subject:"RE\: Turning the tables on the doctor"



On 25 Feb 2014, at 23:30, Craig Weinberg wrote:


0 doesn't = 0 in my theory.



I was beginning suspecting this.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor



On 25 Feb 2014, at 18:44, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/25/2014 7:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 23 Feb 2014, at 20:38, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/23/2014 4:35 AM, David Nyman wrote:
Not "my" consciousness, no. I'm just suggesting that CTM  
ultimately relies on some transcendent notion of perspective  
itself. IOW, the sensible world is conceived as the resultant of  
the inter-subjective agreement of its possible observers, each of  
which discovers itself to be centred in some perspective.


Is the sensible world of *possible* observers supposed to include  
the whole world.  I'm always suspicious of the word "possible".   
Does it refer to chance, i.e. many events were possible, I might  
have had coffee instead of tea this morning, but only a few are  
actual?  Does it refer to anything not prohibited by (our best  
theory of) physics: It's possible a meteorite might strike my  
house?  Or is it anything not entailing a contradiction: X and not  
X?


Possible in the large sense, is the diamond of the modal logic.


But <> is just a symbol that we use with certain rules of  
inference.  To be applied it requires some interpretation.


That's the point.

Mathematical semantics provides then the math for describing a lot of  
them, including sound and complete in their characterization of some  
modal theory.







There are as many notions of possibility than there are modal  
logics, and there are many.


I appreciate that you put in your enumeration the "possible" in the  
sense of the "consistent" (not entailing A & ~A, or not entailing f).


David used "possible observers" as part of a definition.  I don't  
know what it would mean for an observer to not entail f.  So I think  
he had some other meaning (nomological) in mind.  But in that case  
his definition is somewhat circular.


I will interview correct rational machine, and I will say that a  
machine believes A is she asserts A.

To say that they do not assert f means that they are consistent.

Bruno





Brent



That one, consistency,  can be defined in arithmetic for all  
arithmetically correct machine(~beweisbar('~(0=0)')), and it  
happens also that such a definition entails different logics for  
the "philosophical" or "physical" variant of it, and this choose  
the different modal logics from machines self-references.






Bruno


PS my p-time seems to be delayed, I am still in the 23 february,  
gosh!



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor



On 25 Feb 2014, at 18:36, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/25/2014 7:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
admitting simply that indexical notion are modal notion, and thus  
don't need to obey to Leibniz identity rule.


I don't understand that remark.  Are you saying that there is some  
modal notion that makes identity of indiscernibles wrong?  I think  
of indexical predicates as being ostensive.


I am saying that here:

W = H
M = H

But only in the 3-1 view it make sense (locally) to say that M = W. In  
the 1-view M ≠ W.


yet, in the 1-view, W = H, and M = H.

There is nothing paradoxal. It comes from the fact that we agree  
surviving in both place, but are aware we can see only one of them,  
from the 1p view.


Now, provability, and even more provability-&-truth provide  
intensional predicates, their numerical extension have a secondary role.


From []A, and A <-> B, it does not follow that []B. You need [](A <->  
B).


Bruno






Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor

2014-02-27 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Thursday, February 27, 2014 9:38:05 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 24 Feb 2014, at 17:31, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 9:13:26 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>> On 24 February 2014 02:43, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>
>> How do you turn your desire to move your hand into the neurological 
>>> changes which move them? The neurological change is the expression of what 
>>> you actually are. These primitive levels of sense are beyond the question 
>>> of 'how', they are more in the neighborhood of 'how else?'
>>
>>
>> But we cannot be content to let "how else?" stand as mere rhetoric, can 
>> we?
>>
>
> Yes, in this case, we absolutely can. Otherwise you enter into a regress 
> of having to ask 'how does asking how' work? 
>
>
> If you follow the unavoidably more mathematical thread (which exploits the 
> link between computationalism and theoretical computer science) you might 
> eventually understand how a machine can explain its entire 3p functioning 
> (and with chance: at its correct 1p substitution level).
>

The only mathematical thread I would be interested in following is one 
which exploits the link between computationalism or theoretical computer 
science and aesthetic realism.

>
> Like a tiny part of arithmetical truth can already explain why normal 
> universal numbers get in awe in front of the gap between proof and truth.
>

Why would the gap between proof and truth cause awe? What arithmetic 
function does awe server?

>
>
>
>
> We don't have to ask how it works, nor must there be an answer which could 
> satisfy such an expectation.
>
>
> But we *can* ask, isn't it? We might never find the correct answer, but we 
> can find better and better theories.
>

We can ask, sure, but its a mistake. We can ask who matter is made of also, 
or where arithmetic is, but they don't lead to better theories, they lead 
to confusion.

>
> Advantage of comp? We can easily do science.
>

Sure, it makes sense that theories that are made from science instead of 
reality would be easier to manage with science.

>
>
> The whole idea of 'how' is a cognitive framing of sensible comparisons. 
> Sure, it seems very important to the intellect, just as air seems very 
> important to the lungs, but that doesn't mean that 'how' can refer to 
> anything primordial. 
>
>
> Comp is a banal theory, in the sense of being believed (consciously or 
> not) by many people, mainly materialist . Few computationalists today are 
> aware that it put theology and physics upside down, yet in a simple 
> elementary interpretations capable to be understood by any universal 
> machine. 
>

I have no problem with that. I'm never talking about materialist physics, 
only the physics of computation and how it supervenes on deeper, 
non-arithmetic participation.

>
>
>
>
> It's like asking an actor in a movie asking how they got into a projection 
> on a screen.
>
>
> Bad analogy, misused. You beg the question. You just can't  compare 
> authentic self-referentially correct machines, amenable to mathematical 
> studies, with dolls. 
>

I compare them with dolls only as opposed to zombies. Dolls are 3D machines 
which perform a very limited range of behaviors. Dolls that can cry or walk 
add some 4D behavioral capabilities, but they are still 3D dolls doing 4D 
playback of a 4D recording. Talking about self-referentially correct 
machines is an order of magnitude more sophisticated, obviously. These are 
4D dolls doing 5D meta-playbacks of 4D recordings. They not only play back 
their program on cue, they have a program to store and evaluate cues in a 
progressive way. 

Despite appearances to the contrary, I am not dismissing the significance 
of this, nor am I failing to take into account that your view of machines 
includes even more persuasive evidence...perhaps the UM or Lobian machine 
qualifies as a 5D or 6D masterpiece, and I don't deny that. What I deny is 
that it makes any fundamental difference to the impersonal, rootless 
vantage point of any possible program. Consciousness is not entirely 
dimensional, it creates dimensionality. What computational theory produces 
is not mind, but rather mentalism - cardboard cut outs of beliefs and 
intensional references through which a kind of cychic cold-reading can be 
deduced, but there is no feeling, no aesthetic content necessary for this 
to occur.

> Study the movie graph argument, and you will see that you are almost 
> correct here, but this only by reifying mind and/or matter in a way where 
> in comp it becomes a problem in math.
>

I've looked at the MGA before. I don't see that it addresses any of the 
issues that I keep bringing up.

Craig

>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor



On 24 Feb 2014, at 17:31, Craig Weinberg wrote:


On Monday, February 24, 2014 9:13:26 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
On 24 February 2014 02:43, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

How do you turn your desire to move your hand into the neurological  
changes which move them? The neurological change is the expression  
of what you actually are. These primitive levels of sense are beyond  
the question of 'how', they are more in the neighborhood of 'how  
else?'


But we cannot be content to let "how else?" stand as mere rhetoric,  
can we?


Yes, in this case, we absolutely can. Otherwise you enter into a  
regress of having to ask 'how does asking how' work?


If you follow the unavoidably more mathematical thread (which exploits  
the link between computationalism and theoretical computer science)  
you might eventually understand how a machine can explain its entire  
3p functioning (and with chance: at its correct 1p substitution level).


Like a tiny part of arithmetical truth can already explain why normal  
universal numbers get in awe in front of the gap between proof and  
truth.





We don't have to ask how it works, nor must there be an answer which  
could satisfy such an expectation.


But we *can* ask, isn't it? We might never find the correct answer,  
but we can find better and better theories.


Advantage of comp? We can easily do science.


The whole idea of 'how' is a cognitive framing of sensible  
comparisons. Sure, it seems very important to the intellect, just as  
air seems very important to the lungs, but that doesn't mean that  
'how' can refer to anything primordial.


Comp is a banal theory, in the sense of being believed (consciously or  
not) by many people, mainly materialist . Few computationalists today  
are aware that it put theology and physics upside down, yet in a  
simple elementary interpretations capable to be understood by any  
universal machine.





It's like asking an actor in a movie asking how they got into a  
projection on a screen.


Bad analogy, misused. You beg the question. You just can't  compare  
authentic self-referentially correct machines, amenable to  
mathematical studies, with dolls.


Study the movie graph argument, and you will see that you are almost  
correct here, but this only by reifying mind and/or matter in a way  
where in comp it becomes a problem in math.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor

2014-02-25 Thread meekerdb


On 2/25/2014 7:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 23 Feb 2014, at 20:38, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/23/2014 4:35 AM, David Nyman wrote:
Not "my" consciousness, no. I'm just suggesting that CTM ultimately relies on some 
transcendent notion of perspective itself. IOW, the sensible world is conceived as the 
resultant of the inter-subjective agreement of its possible observers, each of which 
discovers itself to be centred in some perspective.


Is the sensible world of *possible* observers supposed to include the whole world.  I'm 
always suspicious of the word "possible".  Does it refer to chance, i.e. many events 
were possible, I might have had coffee instead of tea this morning, but only a few are 
actual?  Does it refer to anything not prohibited by (our best theory of) physics: It's 
possible a meteorite might strike my house?  Or is it anything not entailing a 
contradiction: X and not X?


Possible in the large sense, is the diamond of the modal logic.


But <> is just a symbol that we use with certain rules of inference.  To be applied it 
requires some interpretation.



There are as many notions of possibility than there are modal logics, and there 
are many.

I appreciate that you put in your enumeration the "possible" in the sense of the 
"consistent" (not entailing A & ~A, or not entailing f).


David used "possible observers" as part of a definition.  I don't know what it would mean 
for an observer to not entail f.  So I think he had some other meaning (nomological) in 
mind.  But in that case his definition is somewhat circular.


Brent



That one, consistency,  can be defined in arithmetic for all arithmetically correct 
machine(~beweisbar('~(0=0)')), and it happens also that such a definition entails 
different logics for the "philosophical" or "physical" variant of it, and this choose 
the different modal logics from machines self-references.






Bruno


PS my p-time seems to be delayed, I am still in the 23 february, gosh!


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor

2014-02-25 Thread meekerdb


On 2/25/2014 7:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
admitting simply that indexical notion are modal notion, and thus don't need to obey to 
Leibniz identity rule.


I don't understand that remark.  Are you saying that there is some modal notion that makes 
identity of indiscernibles wrong?  I think of indexical predicates as being ostensive.


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor

On 24 Feb 2014, at 04:23, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Sunday, February 23, 2014 11:50:57 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 22 Feb 2014, at 18:36, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Saturday, February 22, 2014 11:27:45 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:

On 22 Feb 2014, at 15:25, Craig Weinberg wrote:

> If you say yes to the doctor, you are saying that originality is an
> illusion

Not at all. Your 1p-originality is preserved all the time.

I'm not thinking of 1p originality though, I'm talking about  
originality itself - absolute uniqueness. The idea that something  
can occur for the first, last, and only time, and perhaps, by  
extension that everything is in some sense utterly unique and  
irreplacable.

You reify an 1p notion.

What makes you think its more of a 1p notion than arithmetic is?

What makes you think that arithmetic is a 1p notion?

Answer: because you assume only 1p, and believe that you can derive  
anything from that.

The problem is that you don't have a theory, but a collection of  
image, which I still could appreciate, if you were not using it in a  
non valid way on computationalism.

In the H-WM
duplication experience, the experiencers get all a unique experience
of the type

I am the H-guy
I am the H-guy-Washington guy
I am the H-guy-Washington guy, then Moscow guy
I am the H-guy-Washington guy, then Moscow guy, then again Moscow guy
I am the H-guy-Washington guy, then Moscow guy, then again Moscow guy
and again Moscow guy ...

He never feel the split, and keeps its originality all along. he get
doppelgangers who also keep up their originality and develop their
personality.

I understand, but I think it is based on the assumption that "I am  
the H-guy" comes along for the ride when you reproduce a  
description of his body, or the blueprints for his behaviors.

Or a diophantine approximation of the quantum string-brane state  
with 10^(10^10) correct decimal for the rational complex numbers  
involved.

That assumes originality is not fundamental though.

I grant you that. Nor is it easy to define.

I don't see a compelling reason to allow that bottom up construction  
of consciousness will work.

I might agree with you. I am not sure comp allow a bottom up  
construction of consciousness, due to its peculiar relation with truth.

You must study a theory, as you take time to criticize only your own  
restricted comprehension of it.

To the contrary, everything that I have seen suggests that it cannot.

I think you are right on this. It is only your uses of things like  
this against computationalism which are not valid.

My point has been from the start that this is false.

But that is an extraordinary claim, which requires an extraordinary  
arguments.

Why would it be any more extraordinary than the claim that a unique  
conscious experience can be assembled from generic unconscious parts?

That uniqueness is 1p. Comp, if true, guaranties it for each 1p view.  
God knows better, but we are not yet there, isn't it?

No lifetime or event within a lifetime can be reproduced wholly -

I completely agree with you, but those are 1p notion. They have  
referent, but we cannot invoke them when we study them.

All notions are 1p, including the notion that there could be notions  
which are not 1p.

That is akin to solipsism.

And then again explain me why 0 = 0 in your theory, of why there is an  
infinite of primes.

The acceptable level of rigor is to be able to be clear enough so that  
someone else can translated in a first or higher order logic or in  
some already existing theory.

I love poets but I dislike the use of poetry in science.

there is no such thing.

You have to prove that.

It may not be possible to prove anything related to consciousness.

Again I can make a lot sense to this.

If it can be proved, then it only has to do with some particular  
relation within consciousness.

But then how do you know that the digital duplicate is a doll.

Very often, you do the opposite of what your own phenomenology should  
suggest.

All that can be reproduced is a representation within some sensory  
context. Outside of that context, it is a facade.

You should search for an experiment testing your idea, if only with  
the pedagogical goal of giving more sense to it.

The experiments are all around us. I see an actor on TV, but if I  
turn off the TV, it becomes clear that the image is only a visual  
facade.

This is not valid, and beside I was asking for an experience giving a  
different number than say string theory, or computationalism.

Yes, I am saying that C-t and CTM have only to do with  
representations of a particular kind of logic and measurement.

On the contrary, CT makes many different logics mathematically  
amenable, that is the reason to be study it. Whatever the truth is,  
it can only be more complex and subtle.

But is still quantifiable, impersonal kinds of logic,

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor



On 23 Feb 2014, at 20:57, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:



On Sunday, February 23, 2014 7:07:21 PM UTC, Brent wrote:
On 2/23/2014 1:13 AM, LizR wrote:

On 23 February 2014 20:48, meekerdb  wrote:
On 2/22/2014 9:21 PM, LizR wrote:

On 23 February 2014 17:40, meekerdb  wrote:
On 2/22/2014 5:49 PM, David Nyman wrote:
No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of  
consciousness is directly entailed by CTM. In fact it is  
equivalent to the continuing existence of the sensible world  
(i.e. per comp, the world is what is observed). Hence any  
observer can expect to remain centred in the circle of  
observation, come what may, to speak rather loosely. There is a  
transcendent expectation of a definite continuation (aka no cul- 
de-sac). This expectation is relativised only secondarily in  
terms of the specifics of some particular continuation.


So does your consciousness continue indefinitely into the past?

This would imply there is no initial state of mind - assumed  
digital, I assume? - or that every possible mental state has a  
precursor. Does computational theory assume this, or can a mind  
start from a blank state?


Even if it doesn't, it would seem a remarkable coincidence that  
everyone seems to be on their first consciousness.


Not necessarily. It might be a selection effect (a similar argument  
can be made for the QTI, if true - why are we at the start of an  
infinite lifetime? Well, because you have to start somewhere...  
This could be similar - there may be reasons to expect everyone to  
be "on their first consciousness" this near to the big bang,  
perhaps.)

Or given that consciousness is not the contents of consciousness,


I see no reason to assume that.

Hence the phraseology used above. If you say "given that X", that  
means you're assuming it for the sake of argument. (Sorry, maybe I  
should have said "if we assume that..." to make it clearer?)
does this just imply amensia about previous lives? (And maybe that  
"I am he as you are he ashe is me", etc).


Or does it imply that consciousness and memory are intrinsic to  
certain physical processes?


Since you can "see no reason to assume" the initial premise (see  
above) it seems a bit odd that you are then trying to draw  
conclusions from it!


I wrote "no reason to assume" that consciousness is not the content  
of consciousness.  The premise I took is "everyone's on their first  
consciousness". For which you offered the explanation of amnesia;  
and I offered a different one.  If you're going to criticize logic  
you need to parse correctly.


But it raises the question, given complete amnesia and then growing  
up with different experiences and memories in what sense could you  
be the same person.  I John Clark and Bruno's back and forth, the  
one thing they always agree on is that as soon as the M-man and the  
W-man open the transporter doors and see different scenes they are  
different people.


Brent


I'd be very interested to know who in this community currently  
subscribes to this idea that consciousness is not entirely a product  
of evolution of the nervous system and physical


I cannot see the faintest hint of things going this way. The brain  
is exactly the right conditions this extraordinary thing can be  
explicable.


On the bright side, perhaps we can look on this as a distinct predict.

Bruno - what is hanging on this prediction?  Are you willing to nail  
the colours of your work to something hard here>?


I have nailed comp+theaetetus on something "hard", as I give the comp  
quantum logic, and compare them to the one derived from observation.  
That's the whole point.








Things are advancing briskly enough in brain sciences, so it's  
realistic to think a resolution might emerge in the not distant  
future.


That is logically impossible. Or you assume comp, and get the  
conceptual solution which is almost modest as it is not much more than  
"listen to the machines". What they say is already quite astonishing,  
even if today this require some study of mathematical logic.





What sort of standard of proof would it take then, for you to regard  
your theory falsified?


The result is that comp+theaetetus is falsified if nature contradicts  
a physical comp tautology, that if a theorem of Z1*.






Or, where do your assertions about consciousness fit into your whole  
theory?


I define comp with consciousness. Comp is the belief that I will keep  
"my consciousness" through the use of *some* universal machine  
relatively to some probable universal machine.


But the UDA use not a lot, as it uses only a sharable notion of 1p  
(memory accompanying the person entering in the telebox).





Is it just a loosely associated preference, or is it absolutely  
indispensable?


You judge.





Will you formalize a falsifiable prediction?


I did. The arithmetical material "hypostases", that is mainly the  
arithmetical quantum logic Z1*.



 (I am currently

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor



On 23 Feb 2014, at 20:38, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/23/2014 4:35 AM, David Nyman wrote:
Not "my" consciousness, no. I'm just suggesting that CTM ultimately  
relies on some transcendent notion of perspective itself. IOW, the  
sensible world is conceived as the resultant of the inter- 
subjective agreement of its possible observers, each of which  
discovers itself to be centred in some perspective.


Is the sensible world of *possible* observers supposed to include  
the whole world.  I'm always suspicious of the word "possible".   
Does it refer to chance, i.e. many events were possible, I might  
have had coffee instead of tea this morning, but only a few are  
actual?  Does it refer to anything not prohibited by (our best  
theory of) physics: It's possible a meteorite might strike my  
house?  Or is it anything not entailing a contradiction: X and not X?


Possible in the large sense, is the diamond of the modal logic. There  
are as many notions of possibility than there are modal logics, and  
there are many.


I appreciate that you put in your enumeration the "possible" in the  
sense of the "consistent" (not entailing A & ~A, or not entailing f).


That one, consistency,  can be defined in arithmetic for all  
arithmetically correct machine(~beweisbar('~(0=0)')), and it happens  
also that such a definition entails different logics for the  
"philosophical" or "physical" variant of it, and this choose the  
different modal logics from machines self-references.


Bruno


PS my p-time seems to be delayed, I am still in the 23 february, gosh!






Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor



On 23 Feb 2014, at 20:07, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/23/2014 1:13 AM, LizR wrote:

On 23 February 2014 20:48, meekerdb  wrote:
On 2/22/2014 9:21 PM, LizR wrote:

On 23 February 2014 17:40, meekerdb  wrote:
On 2/22/2014 5:49 PM, David Nyman wrote:
No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of  
consciousness is directly entailed by CTM. In fact it is  
equivalent to the continuing existence of the sensible world  
(i.e. per comp, the world is what is observed). Hence any  
observer can expect to remain centred in the circle of  
observation, come what may, to speak rather loosely. There is a  
transcendent expectation of a definite continuation (aka no cul- 
de-sac). This expectation is relativised only secondarily in  
terms of the specifics of some particular continuation.


So does your consciousness continue indefinitely into the past?

This would imply there is no initial state of mind - assumed  
digital, I assume? - or that every possible mental state has a  
precursor. Does computational theory assume this, or can a mind  
start from a blank state?


Even if it doesn't, it would seem a remarkable coincidence that  
everyone seems to be on their first consciousness.


Not necessarily. It might be a selection effect (a similar argument  
can be made for the QTI, if true - why are we at the start of an  
infinite lifetime? Well, because you have to start somewhere...  
This could be similar - there may be reasons to expect everyone to  
be "on their first consciousness" this near to the big bang,  
perhaps.)

Or given that consciousness is not the contents of consciousness,


I see no reason to assume that.

Hence the phraseology used above. If you say "given that X", that  
means you're assuming it for the sake of argument. (Sorry, maybe I  
should have said "if we assume that..." to make it clearer?)
does this just imply amensia about previous lives? (And maybe that  
"I am he as you are he as he is me", etc).


Or does it imply that consciousness and memory are intrinsic to  
certain physical processes?


Since you can "see no reason to assume" the initial premise (see  
above) it seems a bit odd that you are then trying to draw  
conclusions from it!


I wrote "no reason to assume" that consciousness is not the content  
of consciousness.  The premise I took is "everyone's on their first  
consciousness". For which you offered the explanation of amnesia; 
and I offered a different one.  If you're going to criticize logic  
you need to parse correctly.


But it raises the question, given complete amnesia and then growing  
up with different experiences and memories in what sense could you  
be the same person.  I John Clark and Bruno's back and forth, the  
one thing they always agree on is that as soon as the M-man and the  
W-man open the transporter doors and see different scenes they are  
different people.



We agree that the W-man and the M-man are different, yes.
We even agree that both the W-man and the M-man are the H-man,  
admitting simply that indexical notion are modal notion, and thus  
don't need to obey to Leibniz identity rule.


I am not sure there is any disagreement, actually, except only on  
this, but even there he does not convince me. Why he stays mute on  
step 4 is perhaps that he does already understand it and the  
consequences, and he dislikes them, perhaps. Well, it is weird, but we  
are accustom of irrationality in theology aren't we?


Bruno





Brent

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor



On 23 Feb 2014, at 13:54, David Nyman wrote:


On 23 February 2014 09:22, LizR  wrote:
On 23 February 2014 20:48, meekerdb  wrote:
On 2/22/2014 9:21 PM, LizR wrote:

On 23 February 2014 17:40, meekerdb  wrote:
On 2/22/2014 5:49 PM, David Nyman wrote:
No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of  
consciousness is directly entailed by CTM. In fact it is  
equivalent to the continuing existence of the sensible world (i.e.  
per comp, the world is what is observed). Hence any observer can  
expect to remain centred in the circle of observation, come what  
may, to speak rather loosely. There is a transcendent expectation  
of a definite continuation (aka no cul-de-sac). This expectation  
is relativised only secondarily in terms of the specifics of some  
particular continuation.


So does your consciousness continue indefinitely into the past?

This would imply there is no initial state of mind - assumed  
digital, I assume? - or that every possible mental state has a  
precursor. Does computational theory assume this, or can a mind  
start from a blank state?


Even if it doesn't, it would seem a remarkable coincidence that  
everyone seems to be on their first consciousness.


Not necessarily. It might be a selection effect (a similar argument  
can be made for the QTI, if true - why are we at the start of an  
infinite lifetime? Well, you have to start somewhere.)


Right. And I guess you'd expect me by now to invite you to consider  
this with a Hoylean hat on. From Hoyle's perspective a momentary  
experience can be *typical* only to the degree that equivalent  
fungible experiences predominate in some underlying measure contest.  
So, as an analogy, experiences in which "I" hold a losing ticket in  
the UK lottery predominate hugely over those in which I hold a  
winning ticket, and this continues to be the case even though from  
Hoyle's perspective "I" am *all* the ticket holders. If this makes  
any sense, we must assume (for the analogy to hold) that experiences  
in which "I" appear to have a relatively recent origin in space and  
time predominate in the measure battle with those in which my  
apparent origin recedes towards some asymptotic limit. The former,  
one might say, are more *typical* of the experience of the universal  
observer than the latter.



For me this touches open problems (some made worst by explaining in  
comp the possibility of the salvia experience).


All "memorized past" can only scratches the "futures". In a sense we  
are always "young". From inside, it always look like a beginning, and  
in a sense it is (I think).


Bruno






David



Or given that consciousness is not the contents of consciousness,


I see no reason to assume that.

Hence the phraseology used above. If you say "given that X", that  
means you're assuming it for the sake of argument. Sorry, maybe I  
should have said "if we assume that..." to make it clearer.
does this just imply amensia about previous lives? (And maybe that  
"I am he as you are he as he is me", etc).


Or does it imply that consciousness and memory are intrinsic to  
certain physical processes?


Since you can "see no reason to assume" the initial premise (see  
above) it seems a bit odd that you are then trying to draw  
conclusions from it!



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor

2014-02-24 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Monday, February 24, 2014 3:32:03 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 24 February 2014 16:31, Craig Weinberg 
> > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 9:13:26 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>>> On 24 February 2014 02:43, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>>
>>> How do you turn your desire to move your hand into the neurological 
 changes which move them? The neurological change is the expression of what 
 you actually are. These primitive levels of sense are beyond the question 
 of 'how', they are more in the neighborhood of 'how else?'
>>>
>>>
>>> But we cannot be content to let "how else?" stand as mere rhetoric, can 
>>> we?
>>>
>>
>> Yes, in this case, we absolutely can. Otherwise you enter into a regress 
>> of having to ask 'how does asking how' work? We don't have to ask how it 
>> works, nor must there be an answer which could satisfy such an expectation. 
>> The whole idea of 'how' is a cognitive framing of sensible comparisons. 
>> Sure, it seems very important to the intellect, just as air seems very 
>> important to the lungs, but that doesn't mean that 'how' can refer to 
>> anything primordial. It's like asking an actor in a movie asking how they 
>> got into a projection on a screen.
>>
>
> Er, no I don't agree that it's like that at all, if I've managed to puzzle 
> out your drift. I wasn't asking "why primitive sense" because that's a 
> posit of your theory. I was asking how the desire to move your hand turns 
> into the neurological changes which move them in terms of that posit. 
>

The desire to move your hand doesn't 'turn into' anything. Think of your 
desire as an earthquake causing ripples in various parts of the world 
simultaneously, on all different scales. The molecules are changing 
polarity, the ion gates are closing, the neurons are firing, the muscle 
fibers are contracting, the arm is moving - they are all the same event, 
only expressed within different sized frames of 'here' and 'now'. 

Where there are neurons, there is no person. Where there is a person, there 
can be neurons in a figurative sense, derived through understanding and 
instrumental extension, but at the level of a personal experience, a 
'neuron' is *really* an ability to feel or touch something. I am saying 
that is the ontological reality of what it is. The neuron is an outsider's 
view which reveals details that the insider view cannot, but I suggest that 
the view which reconciles them both is metaphenomenal rather than 
meta-mechanical (arithmetic).

> How. This is a question whose answer must lie *within* the theory, hence 
> be derivable from it. I'm asking how your theory can frame these questions 
> in such a way that they are capable of being answered. Or are you implying 
> that the only right way to frame the problem is in such a way that no 
> questions of this kind can ever be answered?
>

Yes. There is no way to ask how you begin the chain of physical changes 
which moves your arm, or how you know how to do that. It is primitive. You 
can only experience it directly. A computation does not have that. It can 
never know how to initiate any physical or phenomenal change, any more than 
"a ripple" can initiate rippling in a lake.

>
>  
>>
>>>  The question of how the desire moves the hand is essentially the same 
>>> question I have been asking you all along to try to justify in terms of a 
>>> theory of primitive sensory-motive relations. How specifically might 
>>> experience translate to function? 
>>>
>>
>> It doesn't. It's a matter of the frame of reference. My experience looks 
>> like a function from your distance.
>>
>
> Yes, but how or why does it look like that.? 
>

Because that's how sense organizes itself to invite opportunities for 
richer qualities of experience. Mathematics can show us precisely why the 
relations which are used in nature make that kind of sense, but it is 
meaningless outside of a context which is worth making sense of. Counting 
what can never be encountered is a moot point ontologically.

> That's what my question means. I think this is what Bruno is getting at 
> when he says that genuine problems should be invariant to the terms in 
> which they are described. I find that you have an unfortunate tendency to 
> assume that you have avoided the need to address a question just because 
> you change the words you use to describe it. I don't think that helps 
> either your understanding or your ability to convey it to me.
>

I don't avoid the need to address a question, I explain that the question 
is coming from somewhere that evaporates as soon as you accept the 
consequences of the original premise. How comes from sense, so it makes no 
sense to ask how sense makes itself.

>
> From a greater, absolute distance, both of our functions looks like 
>> mathematics.
>>  
>>
>>> Certainly it is the expression of what you actually are, but how can 
>>> this be cashed out in detail, or even in principle? You may feel that it is 
>>> unfai

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor

2014-02-24 Thread David Nyman

On 24 February 2014 16:31, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 9:13:26 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> On 24 February 2014 02:43, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>
>> How do you turn your desire to move your hand into the neurological
>>> changes which move them? The neurological change is the expression of what
>>> you actually are. These primitive levels of sense are beyond the question
>>> of 'how', they are more in the neighborhood of 'how else?'
>>
>>
>> But we cannot be content to let "how else?" stand as mere rhetoric, can
>> we?
>>
>
> Yes, in this case, we absolutely can. Otherwise you enter into a regress
> of having to ask 'how does asking how' work? We don't have to ask how it
> works, nor must there be an answer which could satisfy such an expectation.
> The whole idea of 'how' is a cognitive framing of sensible comparisons.
> Sure, it seems very important to the intellect, just as air seems very
> important to the lungs, but that doesn't mean that 'how' can refer to
> anything primordial. It's like asking an actor in a movie asking how they
> got into a projection on a screen.
>

Er, no I don't agree that it's like that at all, if I've managed to puzzle
out your drift. I wasn't asking "why primitive sense" because that's a
posit of your theory. I was asking how the desire to move your hand turns
into the neurological changes which move them in terms of that posit. How.
This is a question whose answer must lie *within* the theory, hence be
derivable from it. I'm asking how your theory can frame these questions in
such a way that they are capable of being answered. Or are you implying
that the only right way to frame the problem is in such a way that no
questions of this kind can ever be answered?

>
>>  The question of how the desire moves the hand is essentially the same
>> question I have been asking you all along to try to justify in terms of a
>> theory of primitive sensory-motive relations. How specifically might
>> experience translate to function?
>>
>
> It doesn't. It's a matter of the frame of reference. My experience looks
> like a function from your distance.
>

Yes, but how or why does it look like that.? That's what my question means.
I think this is what Bruno is getting at when he says that genuine problems
should be invariant to the terms in which they are described. I find that
you have an unfortunate tendency to assume that you have avoided the need
to address a question just because you change the words you use to describe
it. I don't think that helps either your understanding or your ability to
convey it to me.

>From a greater, absolute distance, both of our functions looks like
> mathematics.
>
>
>> Certainly it is the expression of what you actually are, but how can this
>> be cashed out in detail, or even in principle? You may feel that it is
>> unfair of me to make this demand at such an early stage because it is
>> precisely the unsolved conundrum of any theory that doesn't fundamentally
>> sweep consciousness under the rug.
>>
>
> No, no, it's not unfair at all. I'm not ducking the question and saying
> 'we can't know the answer to this mystery because blah blah sacred
> ineffable', I am saying that the question cannot be asked because it can
> only be asked within sense to begin with. If you can ask what sense is,
> your asking is already a first hand demonstration of what it is. It can
> have no better description, nor could it ever require one. All that is
> required is for us to stop doubting what we already experience directly.
>

We cannot doubt it. Uniquely so, in fact.

>  We can doubt whether what we experience is this kind of an experience or
> that kind, whether it is more 'real' or more like a dream, but we cannot
> doubt that there is an experience in which there is a feeling of direct
> participation - a sense which includes the possibility of a sense of motive.
>

I agree. As indeed did Descartes.

>
>
>> But I have been under the strong impression that you see the
>> sensory-motive approach as the key precisely fitted to unlocking this
>> puzzle; hence my enquiry as to the specifics.
>>
>
> Yes, I think it is the frame of the puzzle. If we start from sense, then
> every piece falls into place eventually. If we start from non-sense, then
> we can never find the piece of the puzzle which is the puzzle itself.
>

I understand that feeling and share it. It's very common (though curiously,
not universal) and perhaps it is not eliminable as long as we insist on
understanding the puzzle exclusively from within the frame of sense. I know
it seems as if once we step outside that frame, even conceptually, we can
never step back in. It seems impossible, like lifting oneself by one's own
bootstraps. But understanding the world in its fullness inevitably seems to
involve believing six impossible things before breakfast. This step is not
by any stretch the most impossible, especially if we can find ways of
accurately modelling the reference to s

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor

2014-02-24 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Monday, February 24, 2014 9:13:26 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 24 February 2014 02:43, Craig Weinberg 
> > wrote:
>
> How do you turn your desire to move your hand into the neurological 
>> changes which move them? The neurological change is the expression of what 
>> you actually are. These primitive levels of sense are beyond the question 
>> of 'how', they are more in the neighborhood of 'how else?'
>
>
> But we cannot be content to let "how else?" stand as mere rhetoric, can we?
>

Yes, in this case, we absolutely can. Otherwise you enter into a regress of 
having to ask 'how does asking how' work? We don't have to ask how it 
works, nor must there be an answer which could satisfy such an expectation. 
The whole idea of 'how' is a cognitive framing of sensible comparisons. 
Sure, it seems very important to the intellect, just as air seems very 
important to the lungs, but that doesn't mean that 'how' can refer to 
anything primordial. It's like asking an actor in a movie asking how they 
got into a projection on a screen.

> The question of how the desire moves the hand is essentially the same 
> question I have been asking you all along to try to justify in terms of a 
> theory of primitive sensory-motive relations. How specifically might 
> experience translate to function? 
>

It doesn't. It's a matter of the frame of reference. My experience looks 
like a function from your distance. From a greater, absolute distance, both 
of our functions looks like mathematics.

> Certainly it is the expression of what you actually are, but how can this 
> be cashed out in detail, or even in principle? You may feel that it is 
> unfair of me to make this demand at such an early stage because it is 
> precisely the unsolved conundrum of any theory that doesn't fundamentally 
> sweep consciousness under the rug. 
>

No, no, it's not unfair at all. I'm not ducking the question and saying 'we 
can't know the answer to this mystery because blah blah sacred ineffable', 
I am saying that the question cannot be asked because it can only be asked 
within sense to begin with. If you can ask what sense is, your asking is 
already a first hand demonstration of what it is. It can have no better 
description, nor could it ever require one. All that is required is for us 
to stop doubting what we already experience directly. We can doubt whether 
what we experience is this kind of an experience or that kind, whether it 
is more 'real' or more like a dream, but we cannot doubt that there is an 
experience in which there is a feeling of direct participation - a sense 
which includes the possibility of a sense of motive.

> But I have been under the strong impression that you see the 
> sensory-motive approach as the key precisely fitted to unlocking this 
> puzzle; hence my enquiry as to the specifics.
>

Yes, I think it is the frame of the puzzle. If we start from sense, then 
every piece falls into place eventually. If we start from non-sense, then 
we can never find the piece of the puzzle which is the puzzle itself.

>
> To be honest it was the realisation of (or at least the possibility of) a 
> novel resolution of these issues in the comp formulation of the 
> world-problem in general that eventually made me waver from my prior 
> attachment to a sensory-motive approach.
>

I don't think that you had a sensory-motive approach, I think you probably 
had an idealist-theoretic approach...the idea of experience as a 
pseudo-substance rather than ordinary sense/sense-making.

> In the end, as I tried to frame counter-arguments in the debate and turned 
> the thing over and over in my mind, I found that this possibility of 
> resolution carried more immediate persuasive heft for me than my worries 
> about the precise metaphysical relation of the various elements of the 
> schema. After all, we cannot expect to be able to explain everything at 
> once. 
>

We can if the explanation is felt directly rather than symbolized and 
communicated.

> And also it seemed to me that we were not that far away from being able to 
> test at least some of this conjecture in "yes doctor" mode, by direct 
> interface with digital prostheses and the like (hence my posting of that 
> link). That would be rather persuasive wouldn't it? 
>

Nothing is persuasive until someone is transplanted into a synthetic brain 
and returns to tell the tale.

> We shouldn't have to wait interminably for some unfortunate AI "doll" to 
> become capable of protesting its heartfelt feelings to our unsympathetic 
> ear; we could directly experience the computational simulation of real 
> consciousness for ourselves and let that be the criterion. No?
>

As long as there is enough of us left to live and participate as a person, 
we can compensate to some extent for the shortfall of a prosthetic limb. We 
triangulate the gap and our perception can fill-in to a surprising degree. 
Only if our entire brain is amputated and replaced successfully wi

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor

2014-02-24 Thread David Nyman

On 24 February 2014 02:43, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

How do you turn your desire to move your hand into the neurological changes
> which move them? The neurological change is the expression of what you
> actually are. These primitive levels of sense are beyond the question of
> 'how', they are more in the neighborhood of 'how else?'

But we cannot be content to let "how else?" stand as mere rhetoric, can we?
The question of how the desire moves the hand is essentially the same
question I have been asking you all along to try to justify in terms of a
theory of primitive sensory-motive relations. How specifically might
experience translate to function? Certainly it is the expression of what
you actually are, but how can this be cashed out in detail, or even in
principle? You may feel that it is unfair of me to make this demand at such
an early stage because it is precisely the unsolved conundrum of any theory
that doesn't fundamentally sweep consciousness under the rug. But I have
been under the strong impression that you see the sensory-motive approach
as the key precisely fitted to unlocking this puzzle; hence my enquiry as
to the specifics.

To be honest it was the realisation of (or at least the possibility of) a
novel resolution of these issues in the comp formulation of the
world-problem in general that eventually made me waver from my prior
attachment to a sensory-motive approach. In the end, as I tried to frame
counter-arguments in the debate and turned the thing over and over in my
mind, I found that this possibility of resolution carried more immediate
persuasive heft for me than my worries about the precise metaphysical
relation of the various elements of the schema. After all, we cannot expect
to be able to explain everything at once. And also it seemed to me that we
were not that far away from being able to test at least some of this
conjecture in "yes doctor" mode, by direct interface with digital
prostheses and the like (hence my posting of that link). That would be
rather persuasive wouldn't it? We shouldn't have to wait interminably for
some unfortunate AI "doll" to become capable of protesting its heartfelt
feelings to our unsympathetic ear; we could directly experience the
computational simulation of real consciousness for ourselves and let that
be the criterion. No?

David

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor

2014-02-23 Thread Craig Weinberg



On Sunday, February 23, 2014 11:50:57 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 22 Feb 2014, at 18:36, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 11:27:45 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 22 Feb 2014, at 15:25, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
>>
>> > If you say yes to the doctor, you are saying that originality is an   
>> > illusion 
>>
>>
>> Not at all. Your 1p-originality is preserved all the time.
>
>
> I'm not thinking of 1p originality though, I'm talking about originality 
> itself - absolute uniqueness. The idea that something can occur for the 
> first, last, and only time, and perhaps, by extension that everything is in 
> some sense utterly unique and irreplacable. 
>
>
> You reify an 1p notion.
>

What makes you think its more of a 1p notion than arithmetic is?
 

>
>
>  
>
>> In the H-WM   
>> duplication experience, the experiencers get all a unique experience   
>> of the type 
>>
>> I am the H-guy 
>> I am the H-guy-Washington guy 
>> I am the H-guy-Washington guy, then Moscow guy 
>> I am the H-guy-Washington guy, then Moscow guy, then again Moscow guy 
>> I am the H-guy-Washington guy, then Moscow guy, then again Moscow guy   
>> and again Moscow guy ... 
>>
>> He never feel the split, and keeps its originality all along. he get   
>> doppelgangers who also keep up their originality and develop their   
>> personality. 
>>
>
> I understand, but I think it is based on the assumption that "I am the 
> H-guy" comes along for the ride when you reproduce a description of his 
> body, or the blueprints for his behaviors. 
>
>
> Or a diophantine approximation of the quantum string-brane state with 
> 10^(10^10) correct decimal for the rational complex numbers involved.
>

That assumes originality is not fundamental though. I don't see a 
compelling reason to allow that bottom up construction of consciousness 
will work. To the contrary, everything that I have seen suggests that it 
cannot.
 

>
>
> My point has been from the start that this is false.
>
>
>
> But that is an extraordinary claim, which requires an extraordinary 
> arguments.
>

Why would it be any more extraordinary than the claim that a unique 
conscious experience can be assembled from generic unconscious parts?
 

>
>
>
> No lifetime or event within a lifetime can be reproduced wholly -
>
>
>
> I completely agree with you, but those are 1p notion. They have referent, 
> but we cannot invoke them when we study them.
>

All notions are 1p, including the notion that there could be notions which 
are not 1p.
 

>
>
>
> there is no such thing. 
>
>
> You have to prove that.
>

It may not be possible to prove anything related to consciousness. If it 
can be proved, then it only has to do with some particular relation within 
consciousness.
 

>
>
>
>
>
> All that can be reproduced is a representation within some sensory 
> context. Outside of that context, it is a facade.
>
>
> You should search for an experiment testing your idea, if only with the 
> pedagogical goal of giving more sense to it.
>

The experiments are all around us. I see an actor on TV, but if I turn off 
the TV, it becomes clear that the image is only a visual facade.
 

>
>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>> Of course in your theory that is an illusion, as they are all zombies,   
>> and the H-guy is dead. 
>>
>
> Never zombies - always dolls. 
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Zombies are supernatural fiction, dolls are ordinary. The consciousness of 
> dolls is not at the level of the plastic figure - there is consciousness 
> there but on the level which holds the plastic together, and perhaps which 
> on the metaphenomenal level of synchronicity, poetry, etc.
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>> > and simulation is absolute. 
>>
>> Emulation is absolute by Church thesis, and a "correct" simulation is   
>> what comp assumes the existence through the existence of the   
>> substitution level. 
>>
>
> Yes, I am saying that C-t and CTM have only to do with representations of 
> a particular kind of logic and measurement.
>
>
> On the contrary, CT makes many different logics mathematically amenable, 
> that is the reason to be study it. Whatever the truth is, it can only be 
> more complex and subtle.
>

But is still quantifiable, impersonal kinds of logic, as opposed to dream 
logic or sentimental logic, etc.
 

>
> Your intution that comp is false is "correct", but it is 1p, and by 
> itself, it does not provide a refutation of comp, as comp already explain 
> why machine can develop that intuition, and this correctly.
>

If you use comp to explain why I develop this correct intuition then comp 
cannot explain how you use your incorrect counter-intuition to support the 
possibility of comp. Your assertion that my intuition is 1p is also a 1p 
intuition based on your 1p experiences with math.
 

>
> The 1p is not a machine, he is the owner of the brain, that it borrows to 
> the most probable universal neighbors. 
>

I am not the owner of a brain, I am the participant in a life. I don't 
think that a

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor

On 24 February 2014 15:04, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 2/23/2014 4:57 PM, LizR wrote:
>
>
>> But it raises the question, given complete amnesia and then growing up
>> with different experiences and memories in what sense could you be the same
>> person.  I John Clark and Bruno's back and forth, the one thing they always
>> agree on is that as soon as the M-man and the W-man open the transporter
>> doors and see different scenes they are different people.
>>
>
>  Yes, it does of course raise this problem, and I agree with you that
> this seems to stretch the definition of similarity to meaninglessness. For
> this to mean anything, one really requires some way for one stream of
> consciousness to segue into another, so that although the amnesia becomes
> complete eventually, there is a transition between the two. Or perhaps each
> stream of consciousness cycles back and forth between some tabula rasa
> state (assuming any of this has any validity at all, of course). Of course
> (as per the transporter) we also find ourselves in the position of
> Heraclitus' man entering the river, of a person being in constant flux in
> any case. This is a result of the idea of the brain being at some level a
> digital computer (and probably of it being an analogue one too...).
>
>
> For my analysis I'll invoke my favorite intuition pump, the AI Mars Rover.As 
> the Rover explores the terrain and learns things to enhance its
> probability of mission success it fills its memory with things like "don't
> try to cross those white patches" and "look for another rock that looks
> like a donut".  Now we can see what degrees of amnesia would mean.  If just
> the learned stuff were erased, as they would be blank on a second Rover,
> then the Rover would be "the same" in terms of what it tried to do and how
> it tried to do it, but it would be different in that it would develop
> different memories and learn new tricks.  You might say it had "the same
> personality" as the other AI Rover.
>
> But then consider a more extreme case: Back a JPL they have a spare Rover
> that's identical to those sent to Mars.  But after the mission is over they
> move the cpu and memory with the same general AI into an AI deep
> submersible where they are connected to different sensors and controllers.
> Then I'd say it had a different consciousness, based on my theory that
> consciousness depends on how one perceives and acts on the environment.
>

Yes. I think this is what might be called the standard view of
consciousness, the sort that most people who think about this sort of thing
think should exist, especially if the brain is like a computer (and
assuming the consequences of comp don't follow from that assumption). I
think some aspects would be "wired in" of course (that's equivalent to a
genetic version of tuning the brain to interact with an expected
environment) and some would be learned from experience. This is the view I
have when I put my materialist hat on (This is certainly the view that I
would take as read if I was writing a hard / cyberpunk SF novel, for
example).

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor

2014-02-23 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Sunday, February 23, 2014 6:51:21 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 23 February 2014 19:04, Craig Weinberg 
> > wrote:
>
>>
>>  After all, the standard objection to starting from the putative 
>>> universality of consciousness is why does it appear that so much of the 
>>> world of appearance is *unconscious*? 
>>>
>>
>> That is the only criticism that I have come up with so far of my own 
>> position that has some potential.
>>
>
> Then it is the one you should concentrate on.
>

Yes, I already have. As I explain, it's not actually a problem, but it does 
require more of a counter-intuitive solution than most of the other 
criticisms I get (which are straw men from the start).

>  
>
>> It is very hard to imagine that what we see as inanimate objects could be 
>> just the tip of an iceberg of non-human storytelling,
>>
>
> You might be surprised how similar this analogy is to my personal metaphor 
> for the sensible worlds of CTM. That's why I sometimes call it the 
> Programmatic Library of Babel. If Borges had known about CTM, I'm sure he 
> would have relished it.
>

CTM was the closest thing to how I conceived of metaphysics before I 
stumbled on the deeper necessity of sense. The idea of sensible worlds of 
CTM is not objectionable to me at all, except that computation does not 
require sense, and has no plausible use for it. 

>  
>
>> however, it really is no more far fetched than imagining the underlying 
>> microphysics of any given object.
>>
>
> True dat.
>  
>
>> All that it really means is that the relation that we enjoy with the 
>> world is in some sense the fundamental relation of all natural phenomena.
>>
>
> But what sense is that? You say that it is the relation of common, 
> ordinary sense, as though that alone will prime our intuition to leap the 
> gap between the human scale and that of - well what precisely? 
>

I don't think that there is a gap. Our ordinary sense - the practice of 
participating in aesthetic experiences is exactly what is happening on 
every level of physics and at every time in history. The content is 
different, obviously, but the fundamental capacity to relate is the same, 
and it is the polar opposite of computation.

> Are we perhaps to suppose all conceivable relations to be those of 
> reciprocal perception and acting-upon? 
>

Yes. All relations diverge from the nesting of that capacity.

> That's out there as the poetic precursor to an idea. Gregg Rosenberg, for 
> example, has re-analysed the notion of causality from first principles in 
> order to argue that the effective (i.e. motive) notion of physical 
> causality at the micro-scale cannot be fully coherent without a receptive 
> (i.e. sensory) dual. But he struggles mightily to cash this out 
> consistently at the macro-scale. I'm not suggesting that this is 
> necessarily precisely equivalent to your basic assumption, but I do believe 
> that you cannot avoid a similar struggle with these difficulties because 
> they are inherent in the topic.
>

He'll have problems if he assumes that the microphysical appearance adds up 
to macrophenomenal content. That problem goes away with the primoridial 
identity version of pansensitivity. We begin with metaphenomenal content, 
so that all distinctions between micro and macro, physical and phenomenal 
are embedded at the higher level. The microphysics that we see through our 
body does not match the microphenomena. Physics can be thought of as 
alienated phenomena nested in discrete rows across space, while phenomenal 
experience would be nested as a single figurative column through time. The 
nesting is orthogonal. Coincidences synchronize events on multiple physical 
scales and build on meaningful associations in many seemingly different 
semantic contexts. The relation of physical and phenomenal is basically one 
of accelerated coincidence.

http://s33light.org/post/77527626589

If you try to force panpsychism into an emergence model, then yeah, it 
won't work. You have to think of consciousness as relativity and the speed 
of light all rolled into one.

> All of the objectionable anthropocentrism can be potentially alleviated by 
>> applying exponential filters of insensitivity
>>
>
> No doubt, if we can indeed elucidate precisely what is entailed by 
> exponential filters of insensitivity.
>

I call it eigenmorphism. I don't know that we need to publish a theory 
about how it works at this point, for now, I think its enough to point in 
this general direction and see how it might plug into existing physics. 

>  
>
>>  which are proportional to distance, scale, and unfamiliarity. It would 
>> make sense also,
>>
>
> Make sense to whom? I'm not being facetious: we should be very careful in 
> theory-making that we are not merely projecting terrestrial notions of what 
> makes sense on to the cosmic scale. You yourself have used the analogy of 
> the Galilean paradigm replacing the Ptolemaic and there are countless 
> others.
>

Makes sense

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor

On 2/23/2014 4:57 PM, LizR wrote:

But it raises the question, given complete amnesia and then growing up with
different experiences and memories in what sense could you be the same
person. I
John Clark and Bruno's back and forth, the one thing they always agree on
is that as
soon as the M-man and the W-man open the transporter doors and see
different scenes
they are different people.

Yes, it does of course raise this problem, and I agree with you that this seems to
stretch the definition of similarity to meaninglessness. For this to mean anything, one
really requires some way for one stream of consciousness to segue into another, so that
although the amnesia becomes complete eventually, there is a transition between the two.
Or perhaps each stream of consciousness cycles back and forth between some tabula rasa
state (assuming any of this has any validity at all, of course). Of course (as per the
transporter) we also find ourselves in the position of Heraclitus' man entering the
river, of a person being in constant flux in any case. This is a result of the idea of
the brain being at some level a digital computer (and probably of it being an analogue
one too...).

For my analysis I'll invoke my favorite intuition pump, the AI Mars Rover. As the Rover
explores the terrain and learns things to enhance its probability of mission success it
fills its memory with things like "don't try to cross those white patches" and "look for
another rock that looks like a donut". Now we can see what degrees of amnesia would
mean. If just the learned stuff were erased, as they would be blank on a second Rover,
then the Rover would be "the same" in terms of what it tried to do and how it tried to do
it, but it would be different in that it would develop different memories and learn new
tricks. You might say it had "the same personality" as the other AI Rover.

But then consider a more extreme case: Back a JPL they have a spare Rover that's identical
to those sent to Mars. But after the mission is over they move the cpu and memory with
the same general AI into an AI deep submersible where they are connected to different
sensors and controllers. Then I'd say it had a different consciousness, based on my theory
that consciousness depends on how one perceives and acts on the environment.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor

On 24 February 2014 08:07, meekerdb  wrote:

> I wrote "no reason to assume" that consciousness is not the content of
> consciousness.  The premise I took is "everyone's on their first
> consciousness". For which you offered the explanation of amnesia; and I
> offered a different one.  If you're going to criticize logic you need to
> parse correctly.
>

Sorry, Brent, but in this case you're the one who didn't parse correctly.

I originally wrote...

Or given that consciousness is not the contents of consciousness,
does this just imply amensia about previous lives? (And maybe that "I am he
as you are he as he is me", etc).

Note that this is a single sentence with the structure - "Given that X,
does this imply Y?"

   You interjected after the first half of my sentence:

I see no reason to assume that.

In other words, on any reasonable reading, you are saying you see no reason
to assume my "Given that X" clause stated above.

You then added, after the second half of the sentence:

>
Or does it imply that consciousness and memory are intrinsic to certain
physical processes?

This is clearly intended to be in response to my "does this imply Y?"
clause - which was, as you can see above, predicated on my "Given that X"
clause. Hence the only reasonable parsing of your responses was that you
were giving an alternative conclusion to my "Does this imply Y?" which was
based on my original "Given that X". Since you have already said you had no
reason to assume X, it seemed odd that you were giving an alternative
conclusion based on X.

Which is what I said.

Your comments about first consciousness, which wasn't attached to the
statement you were (or appeared to be) critiquing, could only reasonably be
taken as a standalone comment responding to my earlier comment, which it
immediately followed. You may have thought your subsequent comments were
predicated on it, but if you intended me (or anyone) to make that
connection, you should have structured your response accordingly. It was
your choice to interleave your response into a sentence I'd written, rather
than putting it as a separate paragraph at the end, and the implication is
clearly that that interleaving was necessary. Hence I parsed your comments
as direct responses to the fragments you'd woven them around, which seems
the only reasonable reading, given that you'd gone to the trouble of laying
them out that way.

>
> But it raises the question, given complete amnesia and then growing up
> with different experiences and memories in what sense could you be the same
> person.  I John Clark and Bruno's back and forth, the one thing they always
> agree on is that as soon as the M-man and the W-man open the transporter
> doors and see different scenes they are different people.
>

Yes, it does of course raise this problem, and I agree with you that this
seems to stretch the definition of similarity to meaninglessness. For this
to mean anything, one really requires some way for one stream of
consciousness to segue into another, so that although the amnesia becomes
complete eventually, there is a transition between the two. Or perhaps each
stream of consciousness cycles back and forth between some tabula rasa
state (assuming any of this has any validity at all, of course). Of course
(as per the transporter) we also find ourselves in the position of
Heraclitus' man entering the river, of a person being in constant flux in
any case. This is a result of the idea of the brain being at some level a
digital computer (and probably of it being an analogue one too...).

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor

On 23 February 2014 19:04, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

I like that. Not sure about being *an* iron man, I have to be *the* iron
> man (for my money there is only one iron man, and its the Ozzy one).


This one?

".. The story of a man who time travels into the future, and sees the
apocalypse. In the process of returning to the present, he is turned into
steel by a magnetic field. He is rendered mute, unable verbally to warn
people of his time of the impending destruction. His attempts to
communicate are ignored and mocked. This causes Iron Man to become angry,
and have his revenge on mankind, causing the destruction seen in his vision
.."

OMG :-(

David

PS Thanks for extending my range of cultural reference!

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor

On 24 February 2014 00:05, meekerdb  wrote:

The point I was getting at was whether you're supposing there are
> *insensible^ parts to the world, which we may infer from the sensible part
> or from mathematics?


In short, yes.

David

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor


On 2/23/2014 2:45 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 23 February 2014 19:38, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> 
wrote:


On 2/23/2014 4:35 AM, David Nyman wrote:

Not "my" consciousness, no. I'm just suggesting that CTM ultimately relies 
on some
transcendent notion of perspective itself. IOW, the sensible world is 
conceived as
the resultant of the inter-subjective agreement of its possible observers, 
each of
which discovers itself to be centred in some perspective.


Is the sensible world of *possible* observers supposed to include the whole 
world.


Well, in a way I was merely stating a tautology: i.e. the "world" of inter-subjective 
agreement is just what we infer from those observations. I didn't mean to imply that 
such a world stands alone or is in need of no further explanation, quite the contrary. 
But a stable perspective on a sensible world, in something like this sense, is what 
comp, for example, assumes to be invariant to substitution at the relevant level.



The point I was getting at was whether you're supposing there are *insensible^ parts to 
the world, which we may infer from the sensible part or from mathematics?


Brent



David

  I'm always suspicious of the word "possible".  Does it refer to chance, 
i.e. many
events were possible, I might have had coffee instead of tea this morning, 
but only
a few are actual?  Does it refer to anything not prohibited by (our best 
theory of)
physics: It's possible a meteorite might strike my house?  Or is it 
anything not
entailing a contradiction: X and not X?


Brent
-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups

"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
email to
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything 
List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor

On 23 February 2014 19:04, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>
>  After all, the standard objection to starting from the putative
>> universality of consciousness is why does it appear that so much of the
>> world of appearance is *unconscious*?
>>
>
> That is the only criticism that I have come up with so far of my own
> position that has some potential.
>

Then it is the one you should concentrate on.

> It is very hard to imagine that what we see as inanimate objects could be
> just the tip of an iceberg of non-human storytelling,
>

You might be surprised how similar this analogy is to my personal metaphor
for the sensible worlds of CTM. That's why I sometimes call it the
Programmatic Library of Babel. If Borges had known about CTM, I'm sure he
would have relished it.

> however, it really is no more far fetched than imagining the underlying
> microphysics of any given object.
>

True dat.

> All that it really means is that the relation that we enjoy with the world
> is in some sense the fundamental relation of all natural phenomena.
>

But what sense is that? You say that it is the relation of common, ordinary
sense, as though that alone will prime our intuition to leap the gap
between the human scale and that of - well what precisely? Are we perhaps
to suppose all conceivable relations to be those of reciprocal perception
and acting-upon? That's out there as the poetic precursor to an idea. Gregg
Rosenberg, for example, has re-analysed the notion of causality from first
principles in order to argue that the effective (i.e. motive) notion of
physical causality at the micro-scale cannot be fully coherent without a
receptive (i.e. sensory) dual. But he struggles mightily to cash this out
consistently at the macro-scale. I'm not suggesting that this is
necessarily precisely equivalent to your basic assumption, but I do believe
that you cannot avoid a similar struggle with these difficulties because
they are inherent in the topic.

All of the objectionable anthropocentrism can be potentially alleviated by
> applying exponential filters of insensitivity
>

No doubt, if we can indeed elucidate precisely what is entailed by
exponential filters of insensitivity.

>  which are proportional to distance, scale, and unfamiliarity. It would
> make sense also,
>

Make sense to whom? I'm not being facetious: we should be very careful in
theory-making that we are not merely projecting terrestrial notions of what
makes sense on to the cosmic scale. You yourself have used the analogy of
the Galilean paradigm replacing the Ptolemaic and there are countless
others.

> that in a universe produced from the start as an experiential phenomenon,
> that the partitioning of experiences, particularly those which are to
> contain psychologically sophisticated participants, must be especially firm.
>

Must be indeed. But how specifically?

>  It may not be possible even for my hypothesis to gain traction on these
> grounds. It may be too much of a spoiler and too many storylines would have
> to be dropped.
>

Well this is the interesting and also the hard part. Your doubt does you
credit. But I really think you may be making it harder by setting your face
so resolutely against CTM, or at least what such an approach has to teach
us (which is really Bruno's fundamental aim). I'm sure there must be a more
mutually informative way of approaching such über-puzzling issues that
isn't merely a wearisome recycling of yes-it-is no-it-isn't.

David

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor

On 23 February 2014 19:38, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 2/23/2014 4:35 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>
> Not "my" consciousness, no. I'm just suggesting that CTM ultimately relies
> on some transcendent notion of perspective itself. IOW, the sensible world
> is conceived as the resultant of the inter-subjective agreement of its
> possible observers, each of which discovers itself to be centred in some
> perspective.
>
>
> Is the sensible world of *possible* observers supposed to include the
> whole world.
>

Well, in a way I was merely stating a tautology: i.e. the "world" of
inter-subjective agreement is just what we infer from those observations. I
didn't mean to imply that such a world stands alone or is in need of no
further explanation, quite the contrary. But a stable perspective on a
sensible world, in something like this sense, is what comp, for example,
assumes to be invariant to substitution at the relevant level.

David

  I'm always suspicious of the word "possible".  Does it refer to chance,
> i.e. many events were possible, I might have had coffee instead of tea this
> morning, but only a few are actual?  Does it refer to anything not
> prohibited by (our best theory of) physics: It's possible a meteorite might
> strike my house?  Or is it anything not entailing a contradiction: X and
> not X?
>

Brent
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor

2014-02-23 Thread ghibbsa


On Sunday, February 23, 2014 7:07:21 PM UTC, Brent wrote:
>
>  On 2/23/2014 1:13 AM, LizR wrote:
>  
>  On 23 February 2014 20:48, meekerdb >wrote:
>
>>  On 2/22/2014 9:21 PM, LizR wrote:
>>  
>>  On 23 February 2014 17:40, meekerdb > >wrote:
>>
>>>  On 2/22/2014 5:49 PM, David Nyman wrote:
>>>  
>>> No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of 
>>> consciousness is directly entailed by CTM. In fact it is equivalent to the 
>>> continuing existence of the sensible world (i.e. per comp, the world is 
>>> what is observed). Hence any observer can expect to remain centred in the 
>>> circle of observation, come what may, to speak rather loosely. There is a 
>>> transcendent expectation of a definite continuation (aka no cul-de-sac). 
>>> This expectation is relativised only secondarily in terms of the specifics 
>>> of some particular continuation.
>>>
>>>
>>>  So does your consciousness continue indefinitely into the past?
>>>  
>>>  This would imply there is no initial state of mind - assumed digital, 
>> I assume? - or that every possible mental state has a precursor. Does 
>> computational theory assume this, or can a mind start from a blank state?
>>   
>>
>>  Even if it doesn't, it would seem a remarkable coincidence that everyone 
>> seems to be on their first consciousness.  
>>  
>
>  Not necessarily. It might be a selection effect (a similar argument can 
> be made for the QTI, if true - why are we at the start of an infinite 
> lifetime? Well, because you have to start somewhere... This could be 
> similar - there may be reasons to expect everyone to be "on their first 
> consciousness" this near to the big bang, perhaps.)
>
>Or given that consciousness is not the contents of consciousness, 
>   
>   I see no reason to assume that.
>>
>
>  Hence the phraseology used above. If you say "given that X", that means 
> you're assuming it for the sake of argument. (Sorry, maybe I should have 
> said "if we assume that..." to make it clearer?)
>
>   does this just imply amensia about previous lives? (And maybe that "I 
> am he as you are he as he is me", etc).
>   
>   Or does it imply that consciousness and memory are intrinsic to certain 
>> physical processes?
>>
>>  Since you can "see no reason to assume" the initial premise (see above) 
> it seems a bit odd that you are then trying to draw conclusions from it!
>   
>
> I wrote "no reason to assume" that consciousness is not the content of 
> consciousness.  The premise I took is "everyone's on their first 
> consciousness". For which you offered the explanation of amnesia; and I 
> offered a different one.  If you're going to criticize logic you need to 
> parse correctly.
>
> But it raises the question, given complete amnesia and then growing up 
> with different experiences and memories in what sense could you be the same 
> person.  I John Clark and Bruno's back and forth, the one thing they always 
> agree on is that as soon as the M-man and the W-man open the transporter 
> doors and see different scenes they are different people.  
>
> Brent
> 
>
 
I'd be very interested to know who in this community currently subscribes 
to this idea that consciousness is not entirely a product of evolution of 
the nervous system and physical 
 
I cannot see the faintest hint of things going this way. The brain is 
exactly the right conditions this extraordinary thing can be explicable. 
 
On the bright side, perhaps we can look on this as a distinct predict. 
 
Bruno - what is hanging on this prediction?  Are you willing to nail the 
colours of your work to something hard here>? 
 
Things are advancing briskly enough in brain sciences, so it's realistic to 
think a resolution might emerge in the not distant future.  What sort of 
standard of proof would it take then, for you to regard your theory 
falsified? 
 
Or, where do your assertions about consciousness fit into your whole 
theory? Is it just a loosely associated preference, or is it absolutely 
indispensable? 
 
Will you formalize a falsifiable prediction?
 
 
 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor


On 2/23/2014 4:35 AM, David Nyman wrote:
Not "my" consciousness, no. I'm just suggesting that CTM ultimately relies on some 
transcendent notion of perspective itself. IOW, the sensible world is conceived as the 
resultant of the inter-subjective agreement of its possible observers, each of which 
discovers itself to be centred in some perspective.


Is the sensible world of *possible* observers supposed to include the whole world.  I'm 
always suspicious of the word "possible".  Does it refer to chance, i.e. many events were 
possible, I might have had coffee instead of tea this morning, but only a few are actual?  
Does it refer to anything not prohibited by (our best theory of) physics: It's possible a 
meteorite might strike my house?  Or is it anything not entailing a contradiction: X and 
not X?


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor

On 2/23/2014 1:13 AM, LizR wrote:
On 23 February 2014 20:48, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>
wrote:

On 2/22/2014 9:21 PM, LizR wrote:

On 23 February 2014 17:40, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

On 2/22/2014 5:49 PM, David Nyman wrote:

No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of
consciousness
is directly entailed by CTM. In fact it is equivalent to the continuing
existence of the sensible world (i.e. per comp, the world is what is
observed). Hence any observer can expect to remain centred in the
circle of
observation, come what may, to speak rather loosely. There is a
transcendent
expectation of a definite continuation (aka no cul-de-sac). This
expectation
is relativised only secondarily in terms of the specifics of some
particular
continuation.

So does your consciousness continue indefinitely into the past?

This would imply there is no initial state of mind - assumed digital, I
assume? -
or that every possible mental state has a precursor. Does computational
theory
assume this, or can a mind start from a blank state?

Even if it doesn't, it would seem a remarkable coincidence that everyone
seems to be
on their first consciousness.

Not necessarily. It might be a selection effect (a similar argument can be made for the
QTI, if true - why are we at the start of an infinite lifetime? Well, because you have
to start somewhere... This could be similar - there may be reasons to expect everyone to
be "on their first consciousness" this near to the big bang, perhaps.)

Or given that consciousness is not the contents of consciousness,

I see no reason to assume that.

Hence the phraseology used above. If you say "given that X", that means you're assuming
it for the sake of argument. (Sorry, maybe I should have said "if we assume that..." to
make it clearer?)
does this just imply amensia about previous lives? (And maybe that "I am he as you are
he as he is me", etc).

Or does it imply that consciousness and memory are intrinsic to certain
physical
processes?

Since you can "see no reason to assume" the initial premise (see above) it seems a bit
odd that you are then trying to draw conclusions from it!

I wrote "no reason to assume" that consciousness is not the content of consciousness. The
premise I took is "everyone's on their first consciousness". For which you offered the
explanation of amnesia; and I offered a different one. If you're going to criticize logic
you need to parse correctly.

But it raises the question, given complete amnesia and then growing up with different
experiences and memories in what sense could you be the same person. I John Clark and
Bruno's back and forth, the one thing they always agree on is that as soon as the M-man
and the W-man open the transporter doors and see different scenes they are different people.

Brent

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor

2014-02-23 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 22 Feb 2014, at 18:36, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Saturday, February 22, 2014 11:27:45 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 22 Feb 2014, at 15:25, Craig Weinberg wrote:

> If you say yes to the doctor, you are saying that originality is an
> illusion

Not at all. Your 1p-originality is preserved all the time.

I'm not thinking of 1p originality though, I'm talking about  
originality itself - absolute uniqueness. The idea that something  
can occur for the first, last, and only time, and perhaps, by  
extension that everything is in some sense utterly unique and  
irreplacable.

You reify an 1p notion.

In the H-WM
duplication experience, the experiencers get all a unique experience
of the type

I am the H-guy
I am the H-guy-Washington guy
I am the H-guy-Washington guy, then Moscow guy
I am the H-guy-Washington guy, then Moscow guy, then again Moscow guy
I am the H-guy-Washington guy, then Moscow guy, then again Moscow guy
and again Moscow guy ...

He never feel the split, and keeps its originality all along. he get
doppelgangers who also keep up their originality and develop their
personality.

I understand, but I think it is based on the assumption that "I am  
the H-guy" comes along for the ride when you reproduce a description  
of his body, or the blueprints for his behaviors.

Or a diophantine approximation of the quantum string-brane state with  
10^(10^10) correct decimal for the rational complex numbers involved.

My point has been from the start that this is false.

But that is an extraordinary claim, which requires an extraordinary  
arguments.

No lifetime or event within a lifetime can be reproduced wholly -

I completely agree with you, but those are 1p notion. They have  
referent, but we cannot invoke them when we study them.

there is no such thing.

You have to prove that.

All that can be reproduced is a representation within some sensory  
context. Outside of that context, it is a facade.

You should search for an experiment testing your idea, if only with  
the pedagogical goal of giving more sense to it.

Of course in your theory that is an illusion, as they are all zombies,
and the H-guy is dead.

Never zombies - always dolls.

Zombies are supernatural fiction, dolls are ordinary. The  
consciousness of dolls is not at the level of the plastic figure -  
there is consciousness there but on the level which holds the  
plastic together, and perhaps which on the metaphenomenal level of  
synchronicity, poetry, etc.

> and simulation is absolute.

Emulation is absolute by Church thesis, and a "correct" simulation is
what comp assumes the existence through the existence of the
substitution level.

Yes, I am saying that C-t and CTM have only to do with  
representations of a particular kind of logic and measurement.

On the contrary, CT makes many different logics mathematically  
amenable, that is the reason to be study it. Whatever the truth is, it  
can only be more complex and subtle.

Your intution that comp is false is "correct", but it is 1p, and by  
itself, it does not provide a refutation of comp, as comp already  
explain why machine can develop that intuition, and this correctly.

The 1p is not a machine, he is the owner of the brain, that it borrows  
to the most probable universal neighbors.

It is measurement which provides the local appearance of  
substitution. In reality, theory can never substitute for  
consciousness,

You don't know that, and there are no evidences. An organic brain  
might already be a dynamical theory reflecting diverses dynamical  
theories. A genome might already be a theory. The theory is not a  
substitute for consciousness, but it might be handy to make possible  
for a conscious 1p person to say hello to other persons, and share  
histories.

and consciousness can have no theories outside of consciousness.

Not sure.

> Arithmetic can do so many things, but it can't do something that can
> only be done once.

That is ambiguous.

I don't think it is. Arithmetic is based on recursive enumeration.

Notably. But also on non recursive enumeration, and arbitrarily  
complex. recursive is just sigma_0 or sigma_1, beyond that the  
arithmetical proposition are not computably decidable.

Keep in mind arithmetical is a much more general notion than  
computable (or sigma_1 arithmetical).

There is no one and only time that any number can appear. Every  
number can be arrived at by many different routes - every number is  
always repeatable and transferable. Numbers can't own anything, they  
are generic addresses in a theoretical schema that appears again and  
again.

They can talk also, but if your philosophy prevents you to listen to  
them, then well, that's not a good point to your philosophy.

All "conscious present instant" are done once, in
arithmetic.

Where do we find a conscious present instant in arithmetic? If you  
assume that, then you would be begging the que

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor

On 23 February 2014 03:12, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>
>
> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 8:49:33 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> On 23 February 2014 00:27, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 4:06:39 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>>>
 On 22 February 2014 15:09, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>
>
> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 9:34:08 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> On 22 February 2014 14:25, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>
>> If you say yes to the doctor, you are saying that originality is an
>>> illusion
>>>
>>
>> Not an illusion, an invariant.
>>
>
> If it is invariant then it can't be original. Invariant means that it
> remains fixed across a multiplicity of variations. To be original means
> that it undergoes no variation. It is uncopied and uncopyable.
>

 But I think that any serious (i.e. non-eliminitavist) theory of
 consciousness must find it to be original and indeed uncopyable in the
 sense that you stipulate.

>>>
>>> That is the opposite of what CTM does though. In order to say yes to the
>>> doctor, we must believe that we are justified in expecting to be copied
>>> into an identical conscious personhood.
>>>
>>
>> No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of
>> consciousness is directly entailed by CTM.
>>
>
> But it is directly contradicted by the idea that consciousness is tied to
> originality. You can't have it both ways. If consciousness can be continued
> by a computation, then it cannot be considered original.
>

I don't see why that follows at all. The need to have it both ways is the
basic paradox of mereology; there's no escaping it. The notion of the
transcendent originality of consciousness I have in mind is not dissimilar
to those typical of Eastern metaphysical systems, or the metaphysics of
Plotinus that Bruno refers to when he's wearing his theological hat. In
these systems the originality of consciousness per se is always contrasted
with the ephemerality of the appearances that somehow arise within it. You
could think of CTM as providing at least the basis of a principled
"somehow" to justify the particularity of such appearances.

> It is no more original than a long IP address. Any computation which can
> reproduce the complex number must forever instantiate a non-original
> address of consciousness.
>

I think you demand of originality more than it can possibly deliver.

>
>
>> In fact it is equivalent to the continuing existence of the sensible
>> world (i.e. per comp, the world is what is observed).
>>
>
> The world of comp is what is observed, which is why it can never contain
> even a single observer.
>

Very true. The sensible "world", or worlds, of comp contain not a single
observer. What they contain are mutually correlated *appearances* of
observers. Observation per se is necessarily out of sight. CTM, or any
equivalently explanatory schema, concerns the systematic correlation of the
mise-en-scène with the behind the scenes activity that might plausibly have
produced it.

>
>>  Hence any observer can expect to remain centred in the circle of
>> observation, come what may, to speak rather loosely. There is a
>> transcendent expectation of a definite continuation (aka no cul-de-sac).
>> This expectation is relativised only secondarily in terms of the specifics
>> of some particular continuation.
>>
>
> Any continuation is a violation of originality/authenticity and is
> therefore, by my definition, unconscious and impossible.
>

Yes, I understand that this is your definition. I'm less sure that this
definition leads to any promising resolution of the problems with which we
wish to deal.

> I assure you that there is nothing significant that I misunderstand about
> comp.
>

I seriously doubt that.

>  You are telling me over and over what I already know,
>

You think that you know that CTM, in assuming no more than arithmetic, can
thereby derive no more than arithmetical conclusions from it. But I have
suggested to you, as a corrective to this understanding, that CTM
implicitly relies on a transcendental notion of originality and invariance;
otherwise it must fail in precisely the way you suggest. This implicit
notion is the transcendent originality of the observer perspective, the
sensible context, call it what you will. It is the defining paradigm of the
perennial philosophy, the ultimate original, sui generis, incontrovertible,
ineffable, incomparably real.

> and your responses clearly indicate to me that you are primarily focused
> on your view being heard rather than considering mine.
>

I'm sorry you feel like that. My original impetus for commenting on what
you said was specifically that I felt your criticisms of CTM were
ill-founded for the reasons I have tried to articulate. My personal view of
CTM was transformed by the realisation that arithmetic could be contrived
to refer to more than itself (indeed to refer t

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor

On 23 February 2014 09:22, LizR  wrote:

> On 23 February 2014 20:48, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>>  On 2/22/2014 9:21 PM, LizR wrote:
>>
>>  On 23 February 2014 17:40, meekerdb  wrote:
>>
>>>  On 2/22/2014 5:49 PM, David Nyman wrote:
>>>
>>> No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of
>>> consciousness is directly entailed by CTM. In fact it is equivalent to the
>>> continuing existence of the sensible world (i.e. per comp, the world is
>>> what is observed). Hence any observer can expect to remain centred in the
>>> circle of observation, come what may, to speak rather loosely. There is a
>>> transcendent expectation of a definite continuation (aka no cul-de-sac).
>>> This expectation is relativised only secondarily in terms of the specifics
>>> of some particular continuation.
>>>
>>>
>>>  So does your consciousness continue indefinitely into the past?
>>>
>>>  This would imply there is no initial state of mind - assumed digital,
>> I assume? - or that every possible mental state has a precursor. Does
>> computational theory assume this, or can a mind start from a blank state?
>>
>>
>> Even if it doesn't, it would seem a remarkable coincidence that everyone
>> seems to be on their first consciousness.
>>
>
> Not necessarily. It might be a selection effect (a similar argument can be
> made for the QTI, if true - why are we at the start of an infinite
> lifetime? Well, you have to start somewhere.)
>

Right. And I guess you'd expect me by now to invite you to consider this
with a Hoylean hat on. From Hoyle's perspective a momentary experience can
be *typical* only to the degree that equivalent fungible experiences
predominate in some underlying measure contest. So, as an analogy,
experiences in which "I" hold a losing ticket in the UK lottery predominate
hugely over those in which I hold a winning ticket, and this continues to
be the case even though from Hoyle's perspective "I" am *all* the ticket
holders. If this makes any sense, we must assume (for the analogy to hold)
that experiences in which "I" appear to have a relatively recent origin in
space and time predominate in the measure battle with those in which my
apparent origin recedes towards some asymptotic limit. The former, one
might say, are more *typical* of the experience of the universal observer
than the latter.

David

>
>
>Or given that consciousness is not the contents of consciousness,
>
>  I see no reason to assume that.
>>
>
> Hence the phraseology used above. If you say "given that X", that means
> you're assuming it for the sake of argument. Sorry, maybe I should have
> said "if we assume that..." to make it clearer.
>
>   does this just imply amensia about previous lives? (And maybe that "I
> am he as you are he as he is me", etc).
>
>  Or does it imply that consciousness and memory are intrinsic to certain
>> physical processes?
>>
>> Since you can "see no reason to assume" the initial premise (see above)
> it seems a bit odd that you are then trying to draw conclusions from it!
>
>  --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor

On 23 February 2014 04:40, meekerdb  wrote:

> No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of
> consciousness is directly entailed by CTM. In fact it is equivalent to the
> continuing existence of the sensible world (i.e. per comp, the world is
> what is observed). Hence any observer can expect to remain centred in the
> circle of observation, come what may, to speak rather loosely. There is a
> transcendent expectation of a definite continuation (aka no cul-de-sac).
> This expectation is relativised only secondarily in terms of the specifics
> of some particular continuation.
>
>
> So does your consciousness continue indefinitely into the past?

Not "my" consciousness, no. I'm just suggesting that CTM ultimately relies
on some transcendent notion of perspective itself. IOW, the sensible world
is conceived as the resultant of the inter-subjective agreement of its
possible observers, each of which discovers itself to be centred in some
perspective. Then the task of CTM, or any equivalent theory, is to justify
on more general grounds why and how this might be the case.

As you may have realised by now I'm rather fond of Hoyle's formulation of
this intuition from the point of view of a single, universal observer, at
least as a first approximation. In terms of Hoyle's quasi-frequency
heuristic, all possible observer moments are perpetually in play; hence one
might appeal to differential selection effects to justify why "my" past
history might *typically* appear to have some relatively recent origin,
whilst *atypically* appearing to be indefinitely extended in the asymptotic
limit. I appreciate that, as in the Everett interpretation, it is unclear
or at least controversial precisely how such a contest of measures can be
finitely resolved; the possibility of definite momentary outcomes must be
presupposed by framing the problem in this way.

Of course you may feel that all of the above is just another good reason
not to go beyond the assumption that consciousness is just a necessary
accompaniment of physical activity. Each formulation entails its own
peculiar conundrums.

David

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor

On 23 February 2014 20:48, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 2/22/2014 9:21 PM, LizR wrote:
>
>  On 23 February 2014 17:40, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>>  On 2/22/2014 5:49 PM, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>> No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of
>> consciousness is directly entailed by CTM. In fact it is equivalent to the
>> continuing existence of the sensible world (i.e. per comp, the world is
>> what is observed). Hence any observer can expect to remain centred in the
>> circle of observation, come what may, to speak rather loosely. There is a
>> transcendent expectation of a definite continuation (aka no cul-de-sac).
>> This expectation is relativised only secondarily in terms of the specifics
>> of some particular continuation.
>>
>>
>>  So does your consciousness continue indefinitely into the past?
>>
>>  This would imply there is no initial state of mind - assumed digital, I
> assume? - or that every possible mental state has a precursor. Does
> computational theory assume this, or can a mind start from a blank state?
>
>
> Even if it doesn't, it would seem a remarkable coincidence that everyone
> seems to be on their first consciousness.
>

Not necessarily. It might be a selection effect (a similar argument can be
made for the QTI, if true - why are we at the start of an infinite
lifetime? Well, you have to start somewhere.)

   Or given that consciousness is not the contents of consciousness,

 I see no reason to assume that.
>

Hence the phraseology used above. If you say "given that X", that means
you're assuming it for the sake of argument. Sorry, maybe I should have
said "if we assume that..." to make it clearer.

  does this just imply amensia about previous lives? (And maybe that "I am
he as you are he as he is me", etc).

 Or does it imply that consciousness and memory are intrinsic to certain
> physical processes?
>
> Since you can "see no reason to assume" the initial premise (see above) it
seems a bit odd that you are then trying to draw conclusions from it!

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor

On 23 February 2014 20:48, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 2/22/2014 9:21 PM, LizR wrote:
>
>  On 23 February 2014 17:40, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>>  On 2/22/2014 5:49 PM, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>> No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of
>> consciousness is directly entailed by CTM. In fact it is equivalent to the
>> continuing existence of the sensible world (i.e. per comp, the world is
>> what is observed). Hence any observer can expect to remain centred in the
>> circle of observation, come what may, to speak rather loosely. There is a
>> transcendent expectation of a definite continuation (aka no cul-de-sac).
>> This expectation is relativised only secondarily in terms of the specifics
>> of some particular continuation.
>>
>>
>>  So does your consciousness continue indefinitely into the past?
>>
>>  This would imply there is no initial state of mind - assumed digital, I
> assume? - or that every possible mental state has a precursor. Does
> computational theory assume this, or can a mind start from a blank state?
>
>
> Even if it doesn't, it would seem a remarkable coincidence that everyone
> seems to be on their first consciousness.
>

Not necessarily. It might be a selection effect (a similar argument can be
made for the QTI, if true - why are we at the start of an infinite
lifetime? Well, because you have to start somewhere... This could be
similar - there may be reasons to expect everyone to be "on their first
consciousness" this near to the big bang, perhaps.)

   Or given that consciousness is not the contents of consciousness,

 I see no reason to assume that.
>

Hence the phraseology used above. If you say "given that X", that means
you're assuming it for the sake of argument. (Sorry, maybe I should have
said "if we assume that..." to make it clearer?)

  does this just imply amensia about previous lives? (And maybe that "I am
he as you are he as he is me", etc).

 Or does it imply that consciousness and memory are intrinsic to certain
> physical processes?
>
> Since you can "see no reason to assume" the initial premise (see above) it
seems a bit odd that you are then trying to draw conclusions from it!

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

RE: Turning the tables on the doctor

2014-02-23 Thread Chris de Morsella

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of LizR
Sent: Friday, February 21, 2014 11:37 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Turning the tables on the doctor

 

"I wouldn't ride in the damn thing!" -- Larry Niven, "The theory and
practice of teleportation" (from memory, I may not have got that quote 100%
right)

 

Certainly would not want to be a beta tester for it J

 

On 22 February 2014 14:39, David Nyman  wrote:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pdxucpPq6Lc

 

 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
<mailto:everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com> .
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor

2014-02-22 Thread meekerdb


On 2/22/2014 9:21 PM, LizR wrote:
On 23 February 2014 17:40, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> 
wrote:


On 2/22/2014 5:49 PM, David Nyman wrote:

No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of 
consciousness is
directly entailed by CTM. In fact it is equivalent to the continuing 
existence of
the sensible world (i.e. per comp, the world is what is observed). Hence any
observer can expect to remain centred in the circle of observation, come 
what may,
to speak rather loosely. There is a transcendent expectation of a definite
continuation (aka no cul-de-sac). This expectation is relativised only 
secondarily
in terms of the specifics of some particular continuation.


So does your consciousness continue indefinitely into the past?

This would imply there is no initial state of mind - assumed digital, I assume? - or 
that every possible mental state has a precursor. Does computational theory assume this, 
or can a mind start from a blank state?


Even if it doesn't, it would seem a remarkable coincidence that everyone seems to be on 
their first consciousness.




Or given that consciousness is not the contents of consciousness,


I see no reason to assume that.

does this just imply amensia about previous lives? (And maybe that "I am he as you are 
he as he is me", etc).


Or does it imply that consciousness and memory are intrinsic to certain 
physical processes.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor

2014-02-22 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 23 Feb 2014, at 06:21, LizR wrote:


On 23 February 2014 17:40, meekerdb  wrote:
On 2/22/2014 5:49 PM, David Nyman wrote:
No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of  
consciousness is directly entailed by CTM. In fact it is equivalent  
to the continuing existence of the sensible world (i.e. per comp,  
the world is what is observed). Hence any observer can expect to  
remain centred in the circle of observation, come what may, to  
speak rather loosely. There is a transcendent expectation of a  
definite continuation (aka no cul-de-sac). This expectation is  
relativised only secondarily in terms of the specifics of some  
particular continuation.


So does your consciousness continue indefinitely into the past?

This would imply there is no initial state of mind - assumed  
digital, I assume? - or that every possible mental state has a  
precursor. Does computational theory assume this, or can a mind  
start from a blank state?


It might start from a state of consciousness which is beyond time. Let  
us say the "blank state of the universal "virgin" (non programmed)  
machine.


The []p & <>t modality makes the "world" into a non-cul-de-sac world,  
but does not imply an infinite "past", or previous computational  
history per se, although this is not entirely excluded for the physics  
in comp.






Or given that consciousness is not the contents of consciousness,  
does this just imply amensia about previous lives? (And maybe that  
"I am he as you are he as he is me", etc).


In some sense, perhaps. That can be related somehow.

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor

2014-02-22 Thread LizR

On 23 February 2014 17:40, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 2/22/2014 5:49 PM, David Nyman wrote:
>
> No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of
> consciousness is directly entailed by CTM. In fact it is equivalent to the
> continuing existence of the sensible world (i.e. per comp, the world is
> what is observed). Hence any observer can expect to remain centred in the
> circle of observation, come what may, to speak rather loosely. There is a
> transcendent expectation of a definite continuation (aka no cul-de-sac).
> This expectation is relativised only secondarily in terms of the specifics
> of some particular continuation.
>
>
> So does your consciousness continue indefinitely into the past?
>
> This would imply there is no initial state of mind - assumed digital, I
assume? - or that every possible mental state has a precursor. Does
computational theory assume this, or can a mind start from a blank state?

Or given that consciousness is not the contents of consciousness, does this
just imply amensia about previous lives? (And maybe that "I am he as you
are he as he is me", etc).

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor

2014-02-22 Thread meekerdb


On 2/22/2014 5:49 PM, David Nyman wrote:
No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of consciousness is directly 
entailed by CTM. In fact it is equivalent to the continuing existence of the sensible 
world (i.e. per comp, the world is what is observed). Hence any observer can expect to 
remain centred in the circle of observation, come what may, to speak rather loosely. 
There is a transcendent expectation of a definite continuation (aka no cul-de-sac). This 
expectation is relativised only secondarily in terms of the specifics of some particular 
continuation.


So does your consciousness continue indefinitely into the past?

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor

On Saturday, February 22, 2014 8:49:33 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 23 February 2014 00:27, Craig Weinberg 
> > wrote:
>
>
>
>>
>> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 4:06:39 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>>> On 22 February 2014 15:09, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>>

 On Saturday, February 22, 2014 9:34:08 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:

> On 22 February 2014 14:25, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>
> If you say yes to the doctor, you are saying that originality is an 
>> illusion
>>
>
> Not an illusion, an invariant.
>

 If it is invariant then it can't be original. Invariant means that it 
 remains fixed across a multiplicity of variations. To be original means 
 that it undergoes no variation. It is uncopied and uncopyable.

>>>
>>> But I think that any serious (i.e. non-eliminitavist) theory of 
>>> consciousness must find it to be original and indeed uncopyable in the 
>>> sense that you stipulate. 
>>>
>>
>> That is the opposite of what CTM does though. In order to say yes to the 
>> doctor, we must believe that we are justified in expecting to be copied 
>> into an identical conscious personhood.
>>
>
> No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of 
> consciousness is directly entailed by CTM. 
>

But it is directly contradicted by the idea that consciousness is tied to 
originality. You can't have it both ways. If consciousness can be continued 
by a computation, then it cannot be considered original. It is no more 
original than a long IP address. Any computation which can reproduce the 
complex number must forever instantiate a non-original address of 
consciousness.

> In fact it is equivalent to the continuing existence of the sensible world 
> (i.e. per comp, the world is what is observed).
>

The world of comp is what is observed, which is why it can never contain 
even a single observer.

> Hence any observer can expect to remain centred in the circle of 
> observation, come what may, to speak rather loosely. There is a 
> transcendent expectation of a definite continuation (aka no cul-de-sac). 
> This expectation is relativised only secondarily in terms of the specifics 
> of some particular continuation.
>

Any continuation is a violation of originality/authenticity and is 
therefore, by my definition, unconscious and impossible. I assure you that 
there is nothing significant that I misunderstand about comp. You are 
telling me over and over what I already know, and your responses clearly 
indicate to me that you are primarily focused on your view being heard 
rather than considering mine. You are getting some of my view, more than 
most others on this list have been willing to sit through, but still, your 
argument is 90% shadow boxing.

>
>  
>>
>>> Sense is never copied; rather it is encountered wherever there is a 
>>> sensible context. 
>>>
>>
>> Encountered by what? Nonsense? What is a non-sensible context?
>>
>  
> There is no precisely apposite vocabulary here. I simply meant the 
> sufficient conditions for the self-relative actualisation of a who, a 
> where, a when, a history and so forth. In short-hand: a sensible context.
>

I understand exactly what you simply meant, but I am challenging you to see 
that it is too simple. My attack on CTM begins miles beneath the facile 
assumptions of modal logic and enumerated data fields. I'm talking about 
screaming, crying, stinking reality here, not a hypothesis of pretty 
puzzles. Fuck the puzzles. I'm not playing with words, I'm saying simply 
that it is impossible for sense to be superseded in any way. Every context 
is a context of sense and nothing else.

>  
>>
>>> One might say that it is encountered wherever what is obscuring it has 
>>> been sufficiently clarified. It originates perpetually at the centre of a 
>>> circle whose limits are not discoverable. One shouldn't therefore think of 
>>> sense as what is copied in the protocol; rather what is copiable is only 
>>> that which is capable of differentiating one sensible context from another. 
>>>
>>
>> What else could be capable of differentiating one sensible context from 
>> another besides sense? You are saying that sense is not copied, only 
>> sense-making is copied. I am saying that nothing is copied except for the 
>> ratios of distance between experiences.
>>
>
> I am only saying, or trying to say, what follows from the assumptions and 
> explicit rules of derivation of a particular theory.
>

You must know by now though that I have no interest in that theory except 
to show that it is inside out.

> I can do no other and no more. 
>

Why? Can't you set aside CTM for a while to contemplate other possibilities?

> Under CTM, what might look like arithmetic, computation and logic from the 
> bird perspective transforms, in terms of those very rules of derivation, 
> into an inter-subjective Multiverse in the frog perspective. In so doing it 
> relies implicitly, as I have suggested,

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor

2014-02-22 Thread David Nyman

On 23 February 2014 00:27, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>
> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 4:06:39 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> On 22 February 2014 15:09, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 9:34:08 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>>>
 On 22 February 2014 14:25, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

 If you say yes to the doctor, you are saying that originality is an
> illusion
>

 Not an illusion, an invariant.

>>>
>>> If it is invariant then it can't be original. Invariant means that it
>>> remains fixed across a multiplicity of variations. To be original means
>>> that it undergoes no variation. It is uncopied and uncopyable.
>>>
>>
>> But I think that any serious (i.e. non-eliminitavist) theory of
>> consciousness must find it to be original and indeed uncopyable in the
>> sense that you stipulate.
>>
>
> That is the opposite of what CTM does though. In order to say yes to the
> doctor, we must believe that we are justified in expecting to be copied
> into an identical conscious personhood.
>

No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of
consciousness is directly entailed by CTM. In fact it is equivalent to the
continuing existence of the sensible world (i.e. per comp, the world is
what is observed). Hence any observer can expect to remain centred in the
circle of observation, come what may, to speak rather loosely. There is a
transcendent expectation of a definite continuation (aka no cul-de-sac).
This expectation is relativised only secondarily in terms of the specifics
of some particular continuation.

>
>> Sense is never copied; rather it is encountered wherever there is a
>> sensible context.
>>
>
> Encountered by what? Nonsense? What is a non-sensible context?
>

There is no precisely apposite vocabulary here. I simply meant the
sufficient conditions for the self-relative actualisation of a who, a
where, a when, a history and so forth. In short-hand: a sensible context.

>
>> One might say that it is encountered wherever what is obscuring it has
>> been sufficiently clarified. It originates perpetually at the centre of a
>> circle whose limits are not discoverable. One shouldn't therefore think of
>> sense as what is copied in the protocol; rather what is copiable is only
>> that which is capable of differentiating one sensible context from another.
>>
>
> What else could be capable of differentiating one sensible context from
> another besides sense? You are saying that sense is not copied, only
> sense-making is copied. I am saying that nothing is copied except for the
> ratios of distance between experiences.
>

I am only saying, or trying to say, what follows from the assumptions and
explicit rules of derivation of a particular theory. I can do no other and
no more. Under CTM, what might look like arithmetic, computation and logic
from the bird perspective transforms, in terms of those very rules of
derivation, into an inter-subjective Multiverse in the frog perspective. In
so doing it relies implicitly, as I have suggested, on a notion of
consciousness as a transcendent observational invariant.

>
>> I think that consciousness, transcendently, is a necessary, original and
>> invariant assumption of any theory of itself.
>>
>
> We agree then, but how does that allow for CTM?
>

Because if we are on the track of a theory of everything (vainglorious
though that may be) we need more than just a transcendent assumption. We
need a robust framework that shows at least some early promise of being
able to address the formidable conceptual and technical challenges that
infest the world-problem, hopefully without sweeping any of them "under the
rug".

>
>> As such it is perpetually capable of self-manifestation, given the
>> sufficient conditions of a sensible context. Always in terms of some
>> theory, of course.
>>
>
> Theory is always in terms of a deeper sense-making substrate.
>

I would say rather that theory must be capable of situating the required
notions of sense both transcendently and contextually. And theory mustn't
cheat by assuming a priori that its postulates are real (as opposed to the
point of departure of an argument).

David

> and simulation is absolute.
>

 Not absolute, but hopefully sufficient (i.e. the idea of a level of
 substitution).

 Hope that helps.

>>>
>>> I'm saying that the idea of a level of substitution is absolute.
>>>
>>> I wish I could hope that helps, but I expect that it will only be
>>> twisted around, dismissed, and diluted.
>>>
>>> Craig
>>>
>>>

 David

> Arithmetic can do so many things, but it can't do something that can
> only be done once. Think of consciousness as not only that which can't be
> done more than once, it is that which cannot even be fully completed one
> time. It doesn't begin or end, and it is neither finite nor infinite,
> progressing or static, but instead it is the fundamental ab

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor



On Saturday, February 22, 2014 4:06:39 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 22 February 2014 15:09, Craig Weinberg 
> > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 9:34:08 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>>> On 22 February 2014 14:25, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>>
>>> If you say yes to the doctor, you are saying that originality is an 
 illusion

>>>
>>> Not an illusion, an invariant.
>>>
>>
>> If it is invariant then it can't be original. Invariant means that it 
>> remains fixed across a multiplicity of variations. To be original means 
>> that it undergoes no variation. It is uncopied and uncopyable.
>>
>
> But I think that any serious (i.e. non-eliminitavist) theory of 
> consciousness must find it to be original and indeed uncopyable in the 
> sense that you stipulate. 
>

That is the opposite of what CTM does though. In order to say yes to the 
doctor, we must believe that we are justified in expecting to be copied 
into an identical conscious personhood.
 

> Sense is never copied; rather it is encountered wherever there is a 
> sensible context. 
>

Encountered by what? Nonsense? What is a non-sensible context?
 

> One might say that it is encountered wherever what is obscuring it has 
> been sufficiently clarified. It originates perpetually at the centre of a 
> circle whose limits are not discoverable. One shouldn't therefore think of 
> sense as what is copied in the protocol; rather what is copiable is only 
> that which is capable of differentiating one sensible context from another. 
>

What else could be capable of differentiating one sensible context from 
another besides sense? You are saying that sense is not copied, only 
sense-making is copied. I am saying that nothing is copied except for the 
ratios of distance between experiences.
 

> I think that consciousness, transcendently, is a necessary, original and 
> invariant assumption of any theory of itself. 
>

We agree then, but how does that allow for CTM?
 

> As such it is perpetually capable of self-manifestation, given the 
> sufficient conditions of a sensible context. Always in terms of some 
> theory, of course.
>

Theory is always in terms of a deeper sense-making substrate.

Craig 


> David
>
>  
>>>
 and simulation is absolute.

>>>
>>> Not absolute, but hopefully sufficient (i.e. the idea of a level of 
>>> substitution).
>>>
>>> Hope that helps.
>>>
>>
>> I'm saying that the idea of a level of substitution is absolute.
>>
>> I wish I could hope that helps, but I expect that it will only be twisted 
>> around, dismissed, and diluted.
>>
>> Craig
>>  
>>
>>>
>>> David
>>>
>>>
>>>  
>>>
 Arithmetic can do so many things, but it can't do something that can 
 only be done once. Think of consciousness as not only that which can't be 
 done more than once, it is that which cannot even be fully completed one 
 time. It doesn't begin or end, and it is neither finite nor infinite, 
 progressing or static, but instead it is the fundamental ability for 
 beginnings and endings to seem to exist and to relate to each other 
 sensibly. Consciousness is orthogonal to all process and form, but it 
 reflects itself in different sensible ways through every appreciation of 
 form.

 The not-even-done-onceness of consciousness and the 
 done-over-and-overness of its self reflection can be made to seem 
 equivalent from any local perspective, since the very act of looking 
 through a local perspective requires a comparison with prior perspectives, 
 and therefore attention to the done-over-and-overness - the rigorously 
 measured and recorded. In this way, the diagonalization of originality is 
 preserved, but always behind our back. Paradoxically, it is only when we 
 suspend our rigid attention and unexamine the forms presented within 
 consciousness and the world that we can become the understanding that we 
 expect.


 On Friday, February 21, 2014 8:39:47 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pdxucpPq6Lc
>
>
>  -- 
 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google 
 Groups "Everything List" group.
 To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send 
 an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
 To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.

 Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
 For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

>>>
>>>  -- 
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
>> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com .
>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com
>> .
>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
>> For more options, visit https

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor

2014-02-22 Thread David Nyman

On 22 February 2014 15:09, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>
>
> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 9:34:08 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> On 22 February 2014 14:25, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>
>> If you say yes to the doctor, you are saying that originality is an
>>> illusion
>>>
>>
>> Not an illusion, an invariant.
>>
>
> If it is invariant then it can't be original. Invariant means that it
> remains fixed across a multiplicity of variations. To be original means
> that it undergoes no variation. It is uncopied and uncopyable.
>

But I think that any serious (i.e. non-eliminitavist) theory of
consciousness must find it to be original and indeed uncopyable in the
sense that you stipulate. Sense is never copied; rather it is encountered
wherever there is a sensible context. One might say that it is encountered
wherever what is obscuring it has been sufficiently clarified. It
originates perpetually at the centre of a circle whose limits are not
discoverable. One shouldn't therefore think of sense as what is copied in
the protocol; rather what is copiable is only that which is capable of
differentiating one sensible context from another. I think that
consciousness, transcendently, is a necessary, original and invariant
assumption of any theory of itself. As such it is perpetually capable of
self-manifestation, given the sufficient conditions of a sensible context.
Always in terms of some theory, of course.

David


>>
>>> and simulation is absolute.
>>>
>>
>> Not absolute, but hopefully sufficient (i.e. the idea of a level of
>> substitution).
>>
>> Hope that helps.
>>
>
> I'm saying that the idea of a level of substitution is absolute.
>
> I wish I could hope that helps, but I expect that it will only be twisted
> around, dismissed, and diluted.
>
> Craig
>
>
>>
>> David
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> Arithmetic can do so many things, but it can't do something that can
>>> only be done once. Think of consciousness as not only that which can't be
>>> done more than once, it is that which cannot even be fully completed one
>>> time. It doesn't begin or end, and it is neither finite nor infinite,
>>> progressing or static, but instead it is the fundamental ability for
>>> beginnings and endings to seem to exist and to relate to each other
>>> sensibly. Consciousness is orthogonal to all process and form, but it
>>> reflects itself in different sensible ways through every appreciation of
>>> form.
>>>
>>> The not-even-done-onceness of consciousness and the
>>> done-over-and-overness of its self reflection can be made to seem
>>> equivalent from any local perspective, since the very act of looking
>>> through a local perspective requires a comparison with prior perspectives,
>>> and therefore attention to the done-over-and-overness - the rigorously
>>> measured and recorded. In this way, the diagonalization of originality is
>>> preserved, but always behind our back. Paradoxically, it is only when we
>>> suspend our rigid attention and unexamine the forms presented within
>>> consciousness and the world that we can become the understanding that we
>>> expect.
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, February 21, 2014 8:39:47 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:

 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pdxucpPq6Lc


  --
>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
>>> Groups "Everything List" group.
>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send
>>> an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
>>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
>>>
>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
>>>
>>
>>  --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor

On Saturday, February 22, 2014 11:27:45 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 22 Feb 2014, at 15:25, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
>
> > If you say yes to the doctor, you are saying that originality is an   
> > illusion 
>
>
> Not at all. Your 1p-originality is preserved all the time.

I'm not thinking of 1p originality though, I'm talking about originality 
itself - absolute uniqueness. The idea that something can occur for the 
first, last, and only time, and perhaps, by extension that everything is in 
some sense utterly unique and irreplacable. 

> In the H-WM   
> duplication experience, the experiencers get all a unique experience   
> of the type 
>
> I am the H-guy 
> I am the H-guy-Washington guy 
> I am the H-guy-Washington guy, then Moscow guy 
> I am the H-guy-Washington guy, then Moscow guy, then again Moscow guy 
> I am the H-guy-Washington guy, then Moscow guy, then again Moscow guy   
> and again Moscow guy ... 
>
> He never feel the split, and keeps its originality all along. he get   
> doppelgangers who also keep up their originality and develop their   
> personality. 
>

I understand, but I think it is based on the assumption that "I am the 
H-guy" comes along for the ride when you reproduce a description of his 
body, or the blueprints for his behaviors. My point has been from the start 
that this is false. No lifetime or event within a lifetime can be 
reproduced wholly - there is no such thing. All that can be reproduced is a 
representation within some sensory context. Outside of that context, it is 
a facade.

>
> Of course in your theory that is an illusion, as they are all zombies,   
> and the H-guy is dead. 
>

Never zombies - always dolls. Zombies are supernatural fiction, dolls are 
ordinary. The consciousness of dolls is not at the level of the plastic 
figure - there is consciousness there but on the level which holds the 
plastic together, and perhaps which on the metaphenomenal level of 
synchronicity, poetry, etc.

>
>
>
> > and simulation is absolute. 
>
> Emulation is absolute by Church thesis, and a "correct" simulation is   
> what comp assumes the existence through the existence of the   
> substitution level. 
>

Yes, I am saying that C-t and CTM have only to do with representations of a 
particular kind of logic and measurement. It is measurement which provides 
the local appearance of substitution. In reality, theory can never 
substitute for consciousness, and consciousness can have no theories 
outside of consciousness.

>
>
>
> > Arithmetic can do so many things, but it can't do something that can   
> > only be done once. 
>
> That is ambiguous. 

I don't think it is. Arithmetic is based on recursive enumeration. There is 
no one and only time that any number can appear. Every number can be 
arrived at by many different routes - every number is always repeatable and 
transferable. Numbers can't own anything, they are generic addresses in a 
theoretical schema that appears again and again.

> All "conscious present instant" are done once, in   
> arithmetic. 

Where do we find a conscious present instant in arithmetic? If you assume 
that, then you would be begging the question of consciousness.

> Trivially in the bloc mindscape of the numbers possible   
> extensional and intensional relations. 
>

What is making "relations" possible, other than sense?

>
>
>
>
> > Think of consciousness as not only that which can't be done more   
> > than once, it is that which cannot even be fully completed one time. 
>
>  From inside arithmetic that's necessarily the case. 
>

Then how can it be said to have a substitution level?

>
>
>
> > It doesn't begin or end, and it is neither finite nor infinite,   
> > progressing or static, but instead it is the fundamental ability for   
> > beginnings and endings to seem to exist and to relate to each other   
> > sensibly. 
>
> The UD, and arithmetic determines all effective endings and non   
> endings (by Church's thesis). Then the internal views put colors on   
> this. 
>

Why and how would internal views put anything non-arithmetic on it though? 

Why and how does the UD develop the idea of endings and non-endings? It is 
not clear that there can be any endings or beginnings within arithmetic.

>
>
>
>
>
> > Consciousness is orthogonal to all process and form, but it reflects   
> > itself in different sensible ways through every appreciation of form. 
>
> OK. 
>
>
>
> > 
> > The not-even-done-onceness of consciousness and the done-over-and- 
> > overness of its self reflection can be made to seem equivalent from   
> > any local perspective, since the very act of looking through a local   
> > perspective requires a comparison with prior perspectives, and   
> > therefore attention to the done-over-and-overness - the rigorously   
> > measured and recorded. In this way, the diagonalization of   
> > originality is preserved, but always behind our back. 
>
> OK. 
>
> By "OK" I mean that the correct Lô

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor

2014-02-22 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 22 Feb 2014, at 15:25, Craig Weinberg wrote:

If you say yes to the doctor, you are saying that originality is an  
illusion



Not at all. Your 1p-originality is preserved all the time. In the H-WM  
duplication experience, the experiencers get all a unique experience  
of the type


I am the H-guy
I am the H-guy-Washington guy
I am the H-guy-Washington guy, then Moscow guy
I am the H-guy-Washington guy, then Moscow guy, then again Moscow guy
I am the H-guy-Washington guy, then Moscow guy, then again Moscow guy  
and again Moscow guy ...


He never feel the split, and keeps its originality all along. he get  
doppelgangers who also keep up their originality and develop their  
personality.


Of course in your theory that is an illusion, as they are all zombies,  
and the H-guy is dead.





and simulation is absolute.


Emulation is absolute by Church thesis, and a "correct" simulation is  
what comp assumes the existence through the existence of the  
substitution level.




Arithmetic can do so many things, but it can't do something that can  
only be done once.


That is ambiguous. All "conscious present instant" are done once, in  
arithmetic. Trivially in the bloc mindscape of the numbers possible  
extensional and intensional relations.





Think of consciousness as not only that which can't be done more  
than once, it is that which cannot even be fully completed one time.


From inside arithmetic that's necessarily the case.



It doesn't begin or end, and it is neither finite nor infinite,  
progressing or static, but instead it is the fundamental ability for  
beginnings and endings to seem to exist and to relate to each other  
sensibly.


The UD, and arithmetic determines all effective endings and non  
endings (by Church's thesis). Then the internal views put colors on  
this.






Consciousness is orthogonal to all process and form, but it reflects  
itself in different sensible ways through every appreciation of form.


OK.





The not-even-done-onceness of consciousness and the done-over-and- 
overness of its self reflection can be made to seem equivalent from  
any local perspective, since the very act of looking through a local  
perspective requires a comparison with prior perspectives, and  
therefore attention to the done-over-and-overness - the rigorously  
measured and recorded. In this way, the diagonalization of  
originality is preserved, but always behind our back.


OK.

By "OK" I mean that the correct Lôbian machines roughly agree with you  
(stretching definitions enough ...




Paradoxically, it is only when we suspend our rigid attention and  
unexamine the forms presented within consciousness and the world  
that we can become the understanding that we expect.


... up to where the definitions broke.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor

2014-02-22 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 22 Feb 2014, at 02:39, David Nyman wrote:


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pdxucpPq6Lc



Ha ha! I love when he shows the identity cards!

Note that this is among the thought experiences that I call  
"forbidden" on this list, some years ago.
They are shortcuts, and can also provide "arguments" against either  
the truth of comp or its ethical consequences. They share this with  
the thought experiments involving amnesia. The movie prestige exploits  
one such experience too. Step five is close, but we don't ask the  
"original" to commit suicide though!


Bruno







--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor



On Saturday, February 22, 2014 9:34:08 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 22 February 2014 14:25, Craig Weinberg 
> > wrote:
>
> If you say yes to the doctor, you are saying that originality is an 
>> illusion
>>
>
> Not an illusion, an invariant.
>

If it is invariant then it can't be original. Invariant means that it 
remains fixed across a multiplicity of variations. To be original means 
that it undergoes no variation. It is uncopied and uncopyable.
 

>  
>
>> and simulation is absolute.
>>
>
> Not absolute, but hopefully sufficient (i.e. the idea of a level of 
> substitution).
>
> Hope that helps.
>

I'm saying that the idea of a level of substitution is absolute.

I wish I could hope that helps, but I expect that it will only be twisted 
around, dismissed, and diluted.

Craig
 

>
> David
>
>
>  
>
>> Arithmetic can do so many things, but it can't do something that can only 
>> be done once. Think of consciousness as not only that which can't be done 
>> more than once, it is that which cannot even be fully completed one time. 
>> It doesn't begin or end, and it is neither finite nor infinite, progressing 
>> or static, but instead it is the fundamental ability for beginnings and 
>> endings to seem to exist and to relate to each other sensibly. 
>> Consciousness is orthogonal to all process and form, but it reflects itself 
>> in different sensible ways through every appreciation of form.
>>
>> The not-even-done-onceness of consciousness and the 
>> done-over-and-overness of its self reflection can be made to seem 
>> equivalent from any local perspective, since the very act of looking 
>> through a local perspective requires a comparison with prior perspectives, 
>> and therefore attention to the done-over-and-overness - the rigorously 
>> measured and recorded. In this way, the diagonalization of originality is 
>> preserved, but always behind our back. Paradoxically, it is only when we 
>> suspend our rigid attention and unexamine the forms presented within 
>> consciousness and the world that we can become the understanding that we 
>> expect.
>>
>>
>> On Friday, February 21, 2014 8:39:47 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>>>
>>> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pdxucpPq6Lc
>>>
>>>
>>>  -- 
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
>> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com .
>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com
>> .
>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
>>
>
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor

2014-02-22 Thread David Nyman

On 22 February 2014 14:25, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

If you say yes to the doctor, you are saying that originality is an illusion
>

Not an illusion, an invariant.


> and simulation is absolute.
>

Not absolute, but hopefully sufficient (i.e. the idea of a level of
substitution).

Hope that helps.

David




> Arithmetic can do so many things, but it can't do something that can only
> be done once. Think of consciousness as not only that which can't be done
> more than once, it is that which cannot even be fully completed one time.
> It doesn't begin or end, and it is neither finite nor infinite, progressing
> or static, but instead it is the fundamental ability for beginnings and
> endings to seem to exist and to relate to each other sensibly.
> Consciousness is orthogonal to all process and form, but it reflects itself
> in different sensible ways through every appreciation of form.
>
> The not-even-done-onceness of consciousness and the done-over-and-overness
> of its self reflection can be made to seem equivalent from any local
> perspective, since the very act of looking through a local perspective
> requires a comparison with prior perspectives, and therefore attention to
> the done-over-and-overness - the rigorously measured and recorded. In this
> way, the diagonalization of originality is preserved, but always behind our
> back. Paradoxically, it is only when we suspend our rigid attention and
> unexamine the forms presented within consciousness and the world that we
> can become the understanding that we expect.
>
>
> On Friday, February 21, 2014 8:39:47 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pdxucpPq6Lc
>>
>>
>>  --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor