any card game.
>> >
>> > 3. The difference between a game like chess and a sport like basketball
>> > is
>> > that in chess, the game has only to do with the difficulty for the
human
>> > intellect to compute all of the possibilities and prioritize them
>> > logically.
>> > Sports have strategy as well, but they differ fundamentally in that the
>> > real
>> > challenge of the game is the physical execution of the moves. A machine
>> > has
>> > no feeling so it can never participate meaningfully in a sport. It
>> > doesn't
>> > get tired or feel pain, it need not attempt to accomplish something
that
>> > it
>> > cannot accomplish, etc. If chess were a sport, completing each move
>> > would be
>> > subject to the possibility of failure and surprise, and the end can
>> > never
>> > result in checkmate, since there is always the chance of weaker pieces
>> > getting lucky and overpowering the strong. There is no Cinderella Story
>> > in
>> > real chess, the winning strategy always wins because there can be no
>> > difference between theory and reality in an information-theoretic
>> > universe.
>>
>> How can you start a sentence "a machine has no feeling so..." and
>> purport to discuss the question of whether a machine can have feeling?
>>
>> > So no, I do not "believe" this, I understand it. I do not think that
the
>> > Chinese Room is valid because wholes must be i

Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Bruno Marchal]

On 12 Jan 2014, at 14:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:

Here then is simpler and more familiar example of how computation  
can differ from natural understanding which is not susceptible to  
any mereological Systems argument.


If any of you have use passwords which are based on a pattern of  
keystrokes rather than the letters on the keys, you know that you  
can enter your password every day without ever knowing what it is  
you are typing (something with a #r5f^ in it…?).


I think this is a good analogy for machine intelligence. By storing  
and copying procedures, a pseudo-semantic analysis can be performed,  
but it is an instrumental logic that has no way to access the  
letters of the ‘human keyboard’. The universal machine’s keyboard is  
blank and consists only of theoretical x,y coordinates where keys  
would be. No matter how good or sophisticated the machine is, it  
will still have no way to understand what the particular keystrokes  
"mean" to a person, only how they fit in with whatever set of fixed  
possibilities has been defined.


You confuse level of description. What you say does not distinguish an  
organic brain from a silicon one. The understanding is not done by the  
computation in the brain, but by the person having some role in some  
history, and only manifest itself through some computations (assuming  
comp).




Taking the analogy further, the human keyboard only applies to  
public communication. Privately, we have no keys to strike, and  
entire paragraphs or books can be represented by a single thought.  
Unlike computers, we do not have to build our ideas up from  
syntactic digits.


It is the same for computers, once they have developed some relative  
history. This is well modeled by the "& p" part of the definition of  
knowing, and the math confirms this. Similarly, no code at all can  
explain why you feel to be the one in W, instead of the one in M, in  
the WM-duplication experience. Computers are not just confronted with  
symbol, but also with truth.




Instead the public-facing computation follows from the experienced  
sense of what is to be communicated in general, from the top down,  
and the inside out.



OK. But that does not distinguish a carbon brain from a silicon machine.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Craig Weinberg]

On Sunday, January 12, 2014 10:51:37 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 12 Jan 2014, at 14:40, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
>
> > Here then is simpler and more familiar example of how computation   
> > can differ from natural understanding which is not susceptible to   
> > any mereological Systems argument. 
> > 
> > If any of you have use passwords which are based on a pattern of   
> > keystrokes rather than the letters on the keys, you know that you   
> > can enter your password every day without ever knowing what it is   
> > you are typing (something with a #r5f^ in it…?). 
> > 
> > I think this is a good analogy for machine intelligence. By storing   
> > and copying procedures, a pseudo-semantic analysis can be performed,   
> > but it is an instrumental logic that has no way to access the   
> > letters of the ‘human keyboard’. The universal machine’s keyboard is   
> > blank and consists only of theoretical x,y coordinates where keys   
> > would be. No matter how good or sophisticated the machine is, it   
> > will still have no way to understand what the particular keystrokes   
> > "mean" to a person, only how they fit in with whatever set of fixed   
> > possibilities has been defined. 
> > 
> You confuse level of description. 


I think that the existence of a level of description invalidates comp.
 

> What you say does not distinguish an   
> organic brain from a silicon one. 


Sure, but we to give the organic brain the benefit of the doubt of 
association with consciousness. Since silicon does not naturally seek to 
organize itself as a brain, we should doubt that it is associated with 
human consciousness by default.

 

> The understanding is not done by the   
> computation in the brain, but by the person having some role in some   
> history, and only manifest itself through some computations (assuming   
> comp). 
>

I don't see that computations can manifest anything by themselves though.
 

>
>
>
> > Taking the analogy further, the human keyboard only applies to   
> > public communication. Privately, we have no keys to strike, and   
> > entire paragraphs or books can be represented by a single thought.   
> > Unlike computers, we do not have to build our ideas up from   
> > syntactic digits. 
> > 
> It is the same for computers, once they have developed some relative   
> history. This is well modeled by the "& p" part of the definition of   
> knowing, and the math confirms this. Similarly, no code at all can   
> explain why you feel to be the one in W, instead of the one in M, in   
> the WM-duplication experience. Computers are not just confronted with   
> symbol, but also with truth. 
>
>
>
> > Instead the public-facing computation follows from the experienced   
> > sense of what is to be communicated in general, from the top down,   
> > and the inside out. 
> > 
> OK. But that does not distinguish a carbon brain from a silicon machine. 
>

The silicon machine is built from the bottom up and the outside in. It 
doesn't develop its own agenda, it only mindlessly executes an alien agenda.

Craig
 

>
> Bruno 
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
>
>
>
>

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 13 January 2014 00:40, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
> Here then is simpler and more familiar example of how computation can differ
> from natural understanding which is not susceptible to any mereological
> Systems argument.
>
> If any of you have use passwords which are based on a pattern of keystrokes
> rather than the letters on the keys, you know that you can enter your
> password every day without ever knowing what it is you are typing (something
> with a #r5f^ in it…?).
>
> I think this is a good analogy for machine intelligence. By storing and
> copying procedures, a pseudo-semantic analysis can be performed, but it is
> an instrumental logic that has no way to access the letters of the ‘human
> keyboard’. The universal machine’s keyboard is blank and consists only of
> theoretical x,y coordinates where keys would be. No matter how good or
> sophisticated the machine is, it will still have no way to understand what
> the particular keystrokes "mean" to a person, only how they fit in with
> whatever set of fixed possibilities has been defined.
>
> Taking the analogy further, the human keyboard only applies to public
> communication. Privately, we have no keys to strike, and entire paragraphs
> or books can be represented by a single thought. Unlike computers, we do not
> have to build our ideas up from syntactic digits. Instead the public-facing
> computation follows from the experienced sense of what is to be communicated
> in general, from the top down, and the inside out.

I think you have a problem with the idea that a system could display
properties that are not obvious from examining its parts. There's no
way to argue around this, you just believe it and that's that.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, January 23, 2014 5:39:08 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>
> On 13 January 2014 00:40, Craig Weinberg > 
> wrote: 
> > Here then is simpler and more familiar example of how computation can 
> differ 
> > from natural understanding which is not susceptible to any mereological 
> > Systems argument. 
> > 
> > If any of you have use passwords which are based on a pattern of 
> keystrokes 
> > rather than the letters on the keys, you know that you can enter your 
> > password every day without ever knowing what it is you are typing 
> (something 
> > with a #r5f^ in it…?). 
> > 
> > I think this is a good analogy for machine intelligence. By storing and 
> > copying procedures, a pseudo-semantic analysis can be performed, but it 
> is 
> > an instrumental logic that has no way to access the letters of the 
> ‘human 
> > keyboard’. The universal machine’s keyboard is blank and consists only 
> of 
> > theoretical x,y coordinates where keys would be. No matter how good or 
> > sophisticated the machine is, it will still have no way to understand 
> what 
> > the particular keystrokes "mean" to a person, only how they fit in with 
> > whatever set of fixed possibilities has been defined. 
> > 
> > Taking the analogy further, the human keyboard only applies to public 
> > communication. Privately, we have no keys to strike, and entire 
> paragraphs 
> > or books can be represented by a single thought. Unlike computers, we do 
> not 
> > have to build our ideas up from syntactic digits. Instead the 
> public-facing 
> > computation follows from the experienced sense of what is to be 
> communicated 
> > in general, from the top down, and the inside out. 
>
> I think you have a problem with the idea that a system could display 
> properties that are not obvious from examining its parts. There's no 
> way to argue around this, you just believe it and that's that. 
>

I don't have a problem with the idea that a "system" could DISPLAY 
properties that are not obvious from EXAMINING its "parts", but you 
overlook that DISPLAYING and EXAMINING are functions of consciousness only. 
If they were not, then consciousness would be superfluous. If my brain 
could examine the display of the body's environment, then it would, and the 
presence or absence of perceptual experience would not make any difference. 

Systems and parts are defined by level of description - scales and scopes 
of perception and abstracted potential perception. They aren't primitively 
real. A machine is not a machine in its own eyes, but our body is an 
expression of a single event which spans a human lifetime. A person is 
another expression of that event. The "system" of a person does not emerge 
from the activity of the body parts, as the entire coherence of the body is 
as a character within relativistically scoped perceptual experiences.

I don't think that I believe, I think that I understand. I think that you 
do not understand what I mean, but are projecting that onto me, and 
therefore have assigned a straw man to take my place. It is your straw man 
projection who must believe.

Craig


>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou 
>

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 24 January 2014 01:15, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>
>
> On Thursday, January 23, 2014 5:39:08 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>>
>> On 13 January 2014 00:40, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>> > Here then is simpler and more familiar example of how computation can
>> > differ
>> > from natural understanding which is not susceptible to any mereological
>> > Systems argument.
>> >
>> > If any of you have use passwords which are based on a pattern of
>> > keystrokes
>> > rather than the letters on the keys, you know that you can enter your
>> > password every day without ever knowing what it is you are typing
>> > (something
>> > with a #r5f^ in it…?).
>> >
>> > I think this is a good analogy for machine intelligence. By storing and
>> > copying procedures, a pseudo-semantic analysis can be performed, but it
>> > is
>> > an instrumental logic that has no way to access the letters of the
>> > ‘human
>> > keyboard’. The universal machine’s keyboard is blank and consists only
>> > of
>> > theoretical x,y coordinates where keys would be. No matter how good or
>> > sophisticated the machine is, it will still have no way to understand
>> > what
>> > the particular keystrokes "mean" to a person, only how they fit in with
>> > whatever set of fixed possibilities has been defined.
>> >
>> > Taking the analogy further, the human keyboard only applies to public
>> > communication. Privately, we have no keys to strike, and entire
>> > paragraphs
>> > or books can be represented by a single thought. Unlike computers, we do
>> > not
>> > have to build our ideas up from syntactic digits. Instead the
>> > public-facing
>> > computation follows from the experienced sense of what is to be
>> > communicated
>> > in general, from the top down, and the inside out.
>>
>> I think you have a problem with the idea that a system could display
>> properties that are not obvious from examining its parts. There's no
>> way to argue around this, you just believe it and that's that.
>
>
> I don't have a problem with the idea that a "system" could DISPLAY
> properties that are not obvious from EXAMINING its "parts", but you overlook
> that DISPLAYING and EXAMINING are functions of consciousness only. If they
> were not, then consciousness would be superfluous. If my brain could examine
> the display of the body's environment, then it would, and the presence or
> absence of perceptual experience would not make any difference.
>
> Systems and parts are defined by level of description - scales and scopes of
> perception and abstracted potential perception. They aren't primitively
> real. A machine is not a machine in its own eyes, but our body is an
> expression of a single event which spans a human lifetime. A person is
> another expression of that event. The "system" of a person does not emerge
> from the activity of the body parts, as the entire coherence of the body is
> as a character within relativistically scoped perceptual experiences.
>
> I don't think that I believe, I think that I understand. I think that you do
> not understand what I mean, but are projecting that onto me, and therefore
> have assigned a straw man to take my place. It is your straw man projection
> who must believe.
>
> Craig

Tell me what you believe so we can be clear:

My understanding is that you believe that if the parts of the Chinese
Room don't understand Chinese, then the Chinese Room can't understand
Chinese. Have I got this wrong?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Craig Weinberg]

On Friday, January 24, 2014 12:31:33 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>
> On 24 January 2014 01:15, Craig Weinberg > 
> wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > On Thursday, January 23, 2014 5:39:08 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: 
> >> 
> >> On 13 January 2014 00:40, Craig Weinberg  wrote: 
> >> > Here then is simpler and more familiar example of how computation can 
> >> > differ 
> >> > from natural understanding which is not susceptible to any 
> mereological 
> >> > Systems argument. 
> >> > 
> >> > If any of you have use passwords which are based on a pattern of 
> >> > keystrokes 
> >> > rather than the letters on the keys, you know that you can enter your 
> >> > password every day without ever knowing what it is you are typing 
> >> > (something 
> >> > with a #r5f^ in it…?). 
> >> > 
> >> > I think this is a good analogy for machine intelligence. By storing 
> and 
> >> > copying procedures, a pseudo-semantic analysis can be performed, but 
> it 
> >> > is 
> >> > an instrumental logic that has no way to access the letters of the 
> >> > ‘human 
> >> > keyboard’. The universal machine’s keyboard is blank and consists 
> only 
> >> > of 
> >> > theoretical x,y coordinates where keys would be. No matter how good 
> or 
> >> > sophisticated the machine is, it will still have no way to understand 
> >> > what 
> >> > the particular keystrokes "mean" to a person, only how they fit in 
> with 
> >> > whatever set of fixed possibilities has been defined. 
> >> > 
> >> > Taking the analogy further, the human keyboard only applies to public 
> >> > communication. Privately, we have no keys to strike, and entire 
> >> > paragraphs 
> >> > or books can be represented by a single thought. Unlike computers, we 
> do 
> >> > not 
> >> > have to build our ideas up from syntactic digits. Instead the 
> >> > public-facing 
> >> > computation follows from the experienced sense of what is to be 
> >> > communicated 
> >> > in general, from the top down, and the inside out. 
> >> 
> >> I think you have a problem with the idea that a system could display 
> >> properties that are not obvious from examining its parts. There's no 
> >> way to argue around this, you just believe it and that's that. 
> > 
> > 
> > I don't have a problem with the idea that a "system" could DISPLAY 
> > properties that are not obvious from EXAMINING its "parts", but you 
> overlook 
> > that DISPLAYING and EXAMINING are functions of consciousness only. If 
> they 
> > were not, then consciousness would be superfluous. If my brain could 
> examine 
> > the display of the body's environment, then it would, and the presence 
> or 
> > absence of perceptual experience would not make any difference. 
> > 
> > Systems and parts are defined by level of description - scales and 
> scopes of 
> > perception and abstracted potential perception. They aren't primitively 
> > real. A machine is not a machine in its own eyes, but our body is an 
> > expression of a single event which spans a human lifetime. A person is 
> > another expression of that event. The "system" of a person does not 
> emerge 
> > from the activity of the body parts, as the entire coherence of the body 
> is 
> > as a character within relativistically scoped perceptual experiences. 
> > 
> > I don't think that I believe, I think that I understand. I think that 
> you do 
> > not understand what I mean, but are projecting that onto me, and 
> therefore 
> > have assigned a straw man to take my place. It is your straw man 
> projection 
> > who must believe. 
> > 
> > Craig 
>
> Tell me what you believe so we can be clear: 
>
> My understanding is that you believe that if the parts of the Chinese 
> Room don't understand Chinese, then the Chinese Room can't understand 
> Chinese. Have I got this wrong? 
>

The fact that the Chinese Room can't understand Chinese is not related to 
its parts, but to the category error of the root assumption that forms and 
functions can understand things.  I see forms and functions as one of the 
effects of experience, not as a cause of them.

I like my examples better than the Chinese Room, because they are simpler:

1. I can type a password based on the keystrokes instead of the letters

Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 25 January 2014 00:26, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>> Tell me what you believe so we can be clear:
>>
>> My understanding is that you believe that if the parts of the Chinese
>> Room don't understand Chinese, then the Chinese Room can't understand
>> Chinese. Have I got this wrong?
>
>
> The fact that the Chinese Room can't understand Chinese is not related to
> its parts, but to the category error of the root assumption that forms and
> functions can understand things.  I see forms and functions as one of the
> effects of experience, not as a cause of them.

But that doesn't answer the question: do you think (or understand, or
whatever you think the appropriate term is) that the Chinese Room
COULD POSSIBLY be conscious or do you think that it COULD NOT POSSIBLY
be conscious? Or do you claim that the question is meaningless, a
category error (which ironically is a term beloved of positivists)? If
the latter, how is it that the question can be meaningfully asked
about humans but not the Chinese Room?

> I like my examples better than the Chinese Room, because they are simpler:
>
> 1. I can type a password based on the keystrokes instead of the letters on
> the keys. This way no part of the "system" needs to know the letters,
> indeed, they could be removed altogether, thereby showing that data
> processing does not require all of the qualia that can be associated with
> it, and therefore it follows that data processing does not necessarily
> produce any or all qualia.
>
> 2. The functional aspects of playing cards are unrelated to the suits, their
> colors, the pictures of the royal cards, and the participation of the
> players. No digital simulation of playing card games requires any aesthetic
> qualities to simulate any card game.
>
> 3. The difference between a game like chess and a sport like basketball is
> that in chess, the game has only to do with the difficulty for the human
> intellect to compute all of the possibilities and prioritize them logically.
> Sports have strategy as well, but they differ fundamentally in that the real
> challenge of the game is the physical execution of the moves. A machine has
> no feeling so it can never participate meaningfully in a sport. It doesn't
> get tired or feel pain, it need not attempt to accomplish something that it
> cannot accomplish, etc. If chess were a sport, completing each move would be
> subject to the possibility of failure and surprise, and the end can never
> result in checkmate, since there is always the chance of weaker pieces
> getting lucky and overpowering the strong. There is no Cinderella Story in
> real chess, the winning strategy always wins because there can be no
> difference between theory and reality in an information-theoretic universe.

How can you start a sentence "a machine has no feeling so..." and
purport to discuss the question of whether a machine can have feeling?

> So no, I do not "believe" this, I understand it. I do not think that the
> Chinese Room is valid because wholes must be identical to their parts. The
> Chinese Room is valid because it can (if you let it) illustrate that the
> difference between understanding and processing is a difference in kind
> rather than a difference in degree. Technically, it is a difference in kind
> going one way (from the quantitative to the qualitative) and a difference in
> degree going the other way. You can reduce a sport to a game (as in computer
> basketball) but you can't turn a video game into a sport unless you bring in
> hardware that is physical/aesthetic rather than programmatic. Which leads me
> to:

The Chinese Room argument is valid if it follows that if the parts of
the system have no understanding then the system can have no
understanding. It is pointed out (correctly) by Searle that the person
in the room does not understand Chinese, from which he CONCLUDES that
the room does not understand Chinese, and uses this conclusion to
support the idea that the difference between understanding and
processing is a difference in kind, so no matter how clever the
computer or how convincing its behaviour it will never have
understanding.

I don't think your example with the typing is as good as the Chinese
Room, because by changing the keys around a bit it would be obvious
that there is no real understanding, while with the Chinese Room would
be able to pass any test that a Chinese speaker could pass.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Craig Weinberg]

On Saturday, January 25, 2014 1:41:30 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>
> On 25 January 2014 00:26, Craig Weinberg > 
> wrote: 
>
> >> Tell me what you believe so we can be clear: 
> >> 
> >> My understanding is that you believe that if the parts of the Chinese 
> >> Room don't understand Chinese, then the Chinese Room can't understand 
> >> Chinese. Have I got this wrong? 
> > 
> > 
> > The fact that the Chinese Room can't understand Chinese is not related 
> to 
> > its parts, but to the category error of the root assumption that forms 
> and 
> > functions can understand things.  I see forms and functions as one of 
> the 
> > effects of experience, not as a cause of them. 
>
> But that doesn't answer the question: do you think (or understand, or 
> whatever you think the appropriate term is) that the Chinese Room 
> COULD POSSIBLY be conscious or do you think that it COULD NOT POSSIBLY 
> be conscious?


NO ROOM CAN BE CONSCIOUS. NO BODY CAN BE CONSCIOUS. NO FORM CAN BE 
CONSCIOUS.*

*Except within the fictional narrative of a conscious experience. Puppets 
can seem conscious. Doors, door-knobs, and Chinese rooms can SEEM to be 
conscious.

 

> Or do you claim that the question is meaningless, a 
> category error (which ironically is a term beloved of positivists)? If 
> the latter, how is it that the question can be meaningfully asked 
> about humans but not the Chinese Room? 
>

Because humans are not human bodies. We don't have to doubt that humans are 
conscious, as to do so would be to admit that we humans are the ones 
choosing to do the doubting and therefore are a priori certainly conscious. 
Bodies do not deserve the benefit of the doubt, since they remain when we 
are personally unconscious or dear. That does not mean, however, that our 
body is not itself composed on lower and lower levels by microphenomenal 
experiences which only seem to us at the macro level to be forms and 
functionsthey are forms and functions relative to our 
perceptual-relativistic distance from their level of description. Since 
there is no distance between our experience and ourselves, we experience 
ourselves in every way that it can be experienced without being outside of 
itself, and are therefore not limited to mathematical descriptions. The 
sole purpose of mathematical descriptions are to generalize measurements - 
to make phenomena distant and quantified.


> > I like my examples better than the Chinese Room, because they are 
> simpler: 
> > 
> > 1. I can type a password based on the keystrokes instead of the letters 
> on 
> > the keys. This way no part of the "system" needs to know the letters, 
> > indeed, they could be removed altogether, thereby showing that data 
> > processing does not require all of the qualia that can be associated 
> with 
> > it, and therefore it follows that data processing does not necessarily 
> > produce any or all qualia. 
> > 
> > 2. The functional aspects of playing cards are unrelated to the suits, 
> their 
> > colors, the pictures of the royal cards, and the participation of the 
> > players. No digital simulation of playing card games requires any 
> aesthetic 
> > qualities to simulate any card game. 
> > 
> > 3. The difference between a game like chess and a sport like basketball 
> is 
> > that in chess, the game has only to do with the difficulty for the human 
> > intellect to compute all of the possibilities and prioritize them 
> logically. 
> > Sports have strategy as well, but they differ fundamentally in that the 
> real 
> > challenge of the game is the physical execution of the moves. A machine 
> has 
> > no feeling so it can never participate meaningfully in a sport. It 
> doesn't 
> > get tired or feel pain, it need not attempt to accomplish something that 
> it 
> > cannot accomplish, etc. If chess were a sport, completing each move 
> would be 
> > subject to the possibility of failure and surprise, and the end can 
> never 
> > result in checkmate, since there is always the chance of weaker pieces 
> > getting lucky and overpowering the strong. There is no Cinderella Story 
> in 
> > real chess, the winning strategy always wins because there can be no 
> > difference between theory and reality in an information-theoretic 
> universe. 
>
> How can you start a sentence "a machine has no feeling so..." and 
> purport to discuss the question of whether a machine can have feeling? 
>
> > So no, I do not "believe" this, I understand it. I do not think that the 
> > Chinese Room is valid because wholes must be identical to th

Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Bruno Marchal]

On 25 Jan 2014, at 15:35, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Saturday, January 25, 2014 1:41:30 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
On 25 January 2014 00:26, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>> Tell me what you believe so we can be clear:
>>
>> My understanding is that you believe that if the parts of the  
Chinese
>> Room don't understand Chinese, then the Chinese Room can't  
understand

>> Chinese. Have I got this wrong?
>
>
> The fact that the Chinese Room can't understand Chinese is not  
related to
> its parts, but to the category error of the root assumption that  
forms and
> functions can understand things.  I see forms and functions as one  
of the

> effects of experience, not as a cause of them.

But that doesn't answer the question: do you think (or understand, or
whatever you think the appropriate term is) that the Chinese Room
COULD POSSIBLY be conscious or do you think that it COULD NOT POSSIBLY
be conscious?

NO ROOM CAN BE CONSCIOUS. NO BODY CAN BE CONSCIOUS. NO FORM CAN BE  
CONSCIOUS.*


I agree.




*Except within the fictional narrative of a conscious experience.  
Puppets can seem conscious. Doors, door-knobs, and Chinese rooms can  
SEEM to be conscious.


You do the Searle error. The fact that the room/body form is not  
conscious does not entail that the narrative is fictional. If the room  
simulates the person at its right level, it can manifest the real  
abstract person related to the narrative.


With your body or form is a sort of zombie. It does no more think than  
a car. But the owner of the body can think, and use his body to  
manifest his thinking (which is really "done" in platonia) relatively  
to its most probable continuations in Platonia.







Or do you claim that the question is meaningless, a
category error (which ironically is a term beloved of positivists)? If
the latter, how is it that the question can be meaningfully asked
about humans but not the Chinese Room?

Because humans are not human bodies.


We agree on this.


We don't have to doubt that humans are conscious, as to do so would  
be to admit that we humans are the ones choosing to do the doubting  
and therefore are a priori certainly conscious.


OK.


Bodies do not deserve the benefit of the doubt, since they remain  
when we are personally unconscious or dear. That does not mean,  
however, that our body is not itself composed on lower and lower  
levels by microphenomenal experiences which only seem to us at the  
macro level to be forms and functionsthey are forms and  
functions relative to our perceptual-relativistic distance from  
their level of description. Since there is no distance between our  
experience and ourselves, we experience ourselves in every way that  
it can be experienced without being outside of itself, and are  
therefore not limited to mathematical descriptions. The sole purpose  
of mathematical descriptions are to generalize measurements - to  
make phenomena distant and quantified.


No problem with this.





> I like my examples better than the Chinese Room, because they are  
simpler:

>
> 1. I can type a password based on the keystrokes instead of the  
letters on
> the keys. This way no part of the "system" needs to know the  
letters,

> indeed, they could be removed altogether, thereby showing that data
> processing does not require all of the qualia that can be  
associated with
> it, and therefore it follows that data processing does not  
necessarily

> produce any or all qualia.
>
> 2. The functional aspects of playing cards are unrelated to the  
suits, their
> colors, the pictures of the royal cards, and the participation of  
the
> players. No digital simulation of playing card games requires any  
aesthetic

> qualities to simulate any card game.
>
> 3. The difference between a game like chess and a sport like  
basketball is
> that in chess, the game has only to do with the difficulty for the  
human
> intellect to compute all of the possibilities and prioritize them  
logically.
> Sports have strategy as well, but they differ fundamentally in  
that the real
> challenge of the game is the physical execution of the moves. A  
machine has
> no feeling so it can never participate meaningfully in a sport. It  
doesn't
> get tired or feel pain, it need not attempt to accomplish  
something that it
> cannot accomplish, etc. If chess were a sport, completing each  
move would be
> subject to the possibility of failure and surprise, and the end  
can never
> result in checkmate, since there is always the chance of weaker  
pieces
> getting lucky and overpowering the strong. There is no Cinderella  
Story in

> real chess, the winning strategy always wins because there can be no
> difference between theory and reality in an information-theoretic  
universe.


How can you start a sentence "

Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Craig Weinberg]

On Saturday, January 25, 2014 11:36:11 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On 26 January 2014 01:35, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>
> >> But that doesn't answer the question: do you think (or understand, or
> >> whatever you think the appropriate term is) that the Chinese Room
> >> COULD POSSIBLY be conscious or do you think that it COULD NOT POSSIBLY
> >> be conscious?
> >
> >
> > NO ROOM CAN BE CONSCIOUS. NO BODY CAN BE CONSCIOUS. NO FORM CAN BE
> > CONSCIOUS.*
> >
> > *Except within the fictional narrative of a conscious experience. Puppets
> > can seem conscious. Doors, door-knobs, and Chinese rooms can SEEM to be
> > conscious.
>
> Do you think Barack Obama is conscious? If you do, then in whatever sense 
> you understand that, can the Chinese Room also be conscious? Or do you 
> think that is impossible?
>

Yes, I think that Barack Obama is conscious, because he is different from a 
building or machine. Buildings and machines cannot be conscious, just as 
pictures of people drinking pictures of water do no experience relief from 
thirst.
 

>
> >> Or do you claim that the question is meaningless, a
> >> category error (which ironically is a term beloved of positivists)? If
> >> the latter, how is it that the question can be meaningfully asked
> >> about humans but not the Chinese Room?
> >
> >
> > Because humans are not human bodies. We don't have to doubt that humans 
> are
> > conscious, as to do so would be to admit that we humans are the ones
> > choosing to do the doubting and therefore are a priori certainly 
> conscious.
> > Bodies do not deserve the benefit of the doubt, since they remain when we
> > are personally unconscious or dear. That does not mean, however, that our
> > body is not itself composed on lower and lower levels by microphenomenal
> > experiences which only seem to us at the macro level to be forms and
> > functionsthey are forms and functions relative to our
> > perceptual-relativistic distance from their level of description. Since
> > there is no distance between our experience and ourselves, we experience
> > ourselves in every way that it can be experienced without being outside 
> of
> > itself, and are therefore not limited to mathematical descriptions. The 
> sole
> > purpose of mathematical descriptions are to generalize measurements - to
> > make phenomena distant and quantified.
>
> Wouldn't the Chinese Room also say the same things, i.e. "We Chinese Rooms 
> don't have to doubt that we are
> conscious, as to do so would be to admit that we are the ones
> choosing to do the doubting and therefore are a priori certainly 
> conscious."
>

Why would the things a doll says things make any difference? If a puppet 
moves its mouth and you hear words that seem to be coming out of it, does 
that mean that the words are true, and that they are the true words of a 
puppet?
 

>
> >> > I like my examples better than the Chinese Room, because they are
> >> > simpler:
> >> >
> >> > 1. I can type a password based on the keystrokes instead of the 
> letters
> >> > on
> >> > the keys. This way no part of the "system" needs to know the letters,
> >> > indeed, they could be removed altogether, thereby showing that data
> >> > processing does not require all of the qualia that can be associated
> >> > with
> >> > it, and therefore it follows that data processing does not necessarily
> >> > produce any or all qualia.
> >> >
> >> > 2. The functional aspects of playing cards are unrelated to the suits,
> >> > their
> >> > colors, the pictures of the royal cards, and the participation of the
> >> > players. No digital simulation of playing card games requires any
> >> > aesthetic
> >> > qualities to simulate any card game.
> >> >
> >> > 3. The difference between a game like chess and a sport like 
> basketball
> >> > is
> >> > that in chess, the game has only to do with the difficulty for the 
> human
> >> > intellect to compute all of the possibilities and prioritize them
> >> > logically.
> >> > Sports have strategy as well, but they differ fundamentally in that 
> the
> >> > real
> >> > challenge of the game is the physical execution of the moves. A 
> machine
> >> > has
> >> > no feeling so it can never participate meaningfully in a sport. It
> >> > doesn't
> >> > get tired

Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Craig Weinberg]

On Sunday, January 26, 2014 5:18:53 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 25 Jan 2014, at 15:35, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, January 25, 2014 1:41:30 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>>
>> On 25 January 2014 00:26, Craig Weinberg  wrote: 
>>
>> >> Tell me what you believe so we can be clear: 
>> >> 
>> >> My understanding is that you believe that if the parts of the Chinese 
>> >> Room don't understand Chinese, then the Chinese Room can't understand 
>> >> Chinese. Have I got this wrong? 
>> > 
>> > 
>> > The fact that the Chinese Room can't understand Chinese is not related 
>> to 
>> > its parts, but to the category error of the root assumption that forms 
>> and 
>> > functions can understand things.  I see forms and functions as one of 
>> the 
>> > effects of experience, not as a cause of them. 
>>
>> But that doesn't answer the question: do you think (or understand, or 
>> whatever you think the appropriate term is) that the Chinese Room 
>> COULD POSSIBLY be conscious or do you think that it COULD NOT POSSIBLY 
>> be conscious?
>
>
> NO ROOM CAN BE CONSCIOUS. NO BODY CAN BE CONSCIOUS. NO FORM CAN BE 
> CONSCIOUS.*
>
>
> I agree.
>

Cool.
 

>
>
>
> *Except within the fictional narrative of a conscious experience. Puppets 
> can seem conscious. Doors, door-knobs, and Chinese rooms can SEEM to be 
> conscious.
>
>
> You do the Searle error. The fact that the room/body form is not conscious 
> does not entail that the narrative is fictional. If the room simulates the 
> person at its right level, it can manifest the real abstract person related 
> to the narrative.
>

That makes perfect sense to me, but it makes more sense that it is a 
mistake. It assumes the information-theoretic ground of being in which 
simulation is possible. My understanding is that this is not only precisely 
the opposite of the whole truth, which is that all awareness is grounded in 
the unprecedented, unrepeatable, and unique, but that the inverted 
assumption of comp is actually incapable of detecting its own error. This 
blindness is what is being reflected in its projections of first person 
machine denial of mechanism. There is no level of simulation, because 
simulation itself is a theory which mistakes local sensory approximation 
for universal interchangeability. It makes the mistake of imposing the 
specially blunted aesthetics of functionalism onto the aesthetic totality.
 

>
> With your body or form is a sort of zombie. It does no more think than a 
> car. But the owner of the body can think, and use his body to manifest his 
> thinking (which is really "done" in platonia) relatively to its most 
> probable continuations in Platonia.
>

I think that the owners of my body look like cells to me. I am a 
contributor to their experience, and other, greater owners of my lifetime 
likely contribute to my experience. 


>
>
>
>  
>
>> Or do you claim that the question is meaningless, a 
>> category error (which ironically is a term beloved of positivists)? If 
>> the latter, how is it that the question can be meaningfully asked 
>> about humans but not the Chinese Room? 
>>
>
> Because humans are not human bodies. 
>
>
> We agree on this. 
>
> Ok
 

>
> We don't have to doubt that humans are conscious, as to do so would be to 
> admit that we humans are the ones choosing to do the doubting and therefore 
> are a priori certainly conscious. 
>
>
> OK.
>
>
> Bodies do not deserve the benefit of the doubt, since they remain when we 
> are personally unconscious or dear. That does not mean, however, that our 
> body is not itself composed on lower and lower levels by microphenomenal 
> experiences which only seem to us at the macro level to be forms and 
> functionsthey are forms and functions relative to our 
> perceptual-relativistic distance from their level of description. Since 
> there is no distance between our experience and ourselves, we experience 
> ourselves in every way that it can be experienced without being outside of 
> itself, and are therefore not limited to mathematical descriptions. The 
> sole purpose of mathematical descriptions are to generalize measurements - 
> to make phenomena distant and quantified.
>
>
> No problem with this.
>

Ok
 

>
>
>
>
>> > I like my examples better than the Chinese Room, because they are 
>> simpler: 
>> > 
>> > 1. I can type a password based on the keystrokes instead of the letters 
>> on 
>> > the keys. This way no part of the "system&quo

Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Bruno Marchal]

On 27 Jan 2014, at 06:07, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Saturday, January 25, 2014 11:36:11 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:


On 26 January 2014 01:35, Craig Weinberg   
wrote:


>> But that doesn't answer the question: do you think (or  
understand, or

>> whatever you think the appropriate term is) that the Chinese Room
>> COULD POSSIBLY be conscious or do you think that it COULD NOT  
POSSIBLY

>> be conscious?
>
>
> NO ROOM CAN BE CONSCIOUS. NO BODY CAN BE CONSCIOUS. NO FORM CAN BE
> CONSCIOUS.*
>
> *Except within the fictional narrative of a conscious experience.  
Puppets
> can seem conscious. Doors, door-knobs, and Chinese rooms can SEEM  
to be

> conscious.

Do you think Barack Obama is conscious? If you do, then in whatever  
sense you understand that, can the Chinese Room also be conscious?  
Or do you think that is impossible?


Yes, I think that Barack Obama is conscious, because he is different  
from a building or machine. Buildings and machines cannot be  
conscious, just as pictures of people drinking pictures of water do  
no experience relief from thirst.


To compare a brain with a machine can make sense.
To compare a brain with a picture cannot.

Bruno






>> Or do you claim that the question is meaningless, a
>> category error (which ironically is a term beloved of  
positivists)? If

>> the latter, how is it that the question can be meaningfully asked
>> about humans but not the Chinese Room?
>
>
> Because humans are not human bodies. We don't have to doubt that  
humans are

> conscious, as to do so would be to admit that we humans are the ones
> choosing to do the doubting and therefore are a priori certainly  
conscious.
> Bodies do not deserve the benefit of the doubt, since they remain  
when we
> are personally unconscious or dear. That does not mean, however,  
that our
> body is not itself composed on lower and lower levels by  
microphenomenal

> experiences which only seem to us at the macro level to be forms and
> functionsthey are forms and functions relative to our
> perceptual-relativistic distance from their level of description.  
Since
> there is no distance between our experience and ourselves, we  
experience
> ourselves in every way that it can be experienced without being  
outside of
> itself, and are therefore not limited to mathematical  
descriptions. The sole
> purpose of mathematical descriptions are to generalize  
measurements - to

> make phenomena distant and quantified.

Wouldn't the Chinese Room also say the same things, i.e. "We Chinese  
Rooms don't have to doubt that we are

conscious, as to do so would be to admit that we are the ones
choosing to do the doubting and therefore are a priori certainly  
conscious."


Why would the things a doll says things make any difference? If a  
puppet moves its mouth and you hear words that seem to be coming out  
of it, does that mean that the words are true, and that they are the  
true words of a puppet?



>> > I like my examples better than the Chinese Room, because they are
>> > simpler:
>> >
>> > 1. I can type a password based on the keystrokes instead of the  
letters

>> > on
>> > the keys. This way no part of the "system" needs to know the  
letters,
>> > indeed, they could be removed altogether, thereby showing that  
data
>> > processing does not require all of the qualia that can be  
associated

>> > with
>> > it, and therefore it follows that data processing does not  
necessarily

>> > produce any or all qualia.
>> >
>> > 2. The functional aspects of playing cards are unrelated to the  
suits,

>> > their
>> > colors, the pictures of the royal cards, and the participation  
of the

>> > players. No digital simulation of playing card games requires any
>> > aesthetic
>> > qualities to simulate any card game.
>> >
>> > 3. The difference between a game like chess and a sport like  
basketball

>> > is
>> > that in chess, the game has only to do with the difficulty for  
the human

>> > intellect to compute all of the possibilities and prioritize them
>> > logically.
>> > Sports have strategy as well, but they differ fundamentally in  
that the

>> > real
>> > challenge of the game is the physical execution of the moves. A  
machine

>> > has
>> > no feeling so it can never participate meaningfully in a sport.  
It

>> > doesn't
>> > get tired or feel pain, it need not attempt to accomplish  
something that

>> > it
>> > cannot accomplish, etc. If chess were a sport, completing each  
move

>> > would be
>> > subject to the p

Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Bruno Marchal]

On 27 Jan 2014, at 06:28, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Sunday, January 26, 2014 5:18:53 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 25 Jan 2014, at 15:35, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Saturday, January 25, 2014 1:41:30 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
On 25 January 2014 00:26, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>> Tell me what you believe so we can be clear:
>>
>> My understanding is that you believe that if the parts of the  
Chinese
>> Room don't understand Chinese, then the Chinese Room can't  
understand

>> Chinese. Have I got this wrong?
>
>
> The fact that the Chinese Room can't understand Chinese is not  
related to
> its parts, but to the category error of the root assumption that  
forms and
> functions can understand things.  I see forms and functions as  
one of the

> effects of experience, not as a cause of them.

But that doesn't answer the question: do you think (or understand, or
whatever you think the appropriate term is) that the Chinese Room
COULD POSSIBLY be conscious or do you think that it COULD NOT  
POSSIBLY

be conscious?

NO ROOM CAN BE CONSCIOUS. NO BODY CAN BE CONSCIOUS. NO FORM CAN BE  
CONSCIOUS.*


I agree.

Cool.





*Except within the fictional narrative of a conscious experience.  
Puppets can seem conscious. Doors, door-knobs, and Chinese rooms  
can SEEM to be conscious.


You do the Searle error. The fact that the room/body form is not  
conscious does not entail that the narrative is fictional. If the  
room simulates the person at its right level, it can manifest the  
real abstract person related to the narrative.


That makes perfect sense to me, but it makes more sense that it is a  
mistake. It assumes the information-theoretic ground of being in  
which simulation is possible.


That is arithmetic. yes we assume things like 0+1=1, etc.



My understanding is that this is not only precisely the opposite of  
the whole truth, which is that all awareness is grounded in the  
unprecedented, unrepeatable, and unique,


If you know the truth; there is nothing we can do for you.



but that the inverted assumption of comp is actually incapable of  
detecting its own error.



The point is that it can, but not by introspection. Just by comparing  
the comp physics and the inferred physics.




This blindness is what is being reflected in its projections of  
first person machine denial of mechanism.


?
To be clear, 1p is not denied. It plays indeed the key role in the  
whole UDA.
Then the math recover it Through the arithmetical translation of  
Theaetetus idea, and this is made possible by machine's incompleteness.




There is no level of simulation, because simulation itself is a  
theory which mistakes local sensory approximation for universal  
interchangeability.


Well, that is the comp bet. You just assert non)comp here, without an  
argument.





It makes the mistake of imposing the specially blunted aesthetics of  
functionalism onto the aesthetic totality.


That's no better than Jacques Arsac argument: "i am catholic, so i  
can't believe that a machine will ever think".






With your body or form is a sort of zombie. It does no more think  
than a car. But the owner of the body can think, and use his body to  
manifest his thinking (which is really "done" in platonia)  
relatively to its most probable continuations in Platonia.


I think that the owners of my body look like cells to me. I am a  
contributor to their experience, and other, greater owners of my  
lifetime likely contribute to my experience.








Or do you claim that the question is meaningless, a
category error (which ironically is a term beloved of positivists)?  
If

the latter, how is it that the question can be meaningfully asked
about humans but not the Chinese Room?

Because humans are not human bodies.


We agree on this.

Ok


We don't have to doubt that humans are conscious, as to do so would  
be to admit that we humans are the ones choosing to do the doubting  
and therefore are a priori certainly conscious.


OK.


Bodies do not deserve the benefit of the doubt, since they remain  
when we are personally unconscious or dear. That does not mean,  
however, that our body is not itself composed on lower and lower  
levels by microphenomenal experiences which only seem to us at the  
macro level to be forms and functionsthey are forms and  
functions relative to our perceptual-relativistic distance from  
their level of description. Since there is no distance between our  
experience and ourselves, we experience ourselves in every way that  
it can be experienced without being outside of itself, and are  
therefore not limited to mathematical descriptions. The sole  
purpose of mathematical descriptions are to generalize measurements  
- to make phenomena distant and quantified.


No problem with this.

Ok






> I like my examples better than the Chinese Room, because they are  
sim

Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, January 27, 2014 5:57:55 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 27 Jan 2014, at 06:07, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, January 25, 2014 11:36:11 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 26 January 2014 01:35, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>
>> >> But that doesn't answer the question: do you think (or understand, or
>> >> whatever you think the appropriate term is) that the Chinese Room
>> >> COULD POSSIBLY be conscious or do you think that it COULD NOT POSSIBLY
>> >> be conscious?
>> >
>> >
>> > NO ROOM CAN BE CONSCIOUS. NO BODY CAN BE CONSCIOUS. NO FORM CAN BE
>> > CONSCIOUS.*
>> >
>> > *Except within the fictional narrative of a conscious experience. 
>> Puppets
>> > can seem conscious. Doors, door-knobs, and Chinese rooms can SEEM to be
>> > conscious.
>>
>> Do you think Barack Obama is conscious? If you do, then in whatever sense 
>> you understand that, can the Chinese Room also be conscious? Or do you 
>> think that is impossible?
>>
>
> Yes, I think that Barack Obama is conscious, because he is different from 
> a building or machine. Buildings and machines cannot be conscious, just as 
> pictures of people drinking pictures of water do no experience relief from 
> thirst.
>
>
> To compare a brain with a machine can make sense.
> To compare a brain with a picture cannot.
>

It depends what the picture is doing. If you have a collection of detailed 
pictures of brains, and you organize them so that they are shown in 
different sequences according to some computation, isn't that a simulation 
of a brain?

In either case, consciousness makes no more sense as part of a brain or a 
machine than a picture. Machines are like 4D pictures. One picture or form 
leads to another and another, and if there were some interpreter they could 
infer a logic to those transitions, but there is nothing in the machine 
which would itself lead from unconsciousness to awareness.

Craig


> Bruno
>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>> >> Or do you claim that the question is meaningless, a
>> >> category error (which ironically is a term beloved of positivists)? If
>> >> the latter, how is it that the question can be meaningfully asked
>> >> about humans but not the Chinese Room?
>> >
>> >
>> > Because humans are not human bodies. We don't have to doubt that humans 
>> are
>> > conscious, as to do so would be to admit that we humans are the ones
>> > choosing to do the doubting and therefore are a priori certainly 
>> conscious.
>> > Bodies do not deserve the benefit of the doubt, since they remain when 
>> we
>> > are personally unconscious or dear. That does not mean, however, that 
>> our
>> > body is not itself composed on lower and lower levels by microphenomenal
>> > experiences which only seem to us at the macro level to be forms and
>> > functionsthey are forms and functions relative to our
>> > perceptual-relativistic distance from their level of description. Since
>> > there is no distance between our experience and ourselves, we experience
>> > ourselves in every way that it can be experienced without being outside 
>> of
>> > itself, and are therefore not limited to mathematical descriptions. The 
>> sole
>> > purpose of mathematical descriptions are to generalize measurements - to
>> > make phenomena distant and quantified.
>>
>> Wouldn't the Chinese Room also say the same things, i.e. "We Chinese 
>> Rooms don't have to doubt that we are
>> conscious, as to do so would be to admit that we are the ones
>> choosing to do the doubting and therefore are a priori certainly 
>> conscious."
>>
>
> Why would the things a doll says things make any difference? If a puppet 
> moves its mouth and you hear words that seem to be coming out of it, does 
> that mean that the words are true, and that they are the true words of a 
> puppet?
>  
>
>>
>> >> > I like my examples better than the Chinese Room, because they are
>> >> > simpler:
>> >> >
>> >> > 1. I can type a password based on the keystrokes instead of the 
>> letters
>> >> > on
>> >> > the keys. This way no part of the "system" needs to know the letters,
>> >> > indeed, they could be removed altogether, thereby showing that data
>> >> > processing does not require all of the qualia that can be associated
>> >> > with
>> >>

Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Craig Weinberg]

>>
>> With your body or form is a sort of zombie. It does no more think than a 
>> car. But the owner of the body can think, and use his body to manifest his 
>> thinking (which is really "done" in platonia) relatively to its most 
>> probable continuations in Platonia.
>>
>
> I think that the owners of my body look like cells to me. I am a 
> contributor to their experience, and other, greater owners of my lifetime 
> likely contribute to my experience. 
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>>> Or do you claim that the question is meaningless, a 
>>> category error (which ironically is a term beloved of positivists)? If 
>>> the latter, how is it that the question can be meaningfully asked 
>>> about humans but not the Chinese Room? 
>>>
>>
>> Because humans are not human bodies. 
>>
>>
>> We agree on this. 
>>
>> Ok
>  
>
>>
>> We don't have to doubt that humans are conscious, as to do so would be to 
>> admit that we humans are the ones choosing to do the doubting and therefore 
>> are a priori certainly conscious. 
>>
>>
>> OK.
>>
>>
>> Bodies do not deserve the benefit of the doubt, since they remain when we 
>> are personally unconscious or dear. That does not mean, however, that our 
>> body is not itself composed on lower and lower levels by microphenomenal 
>> experiences which only seem to us at the macro level to be forms and 
>> functionsthey are forms and functions relative to our 
>> perceptual-relativistic distance from their level of description. Since 
>> there is no distance between our experience and ourselves, we experience 
>> ourselves in every way that it can be experienced without being outside of 
>> itself, and are therefore not limited to mathematical descriptions. The 
>> sole purpose of mathematical descriptions are to generalize measurements - 
>> to make phenomena distant and quantified.
>>
>>
>> No problem with this.
>>
>
> Ok
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> > I like my examples better than the Chinese Room, because they are 
>>> simpler: 
>>> > 
>>> > 1. I can type a password based on the keystrokes instead of the 
>>> letters on 
>>> > the keys. This way no part of the "system" needs to know the letters, 
>>> > indeed, they could be removed altogether, thereby showing that data 
>>> > processing does not require all of the qualia that can be associated 
>>> with 
>>> > it, and therefore it follows that data processing does not necessarily 
>>> > produce any or all qualia. 
>>> > 
>>> > 2. The functional aspects of playing cards are unrelated to the suits, 
>>> their 
>>> > colors, the pictures of the royal cards, and the participation of the 
>>> > players. No digital simulation of playing card games requires any 
>>> aesthetic 
>>> > qualities to simulate any card game. 
>>> > 
>>> > 3. The difference between a game like chess and a sport like 
>>> basketball is 
>>> > that in chess, the game has only to do with the difficulty for the 
>>> human 
>>> > intellect to compute all of the possibilities and prioritize them 
>>> logically. 
>>> > Sports have strategy as well, but they differ fundamentally in that 
>>> the real 
>>> > challenge of the game is the physical execution of the moves. A 
>>> machine has 
>>> > no feeling so it can never participate meaningfully in a sport. It 
>>> doesn't 
>>> > get tired or feel pain, it need not attempt to accomplish something 
>>> that it 
>>> > cannot accomplish, etc. If chess were a sport, completing each move 
>>> would be 
>>> > subject to the possibility of failure and surprise, and the end can 
>>> never 
>>> > result in checkmate, since there is always the chance of weaker pieces 
>>> > getting lucky and overpowering the strong. There is no Cinderella 
>>> Story in 
>>> > real chess, the winning strategy always wins because there can be no 
>>> > difference between theory and reality in an information-theoretic 
>>> universe. 
>>>
>>> How can you start a sentence "a machine has no feeling so..." and 
>>> purport to discuss the question of whether a machine can have feeling? 
>>>
>>> > So no, I do not "believe" this, I understand it. I do not 

Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[LizR]

On 28 January 2014 10:59, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>
> I think that 0+1=1 already requires consciousness. If we assume that from
>> the start, then all further argument is begging the question. If something
>> can 'equal' something else, then consciousness is unnecessary.
>>
>> Could you explain? (I don't understand what's being said in any of the
three sentences above, so would appreciate a "blow by blow" explanation if
that's OK).

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, January 27, 2014 5:24:06 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>
> On 28 January 2014 10:59, Craig Weinberg 
> > wrote:
>
>>
>> I think that 0+1=1 already requires consciousness. If we assume that from 
>>> the start, then all further argument is begging the question. If something 
>>> can 'equal' something else, then consciousness is unnecessary.
>>>
>>> Could you explain? (I don't understand what's being said in any of the 
> three sentences above, so would appreciate a "blow by blow" explanation if 
> that's OK).
>
>
By saying that 0+1=1 already requires consciousness, I mean that all 
mathematical expressions are intentional communication of a conscious 
appreciation of symbolic relations. If we start with disembodied 
mathematical concepts as realities in their own right, then we are 
automatically smuggling in all kinds of assumptions about what the universe 
comes with out of the box. Integers, operators, and equivalence are the end 
result of a kind of manufacturing process which includes a lot of 
ontological raw materials; sequence, representation, symmetry, 
universality, ideal objects, participation in manipulating formulas...lots 
of things which have no plausible origin within mathematics. They are all 
figures of experience which are valid because of aesthetic familiarity - 
because of the sense that cognitive awareness furnishes us with. If math 
can do all of that by itself, then an additional type of 'consciousness' 
would be redundant.


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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[LizR]

On 28 January 2014 17:35, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>
> On Monday, January 27, 2014 5:24:06 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>
>> On 28 January 2014 10:59, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> I think that 0+1=1 already requires consciousness. If we assume that
 from the start, then all further argument is begging the question. If
 something can 'equal' something else, then consciousness is unnecessary.

 Could you explain? (I don't understand what's being said in any of the
>> three sentences above, so would appreciate a "blow by blow" explanation if
>> that's OK).
>>
>> By saying that 0+1=1 already requires consciousness, I mean that all
> mathematical expressions are intentional communication of a conscious
> appreciation of symbolic relations.
>

In itself, that looks like a confusion of the map with the territory.
Fortunately, however, you have a lot more to say on the subject...


> If we start with disembodied mathematical concepts as realities in their
> own right, then we are automatically smuggling in all kinds of assumptions
> about what the universe comes with out of the box. Integers, operators, and
> equivalence are the end result of a kind of manufacturing process which
> includes a lot of ontological raw materials; sequence, representation,
> symmetry, universality, ideal objects, participation in manipulating
> formulas...lots of things which have no plausible origin within
> mathematics. They are all figures of experience which are valid because of
> aesthetic familiarity - because of the sense that cognitive awareness
> furnishes us with. If math can do all of that by itself, then an additional
> type of 'consciousness' would be redundant.
>
> That's a good point.

At a slight tangent, it seems possible that the universe has some of these
concepts built in (in some sense). This isn't an objection to what you're
saying, but maybe it should be borne in mind, in case these are somehow
indicative of what can be considered primitive...

Equivalence - all electrons (say) appear to be identical.

Counting - a BEC (for example) does a sort of simple arithmetic, in that
the universe keeps track of the number of objects involved even when they
aren't even in theory distinguishable.

Symmetry - as I'm sure you know there all lots of examples of this in
physics. All the conservation laws (energy, momentum, etc) can be expressed
in terms of symmetries.

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Bruno Marchal]

On 27 Jan 2014, at 22:22, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Monday, January 27, 2014 5:57:55 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 27 Jan 2014, at 06:07, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Saturday, January 25, 2014 11:36:11 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:


On 26 January 2014 01:35, Craig Weinberg   
wrote:


>> But that doesn't answer the question: do you think (or  
understand, or

>> whatever you think the appropriate term is) that the Chinese Room
>> COULD POSSIBLY be conscious or do you think that it COULD NOT  
POSSIBLY

>> be conscious?
>
>
> NO ROOM CAN BE CONSCIOUS. NO BODY CAN BE CONSCIOUS. NO FORM CAN BE
> CONSCIOUS.*
>
> *Except within the fictional narrative of a conscious experience.  
Puppets
> can seem conscious. Doors, door-knobs, and Chinese rooms can SEEM  
to be

> conscious.

Do you think Barack Obama is conscious? If you do, then in whatever  
sense you understand that, can the Chinese Room also be conscious?  
Or do you think that is impossible?


Yes, I think that Barack Obama is conscious, because he is  
different from a building or machine. Buildings and machines cannot  
be conscious, just as pictures of people drinking pictures of water  
do no experience relief from thirst.


To compare a brain with a machine can make sense.
To compare a brain with a picture cannot.

It depends what the picture is doing. If you have a collection of  
detailed pictures of brains, and you organize them so that they are  
shown in different sequences according to some computation, isn't  
that a simulation of a brain?


It is not. It is a description of a computation, not a computation.  
The computation is in the logical relation, which includes the  
counterfactuals.
Now, we do describe computation by some description, and so this  
confusion is frequent. But it is the same type of confusion between  
ciphers and numbers. Ciphers and sequence of ciphers are not numbers.  
It is the cionfusion between "345" and 345.





In either case, consciousness makes no more sense as part of a brain  
or a machine than a picture.


Right. We agree on that. But a brain can locally manifest a person. A  
picture cannot. You can't implement it in a computer, in the sense of  
implementing a program, which then can manifest a person.




Machines are like 4D pictures. One picture or form leads to another  
and another, and if there were some interpreter they could infer a  
logic to those transitions, but there is nothing in the machine  
which would itself lead from unconsciousness to awareness.


No, but the machine can still enact it.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Bruno Marchal]

that a machine will ever think".


It's the argument that makes the most sense, given the assumption  
that sense is primordial and function is derived.


Then you do phenomenological hermeneutics. I am OK with this, unless  
you use it to deny comp, as this cannot work. What you think and feel  
cannot be used against the idea that some others feel or does not feel.











With your body or form is a sort of zombie. It does no more think  
than a car. But the owner of the body can think, and use his body  
to manifest his thinking (which is really "done" in platonia)  
relatively to its most probable continuations in Platonia.


I think that the owners of my body look like cells to me. I am a  
contributor to their experience, and other, greater owners of my  
lifetime likely contribute to my experience.








Or do you claim that the question is meaningless, a
category error (which ironically is a term beloved of  
positivists)? If

the latter, how is it that the question can be meaningfully asked
about humans but not the Chinese Room?

Because humans are not human bodies.


We agree on this.

Ok


We don't have to doubt that humans are conscious, as to do so  
would be to admit that we humans are the ones choosing to do the  
doubting and therefore are a priori certainly conscious.


OK.


Bodies do not deserve the benefit of the doubt, since they remain  
when we are personally unconscious or dear. That does not mean,  
however, that our body is not itself composed on lower and lower  
levels by microphenomenal experiences which only seem to us at the  
macro level to be forms and functionsthey are forms and  
functions relative to our perceptual-relativistic distance from  
their level of description. Since there is no distance between our  
experience and ourselves, we experience ourselves in every way  
that it can be experienced without being outside of itself, and  
are therefore not limited to mathematical descriptions. The sole  
purpose of mathematical descriptions are to generalize  
measurements - to make phenomena distant and quantified.


No problem with this.

Ok






> I like my examples better than the Chinese Room, because they  
are simpler:

>
> 1. I can type a password based on the keystrokes instead of the  
letters on
> the keys. This way no part of the "system" needs to know the  
letters,
> indeed, they could be removed altogether, thereby showing that  
data
> processing does not require all of the qualia that can be  
associated with
> it, and therefore it follows that data processing does not  
necessarily

> produce any or all qualia.
>
> 2. The functional aspects of playing cards are unrelated to the  
suits, their
> colors, the pictures of the royal cards, and the participation  
of the
> players. No digital simulation of playing card games requires  
any aesthetic

> qualities to simulate any card game.
>
> 3. The difference between a game like chess and a sport like  
basketball is
> that in chess, the game has only to do with the difficulty for  
the human
> intellect to compute all of the possibilities and prioritize  
them logically.
> Sports have strategy as well, but they differ fundamentally in  
that the real
> challenge of the game is the physical execution of the moves. A  
machine has
> no feeling so it can never participate meaningfully in a sport.  
It doesn't
> get tired or feel pain, it need not attempt to accomplish  
something that it
> cannot accomplish, etc. If chess were a sport, completing each  
move would be
> subject to the possibility of failure and surprise, and the end  
can never
> result in checkmate, since there is always the chance of weaker  
pieces
> getting lucky and overpowering the strong. There is no  
Cinderella Story in
> real chess, the winning strategy always wins because there can  
be no
> difference between theory and reality in an information- 
theoretic universe.


How can you start a sentence "a machine has no feeling so..." and
purport to discuss the question of whether a machine can have  
feeling?


> So no, I do not "believe" this, I understand it. I do not think  
that the
> Chinese Room is valid because wholes must be identical to their  
parts. The
> Chinese Room is valid because it can (if you let it) illustrate  
that the
> difference between understanding and processing is a difference  
in kind
> rather than a difference in degree. Technically, it is a  
difference in kind
> going one way (from the quantitative to the qualitative) and a  
difference in
> degree going the other way. You can reduce a sport to a game (as  
in computer
> basketball) but you can't turn a video game into a sport unless  
you bring in
> hardware that is physical/aesthetic rather than programmatic.  
Which leads me

> to:

The Chinese Room argument is valid 

Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Bruno Marchal]

On 28 Jan 2014, at 07:52, LizR wrote:

On 28 January 2014 17:35, Craig Weinberg   
wrote:

On Monday, January 27, 2014 5:24:06 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
On 28 January 2014 10:59, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

I think that 0+1=1 already requires consciousness. If we assume that  
from the start, then all further argument is begging the question.  
If something can 'equal' something else, then consciousness is  
unnecessary.


Could you explain? (I don't understand what's being said in any of  
the three sentences above, so would appreciate a "blow by blow"  
explanation if that's OK).


By saying that 0+1=1 already requires consciousness, I mean that all  
mathematical expressions are intentional communication of a  
conscious appreciation of symbolic relations.


In itself, that looks like a confusion of the map with the  
territory. Fortunately, however, you have a lot more to say on the  
subject...


If we start with disembodied mathematical concepts as realities in  
their own right, then we are automatically smuggling in all kinds of  
assumptions about what the universe comes with out of the box.  
Integers, operators, and equivalence are the end result of a kind of  
manufacturing process which includes a lot of ontological raw  
materials; sequence, representation, symmetry, universality, ideal  
objects, participation in manipulating formulas...lots of things  
which have no plausible origin within mathematics.


False. We know now that arithmetic is full of mathematicians. That is  
the essence of Gödel discovery (not just in the light of  
computationalism). This is brought from Gödel understanding that  
arithmetic already do meta-arithmetic. More on this later, probably.




They are all figures of experience which are valid because of  
aesthetic familiarity - because of the sense that cognitive  
awareness furnishes us with. If math can do all of that by itself,  
then an additional type of 'consciousness' would be redundant.


That's a good point.


Yes. That is the mind-body problem (that some physicalist call "hard  
problem of consciousness", but I prefer the more neutral standard  
expression in philosophy of mind).


Bruno




At a slight tangent, it seems possible that the universe has some of  
these concepts built in (in some sense). This isn't an objection to  
what you're saying, but maybe it should be borne in mind, in case  
these are somehow indicative of what can be considered primitive...


Equivalence - all electrons (say) appear to be identical.

Counting - a BEC (for example) does a sort of simple arithmetic, in  
that the universe keeps track of the number of objects involved even  
when they aren't even in theory distinguishable.


Symmetry - as I'm sure you know there all lots of examples of this  
in physics. All the conservation laws (energy, momentum, etc) can be  
expressed in terms of symmetries.



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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, January 28, 2014 5:23:02 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 27 Jan 2014, at 22:22, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, January 27, 2014 5:57:55 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 27 Jan 2014, at 06:07, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, January 25, 2014 11:36:11 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 26 January 2014 01:35, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>>
>>> >> But that doesn't answer the question: do you think (or understand, or
>>> >> whatever you think the appropriate term is) that the Chinese Room
>>> >> COULD POSSIBLY be conscious or do you think that it COULD NOT POSSIBLY
>>> >> be conscious?
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > NO ROOM CAN BE CONSCIOUS. NO BODY CAN BE CONSCIOUS. NO FORM CAN BE
>>> > CONSCIOUS.*
>>> >
>>> > *Except within the fictional narrative of a conscious experience. 
>>> Puppets
>>> > can seem conscious. Doors, door-knobs, and Chinese rooms can SEEM to be
>>> > conscious.
>>>
>>> Do you think Barack Obama is conscious? If you do, then in whatever 
>>> sense you understand that, can the Chinese Room also be conscious? Or do 
>>> you think that is impossible?
>>>
>>
>> Yes, I think that Barack Obama is conscious, because he is different from 
>> a building or machine. Buildings and machines cannot be conscious, just as 
>> pictures of people drinking pictures of water do no experience relief from 
>> thirst.
>>
>>
>> To compare a brain with a machine can make sense.
>> To compare a brain with a picture cannot.
>>
>
> It depends what the picture is doing. If you have a collection of detailed 
> pictures of brains, and you organize them so that they are shown in 
> different sequences according to some computation, isn't that a simulation 
> of a brain?
>
>
> It is not. It is a description of a computation, not a computation. The 
> computation is in the logical relation, which includes the counterfactuals.
>

But the counterfactuals are theoretical rather than realistic. The 
computation is like an Escher drawing, it can do things that would be 
impossible for a real brain and cannot do or be real in ways that a brain 
must necessarily be. A picture is just the next step in abstraction toward 
the sub-theoretical, but it is actually one step more concrete in aesthetic 
realism. A real picture of a triangle is closer to consciousness than a 
computation for the Mandelbot Set, which is only a theory until it is 
presented graphically to a visual participant.
 

> Now, we do describe computation by some description, and so this confusion 
> is frequent. But it is the same type of confusion between ciphers and 
> numbers. Ciphers and sequence of ciphers are not numbers. It is the 
> cionfusion between "345" and 345.
>

Both "345" and 345 are still pictures. They can only be made meaningful 
when they are associated by a sensory experience in which some aesthetic 
content or expectation can be labelled with a string or value.
 

>
>
>
> In either case, consciousness makes no more sense as part of a brain or a 
> machine than a picture. 
>
>
> Right. We agree on that. But a brain can locally manifest a person. 
>

I don't think it can. A tip cannot locally manifest an iceberg. A cookie 
cutter cannot manifest a cookie.
 

> A picture cannot. You can't implement it in a computer, in the sense of 
> implementing a program, which then can manifest a person.
>

Right, because nothing can manifest a person except the complete history of 
experiences of Homo sapiens. 


>
>
> Machines are like 4D pictures. One picture or form leads to another and 
> another, and if there were some interpreter they could infer a logic to 
> those transitions, but there is nothing in the machine which would itself 
> lead from unconsciousness to awareness.
>
>
> No, but the machine can still enact it. 
>

What the machine enacts is an impersonal performance of personhood, not a 
person. 

Craig


> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, January 28, 2014 1:52:47 AM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>
> On 28 January 2014 17:35, Craig Weinberg 
> > wrote:
>>
>> On Monday, January 27, 2014 5:24:06 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>>
>>> On 28 January 2014 10:59, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>>

 I think that 0+1=1 already requires consciousness. If we assume that 
> from the start, then all further argument is begging the question. If 
> something can 'equal' something else, then consciousness is unnecessary.
>
> Could you explain? (I don't understand what's being said in any of the 
>>> three sentences above, so would appreciate a "blow by blow" explanation if 
>>> that's OK).
>>>
>>> By saying that 0+1=1 already requires consciousness, I mean that all 
>> mathematical expressions are intentional communication of a conscious 
>> appreciation of symbolic relations.
>>
>
> In itself, that looks like a confusion of the map with the territory. 
> Fortunately, however, you have a lot more to say on the subject...
>  
>
>>  If we start with disembodied mathematical concepts as realities in their 
>> own right, then we are automatically smuggling in all kinds of assumptions 
>> about what the universe comes with out of the box. Integers, operators, and 
>> equivalence are the end result of a kind of manufacturing process which 
>> includes a lot of ontological raw materials; sequence, representation, 
>> symmetry, universality, ideal objects, participation in manipulating 
>> formulas...lots of things which have no plausible origin within 
>> mathematics. They are all figures of experience which are valid because of 
>> aesthetic familiarity - because of the sense that cognitive awareness 
>> furnishes us with. If math can do all of that by itself, then an additional 
>> type of 'consciousness' would be redundant.
>>
>> That's a good point. 
>
> At a slight tangent, it seems possible that the universe has some of these 
> concepts built in (in some sense). This isn't an objection to what you're 
> saying, but maybe it should be borne in mind, in case these are somehow 
> indicative of what can be considered primitive...
>

Yes exactly. I would say that *our kind of view* of the totality includes 
the appearance of those concepts being built in to the universe. Locally 
that is true, just as locally it seems to me that the meaning of these 
letters and words as English language is now, as an adult, part of the 
scenery. I think that because mathematical relations are almost completely 
primitive, they appear almost as a shadow of what is absolutely primitive, 
which is sense itself. Being that it is more primitive than space or time 
(which, as Bruno suggests, are mathematically derived), math is eternal and 
instantaneous relative to our awareness. Our local frame of reference is 
nested within schemas which are both larger and smaller: 
astrophysics-QM<>geology-chemistry<>evolution-microbiology<>zoology-physiology<>anthropology-neurology.
 
The position of our frame of reference flattens the more distant frames as 
they occur on scales which are too remote, too fast and too slow, for us to 
relate to as consciousness.


> Equivalence - all electrons (say) appear to be identical.
>

The more remote the frame of reference (for us, Astrophysics and QM are the 
most remote), the more generic and mechanical appearances tend to be. The 
electron itself may not even be 'real' so much as perceptual 'fill-in' from 
those remote levels. There may not be individual electrons at all, but more 
of a stereotype of a whole category of low level experiences which are, 
ontologically, none of our business.
 

>
> Counting - a BEC (for example) does a sort of simple arithmetic, in that 
> the universe keeps track of the number of objects involved even when they 
> aren't even in theory distinguishable.
>

Sure, the universe keeps track of everything. It is only our nested 
insensitivity which obscures almost everything from us. I would not say 
that the BEC *does* arithmetic, so much as the fidelity of arithmetic sense 
is preserved (as one of many layers of sense that is preserved, at or 
beneath our measurement).
 

>
> Symmetry - as I'm sure you know there all lots of examples of this in 
> physics. All the conservation laws (energy, momentum, etc) can be expressed 
> in terms of symmetries.
>

Yes, symmetry is a key principle, but it is an aesthetic phenomenon 
already. We can define symmetry in specific terms, but the presence of 
symmetry requires some aesthetic description to be realized. There can be 
no theory of symmetry without the reality of spatiotemporal experiences.

 

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, January 28, 2014 6:09:33 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 28 Jan 2014, at 07:52, LizR wrote:
>
> On 28 January 2014 17:35, Craig Weinberg 
> > wrote:
>>
>> On Monday, January 27, 2014 5:24:06 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>>
>>> On 28 January 2014 10:59, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>>

 I think that 0+1=1 already requires consciousness. If we assume that 
> from the start, then all further argument is begging the question. If 
> something can 'equal' something else, then consciousness is unnecessary.
>
> Could you explain? (I don't understand what's being said in any of the 
>>> three sentences above, so would appreciate a "blow by blow" explanation if 
>>> that's OK).
>>>
>>> By saying that 0+1=1 already requires consciousness, I mean that all 
>> mathematical expressions are intentional communication of a conscious 
>> appreciation of symbolic relations.
>>
>
> In itself, that looks like a confusion of the map with the territory. 
> Fortunately, however, you have a lot more to say on the subject...
>  
>
>>  If we start with disembodied mathematical concepts as realities in their 
>> own right, then we are automatically smuggling in all kinds of assumptions 
>> about what the universe comes with out of the box. Integers, operators, and 
>> equivalence are the end result of a kind of manufacturing process which 
>> includes a lot of ontological raw materials; sequence, representation, 
>> symmetry, universality, ideal objects, participation in manipulating 
>> formulas...lots of things which have no plausible origin within 
>> mathematics. 
>>
>
> False. We know now that arithmetic is full of mathematicians. That is the 
> essence of Gödel discovery (not just in the light of computationalism). 
> This is brought from Gödel understanding that arithmetic already do 
> meta-arithmetic. More on this later, probably.
>

>From what I have read, I suspect that Gödel would disagree. I do not think 
that incompleteness implicates consciousness within arithmetic, and in fact 
suggests the opposite - that arithmetic is not complete enough to contain 
consciousness. To say that arithmetic is full of mathematicians sounds 
unfalsifiable and arbitrary to me. At the very least it is a discovery 
which is yours and not a popular understanding within mathematics. How 
would you tell the difference between arithmetic being full of 
mathematicians and arithmetic being full of impersonal reflections of the 
mathematician?


>
>
> They are all figures of experience which are valid because of aesthetic 
>> familiarity - because of the sense that cognitive awareness furnishes us 
>> with. If math can do all of that by itself, then an additional type of 
>> 'consciousness' would be redundant.
>>
>> That's a good point. 
>
>
> Yes. That is the mind-body problem (that some physicalist call "hard 
> problem of consciousness", but I prefer the more neutral standard 
> expression in philosophy of mind).
>

If we are talking about math though, then we don't need the body. It is 
more like the mind-math problem. If you have the math, why do you need an 
aesthetic mind?

Craig
 

>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> At a slight tangent, it seems possible that the universe has some of these 
> concepts built in (in some sense). This isn't an objection to what you're 
> saying, but maybe it should be borne in mind, in case these are somehow 
> indicative of what can be considered primitive...
>
> Equivalence - all electrons (say) appear to be identical.
>
> Counting - a BEC (for example) does a sort of simple arithmetic, in that 
> the universe keeps track of the number of objects involved even when they 
> aren't even in theory distinguishable.
>
> Symmetry - as I'm sure you know there all lots of examples of this in 
> physics. All the conservation laws (energy, momentum, etc) can be expressed 
> in terms of symmetries.
>
>
> -- 
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> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com .
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>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 27 January 2014 16:07, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>> Do you think Barack Obama is conscious? If you do, then in whatever sense
>> you understand that, can the Chinese Room also be conscious? Or do you think
>> that is impossible?
>
>
> Yes, I think that Barack Obama is conscious, because he is different from a
> building or machine. Buildings and machines cannot be conscious, just as
> pictures of people drinking pictures of water do no experience relief from
> thirst.

If Barack Obama revealed that he was a machine, would that change your
view of whether machines could be conscious?

> The Chinese Room is not important. You are missing the whole point.
> Consciousness is beyond reason and cannot be discovered through evidence or
> argument, but sensory experience alone.

So the Chinese Room is conscious not through evidence or argument, but
through sensory experience alone.

>> The claim is that the consciousness of the room stands in relation to the
>> physical room as the consciousness of a person stands in relation to the
>> physical person.
>
>
> There is no 'physical person', there is a public facing body. A person is
> not a body. On one level of an animal's body there are organs which cannot
> survive independently of the body as a whole, but on another level all of
> those organs are composed of living cells which have more autonomy.
> Understanding this theme of coexisting but contrasting levels of description
> suggests that a room need not be comparable to the body of a living
> organism. Since the room is not something which naturally evolves of its own
> motives and sense, we need not assume that the level at which it appears to
> us as a room or machine is in fact the relevant level of description when
> considering its autonomy and coherence. In my view, the machine expresses
> only the lowest levels of immediate thermodynamic sensitivity according to
> the substance which is actually reacting, and the most distant levels of
> theoretical design, but with nothing in between. We do not have to pretend
> that there is no way to guess whether a doll or a cadaver might be
> conscious. With an adequate model of qualitative nesting and its relation to
> quantitative scale, we can be freed from sophism and pathetic fallacy.

An observer might say that the Chinese Room or the AI in "Her" or
Barack Obama "naturally evolves of its own motives and sense" after
the point of creation.

>> It could not become John Wayne physically, and it could not become John
>> Wayne mentally if the actual matter in John Wayne is required to reproduce
>> John Wayne's mind, but you have not proved that the latter is the case.
>
> It has nothing to do with matter. There can only ever be one John Wayne. A
> person is like a composite snapshot of a unique human lifetime, and the
> nesting of that lifetime within a unique cultural zeitgeist. It's all made
> of the expression of experience through time. The matter is just the story
> told to us by the experiences of eyeballs and fingertips, microscopes, etc.

What if it were revealed that John Wayne's body while he was asleep on
the night of his 40th birthday was annihilated and replaced by a copy?
Would you still say there can only be one John Wayne? Why couldn't we
make a John Wayne Mk3 long after his death, who would stand in
relation to John Wayne Mk2 as John Wayne Mk2 stood in relation to John
Wayne Mk1?

>> That's what Searle claims, which is why he makes the Room pass a Turing
>> test in Chinese and then purports to prove (invalidly, according to what
>> you've said) that despite passing the test it isn't conscious.
>
>
> The question of whether or not a Turing test is possible is beyond the scope
> of the the Chinese Room. The Room assumes, for the sake of argument, that
> Computationalist assumptions are true, and that a Turing type test would be
> useful, and that anything which could pass such a test would have to be
> conscious. Searle rightly identifies the futility of looking for outward
> appearances to reveal the quality of interior awareness. He successfully
> demonstrates that blind syntactic approaches to producing symbols of
> consciousness could indeed match any blind semantic approach of expecting
> consciousness.

And he purports to do that by showing that despite external
appearances the Chinese Room cannot be conscious because the
components are not conscious, which you agree is not a valid argument.

> My hypotheses go further into the ontology of awareness, so
> that we are not limited to the blindness of measurable communication in our
> empathy, and that our senses extend beyond their own accounts of each other.
> Our intuitive capacities can be more fallible than empirical views can
> measure, but they can also be more veridical than information based methods
> can ever dream of. Intuition, serendipity, and imagination are required to
> generate the perpetual denationalization of creators ahead of the created.
> This doesn't mean that some peopl

Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Bruno Marchal]

On 28 Jan 2014, at 13:36, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Tuesday, January 28, 2014 5:23:02 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 27 Jan 2014, at 22:22, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Monday, January 27, 2014 5:57:55 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 27 Jan 2014, at 06:07, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Saturday, January 25, 2014 11:36:11 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:


On 26 January 2014 01:35, Craig Weinberg   
wrote:


>> But that doesn't answer the question: do you think (or  
understand, or

>> whatever you think the appropriate term is) that the Chinese Room
>> COULD POSSIBLY be conscious or do you think that it COULD NOT  
POSSIBLY

>> be conscious?
>
>
> NO ROOM CAN BE CONSCIOUS. NO BODY CAN BE CONSCIOUS. NO FORM CAN BE
> CONSCIOUS.*
>
> *Except within the fictional narrative of a conscious  
experience. Puppets
> can seem conscious. Doors, door-knobs, and Chinese rooms can  
SEEM to be

> conscious.

Do you think Barack Obama is conscious? If you do, then in  
whatever sense you understand that, can the Chinese Room also be  
conscious? Or do you think that is impossible?


Yes, I think that Barack Obama is conscious, because he is  
different from a building or machine. Buildings and machines  
cannot be conscious, just as pictures of people drinking pictures  
of water do no experience relief from thirst.


To compare a brain with a machine can make sense.
To compare a brain with a picture cannot.

It depends what the picture is doing. If you have a collection of  
detailed pictures of brains, and you organize them so that they are  
shown in different sequences according to some computation, isn't  
that a simulation of a brain?


It is not. It is a description of a computation, not a computation.  
The computation is in the logical relation, which includes the  
counterfactuals.


But the counterfactuals are theoretical rather than realistic.


I will no more comment any statements using word like "real",  
"realistic", "concrete", etc.




The computation is like an Escher drawing, it can do things that  
would be impossible for a real brain and cannot do or be real in  
ways that a brain must necessarily be. A picture is just the next  
step in abstraction toward the sub-theoretical, but it is actually  
one step more concrete in aesthetic realism. A real picture of a  
triangle is closer to consciousness than a computation for the  
Mandelbot Set, which is only a theory until it is presented  
graphically to a visual participant.


Now, we do describe computation by some description, and so this  
confusion is frequent. But it is the same type of confusion between  
ciphers and numbers. Ciphers and sequence of ciphers are not  
numbers. It is the cionfusion between "345" and 345.


Both "345" and 345 are still pictures.


?

I ask myself if you get the notion of number.


They can only be made meaningful when they are associated by a  
sensory experience in which some aesthetic content or expectation  
can be labelled with a string or value.


What can I say? That follows from your theory. But your theory does  
not even try to explain the sensory experience. You assume the  
difficulty which I think computer science explains partially, and in a  
testable way.
The existence of your theory is not by itself a refutation of a  
different theory.










In either case, consciousness makes no more sense as part of a  
brain or a machine than a picture.


Right. We agree on that. But a brain can locally manifest a person.

I don't think it can.


So, if someone lost his body in some accident, but the rescuer saves  
the brain, and succeeded in connecting it to an artificial heart, and  
eventually an artificial body (but still with his natural brain).
The guy behaves normally. He kept his job. But you tell me that he has  
become a zombie?




A tip cannot locally manifest an iceberg. A cookie cutter cannot  
manifest a cookie.


A picture cannot. You can't implement it in a computer, in the sense  
of implementing a program, which then can manifest a person.


Right, because nothing can manifest a person except the complete  
history of experiences of Homo sapiens.


You confirm that you are lowering the level, and in fact up to infinity.

It looks like saying "I am an infinite being".
I have no local Gödel number that you can put on some hard disk.

It is your right, but, well, I am not interested in that type of theory.

It excludes too much possibilities, and is based on some illusion of  
superiority. The 1p of the machine also believes, even know, its  
relation with *infinity*, but the correct machine does not brag on  
this, and still less, derived any superiority feeling from this.


(especially that comp explains in which sense the machine is right  
when saying that about herself (her 1-self).







Machines are like 4D pictures. One picture or form leads to another  
and another, and if there were some interpreter they could infer a  
logic to those transitions, but there is nothing in the 

Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Bruno Marchal]

On 28 Jan 2014, at 14:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Tuesday, January 28, 2014 6:09:33 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 28 Jan 2014, at 07:52, LizR wrote:


On 28 January 2014 17:35, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
On Monday, January 27, 2014 5:24:06 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
On 28 January 2014 10:59, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

I think that 0+1=1 already requires consciousness. If we assume  
that from the start, then all further argument is begging the  
question. If something can 'equal' something else, then  
consciousness is unnecessary.


Could you explain? (I don't understand what's being said in any of  
the three sentences above, so would appreciate a "blow by blow"  
explanation if that's OK).


By saying that 0+1=1 already requires consciousness, I mean that  
all mathematical expressions are intentional communication of a  
conscious appreciation of symbolic relations.


In itself, that looks like a confusion of the map with the  
territory. Fortunately, however, you have a lot more to say on the  
subject...


If we start with disembodied mathematical concepts as realities in  
their own right, then we are automatically smuggling in all kinds  
of assumptions about what the universe comes with out of the box.  
Integers, operators, and equivalence are the end result of a kind  
of manufacturing process which includes a lot of ontological raw  
materials; sequence, representation, symmetry, universality, ideal  
objects, participation in manipulating formulas...lots of things  
which have no plausible origin within mathematics.


False. We know now that arithmetic is full of mathematicians. That  
is the essence of Gödel discovery (not just in the light of  
computationalism). This is brought from Gödel understanding that  
arithmetic already do meta-arithmetic. More on this later, probably.


From what I have read, I suspect that Gödel would disagree.


You are right, but I was talking in the comp theory. I should have  
said that if comp is true, then arithmetic is full of mathematicians.


By the way, arithmetic is also full of non-machine entities, and some  
(most self-referentially correct one) are still  Löbian and obeys the  
same theology. Infinity by itself does not help to escape the  
consequence of comp.





I do not think that incompleteness implicates consciousness within  
arithmetic,


Indeed. But the self-consciousness or self-awareness will start, not  
from incompleteness, but from the provable incompleteness. (Already  
mirrored by Gödel second incompleteness theorem, or by Löb theorem).  
Löbian machines are aware of their limitations.




and in fact suggests the opposite - that arithmetic is not complete  
enough to contain consciousness.


You misunderstand Gödel. Arithmetic is the reality for which machines,  
theories, and any finite beings, are only capable to scratch.





To say that arithmetic is full of mathematicians sounds  
unfalsifiable and arbitrary to me.



It is a direct consequence of comp, and of a theorem showing the  
representability of the partial recursive function in (Robinson  
already) arithmetic (RA).   (with comp = Church's thesis + it exists a  
level n such ... yes doctor).


If you bet in comp, it exists an infinity of computations going  
through you actual state "S". And Löbian machines can prove that. The  
existence of all such computations are theorem in RA.







At the very least it is a discovery which is yours and not a popular  
understanding within mathematics.


Since how long can woman vote?

It is the normal fear of the others. That kind of thing takes time.



How would you tell the difference between arithmetic being full of  
mathematicians and arithmetic being full of impersonal reflections  
of the mathematician?


No, no, it is full of mathematicians. With comp, Euler is there, and  
Ramanujan too. It is a triviality. Astonishing, but trivial (and only  
a tiny part of a difficult but interesting problem deriving physics  
from the statistics on those computations).


I think it is a problem of your theory: it solves the problem. It is  
more interesting when a theory lead to a problem. Especially to  
attract the serious guy with competence, in this morbid and taboo  
field. Comp leads to reducing physics to a dreamy arithmetical complex  
structures.









They are all figures of experience which are valid because of  
aesthetic familiarity - because of the sense that cognitive  
awareness furnishes us with. If math can do all of that by itself,  
then an additional type of 'consciousness' would be redundant.


That's a good point.


Yes. That is the mind-body problem (that some physicalist call "hard  
problem of consciousness", but I prefer the more neutral standard  
expression in philosophy of mind).


If we are talking about math though, then we don't need the body. It  
is more like the mind-math problem. If you have the math, why do you  
need an aesthetic mind?


After Gödel we have reason to expect arithmetic or co

Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, January 28, 2014 12:31:07 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 28 Jan 2014, at 13:36, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, January 28, 2014 5:23:02 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 27 Jan 2014, at 22:22, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, January 27, 2014 5:57:55 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 27 Jan 2014, at 06:07, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, January 25, 2014 11:36:11 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:



 On 26 January 2014 01:35, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

 >> But that doesn't answer the question: do you think (or understand, or
 >> whatever you think the appropriate term is) that the Chinese Room
 >> COULD POSSIBLY be conscious or do you think that it COULD NOT 
 POSSIBLY
 >> be conscious?
 >
 >
 > NO ROOM CAN BE CONSCIOUS. NO BODY CAN BE CONSCIOUS. NO FORM CAN BE
 > CONSCIOUS.*
 >
 > *Except within the fictional narrative of a conscious experience. 
 Puppets
 > can seem conscious. Doors, door-knobs, and Chinese rooms can SEEM to 
 be
 > conscious.

 Do you think Barack Obama is conscious? If you do, then in whatever 
 sense you understand that, can the Chinese Room also be conscious? Or do 
 you think that is impossible?

>>>
>>> Yes, I think that Barack Obama is conscious, because he is different 
>>> from a building or machine. Buildings and machines cannot be conscious, 
>>> just as pictures of people drinking pictures of water do no experience 
>>> relief from thirst.
>>>
>>>
>>> To compare a brain with a machine can make sense.
>>> To compare a brain with a picture cannot.
>>>
>>
>> It depends what the picture is doing. If you have a collection of 
>> detailed pictures of brains, and you organize them so that they are shown 
>> in different sequences according to some computation, isn't that a 
>> simulation of a brain?
>>
>>
>> It is not. It is a description of a computation, not a computation. The 
>> computation is in the logical relation, which includes the counterfactuals.
>>
>
> But the counterfactuals are theoretical rather than realistic. 
>
>
> I will no more comment any statements using word like "real", "realistic", 
> "concrete", etc. 
>

How would you like to refer to the difference between an Escher portrait, 
in which lizards can come from paper and staircases can turn inside out, 
and the ordinary world which is presented in which such things are 
understood to be obviously and permanently impossible?
 

>
>
>
> The computation is like an Escher drawing, it can do things that would be 
> impossible for a real brain and cannot do or be real in ways that a brain 
> must necessarily be. A picture is just the next step in abstraction toward 
> the sub-theoretical, but it is actually one step more concrete in aesthetic 
> realism. A real picture of a triangle is closer to consciousness than a 
> computation for the Mandelbot Set, which is only a theory until it is 
> presented graphically to a visual participant.
>  
>
>> Now, we do describe computation by some description, and so this 
>> confusion is frequent. But it is the same type of confusion between ciphers 
>> and numbers. Ciphers and sequence of ciphers are not numbers. It is the 
>> cionfusion between "345" and 345.
>>
>
> Both "345" and 345 are still pictures. 
>
>
> ?
>
> I ask myself if you get the notion of number.
>

Yes, but the notion of number is not the necessarily true. It may not refer 
to something which exists, but rather common sense of the gaps between what 
exists.
 

>
>
> They can only be made meaningful when they are associated by a sensory 
> experience in which some aesthetic content or expectation can be labelled 
> with a string or value.
>
>
> What can I say? That follows from your theory. But your theory does not 
> even try to explain the sensory experience. 
>

Of course. Explanation means only the translation from one aesthetic 
context to another. Sense experience is the primordial identity, so 
explaining it would be to appeal to the senseless.
 

> You assume the difficulty which I think computer science explains 
> partially, and in a testable way.
> The existence of your theory is not by itself a refutation of a different 
> theory.
>

That's because the theory prevents the truth about it from being accessed. 
The theory of comp is blind to its blindness, and demands to be refuted 
only by those wearing blindfolds. To test fairly, you would have to take 
off the blindfold, but then the fact of your seeing would make the test 
redundant.
 

>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>> In either case, consciousness makes no more sense as part of a brain or a 
>> machine than a picture. 
>>
>>
>> Right. We agree on that. But a brain can locally manifest a person. 
>>
>
> I don't think it can. 
>
>
> So, if someone lost his body in some accident, but the rescuer saves the 
> brain, and succeeded in connecting it to an artificial heart, and 
> eventually

Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, January 28, 2014 8:37:04 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>
> On 27 January 2014 16:07, Craig Weinberg > 
> wrote: 
>
> >> Do you think Barack Obama is conscious? If you do, then in whatever 
> sense 
> >> you understand that, can the Chinese Room also be conscious? Or do you 
> think 
> >> that is impossible? 
> > 
> > 
> > Yes, I think that Barack Obama is conscious, because he is different 
> from a 
> > building or machine. Buildings and machines cannot be conscious, just as 
> > pictures of people drinking pictures of water do no experience relief 
> from 
> > thirst. 
>
> If Barack Obama revealed that he was a machine, would that change your 
> view of whether machines could be conscious? 
>

If nobody ever survived a translation into machine simulation, would that 
change your mind of whether consciousness can be simulated?


> > The Chinese Room is not important. You are missing the whole point. 
> > Consciousness is beyond reason and cannot be discovered through evidence 
> or 
> > argument, but sensory experience alone. 
>
> So the Chinese Room is conscious not through evidence or argument, but 
> through sensory experience alone. 
>

It would be if the Chinese Room had sensory experience. Our experience of 
the Chinese Room doesn't matter.
 

>
> >> The claim is that the consciousness of the room stands in relation to 
> the 
> >> physical room as the consciousness of a person stands in relation to 
> the 
> >> physical person. 
> > 
> > 
> > There is no 'physical person', there is a public facing body. A person 
> is 
> > not a body. On one level of an animal's body there are organs which 
> cannot 
> > survive independently of the body as a whole, but on another level all 
> of 
> > those organs are composed of living cells which have more autonomy. 
> > Understanding this theme of coexisting but contrasting levels of 
> description 
> > suggests that a room need not be comparable to the body of a living 
> > organism. Since the room is not something which naturally evolves of its 
> own 
> > motives and sense, we need not assume that the level at which it appears 
> to 
> > us as a room or machine is in fact the relevant level of description 
> when 
> > considering its autonomy and coherence. In my view, the machine 
> expresses 
> > only the lowest levels of immediate thermodynamic sensitivity according 
> to 
> > the substance which is actually reacting, and the most distant levels of 
> > theoretical design, but with nothing in between. We do not have to 
> pretend 
> > that there is no way to guess whether a doll or a cadaver might be 
> > conscious. With an adequate model of qualitative nesting and its 
> relation to 
> > quantitative scale, we can be freed from sophism and pathetic fallacy. 
>
> An observer might say that the Chinese Room or the AI in "Her" or 
> Barack Obama "naturally evolves of its own motives and sense" after 
> the point of creation. 
>

Those are fictional examples. I don't deny that many people find it 
plausible that machines can evolve their own motives, but I think that I 
understand why they are mistaken.
 

>
> >> It could not become John Wayne physically, and it could not become John 
> >> Wayne mentally if the actual matter in John Wayne is required to 
> reproduce 
> >> John Wayne's mind, but you have not proved that the latter is the case. 
> > 
> > It has nothing to do with matter. There can only ever be one John Wayne. 
> A 
> > person is like a composite snapshot of a unique human lifetime, and the 
> > nesting of that lifetime within a unique cultural zeitgeist. It's all 
> made 
> > of the expression of experience through time. The matter is just the 
> story 
> > told to us by the experiences of eyeballs and fingertips, microscopes, 
> etc. 
>
> What if it were revealed that John Wayne's body while he was asleep on 
> the night of his 40th birthday was annihilated and replaced by a copy? 
> Would you still say there can only be one John Wayne? 


What if you were annihilated at age 5, but you were replaced by a copy? 
Would you still say that the body using your name was you, even though you 
are not using it?
 

> Why couldn't we 
> make a John Wayne Mk3 long after his death, who would stand in 
> relation to John Wayne Mk2 as John Wayne Mk2 stood in relation to John 
> Wayne Mk1? 
>

For the same reason that we can't build a model of Paris out of clay and 
have it actually become Paris. It is because the publicly measurable end of 
what we are is not sufficient to describe who we have been and who we are 
becoming.
 

>
> >> That's what Searle claims, which is why he makes the Room pass a Turing 
> >> test in Chinese and then purports to prove (invalidly, according to 
> what 
> >> you've said) that despite passing the test it isn't conscious. 
> > 
> > 
> > The question of whether or not a Turing test is possible is beyond the 
> scope 
> > of the the Chinese Room. The Room assumes, for the sake of argument, 
> that 
> > Computationalist

Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[David Nyman]

On 28 January 2014 18:25, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

That's because the theory prevents the truth about it from being accessed.
> The theory of comp is blind to its blindness, and demands to be refuted
> only by those wearing blindfolds. To test fairly, you would have to take
> off the blindfold, but then the fact of your seeing would make the test
> redundant.


Hi Craig

Your use of the word "blindness" above prompts me to ask you a question
that has long puzzled me about your ideas. What I don't understand is why
the sense you posit as fundamental in your theory would not, in effect, be
"blind" to itself. If I've understood you (which isn't necessarily the
case, of course) sense is the "inner dual" of outer activity (or vice
versa) - so that the complete picture is a sort of intrinsic/extrinsic
duality. If that is the case, your ideas seem to bear a strong relation to
panpsychist or panexperientialist theories.

These latter theories do not, in general, dispute that extrinsic activity
per se is fully explainable in its own terms (is reducible, for example, to
the entities and processes described by physics) Rather, they additionally
posit a basic sensory component accompanying these activities (i.e. an
inner duality) that in some way summates, at the appropriate level, all the
way up to conscious experience. The problem that concerns me about this way
of looking at things is that any and all behaviour associated with
consciousness - including, crucially, the articulation of our very thoughts
and beliefs about conscious phenomena - can at least in principle be
exhausted by an extrinsic account. But if this be so, it is very difficult
indeed to understand how such extrinsic behaviours could possibly make
reference to any "intrinsic" remainder, even were its existence granted. It
isn't merely that any postulated remainder would be redundant in the
explanation of such behaviour, but that it is hardly possible to see how an
inner dual could even be accessible in principle to a complete (i.e.
causally closed) extrinsic system of reference in the first place.

It might seem at first that comp (which also exploits an outer/inner
distinction) is vulnerable to a similar line of criticism, but I believe it
can escape it - unlike primitive-physical or (subject to your comments)
primitive-sensory explanations - by building on the fundamental elements of
reference from the ground up (so to speak). Comp (which derives from the
study of computation, not computers, as you seem to assume rather often in
your critique) is built on recursive webs of reference (notably
self-reference) which bootstrap beyond proof or ostensive demonstration to
incontrovertible truth (at least the arithmetical variety). This puts us in
the position (assuming the comp hypothesis) of accepting our own
incommunicable ability to access such incorrigible indexical truths - in
common with the arithmetical machines we study - or concluding (per
impossibile) that we too are truthless "zombies".

David

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 29 January 2014 05:39, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>
>
> On Tuesday, January 28, 2014 8:37:04 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>>
>> On 27 January 2014 16:07, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>
>> >> Do you think Barack Obama is conscious? If you do, then in whatever
>> >> sense
>> >> you understand that, can the Chinese Room also be conscious? Or do you
>> >> think
>> >> that is impossible?
>> >
>> >
>> > Yes, I think that Barack Obama is conscious, because he is different
>> > from a
>> > building or machine. Buildings and machines cannot be conscious, just as
>> > pictures of people drinking pictures of water do no experience relief
>> > from
>> > thirst.
>>
>> If Barack Obama revealed that he was a machine, would that change your
>> view of whether machines could be conscious?
>
>
> If nobody ever survived a translation into machine simulation, would that
> change your mind of whether consciousness can be simulated?

Yes. But you didn't answer my question.

>> > The Chinese Room is not important. You are missing the whole point.
>> > Consciousness is beyond reason and cannot be discovered through evidence
>> > or
>> > argument, but sensory experience alone.
>>
>> So the Chinese Room is conscious not through evidence or argument, but
>> through sensory experience alone.
>
>
> It would be if the Chinese Room had sensory experience. Our experience of
> the Chinese Room doesn't matter.

That's the question: could the Chinese Room have sensory experience?
For entities such as Barack Obama, you guess that they do based on
your observation of their behaviour.

>> What if it were revealed that John Wayne's body while he was asleep on
>> the night of his 40th birthday was annihilated and replaced by a copy?
>> Would you still say there can only be one John Wayne?
>
>
> What if you were annihilated at age 5, but you were replaced by a copy?
> Would you still say that the body using your name was you, even though you
> are not using it?

As a matter of fact, I was annihilated when I was 5. The atoms making
up my body then are long gone, dispersed throughout the Earth and
probably even beyond.

>> Why couldn't we
>> make a John Wayne Mk3 long after his death, who would stand in
>> relation to John Wayne Mk2 as John Wayne Mk2 stood in relation to John
>> Wayne Mk1?
>
>
> For the same reason that we can't build a model of Paris out of clay and
> have it actually become Paris. It is because the publicly measurable end of
> what we are is not sufficient to describe who we have been and who we are
> becoming.

Do you think it is impossible that John Wayne was replaced by a copy
at age 40 and nobody noticed?

>> And he purports to do that by showing that despite external
>> appearances the Chinese Room cannot be conscious because the
>> components are not conscious, which you agree is not a valid argument.
>
>
> It's not because the components are not conscious, it is because the
> description of the Room or 'system' as a whole is consistent with the
> absence of consciousness. This is the double standard of functionalism which
> makes the hard problem hard. Functionalism asserts on the one hand that all
> functions of consciousness can be produced mechanically, but then the effect
> of consciousness could not provide any additional functionality to the
> mechanism. The hard problem exposes the hypocrisy of 'We don't need
> consciousness to explain everything" when consciousness itself is what needs
> to be explained. The machine's definition of itself does not include
> consciousness. Building machines based on that definition will therefore not
> include consciousness.

If the machine were conscious, then its definition of itself would
include consciousness. Functionalism asserts that consciousness
emerges from function, but it's a non sequitar to say that therefore
consciousness should provide additional functionality.

>> > My hypotheses go further into the ontology of awareness, so
>> > that we are not limited to the blindness of measurable communication in
>> > our
>> > empathy, and that our senses extend beyond their own accounts of each
>> > other.
>> > Our intuitive capacities can be more fallible than empirical views can
>> > measure, but they can also be more veridical than information based
>> > methods
>> > can ever dream of. Intuition, serendipity, and imagination are required
>> > to
>> > generate the perpetual denationalization of creators ahead of the
>> > created.
>> > This doesn't mean that some people cannot be fooled all of the time or
>> > that
>> > all of the people can't be fooled some of the time, only that all of the
>> > people cannot be fooled all of the time.
>>
>> You still haven't come up with any reason better than a vague
>> prejudice why, for example, the AI in the movie "Her" could not be
>> conscious.
>
>
> Because she doesn't need to be conscious. She could just as easily be
> programmed as a chameleon, which analyzes the profile of each user and
> builds an ad hoc identity to reflect some Bayesian ex

Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Bruno Marchal]

On 28 Jan 2014, at 19:25, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Tuesday, January 28, 2014 12:31:07 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 28 Jan 2014, at 13:36, Craig Weinberg wrote:



But the counterfactuals are theoretical rather than realistic.


I will no more comment any statements using word like "real",  
"realistic", "concrete", etc.


How would you like to refer to the difference between an Escher  
portrait, in which lizards can come from paper and staircases can  
turn inside out, and the ordinary world which is presented in which  
such things are understood to be obviously and permanently impossible?


As different type of objects on which we can propose different theories.








The computation is like an Escher drawing, it can do things that  
would be impossible for a real brain and cannot do or be real in  
ways that a brain must necessarily be. A picture is just the next  
step in abstraction toward the sub-theoretical, but it is actually  
one step more concrete in aesthetic realism. A real picture of a  
triangle is closer to consciousness than a computation for the  
Mandelbot Set, which is only a theory until it is presented  
graphically to a visual participant.


Now, we do describe computation by some description, and so this  
confusion is frequent. But it is the same type of confusion between  
ciphers and numbers. Ciphers and sequence of ciphers are not  
numbers. It is the cionfusion between "345" and 345.


Both "345" and 345 are still pictures.


?

I ask myself if you get the notion of number.

Yes, but the notion of number is not the necessarily true. It may  
not refer to something which exists, but rather common sense of the  
gaps between what exists.


I did not mention any particular "notion of number".








They can only be made meaningful when they are associated by a  
sensory experience in which some aesthetic content or expectation  
can be labelled with a string or value.


What can I say? That follows from your theory. But your theory does  
not even try to explain the sensory experience.


Of course. Explanation means only the translation from one aesthetic  
context to another. Sense experience is the primordial identity, so  
explaining it would be to appeal to the senseless.


Yes.





You assume the difficulty which I think computer science explains  
partially, and in a testable way.
The existence of your theory is not by itself a refutation of a  
different theory.


That's because the theory prevents the truth about it from being  
accessed.


= "don't ask". You oppose science.


The theory of comp is blind to its blindness, and demands to be  
refuted only by those wearing blindfolds. To test fairly, you would  
have to take off the blindfold, but then the fact of your seeing  
would make the test redundant.


Of course, you take the problem as the solution of the problem. That's  
bad "don't ask philosophy".
















In either case, consciousness makes no more sense as part of a  
brain or a machine than a picture.


Right. We agree on that. But a brain can locally manifest a person.

I don't think it can.


So, if someone lost his body in some accident, but the rescuer saves  
the brain, and succeeded in connecting it to an artificial heart,  
and eventually an artificial body (but still with his natural brain).
The guy behaves normally. He kept his job. But you tell me that he  
has become a zombie?


The brain never stopped being an expression of the victim's life  
though. It is still his body in some sense, even if there is only  
one cell. The copy of the brain never starts becoming an expression  
of anyone's life because it is made of nothing but lower level pre- 
biotic experiences.


Making your "I don't think it can" even more incomprehensible.








A tip cannot locally manifest an iceberg. A cookie cutter cannot  
manifest a cookie.


A picture cannot. You can't implement it in a computer, in the  
sense of implementing a program, which then can manifest a person.


Right, because nothing can manifest a person except the complete  
history of experiences of Homo sapiens.


You confirm that you are lowering the level, and in fact up to  
infinity.


It's not a difference in degree, but a difference in kind.  It isn't  
a question of lowering or raising, it is a matter of understanding  
that just because all pizzas can be sliced in the same way does not  
mean that a pizza can be made by slicing-ness. Arithmetic is slicing- 
ness.


If 345 is a picture, you can say that. But you can say anything.







It looks like saying "I am an infinite being".

I would say "I am an infinitely unique experience, made of  
infinitely unique experiences, which approximates experience as  
finite and generic".


I have no local Gödel number that you can put on some hard disk.

It is your right, but, well, I am not interested in that type of  
theory.


It excludes too much possibilities, and is based on some illusion of  
superiority.


I don't see i

Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[John Clark]

On Sat, Jan 25, 2014 at 9:35 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

> NO ROOM CAN BE CONSCIOUS.
>

And we know that because we can say it in all capital letters, or possibly
from the teachings of two of your favorite subjects, astrology and
numerology.

> *Except within the fictional narrative of a conscious experience.
>

So only things that have conscious experiences can be conscious. Thanks for
the news flash.

  John K Clark

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, January 28, 2014 3:56:34 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 28 January 2014 18:25, Craig Weinberg 
> > wrote:
>
> That's because the theory prevents the truth about it from being accessed. 
>> The theory of comp is blind to its blindness, and demands to be refuted 
>> only by those wearing blindfolds. To test fairly, you would have to take 
>> off the blindfold, but then the fact of your seeing would make the test 
>> redundant.
>
>
> Hi Craig
>
> Your use of the word "blindness" above prompts me to ask you a question 
> that has long puzzled me about your ideas. What I don't understand is why 
> the sense you posit as fundamental in your theory would not, in effect, be 
> "blind" to itself.
>

Because blindness is an invention of sense. Sense can't be blind to itself 
because there isn't anything to obstruct it at the fundamental level.
 

> If I've understood you (which isn't necessarily the case, of course) sense 
> is the "inner dual" of outer activity (or vice versa) - so that the 
> complete picture is a sort of intrinsic/extrinsic duality. If that is the 
> case, your ideas seem to bear a strong relation to panpsychist or 
> panexperientialist theories.
>

Very close. Sense is both the inner, the outer, and the duality that 
separates them. All of those discernments are sensible and relate to 
sensory aesthetics. Of the three, the outer or extrinsic is more like the 
opposite of the fundamental sense, and the intrinsic is more like a limited 
version of the fundamental sense, the former being spread across a sense of 
space as bodies and the latter being confined by a sense of past and future 
as non-experiences.

It is related to panexperientialism, yes. I use the term pansensitivity or 
Primordial Identity Pansensitivity to make it clear that I am not saying 
"everything has experience" or "rocks have experiences like people do", but 
rather "all matter and energy is a representation of an underlying 
experience which may be out of range/frequency of direct perception". 

The perceiver is not a thing, but an experience. We are a human lifetime, 
constrained into conscious episodes, which includes many experiences and is 
part of many experiences. The body, brain, and mechanisms thereof are a 
kind of back-door representation of all of those experiences on different 
scales. By saying that sense is the Primordial Identity, I am suggesting 
that it is ontologically impossible for anything to exist in any way 
outside of sense, and that everything that can ever exist does so because 
it is a feature developed through sense.


> These latter theories do not, in general, dispute that extrinsic activity 
> per se is fully explainable in its own terms (is reducible, for example, to 
> the entities and processes described by physics) Rather, they additionally 
> posit a basic sensory component accompanying these activities (i.e. an 
> inner duality) that in some way summates, at the appropriate level, all the 
> way up to conscious experience. 
>

I am putting the sensory component as primary, so that extrinsic activities 
and intrinsic activities can both be explained almost completely in their 
own terms, as everything makes sense in many different ways (although every 
way of making sense has the same sense-centered sense in common also). For 
a human being, we are an example of a massively elaborated experience which 
is 'folded in on itself' several times, so that we cannot be explained 
completely in either intrinsic or extrinsic terms. Our experience is likely 
much more of a hybrid of intrinsic and extrinsic experiences than something 
with a simpler body.
 

> The problem that concerns me about this way of looking at things is that 
> any and all behaviour associated with consciousness - including, crucially, 
> the articulation of our very thoughts and beliefs about conscious phenomena 
> - can at least in principle be exhausted by an extrinsic account. But if 
> this be so, it is very difficult indeed to understand how such extrinsic 
> behaviours could possibly make reference to any "intrinsic" remainder, even 
> were its existence granted. It isn't merely that any postulated remainder 
> would be redundant in the explanation of such behaviour, but that it is 
> hardly possible to see how an inner dual could even be accessible in 
> principle to a complete (i.e. causally closed) extrinsic system of 
> reference in the first place.
>

Right, because the extrinsic perspective is blind to the limits of causal 
closure. With sense connecting all phenomena and masking that connection on 
other levels, the idea of closure is an expectation which does not apply 
intrinsically. The duality, and the outer aesthetic are all inner to sense 
at the fundamental level, even though locally the appearance is exactly the 
contrary (by necessity).
 

>
> It might seem at first that comp (which also exploits an outer/inner 
> distinction) is vulnerable to a similar line of criticism, but I believe

Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 1:34:48 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Sat, Jan 25, 2014 at 9:35 AM, Craig Weinberg 
> 
> > wrote:
>
> > NO ROOM CAN BE CONSCIOUS. 
>>
>
> And we know that because we can say it in all capital letters, or possibly 
> from the teachings of two of your favorite subjects, astrology and 
> numerology.
>

The all caps were in response to Bruno's all caps, and no, you don't need 
astrology and numerology to understand that rooms are not haunted by the 
spirits of system-hood.
 

>
> > *Except within the fictional narrative of a conscious experience.
>>
>
> So only things that have conscious experiences can be conscious. Thanks 
> for the news flash.
>

No, the other way around. Only conscious experiences exist, but we can be 
misled about what exists.

Craig


>   John K Clark 
>
>
>

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[LizR]

On 30 January 2014 11:24, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

> On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 1:34:48 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
>> On Sat, Jan 25, 2014 at 9:35 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>> > NO ROOM CAN BE CONSCIOUS.
>>>
>>
>> And we know that because we can say it in all capital letters, or
>> possibly from the teachings of two of your favorite subjects, astrology and
>> numerology.
>>
>
> The all caps were in response to Bruno's all caps, and no, you don't need
> astrology and numerology to understand that rooms are not haunted by the
> spirits of system-hood.
>

Imagine a small, roughly spherical room made out of a fairly hard material
something like limestone. Make a few holes in it, fill it with some goop
with the consistency of blancmange, decorate with sense organs and throw in
a body.

Et voila!

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 5:38:04 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>
> On 30 January 2014 11:24, Craig Weinberg 
> > wrote:
>
>> On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 1:34:48 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>>
>>> On Sat, Jan 25, 2014 at 9:35 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>> > NO ROOM CAN BE CONSCIOUS. 

>>>
>>> And we know that because we can say it in all capital letters, or 
>>> possibly from the teachings of two of your favorite subjects, astrology and 
>>> numerology.
>>>
>>
>> The all caps were in response to Bruno's all caps, and no, you don't need 
>> astrology and numerology to understand that rooms are not haunted by the 
>> spirits of system-hood.
>>
>
> Imagine a small, roughly spherical room made out of a fairly hard material 
> something like limestone. Make a few holes in it, fill it with some goop 
> with the consistency of blancmange, decorate with sense organs and throw in 
> a body.
>
> Et voila!
>

Voila, a cadaver. 

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 30 January 2014 09:39, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>
>
> On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 5:38:04 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>>
>> On 30 January 2014 11:24, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 1:34:48 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:

 On Sat, Jan 25, 2014 at 9:35 AM, Craig Weinberg 
 wrote:

> > NO ROOM CAN BE CONSCIOUS.


 And we know that because we can say it in all capital letters, or
 possibly from the teachings of two of your favorite subjects, astrology and
 numerology.
>>>
>>>
>>> The all caps were in response to Bruno's all caps, and no, you don't need
>>> astrology and numerology to understand that rooms are not haunted by the
>>> spirits of system-hood.
>>
>>
>> Imagine a small, roughly spherical room made out of a fairly hard material
>> something like limestone. Make a few holes in it, fill it with some goop
>> with the consistency of blancmange, decorate with sense organs and throw in
>> a body.
>>
>> Et voila!
>
>
> Voila, a cadaver.

Unless it's all set up to function properly.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 5:46:25 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>
> On 30 January 2014 09:39, Craig Weinberg > 
> wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 5:38:04 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: 
> >> 
> >> On 30 January 2014 11:24, Craig Weinberg  wrote: 
> >>> 
> >>> On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 1:34:48 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote: 
>  
>  On Sat, Jan 25, 2014 at 9:35 AM, Craig Weinberg  
>  wrote: 
>  
> > > NO ROOM CAN BE CONSCIOUS. 
>  
>  
>  And we know that because we can say it in all capital letters, or 
>  possibly from the teachings of two of your favorite subjects, 
> astrology and 
>  numerology. 
> >>> 
> >>> 
> >>> The all caps were in response to Bruno's all caps, and no, you don't 
> need 
> >>> astrology and numerology to understand that rooms are not haunted by 
> the 
> >>> spirits of system-hood. 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> Imagine a small, roughly spherical room made out of a fairly hard 
> material 
> >> something like limestone. Make a few holes in it, fill it with some 
> goop 
> >> with the consistency of blancmange, decorate with sense organs and 
> throw in 
> >> a body. 
> >> 
> >> Et voila! 
> > 
> > 
> > Voila, a cadaver. 
>
> Unless it's all set up to function properly. 
>

What's wrong with the way a cadaver functions?
 

>
>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou 
>

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[LizR]

On 30 January 2014 11:39, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

> On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 5:38:04 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>
>> On 30 January 2014 11:24, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>
>>> On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 1:34:48 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>>>
 On Sat, Jan 25, 2014 at 9:35 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

 > NO ROOM CAN BE CONSCIOUS.
>

 And we know that because we can say it in all capital letters, or
 possibly from the teachings of two of your favorite subjects, astrology and
 numerology.

>>>
>>> The all caps were in response to Bruno's all caps, and no, you don't
>>> need astrology and numerology to understand that rooms are not haunted by
>>> the spirits of system-hood.
>>>
>>
>> Imagine a small, roughly spherical room made out of a fairly hard
>> material something like limestone. Make a few holes in it, fill it with
>> some goop with the consistency of blancmange, decorate with sense organs
>> and throw in a body.
>>
>> Et voila!
>>
>
> Voila, a cadaver.
>
> Unless *all *such objects are cadavers, this "disproves" the statement
that *no *room can be conscious.

(I must admit the idea that "no room can be conscious" seems to demand
qualification...)

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 5:46:25 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>
> On 30 January 2014 09:39, Craig Weinberg > 
> wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 5:38:04 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: 
> >> 
> >> On 30 January 2014 11:24, Craig Weinberg  wrote: 
> >>> 
> >>> On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 1:34:48 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote: 
>  
>  On Sat, Jan 25, 2014 at 9:35 AM, Craig Weinberg  
>  wrote: 
>  
> > > NO ROOM CAN BE CONSCIOUS. 
>  
>  
>  And we know that because we can say it in all capital letters, or 
>  possibly from the teachings of two of your favorite subjects, 
> astrology and 
>  numerology. 
> >>> 
> >>> 
> >>> The all caps were in response to Bruno's all caps, and no, you don't 
> need 
> >>> astrology and numerology to understand that rooms are not haunted by 
> the 
> >>> spirits of system-hood. 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> Imagine a small, roughly spherical room made out of a fairly hard 
> material 
> >> something like limestone. Make a few holes in it, fill it with some 
> goop 
> >> with the consistency of blancmange, decorate with sense organs and 
> throw in 
> >> a body. 
> >> 
> >> Et voila! 
> > 
> > 
> > Voila, a cadaver. 
>
> Unless it's all set up to function properly. 
>

As far as comp tells us, the function of a human body might as well be to 
host a variety of microbiological systems, which a cadaver excels at. The 
dead body is also better for the larger ecological computations.

 

>
>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou 
>

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[LizR]

According to comp, consciousness can't be localised, so neither a brain nor
a room can be conscious.

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 6:01:19 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>
> On 30 January 2014 11:39, Craig Weinberg 
> > wrote:
>
>> On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 5:38:04 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>>
>>> On 30 January 2014 11:24, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>>
 On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 1:34:48 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:

> On Sat, Jan 25, 2014 at 9:35 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > NO ROOM CAN BE CONSCIOUS. 
>>
>
> And we know that because we can say it in all capital letters, or 
> possibly from the teachings of two of your favorite subjects, astrology 
> and 
> numerology.
>

 The all caps were in response to Bruno's all caps, and no, you don't 
 need astrology and numerology to understand that rooms are not haunted by 
 the spirits of system-hood.

>>>
>>> Imagine a small, roughly spherical room made out of a fairly hard 
>>> material something like limestone. Make a few holes in it, fill it with 
>>> some goop with the consistency of blancmange, decorate with sense organs 
>>> and throw in a body.
>>>
>>> Et voila!
>>>
>>
>> Voila, a cadaver.
>>
>> Unless *all *such objects are cadavers, this "disproves" the statement 
> that *no *room can be conscious.
>
> (I must admit the idea that "no room can be conscious" seems to demand 
> qualification...)
>

All such objects would be cadavers, in the absence of some subjective 
experience which is being expressed.  

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[LizR]

On 30 January 2014 12:09, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

> On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 6:01:19 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>
>> On 30 January 2014 11:39, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>
>>> On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 5:38:04 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>>>
 On 30 January 2014 11:24, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

> On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 1:34:48 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
>> On Sat, Jan 25, 2014 at 9:35 AM, Craig Weinberg 
>> wrote:
>>
>> > NO ROOM CAN BE CONSCIOUS.
>>>
>>
>> And we know that because we can say it in all capital letters, or
>> possibly from the teachings of two of your favorite subjects, astrology 
>> and
>> numerology.
>>
>
> The all caps were in response to Bruno's all caps, and no, you don't
> need astrology and numerology to understand that rooms are not haunted by
> the spirits of system-hood.
>

 Imagine a small, roughly spherical room made out of a fairly hard
 material something like limestone. Make a few holes in it, fill it with
 some goop with the consistency of blancmange, decorate with sense organs
 and throw in a body.

 Et voila!

>>>
>>> Voila, a cadaver.
>>>
>>> Unless *all *such objects are cadavers, this "disproves" the statement
>> that *no *room can be conscious.
>>
>> (I must admit the idea that "no room can be conscious" seems to demand
>> qualification...)
>>
>
> All such objects would be cadavers, in the absence of some subjective
> experience which is being expressed.
>

What about anaesthesia and dreamless sleep?

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 6:13:35 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>
> On 30 January 2014 12:09, Craig Weinberg 
> > wrote:
>
>> On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 6:01:19 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>>
>>> On 30 January 2014 11:39, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>>
 On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 5:38:04 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:

> On 30 January 2014 11:24, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>
>> On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 1:34:48 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>>
>>> On Sat, Jan 25, 2014 at 9:35 AM, Craig Weinberg 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> > NO ROOM CAN BE CONSCIOUS. 

>>>
>>> And we know that because we can say it in all capital letters, or 
>>> possibly from the teachings of two of your favorite subjects, astrology 
>>> and 
>>> numerology.
>>>
>>
>> The all caps were in response to Bruno's all caps, and no, you don't 
>> need astrology and numerology to understand that rooms are not haunted 
>> by 
>> the spirits of system-hood.
>>
>
> Imagine a small, roughly spherical room made out of a fairly hard 
> material something like limestone. Make a few holes in it, fill it with 
> some goop with the consistency of blancmange, decorate with sense organs 
> and throw in a body.
>
> Et voila!
>

 Voila, a cadaver.

 Unless *all *such objects are cadavers, this "disproves" the statement 
>>> that *no *room can be conscious.
>>>
>>> (I must admit the idea that "no room can be conscious" seems to demand 
>>> qualification...)
>>>
>>
>> All such objects would be cadavers, in the absence of some subjective 
>> experience which is being expressed.  
>>
>
> What about anaesthesia and dreamless sleep? 
>

Our personal level of awareness is not the totality of the awareness that 
our lives consist of. We sleep, but if we have to pee, who wakes us up so 
we don't wet the bed?
 

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[LizR]

On 30 January 2014 12:21, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

> On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 6:13:35 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>
>> On 30 January 2014 12:09, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>
>>> On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 6:01:19 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>>>
 On 30 January 2014 11:39, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

> On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 5:38:04 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>
>> On 30 January 2014 11:24, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>
>>> On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 1:34:48 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>>>
 On Sat, Jan 25, 2014 at 9:35 AM, Craig Weinberg >>> > wrote:

 > NO ROOM CAN BE CONSCIOUS.
>

 And we know that because we can say it in all capital letters, or
 possibly from the teachings of two of your favorite subjects, 
 astrology and
 numerology.

>>>
>>> The all caps were in response to Bruno's all caps, and no, you don't
>>> need astrology and numerology to understand that rooms are not haunted 
>>> by
>>> the spirits of system-hood.
>>>
>>
>> Imagine a small, roughly spherical room made out of a fairly hard
>> material something like limestone. Make a few holes in it, fill it with
>> some goop with the consistency of blancmange, decorate with sense organs
>> and throw in a body.
>>
>> Et voila!
>>
>
> Voila, a cadaver.
>
> Unless *all *such objects are cadavers, this "disproves" the
 statement that *no *room can be conscious.

 (I must admit the idea that "no room can be conscious" seems to demand
 qualification...)

>>>
>>> All such objects would be cadavers, in the absence of some subjective
>>> experience which is being expressed.
>>>
>>
>> What about anaesthesia and dreamless sleep?
>>
>
> Our personal level of awareness is not the totality of the awareness that
> our lives consist of. We sleep, but if we have to pee, who wakes us up so
> we don't wet the bed?
>

So all such objects aren't cadavers.

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 6:22:43 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>
> On 30 January 2014 12:21, Craig Weinberg 
> > wrote:
>
>> On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 6:13:35 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>>
>>> On 30 January 2014 12:09, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>>
 On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 6:01:19 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:

> On 30 January 2014 11:39, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>
>> On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 5:38:04 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>>
>>> On 30 January 2014 11:24, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>>
 On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 1:34:48 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:

> On Sat, Jan 25, 2014 at 9:35 AM, Craig Weinberg <
> whats...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > NO ROOM CAN BE CONSCIOUS. 
>>
>
> And we know that because we can say it in all capital letters, or 
> possibly from the teachings of two of your favorite subjects, 
> astrology and 
> numerology.
>

 The all caps were in response to Bruno's all caps, and no, you 
 don't need astrology and numerology to understand that rooms are not 
 haunted by the spirits of system-hood.

>>>
>>> Imagine a small, roughly spherical room made out of a fairly hard 
>>> material something like limestone. Make a few holes in it, fill it with 
>>> some goop with the consistency of blancmange, decorate with sense 
>>> organs 
>>> and throw in a body.
>>>
>>> Et voila!
>>>
>>
>> Voila, a cadaver.
>>
>> Unless *all *such objects are cadavers, this "disproves" the 
> statement that *no *room can be conscious.
>
> (I must admit the idea that "no room can be conscious" seems to demand 
> qualification...)
>

 All such objects would be cadavers, in the absence of some subjective 
 experience which is being expressed.  

>>>
>>> What about anaesthesia and dreamless sleep? 
>>>
>>
>> Our personal level of awareness is not the totality of the awareness that 
>> our lives consist of. We sleep, but if we have to pee, who wakes us up so 
>> we don't wet the bed?
>>
>
> So all such objects aren't cadavers.
>

If you are unconscious, you don't personally exist, but you exist 
sub-personally and super-personally. A body has microscopic and macroscopic 
scales, but those are only from the perspective which is available through 
our body, and its use of other bodies. The difference between a cadaver and 
a living person's body is not within the body, it is within experience. 
It's aesthetic, not functional. Although the functional and aesthetic 
perspectives can influence each other, as the cart can influence the 
behavior of the horse, the cart is ultimately dependent on the horse rather 
than the other way around.

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[LizR]

On 30 January 2014 12:32, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

> On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 6:22:43 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>
>> On 30 January 2014 12:21, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>
>>> On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 6:13:35 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>>>
 On 30 January 2014 12:09, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

> On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 6:01:19 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>
>> On 30 January 2014 11:39, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>
>>> On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 5:38:04 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>>>
 On 30 January 2014 11:24, Craig Weinberg wrote:

> On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 1:34:48 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
>> On Sat, Jan 25, 2014 at 9:35 AM, Craig Weinberg <
>> whats...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> > NO ROOM CAN BE CONSCIOUS.
>>>
>> And we know that because we can say it in all capital letters, or
>> possibly from the teachings of two of your favorite subjects, 
>> astrology and
>> numerology.
>>
> The all caps were in response to Bruno's all caps, and no, you
> don't need astrology and numerology to understand that rooms are not
> haunted by the spirits of system-hood.
>
 Imagine a small, roughly spherical room made out of a fairly hard
 material something like limestone. Make a few holes in it, fill it with
 some goop with the consistency of blancmange, decorate with sense 
 organs
 and throw in a body.
 Et voila!

>>> Voila, a cadaver.
>>>
>> Unless *all *such objects are cadavers, this "disproves" the
>> statement that *no *room can be conscious.
>> (I must admit the idea that "no room can be conscious" seems to
>> demand qualification...)
>>
> All such objects would be cadavers, in the absence of some subjective
> experience which is being expressed.
>
 What about anaesthesia and dreamless sleep?

>>> Our personal level of awareness is not the totality of the awareness
>>> that our lives consist of. We sleep, but if we have to pee, who wakes us up
>>> so we don't wet the bed?
>>>
>> So all such objects aren't cadavers.
>>
> If you are unconscious, you don't personally exist, but you exist
> sub-personally and super-personally. A body has microscopic and macroscopic
> scales, but those are only from the perspective which is available through
> our body, and its use of other bodies. The difference between a cadaver and
> a living person's body is not within the body, it is within experience.
> It's aesthetic, not functional. Although the functional and aesthetic
> perspectives can influence each other, as the cart can influence the
> behavior of the horse, the cart is ultimately dependent on the horse rather
> than the other way around.
>

One difference between an unconscious body and a dead one is that you can
return an unconscious one to consciousness later.

That sounds kind of functional to me.

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 6:38:22 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>
> On 30 January 2014 12:32, Craig Weinberg 
> > wrote:
>
>> On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 6:22:43 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>>
>>> On 30 January 2014 12:21, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>>
 On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 6:13:35 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:

> On 30 January 2014 12:09, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>
>> On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 6:01:19 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>>
>>> On 30 January 2014 11:39, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>>
 On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 5:38:04 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:

> On 30 January 2014 11:24, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>> On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 1:34:48 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>>
>>> On Sat, Jan 25, 2014 at 9:35 AM, Craig Weinberg <
>>> whats...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
 > NO ROOM CAN BE CONSCIOUS.

>>> And we know that because we can say it in all capital letters, 
>>> or possibly from the teachings of two of your favorite subjects, 
>>> astrology 
>>> and numerology.   
>>>
>> The all caps were in response to Bruno's all caps, and no, you 
>> don't need astrology and numerology to understand that rooms are not 
>> haunted by the spirits of system-hood.
>>
> Imagine a small, roughly spherical room made out of a fairly hard 
> material something like limestone. Make a few holes in it, fill it 
> with 
> some goop with the consistency of blancmange, decorate with sense 
> organs 
> and throw in a body.
> Et voila!
>
 Voila, a cadaver.

>>> Unless *all *such objects are cadavers, this "disproves" the 
>>> statement that *no *room can be conscious.
>>> (I must admit the idea that "no room can be conscious" seems to 
>>> demand qualification...)
>>>
>> All such objects would be cadavers, in the absence of some subjective 
>> experience which is being expressed.  
>>
> What about anaesthesia and dreamless sleep? 
>
 Our personal level of awareness is not the totality of the awareness 
 that our lives consist of. We sleep, but if we have to pee, who wakes us 
 up 
 so we don't wet the bed?

>>> So all such objects aren't cadavers.
>>>
>> If you are unconscious, you don't personally exist, but you exist 
>> sub-personally and super-personally. A body has microscopic and macroscopic 
>> scales, but those are only from the perspective which is available through 
>> our body, and its use of other bodies. The difference between a cadaver and 
>> a living person's body is not within the body, it is within experience. 
>> It's aesthetic, not functional. Although the functional and aesthetic 
>> perspectives can influence each other, as the cart can influence the 
>> behavior of the horse, the cart is ultimately dependent on the horse rather 
>> than the other way around.
>>
>
> One difference between an unconscious body and a dead one is that you can 
> return an unconscious one to consciousness later.
>
> That sounds kind of functional to me.
>

It's only functional if you assume that consciousness has value beyond the 
operation of the body. The condition of being able to return though is not 
necessarily part of the body. I can leave my house and the house will fall 
into disrepair eventually, but that doesn't mean that I am part of my 
house, or that there is some quality of my house which equals the fact of 
my presence in it. 

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[LizR]

On 30 January 2014 12:45, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

> On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 6:38:22 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>
>> On 30 January 2014 12:32, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>
>>> On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 6:22:43 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>>>
 On 30 January 2014 12:21, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

> On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 6:13:35 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>
>> On 30 January 2014 12:09, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>
>>> On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 6:01:19 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>>>
 On 30 January 2014 11:39, Craig Weinberg wrote:

> On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 5:38:04 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>
>> On 30 January 2014 11:24, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>> On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 1:34:48 PM UTC-5, John Clark
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Sat, Jan 25, 2014 at 9:35 AM, Craig Weinberg <
 whats...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > NO ROOM CAN BE CONSCIOUS.
>
 And we know that because we can say it in all capital letters,
 or possibly from the teachings of two of your favorite subjects, 
 astrology
 and numerology.

>>> The all caps were in response to Bruno's all caps, and no, you
>>> don't need astrology and numerology to understand that rooms are not
>>> haunted by the spirits of system-hood.
>>>
>> Imagine a small, roughly spherical room made out of a fairly hard
>> material something like limestone. Make a few holes in it, fill it 
>> with
>> some goop with the consistency of blancmange, decorate with sense 
>> organs
>> and throw in a body.
>> Et voila!
>>
> Voila, a cadaver.
>
 Unless *all *such objects are cadavers, this "disproves" the
 statement that *no *room can be conscious.
 (I must admit the idea that "no room can be conscious" seems to
 demand qualification...)

>>> All such objects would be cadavers, in the absence of some
>>> subjective experience which is being expressed.
>>>
>> What about anaesthesia and dreamless sleep?
>>
> Our personal level of awareness is not the totality of the awareness
> that our lives consist of. We sleep, but if we have to pee, who wakes us 
> up
> so we don't wet the bed?
>
 So all such objects aren't cadavers.

>>> If you are unconscious, you don't personally exist, but you exist
>>> sub-personally and super-personally. A body has microscopic and macroscopic
>>> scales, but those are only from the perspective which is available through
>>> our body, and its use of other bodies. The difference between a cadaver and
>>> a living person's body is not within the body, it is within experience.
>>> It's aesthetic, not functional. Although the functional and aesthetic
>>> perspectives can influence each other, as the cart can influence the
>>> behavior of the horse, the cart is ultimately dependent on the horse rather
>>> than the other way around.
>>>
>>
>> One difference between an unconscious body and a dead one is that you can
>> return an unconscious one to consciousness later.
>> That sounds kind of functional to me.
>>
>
> It's only functional if you assume that consciousness has value beyond the
> operation of the body. The condition of being able to return though is not
> necessarily part of the body. I can leave my house and the house will fall
> into disrepair eventually, but that doesn't mean that I am part of my
> house, or that there is some quality of my house which equals the fact of
> my presence in it.
>

The quality is being in a state of good repair, surely?

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 7:10:30 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>
> On 30 January 2014 12:45, Craig Weinberg 
> > wrote:
>
>> On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 6:38:22 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>>
>>> On 30 January 2014 12:32, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>>
 On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 6:22:43 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:

> On 30 January 2014 12:21, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>
>> On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 6:13:35 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>>
>>> On 30 January 2014 12:09, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>>
 On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 6:01:19 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:

> On 30 January 2014 11:39, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>> On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 5:38:04 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>>
>>> On 30 January 2014 11:24, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
 On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 1:34:48 PM UTC-5, John Clark 
 wrote:

> On Sat, Jan 25, 2014 at 9:35 AM, Craig Weinberg <
> whats...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> > NO ROOM CAN BE CONSCIOUS.
>>
> And we know that because we can say it in all capital letters, 
> or possibly from the teachings of two of your favorite subjects, 
> astrology 
> and numerology.   
>
 The all caps were in response to Bruno's all caps, and no, you 
 don't need astrology and numerology to understand that rooms are 
 not 
 haunted by the spirits of system-hood.

>>> Imagine a small, roughly spherical room made out of a fairly 
>>> hard material something like limestone. Make a few holes in it, 
>>> fill it 
>>> with some goop with the consistency of blancmange, decorate with 
>>> sense 
>>> organs and throw in a body.
>>> Et voila!
>>>
>> Voila, a cadaver.
>>
> Unless *all *such objects are cadavers, this "disproves" the 
> statement that *no *room can be conscious.
> (I must admit the idea that "no room can be conscious" seems to 
> demand qualification...)
>
 All such objects would be cadavers, in the absence of some 
 subjective experience which is being expressed.  

>>> What about anaesthesia and dreamless sleep? 
>>>
>> Our personal level of awareness is not the totality of the awareness 
>> that our lives consist of. We sleep, but if we have to pee, who wakes us 
>> up 
>> so we don't wet the bed?
>>
> So all such objects aren't cadavers.
>
 If you are unconscious, you don't personally exist, but you exist 
 sub-personally and super-personally. A body has microscopic and 
 macroscopic 
 scales, but those are only from the perspective which is available through 
 our body, and its use of other bodies. The difference between a cadaver 
 and 
 a living person's body is not within the body, it is within experience. 
 It's aesthetic, not functional. Although the functional and aesthetic 
 perspectives can influence each other, as the cart can influence the 
 behavior of the horse, the cart is ultimately dependent on the horse 
 rather 
 than the other way around.

>>>
>>> One difference between an unconscious body and a dead one is that you 
>>> can return an unconscious one to consciousness later.
>>> That sounds kind of functional to me.
>>>
>>
>> It's only functional if you assume that consciousness has value beyond 
>> the operation of the body. The condition of being able to return though is 
>> not necessarily part of the body. I can leave my house and the house will 
>> fall into disrepair eventually, but that doesn't mean that I am part of my 
>> house, or that there is some quality of my house which equals the fact of 
>> my presence in it. 
>>
>
> The quality is being in a state of good repair, surely?
>

I could be in my house and still let it fall apart. The house could also be 
damaged to the point where I decide to leave, of no fault of my own. There 
is correlation, but not cause. 

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[David Nyman]

On 29 January 2014 22:15, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

> The problem that concerns me about this way of looking at things is that
>> any and all behaviour associated with consciousness - including, crucially,
>> the articulation of our very thoughts and beliefs about conscious phenomena
>> - can at least in principle be exhausted by an extrinsic account. But if
>> this be so, it is very difficult indeed to understand how such extrinsic
>> behaviours could possibly make reference to any "intrinsic" remainder, even
>> were its existence granted. It isn't merely that any postulated remainder
>> would be redundant in the explanation of such behaviour, but that it is
>> hardly possible to see how an inner dual could even be accessible in
>> principle to a complete (i.e. causally closed) extrinsic system of
>> reference in the first place.
>>
>
> Right, because the extrinsic perspective is blind to the limits of causal
> closure.
>

But I'm afraid the problem is precisely that it behaves as if it is NOT in
fact blind to such limits. As Bruno points out in a recent response to John
Clark, if we rely on the causal closure of the extrinsic account (and which
of us does not?) then we commit ourselves to the view that there must be
such an account, at some level, of any behaviour to which we might
otherwise wish to impute a conscious origin. However, my point above is
that the problem is in fact even worse than this. In fact, it amounts to a
paradox.

The existence of a causally closed extrinsic account forces us to the view
that the very thoughts and utterances - even our own - that purport to
refer to irreducibly conscious phenomena must also be fully explicable
extrinsically. But how then could any such sequence of extrinsic events
possibly be linked to anything outside its causally-closed circle of
explanation? To put this baldly, even whilst asserting with absolute
certainty "the fact that I am conscious" I am forced nonetheless to accept
that this very assertion need have nothing to do (and, more strongly,
cannot have anything to do) with the fact that I am conscious!

I take no credit for being the originator of this insight, although it
isn't IMO acknowledged as often as it should be, perhaps because of its
very intractability. It's sometimes referred to as the Paradox of
Phenomenal Judgement. David Chalmers, for example, acknowledges it in
passing in The Conscious Mind, fails to offer any solution and then
proceeds to ignore it. Gregg Rosenberg - who if you haven't read perhaps
you should - deals with it a little more explicitly in A Place for
Consciousness, but IMO ultimately also fails to square this particular
circle. In fact I know of no mind-body theory, other than comp, that
confronts it head-on and suggests at least the shape of a possible
solution. That said, do you see what the paradox is and if you do, how
specifically does your theory deal with it?

David

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 8:06:03 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 29 January 2014 22:15, Craig Weinberg 
> > wrote:
>
>> The problem that concerns me about this way of looking at things is that 
>>> any and all behaviour associated with consciousness - including, crucially, 
>>> the articulation of our very thoughts and beliefs about conscious phenomena 
>>> - can at least in principle be exhausted by an extrinsic account. But if 
>>> this be so, it is very difficult indeed to understand how such extrinsic 
>>> behaviours could possibly make reference to any "intrinsic" remainder, even 
>>> were its existence granted. It isn't merely that any postulated remainder 
>>> would be redundant in the explanation of such behaviour, but that it is 
>>> hardly possible to see how an inner dual could even be accessible in 
>>> principle to a complete (i.e. causally closed) extrinsic system of 
>>> reference in the first place.
>>>
>>
>> Right, because the extrinsic perspective is blind to the limits of causal 
>> closure.
>>
>
> But I'm afraid the problem is precisely that it behaves as if it is NOT in 
> fact blind to such limits. 
>

Yes, it's blind in the sense of the blind spot that we have in our visual 
field. It appears that there is no blind spot. We can only infer a blind 
spot by appealing to another sense, an intellectual sense, to understand 
the limitation of the optical sense. With comp, we have to appeal to other 
senses which are grounded in aesthetic realism rather than logical 
positivism or functionalism.
 

> As Bruno points out in a recent response to John Clark, if we rely on the 
> causal closure of the extrinsic account (and which of us does not?)
>

I don't think that I do. I operate primarily on intuition. Causality tends 
to be irrelevant and self-revising in my experience.
 

> then we commit ourselves to the view that there must be such an account, 
> at some level, of any behaviour to which we might otherwise wish to impute 
> a conscious origin. However, my point above is that the problem is in fact 
> even worse than this. In fact, it amounts to a paradox.
>
> The existence of a causally closed extrinsic account forces us to the view 
> that the very thoughts and utterances - even our own - that purport to 
> refer to irreducibly conscious phenomena must also be fully explicable 
> extrinsically.
>

That follows naturally though if the extrinsic is a representation of the 
intrinsic, which is itself part of a single pansensitivity. The extrinsic 
'fills in', just like perception, even retrocausally from our perspective 
(because every moment is on some level part of the same now).
 

> But how then could any such sequence of extrinsic events possibly be 
> linked to anything outside its causally-closed circle of explanation? To 
> put this baldly, even whilst asserting with absolute certainty "the fact 
> that I am conscious" I am forced nonetheless to accept that this very 
> assertion need have nothing to do (and, more strongly, cannot have anything 
> to do) with the fact that I am conscious!
>

Sure, but the fact that you would expect that your assertion could or 
should have anything to do with your being conscious would not make sense 
in a universe in which consciousness did not exist in a fundamentally real 
way.
 

>
> I take no credit for being the originator of this insight, although it 
> isn't IMO acknowledged as often as it should be, perhaps because of its 
> very intractability. It's sometimes referred to as the Paradox of 
> Phenomenal Judgement. David Chalmers, for example, acknowledges it in 
> passing in The Conscious Mind, fails to offer any solution and then 
> proceeds to ignore it. Gregg Rosenberg - who if you haven't read perhaps 
> you should - deals with it a little more explicitly in A Place for 
> Consciousness, but IMO ultimately also fails to square this particular 
> circle. In fact I know of no mind-body theory, other than comp, that 
> confronts it head-on and suggests at least the shape of a possible 
> solution. That said, do you see what the paradox is and if you do, how 
> specifically does your theory deal with it?
>

I think that the paradox arises directly from the assumption of fundamental 
isolation rather than fundamental identity. Once you place sense first, 
then the paranoid scenario in which an inanimate universe conspires to 
invent a puppet which invents itself as a non-puppet falls apart. Without 
putting sense first, we will chase our tails, over and over and over again, 
looking for the curtain behind the man behind the curtain. A man can make a 
curtain, but a curtain can't make a man, let alone a man who is really a 
curtain but thinks that he is not.

Craig


> David
>

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 30 January 2014 10:00, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>
>
> On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 5:46:25 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>>
>> On 30 January 2014 09:39, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> > On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 5:38:04 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>> >>
>> >> On 30 January 2014 11:24, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>> >>>
>> >>> On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 1:34:48 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>> 
>>  On Sat, Jan 25, 2014 at 9:35 AM, Craig Weinberg 
>>  wrote:
>> 
>> > > NO ROOM CAN BE CONSCIOUS.
>> 
>> 
>>  And we know that because we can say it in all capital letters, or
>>  possibly from the teachings of two of your favorite subjects,
>>  astrology and
>>  numerology.
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>> The all caps were in response to Bruno's all caps, and no, you don't
>> >>> need
>> >>> astrology and numerology to understand that rooms are not haunted by
>> >>> the
>> >>> spirits of system-hood.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Imagine a small, roughly spherical room made out of a fairly hard
>> >> material
>> >> something like limestone. Make a few holes in it, fill it with some
>> >> goop
>> >> with the consistency of blancmange, decorate with sense organs and
>> >> throw in
>> >> a body.
>> >>
>> >> Et voila!
>> >
>> >
>> > Voila, a cadaver.
>>
>> Unless it's all set up to function properly.
>
>
> What's wrong with the way a cadaver functions?

Many changes occur after death, the end result of which is that in a
cadaver, the parts are in the wrong configuration and therefore don't
work together as they do in a living person. Death is said to occur
when the changes are irreversible, but people who have themselves
cryonically preserved hope that future technology will allow what is
currently thought to be irreversible to become reversible.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 9:21:44 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>
> On 30 January 2014 10:00, Craig Weinberg > 
> wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 5:46:25 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: 
> >> 
> >> On 30 January 2014 09:39, Craig Weinberg  wrote: 
> >> > 
> >> > 
> >> > On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 5:38:04 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: 
> >> >> 
> >> >> On 30 January 2014 11:24, Craig Weinberg  
> wrote: 
> >> >>> 
> >> >>> On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 1:34:48 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote: 
> >>  
> >>  On Sat, Jan 25, 2014 at 9:35 AM, Craig Weinberg <
> whats...@gmail.com> 
> >>  wrote: 
> >>  
> >> > > NO ROOM CAN BE CONSCIOUS. 
> >>  
> >>  
> >>  And we know that because we can say it in all capital letters, or 
> >>  possibly from the teachings of two of your favorite subjects, 
> >>  astrology and 
> >>  numerology. 
> >> >>> 
> >> >>> 
> >> >>> The all caps were in response to Bruno's all caps, and no, you 
> don't 
> >> >>> need 
> >> >>> astrology and numerology to understand that rooms are not haunted 
> by 
> >> >>> the 
> >> >>> spirits of system-hood. 
> >> >> 
> >> >> 
> >> >> Imagine a small, roughly spherical room made out of a fairly hard 
> >> >> material 
> >> >> something like limestone. Make a few holes in it, fill it with some 
> >> >> goop 
> >> >> with the consistency of blancmange, decorate with sense organs and 
> >> >> throw in 
> >> >> a body. 
> >> >> 
> >> >> Et voila! 
> >> > 
> >> > 
> >> > Voila, a cadaver. 
> >> 
> >> Unless it's all set up to function properly. 
> > 
> > 
> > What's wrong with the way a cadaver functions? 
>
> Many changes occur after death, the end result of which is that in a 
> cadaver, the parts are in the wrong configuration and therefore don't 
> work together as they do in a living person. 


Wrong for whom? They are in a better configuration for certain 
microrganisms to thrive. There's probably more complexity in the 
computation of a decomposing body than a healthy one .
 

> Death is said to occur 
> when the changes are irreversible, but people who have themselves 
> cryonically preserved hope that future technology will allow what is 
> currently thought to be irreversible to become reversible. 
>

Had we not already discovered the impossibility of resurrecting a dead 
person with raw electricity, would your position offer any insight into why 
that strategy would fail 100% of the time?

Craig
 

>
>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou 
>

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 30 January 2014 13:30, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>> > What's wrong with the way a cadaver functions?
>>
>> Many changes occur after death, the end result of which is that in a
>> cadaver, the parts are in the wrong configuration and therefore don't
>> work together as they do in a living person.
>
>
> Wrong for whom? They are in a better configuration for certain microrganisms
> to thrive. There's probably more complexity in the computation of a
> decomposing body than a healthy one .
>
>>
>> Death is said to occur
>> when the changes are irreversible, but people who have themselves
>> cryonically preserved hope that future technology will allow what is
>> currently thought to be irreversible to become reversible.
>
>
> Had we not already discovered the impossibility of resurrecting a dead
> person with raw electricity, would your position offer any insight into why
> that strategy would fail 100% of the time?

Actually, we can sometimes resurrect a dead person with raw
electricity in cases of cardiac arrest, which would previously have
been defined as death. It's a case of the definition of death changing
with technology. In future, there will probably be patients who would
currently considered brain dead who will be able to be revived.


-- 
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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[meekerdb]

On 1/29/2014 5:06 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 29 January 2014 22:15, Craig Weinberg > wrote:


The problem that concerns me about this way of looking at things is 
that any and
all behaviour associated with consciousness - including, crucially, the
articulation of our very thoughts and beliefs about conscious phenomena 
- can at
least in principle be exhausted by an extrinsic account. But if this be 
so, it
is very difficult indeed to understand how such extrinsic behaviours 
could
possibly make reference to any "intrinsic" remainder, even were its 
existence
granted. It isn't merely that any postulated remainder would be 
redundant in the
explanation of such behaviour, but that it is hardly possible to see 
how an
inner dual could even be accessible in principle to a complete (i.e. 
causally
closed) extrinsic system of reference in the first place.


Right, because the extrinsic perspective is blind to the limits of causal 
closure.


But I'm afraid the problem is precisely that it behaves as if it is NOT in fact blind to 
such limits. As Bruno points out in a recent response to John Clark, if we rely on the 
causal closure of the extrinsic account (and which of us does not?) then we commit 
ourselves to the view that there must be such an account, at some level, of any 
behaviour to which we might otherwise wish to impute a conscious origin. However, my 
point above is that the problem is in fact even worse than this. In fact, it amounts to 
a paradox.


The existence of a causally closed extrinsic account forces us to the view that the very 
thoughts and utterances - even our own - that purport to refer to irreducibly conscious 
phenomena must also be fully explicable extrinsically. But how then could any such 
sequence of extrinsic events possibly be linked to anything outside its causally-closed 
circle of explanation? To put this baldly, even whilst asserting with absolute certainty 
"the fact that I am conscious" I am forced nonetheless to accept that this very 
assertion need have nothing to do (and, more strongly, cannot have anything to do) with 
the fact that I am conscious!


I take no credit for being the originator of this insight,


But you have explained it well.  And it's not at all clear to me that Bruno's 
computational theory avoids this paradox.  It seems there will still, in the UD 
computation, be a closed account of the physical processes.  No doubt it will be 
computationally linked with some provable sentences, which Bruno wants to then identify 
with beliefs.  But this still leaves beliefs as epiphenomena of the physical processes; 
even if comp explains them both.


Brent


although it isn't IMO acknowledged as often as it should be, perhaps because of its very 
intractability. It's sometimes referred to as the Paradox of Phenomenal Judgement. David 
Chalmers, for example, acknowledges it in passing in The Conscious Mind, fails to offer 
any solution and then proceeds to ignore it. Gregg Rosenberg - who if you haven't read 
perhaps you should - deals with it a little more explicitly in A Place for 
Consciousness, but IMO ultimately also fails to square this particular circle. In fact I 
know of no mind-body theory, other than comp, that confronts it head-on and suggests at 
least the shape of a possible solution. That said, do you see what the paradox is and if 
you do, how specifically does your theory deal with it?


David
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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 30 January 2014 16:00, meekerdb  wrote:
> On 1/29/2014 5:06 PM, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 29 January 2014 22:15, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>>
>>> The problem that concerns me about this way of looking at things is that
>>> any and all behaviour associated with consciousness - including, crucially,
>>> the articulation of our very thoughts and beliefs about conscious phenomena
>>> - can at least in principle be exhausted by an extrinsic account. But if
>>> this be so, it is very difficult indeed to understand how such extrinsic
>>> behaviours could possibly make reference to any "intrinsic" remainder, even
>>> were its existence granted. It isn't merely that any postulated remainder
>>> would be redundant in the explanation of such behaviour, but that it is
>>> hardly possible to see how an inner dual could even be accessible in
>>> principle to a complete (i.e. causally closed) extrinsic system of reference
>>> in the first place.
>>
>>
>> Right, because the extrinsic perspective is blind to the limits of causal
>> closure.
>
>
> But I'm afraid the problem is precisely that it behaves as if it is NOT in
> fact blind to such limits. As Bruno points out in a recent response to John
> Clark, if we rely on the causal closure of the extrinsic account (and which
> of us does not?) then we commit ourselves to the view that there must be
> such an account, at some level, of any behaviour to which we might otherwise
> wish to impute a conscious origin. However, my point above is that the
> problem is in fact even worse than this. In fact, it amounts to a paradox.
>
> The existence of a causally closed extrinsic account forces us to the view
> that the very thoughts and utterances - even our own - that purport to refer
> to irreducibly conscious phenomena must also be fully explicable
> extrinsically. But how then could any such sequence of extrinsic events
> possibly be linked to anything outside its causally-closed circle of
> explanation? To put this baldly, even whilst asserting with absolute
> certainty "the fact that I am conscious" I am forced nonetheless to accept
> that this very assertion need have nothing to do (and, more strongly, cannot
> have anything to do) with the fact that I am conscious!
>
> I take no credit for being the originator of this insight,
>
>
> But you have explained it well.  And it's not at all clear to me that
> Bruno's computational theory avoids this paradox.  It seems there will
> still, in the UD computation, be a closed account of the physical processes.
> No doubt it will be computationally linked with some provable sentences,
> which Bruno wants to then identify with beliefs.  But this still leaves
> beliefs as epiphenomena of the physical processes; even if comp explains
> them both.

I don't think there is a problem if consciousness is an epiphenomenon.
If you start looking for consciousness being an extra thing with
(perhaps) its own separate causal efficacy, that's where problems
arise.


-- 
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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Bruno Marchal]

On 29 Jan 2014, at 23:24, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 1:34:48 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Jan 25, 2014 at 9:35 AM, Craig Weinberg   
wrote:


> NO ROOM CAN BE CONSCIOUS.

And we know that because we can say it in all capital letters, or  
possibly from the teachings of two of your favorite subjects,  
astrology and numerology.


The all caps were in response to Bruno's all caps,


No. I only quoted this. I think you wrote this (on the 25 january).

(Not important. But I never use caps, except in figure, like in  
NUMBERS ==> MIND ==> PHYSICS, for example. If not it looks like we are  
angry!)


Bruno



and no, you don't need astrology and numerology to understand that  
rooms are not haunted by the spirits of system-hood.



> *Except within the fictional narrative of a conscious experience.

So only things that have conscious experiences can be conscious.  
Thanks for the news flash.


No, the other way around. Only conscious experiences exist, but we  
can be misled about what exists.


Craig


  John K Clark



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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[David Nyman]

On 30 January 2014 05:00, meekerdb  wrote:

But you have explained it well.  And it's not at all clear to me that
> Bruno's computational theory avoids this paradox.  It seems there will
> still, in the UD computation, be a closed account of the physical
> processes.  No doubt it will be computationally linked with some provable
> sentences, which Bruno wants to then identify with beliefs.  But this still
> leaves beliefs as epiphenomena of the physical processes; even if comp
> explains them both.


Well, this is the part I've been struggling for years to understand.
However I think I may be starting at least to see the shape of a possible
solution and I'm not sure that it's precisely what you say above. As well
as I can articulate it (which isn't saying much), "causation" in comp seems
to come from more than one direction. There is the trace of the UD, which
instantiates (platonically speaking) all possible computations and hence
constitutes a foundation (or cause) for any and all possibilities
whatsoever. Embedded within this is an infinity of self-referential
machines whose shared indexical "beliefs" effectively compete and
collaborate to filter out a self-consistent, 1p-plural physics from this
computational background.

Of course, there is a lot of hand-waving going on here; showing precisely
by what measure "normal" indexical computations succeed in outnumbering
pathological competitors seems to be a major open problem with any such
view. But if we grant at least the possibility, then - unlike Borges's
endlessly useless stacks of books - what we have is a "Library of
Programmatic Babel" where self-consistent entities effectively *find
themselves* in the context of a self-selected consistent physics. There is
a sort of multiple-causation in play here, in terms of which it doesn't
perhaps make much sense to think of either the physics or the beliefs as
"epiphenomena" of the other.

Were this the limit of the scope of the theory, however, the dreaded
Paradox of Phenomenal Judgement would still rear its ugly head. The most we
might appear to lay claim to, up to this point, is a bunch of logical
self-references instantiated in arithmetic. Even were we able to interpret
these references as having something to do with consciousness, this needn't
necessarily amount to "consciousness itself" nor would is it obvious that
extrinsically-defined computational "beliefs" could possibly have access to
(and hence truly refer to) any such intrinsic "dual". This is where we seem
to need a gap to open up that we aren't willing (or able) to grant in the
physical account.

And the gap that offers itself (following Bruno) is that between the
assertion of an arithmetical belief and its truth. To put it shortly, if a
computational machine asserts an indexical belief of the incorrigible type
that distinguishes, we are to understand, unshareable from shareable
beliefs, then either that belief is true (i.e. truly refers) or it fails to
refer. But if this be the case, then - if we are indeed "machines" in this
sense - we are forced to the conclusion that either our own beliefs and
assertions of this type truly refer, or that we too fail to refer (i.e. we
are zombies). Since this latter conclusion must seem to us to be untenable,
we may conclude that, for machines at least, unshareable ("conscious")
phenomena and arithmetical truth are co-terminous. So the POPJ would seem
to be effectively side-stepped because "extrinsic" beliefs, defined in this
particular way, turn out in fact to be capable of referring truly to an
"intrinsic" dual (i.e. the "inside view" of arithmetical truth). This
strikes me as a neat trick.

Bruno sometimes poetically describes the comp view as conceiving "life, the
universe and everything" as a sort of multi-player video game, in which an
infinity of indexical filtrations compete and collaborate (through the FPI)
to resolve what the "game physics" will be turn out to be from the
point-of-view of the players. If so, it would seem to encapsulate one of
those virtuous circles that you talk about. Each level contributes
something not fully present in the others and it isn't quite right to say
that there is a bottom turtle that is the ultimate "cause" of everything
else; hence nothing is truly "epiphenomenal".

David

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Edgar L. Owen]

David,

Bruno's 'comp' has 2 intractable fundamental problems that I see.

1. There is absolutely no way for a static arithmetical Plantonia to 
generate any happening whatsoever. Bruno's theory that all happening is a 
1p perspective of human observers implies nothing happened in the entire 
history of the universe until some human observer became conscious. Total 
nonsense.

2. Perhaps even worse there is absolutely no way for pure arithmetic to 
generate the ACTUAL computational state of the observable universe. How 
does the actual particular Fine Tuning of our universe arise from pure 
arithmetic? Especially if it just sits there in some pure static Platonic 
state? It just doesn't! It can't

In my view the whole UD can be as logically consistent as it wants to be 
but still has no connection with the actual observable reality of our 
universe...

Edgar



On Thursday, January 30, 2014 10:03:01 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 30 January 2014 05:00, meekerdb >wrote:
>
> But you have explained it well.  And it's not at all clear to me that 
>> Bruno's computational theory avoids this paradox.  It seems there will 
>> still, in the UD computation, be a closed account of the physical 
>> processes.  No doubt it will be computationally linked with some provable 
>> sentences, which Bruno wants to then identify with beliefs.  But this still 
>> leaves beliefs as epiphenomena of the physical processes; even if comp 
>> explains them both.
>
>
> Well, this is the part I've been struggling for years to understand. 
> However I think I may be starting at least to see the shape of a possible 
> solution and I'm not sure that it's precisely what you say above. As well 
> as I can articulate it (which isn't saying much), "causation" in comp seems 
> to come from more than one direction. There is the trace of the UD, which 
> instantiates (platonically speaking) all possible computations and hence 
> constitutes a foundation (or cause) for any and all possibilities 
> whatsoever. Embedded within this is an infinity of self-referential 
> machines whose shared indexical "beliefs" effectively compete and 
> collaborate to filter out a self-consistent, 1p-plural physics from this 
> computational background.
>
> Of course, there is a lot of hand-waving going on here; showing precisely 
> by what measure "normal" indexical computations succeed in outnumbering 
> pathological competitors seems to be a major open problem with any such 
> view. But if we grant at least the possibility, then - unlike Borges's 
> endlessly useless stacks of books - what we have is a "Library of 
> Programmatic Babel" where self-consistent entities effectively *find 
> themselves* in the context of a self-selected consistent physics. There is 
> a sort of multiple-causation in play here, in terms of which it doesn't 
> perhaps make much sense to think of either the physics or the beliefs as 
> "epiphenomena" of the other.
>
> Were this the limit of the scope of the theory, however, the dreaded 
> Paradox of Phenomenal Judgement would still rear its ugly head. The most we 
> might appear to lay claim to, up to this point, is a bunch of logical 
> self-references instantiated in arithmetic. Even were we able to interpret 
> these references as having something to do with consciousness, this needn't 
> necessarily amount to "consciousness itself" nor would is it obvious that 
> extrinsically-defined computational "beliefs" could possibly have access to 
> (and hence truly refer to) any such intrinsic "dual". This is where we seem 
> to need a gap to open up that we aren't willing (or able) to grant in the 
> physical account.
>
> And the gap that offers itself (following Bruno) is that between the 
> assertion of an arithmetical belief and its truth. To put it shortly, if a 
> computational machine asserts an indexical belief of the incorrigible type 
> that distinguishes, we are to understand, unshareable from shareable 
> beliefs, then either that belief is true (i.e. truly refers) or it fails to 
> refer. But if this be the case, then - if we are indeed "machines" in this 
> sense - we are forced to the conclusion that either our own beliefs and 
> assertions of this type truly refer, or that we too fail to refer (i.e. we 
> are zombies). Since this latter conclusion must seem to us to be untenable, 
> we may conclude that, for machines at least, unshareable ("conscious") 
> phenomena and arithmetical truth are co-terminous. So the POPJ would seem 
> to be effectively side-stepped because "extrinsic" beliefs, defined in this 
> particular way, turn out in fact to be capable of referring truly to an 
> "intrinsic" dual (i.e. the "inside view" of arithmetical truth). This 
> strikes me as a neat trick.
>
> Bruno sometimes poetically describes the comp view as conceiving "life, 
> the universe and everything" as a sort of multi-player video game, in which 
> an infinity of indexical filtrations compete and collaborate (through the 
> FP

Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, January 30, 2014 12:19:56 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>
> On 30 January 2014 16:00, meekerdb > 
> wrote: 
> > On 1/29/2014 5:06 PM, David Nyman wrote: 
> > 
> > On 29 January 2014 22:15, Craig Weinberg > 
> wrote: 
> >>> 
> >>> The problem that concerns me about this way of looking at things is 
> that 
> >>> any and all behaviour associated with consciousness - including, 
> crucially, 
> >>> the articulation of our very thoughts and beliefs about conscious 
> phenomena 
> >>> - can at least in principle be exhausted by an extrinsic account. But 
> if 
> >>> this be so, it is very difficult indeed to understand how such 
> extrinsic 
> >>> behaviours could possibly make reference to any "intrinsic" remainder, 
> even 
> >>> were its existence granted. It isn't merely that any postulated 
> remainder 
> >>> would be redundant in the explanation of such behaviour, but that it 
> is 
> >>> hardly possible to see how an inner dual could even be accessible in 
> >>> principle to a complete (i.e. causally closed) extrinsic system of 
> reference 
> >>> in the first place. 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> Right, because the extrinsic perspective is blind to the limits of 
> causal 
> >> closure. 
> > 
> > 
> > But I'm afraid the problem is precisely that it behaves as if it is NOT 
> in 
> > fact blind to such limits. As Bruno points out in a recent response to 
> John 
> > Clark, if we rely on the causal closure of the extrinsic account (and 
> which 
> > of us does not?) then we commit ourselves to the view that there must be 
> > such an account, at some level, of any behaviour to which we might 
> otherwise 
> > wish to impute a conscious origin. However, my point above is that the 
> > problem is in fact even worse than this. In fact, it amounts to a 
> paradox. 
> > 
> > The existence of a causally closed extrinsic account forces us to the 
> view 
> > that the very thoughts and utterances - even our own - that purport to 
> refer 
> > to irreducibly conscious phenomena must also be fully explicable 
> > extrinsically. But how then could any such sequence of extrinsic events 
> > possibly be linked to anything outside its causally-closed circle of 
> > explanation? To put this baldly, even whilst asserting with absolute 
> > certainty "the fact that I am conscious" I am forced nonetheless to 
> accept 
> > that this very assertion need have nothing to do (and, more strongly, 
> cannot 
> > have anything to do) with the fact that I am conscious! 
> > 
> > I take no credit for being the originator of this insight, 
> > 
> > 
> > But you have explained it well.  And it's not at all clear to me that 
> > Bruno's computational theory avoids this paradox.  It seems there will 
> > still, in the UD computation, be a closed account of the physical 
> processes. 
> > No doubt it will be computationally linked with some provable sentences, 
> > which Bruno wants to then identify with beliefs.  But this still leaves 
> > beliefs as epiphenomena of the physical processes; even if comp explains 
> > them both. 
>
> I don't think there is a problem if consciousness is an epiphenomenon. 
> If you start looking for consciousness being an extra thing with 
> (perhaps) its own separate causal efficacy, that's where problems 
> arise. 
>

Then you would still have the problem of why there are epiphenomema. They 
are already "an extra thing" with no functional explanation.
 

>
>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou 
>

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Richard Ruquist]

Mentioning comp poetry,
if we are just conscious mathematical creatures and mathematics has existed
long before us,
perhaps other conscious math creatures have also existed long before us as
Bruno describes.


On Thu, Jan 30, 2014 at 10:03 AM, David Nyman  wrote:

> On 30 January 2014 05:00, meekerdb  wrote:
>
> But you have explained it well.  And it's not at all clear to me that
>> Bruno's computational theory avoids this paradox.  It seems there will
>> still, in the UD computation, be a closed account of the physical
>> processes.  No doubt it will be computationally linked with some provable
>> sentences, which Bruno wants to then identify with beliefs.  But this still
>> leaves beliefs as epiphenomena of the physical processes; even if comp
>> explains them both.
>
>
> Well, this is the part I've been struggling for years to understand.
> However I think I may be starting at least to see the shape of a possible
> solution and I'm not sure that it's precisely what you say above. As well
> as I can articulate it (which isn't saying much), "causation" in comp seems
> to come from more than one direction. There is the trace of the UD, which
> instantiates (platonically speaking) all possible computations and hence
> constitutes a foundation (or cause) for any and all possibilities
> whatsoever. Embedded within this is an infinity of self-referential
> machines whose shared indexical "beliefs" effectively compete and
> collaborate to filter out a self-consistent, 1p-plural physics from this
> computational background.
>
> Of course, there is a lot of hand-waving going on here; showing precisely
> by what measure "normal" indexical computations succeed in outnumbering
> pathological competitors seems to be a major open problem with any such
> view. But if we grant at least the possibility, then - unlike Borges's
> endlessly useless stacks of books - what we have is a "Library of
> Programmatic Babel" where self-consistent entities effectively *find
> themselves* in the context of a self-selected consistent physics. There is
> a sort of multiple-causation in play here, in terms of which it doesn't
> perhaps make much sense to think of either the physics or the beliefs as
> "epiphenomena" of the other.
>
> Were this the limit of the scope of the theory, however, the dreaded
> Paradox of Phenomenal Judgement would still rear its ugly head. The most we
> might appear to lay claim to, up to this point, is a bunch of logical
> self-references instantiated in arithmetic. Even were we able to interpret
> these references as having something to do with consciousness, this needn't
> necessarily amount to "consciousness itself" nor would is it obvious that
> extrinsically-defined computational "beliefs" could possibly have access to
> (and hence truly refer to) any such intrinsic "dual". This is where we seem
> to need a gap to open up that we aren't willing (or able) to grant in the
> physical account.
>
> And the gap that offers itself (following Bruno) is that between the
> assertion of an arithmetical belief and its truth. To put it shortly, if a
> computational machine asserts an indexical belief of the incorrigible type
> that distinguishes, we are to understand, unshareable from shareable
> beliefs, then either that belief is true (i.e. truly refers) or it fails to
> refer. But if this be the case, then - if we are indeed "machines" in this
> sense - we are forced to the conclusion that either our own beliefs and
> assertions of this type truly refer, or that we too fail to refer (i.e. we
> are zombies). Since this latter conclusion must seem to us to be untenable,
> we may conclude that, for machines at least, unshareable ("conscious")
> phenomena and arithmetical truth are co-terminous. So the POPJ would seem
> to be effectively side-stepped because "extrinsic" beliefs, defined in this
> particular way, turn out in fact to be capable of referring truly to an
> "intrinsic" dual (i.e. the "inside view" of arithmetical truth). This
> strikes me as a neat trick.
>
> Bruno sometimes poetically describes the comp view as conceiving "life,
> the universe and everything" as a sort of multi-player video game, in which
> an infinity of indexical filtrations compete and collaborate (through the
> FPI) to resolve what the "game physics" will be turn out to be from the
> point-of-view of the players. If so, it would seem to encapsulate one of
> those virtuous circles that you talk about. Each level contributes
> something not fully present in the others and it isn't quite right to say
> that there is a bottom turtle that is the ultimate "cause" of everything
> else; hence nothing is truly "epiphenomenal".
>
> David
>
> --
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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 11:26:17 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>
> On 30 January 2014 13:30, Craig Weinberg > 
> wrote: 
>
> >> > What's wrong with the way a cadaver functions? 
> >> 
> >> Many changes occur after death, the end result of which is that in a 
> >> cadaver, the parts are in the wrong configuration and therefore don't 
> >> work together as they do in a living person. 
> > 
> > 
> > Wrong for whom? They are in a better configuration for certain 
> microrganisms 
> > to thrive. There's probably more complexity in the computation of a 
> > decomposing body than a healthy one . 
> > 
> >> 
> >> Death is said to occur 
> >> when the changes are irreversible, but people who have themselves 
> >> cryonically preserved hope that future technology will allow what is 
> >> currently thought to be irreversible to become reversible. 
> > 
> > 
> > Had we not already discovered the impossibility of resurrecting a dead 
> > person with raw electricity, would your position offer any insight into 
> why 
> > that strategy would fail 100% of the time? 
>
> Actually, we can sometimes resurrect a dead person with raw 
> electricity in cases of cardiac arrest, which would previously have 
> been defined as death. It's a case of the definition of death changing 
> with technology. In future, there will probably be patients who would 
> currently considered brain dead who will be able to be revived. 
>

That does not resurrect a dead person, it just helps restart a still-living 
person's heart. True, cardiac arrest will eventually kill a person, but 
sending electricity through the body of someone who has died of cholera or 
a stroke is not going to revive them. My point though is that there is 
nothing within functionalism which predicts the finality or complexity of 
death. If we are just a machine halting, why wouldn't fixing the machine 
restart it in theory? We can smuggle in our understanding of the 
irreversibility of death, and rationalize it after the fact, but can you 
honestly say that functionalism predicts the pervasiveness of it?

Craig


>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou 
>

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, January 30, 2014 6:46:52 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 29 Jan 2014, at 23:24, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 1:34:48 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> On Sat, Jan 25, 2014 at 9:35 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>> > NO ROOM CAN BE CONSCIOUS. 
>>>
>>
>> And we know that because we can say it in all capital letters, or 
>> possibly from the teachings of two of your favorite subjects, astrology and 
>> numerology.
>>
>
> The all caps were in response to Bruno's all caps, 
>
>
> No. I only quoted this. I think you wrote this (on the 25 january). 
>
> (Not important. But I never use caps, except in figure, like in NUMBERS 
> ==> MIND ==> PHYSICS, for example. If not it looks like we are angry!)
>

No, I was responding to you:

"But that doesn't answer the question: do you think (or understand, or 
whatever you think the appropriate term is) that the Chinese Room 
COULD POSSIBLY be conscious or do you think that it COULD NOT POSSIBLY 
be conscious?"

Craig


> Bruno
>
>
>
> and no, you don't need astrology and numerology to understand that rooms 
> are not haunted by the spirits of system-hood.
>  
>
>>
>> > *Except within the fictional narrative of a conscious experience.
>>>
>>
>> So only things that have conscious experiences can be conscious. Thanks 
>> for the news flash.
>>
>
> No, the other way around. Only conscious experiences exist, but we can be 
> misled about what exists.
>
> Craig
>
>
>>   John K Clark 
>>
>>
>>
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>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[David Nyman]

On 30 January 2014 15:13, Edgar L. Owen  wrote:

In my view the whole UD can be as logically consistent as it wants to be
> but still has no connection with the actual observable reality of our
> universe...


I'm afraid I don't seem to share your enviable certainty on the range of
possibilities that could account for "the actual observable reality of our
universe". Some carefully reasoned argument that doesn't beg the most
crucial questions might help.

David

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Bruno Marchal]

On 30 Jan 2014, at 00:13, LizR wrote:

On 30 January 2014 12:09, Craig Weinberg   
wrote:

On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 6:01:19 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
On 30 January 2014 11:39, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 5:38:04 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
On 30 January 2014 11:24, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 1:34:48 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Jan 25, 2014 at 9:35 AM, Craig Weinberg   
wrote:


> NO ROOM CAN BE CONSCIOUS.

And we know that because we can say it in all capital letters, or  
possibly from the teachings of two of your favorite subjects,  
astrology and numerology.


The all caps were in response to Bruno's all caps, and no, you don't  
need astrology and numerology to understand that rooms are not  
haunted by the spirits of system-hood.


Imagine a small, roughly spherical room made out of a fairly hard  
material something like limestone. Make a few holes in it, fill it  
with some goop with the consistency of blancmange, decorate with  
sense organs and throw in a body.


Et voila!

Voila, a cadaver.

Unless all such objects are cadavers, this "disproves" the statement  
that no room can be conscious.


(I must admit the idea that "no room can be conscious" seems to  
demand qualification...)


All such objects would be cadavers, in the absence of some  
subjective experience which is being expressed.


What about anaesthesia and dreamless sleep?


With comp it might be like with death, or approximation. The 1p  
experience are hard to describe, and usually hard to memorize except  
for vague feeling that some time has passed (when "you" come back).


Bruno





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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[David Nyman]

On 30 January 2014 02:19, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

> But how then could any such sequence of extrinsic events possibly be
>> linked to anything outside its causally-closed circle of explanation? To
>> put this baldly, even whilst asserting with absolute certainty "the fact
>> that I am conscious" I am forced nonetheless to accept that this very
>> assertion need have nothing to do (and, more strongly, cannot have anything
>> to do) with the fact that I am conscious!
>>
>
> Sure, but the fact that you would expect that your assertion could or
> should have anything to do with your being conscious would not make sense
> in a universe in which consciousness did not exist in a fundamentally real
> way.
>

I'm sorry, Craig, but nothing that you have said encourages me to believe
that you have understood the paradox as posed or the particular problem it
raises. What we must account for is that there is a causally closed
extrinsic account, on which we rely utterly for every other purpose, that
appears to refer to something with which it has no systematic connection.
This would seem to imply that what truly exists is merely a "mechanism"
that merely gives the appearance of making such references, but that this
is in fact some sort of conceptual mistake (i.e. in truth there are no such
references). Of course, were we to accept such a conclusion, we would be
forced to eliminate consciousness, which is untenable to all but
"objectivist" hard-liners who resolutely avert their eyes from the
paradoxes that ensue.

But postulating sense as fundamental doesn't save you from the paradox,
unless you are willing to believe that the extrinsic account somehow just
mimics the sensory one by some sort of "pre-established harmony" and that
there is in fact no on-going systematic link between them. That's why, as
I've argued in a post to Brent, we need a theory that is, at least,
conceptually equipped to elucidate the systematic logical-causal links
between *all* the domains that appear to be in play. Nothing that you have
said persuades me that merely giving consciousness "fundamental" priority
over everything else even addresses this issue. It merely reverses the
paradox at the price of making the extrinsic account an isolated
epiphenomenon and provides no explanation for how that epiphenomenon might
be linked systematically to the "sense" it purports (per impossibile) to
refer to.

>From my reading of you, I think you have fallen into confusing the notions
of fundamental and irreducible. But in the appropriate schema, it is
possible for entities (conscious phenomena, for example) to be irreducible
to simpler explanatory elements, whilst still being, in an effective sense,
derivable from them by systematic "upwards" or "inner" reference. Of
course, demonstrating this in detail requires argumentative and technical
rigour, rather than mere intuitive poetry, and I leave that to those better
equipped than myself.

David

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, January 30, 2014 10:48:55 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 30 January 2014 02:19, Craig Weinberg 
> > wrote:
>
>> But how then could any such sequence of extrinsic events possibly be 
>>> linked to anything outside its causally-closed circle of explanation? To 
>>> put this baldly, even whilst asserting with absolute certainty "the fact 
>>> that I am conscious" I am forced nonetheless to accept that this very 
>>> assertion need have nothing to do (and, more strongly, cannot have anything 
>>> to do) with the fact that I am conscious!
>>>
>>
>> Sure, but the fact that you would expect that your assertion could or 
>> should have anything to do with your being conscious would not make sense 
>> in a universe in which consciousness did not exist in a fundamentally real 
>> way.
>>
>
> I'm sorry, Craig, but nothing that you have said encourages me to believe 
> that you have understood the paradox as posed or the particular problem it 
> raises. What we must account for is that there is a causally closed 
> extrinsic account, 
>

There is a closed extrinsic account, but all accounts are subjective. There 
seems to be a closed extrinsic account, but that seems to evaporate under 
some states of consciousness. The degree to which it seems closed is not an 
absolute, and seems to be contingent instead upon awareness to some extent.
 

> on which we rely utterly for every other purpose, that appears to refer to 
> something with which it has no systematic connection. This would seem to 
> imply that what truly exists is merely a "mechanism" that merely gives the 
> appearance of making such references, but that this is in fact some sort of 
> conceptual mistake (i.e. in truth there are no such references). Of course, 
> were we to accept such a conclusion, we would be forced to eliminate 
> consciousness, which is untenable to all but "objectivist" hard-liners who 
> resolutely avert their eyes from the paradoxes that ensue.
>

What is a specific example of what you are talking about? The continuity of 
sense does not mean that it is objective in an absolute sense, only that 
our awareness is nested within an ongoing condition rather than 
contributing to it directly. The fact that my dream disappears when I wake 
up in the morning but the Earth persists for billions of my years doesn't 
mean that they are fundamentally different kinds of things. To the 
universe, duration may not be an appropriate measure of realism as it is 
for us.
 

>
> But postulating sense as fundamental doesn't save you from the paradox, 
> unless you are willing to believe that the extrinsic account somehow just 
> mimics the sensory one by some sort of "pre-established harmony" and that 
> there is in fact no on-going systematic link between them. 
>

The extrinsic account is part of the sensory account. The sense fundamental 
means that there can be no "account" which is not sensory. Certainly there 
are many sensory accounts which are not available to us personally, but 
which are available to us indirectly through the extrinsic-facing senses of 
the body, but there is no problem with the congruency of all of the various 
views. Everything makes sense in the appropriate ways to reflect their 
relation to the whole.
 

> That's why, as I've argued in a post to Brent, we need a theory that is, 
> at least, conceptually equipped to elucidate the systematic logical-causal 
> links between *all* the domains that appear to be in play. Nothing that you 
> have said persuades me that merely giving consciousness "fundamental" 
> priority over everything else even addresses this issue. It merely reverses 
> the paradox at the price of making the extrinsic account an isolated 
> epiphenomenon and provides no explanation for how that epiphenomenon might 
> be linked systematically to the "sense" it purports (per impossibile) to 
> refer to.
>

It's not an isolated epiphenomenon, it is a function of perceptual 
relativity. It's not necessarily possible to draw a direct relation between 
the extrinsic and the intrinsic, because the intrinsic contains the entire 
history of the universe, and requires it, whereas the extrinsic account is 
just a paper thin slice which by definition has only a collapsed signature 
of history. It gets us closer to understanding how to engineer reality only 
in the sense of helping us to realize that we are nowhere near as close as 
we think. From my perspective, everyone is talking about the passage to the 
Orient, and I'm saying 'actually it looks like there is a whole other side 
of the world over there'.
 

>
> From my reading of you, I think you have fallen into confusing the notions 
> of fundamental and irreducible. But in the appropriate schema, it is 
> possible for entities (conscious phenomena, for example) to be irreducible 
> to simpler explanatory elements, whilst still being, in an effective sense, 
> derivable from them by systematic "upwards" or "inner" reference. Of 
> course, demons

Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Edgar L. Owen]

David,

Boy, O Boy!

You deliberately snipped the part of my post that you then accused me of 
not providing!

Sorry for trying to help!
:-)

Edgar




On Thursday, January 30, 2014 10:55:00 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 30 January 2014 15:13, Edgar L. Owen >wrote:
>
> In my view the whole UD can be as logically consistent as it wants to be 
>> but still has no connection with the actual observable reality of our 
>> universe...
>
>  
> I'm afraid I don't seem to share your enviable certainty on the range of 
> possibilities that could account for "the actual observable reality of our 
> universe". Some carefully reasoned argument that doesn't beg the most 
> crucial questions might help.
>
> David
>
>

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Bruno Marchal]

On 30 Jan 2014, at 02:06, David Nyman wrote:

On 29 January 2014 22:15, Craig Weinberg   
wrote:
The problem that concerns me about this way of looking at things is  
that any and all behaviour associated with consciousness -  
including, crucially, the articulation of our very thoughts and  
beliefs about conscious phenomena - can at least in principle be  
exhausted by an extrinsic account. But if this be so, it is very  
difficult indeed to understand how such extrinsic behaviours could  
possibly make reference to any "intrinsic" remainder, even were its  
existence granted. It isn't merely that any postulated remainder  
would be redundant in the explanation of such behaviour, but that it  
is hardly possible to see how an inner dual could even be accessible  
in principle to a complete (i.e. causally closed) extrinsic system  
of reference in the first place.


Right, because the extrinsic perspective is blind to the limits of  
causal closure.


But I'm afraid the problem is precisely that it behaves as if it is  
NOT in fact blind to such limits. As Bruno points out in a recent  
response to John Clark, if we rely on the causal closure of the  
extrinsic account (and which of us does not?) then we commit  
ourselves to the view that there must be such an account, at some  
level, of any behaviour to which we might otherwise wish to impute a  
conscious origin. However, my point above is that the problem is in  
fact even worse than this. In fact, it amounts to a paradox.


The existence of a causally closed extrinsic account forces us to  
the view that the very thoughts and utterances - even our own - that  
purport to refer to irreducibly conscious phenomena must also be  
fully explicable extrinsically.


Yes. The solution will be that "explicable" is a notion depending on  
level, and that eventually the scientist (played by Bp) cannot put  
itself at the (Bp & p) place.


Precisely, we can explain the reason of the paradox from the first  
point of view of the machine (the concrete (but immaterial person)  
owning that machine).




But how then could any such sequence of extrinsic events possibly be  
linked to anything outside its causally-closed circle of  
explanation? To put this baldly, even whilst asserting with absolute  
certainty "the fact that I am conscious" I am forced nonetheless to  
accept that this very assertion need have nothing to do (and, more  
strongly, cannot have anything to do) with the fact that I am  
conscious!


Not really. Somehow, you conflate levels and points of view. It is a  
sin of reductionism :)

You do the "mistake" of those who deny compatibilistic free-will.

Of course we are at the crux of the mind-body problem.





I take no credit for being the originator of this insight, although  
it isn't IMO acknowledged as often as it should be, perhaps because  
of its very intractability. It's sometimes referred to as the  
Paradox of Phenomenal Judgement. David Chalmers, for example,  
acknowledges it in passing in The Conscious Mind, fails to offer any  
solution and then proceeds to ignore it.


In my mind thats the mind-body problem. I often called it the "hard  
problem of consciousness".
I show that any comp solutions of this is lead to a "hard problem of  
matter".





Gregg Rosenberg - who if you haven't read perhaps you should - deals  
with it a little more explicitly in A Place for Consciousness, but  
IMO ultimately also fails to square this particular circle. In fact  
I know of no mind-body theory, other than comp, that confronts it  
head-on and suggests at least the shape of a possible solution. That  
said, do you see what the paradox is and if you do, how specifically  
does your theory deal with it?


I think that Craig is aware of this problem, so much that he used its  
apparent non tractability to make consciousness into a primitive.  
Others do that, but Craig is coherent by accepting the no-comp  
consequences.
Of course taking consciousness as primitive is like abandoning the  
project to solve, or put light, on this problem. It leads to some form  
of solipsism, notably with respect to person owning only silicon  
computers (after losing their carbonic skull computer in some  
accident, say).


I will have opportunity to say more, but Theaetetus is close to the  
solution, and it will work in arithmetic.


In the comp solution, your consciousness has indeed nothing to do with  
the physical computation, nor even the arithmetical computation. It is  
more a universal knowledge, that brain and universal numbers can  
relatively particularize.


That universal knowledge exist because numbers are not stupid. Simply.  
But the particularization, and the local universal neighbors can  
handicap the remembrance in many histories.


The only remaining mystery will be our 1p  faith in arithmetic. But  
this, the theory will explain that without it, we lost the ability to  
even ask the question. It re-explains in a second sight why we hav

Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Bruno Marchal]

On 30 Jan 2014, at 03:21, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 30 January 2014 10:00, Craig Weinberg   
wrote:



On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 5:46:25 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:


On 30 January 2014 09:39, Craig Weinberg  wrote:



On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 5:38:04 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:


On 30 January 2014 11:24, Craig Weinberg   
wrote:


On Wednesday, January 29, 2014 1:34:48 PM UTC-5, John Clark  
wrote:


On Sat, Jan 25, 2014 at 9:35 AM, Craig Weinberg  


wrote:


NO ROOM CAN BE CONSCIOUS.



And we know that because we can say it in all capital letters,  
or

possibly from the teachings of two of your favorite subjects,
astrology and
numerology.



The all caps were in response to Bruno's all caps, and no, you  
don't

need
astrology and numerology to understand that rooms are not  
haunted by

the
spirits of system-hood.



Imagine a small, roughly spherical room made out of a fairly hard
material
something like limestone. Make a few holes in it, fill it with  
some

goop
with the consistency of blancmange, decorate with sense organs and
throw in
a body.

Et voila!



Voila, a cadaver.


Unless it's all set up to function properly.



What's wrong with the way a cadaver functions?


Many changes occur after death, the end result of which is that in a
cadaver, the parts are in the wrong configuration and therefore don't
work together as they do in a living person.


Not bad 3p-description. It is the same with machines and houses. They  
can decay, and nothing works no more.






Death is said to occur
when the changes are irreversible,


Yes. The clinical 3p death.  (For the 1p, the knower and owner of the  
body, it is more difficult).





but people who have themselves
cryonically preserved hope that future technology will allow what is
currently thought to be irreversible to become reversible.


They try to say yes to future doctors.

Bruno







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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Bruno Marchal]

On 30 Jan 2014, at 06:00, meekerdb wrote:


On 1/29/2014 5:06 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 29 January 2014 22:15, Craig Weinberg   
wrote:
The problem that concerns me about this way of looking at things is  
that any and all behaviour associated with consciousness -  
including, crucially, the articulation of our very thoughts and  
beliefs about conscious phenomena - can at least in principle be  
exhausted by an extrinsic account. But if this be so, it is very  
difficult indeed to understand how such extrinsic behaviours could  
possibly make reference to any "intrinsic" remainder, even were its  
existence granted. It isn't merely that any postulated remainder  
would be redundant in the explanation of such behaviour, but that  
it is hardly possible to see how an inner dual could even be  
accessible in principle to a complete (i.e. causally closed)  
extrinsic system of reference in the first place.


Right, because the extrinsic perspective is blind to the limits of  
causal closure.


But I'm afraid the problem is precisely that it behaves as if it is  
NOT in fact blind to such limits. As Bruno points out in a recent  
response to John Clark, if we rely on the causal closure of the  
extrinsic account (and which of us does not?) then we commit  
ourselves to the view that there must be such an account, at some  
level, of any behaviour to which we might otherwise wish to impute  
a conscious origin. However, my point above is that the problem is  
in fact even worse than this. In fact, it amounts to a paradox.


The existence of a causally closed extrinsic account forces us to  
the view that the very thoughts and utterances - even our own -  
that purport to refer to irreducibly conscious phenomena must also  
be fully  explicable extrinsically. But how then could  
any such sequence of extrinsic events possibly be linked to  
anything outside its causally-closed circle of explanation? To put  
this baldly, even whilst asserting with absolute certainty "the  
fact that I am conscious" I am forced nonetheless to accept that  
this very assertion need have nothing to do (and, more strongly,  
cannot have anything to do) with the fact that I am conscious!


I take no credit for being the originator of this insight,


But you have explained it well.  And it's not at all clear to me  
that Bruno's computational theory avoids this paradox.


Thanks for precising this. I do think that both UDA and AUDA put  
(different) light on this. I hope you will follow enough of the "modal  
logic". The explanations should be provided by the very existence of  
the arithmetical "hypostases".



It seems there will still, in the UD computation, be a closed  
account of the physical processes.  No doubt it will be  
computationally linked with some provable sentences, which Bruno  
wants to then identify with beliefs.  But this still leaves beliefs  
as epiphenomena of the physical processes; even if comp explains  
them both.


You are two quick. It is primitive matter which would become  
epiphenomenal, but we can just abandon the idea.
Consciousness will be justified by semantical (related with the  
arithmetical truth) fixed point for machine having enough belief  
(where an explicit  belief is made of accessible self-representation).


The Bp and Bp & p views on oneself are in conflict, for all self- 
referentially correct machine. Then life teaches this in the hard way.  
The same reappears between Bp & Dt and Bp & Dt & p.


Consciousness is close to an instinctive belief in *some* truth,  
together with the fact that a part of that truth is true. It is a form  
of unconscious and unavoidable faith. It is the zeroth state of the  
mystical states.


Bruno







Brent


although it isn't IMO acknowledged as often as it should be,  
perhaps because of its very intractability. It's sometimes referred  
to as the Paradox of Phenomenal Judgement. David Chalmers, for  
example, acknowledges it in passing in The Conscious Mind, fails to  
offer any solution and then proceeds to ignore it. Gregg Rosenberg  
- who if you haven't read perhaps you should - deals with it a  
little more explicitly in A Place for Consciousness, but IMO  
ultimately also fails to square this particular circle. In fact I  
know of no mind-body theory, other than comp, that confronts it  
head-on and suggests at least the shape of a possible solution.  
That said, do you see what the paradox is and if you do, how  
specifically does your theory deal with it?


David
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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Bruno Marchal]

On 30 Jan 2014, at 06:19, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


On 30 January 2014 16:00, meekerdb  wrote:

On 1/29/2014 5:06 PM, David Nyman wrote:

On 29 January 2014 22:15, Craig Weinberg   
wrote:


The problem that concerns me about this way of looking at things  
is that
any and all behaviour associated with consciousness - including,  
crucially,
the articulation of our very thoughts and beliefs about conscious  
phenomena
- can at least in principle be exhausted by an extrinsic account.  
But if
this be so, it is very difficult indeed to understand how such  
extrinsic
behaviours could possibly make reference to any "intrinsic"  
remainder, even
were its existence granted. It isn't merely that any postulated  
remainder
would be redundant in the explanation of such behaviour, but that  
it is
hardly possible to see how an inner dual could even be accessible  
in
principle to a complete (i.e. causally closed) extrinsic system  
of reference

in the first place.



Right, because the extrinsic perspective is blind to the limits of  
causal

closure.



But I'm afraid the problem is precisely that it behaves as if it is  
NOT in
fact blind to such limits. As Bruno points out in a recent response  
to John
Clark, if we rely on the causal closure of the extrinsic account  
(and which
of us does not?) then we commit ourselves to the view that there  
must be
such an account, at some level, of any behaviour to which we might  
otherwise
wish to impute a conscious origin. However, my point above is that  
the
problem is in fact even worse than this. In fact, it amounts to a  
paradox.


The existence of a causally closed extrinsic account forces us to  
the view
that the very thoughts and utterances - even our own - that purport  
to refer

to irreducibly conscious phenomena must also be fully explicable
extrinsically. But how then could any such sequence of extrinsic  
events

possibly be linked to anything outside its causally-closed circle of
explanation? To put this baldly, even whilst asserting with absolute
certainty "the fact that I am conscious" I am forced nonetheless to  
accept
that this very assertion need have nothing to do (and, more  
strongly, cannot

have anything to do) with the fact that I am conscious!

I take no credit for being the originator of this insight,


But you have explained it well.  And it's not at all clear to me that
Bruno's computational theory avoids this paradox.  It seems there  
will
still, in the UD computation, be a closed account of the physical  
processes.
No doubt it will be computationally linked with some provable  
sentences,
which Bruno wants to then identify with beliefs.  But this still  
leaves
beliefs as epiphenomena of the physical processes; even if comp  
explains

them both.


I don't think there is a problem if consciousness is an epiphenomenon.


Is it not that very idea which leads to the notion of zombie?
If consciousness is an epiphenomenon, eliminating it would change  
nothing in the 3p.





If you start looking for consciousness being an extra thing with
(perhaps) its own separate causal efficacy, that's where problems
arise.


Dualism is a problem. Making consciousness epiphenomenal is not  
satisfying, and basically contradicted in the everyday life. It is  
because pain is unpleasant that we take anesthetic medicine.


The brain is obliged to "lie" at some (uncknown, crypted) level, not  
for consciousness (that it filters), but for pain and joy. That's  
normal. If you run toward the lion mouth, you lower the probability of  
surviving.


Epiphenomenalism does not eliminate consciousness, but it still  
eliminate conscience and persons.


With comp I think we avoid it, even if the solution will appear to be  
very Platonist, as truth, beauty, and universal values (mostly  
unknown) will be more "real" than their local terrestrial  
approximations through primitively physical brains and other  
interacting molecules like galaxies foam.


Bruno




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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[meekerdb]

On 1/30/2014 8:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
With comp it might be like with death, or approximation. The 1p experience are hard to 
describe, and usually hard to memorize except for vague feeling that some time has 
passed (when "you" come back).


In my experience both concussions and anesthesia are characterized by *not* feeling that 
time has passed.


Brent

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[meekerdb]

On 1/30/2014 8:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
In the comp solution, your consciousness has indeed nothing to do with the physical 
computation, nor even the arithmetical computation.


But empirically it has a lot to do with it, hence concussions and anesthesia.

Brent

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[meekerdb]

On 1/30/2014 9:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Is it not that very idea which leads to the notion of zombie?
If consciousness is an epiphenomenon, eliminating it would change nothing in the 3p. 


Depends on what you mean by epiphenomenon.  Is temperature an epiphenomenon of atomic 
matter?  I think so, but you can't eliminate temperature; it's a consequence of the atomic 
structure and the potential for atomic motion.


Brent

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, January 28, 2014 5:45:51 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>
> On 29 January 2014 05:39, Craig Weinberg > 
> wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > On Tuesday, January 28, 2014 8:37:04 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: 
> >> 
> >> On 27 January 2014 16:07, Craig Weinberg  wrote: 
> >> 
> >> >> Do you think Barack Obama is conscious? If you do, then in whatever 
> >> >> sense 
> >> >> you understand that, can the Chinese Room also be conscious? Or do 
> you 
> >> >> think 
> >> >> that is impossible? 
> >> > 
> >> > 
> >> > Yes, I think that Barack Obama is conscious, because he is different 
> >> > from a 
> >> > building or machine. Buildings and machines cannot be conscious, just 
> as 
> >> > pictures of people drinking pictures of water do no experience relief 
> >> > from 
> >> > thirst. 
> >> 
> >> If Barack Obama revealed that he was a machine, would that change your 
> >> view of whether machines could be conscious? 
> > 
> > 
> > If nobody ever survived a translation into machine simulation, would 
> that 
> > change your mind of whether consciousness can be simulated? 
>
> Yes. But you didn't answer my question. 
>

Because the question presumes that my position is wrong. In theory, no, if 
some public figure revealed that they were a machine it would not affect my 
position, since all that it really means is that machines had become very 
sophisticated at imitating a person on TV. In practice, sure, it might make 
me think about it differently if I had no inkling that someone was a 
machine. 


> >> > The Chinese Room is not important. You are missing the whole point. 
> >> > Consciousness is beyond reason and cannot be discovered through 
> evidence 
> >> > or 
> >> > argument, but sensory experience alone. 
> >> 
> >> So the Chinese Room is conscious not through evidence or argument, but 
> >> through sensory experience alone. 
> > 
> > 
> > It would be if the Chinese Room had sensory experience. Our experience 
> of 
> > the Chinese Room doesn't matter. 
>
> That's the question: could the Chinese Room have sensory experience? 
>

No
 

> For entities such as Barack Obama, you guess that they do based on 
> your observation of their behaviour. 
>

Not necessarily. It might also have to do with my expectations plus 
aesthetic cues which are subconscious and superconscious.  


> >> What if it were revealed that John Wayne's body while he was asleep on 
> >> the night of his 40th birthday was annihilated and replaced by a copy? 
> >> Would you still say there can only be one John Wayne? 
> > 
> > 
> > What if you were annihilated at age 5, but you were replaced by a copy? 
> > Would you still say that the body using your name was you, even though 
> you 
> > are not using it? 
>
> As a matter of fact, I was annihilated when I was 5. The atoms making 
> up my body then are long gone, dispersed throughout the Earth and 
> probably even beyond. 
>

Yet you could still have a scar from when you were 4. If you lose an arm, 
it does not grow back. That's not really relevant to the question though. I 
was asking if it mattered or not whether your body was 'the same' if you 
yourself could not experience what it is like to be inside of it.
 

>
> >> Why couldn't we 
> >> make a John Wayne Mk3 long after his death, who would stand in 
> >> relation to John Wayne Mk2 as John Wayne Mk2 stood in relation to John 
> >> Wayne Mk1? 
> > 
> > 
> > For the same reason that we can't build a model of Paris out of clay and 
> > have it actually become Paris. It is because the publicly measurable end 
> of 
> > what we are is not sufficient to describe who we have been and who we 
> are 
> > becoming. 
>
> Do you think it is impossible that John Wayne was replaced by a copy 
> at age 40 and nobody noticed? 
>

Probably impossible, definitely outside of the range of realistic 
possibility. Why, do you think that people get replaced by dopplegangers 
sometimes? I find it hard to take that seriously, although the tendency of 
great artists and musicians to suddenly start producing crap at a certain 
point in their career makes me wonder sometimes.
 

>
> >> And he purports to do that by showing that despite external 
> >> appearances the Chinese Room cannot be conscious because the 
> >> components are not conscious, which you agree is not a valid argument. 
> > 
> > 
> > It's not because the components are not conscious, it is because the 
> > description of the Room or 'system' as a whole is consistent with the 
> > absence of consciousness. This is the double standard of functionalism 
> which 
> > makes the hard problem hard. Functionalism asserts on the one hand that 
> all 
> > functions of consciousness can be produced mechanically, but then the 
> effect 
> > of consciousness could not provide any additional functionality to the 
> > mechanism. The hard problem exposes the hypocrisy of 'We don't need 
> > consciousness to explain everything" when consciousness itself is what 
> needs 
> > to be explained. The machine's definition

Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[David Nyman]

On 30 January 2014 16:33, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

Not really. Somehow, you conflate levels and points of view. It is a sin of
> reductionism :)
> You do the "mistake" of those who deny compatibilistic free-will.
>
> Of course we are at the crux of the mind-body problem.
>

Bruno, my dear and much-valued correspondent, you exasperate me sometimes
by commenting a mere step in my argument as if it were the conclusion. I
was attempting here to articulate the Paradox of Phenomenal Judgement in
its default form (i.e. assuming a primitively-physical basis) because this
is how it typically arises in the first place. Hence I meant this step of
the argument to be a kind of reductio of this position. Later in my post I
went on to say how that I think comp may avoid the paradox, which you also
commented. If you could perhaps restrain your enthusiasm and read the post
to the end before commenting, you might occasionally save yourself some
typing! Don't mean to scold, just help :)

BTW, although you say that Craig can perhaps avoid the POPJ by appealing to
a non-comp theory, ISTM that the problem of reference is still there so
long as his "fundamental-sense" theory relies on causally-closed extrinsic
*appearances". However, under questioning he's so far been rather unclear
about this aspect of his theory. Are such appearances causally closed? Do
we not rely on such "physical" consistency? Maybe, sometimes, who knows,
whatever. I might go so far as to say that he's been dodging the question.

That said, if I'm even approximately right about this fundamental problem
of reference, then of theories known to me, only comp confronts the POPJ
directly. The plausible resolution of the paradox, if I've understood you,
lies in the capability of the machine to refer to non-shareable but
incorrigible truths beyond formal proof and demonstration. Then - if we are
machines - our own incontrovertible faith in, and ability to refer to, such
indexical "facts" may serve as the warrant that also delivers our fellow
machines from zombie-hood.

David

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 31 January 2014 02:29, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>
>
> On Thursday, January 30, 2014 12:19:56 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>>
>> On 30 January 2014 16:00, meekerdb  wrote:
>> > On 1/29/2014 5:06 PM, David Nyman wrote:
>> >
>> > On 29 January 2014 22:15, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>> >>>
>> >>> The problem that concerns me about this way of looking at things is
>> >>> that
>> >>> any and all behaviour associated with consciousness - including,
>> >>> crucially,
>> >>> the articulation of our very thoughts and beliefs about conscious
>> >>> phenomena
>> >>> - can at least in principle be exhausted by an extrinsic account. But
>> >>> if
>> >>> this be so, it is very difficult indeed to understand how such
>> >>> extrinsic
>> >>> behaviours could possibly make reference to any "intrinsic" remainder,
>> >>> even
>> >>> were its existence granted. It isn't merely that any postulated
>> >>> remainder
>> >>> would be redundant in the explanation of such behaviour, but that it
>> >>> is
>> >>> hardly possible to see how an inner dual could even be accessible in
>> >>> principle to a complete (i.e. causally closed) extrinsic system of
>> >>> reference
>> >>> in the first place.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Right, because the extrinsic perspective is blind to the limits of
>> >> causal
>> >> closure.
>> >
>> >
>> > But I'm afraid the problem is precisely that it behaves as if it is NOT
>> > in
>> > fact blind to such limits. As Bruno points out in a recent response to
>> > John
>> > Clark, if we rely on the causal closure of the extrinsic account (and
>> > which
>> > of us does not?) then we commit ourselves to the view that there must be
>> > such an account, at some level, of any behaviour to which we might
>> > otherwise
>> > wish to impute a conscious origin. However, my point above is that the
>> > problem is in fact even worse than this. In fact, it amounts to a
>> > paradox.
>> >
>> > The existence of a causally closed extrinsic account forces us to the
>> > view
>> > that the very thoughts and utterances - even our own - that purport to
>> > refer
>> > to irreducibly conscious phenomena must also be fully explicable
>> > extrinsically. But how then could any such sequence of extrinsic events
>> > possibly be linked to anything outside its causally-closed circle of
>> > explanation? To put this baldly, even whilst asserting with absolute
>> > certainty "the fact that I am conscious" I am forced nonetheless to
>> > accept
>> > that this very assertion need have nothing to do (and, more strongly,
>> > cannot
>> > have anything to do) with the fact that I am conscious!
>> >
>> > I take no credit for being the originator of this insight,
>> >
>> >
>> > But you have explained it well.  And it's not at all clear to me that
>> > Bruno's computational theory avoids this paradox.  It seems there will
>> > still, in the UD computation, be a closed account of the physical
>> > processes.
>> > No doubt it will be computationally linked with some provable sentences,
>> > which Bruno wants to then identify with beliefs.  But this still leaves
>> > beliefs as epiphenomena of the physical processes; even if comp explains
>> > them both.
>>
>> I don't think there is a problem if consciousness is an epiphenomenon.
>> If you start looking for consciousness being an extra thing with
>> (perhaps) its own separate causal efficacy, that's where problems
>> arise.
>
>
> Then you would still have the problem of why there are epiphenomema. They
> are already "an extra thing" with no functional explanation.

That statement assumes the possibility of zombies. If consciousness is
epiphenomenal, zombies are impossible.


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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 31 January 2014 02:51, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>> > Had we not already discovered the impossibility of resurrecting a dead
>> > person with raw electricity, would your position offer any insight into
>> > why
>> > that strategy would fail 100% of the time?
>>
>> Actually, we can sometimes resurrect a dead person with raw
>> electricity in cases of cardiac arrest, which would previously have
>> been defined as death. It's a case of the definition of death changing
>> with technology. In future, there will probably be patients who would
>> currently considered brain dead who will be able to be revived.
>
>
> That does not resurrect a dead person, it just helps restart a still-living
> person's heart. True, cardiac arrest will eventually kill a person, but
> sending electricity through the body of someone who has died of cholera or a
> stroke is not going to revive them. My point though is that there is nothing
> within functionalism which predicts the finality or complexity of death. If
> we are just a machine halting, why wouldn't fixing the machine restart it in
> theory? We can smuggle in our understanding of the irreversibility of death,
> and rationalize it after the fact, but can you honestly say that
> functionalism predicts the pervasiveness of it?

Death used to be defined as the cessation of heartbeat and breathing,
so according to this definition you *could* resurrect a dead person
with fairly simple techniques which "fix the machine". In the future,
this may be possible with what is currently defined as brain death.


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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 31 January 2014 04:19, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> I don't think there is a problem if consciousness is an epiphenomenon.
>
>
> Is it not that very idea which leads to the notion of zombie?
> If consciousness is an epiphenomenon, eliminating it would change nothing in
> the 3p.

There can be no zombies if consciousness is epiphenomenal.
Equivalently, if consciousness is epiphenomenal we could say it does
not really exist and we are all zombies; but I think that's just
semantics, and misleading.

>> If you start looking for consciousness being an extra thing with
>> (perhaps) its own separate causal efficacy, that's where problems
>> arise.
>
>
> Dualism is a problem. Making consciousness epiphenomenal is not satisfying,
> and basically contradicted in the everyday life. It is because pain is
> unpleasant that we take anesthetic medicine.
>
> The brain is obliged to "lie" at some (uncknown, crypted) level, not for
> consciousness (that it filters), but for pain and joy. That's normal. If you
> run toward the lion mouth, you lower the probability of surviving.
>
> Epiphenomenalism does not eliminate consciousness, but it still eliminate
> conscience and persons.

I don't think it diminishes the significance of consciousness, but
maybe I just look at it differently.

> With comp I think we avoid it, even if the solution will appear to be very
> Platonist, as truth, beauty, and universal values (mostly unknown) will be
> more "real" than their local terrestrial approximations through primitively
> physical brains and other interacting molecules like galaxies foam.
>
> Bruno
>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>
>>
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>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, January 30, 2014 4:08:31 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 30 January 2014 16:33, Bruno Marchal >wrote:
>
> Not really. Somehow, you conflate levels and points of view. It is a sin 
>> of reductionism :)
>> You do the "mistake" of those who deny compatibilistic free-will.
>>
>> Of course we are at the crux of the mind-body problem.
>>
>
> Bruno, my dear and much-valued correspondent, you exasperate me sometimes 
> by commenting a mere step in my argument as if it were the conclusion. I 
> was attempting here to articulate the Paradox of Phenomenal Judgement in 
> its default form (i.e. assuming a primitively-physical basis) because this 
> is how it typically arises in the first place. Hence I meant this step of 
> the argument to be a kind of reductio of this position. Later in my post I 
> went on to say how that I think comp may avoid the paradox, which you also 
> commented. If you could perhaps restrain your enthusiasm and read the post 
> to the end before commenting, you might occasionally save yourself some 
> typing! Don't mean to scold, just help :)
>
> BTW, although you say that Craig can perhaps avoid the POPJ by appealing 
> to a non-comp theory, ISTM that the problem of reference is still there so 
> long as his "fundamental-sense" theory relies on causally-closed extrinsic 
> *appearances".
>

If it relies on extrinsic appearances, then sense wouldn't be fundamental. 
I call my view of sense Primordial Identity Pansensitivity - which means 
that all possible phenomena are sensory experiences, including the 
experience of "having" experiences, or "being" a being. Causality itself 
supervenes on senses like memory, sequence, change, inertia, 
correspondence...lots of sensible infrastructure has to be in place before 
causality can appear.

 

> However, under questioning he's so far been rather unclear about this 
> aspect of his theory.
>

If I am it is certainly not intentional. What does it seem like I'm unclear 
about? There's always my website too if you are interested: 
http://multisenserealism.com
 

> Are such appearances causally closed? Do we not rely on such "physical" 
> consistency?
>

The "we" of individual human beings relies on physical consistency because 
that is a common sensory experience of the animal>organism>substance 
context. The substance context however relies on the "we" of the Absolute 
context. The biological context relies on those "we"s, and the animal 
context relies on the biological "we"s. It's all nested but the bottom of 
each extrinsic level is being supported by the top of the previous 
intrinsic level.

I was trying to get at something close to that in this diagram:

>  
>
 Maybe, sometimes, who knows, whatever. I might go so far as to say that 
> he's been dodging the question.
>
 
>
That said, if I'm even approximately right about this fundamental problem 
> of reference, then of theories known to me, only comp confronts the POPJ 
> directly. The plausible resolution of the paradox, if I've understood you, 
> lies in the capability of the machine to refer to non-shareable but 
> incorrigible truths beyond formal proof and demonstration. Then - if we are 
> machines - our own incontrovertible faith in, and ability to refer to, such 
> indexical "facts" may serve as the warrant that also delivers our fellow 
> machines from zombie-hood.
>
> David
>

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[David Nyman]

You may consider that repeated assertions of "there is absolutely no way"
constitute a carefully reasoned argument, but I'm afraid I do not.

David
On 30 Jan 2014 16:18, "Edgar L. Owen"  wrote:

> David,
>
> Boy, O Boy!
>
> You deliberately snipped the part of my post that you then accused me of
> not providing!
>
> Sorry for trying to help!
> :-)
>
> Edgar
>
>
>
>
> On Thursday, January 30, 2014 10:55:00 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>> On 30 January 2014 15:13, Edgar L. Owen  wrote:
>>
>> In my view the whole UD can be as logically consistent as it wants to be
>>> but still has no connection with the actual observable reality of our
>>> universe...
>>
>>
>> I'm afraid I don't seem to share your enviable certainty on the range of
>> possibilities that could account for "the actual observable reality of our
>> universe". Some carefully reasoned argument that doesn't beg the most
>> crucial questions might help.
>>
>> David
>>
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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Edgar L. Owen]

David,

OK, if there IS a way that Bruno's comp produces the fine tuning AND actual 
happening then explain what it is. You can't claim there is a way without 
explaining what it is.

If you can't then I repeat my assertion that there is absolutely no way it 
does, and that assertion is convincing...

How does the fine tuning and the actual state of the observed universe 
emerge from Bruno's comp, from pure static arithmetic?

How does actual movement emerge from Bruno's comp, from pure static 
arithmetic?

If you can't explain it your statements are just statements of faith...

Edgar



On Thursday, January 30, 2014 8:54:07 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
> You may consider that repeated assertions of "there is absolutely no way" 
> constitute a carefully reasoned argument, but I'm afraid I do not.
>
> David
> On 30 Jan 2014 16:18, "Edgar L. Owen" > 
> wrote:
>
>> David,
>>
>> Boy, O Boy!
>>
>> You deliberately snipped the part of my post that you then accused me of 
>> not providing!
>>
>> Sorry for trying to help!
>> :-)
>>
>> Edgar
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, January 30, 2014 10:55:00 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>>>
>>> On 30 January 2014 15:13, Edgar L. Owen  wrote:
>>>
>>> In my view the whole UD can be as logically consistent as it wants to be 
 but still has no connection with the actual observable reality of our 
 universe...
>>>
>>>  
>>> I'm afraid I don't seem to share your enviable certainty on the range of 
>>> possibilities that could account for "the actual observable reality of our 
>>> universe". Some carefully reasoned argument that doesn't beg the most 
>>> crucial questions might help.
>>>
>>> David
>>>
>>>  -- 
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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[David Nyman]

Concerning comp, the most constructive suggestion I can give you is that
you read Bruno's papers and work through his detailed arguments. You will
find him very patient in answering any questions. I don't see myself as a
"defender" of his ideas, but I have found (over many years, I should say)
that carefully reflecting on them - which, speaking as someone who has
worked professionally with computers for most of my life, had struck me at
first as just "obviously wrong" - has in practice given me pause to
reconsider whatever certainties I may originally have had concerning what
might be "real", "actual" or "obvious".

David
On 31 Jan 2014 02:16, "Edgar L. Owen"  wrote:

> David,
>
> OK, if there IS a way that Bruno's comp produces the fine tuning AND
> actual happening then explain what it is. You can't claim there is a way
> without explaining what it is.
>
> If you can't then I repeat my assertion that there is absolutely no way it
> does, and that assertion is convincing...
>
> How does the fine tuning and the actual state of the observed universe
> emerge from Bruno's comp, from pure static arithmetic?
>
> How does actual movement emerge from Bruno's comp, from pure static
> arithmetic?
>
> If you can't explain it your statements are just statements of faith...
>
> Edgar
>
>
>
> On Thursday, January 30, 2014 8:54:07 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>> You may consider that repeated assertions of "there is absolutely no way"
>> constitute a carefully reasoned argument, but I'm afraid I do not.
>>
>> David
>> On 30 Jan 2014 16:18, "Edgar L. Owen"  wrote:
>>
>>> David,
>>>
>>> Boy, O Boy!
>>>
>>> You deliberately snipped the part of my post that you then accused me of
>>> not providing!
>>>
>>> Sorry for trying to help!
>>> :-)
>>>
>>> Edgar
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, January 30, 2014 10:55:00 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:

 On 30 January 2014 15:13, Edgar L. Owen  wrote:

 In my view the whole UD can be as logically consistent as it wants to
> be but still has no connection with the actual observable reality of our
> universe...


 I'm afraid I don't seem to share your enviable certainty on the range
 of possibilities that could account for "the actual observable reality of
 our universe". Some carefully reasoned argument that doesn't beg the most
 crucial questions might help.

 David

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[LizR]

Why do some people have such a problem with "how change can emerge from
something static" ? It's as simple as F = ma - a static equation describing
something changing. Change is by definition things being different at
different times. If you map out all the times involved as a dimension, you
will naturally get a "static" universe, just as putting together all the
moments making up a movie gives you a reel of film - but only from a "God's
eye perspective". This is the perspective science gives us, the perspective
given by using equations and models and maps to describe reality; it isn't
the world of everyday experience, which (at best) views those equations and
so on from within (assuming for a moment they are so accurate as to be
isomorphic to reality).

Obtaining change from the static view used by science is a non-problem, and
has been since Newton published his Principia.

There *are* problems with comp, of course, like the "white rabbit" problem.
Does anyone have any new views on the real problems, rather than worrying
about straw men?

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, January 30, 2014 10:24:48 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>
> Why do some people have such a problem with "how change can emerge from 
> something static" ? It's as simple as F = ma - a static equation describing 
> something changing. Change is by definition things being different at 
> different times. If you map out all the times involved as a dimension, you 
> will naturally get a "static" universe, just as putting together all the 
> moments making up a movie gives you a reel of film - but only from a "God's 
> eye perspective". This is the perspective science gives us, the perspective 
> given by using equations and models and maps to describe reality; it isn't 
> the world of everyday experience, which (at best) views those equations and 
> so on from within (assuming for a moment they are so accurate as to be 
> isomorphic to reality).
>
> Obtaining change from the static view used by science is a non-problem, 
> and has been since Newton published his Principia.
>

Is a description the same as emergence though? We can read a film strip as 
a moving picture because of the nature of our sensory capacities, not 
because the moving picture emerges from the God's Eye view of the frames. 
F=ma begins with acceleration already assumed, so it is an equation that we 
interpret as referring to motion, nut the equation itself doesn't refer to 
anything. It's neither static nor dynamic, its just conceptual.


> There *are* problems with comp, of course, like the "white rabbit" 
> problem. Does anyone have any new views on the real problems, rather than 
> worrying about straw men?
>
>

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[LizR]

On 31 January 2014 17:19, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

> On Thursday, January 30, 2014 10:24:48 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>>
>> Why do some people have such a problem with "how change can emerge from
>> something static" ? It's as simple as F = ma - a static equation describing
>> something changing. Change is by definition things being different at
>> different times. If you map out all the times involved as a dimension, you
>> will naturally get a "static" universe, just as putting together all the
>> moments making up a movie gives you a reel of film - but only from a "God's
>> eye perspective". This is the perspective science gives us, the perspective
>> given by using equations and models and maps to describe reality; it isn't
>> the world of everyday experience, which (at best) views those equations and
>> so on from within (assuming for a moment they are so accurate as to be
>> isomorphic to reality).
>>
>> Obtaining change from the static view used by science is a non-problem,
>> and has been since Newton published his Principia.
>>
>
> Is a description the same as emergence though? We can read a film strip as
> a moving picture because of the nature of our sensory capacities, not
> because the moving picture emerges from the God's Eye view of the frames.
> F=ma begins with acceleration already assumed, so it is an equation that we
> interpret as referring to motion, nut the equation itself doesn't refer to
> anything. It's neither static nor dynamic, its just conceptual.
>
> I am illustrating where the idea of a block universe comes from, and the
context in which it makes sense. If you mean ontological emergence, the
origin of physics, that can't be answered within the framework of
explaining how a block universe works. It's a separate question. If you
mean emergence within a block universe, clearly that can occur, as it
happened in the past, and the past is a block universe according to the
normal definition.

Or maybe you're just talking nonsense. F=ma refers to a mass accelerating
under a force. It is a static equation describing a dynamic process,
something that could be useful in visualising how a block universe works,
which is why I mentioned it. It's quite straightforward. It isn't rocket
science.

(Oh, wait...)

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Edgar L. Owen]

Liz,

Your mouth sure has to move a lot to tell us it's not moving!

The problem is not that static equations DESCRIBE aspects of reality. The 
problem is that you are denying the flow of time.

For equations to compute (not just describe) reality, there must be active 
processor cycles. There is simply NO way around that...

Edgar



On Thursday, January 30, 2014 10:24:48 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>
> Why do some people have such a problem with "how change can emerge from 
> something static" ? It's as simple as F = ma - a static equation describing 
> something changing. Change is by definition things being different at 
> different times. If you map out all the times involved as a dimension, you 
> will naturally get a "static" universe, just as putting together all the 
> moments making up a movie gives you a reel of film - but only from a "God's 
> eye perspective". This is the perspective science gives us, the perspective 
> given by using equations and models and maps to describe reality; it isn't 
> the world of everyday experience, which (at best) views those equations and 
> so on from within (assuming for a moment they are so accurate as to be 
> isomorphic to reality).
>
> Obtaining change from the static view used by science is a non-problem, 
> and has been since Newton published his Principia.
>
> There *are* problems with comp, of course, like the "white rabbit" 
> problem. Does anyone have any new views on the real problems, rather than 
> worrying about straw men?
>
>

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Craig Weinberg]

On Friday, January 31, 2014 2:22:12 AM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>
> On 31 January 2014 17:19, Craig Weinberg 
> > wrote:
>
>> On Thursday, January 30, 2014 10:24:48 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>>>
>>> Why do some people have such a problem with "how change can emerge from 
>>> something static" ? It's as simple as F = ma - a static equation describing 
>>> something changing. Change is by definition things being different at 
>>> different times. If you map out all the times involved as a dimension, you 
>>> will naturally get a "static" universe, just as putting together all the 
>>> moments making up a movie gives you a reel of film - but only from a "God's 
>>> eye perspective". This is the perspective science gives us, the perspective 
>>> given by using equations and models and maps to describe reality; it isn't 
>>> the world of everyday experience, which (at best) views those equations and 
>>> so on from within (assuming for a moment they are so accurate as to be 
>>> isomorphic to reality).
>>>
>>> Obtaining change from the static view used by science is a non-problem, 
>>> and has been since Newton published his Principia.
>>>
>>
>> Is a description the same as emergence though? We can read a film strip 
>> as a moving picture because of the nature of our sensory capacities, not 
>> because the moving picture emerges from the God's Eye view of the frames. 
>> F=ma begins with acceleration already assumed, so it is an equation that we 
>> interpret as referring to motion, nut the equation itself doesn't refer to 
>> anything. It's neither static nor dynamic, its just conceptual.
>>
>> I am illustrating where the idea of a block universe comes from, and the 
> context in which it makes sense. If you mean ontological emergence, the 
> origin of physics, that can't be answered within the framework of 
> explaining how a block universe works. It's a separate question. If you 
> mean emergence within a block universe, clearly that can occur, as it 
> happened in the past, and the past is a block universe according to the 
> normal definition.
>

I thought that the whole point of a block universe is that nothing can or 
needs to "emerge". It is all there in the block.
 

>
> Or maybe you're just talking nonsense. F=ma refers to a mass accelerating 
> under a force. It is a static equation describing a dynamic process, 
> something that could be useful in visualising how a block universe works, 
> which is why I mentioned it. It's quite straightforward. It isn't rocket 
> science.
>

But F=ma can only be epiphenomenal in a block universe. There can't be an 
true acceleration because acceleration requires time, and a block universe 
would have only coordinates within a static temporal axis, wouldn't it? 
Acceleration would be a statistical derivative only, it seems to me.
 

>
> (Oh, wait...)
>
>

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, January 30, 2014 7:14:18 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>
> On 31 January 2014 02:51, Craig Weinberg > 
> wrote: 
>
> >> > Had we not already discovered the impossibility of resurrecting a 
> dead 
> >> > person with raw electricity, would your position offer any insight 
> into 
> >> > why 
> >> > that strategy would fail 100% of the time? 
> >> 
> >> Actually, we can sometimes resurrect a dead person with raw 
> >> electricity in cases of cardiac arrest, which would previously have 
> >> been defined as death. It's a case of the definition of death changing 
> >> with technology. In future, there will probably be patients who would 
> >> currently considered brain dead who will be able to be revived. 
> > 
> > 
> > That does not resurrect a dead person, it just helps restart a 
> still-living 
> > person's heart. True, cardiac arrest will eventually kill a person, but 
> > sending electricity through the body of someone who has died of cholera 
> or a 
> > stroke is not going to revive them. My point though is that there is 
> nothing 
> > within functionalism which predicts the finality or complexity of death. 
> If 
> > we are just a machine halting, why wouldn't fixing the machine restart 
> it in 
> > theory? We can smuggle in our understanding of the irreversibility of 
> death, 
> > and rationalize it after the fact, but can you honestly say that 
> > functionalism predicts the pervasiveness of it? 
>
> Death used to be defined as the cessation of heartbeat and breathing, 
>

Only by doctors. That is the 3p physiological definition though. People did 
not define their own death that way. If that was ever truly the definition 
of death, then the invention of heart-lung machines would have marked the 
beginning of immortality. Forcing the heart to beat and the lungs to breath 
does not, in fact, resurrect someone who is actually dead.
 

> so according to this definition you *could* resurrect a dead person 
> with fairly simple techniques which "fix the machine".


Because the definition is fictional. According to fictional definitions, 
you could also resurrect a dead person by casting a spell.
 

> In the future, 
> this may be possible with what is currently defined as brain death. 
>

It still does not figure into any prediction of Comp. From a comp 
perspective it should be possible to resurrect specific modules of the mind 
and personality long after death. It should really be possible to piece 
together a person from their effects on the world really. By triangulating 
everything that an artist or writer produced, it should be computationally 
possible to reverse engineer them. As long as our browser history is 
intact, we are potentially immortal.

Craig


>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou 
>

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Telmo Menezes]

Hi Edgar,

On Fri, Jan 31, 2014 at 1:13 PM, Edgar L. Owen  wrote:
> Liz,
>
> Your mouth sure has to move a lot to tell us it's not moving!
>
> The problem is not that static equations DESCRIBE aspects of reality. The
> problem is that you are denying the flow of time.

Why is this a problem? How can you know for sure that there is a flow
of time? Block universe hypothesis can explain how time would appear
to flow for each observer. This doesn't prove that block universe
hypothesis are correct, but they cannot be dismissed that easily
either.

Now you could argue that this is counter-intuitive, but I would remind
you that nature doesn't care. Our intuition is just a bunch of
heuristics evolved to deal with a very narrow set of survival
scenarios.

> For equations to compute (not just describe) reality, there must be active
> processor cycles. There is simply NO way around that...

I wonder.

Telmo.

> Edgar
>
>
>
> On Thursday, January 30, 2014 10:24:48 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>>
>> Why do some people have such a problem with "how change can emerge from
>> something static" ? It's as simple as F = ma - a static equation describing
>> something changing. Change is by definition things being different at
>> different times. If you map out all the times involved as a dimension, you
>> will naturally get a "static" universe, just as putting together all the
>> moments making up a movie gives you a reel of film - but only from a "God's
>> eye perspective". This is the perspective science gives us, the perspective
>> given by using equations and models and maps to describe reality; it isn't
>> the world of everyday experience, which (at best) views those equations and
>> so on from within (assuming for a moment they are so accurate as to be
>> isomorphic to reality).
>>
>> Obtaining change from the static view used by science is a non-problem,
>> and has been since Newton published his Principia.
>>
>> There are problems with comp, of course, like the "white rabbit" problem.
>> Does anyone have any new views on the real problems, rather than worrying
>> about straw men?
>>
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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Craig Weinberg]

On Friday, January 31, 2014 8:08:32 AM UTC-5, telmo_menezes wrote:
>
> Hi Edgar, 
>
> On Fri, Jan 31, 2014 at 1:13 PM, Edgar L. Owen > 
> wrote: 
> > Liz, 
> > 
> > Your mouth sure has to move a lot to tell us it's not moving! 
> > 
> > The problem is not that static equations DESCRIBE aspects of reality. 
> The 
> > problem is that you are denying the flow of time. 
>
> Why is this a problem? How can you know for sure that there is a flow 
> of time? Block universe hypothesis can explain how time would appear 
> to flow for each observer. 


Does it though, or does it just use emergence as a crutch? Wouldn't it make 
more sense for there to be no 'observation' at all? Block universes need 
not have any consciousness. What would be the point?
 

> This doesn't prove that block universe 
> hypothesis are correct, but they cannot be dismissed that easily 
> either. 
>
> Now you could argue that this is counter-intuitive, but I would remind 
> you that nature doesn't care. Our intuition is just a bunch of 
> heuristics evolved to deal with a very narrow set of survival 
> scenarios. 
>
> > For equations to compute (not just describe) reality, there must be 
> active 
> > processor cycles. There is simply NO way around that... 
>
> I wonder. 
>
> Telmo. 
>
> > Edgar 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > On Thursday, January 30, 2014 10:24:48 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: 
> >> 
> >> Why do some people have such a problem with "how change can emerge from 
> >> something static" ? It's as simple as F = ma - a static equation 
> describing 
> >> something changing. Change is by definition things being different at 
> >> different times. If you map out all the times involved as a dimension, 
> you 
> >> will naturally get a "static" universe, just as putting together all 
> the 
> >> moments making up a movie gives you a reel of film - but only from a 
> "God's 
> >> eye perspective". This is the perspective science gives us, the 
> perspective 
> >> given by using equations and models and maps to describe reality; it 
> isn't 
> >> the world of everyday experience, which (at best) views those equations 
> and 
> >> so on from within (assuming for a moment they are so accurate as to be 
> >> isomorphic to reality). 
> >> 
> >> Obtaining change from the static view used by science is a non-problem, 
> >> and has been since Newton published his Principia. 
> >> 
> >> There are problems with comp, of course, like the "white rabbit" 
> problem. 
> >> Does anyone have any new views on the real problems, rather than 
> worrying 
> >> about straw men? 
> >> 
> > -- 
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> Groups 
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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Telmo Menezes]

On Fri, Jan 31, 2014 at 2:14 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>
>
> On Friday, January 31, 2014 8:08:32 AM UTC-5, telmo_menezes wrote:
>>
>> Hi Edgar,
>>
>> On Fri, Jan 31, 2014 at 1:13 PM, Edgar L. Owen  wrote:
>> > Liz,
>> >
>> > Your mouth sure has to move a lot to tell us it's not moving!
>> >
>> > The problem is not that static equations DESCRIBE aspects of reality.
>> > The
>> > problem is that you are denying the flow of time.
>>
>> Why is this a problem? How can you know for sure that there is a flow
>> of time? Block universe hypothesis can explain how time would appear
>> to flow for each observer.
>
>
> Does it though, or does it just use emergence as a crutch?

The way I see it I wouldn't even call it emergence. I imagine that all
the moments where I can be conscious are eternal. They belong to a
structure (block universe), and what we perceive as time is an aspect
of this structure. Imagine we are experiencing all the possible
moments, "eternally", right "now". Would things appear any difference
from the perspective of any of these moments? My point is just that
this hypothesis is consistent with observed reality.

Do you find this idea incompatible with multi-sense realism?

> Wouldn't it make
> more sense for there to be no 'observation' at all?

Yes, even with no block universe, in my opinion.

> Block universes need not
> have any consciousness. What would be the point?

I wish I knew, but I feel the question also applies to non-block universes.

Telmo.

>>
>> This doesn't prove that block universe
>> hypothesis are correct, but they cannot be dismissed that easily
>> either.
>>
>> Now you could argue that this is counter-intuitive, but I would remind
>> you that nature doesn't care. Our intuition is just a bunch of
>> heuristics evolved to deal with a very narrow set of survival
>> scenarios.
>>
>> > For equations to compute (not just describe) reality, there must be
>> > active
>> > processor cycles. There is simply NO way around that...
>>
>> I wonder.
>>
>> Telmo.
>>
>> > Edgar
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > On Thursday, January 30, 2014 10:24:48 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>> >>
>> >> Why do some people have such a problem with "how change can emerge from
>> >> something static" ? It's as simple as F = ma - a static equation
>> >> describing
>> >> something changing. Change is by definition things being different at
>> >> different times. If you map out all the times involved as a dimension,
>> >> you
>> >> will naturally get a "static" universe, just as putting together all
>> >> the
>> >> moments making up a movie gives you a reel of film - but only from a
>> >> "God's
>> >> eye perspective". This is the perspective science gives us, the
>> >> perspective
>> >> given by using equations and models and maps to describe reality; it
>> >> isn't
>> >> the world of everyday experience, which (at best) views those equations
>> >> and
>> >> so on from within (assuming for a moment they are so accurate as to be
>> >> isomorphic to reality).
>> >>
>> >> Obtaining change from the static view used by science is a non-problem,
>> >> and has been since Newton published his Principia.
>> >>
>> >> There are problems with comp, of course, like the "white rabbit"
>> >> problem.
>> >> Does anyone have any new views on the real problems, rather than
>> >> worrying
>> >> about straw men?
>> >>
>> > --
>> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
>> > Groups
>> > "Everything List" group.
>> > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send
>> > an
>> > email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Edgar L. Owen]

Telmo,

Block time and Bruno's comp can only tell us how a set fixed static 
sequence of events could be perceived by some observer as a fixed static 
sequence of events. It simply CANNOT tell us how time moves ALONG that 
sequence.

The fact that time flows, that things change, is a fundamental EMPIRICAL 
OBSERVATION. It is not some intuitive illusion. It is the basic measurable 
observation of our existence and it never ceases from birth to death. It 
simply cannot be disregarded as some sort of survival mechanism. In fact if 
block time were actually real survival mechanisms would not be needed 
because the future is already written deterministically contrary to QM and 
in violation of all sorts of physical laws.

If you think block time exists then where does that entire block come from? 
Did it create itself? Sequentially or all at once? Did something outside of 
it create it? What? How? Was it created causally in time? Or did it just 
magically appear like some kind of miracle? The believers in block time 
have an unfortunate habit of not thinking through the implications of their 
crazy theory.

Again, the best way I can say it is that your mouth has to move plenty to 
tell me it isn't moving!

Best,
Edgar

On Friday, January 31, 2014 8:08:32 AM UTC-5, telmo_menezes wrote:
>
> Hi Edgar, 
>
> On Fri, Jan 31, 2014 at 1:13 PM, Edgar L. Owen > 
> wrote: 
> > Liz, 
> > 
> > Your mouth sure has to move a lot to tell us it's not moving! 
> > 
> > The problem is not that static equations DESCRIBE aspects of reality. 
> The 
> > problem is that you are denying the flow of time. 
>
> Why is this a problem? How can you know for sure that there is a flow 
> of time? Block universe hypothesis can explain how time would appear 
> to flow for each observer. This doesn't prove that block universe 
> hypothesis are correct, but they cannot be dismissed that easily 
> either. 
>
> Now you could argue that this is counter-intuitive, but I would remind 
> you that nature doesn't care. Our intuition is just a bunch of 
> heuristics evolved to deal with a very narrow set of survival 
> scenarios. 
>
> > For equations to compute (not just describe) reality, there must be 
> active 
> > processor cycles. There is simply NO way around that... 
>
> I wonder. 
>
> Telmo. 
>
> > Edgar 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > On Thursday, January 30, 2014 10:24:48 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: 
> >> 
> >> Why do some people have such a problem with "how change can emerge from 
> >> something static" ? It's as simple as F = ma - a static equation 
> describing 
> >> something changing. Change is by definition things being different at 
> >> different times. If you map out all the times involved as a dimension, 
> you 
> >> will naturally get a "static" universe, just as putting together all 
> the 
> >> moments making up a movie gives you a reel of film - but only from a 
> "God's 
> >> eye perspective". This is the perspective science gives us, the 
> perspective 
> >> given by using equations and models and maps to describe reality; it 
> isn't 
> >> the world of everyday experience, which (at best) views those equations 
> and 
> >> so on from within (assuming for a moment they are so accurate as to be 
> >> isomorphic to reality). 
> >> 
> >> Obtaining change from the static view used by science is a non-problem, 
> >> and has been since Newton published his Principia. 
> >> 
> >> There are problems with comp, of course, like the "white rabbit" 
> problem. 
> >> Does anyone have any new views on the real problems, rather than 
> worrying 
> >> about straw men? 
> >> 
> > -- 
> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google 
> Groups 
> > "Everything List" group. 
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> an 
> > email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com . 
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>

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[David Nyman]

On 31 January 2014 13:28, Telmo Menezes  wrote:

Imagine we are experiencing all the possible
> moments, "eternally", right "now". Would things appear any difference
> from the perspective of any of these moments?
>

Interesting question. Depends what you mean by "we", I guess, and also what
you mean by "any of these moments". Are you satisfied with the idea that
"your" experience would be restricted to just any *one* of those moments?
Sure, that might be consistent with the particular "history to this point"
encapsulated by the memories associated with that moment. But a you that is
restricted to one particular moment might seem to lack the possibility of
any "future history" beyond that point, no? Remember that I'm talking about
intuition here, not about "reality", but I think it's matching intuition
with some proposed model of reality that is actually under discussion here.

If we don't allow our intuition to select - and then restrict - our
experience to that of some particular moment, should we accept the
"panoptic" alternative of all moments "simultaneously"? Well, this seems
grossly inconsistent with the experience of any particular one of "us", in
terms of which moments are definitively non-simultaneous. What sort of
intuition might then suggest itself? The panoptic symmetry needs to be
broken in some manner that doesn't leave each one of "us" stranded,
monad-like, in the context of a single moment. I would argue that Hoyle's
stochastic serialisation of the class of all possible moments comes
naturally to hand here.

This idea, let us be clear, simply provides a logical referent, in the
context of a block structure, for our incorrigible belief in the successive
change in our "personal" spatial-temporal location. It's by no means
intended to introduce a "second time dimension", or a primitive physical
"becoming". That said, It may well be that our difficulty with these
intuitions (for those, at least, who entertain such difficulties) is a sign
that there may be something amiss with the block-structure idea itself, at
least when considered as a physical primitive. In particular, as I
suggested at the outset, there may be something amiss with our notion of
"ourselves" - something which is (to say the least, and no doubt
intentionally) under-defined in such a model.

In the computational conception, however, the notion of "person" seems more
subtle. The "person" - at least the conscious person - is hypothesised to
be an emergent at the level of the truth-content of certain classes of
incorrigible indexical beliefs, instantiated by computational machines.
Amongst these, presumably - if, per comp, "we" are some level such machines
- is just such a deeply-rooted belief in successive change in spatial
temporal location. This belief, in common with other definitive
self-concepts, is stabilised by a matrix of highly-consistent physical
appearances. In this conception one might say that a justified (i.e.
"true") belief in the momentary and successive nature of spatial-temporal
location is implicit in the very definition of a person.

David

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

[Bruno Marchal]

On 30 Jan 2014, at 16:13, Edgar L. Owen wrote:


David,

Bruno's 'comp' has 2 intractable fundamental problems that I see.

1. There is absolutely no way for a static arithmetical Plantonia to  
generate any happening whatsoever. Bruno's theory that all happening  
is a 1p perspective of human observers implies nothing happened in  
the entire history of the universe until some human observer became  
conscious. Total nonsense.


See Liz's answer.




2. Perhaps even worse there is absolutely no way for pure arithmetic  
to generate the ACTUAL computational state of the observable universe.


Actual is an indexical.


How does the actual particular Fine Tuning of our universe arise  
from pure arithmetic?


I am not convinced by "fine Tuning", it justifies a posteriori only  
geographical aspect of reality.
But then, even if "fine turning" could make sense, that would not  
prevent arithmetic to explain it in the UDA way. It might only make  
either the substitution level of comp low or the our computational  
histories very intrinsically long or deep (in Bennett's sense).




Especially if it just sits there in some pure static Platonic state?  
It just doesn't! It can't


It does not sit there. Even if we could see the entire arithmetic  
truth from outside, we would not see "our physical universe". We would  
see *many* approximations of it (very plausibly), but the "real"  
universe is an inside view due to a relative (indexical) statistics  
bearing on subjective, first person, experiences. That view has  
temporal, spatial, felt, observable unavoidable modalities.


Note that arithmetic contains also many Löbian entities which are not  
machines. The arithmetical is quite bigger than the computable.  
Usually the analytical, and the physical, are not computable (as not  
arithmetical), but assuming comp they are not needed in the ontology,  
despite they play key roles in the internal epistemology of the numbers.




In my view the whole UD can be as logically consistent


Ex(UD(x)) is a theorem of (very elementary) arithmetic. (With Church  
thesis).


I don't know if that is really consistent, but I know it is provable  
from what I am the most ready to bet the consistency, like 0=0, or the  
fact that 17 is prime.




as it wants to be but still has no connection with the actual  
observable reality of our universe...


It has relation with QM without collapse, detailed, or enunciated,  
here and in the references I gave you.
Some are informal, like indeterminacy, non locality, non cloning, and  
some are formal like the complete set of the quantum tautologies.


I can argue that this is the only approach which saves the quanta and  
the qualia without assuming them in the ontology, but the main point  
is that it is a consequence of the belief that your brain can be  
emulated by a (physical of not) Universal (in the sense of Post-Church- 
Turing) machine (system, language, number, etc.).


You have not answered what is your "computational space", nor explain  
the link between it and your p-time.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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