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Thanks to Kelly Parker for bringing this to my attention.
http://www.logicmatters.net/2015/12/28/springer-make-many-logic-books-freely-downloadable/

← A Christmas card

Springer flood: more logic →

Springer make many logic books freely downloadable
Posted on December 28, 2015

by Peter Smith

Springer have made very many mathematics and philosophy books more than ten
years old freely downloadable. Logicians at various levels may in
interested, for example, in the following:

1. Van Dalen, Logic and Structure (4th edn)

2. Monk, Mathematical Logic

3. Manin, A Course in Mathematical Logic

4. Andrews, An Introduction to Mathematical Logic and Type Theory

5. Fitting & Mendelsohn, First-Order Modal Logic

6. Poizat, Model Theory

7. Marker, Model Theory
8. Marcia & Toffalori, A Guide to Classical and Modern Model Theory

9. Schütte, Proof Theory

10. Hendricks et al, eds., Proof Theory: History and Philosophical
Significance
11. Halmos, Naive Set Theory

12. Moschovakis, Notes on Set Theory (1st edn)

13. Devlin, The Joy of Sets

14. Jech, Set Theory

15. Kechris, Classical Descriptive Set Theory

16. Kanamori, The Higher Infinite

17. Hermes, Enumerability, Decidability, Computability

18. Bridges, Computability

19. Mac Lane, Categories for the Working Mathematician

20. Mac Lane & Moerdijk, Sheaves in Geometry and Logic

Well, that slightly random 20 is enough to start with — though for fun, let
me also mention Aigner & Ziegler, Proofs from THE BOOK
. Try
searching Springer
Link for many more. (Of course, depending on
your university’s library policy, you may already have had access via
Springer Link to these and newer books: but the free access to older books
now, or at least for the moment, appears to be universally available.)

If anyone knows whether this is a new long-term policy at Springer, or is a
more short-lived Christmas treat, do please let us know in the comments!
For a start, I don’t want to spend time updating the TYL Guide with some of
these links if the access is temporary.
This entry was posted in Books
, Logic . Bookmark the
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.
[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
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[PEIRCE-L] Re: off-list

Sung, list,

Sung, because you and I have had several off-list discussions over the past
year or so about problematic aspects of your postings without much
changing, I offered an off-list warning to you, the very first I've offered
in the 5 or so years I've been moderating this list. Ben Udell, the
co-manager of peirce-l, and I have also *on-list *in the past  pointed to
practices which we and members of TPG have found problematic.

It is your decision to leave peirce-l. Good luck to you.

Best,

Gary Richmond (writing as list moderator)

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 9:26 PM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:

> Hi GaryR and list,
>
> (I am sorry to make this off-list email public because it is related to my
> decision described below.)
>
> Since I have said just about all I wanted to say, as a
> chemist-turned-theoretical cell biologists, to the PEIRCE-L list during the
> past year or so, and since my posts are apparently not appreciated by most,
> if not all, of the senior members of The Peirce Group, according to Gary R,
> I have decided not to participate in future discussions on this list as of
> this time.
>
> If you have any questions or comments on the posts that I have written for
> this list in the past, I would be happy to communicate with you off-line
> any time.
>
> Good luck in your continued inquiry of signs.
>
> Sung
>
>
>
> On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 8:50 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> off-list final warning
>>
>> Sung,
>>
>> It has gotten to the point that, especially because we have Peirce
>> novices on list who could be led astray by your posts, frankly,
>> insufficiently informed by insufficient study, that I am seriously
>> considering asking The Peirce Group to approve my permanently removing you
>> from the list. I have no doubt that if I make this request that it will be
>> approved by TPG.
>>
>> In addition, you still tend to post too frequently and at too great
>> length. So it is this combination of things, and your history of
>> problematic postings, which lead me to this decision.
>>
>> In the almost 6 years since Joe Ransdell passed and I took up moderating
>> the list, I have never even once considered taking such a step. But I am
>> beyond frustrated and, indeed, simply fed up with your idiosyncratic
>> postings which lead, as I see it, nowhere except to your own, in my
>> opinion--and others--bizarre theories (and I've heard complaints from
>> several others off-list, including all but one of the board members of The
>> Peirce Group and *all* members of the advisory board).
>>
>> I have discussed these problematic tendencies of yours which, in my
>> opinion, do *not* support good online inquiry. You seem to have no regard
>> for anyone else on the list but yourself, and that is, simply,
>> unacceptable. Consider this an absolutely final warning.
>>
>> Sincerely,
>>
>> Gary Richmond (writing as list moderator)
>>
>> [image: Gary Richmond]
>>
>> *Gary Richmond*
>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>> *Communication Studies*
>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>> *C 745*
>> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
>>
>
>
>
> --
> Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
>
> Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
> Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
> Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
> Rutgers University
> Piscataway, N.J. 08855
> 732-445-4701
>
> www.conformon.net
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

[PEIRCE-L] Re: off-list

Hi GaryR and list,

(I am sorry to make this off-list email public because it is related to my
decision described below.)

Since I have said just about all I wanted to say, as a
chemist-turned-theoretical cell biologists, to the PEIRCE-L list during the
past year or so, and since my posts are apparently not appreciated by most,
if not all, of the senior members of The Peirce Group, according to Gary R,
I have decided not to participate in future discussions on this list as of
this time.

If you have any questions or comments on the posts that I have written for
this list in the past, I would be happy to communicate with you off-line
any time.

Good luck in your continued inquiry of signs.

Sung

On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 8:50 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> off-list final warning
>
> Sung,
>
> It has gotten to the point that, especially because we have Peirce novices
> on list who could be led astray by your posts, frankly, insufficiently
> informed by insufficient study, that I am seriously considering asking The
> Peirce Group to approve my permanently removing you from the list. I have
> no doubt that if I make this request that it will be approved by TPG.
>
> In addition, you still tend to post too frequently and at too great
> length. So it is this combination of things, and your history of
> problematic postings, which lead me to this decision.
>
> In the almost 6 years since Joe Ransdell passed and I took up moderating
> the list, I have never even once considered taking such a step. But I am
> beyond frustrated and, indeed, simply fed up with your idiosyncratic
> postings which lead, as I see it, nowhere except to your own, in my
> opinion--and others--bizarre theories (and I've heard complaints from
> several others off-list, including all but one of the board members of The
> Peirce Group and *all* members of the advisory board).
>
> I have discussed these problematic tendencies of yours which, in my
> opinion, do *not* support good online inquiry. You seem to have no regard
> for anyone else on the list but yourself, and that is, simply,
> unacceptable. Consider this an absolutely final warning.
>
> Sincerely,
>
> Gary Richmond (writing as list moderator)
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *C 745*
> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
>

-- 
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.

Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701

www.conformon.net

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Sung - you are missing my point. I'm not trying to convince YOU to accept my 
view that the Relations are not dyads. I frankly don't care about whether or 
not you agree with me. 

I'm asking you to stop informing this list (as well as your endless postings to 
the biosemiotics list) that I consider the Relations to be dyads! I'm asking 
you to speak for yourself - and not misinform the lists about what I think!  
READ what you wrote:

 "You are agreeing with Edwina in believing that the 9 types of signs are not 
signs because they refer to 9 dyadic relations that are not triadic"

The way this reads - is that Edwina considers '9 dyadic relations'. But I 
don't. So, don't misinform people.  And you wrote:

I say: " The 9 Relations are dyadic relations, not triadic ones." (1229151-2)


I think you also meant (122915-2).


No, Sung, I did NOT say that the 9 Relations are dyadic relations. So - don't 
go and write something, informing the list of 'what Edwina also meant'.

Stick to your own comments about yourself and don't dictate what others 'ought 
to think'.

Edwina 
  - Original Message - 
  From: Sungchul Ji 
  To: PEIRCE-L 
  Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2015 8:50 PM
  Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations


  Edwina,


  You wrote:


  "Sung - how many times do I have to repeat that my view is that the Relations 
are not dyads,  (122915-1)
  are not dyadic relations, but are part of a triad?"

  You may repeat (122915-1) as many times as you wish, but, to me, the fact 
remains that




  "The 9 types of signs are dyadic relations, regardless of whether or not they 
become incorporated   (122915-2)
  into a triadic sign, just as quarks are quarks regardless of whether or not 
they are incorporated into 
  a baryon." 


  Perhaps you will find the quark-sign analogy useful someday, even though it 
may not seem so now, despite the fact that I have been discussing this model on 
these lists since [biosemiotics:46] dated 12/26/2012.  


  All the best.


  Sung










  On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 8:16 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

Sung - how many times do I have to repeat that my view is that the 
Relations are not dyads, are not dyadic relations, but are part of a triad?

Also - your definition of 'nominal' seems to suggest that you think that it 
refers to a view focused around 'names'. No- that's not the definition of 
nominalism.

Furthermore, the difference in analysis of the 9 types of Relations, isn't 
simply due to their 'name' - where you call them 'elementary signs', and Gary 
R. calls them 'parameters' and I call them 'Relations'. These differences 
aren't simply terminological; they are conceptually substantive. I strongly 
reject your mechanical reductionism.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Sungchul Ji 
  To: PEIRCE-L 
  Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2015 6:47 PM
  Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations


  Gary R, Matt, Edwina, Jon A, John C, List,



  You wrote:


  "So, for example, and a fortiori, that bullet hole in the tree is surely 
an index,  (122015-1)
  but may only possibly come to have an interpretant when, say, someone one 
  day passes by, sees it, and interprets it as such."


  (1)  I think you may be conflating "sign" and "semiosis".  


  It is clear that semiois is always triadic, as represented by my "square 
triangle" as you call it, but signs are not always triadic, as will be 
explained below:


   f
  g
  Object (O) -->  Representamen (R)  -->  Interpretant 
(I)
   |
 ^
   |
  |
   |___|
h


  Figure 1.  The irreducible triadic nature of semiosis.
  f = R-O relation, or sign production; g = R-I relation, or sign 
interpretation; h = O-I relation (or correspondence).  
  Each of the three nodes, O, R and I, can be in the mode of Firstness, 
Secondness or Thirdness. 




  The the "bullet hole in the tree", before being "semiosed", i.e., 
"interpreted as a sign, by a passer-by", is still a sign (i.e., R in Figure 1) 
in the mode of being of Secondness, since its very existence is determined by 
TWO objects -- the bullet and the tree penetrated by the bullet.




   (2)  You are agreeing with Edwina in believing that the 9 types of signs 
are not signs because they refer to 9 dyadic relations that are not triadic ?  
Rather you think the 9 types are the "parameters" needed to produce the 10 
classes of triadic signs ?  You may be right, b

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Sung, List:

The nine TERMS are signs (rhematic symbols).  For example, the word
"icon" is obviously a sign.  However, the OBJECTS that the nine terms
represent are NOT signs.  For example, the relation of resemblance between
representamen and object is not itself a sign.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 7:55 PM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:

> Hi Jon,
>
> You wrote:
>
> "The nine terms are certainly signs--rhematic symbols, I suppose--but no
> one is disputing this."   (122915-1)
>
> With all due respect, Jon A, where have you been all these weeks and
> months ?
>
> Our great & honored debatress, Edwina, would not agree with you on
> (122915-1).
>
> Good luck.
>
> Sung
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Jon - yes, I agree. Existentiality functions only within the triad - as 
embodied in 'current time and space'. That's why, in my view, Peirce said that 
a semiosic triad that lacked the third term, the Interpretant - and that means 
not simply 'not now' but 'in the future'...is not a genuine Sign. 

Now, with regard to the triads of the 'qualisign' and 'legisign' -  ...and I'm 
not sure which triads you are referring to...The qualisign is of course, 
operative totally within the mode of Firstness (Rhematic Iconic Qualisign). It 
is a possibility - and possibilities are not existential. But are they Real - 
understanding realism as referring to universal generals or potentialities. OK 
- I'd say 'yes. 

With regard to the legisign - the pure Thirdness - it too refers to 
generalities. So, again, 'yes'. 

As for the bullet-hole, in my view, it is already as you note a triadic sign 
but I consider that this triad needs no human agent to view it. After all, the 
tree trunk has experienced the effect of the bullet in its interior. That's 
certainly an immediate interpretant of the gunshot (besides the noise, the 
odour of gunpowder, etc)..and several dynamic interpretants because of the 
material effect of the bullet on the tree. 

Edwina


  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: PEIRCE-L 
  Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2015 8:48 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations


  Edwina, List:


  In Peirce's terms, would it not be right to say that the representamen, 
object, and interpretant need not EXIST at all?  A qualisign or legisign does 
not exist unless and until it is embodied, but we can still talk about it as a 
REAL triadic sign apart from any such particular instantiation.  The 
lead-pencil streak exists as a triadic sign of a geometrical line, but its 
object is purely hypothetical.  The bullet-hole exists as a triadic sign of a 
gunshot, but its (immediate) interpretant is never actualized unless someone 
attributes it as such.


  Regards,



  Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
  Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
  www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt


  On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 7:11 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

Sung, please don't tell me what I meant. You aren't The Teacher here, but 
just a debater among debaters - and one who hasn't read Peirce but chooses to 
consider that his views on Peirce are always correct. 

I repeat - the 9 Relations are not dyads; that means that they aren't 
dyadic relations because a dyad operates between two existential nodes - and 
the Object-Representamen-Interpretant do not exist 'per se' each in themselves. 
They exist within the interactions...Such semiosic interactions may not be  
with a human agent; a cell can semiosically interact with another cell and 
needs no human involvement. 

As Peirce noted, the semiosic triad is NOT made up of a collection of 
dyadic relations. Your mechanical reductionism is not Peircean.

Edwina.


-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Edwina,

You wrote:

"Sung - how many times do I have to repeat that my view is that the
Relations are not dyads,  (122915-1)
are not dyadic relations, but are part of a triad?"

You may repeat (122915-1) as many times as you wish, but, to me, the fact
remains that


"The 9 types of signs are *dyadic relations*, regardless of whether or not
they become incorporated   (122915-2)
into a triadic sign, just as quarks are quarks regardless of whether or not
they are incorporated into
a baryon."

Perhaps you will find the *quark-sign analogy *useful someday, even though
it may not seem so now, despite the fact that I have been discussing this
model on these lists since [biosemiotics:46] dated 12/26/2012.

All the best.

Sung






On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 8:16 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Sung - how many times do I have to repeat that my view is that the
> Relations are not dyads, are not dyadic relations, but are part of a triad?
>
> Also - your definition of 'nominal' seems to suggest that you think that
> it refers to a view focused around 'names'. No- that's not the definition
> of nominalism.
>
> Furthermore, the difference in analysis of the 9 types of Relations, isn't
> simply due to their 'name' - where you call them 'elementary signs', and
> Gary R. calls them 'parameters' and I call them 'Relations'. These
> differences aren't simply terminological; they are conceptually
> substantive. I strongly reject your mechanical reductionism.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Sungchul Ji 
> *To:* PEIRCE-L 
> *Sent:* Tuesday, December 29, 2015 6:47 PM
> *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
>
> Gary R, Matt, Edwina, Jon A, John C, List,
>
> You wrote:
>
> "So, for example, and a fortiori, that bullet hole in the tree is surely
> an index,  (122015-1)
> but may only possibly come to have an interpretant when, say, someone one
> day passes by, sees it, and interprets it as such."
>
> (*1*)  I think you may be conflating "sign" and "semiosis".
>
> It is clear that semiois is always triadic, as represented by my "square
> triangle" as you call it, but signs are not always triadic, as will be
> explained below:
>
>  f
>  g
> Object (O) -->  Representamen (R)  -->  Interpretant
> (I)
>  |
> ^
>  |
>  |
>  |___|
>   h
>
> *Figure 1.*  The irreducible triadic nature of semiosis.
> f = R-O relation, or sign production; g = R-I relation, or sign
> interpretation; h = O-I relation (or correspondence).
> Each of the three nodes, O, R and I, can be in the mode of Firstness,
> Secondness or Thirdness.
>
>
> The the "bullet hole in the tree", before being "semiosed", i.e.,
> "interpreted as a sign, by a passer-by", is still a sign (i.e., R in *Figure
> 1) *in the mode of being of Secondness, since its very existence is
> determined by TWO objects -- the bullet and the tree penetrated by the
> bullet.
>
>
>  (*2*)  You are agreeing with Edwina in believing that the 9 types of
> signs are not signs because they refer to 9 dyadic relations that are not
> triadic ?  Rather you think the 9 types are the "parameters" needed to
> produce the 10 classes of triadic signs ?  You may be right, but the way
> you are expressing your idea is not too convincing to me.  To repeat my
> humble opinion, both the 9 the types of signs and the 10 classes of signs
> are all signs (simply because we are thinking about them right here and now
> and we can only think in signs) but are not all of the same kind, since the
> former are parts of the latter and not the other way around, in an
> analogous way that quarks (there are 6 different kinds) are parts of
> baryons (i.e., protons, and neutrons) and not the other way around.  This
> is why I think it is justified to differentiate the 9 types of signs and
> the 10 classes of signs by giving them different names, for example, my
> suggestion that the former be referred to as the "elementary signs" and the
> latter "composite signs", which is in principle in the same spirit as your
> naming the former as "parameters" and the latter as "triadic signs", the
> difference being only NOMINAL.
>
> (*3*) Frankly  I am really surprised that, after at least for 3 years of
> discussions on the relation between the 9 types of signs and 10 classes of
> signs on this list and the biosemiotics list, beginning with
> [biosemiotics:46] dated 122/26/2012,  we have not yet reached a consensus
> on the definition of the seemingly simple concept of *the sign*.  It is
> like physicists quibbling over the definition of energy, or chemists not
> agreeing on the definition of molecules endlessly, which is unthinkable.
> In fact semioticians, beginning with Peirce himself, seem to have

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Edwina, List:

In Peirce's terms, would it not be right to say that the representamen,
object, and interpretant need not EXIST at all?  A qualisign or legisign
does not exist unless and until it is embodied, but we can still talk about
it as a REAL triadic sign apart from any such particular instantiation.
The lead-pencil streak exists as a triadic sign of a geometrical line, but
its object is purely hypothetical.  The bullet-hole exists as a triadic
sign of a gunshot, but its (immediate) interpretant is never actualized
unless someone attributes it as such.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 7:11 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Sung, please don't tell me what I meant. You aren't The Teacher here, but
> just a debater among debaters - and one who hasn't read Peirce but chooses
> to consider that his views on Peirce are always correct.
>
> I repeat - the 9 Relations are not dyads; that means that they aren't
> dyadic relations because a dyad operates between two existential nodes -
> and the Object-Representamen-Interpretant do not exist 'per se' each in
> themselves. They exist within the interactions...Such semiosic interactions
> may not be  with a human agent; a cell can semiosically interact with
> another cell and needs no human involvement.
>
> As Peirce noted, the semiosic triad is NOT made up of a collection of
> dyadic relations. Your mechanical reductionism is not Peircean.
>
> Edwina.
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Sung:

Again, the bullet-hole is ONLY a (necessarily triadic) sign because it has
immediate (possible) and final (would-be) interpretants.  The absence of a
dynamical (actual) interpretant does not somehow render it dyadic.

The nine terms are certainly signs--rhematic symbols, I suppose--but no one
is disputing this.  The issue is whether calling them "TYPES of signs" is
helpful or misleading, given the wide agreement that there are ten CLASSES
of signs based on their valid combinations.  Why do we even need a name for
all nine, taken together?  They are three relations that manifest in three
modes; why not just leave it at that?

Regards,

Jon S. (again, NOT Jon A.)

On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 5:47 PM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:

> Gary R, Matt, Edwina, Jon A, John C, List,
>
> You wrote:
>
> "So, for example, and a fortiori, that bullet hole in the tree is surely
> an index,  (122015-1)
> but may only possibly come to have an interpretant when, say, someone one
> day passes by, sees it, and interprets it as such."
>
> (*1*)  I think you may be conflating "sign" and "semiosis".
>
> It is clear that semiois is always triadic, as represented by my "square
> triangle" as you call it, but signs are not always triadic, as will be
> explained below:
>
>  f
>  g
> Object (O) -->  Representamen (R)  -->  Interpretant
> (I)
>  |
> ^
>  |
>  |
>  |___|
>   h
>
> *Figure 1.*  The irreducible triadic nature of semiosis.
> f = R-O relation, or sign production; g = R-I relation, or sign
> interpretation; h = O-I relation (or correspondence).
> Each of the three nodes, O, R and I, can be in the mode of Firstness,
> Secondness or Thirdness.
>
> The the "bullet hole in the tree", before being "semiosed", i.e.,
> "interpreted as a sign, by a passer-by", is still a sign (i.e., R in *Figure
> 1) *in the mode of being of Secondness, since its very existence is
> determined by TWO objects -- the bullet and the tree penetrated by the
> bullet.
>
>  (*2*)  You are agreeing with Edwina in believing that the 9 types of
> signs are not signs because they refer to 9 dyadic relations that are not
> triadic ?  Rather you think the 9 types are the "parameters" needed to
> produce the 10 classes of triadic signs ?  You may be right, but the way
> you are expressing your idea is not too convincing to me.  To repeat my
> humble opinion, both the 9 the types of signs and the 10 classes of signs
> are all signs (simply because we are thinking about them right here and now
> and we can only think in signs) but are not all of the same kind, since the
> former are parts of the latter and not the other way around, in an
> analogous way that quarks (there are 6 different kinds) are parts of
> baryons (i.e., protons, and neutrons) and not the other way around.  This
> is why I think it is justified to differentiate the 9 types of signs and
> the 10 classes of signs by giving them different names, for example, my
> suggestion that the former be referred to as the "elementary signs" and the
> latter "composite signs", which is in principle in the same spirit as your
> naming the former as "parameters" and the latter as "triadic signs", the
> difference being only NOMINAL.
>
> (*3*) Frankly  I am really surprised that, after at least for 3 years of
> discussions on the relation between the 9 types of signs and 10 classes of
> signs on this list and the biosemiotics list, beginning with
> [biosemiotics:46] dated 122/26/2012,  we have not yet reached a consensus
> on the definition of the seemingly simple concept of *the sign*.  It is
> like physicists quibbling over the definition of energy, or chemists not
> agreeing on the definition of molecules endlessly, which is unthinkable.
> In fact semioticians, beginning with Peirce himself, seem to have been
> writing and discussing about the concept of *signs* in unbelievably
> complicated ways for over 100 years ! This is probably not because
> semioticians are, relatively speaking, not too bright on average, but
> because semiotics may be a much more complex discipline -- incomparably
> more complex than physics, chemistry, or even biology. This may explain why
> semiotics has not yet been able to make any significant contributions to
> advancing human knowledge (as I can see; If I am wrong on this, I would
> like to be informed of any specific contributions that smiotics have made
> to science, linguistics, mathematics, philosophy, or to theology throughout
> human history).  And yet semiotics is such an intellectually attractive
> discipline that it may act as a powerful intellectual blackhole for many
> aspiring thinkers. As a possible warning against such a semiotic danger,  I
> am taking the risk of committing the crime of another neologism, the 
> "*s

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Edwina,

I am afraid you may be inside your 'semiotic blackhole" now.  That is, you
may be
(mind you I am not saying you are) so attracted to your own system of
beautiful ideas
that you cannot get out of it to see the real, not always beautiful, world
out there.

All the beast.

Sung

On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 8:11 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Sung, please don't tell me what I meant. You aren't The Teacher here, but
> just a debater among debaters - and one who hasn't read Peirce but chooses
> to consider that his views on Peirce are always correct.
>
> I repeat - the 9 Relations are not dyads; that means that they aren't
> dyadic relations because a dyad operates between two existential nodes -
> and the Object-Representamen-Interpretant do not exist 'per se' each in
> themselves. They exist within the interactions...Such semiosic interactions
> may not be  with a human agent; a cell can semiosically interact with
> another cell and needs no human involvement.
>
> As Peirce noted, the semiosic triad is NOT made up of a collection of
> dyadic relations. Your mechanical reductionism is not Peircean.
>
> Edwina.
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Sungchul Ji 
> *To:* PEIRCE-L 
> *Sent:* Tuesday, December 29, 2015 8:02 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
>
> Edwina,
>
> You say: " . . .  the 9 Relations are not dyads . . ."
>(122915-1)
>
> I say: " The 9 Relations are dyadic relations, not triadic ones."
>(1229151-2)
>
> I think you also meant (122915-2).
>
> Sung
>
> On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 5:57 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Sung - as I have repeatedly said, and which you continue to ignore, the 9
>> Relations are not dyads. A dyad operates within two existentialities, and
>> the Object-Representamen-Interpretant are not each existentialities in
>> themselves.
>>
>> The icon doesn't need an *existential *object or interpretant but it
>> still functions within a triadic semiosis.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> - Original Message -
>> *From:* Sungchul Ji 
>> *To:* Matt Faunce 
>> *Cc:* PEIRCE-L 
>> *Sent:* Tuesday, December 29, 2015 4:34 PM
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
>>
>> Hi Matt.
>>
>> I agree that "icon" can be a triadic sign if there is the object it
>> refers to and the intepretant it determines on its interpreter, whether
>> here and now, or sometime in the future.  In this sense, all of the 9 types
>> of signs are triadic signs as I have been advocating against Edwina's view
>> that they are not signs because they only refer to dyadic relations, i.e.,
>> R-R, R-O and R-I relations in 3 categorical modes.
>>
>> But, icons are different from index or from symbols in that it can act as
>> a sign even without its object and interpretant (as Pointed out by Peirce)
>> neither now nor in the future, like the lead-pencil streak on a
>> blackboard.  It is in this sense that I am referring to icon as a monadic
>> sign, and index a dyadic sign and symbol as a triadic sign. Again, I admit
>> that, depending on the context, icon, index and symbol can be viewed as
>> triadic as mentioned above.   This is what I mean by the "ambiguity of the
>> sign":
>>
>> "Icon can be viewed as triadic or dyadic, depending on the context of
>> discourse."   (122915-1)
>>
>> Sung
>>
>> On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 3:30 PM, Matt Faunce 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Peirce's "there were" means 'existent'. In the past, here, I've spoken
>>> of the "potential interpretant". In the hypothetical science that
>>> mathematics is, a pencil-lead streak forming a (rough but acceptable)
>>> circle signifies the hypothetical object of a perfect circle. In these
>>> cases the signs are still only signs within their triad; it's just that the
>>> object or interpretant doesn't need to be existent.
>>>
>>> Matt
>>>
>>> On 12/29/15 3:14 PM, Matt Faunce wrote:
>>>
>>> On 12/29/15 2:56 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:
>>>
>>> Jon A, List,
>>>
>>> Here is one quotation of Pierce cited in Charles Peirce's Guess at the
>>> Riddle (K. Sheriff, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994):
>>>
>>> "A sinsign may be index or icon.  As index it is 'a sign which would, at
>>> once,  (122915-1)
>>> lose the chracter wich makes it a sign if its object were removed, but
>>> would
>>> not lose that character if there were no interpretant."
>>>
>>> That's in CP 2.304
>>>
>>> "A sign is either an icon, an index, or a symbol. An icon is a sign
>>> which would possess the character which renders it significant, even though
>>> its object had no existence; such as a lead-pencil streak as representing a
>>> geometrical line. An index is a sign which would, at once, lose the
>>> character which makes it a sign if its object were removed, but would not
>>> lose that character if there were no interpretant. Such, for instance, is a
>>> piece of mould with a bullet-hole in it as sign of a shot; for without the
>>> shot there would have been no hole; bu

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Sung - how many times do I have to repeat that my view is that the Relations 
are not dyads, are not dyadic relations, but are part of a triad?

Also - your definition of 'nominal' seems to suggest that you think that it 
refers to a view focused around 'names'. No- that's not the definition of 
nominalism.

Furthermore, the difference in analysis of the 9 types of Relations, isn't 
simply due to their 'name' - where you call them 'elementary signs', and Gary 
R. calls them 'parameters' and I call them 'Relations'. These differences 
aren't simply terminological; they are conceptually substantive. I strongly 
reject your mechanical reductionism.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Sungchul Ji 
  To: PEIRCE-L 
  Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2015 6:47 PM
  Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations


  Gary R, Matt, Edwina, Jon A, John C, List,



  You wrote:


  "So, for example, and a fortiori, that bullet hole in the tree is surely an 
index,  (122015-1)
  but may only possibly come to have an interpretant when, say, someone one 
  day passes by, sees it, and interprets it as such."


  (1)  I think you may be conflating "sign" and "semiosis".  


  It is clear that semiois is always triadic, as represented by my "square 
triangle" as you call it, but signs are not always triadic, as will be 
explained below:


   f  g
  Object (O) -->  Representamen (R)  -->  Interpretant (I)
   |
 ^
   |
  |
   |___|
h


  Figure 1.  The irreducible triadic nature of semiosis.
  f = R-O relation, or sign production; g = R-I relation, or sign 
interpretation; h = O-I relation (or correspondence).  
  Each of the three nodes, O, R and I, can be in the mode of Firstness, 
Secondness or Thirdness. 




  The the "bullet hole in the tree", before being "semiosed", i.e., 
"interpreted as a sign, by a passer-by", is still a sign (i.e., R in Figure 1) 
in the mode of being of Secondness, since its very existence is determined by 
TWO objects -- the bullet and the tree penetrated by the bullet.




   (2)  You are agreeing with Edwina in believing that the 9 types of signs are 
not signs because they refer to 9 dyadic relations that are not triadic ?  
Rather you think the 9 types are the "parameters" needed to produce the 10 
classes of triadic signs ?  You may be right, but the way you are expressing 
your idea is not too convincing to me.  To repeat my humble opinion, both the 9 
the types of signs and the 10 classes of signs are all signs (simply because we 
are thinking about them right here and now and we can only think in signs) but 
are not all of the same kind, since the former are parts of the latter and not 
the other way around, in an analogous way that quarks (there are 6 different 
kinds) are parts of baryons (i.e., protons, and neutrons) and not the other way 
around.  This is why I think it is justified to differentiate the 9 types of 
signs and the 10 classes of signs by giving them different names, for example, 
my suggestion that the former be referred to as the "elementary signs" and the 
latter "composite signs", which is in principle in the same spirit as your 
naming the former as "parameters" and the latter as "triadic signs", the 
difference being only NOMINAL.


  (3) Frankly  I am really surprised that, after at least for 3 years of 
discussions on the relation between the 9 types of signs and 10 classes of 
signs on this list and the biosemiotics list, beginning with [biosemiotics:46] 
dated 122/26/2012,  we have not yet reached a consensus on the definition of 
the seemingly simple concept of the sign.  It is like physicists quibbling over 
the definition of energy, or chemists not agreeing on the definition of 
molecules endlessly, which is unthinkable.  In fact semioticians, beginning 
with Peirce himself, seem to have been writing and discussing about the concept 
of signs in unbelievably complicated ways for over 100 years ! This is probably 
not because semioticians are, relatively speaking, not too bright on average, 
but because semiotics may be a much more complex discipline -- incomparably 
more complex than physics, chemistry, or even biology. This may explain why 
semiotics has not yet been able to make any significant contributions to 
advancing human knowledge (as I can see; If I am wrong on this, I would like to 
be informed of any specific contributions that smiotics have made to science, 
linguistics, mathematics, philosophy, or to theology throughout human history). 
 And yet semiotics is such an intellectually attractive discipline t

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Sung, please don't tell me what I meant. You aren't The Teacher here, but just 
a debater among debaters - and one who hasn't read Peirce but chooses to 
consider that his views on Peirce are always correct. 

I repeat - the 9 Relations are not dyads; that means that they aren't dyadic 
relations because a dyad operates between two existential nodes - and the 
Object-Representamen-Interpretant do not exist 'per se' each in themselves. 
They exist within the interactions...Such semiosic interactions may not be  
with a human agent; a cell can semiosically interact with another cell and 
needs no human involvement. 

As Peirce noted, the semiosic triad is NOT made up of a collection of dyadic 
relations. Your mechanical reductionism is not Peircean.

Edwina.
  - Original Message - 
  From: Sungchul Ji 
  To: PEIRCE-L 
  Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2015 8:02 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations


  Edwina,


  You say: " . . .  the 9 Relations are not dyads . . ."
  (122915-1)


  I say: " The 9 Relations are dyadic relations, not triadic ones." 
   (1229151-2)


  I think you also meant (122915-2).


  Sung


  On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 5:57 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

Sung - as I have repeatedly said, and which you continue to ignore, the 9 
Relations are not dyads. A dyad operates within two existentialities, and the 
Object-Representamen-Interpretant are not each existentialities in themselves. 

The icon doesn't need an existential object or interpretant but it still 
functions within a triadic semiosis.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Sungchul Ji 
  To: Matt Faunce 
  Cc: PEIRCE-L 
  Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2015 4:34 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations


  Hi Matt. 


  I agree that "icon" can be a triadic sign if there is the object it 
refers to and the intepretant it determines on its interpreter, whether here 
and now, or sometime in the future.  In this sense, all of the 9 types of signs 
are triadic signs as I have been advocating against Edwina's view that they are 
not signs because they only refer to dyadic relations, i.e., R-R, R-O and R-I 
relations in 3 categorical modes.


  But, icons are different from index or from symbols in that it can act as 
a sign even without its object and interpretant (as Pointed out by Peirce) 
neither now nor in the future, like the lead-pencil streak on a blackboard.  It 
is in this sense that I am referring to icon as a monadic sign, and index a 
dyadic sign and symbol as a triadic sign. Again, I admit that, depending on the 
context, icon, index and symbol can be viewed as triadic as mentioned above.   
This is what I mean by the "ambiguity of the sign":  

  "Icon can be viewed as triadic or dyadic, depending on the context of 
discourse."   (122915-1)


  Sung


  On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 3:30 PM, Matt Faunce  wrote:

Peirce's "there were" means 'existent'. In the past, here, I've spoken 
of the "potential interpretant". In the hypothetical science that mathematics 
is, a pencil-lead streak forming a (rough but acceptable) circle signifies the 
hypothetical object of a perfect circle. In these cases the signs are still 
only signs within their triad; it's just that the object or interpretant 
doesn't need to be existent.

Matt

On 12/29/15 3:14 PM, Matt Faunce wrote:

  On 12/29/15 2:56 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:

Jon A, List, 


Here is one quotation of Pierce cited in Charles Peirce's Guess at 
the Riddle (K. Sheriff, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994):

"A sinsign may be index or icon.  As index it is 'a sign which 
would, at once,  (122915-1)
lose the chracter wich makes it a sign if its object were removed, 
but would 
not lose that character if there were no interpretant."
  That's in CP 2.304


"A sign is either an icon, an index, or a symbol. An icon is a sign 
which would possess the character which renders it significant, even though its 
object had no existence; such as a lead-pencil streak as representing a 
geometrical line. An index is a sign which would, at once, lose the character 
which makes it a sign if its object were removed, but would not lose that 
character if there were no interpretant. Such, for instance, is a piece of 
mould with a bullet-hole in it as sign of a shot; for without the shot there 
would have been no hole; but there is a hole there, whether anybody has the 
sense to attribute it to a shot or not. A symbol is a sign which would lose the 
character which renders it a sign if there were no interpretant. Such is any 
utterance of speech which signifies what it does only by virtue of its being 
understood to have that signification." 




So it seems to me that

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Edwina,

You say: " . . .  the 9 Relations are not dyads . . ."
 (122915-1)

I say: " The 9 Relations are dyadic relations, not triadic ones."
 (1229151-2)

I think you also meant (122915-2).

Sung

On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 5:57 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Sung - as I have repeatedly said, and which you continue to ignore, the 9
> Relations are not dyads. A dyad operates within two existentialities, and
> the Object-Representamen-Interpretant are not each existentialities in
> themselves.
>
> The icon doesn't need an *existential *object or interpretant but it
> still functions within a triadic semiosis.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Sungchul Ji 
> *To:* Matt Faunce 
> *Cc:* PEIRCE-L 
> *Sent:* Tuesday, December 29, 2015 4:34 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
>
> Hi Matt.
>
> I agree that "icon" can be a triadic sign if there is the object it refers
> to and the intepretant it determines on its interpreter, whether here and
> now, or sometime in the future.  In this sense, all of the 9 types of signs
> are triadic signs as I have been advocating against Edwina's view that they
> are not signs because they only refer to dyadic relations, i.e., R-R, R-O
> and R-I relations in 3 categorical modes.
>
> But, icons are different from index or from symbols in that it can act as
> a sign even without its object and interpretant (as Pointed out by Peirce)
> neither now nor in the future, like the lead-pencil streak on a
> blackboard.  It is in this sense that I am referring to icon as a monadic
> sign, and index a dyadic sign and symbol as a triadic sign. Again, I admit
> that, depending on the context, icon, index and symbol can be viewed as
> triadic as mentioned above.   This is what I mean by the "ambiguity of the
> sign":
>
> "Icon can be viewed as triadic or dyadic, depending on the context of
> discourse."   (122915-1)
>
> Sung
>
> On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 3:30 PM, Matt Faunce  wrote:
>
>> Peirce's "there were" means 'existent'. In the past, here, I've spoken of
>> the "potential interpretant". In the hypothetical science that mathematics
>> is, a pencil-lead streak forming a (rough but acceptable) circle signifies
>> the hypothetical object of a perfect circle. In these cases the signs are
>> still only signs within their triad; it's just that the object or
>> interpretant doesn't need to be existent.
>>
>> Matt
>>
>> On 12/29/15 3:14 PM, Matt Faunce wrote:
>>
>> On 12/29/15 2:56 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:
>>
>> Jon A, List,
>>
>> Here is one quotation of Pierce cited in Charles Peirce's Guess at the
>> Riddle (K. Sheriff, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994):
>>
>> "A sinsign may be index or icon.  As index it is 'a sign which would, at
>> once,  (122915-1)
>> lose the chracter wich makes it a sign if its object were removed, but
>> would
>> not lose that character if there were no interpretant."
>>
>> That's in CP 2.304
>>
>> "A sign is either an icon, an index, or a symbol. An icon is a sign which
>> would possess the character which renders it significant, even though its
>> object had no existence; such as a lead-pencil streak as representing a
>> geometrical line. An index is a sign which would, at once, lose the
>> character which makes it a sign if its object were removed, but would not
>> lose that character if there were no interpretant. Such, for instance, is a
>> piece of mould with a bullet-hole in it as sign of a shot; for without the
>> shot there would have been no hole; but there is a hole there, whether
>> anybody has the sense to attribute it to a shot or not. A symbol is a sign
>> which would lose the character which renders it a sign if there were no
>> interpretant. Such is any utterance of speech which signifies what it does
>> only by virtue of its being understood to have that signification."
>>
>>
>>
>> So it seems to me that (122915-1) establishes the concept of a *dyadic
>> sign*.
>>
>> Therefore,
>>
>> "Not all signs are triadic."
>> (122915-2)
>>
>> as some Peirceans on this list seem to believe.
>>
>> All the best.
>>
>> Sung
>>
>>
>>
>> -
>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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>> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
>> BODY of the message. More at
>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
> --
> Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
>
> Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
> Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
> Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
> Rutgers University
> Piscataway, N.J. 08855
> 732-445-4701
>
> www.conformon.net
>
> --
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All"

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Gary R, Jon A, List,

This is what I would characterize as "quibbling" with different names for a
common object or meaning.  In other words, the 9 types of signs can be
named as "parameters", "terms", "relations", or anything else in the
English language, as long as they all refer to the 9 types of signs, or the
9 different relations between R, O and I in three different modes of
being.  This is what Peirce might have viewed as an example of a
nominalism, i.e., putting all the eggs into one basket of an arbitrarily
chosen name.

Sung

On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 5:24 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jon, list,
>
> Well, and succinctly said!
>
> I will, however, continue to employ the term 'parameters' rather than
> 'terms' for the nine 'characteristics' of signs since 'terms' in that
> context seems far too general to get at their function: "The three
> trichotomies of Signs result together in dividing Signs into TEN CLASSES OF
> SIGNS" (CP 2.264).
>
> Best,
>
> Gary
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *C 745*
> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
>
> On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 5:04 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Sung, List:
>>
>> Again, the nine "types" are really just nine TERMS that name specific
>> characteristics within the ten CLASSES of signs.  For example, an icon is
>> also a rheme, and either a qualisign, sinsign, or legisign; i.e., three of
>> the ten classes correspond to icons.  But no sign is ONLY an icon; it also
>> ALWAYS has the R-R and R-I relations, as well.
>>
>> Icon, index, and symbol are all irreducibly triadic signs.  In claiming
>> otherwise, you seem to be conflating reality with existence, contrary to
>> Peirce's own usage of those terms.  The lead-pencil streak still has an
>> object--the geometrical line--even though it does not exist.  The
>> bullet-hole still has an interpretant--immediate, as well as final--even
>> though it does not exist.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon S.
>>
>> On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 3:34 PM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:
>>
>>> Hi Matt.
>>>
>>> I agree that "icon" can be a triadic sign if there is the object it
>>> refers to and the intepretant it determines on its interpreter, whether
>>> here and now, or sometime in the future.  In this sense, all of the 9 types
>>> of signs are triadic signs as I have been advocating against Edwina's view
>>> that they are not signs because they only refer to dyadic relations, i.e.,
>>> R-R, R-O and R-I relations in 3 categorical modes.
>>>
>>> But, icons are different from index or from symbols in that it can act
>>> as a sign even without its object and interpretant (as Pointed out by
>>> Peirce) neither now nor in the future, like the lead-pencil streak on a
>>> blackboard.  It is in this sense that I am referring to icon as a monadic
>>> sign, and index a dyadic sign and symbol as a triadic sign. Again, I admit
>>> that, depending on the context, icon, index and symbol can be viewed as
>>> triadic as mentioned above.   This is what I mean by the "ambiguity of the
>>> sign":
>>>
>>> "Icon can be viewed as triadic or dyadic, depending on the context of
>>> discourse."   (122915-1)
>>>
>>> Sung
>>>
>>> On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 3:30 PM, Matt Faunce 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 Peirce's "there were" means 'existent'. In the past, here, I've spoken
 of the "potential interpretant". In the hypothetical science that
 mathematics is, a pencil-lead streak forming a (rough but acceptable)
 circle signifies the hypothetical object of a perfect circle. In these
 cases the signs are still only signs within their triad; it's just that the
 object or interpretant doesn't need to be existent.

 Matt

 On 12/29/15 3:14 PM, Matt Faunce wrote:

 On 12/29/15 2:56 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:

 Jon A, List,

 Here is one quotation of Pierce cited in Charles Peirce's Guess at the
 Riddle (K. Sheriff, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994):

 "A sinsign may be index or icon.  As index it is 'a sign which would,
 at once,  (122915-1)
 lose the chracter wich makes it a sign if its object were removed, but
 would
 not lose that character if there were no interpretant."

 That's in CP 2.304

 "A sign is either an icon, an index, or a symbol. An icon is a sign
 which would possess the character which renders it significant, even though
 its object had no existence; such as a lead-pencil streak as representing a
 geometrical line. An index is a sign which would, at once, lose the
 character which makes it a sign if its object were removed, but would not
 lose that character if there were no interpretant. Such, for instance, is a
 piece of mould with a bullet-hole in it as sign of a shot; for without the
 shot there would have been no hole; but there is a hole

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Jon,

You wrote:

" . . . the nine "types" (A) are really just nine TERMS that name specific
 (122915-1)
characteristics (B) . . ."  (letters added)

I agree.  I wrote about it in [biosemiotics:46] dated 12/26/2015.  You can
check it out.


But what I am saying is in addition to what you are saying above. I am
saying that

"If A is the name of B, A is called the sign for B."
 (122915-2)


Do you not agree ?

Sung





On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 5:04 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Sung, List:
>
> Again, the nine "types" are really just nine TERMS that name specific
> characteristics within the ten CLASSES of signs.  For example, an icon is
> also a rheme, and either a qualisign, sinsign, or legisign; i.e., three of
> the ten classes correspond to icons.  But no sign is ONLY an icon; it also
> ALWAYS has the R-R and R-I relations, as well.
>
> Icon, index, and symbol are all irreducibly triadic signs.  In claiming
> otherwise, you seem to be conflating reality with existence, contrary to
> Peirce's own usage of those terms.  The lead-pencil streak still has an
> object--the geometrical line--even though it does not exist.  The
> bullet-hole still has an interpretant--immediate, as well as final--even
> though it does not exist.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 3:34 PM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:
>
>> Hi Matt.
>>
>> I agree that "icon" can be a triadic sign if there is the object it
>> refers to and the intepretant it determines on its interpreter, whether
>> here and now, or sometime in the future.  In this sense, all of the 9 types
>> of signs are triadic signs as I have been advocating against Edwina's view
>> that they are not signs because they only refer to dyadic relations, i.e.,
>> R-R, R-O and R-I relations in 3 categorical modes.
>>
>> But, icons are different from index or from symbols in that it can act as
>> a sign even without its object and interpretant (as Pointed out by Peirce)
>> neither now nor in the future, like the lead-pencil streak on a
>> blackboard.  It is in this sense that I am referring to icon as a monadic
>> sign, and index a dyadic sign and symbol as a triadic sign. Again, I admit
>> that, depending on the context, icon, index and symbol can be viewed as
>> triadic as mentioned above.   This is what I mean by the "ambiguity of the
>> sign":
>>
>> "Icon can be viewed as triadic or dyadic, depending on the context of
>> discourse."   (122915-1)
>>
>> Sung
>>
>> On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 3:30 PM, Matt Faunce 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Peirce's "there were" means 'existent'. In the past, here, I've spoken
>>> of the "potential interpretant". In the hypothetical science that
>>> mathematics is, a pencil-lead streak forming a (rough but acceptable)
>>> circle signifies the hypothetical object of a perfect circle. In these
>>> cases the signs are still only signs within their triad; it's just that the
>>> object or interpretant doesn't need to be existent.
>>>
>>> Matt
>>>
>>> On 12/29/15 3:14 PM, Matt Faunce wrote:
>>>
>>> On 12/29/15 2:56 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:
>>>
>>> Jon A, List,
>>>
>>> Here is one quotation of Pierce cited in Charles Peirce's Guess at the
>>> Riddle (K. Sheriff, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994):
>>>
>>> "A sinsign may be index or icon.  As index it is 'a sign which would, at
>>> once,  (122915-1)
>>> lose the chracter wich makes it a sign if its object were removed, but
>>> would
>>> not lose that character if there were no interpretant."
>>>
>>> That's in CP 2.304
>>>
>>> "A sign is either an icon, an index, or a symbol. An icon is a sign
>>> which would possess the character which renders it significant, even though
>>> its object had no existence; such as a lead-pencil streak as representing a
>>> geometrical line. An index is a sign which would, at once, lose the
>>> character which makes it a sign if its object were removed, but would not
>>> lose that character if there were no interpretant. Such, for instance, is a
>>> piece of mould with a bullet-hole in it as sign of a shot; for without the
>>> shot there would have been no hole; but there is a hole there, whether
>>> anybody has the sense to attribute it to a shot or not. A symbol is a sign
>>> which would lose the character which renders it a sign if there were no
>>> interpretant. Such is any utterance of speech which signifies what it does
>>> only by virtue of its being understood to have that signification."
>>>
>>> So it seems to me that (122915-1) establishes the concept of a *dyadic
>>> sign*.
>>>
>>> Therefore,
>>>
>>> "Not all signs are triadic."
>>> (122915-2)
>>>
>>> as some Peirceans on this list seem to believe.
>>>
>>> All the best.
>>>
>>> Sung
>>>
>>>


-- 
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.

Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701

www.conformon.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Jon S, this is similar to a problem I had in another thread where Clark 
Gobel said that the long-run is a regulative principle that doesn't need 
to be actualized. I still have a problem with it. I need to spend some 
time working on fleshing out a concise explanation of the problem I see.


Matt

On 12/29/15 6:08 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:

Matt, List:

The "annihilation" of a particular dynamical (actual) interpretant 
does not negate the reality of the corresponding final/normal 
(potential) interpretant, does it?  This reminds me of Peirce's 
example of whether a diamond that is never actually scratched can be 
properly predicated as hard--something on which he changed his mind 
over time, ultimately deciding that what matters is what WOULD 
happen IF it were scratched.  The interpretant idea WOULD be 
discoverable under different circumstances--namely, if the individual 
consciousness in which it was determined were NOT annihilated.


Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
 - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 


On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 4:40 PM, Matt Faunce > wrote:


Edwina, List,

OK. I see that Peirce said it, but how can believing that an
interpretant can be annihilated not block the way of inquiry. See
CP. 1.138:

"The second bar which philosophers often set up across the
roadway of inquiry lies in maintaining that this, that, and
the other never can be known. When Auguste Comte was pressed
to specify any matter of positive fact to the knowledge of
which no man could by any possibility attain, he instanced the
knowledge of the chemical composition of the fixed stars; and
you may see his answer set down in the Philosophie positive.^1
But the ink was scarcely dry upon the printed page before the
spectroscope was discovered..."

With this: "the sign is thereby rendered imperfect, at least." I
wonder what "at least" means, i.e., what more might the sign be
rendered. An illusion? If the interpretant, as an object of
inquiry, is rendered "absolutely undiscoverable" then there can be
no potential final opinion of it, therefore it was never real.

What year was CP 1.303 written?

Matt

On 12/29/15 4:24 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

Exactly, Matt. As Peirce said - the interpretant doesn't need to
be existent NOW, for it could be existent in the future - that
potential interpretant to which you refer. BUT - "if the series
of successive interpretants comes to an end, the sign is thereby
rendered imperfect, at least." 2.303. And he continues, "If, an
interpretant idea having been determined in an individual
consciousness, it determines no outward sign, but that
consciousness becomes annihilated, or otherwise loses all memory
or other significant effect of the sign, it becomes absolutely
undiscoverable that there ever was such an idea in that
consciousness..." 2.303.
The point is, that without the interpretant, now or in the
future, the semiosic triad is 'empty' and thus - is no longer a sign.
Edwina





--
Matt


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

2015-12-29 Thread gnox

Matt, CP 2.303 is from Baldwin’s Dictionary, 1901-2. CP 1.138 is dated c.1899 
in CP.

 

Gary f.

 

 

From: Matt Faunce [mailto:mattfau...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 29-Dec-15 17:56



 

On 12/29/15 5:40 PM, Matt Faunce wrote:

 

What year was CP 1.303 written?


I meant, CP 2.303 

I remember hearing Richard J. Bernstein mention in an online lecture that one 
sad consequence of Peirce's ostracization from academia is that he sometimes 
contradicted himself when he probably otherwise wouldn't have. If there's a 
seeming contradiction, I, of course, first look to see if it's just my 
misinterpretation, but second, I look to see if the two items that contradict 
come from two different eras of Peirce's thought. Is that the case here, with 
CP 2.303 and CP 1.138?

Matt


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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Gary R, Matt, Edwina, Jon A, John C, List,

You wrote:

"So, for example, and a fortiori, that bullet hole in the tree is surely an
index,  (122015-1)
but may only possibly come to have an interpretant when, say, someone one
day passes by, sees it, and interprets it as such."

(*1*)  I think you may be conflating "sign" and "semiosis".

It is clear that semiois is always triadic, as represented by my "square
triangle" as you call it, but signs are not always triadic, as will be
explained below:

 f
 g
Object (O) -->  Representamen (R)  -->  Interpretant (I)
 |
^
 |
 |
 |___|
  h

*Figure 1.*  The irreducible triadic nature of semiosis.
f = R-O relation, or sign production; g = R-I relation, or sign
interpretation; h = O-I relation (or correspondence).
Each of the three nodes, O, R and I, can be in the mode of Firstness,
Secondness or Thirdness.

The the "bullet hole in the tree", before being "semiosed", i.e.,
"interpreted as a sign, by a passer-by", is still a sign (i.e., R in *Figure
1) *in the mode of being of Secondness, since its very existence is
determined by TWO objects -- the bullet and the tree penetrated by the
bullet.

 (*2*)  You are agreeing with Edwina in believing that the 9 types of signs
are not signs because they refer to 9 dyadic relations that are not triadic
?  Rather you think the 9 types are the "parameters" needed to produce the
10 classes of triadic signs ?  You may be right, but the way you are
expressing your idea is not too convincing to me.  To repeat my humble
opinion, both the 9 the types of signs and the 10 classes of signs are all
signs (simply because we are thinking about them right here and now and we
can only think in signs) but are not all of the same kind, since the former
are parts of the latter and not the other way around, in an analogous way
that quarks (there are 6 different kinds) are parts of baryons (i.e.,
protons, and neutrons) and not the other way around.  This is why I think
it is justified to differentiate the 9 types of signs and the 10 classes of
signs by giving them different names, for example, my suggestion that the
former be referred to as the "elementary signs" and the latter "composite
signs", which is in principle in the same spirit as your naming the former
as "parameters" and the latter as "triadic signs", the difference being
only NOMINAL.

(*3*) Frankly  I am really surprised that, after at least for 3 years of
discussions on the relation between the 9 types of signs and 10 classes of
signs on this list and the biosemiotics list, beginning with
[biosemiotics:46] dated 122/26/2012,  we have not yet reached a consensus
on the definition of the seemingly simple concept of *the sign*.  It is
like physicists quibbling over the definition of energy, or chemists not
agreeing on the definition of molecules endlessly, which is unthinkable.
In fact semioticians, beginning with Peirce himself, seem to have been
writing and discussing about the concept of *signs* in unbelievably
complicated ways for over 100 years ! This is probably not because
semioticians are, relatively speaking, not too bright on average, but
because semiotics may be a much more complex discipline -- incomparably
more complex than physics, chemistry, or even biology. This may explain why
semiotics has not yet been able to make any significant contributions to
advancing human knowledge (as I can see; If I am wrong on this, I would
like to be informed of any specific contributions that smiotics have made
to science, linguistics, mathematics, philosophy, or to theology throughout
human history).  And yet semiotics is such an intellectually attractive
discipline that it may act as a powerful intellectual blackhole for many
aspiring thinkers. As a possible warning against such a semiotic danger,  I
am taking the risk of committing the crime of another neologism, the "*semiotic
blackhole*" or the "*Peircean blackhole*".  If this wild speculation turns
out to have some validity upon further scrutiny, we may end up having two
kinds of *blackholes* in the Universe --

(i) the astronomical blackholes to be found in *space and time* through
spectroscopy, and

(ii) the "semiotics" or "Peircean blackholes"  that we can *experience*,
*conceptualize*, and *theorize about* in our *mind* through phaneroscopy,
communication, and logical analysis.

With all the best.

Sung

On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 3:46 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Sung, list,
>
> Sung, it seems to me likely that there are *very* few members of this
> list who do not see the Peircean sign as essentially triadic. Your attempts
> to find passages in Peirce to support your idiosyncratic position must
> fail. The vast majority of Peirce quotations which could be provided--and
>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Matt - I think it was written in 1895.
  - Original Message - 
  From: Matt Faunce 
  To: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2015 5:56 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

  On 12/29/15 5:40 PM, Matt Faunce wrote:

What year was CP 1.303 written?

  I meant, CP 2.303 

  I remember hearing Richard J. Bernstein mention in an online lecture that one 
sad consequence of Peirce's ostracization from academia is that he sometimes 
contradicted himself when he probably otherwise wouldn't have. If there's a 
seeming contradiction, I, of course, first look to see if it's just my 
misinterpretation, but second, I look to see if the two items that contradict 
come from two different eras of Peirce's thought. Is that the case here, with 
CP 2.303 and CP 1.138?

  Matt

--

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Matt, List:

The "annihilation" of a particular dynamical (actual) interpretant does not
negate the reality of the corresponding final/normal (potential)
interpretant, does it?  This reminds me of Peirce's example of whether a
diamond that is never actually scratched can be properly predicated as
hard--something on which he changed his mind over time, ultimately deciding
that what matters is what WOULD happen IF it were scratched.  The
interpretant idea WOULD be discoverable under different
circumstances--namely, if the individual consciousness in which it was
determined were NOT annihilated.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 4:40 PM, Matt Faunce  wrote:

> Edwina, List,
>
> OK. I see that Peirce said it, but how can believing that an interpretant
> can be annihilated not block the way of inquiry. See CP. 1.138:
>
> "The second bar which philosophers often set up across the roadway of
> inquiry lies in maintaining that this, that, and the other never can be
> known. When Auguste Comte was pressed to specify any matter of positive
> fact to the knowledge of which no man could by any possibility attain, he
> instanced the knowledge of the chemical composition of the fixed stars; and
> you may see his answer set down in the Philosophie positive.^1 But the ink
> was scarcely dry upon the printed page before the spectroscope was
> discovered..."
>
> With this: "the sign is thereby rendered imperfect, at least." I wonder
> what "at least" means, i.e., what more might the sign be rendered. An
> illusion? If the interpretant, as an object of inquiry, is rendered
> "absolutely undiscoverable" then there can be no potential final opinion of
> it, therefore it was never real.
>
> What year was CP 1.303 written?
>
> Matt
>
> On 12/29/15 4:24 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>
> Exactly, Matt. As Peirce said - the interpretant doesn't need to be
> existent NOW, for it could be existent in the future - that potential
> interpretant to which you refer. BUT - "if the series of successive
> interpretants comes to an end, the sign is thereby rendered imperfect, at
> least." 2.303. And he continues, "If, an interpretant idea having been
> determined in an individual consciousness, it determines no outward sign,
> but that consciousness becomes annihilated, or otherwise loses all memory
> or other significant effect of the sign, it becomes absolutely
> undiscoverable that there ever was such an idea in that consciousness..."
> 2.303.
>
> The point is, that without the interpretant, now or in the future, the
> semiosic triad is 'empty' and thus - is no longer a sign.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

calvert FromeMatt, List,  - if there is no interpretant, now or ever, then 
certainly, inquiry and knowledge development ends. After all, the interpretant 
generates another semiosic triad, and so on, and so on...

I would think that the phrase 'at least' suggests that the lack of an 
interpretant results not merely in an 'imperfect sign' but in 'no sign'.

1.303- written about 1894.

That's quite a different outline from your quote below where Peirce simply 
talks about the 'fixation of belief' held by some people, who consider that the 
current Interpretant is the Final Interpretant, when instead, it is merely 
today's view.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Matt Faunce 
  To: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2015 5:40 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations


  Edwina, List,

  OK. I see that Peirce said it, but how can believing that an interpretant can 
be annihilated not block the way of inquiry. See CP. 1.138: 

"The second bar which philosophers often set up across the roadway of 
inquiry lies in maintaining that this, that, and the other never can be known. 
When Auguste Comte was pressed to specify any matter of positive fact to the 
knowledge of which no man could by any possibility attain, he instanced the 
knowledge of the chemical composition of the fixed stars; and you may see his 
answer set down in the Philosophie positive.^1 But the ink was scarcely dry 
upon the printed page before the spectroscope was discovered..." 

  With this: "the sign is thereby rendered imperfect, at least." I wonder what 
"at least" means, i.e., what more might the sign be rendered. An illusion? If 
the interpretant, as an object of inquiry, is rendered "absolutely 
undiscoverable" then there can be no potential final opinion of it, therefore 
it was never real.

  What year was CP 1.303 written?

  Matt

  On 12/29/15 4:24 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

Exactly, Matt. As Peirce said - the interpretant doesn't need to be 
existent NOW, for it could be existent in the future - that potential 
interpretant to which you refer. BUT - "if the series of successive 
interpretants comes to an end, the sign is thereby rendered imperfect, at 
least." 2.303. And he continues, "If, an interpretant idea having been 
determined in an individual consciousness, it determines no outward sign, but 
that consciousness becomes annihilated, or otherwise loses all memory or other 
significant effect of the sign, it becomes absolutely undiscoverable that there 
ever was such an idea in that consciousness..." 2.303.

The point is, that without the interpretant, now or in the future, the 
semiosic triad is 'empty' and thus - is no longer a sign.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Matt Faunce 
  To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 
  Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2015 3:30 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations


  Peirce's "there were" means 'existent'. In the past, here, I've spoken of 
the "potential interpretant". In the hypothetical science that mathematics is, 
a pencil-lead streak forming a (rough but acceptable) circle signifies the 
hypothetical object of a perfect circle. In these cases the signs are still 
only signs within their triad; it's just that the object or interpretant 
doesn't need to be existent.

  Matt

  On 12/29/15 3:14 PM, Matt Faunce wrote:

On 12/29/15 2:56 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:

  Jon A, List, 


  Here is one quotation of Pierce cited in Charles Peirce's Guess at 
the Riddle (K. Sheriff, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994):

  "A sinsign may be index or icon.  As index it is 'a sign which would, 
at once,  (122915-1)
  lose the chracter wich makes it a sign if its object were removed, 
but would 
  not lose that character if there were no interpretant."
That's in CP 2.304


  "A sign is either an icon, an index, or a symbol. An icon is a sign 
which would possess the character which renders it significant, even though its 
object had no existence; such as a lead-pencil streak as representing a 
geometrical line. An index is a sign which would, at once, lose the character 
which makes it a sign if its object were removed, but would not lose that 
character if there were no interpretant. Such, for instance, is a piece of 
mould with a bullet-hole in it as sign of a shot; for without the shot there 
would have been no hole; but there is a hole there, whether anybody has the 
sense to attribute it to a shot or not. A symbol is a sign which would lose the 
character which renders it a sign if there were no interpretant. Such is any 
utterance of speech which signifies what it does only by virtue of its being 
understood to have that signification."



-- 
Matt

--



  -
  PEIRCE-L subscrib

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Sung - as I have repeatedly said, and which you continue to ignore, the 9 
Relations are not dyads. A dyad operates within two existentialities, and the 
Object-Representamen-Interpretant are not each existentialities in themselves. 

The icon doesn't need an existential object or interpretant but it still 
functions within a triadic semiosis.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Sungchul Ji 
  To: Matt Faunce 
  Cc: PEIRCE-L 
  Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2015 4:34 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations


  Hi Matt.


  I agree that "icon" can be a triadic sign if there is the object it refers to 
and the intepretant it determines on its interpreter, whether here and now, or 
sometime in the future.  In this sense, all of the 9 types of signs are triadic 
signs as I have been advocating against Edwina's view that they are not signs 
because they only refer to dyadic relations, i.e., R-R, R-O and R-I relations 
in 3 categorical modes.


  But, icons are different from index or from symbols in that it can act as a 
sign even without its object and interpretant (as Pointed out by Peirce) 
neither now nor in the future, like the lead-pencil streak on a blackboard.  It 
is in this sense that I am referring to icon as a monadic sign, and index a 
dyadic sign and symbol as a triadic sign. Again, I admit that, depending on the 
context, icon, index and symbol can be viewed as triadic as mentioned above.   
This is what I mean by the "ambiguity of the sign":  

  "Icon can be viewed as triadic or dyadic, depending on the context of 
discourse."   (122915-1)


  Sung


  On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 3:30 PM, Matt Faunce  wrote:

Peirce's "there were" means 'existent'. In the past, here, I've spoken of 
the "potential interpretant". In the hypothetical science that mathematics is, 
a pencil-lead streak forming a (rough but acceptable) circle signifies the 
hypothetical object of a perfect circle. In these cases the signs are still 
only signs within their triad; it's just that the object or interpretant 
doesn't need to be existent.

Matt

On 12/29/15 3:14 PM, Matt Faunce wrote:

  On 12/29/15 2:56 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:

Jon A, List, 


Here is one quotation of Pierce cited in Charles Peirce's Guess at the 
Riddle (K. Sheriff, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994):

"A sinsign may be index or icon.  As index it is 'a sign which would, 
at once,  (122915-1)
lose the chracter wich makes it a sign if its object were removed, but 
would 
not lose that character if there were no interpretant."
  That's in CP 2.304


"A sign is either an icon, an index, or a symbol. An icon is a sign 
which would possess the character which renders it significant, even though its 
object had no existence; such as a lead-pencil streak as representing a 
geometrical line. An index is a sign which would, at once, lose the character 
which makes it a sign if its object were removed, but would not lose that 
character if there were no interpretant. Such, for instance, is a piece of 
mould with a bullet-hole in it as sign of a shot; for without the shot there 
would have been no hole; but there is a hole there, whether anybody has the 
sense to attribute it to a shot or not. A symbol is a sign which would lose the 
character which renders it a sign if there were no interpretant. Such is any 
utterance of speech which signifies what it does only by virtue of its being 
understood to have that signification." 




So it seems to me that (122915-1) establishes the concept of a dyadic 
sign.


Therefore,  



"Not all signs are triadic."
 (122915-2)


as some Peirceans on this list seem to believe.


All the best.


Sung



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  -- 

  Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.

  Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
  Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
  Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
  Rutgers University
  Piscataway, N.J. 08855
  732-445-4701

  www.conformon.net


--



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations


On 12/29/15 5:40 PM, Matt Faunce wrote:


What year was CP 1.303 written?


I meant, CP 2.303

I remember hearing Richard J. Bernstein mention in an online lecture 
that one sad consequence of Peirce's ostracization from academia is that 
he sometimes contradicted himself when he probably otherwise wouldn't 
have. If there's a seeming contradiction, I, of course, first look to 
see if it's just my misinterpretation, but second, I look to see if the 
two items that contradict come from two different eras of Peirce's 
thought. Is that the case here, with CP 2.303 and CP 1.138?


Matt

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations


Edwina, List,

OK. I see that Peirce said it, but how can believing that an 
interpretant can be annihilated not block the way of inquiry. See CP. 
1.138:


calvert Frome

   "The second bar which philosophers often set up across the roadway
   of inquiry lies in maintaining that this, that, and the other never
   can be known. When Auguste Comte was pressed to specify any matter
   of positive fact to the knowledge of which no man could by any
   possibility attain, he instanced the knowledge of the chemical
   composition of the fixed stars; and you may see his answer set down
   in the Philosophie positive.^1 But the ink was scarcely dry upon the
   printed page before the spectroscope was discovered..."

calvert Frome With this: "the sign is thereby rendered imperfect, at 
least." I wonder what "at least" means, i.e., what more might the sign 
be rendered. An illusion? If the interpretant, as an object of inquiry, 
is rendered "absolutely undiscoverable" then there can be no potential 
final opinion of it, therefore it was never real.


What year was CP 1.303 written?

Matt

On 12/29/15 4:24 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

calvert Frome
Exactly, Matt. As Peirce said - the interpretant doesn't need to be 
existent NOW, for it could be existent in the future - that potential 
interpretant to which you refer. BUT - "if the series of successive 
interpretants comes to an end, the sign is thereby rendered imperfect, 
at least." 2.303. And he continues, "If, an interpretant idea having 
been determined in an individual consciousness, it determines no 
outward sign, but that consciousness becomes annihilated, or otherwise 
loses all memory or other significant effect of the sign, it becomes 
absolutely undiscoverable that there ever was such an idea in that 
consciousness..." 2.303.
The point is, that without the interpretant, now or in the future, the 
semiosic triad is 'empty' and thus - is no longer a sign.

Edwina

- Original Message -
*From:* Matt Faunce 
*To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 
*Sent:* Tuesday, December 29, 2015 3:30 PM
*Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Peirce's "there were" means 'existent'. In the past, here, I've
spoken of the "potential interpretant". In the hypothetical
science that mathematics is, a pencil-lead streak forming a (rough
but acceptable) circle signifies the hypothetical object of a
perfect circle. In these cases the signs are still only signs
within their triad; it's just that the object or interpretant
doesn't need to be existent.

Matt

On 12/29/15 3:14 PM, Matt Faunce wrote:

On 12/29/15 2:56 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:

Jon A, List,

Here is one quotation of Pierce cited in Charles Peirce's Guess
at the Riddle (K. Sheriff, Indiana University Press,
Bloomington, 1994):

"A sinsign may be index or icon.  As index it is 'a sign which
would, at once,  (122915-1)
lose the chracter wich makes it a sign if its object were
removed, but would
not lose that character if there were no interpretant."

That's in CP 2.304

"A sign is either an icon, an index, or a symbol. An icon is
a sign which would possess the character which renders it
significant, even though its object had no existence; such as
a lead-pencil streak as representing a geometrical line. An
index is a sign which would, at once, lose the character
which makes it a sign if its object were removed, but would
not lose that character if there were no interpretant. Such,
for instance, is a piece of mould with a bullet-hole in it as
sign of a shot; for without the shot there would have been no
hole; but there is a hole there, whether anybody has the
sense to attribute it to a shot or not. A symbol is a sign
which would lose the character which renders it a sign if
there were no interpretant. Such is any utterance of speech
which signifies what it does only by virtue of its being
understood to have that signification."



--
Matt


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Jon, list,

Well, and succinctly said!

I will, however, continue to employ the term 'parameters' rather than
'terms' for the nine 'characteristics' of signs since 'terms' in that
context seems far too general to get at their function: "The three
trichotomies of Signs result together in dividing Signs into TEN CLASSES OF
SIGNS" (CP 2.264).

Best,

Gary

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 5:04 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Sung, List:
>
> Again, the nine "types" are really just nine TERMS that name specific
> characteristics within the ten CLASSES of signs.  For example, an icon is
> also a rheme, and either a qualisign, sinsign, or legisign; i.e., three of
> the ten classes correspond to icons.  But no sign is ONLY an icon; it also
> ALWAYS has the R-R and R-I relations, as well.
>
> Icon, index, and symbol are all irreducibly triadic signs.  In claiming
> otherwise, you seem to be conflating reality with existence, contrary to
> Peirce's own usage of those terms.  The lead-pencil streak still has an
> object--the geometrical line--even though it does not exist.  The
> bullet-hole still has an interpretant--immediate, as well as final--even
> though it does not exist.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 3:34 PM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:
>
>> Hi Matt.
>>
>> I agree that "icon" can be a triadic sign if there is the object it
>> refers to and the intepretant it determines on its interpreter, whether
>> here and now, or sometime in the future.  In this sense, all of the 9 types
>> of signs are triadic signs as I have been advocating against Edwina's view
>> that they are not signs because they only refer to dyadic relations, i.e.,
>> R-R, R-O and R-I relations in 3 categorical modes.
>>
>> But, icons are different from index or from symbols in that it can act as
>> a sign even without its object and interpretant (as Pointed out by Peirce)
>> neither now nor in the future, like the lead-pencil streak on a
>> blackboard.  It is in this sense that I am referring to icon as a monadic
>> sign, and index a dyadic sign and symbol as a triadic sign. Again, I admit
>> that, depending on the context, icon, index and symbol can be viewed as
>> triadic as mentioned above.   This is what I mean by the "ambiguity of the
>> sign":
>>
>> "Icon can be viewed as triadic or dyadic, depending on the context of
>> discourse."   (122915-1)
>>
>> Sung
>>
>> On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 3:30 PM, Matt Faunce 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Peirce's "there were" means 'existent'. In the past, here, I've spoken
>>> of the "potential interpretant". In the hypothetical science that
>>> mathematics is, a pencil-lead streak forming a (rough but acceptable)
>>> circle signifies the hypothetical object of a perfect circle. In these
>>> cases the signs are still only signs within their triad; it's just that the
>>> object or interpretant doesn't need to be existent.
>>>
>>> Matt
>>>
>>> On 12/29/15 3:14 PM, Matt Faunce wrote:
>>>
>>> On 12/29/15 2:56 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:
>>>
>>> Jon A, List,
>>>
>>> Here is one quotation of Pierce cited in Charles Peirce's Guess at the
>>> Riddle (K. Sheriff, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994):
>>>
>>> "A sinsign may be index or icon.  As index it is 'a sign which would, at
>>> once,  (122915-1)
>>> lose the chracter wich makes it a sign if its object were removed, but
>>> would
>>> not lose that character if there were no interpretant."
>>>
>>> That's in CP 2.304
>>>
>>> "A sign is either an icon, an index, or a symbol. An icon is a sign
>>> which would possess the character which renders it significant, even though
>>> its object had no existence; such as a lead-pencil streak as representing a
>>> geometrical line. An index is a sign which would, at once, lose the
>>> character which makes it a sign if its object were removed, but would not
>>> lose that character if there were no interpretant. Such, for instance, is a
>>> piece of mould with a bullet-hole in it as sign of a shot; for without the
>>> shot there would have been no hole; but there is a hole there, whether
>>> anybody has the sense to attribute it to a shot or not. A symbol is a sign
>>> which would lose the character which renders it a sign if there were no
>>> interpretant. Such is any utterance of speech which signifies what it does
>>> only by virtue of its being understood to have that signification."
>>>
>>> So it seems to me that (122915-1) establishes the concept of a *dyadic
>>> sign*.
>>>
>>> Therefore,
>>>
>>> "Not all signs are triadic."
>>> (122915-2)
>>>
>>> as some Peirceans on this list seem to believe.
>>>
>>> All the best.
>>>
>>> Sung
>>>
>>>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PE

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Sung, List:

Again, the nine "types" are really just nine TERMS that name specific
characteristics within the ten CLASSES of signs.  For example, an icon is
also a rheme, and either a qualisign, sinsign, or legisign; i.e., three of
the ten classes correspond to icons.  But no sign is ONLY an icon; it also
ALWAYS has the R-R and R-I relations, as well.

Icon, index, and symbol are all irreducibly triadic signs.  In claiming
otherwise, you seem to be conflating reality with existence, contrary to
Peirce's own usage of those terms.  The lead-pencil streak still has an
object--the geometrical line--even though it does not exist.  The
bullet-hole still has an interpretant--immediate, as well as final--even
though it does not exist.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 3:34 PM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:

> Hi Matt.
>
> I agree that "icon" can be a triadic sign if there is the object it refers
> to and the intepretant it determines on its interpreter, whether here and
> now, or sometime in the future.  In this sense, all of the 9 types of signs
> are triadic signs as I have been advocating against Edwina's view that they
> are not signs because they only refer to dyadic relations, i.e., R-R, R-O
> and R-I relations in 3 categorical modes.
>
> But, icons are different from index or from symbols in that it can act as
> a sign even without its object and interpretant (as Pointed out by Peirce)
> neither now nor in the future, like the lead-pencil streak on a
> blackboard.  It is in this sense that I am referring to icon as a monadic
> sign, and index a dyadic sign and symbol as a triadic sign. Again, I admit
> that, depending on the context, icon, index and symbol can be viewed as
> triadic as mentioned above.   This is what I mean by the "ambiguity of the
> sign":
>
> "Icon can be viewed as triadic or dyadic, depending on the context of
> discourse."   (122915-1)
>
> Sung
>
> On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 3:30 PM, Matt Faunce  wrote:
>
>> Peirce's "there were" means 'existent'. In the past, here, I've spoken of
>> the "potential interpretant". In the hypothetical science that mathematics
>> is, a pencil-lead streak forming a (rough but acceptable) circle signifies
>> the hypothetical object of a perfect circle. In these cases the signs are
>> still only signs within their triad; it's just that the object or
>> interpretant doesn't need to be existent.
>>
>> Matt
>>
>> On 12/29/15 3:14 PM, Matt Faunce wrote:
>>
>> On 12/29/15 2:56 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:
>>
>> Jon A, List,
>>
>> Here is one quotation of Pierce cited in Charles Peirce's Guess at the
>> Riddle (K. Sheriff, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994):
>>
>> "A sinsign may be index or icon.  As index it is 'a sign which would, at
>> once,  (122915-1)
>> lose the chracter wich makes it a sign if its object were removed, but
>> would
>> not lose that character if there were no interpretant."
>>
>> That's in CP 2.304
>>
>> "A sign is either an icon, an index, or a symbol. An icon is a sign which
>> would possess the character which renders it significant, even though its
>> object had no existence; such as a lead-pencil streak as representing a
>> geometrical line. An index is a sign which would, at once, lose the
>> character which makes it a sign if its object were removed, but would not
>> lose that character if there were no interpretant. Such, for instance, is a
>> piece of mould with a bullet-hole in it as sign of a shot; for without the
>> shot there would have been no hole; but there is a hole there, whether
>> anybody has the sense to attribute it to a shot or not. A symbol is a sign
>> which would lose the character which renders it a sign if there were no
>> interpretant. Such is any utterance of speech which signifies what it does
>> only by virtue of its being understood to have that signification."
>>
>> So it seems to me that (122915-1) establishes the concept of a *dyadic
>> sign*.
>>
>> Therefore,
>>
>> "Not all signs are triadic."
>> (122915-2)
>>
>> as some Peirceans on this list seem to believe.
>>
>> All the best.
>>
>> Sung
>>
>>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Hi Matt.

I agree that "icon" can be a triadic sign if there is the object it refers
to and the intepretant it determines on its interpreter, whether here and
now, or sometime in the future.  In this sense, all of the 9 types of signs
are triadic signs as I have been advocating against Edwina's view that they
are not signs because they only refer to dyadic relations, i.e., R-R, R-O
and R-I relations in 3 categorical modes.

But, icons are different from index or from symbols in that it can act as a
sign even without its object and interpretant (as Pointed out by Peirce)
neither now nor in the future, like the lead-pencil streak on a
blackboard.  It is in this sense that I am referring to icon as a monadic
sign, and index a dyadic sign and symbol as a triadic sign. Again, I admit
that, depending on the context, icon, index and symbol can be viewed as
triadic as mentioned above.   This is what I mean by the "ambiguity of the
sign":

"Icon can be viewed as triadic or dyadic, depending on the context of
discourse."   (122915-1)

Sung

On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 3:30 PM, Matt Faunce  wrote:

> Peirce's "there were" means 'existent'. In the past, here, I've spoken of
> the "potential interpretant". In the hypothetical science that mathematics
> is, a pencil-lead streak forming a (rough but acceptable) circle signifies
> the hypothetical object of a perfect circle. In these cases the signs are
> still only signs within their triad; it's just that the object or
> interpretant doesn't need to be existent.
>
> Matt
>
> On 12/29/15 3:14 PM, Matt Faunce wrote:
>
> On 12/29/15 2:56 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:
>
> Jon A, List,
>
> Here is one quotation of Pierce cited in Charles Peirce's Guess at the
> Riddle (K. Sheriff, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994):
>
> "A sinsign may be index or icon.  As index it is 'a sign which would, at
> once,  (122915-1)
> lose the chracter wich makes it a sign if its object were removed, but
> would
> not lose that character if there were no interpretant."
>
> That's in CP 2.304
>
> "A sign is either an icon, an index, or a symbol. An icon is a sign which
> would possess the character which renders it significant, even though its
> object had no existence; such as a lead-pencil streak as representing a
> geometrical line. An index is a sign which would, at once, lose the
> character which makes it a sign if its object were removed, but would not
> lose that character if there were no interpretant. Such, for instance, is a
> piece of mould with a bullet-hole in it as sign of a shot; for without the
> shot there would have been no hole; but there is a hole there, whether
> anybody has the sense to attribute it to a shot or not. A symbol is a sign
> which would lose the character which renders it a sign if there were no
> interpretant. Such is any utterance of speech which signifies what it does
> only by virtue of its being understood to have that signification."
>
>
>
> So it seems to me that (122915-1) establishes the concept of a *dyadic
> sign*.
>
> Therefore,
>
> "Not all signs are triadic."
>   (122915-2)
>
> as some Peirceans on this list seem to believe.
>
> All the best.
>
> Sung
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

-- 
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.

Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701

www.conformon.net

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

calvert FromeExactly, Matt. As Peirce said - the interpretant doesn't need to 
be existent NOW, for it could be existent in the future - that potential 
interpretant to which you refer. BUT - "if the series of successive 
interpretants comes to an end, the sign is thereby rendered imperfect, at 
least." 2.303. And he continues, "If, an interpretant idea having been 
determined in an individual consciousness, it determines no outward sign, but 
that consciousness becomes annihilated, or otherwise loses all memory or other 
significant effect of the sign, it becomes absolutely undiscoverable that there 
ever was such an idea in that consciousness..." 2.303.

The point is, that without the interpretant, now or in the future, the semiosic 
triad is 'empty' and thus - is no longer a sign.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Matt Faunce 
  To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 
  Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2015 3:30 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations


  Peirce's "there were" means 'existent'. In the past, here, I've spoken of the 
"potential interpretant". In the hypothetical science that mathematics is, a 
pencil-lead streak forming a (rough but acceptable) circle signifies the 
hypothetical object of a perfect circle. In these cases the signs are still 
only signs within their triad; it's just that the object or interpretant 
doesn't need to be existent.

  Matt

  On 12/29/15 3:14 PM, Matt Faunce wrote:

On 12/29/15 2:56 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:

  Jon A, List, 


  Here is one quotation of Pierce cited in Charles Peirce's Guess at the 
Riddle (K. Sheriff, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994):

  "A sinsign may be index or icon.  As index it is 'a sign which would, at 
once,  (122915-1)
  lose the chracter wich makes it a sign if its object were removed, but 
would 
  not lose that character if there were no interpretant."
That's in CP 2.304


  "A sign is either an icon, an index, or a symbol. An icon is a sign which 
would possess the character which renders it significant, even though its 
object had no existence; such as a lead-pencil streak as representing a 
geometrical line. An index is a sign which would, at once, lose the character 
which makes it a sign if its object were removed, but would not lose that 
character if there were no interpretant. Such, for instance, is a piece of 
mould with a bullet-hole in it as sign of a shot; for without the shot there 
would have been no hole; but there is a hole there, whether anybody has the 
sense to attribute it to a shot or not. A symbol is a sign which would lose the 
character which renders it a sign if there were no interpretant. Such is any 
utterance of speech which signifies what it does only by virtue of its being 
understood to have that signification." 




  So it seems to me that (122915-1) establishes the concept of a dyadic 
sign.


  Therefore,  



  "Not all signs are triadic."  
   (122915-2)


  as some Peirceans on this list seem to believe.


  All the best.


  Sung



--



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - meta-languages and propositions of triadicity

Sung, List:

Please see my reply in the other thread.  An index is still always triadic;
it has immediate (possible) and final/normal (would-be) interpretants, even
if it never produces a dynamic (actual) interpretant.

Regards,

Jon S. (not Jon A., since that would be Jon Awbrey)

On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 2:38 PM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:

> John, List,
>
> I just wrote to Jon A as below, reminding him that not all signs are
> triadic, according to Peirce:
>
> "Here is one quotation of Pierce cited in Charles Peirce's Guess at the
> Riddle (K. Sheriff,
> Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994):
>
> "A sinsign may be index or icon.  As index it is 'a sign which would, at
> once,  (122915-1)
> lose the character which makes it a sign if its object were removed, but
> would
> not lose that character if there were no interpretant."
>
> So it seems to me that (122915-1) establishes the concept of a *dyadic
> sign*.
>
> Therefore,
>
> "Not all signs are triadic."
>   (122915-2)"
>
> All the best.
>
> Sung
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Matt:  Thanks for the longer excerpt, which I was just finding myself.

Sung:  In Peirce's example, the bullet-hole is a sign of the shot that
caused it, even if no one ever attributes it as such.  Does this make it
dyadic, rather than triadic?  I do not believe so, at least not according
to my understanding of Peircean semeiotic.  Although there is no DYNAMIC
(actual) interpretant that attributes it to a shot, there is certainly an
IMMEDIATE (possible) interpretant that does so--i.e., this clearly falls
within the range of the sign's interpretability.  "The Immediate
Interpretant consists in the Quality of the Impression that a sign is fit
to produce, not to any actual reaction." (CP8.315)  Furthermore, the FINAL
or NORMAL interpretant definitely attributes the bullet-hole to a shot,
since that is the truth of the matter.  "It is likewise requisite to
distinguish the Immediate Interpretant, i.e. the Interpretant represented
or signified in the Sign, from the Dynamic Interpretant, or effect actually
produced on the mind by the Sign; and both of these from the Normal
Interpretant, or effect that would be produced on the mind by the Sign
after sufficient development of thought." (CP8.343)  Therefore, even though
no interpretant EXISTS in this case, the sign is still triadic; it is "fit
to produce" an interpretant, and WOULD produce an interpretant under the
right circumstances.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 2:14 PM, Matt Faunce  wrote:

> On 12/29/15 2:56 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:
>
> Jon A, List,
>
> Here is one quotation of Pierce cited in Charles Peirce's Guess at the
> Riddle (K. Sheriff, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994):
>
> "A sinsign may be index or icon.  As index it is 'a sign which would, at
> once,  (122915-1)
> lose the chracter wich makes it a sign if its object were removed, but
> would
> not lose that character if there were no interpretant."
>
> That's in CP 2.304
>
> "A sign is either an icon, an index, or a symbol. An icon is a sign which
> would possess the character which renders it significant, even though its
> object had no existence; such as a lead-pencil streak as representing a
> geometrical line. An index is a sign which would, at once, lose the
> character which makes it a sign if its object were removed, but would not
> lose that character if there were no interpretant. Such, for instance, is a
> piece of mould with a bullet-hole in it as sign of a shot; for without the
> shot there would have been no hole; but there is a hole there, whether
> anybody has the sense to attribute it to a shot or not. A symbol is a sign
> which would lose the character which renders it a sign if there were no
> interpretant. Such is any utterance of speech which signifies what it does
> only by virtue of its being understood to have that signification."
>
>So it seems to me that (122915-1) establishes the concept of a 
> *dyadic
> sign*.
>
> Therefore,
>
> "Not all signs are triadic."
>   (122915-2)
>
> as some Peirceans on this list seem to believe.
>
> All the best.
>
> Sung
>
> --
> Matt
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Hi Matt,

Thanks for the original source of the quote I used earlier.

All the best.

Sung

On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 3:14 PM, Matt Faunce  wrote:

> On 12/29/15 2:56 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:
>
> Jon A, List,
>
> Here is one quotation of Pierce cited in Charles Peirce's Guess at the
> Riddle (K. Sheriff, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994):
>
> "A sinsign may be index or icon.  As index it is 'a sign which would, at
> once,  (122915-1)
> lose the chracter wich makes it a sign if its object were removed, but
> would
> not lose that character if there were no interpretant."
>
> That's in CP 2.304
>
> "A sign is either an icon, an index, or a symbol. An icon is a sign which
> would possess the character which renders it significant, even though its
> object had no existence; such as a lead-pencil streak as representing a
> geometrical line. An index is a sign which would, at once, lose the
> character which makes it a sign if its object were removed, but would not
> lose that character if there were no interpretant. Such, for instance, is a
> piece of mould with a bullet-hole in it as sign of a shot; for without the
> shot there would have been no hole; but there is a hole there, whether
> anybody has the sense to attribute it to a shot or not. A symbol is a sign
> which would lose the character which renders it a sign if there were no
> interpretant. Such is any utterance of speech which signifies what it does
> only by virtue of its being understood to have that signification."
>
>
>
> So it seems to me that (122915-1) establishes the concept of a *dyadic
> sign*.
>
> Therefore,
>
> "Not all signs are triadic."
>   (122915-2)
>
> as some Peirceans on this list seem to believe.
>
> All the best.
>
> Sung
>
>
> --
> Matt
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>


-- 
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.

Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701

www.conformon.net

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Sung, list,

Sung, it seems to me likely that there are *very* few members of this list
who do not see the Peircean sign as essentially triadic. Your attempts to
find passages in Peirce to support your idiosyncratic position must fail.
The vast majority of Peirce quotations which could be provided--and we're
probably talking about dozens if not hundreds--*immedately* make it clear
that all signs are triadic. The quotation you just offered, commenting that
in the case of an index that the Interpretant may be merely *possible*,
does not deny the triadic nature of the sign. See, for example, this
quotation which makes this explicit in the very MS which initiated this
thread. NDTR.

A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the Second
Correlate being termed its Object, and the possible Third Correlate being
termed its Interpretant, by which triadic relation the possible
Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic
relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant. A Sign is
a representamen of which some interpetant is a cognition of a mind. Signs
are the only representamens that have been much studied. CP 2.242

Even a symbol has only a 'possible' interpretant so that if, for example, a
novel written in Bulgarian were given to me, I couldn't make any sense of
it since I do not know that language. The interpretant would remain
'possible' for me (I might some day learn Bulgarian and read the novel),
but would be 'real' for an actual Bulgarian reader of it.

So, for example, and a fortiori, that bullet hole in the tree is surely an
index, but may only possibly come to have an interpretent when, say,
someone one day passes by, sees it, and interprets it as such.

Thus, I too would like to recomment that instead of trying to 'square the
triangle', so to speak, that you really do consider reading much more
Peircean semiotic, for example, the late Welby letters which Edwina
recently recommended, so that you will at last come to the conclusion which
virtually every Peircan semiotician recognized as such has come to, namely,
that signs are not dyadic (that's Saussurrean), all are *essentially*
triadic. Any basic handbook on semiotics (of which Kalevi Kull has posted a
list at Academia) will make this distinction between Peirce's and
Saussure's semiotic clear as day.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*

On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 2:56 PM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:

> Jon A, List,
>
> Here is one quotation of Pierce cited in Charles Peirce's Guess at the
> Riddle (K. Sheriff, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994):
>
> "A sinsign may be index or icon.  As index it is 'a sign which would, at
> once,  (122915-1)
> lose the chracter wich makes it a sign if its object were removed, but
> would
> not lose that character if there were no interpretant."
>
> So it seems to me that (122915-1) establishes the concept of a *dyadic
> sign*.
>
> Therefore,
>
> "Not all signs are triadic."
>   (122915-2)
>
> as some Peirceans on this list seem to believe.
>
> All the best.
>
> Sung
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> "
>
> On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 9:00 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Sung, List:
>>
>> Yes, I meant legisign not dicisign.  Thanks for the correction.
>>
>> You asserted that it is "non-Peircean" to think that something
>> non-triadic CANNOT be a sign.  If this is true, then Peirce's writings must
>> identify something non-triadic that CAN be a sign.  I asked you to provide
>> such a citation.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon S.
>>
>> On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 6:47 AM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:
>>
>>> Hi Jon,
>>>
>>> You wrote:
>>>
>>> "Every sign is either a qualisign, a sinsign, or a dicisign; . . . "
>>>   (122915-1)
>>>
>>> Did you mean to say "legisign: instead of "dicisign" ?  It is my
>>> understanding that "dicisign" is the interpretan of a sinsign.
>>>
>>> "Please indicate where in Peirce's writings that he EVER defines
>>> something  (122915-2)
>>> that is dyadic or otherwise non-triadic as a "sign."
>>>
>>> Can you re-phrase (122915-2) ?
>>>
>>> All the best.
>>>
>>> Sung
>>>
>>> On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 11:08 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
>>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
 Sung, List:

 The nine terms that you list are not really TYPES of signs; rather,
 each one is a label for a single ASPECT of a given sign.  Every sign is
 either a qualisign, a sinsign, or a dicisign; every sign is either an icon,
 an index, or a symbol; and every sign is either a rheme, a dicent, or an
 argument.  However, any one of these labels is an INCOMPLETE description,
 with the exception of qualisign (which entails icon and rheme) and argument
 (which entails legisign an

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - meta-languages and propositions of triadicity

John, List,

I just wrote to Jon A as below, reminding him that not all signs are
triadic, according to Peirce:


"Here is one quotation of Pierce cited in Charles Peirce's Guess at the
Riddle (K. Sheriff,
Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994):

"A sinsign may be index or icon.  As index it is 'a sign which would, at
once,  (122915-1)
lose the character which makes it a sign if its object were removed, but
would
not lose that character if there were no interpretant."

So it seems to me that (122915-1) establishes the concept of a *dyadic sign*
.

Therefore,

"Not all signs are triadic."
  (122915-2)"

All the best.

Sung



On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 1:42 PM, John Collier  wrote:

> The interpretant is a sign, so of course it is triadic.
>
>
>
> John Collier
>
> Professor Emeritus, UKZN
>
> http://web.ncf.ca/collier
>
>
>
> *From:* sji.confor...@gmail.com [mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com] *On
> Behalf Of *Sungchul Ji
> *Sent:* Tuesday, 29 December 2015 2:34 PM
> *To:* PEIRCE-L
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations -
> meta-languages and propositions of triadicity
>
>
>
> Jon A, List,
>
>
>
> Your excellent quote
>
>
>
> ". . . . the Interpretant, or Third, cannot stand in a mere dyadic
> relation to the Object,(122915-1)
>
> but must stand in such a relation to it as the Representamen itself does."
>
>
>
> indicates that the Interpretant is triadic as well, just like the
> Representamen is.  But in the following quote I cited yesterday, Peirce
> said:
>
>
>
> " . . . (A, or a sign; my addition) is also in a triadic relation to B
> for a purely   (122915-2)
> passive correlate, C, this triadic relation being such as to determine
> *C to be in a dyadic relation, µ, to B*," (emphasis added)
>
>
>
> *30 - 1905 - SS. pp. 192-193 - Letter to Lady Welby (Draft) presumably
> July 1905 .*
>
> So then anything (generally in a mathematical sense) is a priman (not a
> priman element generally) and we might define a sign as follows:
>
> "A "sign" is anything, A, which,
>
> (1) in addition to other characters of its own,
>
> (2) stands in a dyadic relation Þ, to a purely active correlate, B,
>
> (3) and is also in a triadic relation to B for a purely passive correlate,
> C, this triadic relation being such as to determine C to be in a dyadic
> relation, µ, to B, the relation µ corresponding in a recognized way to the
> relation Þ."
>
> Retrieved from http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM
>
>
> Statements (122915-1) and (122915-2) are clearly contradictory, just as
> the following two statements are with respect to the ambiguous picture, P,
> shown in Figure 1:
>
>
>
> "A is a lion and not a cat."
>(122915-3)
>
> "A is a cat and not a lion."
>(122915-4)
>
>
>
> [image: Inline image 1]
>
>
>
> Figure 1. An ambiguous picture. retrieved from the Internet.
>
>
>
> But in reality
>
>
>
> "A is both a lion and a cat."
>   (122915-5)
>
>
>
> It seems to me that there are two possible explanations for the seeming
> contradiction revealed in Peirce's writings, (122915-1) and (122915-2):
>
> (i)  Peirce contradicted himself.
> (122915-6)
>
>
>
> (ii) Peirce (most likely unknowingly or unconsciously) prescinded
>  (122915-7)
> the dyadic aspect of the triadic sign.
>
>
>
> Possibility (ii) is consistent with what I called yesterday the "Peirce
> uncertainty principle" (PUP) or "Semiotic uncertainty principle" (PUP) in
> analogy to the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle.   I now suggest that a
> stronger version of PUP or SUP would be
>
>
>
> "*All signs are ambiguous to varying degrees*."
>   (122915-8)
>
>
>
> which may be referred to as the "Sign Uncertainty Principle" (SUP)
>
>
>
> where the letter S is ambiguous.
>
>
>
> All the best.
>
>
>
> Sung
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 10:28 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
>
>
> Is it not the case, at least according to Peirce, that the
> interpretant-object relation is necessarily the same as the
> representamen-object relation?  If so, then there is no need for a separate
> trichotomy to characterize it.
>
>
>
> "A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine
> triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of
> determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic
> relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.  The
> triadic relation is genuine, that is, its three members are bound together
> by it in a way that does not consist in any complexus of dyadic relations.
> That is the reason that the Interpretant, or Third, cannot stand in a mere
> dyadic relation to the Object, but must stand in such

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Peirce's "there were" means 'existent'. In the past, here, I've spoken 
of the "potential interpretant". In the hypothetical science that 
mathematics is, a pencil-lead streak forming a (rough but acceptable) 
circle signifies the hypothetical object of a perfect circle. In these 
cases the signs are still only signs within their triad; it's just that 
the object or interpretant doesn't need to be existent.


Matt

On 12/29/15 3:14 PM, Matt Faunce wrote:

On 12/29/15 2:56 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:

Jon A, List,

Here is one quotation of Pierce cited in Charles Peirce's Guess at 
the Riddle (K. Sheriff, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994):


"A sinsign may be index or icon.  As index it is 'a sign which would, 
at once,  (122915-1)
lose the chracter wich makes it a sign if its object were removed, 
but would

not lose that character if there were no interpretant."

That's in CP 2.304

"A sign is either an icon, an index, or a symbol. An icon is a
sign which would possess the character which renders it
significant, even though its object had no existence; such as a
lead-pencil streak as representing a geometrical line. An index is
a sign which would, at once, lose the character which makes it a
sign if its object were removed, but would not lose that character
if there were no interpretant. Such, for instance, is a piece of
mould with a bullet-hole in it as sign of a shot; for without the
shot there would have been no hole; but there is a hole there,
whether anybody has the sense to attribute it to a shot or not. A
symbol is a sign which would lose the character which renders it a
sign if there were no interpretant. Such is any utterance of
speech which signifies what it does only by virtue of its being
understood to have that signification."

calvert Frome calvert Frome


So it seems to me that (122915-1) establishes the concept of a 
*dyadic sign*.


Therefore,

"Not all signs are triadic." (122915-2)

as some Peirceans on this list seem to believe.

All the best.

Sung

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations


On 12/29/15 2:56 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:

Jon A, List,

Here is one quotation of Pierce cited in Charles Peirce's Guess at the 
Riddle (K. Sheriff, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994):


"A sinsign may be index or icon.  As index it is 'a sign which would, 
at once,  (122915-1)
lose the chracter wich makes it a sign if its object were removed, but 
would

not lose that character if there were no interpretant."

That's in CP 2.304

   "A sign is either an icon, an index, or a symbol. An icon is a sign
   which would possess the character which renders it significant, even
   though its object had no existence; such as a lead-pencil streak as
   representing a geometrical line. An index is a sign which would, at
   once, lose the character which makes it a sign if its object were
   removed, but would not lose that character if there were no
   interpretant. Such, for instance, is a piece of mould with a
   bullet-hole in it as sign of a shot; for without the shot there
   would have been no hole; but there is a hole there, whether anybody
   has the sense to attribute it to a shot or not. A symbol is a sign
   which would lose the character which renders it a sign if there were
   no interpretant. Such is any utterance of speech which signifies
   what it does only by virtue of its being understood to have that
   signification."

calvert Frome calvert Frome


So it seems to me that (122915-1) establishes the concept of a *dyadic 
sign*.


Therefore,

"Not all signs are triadic." (122915-2)

as some Peirceans on this list seem to believe.

All the best.

Sung


--
Matt


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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Jon A, List,

Here is one quotation of Pierce cited in Charles Peirce's Guess at the
Riddle (K. Sheriff, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994):

"A sinsign may be index or icon.  As index it is 'a sign which would, at
once,  (122915-1)
lose the chracter wich makes it a sign if its object were removed, but
would
not lose that character if there were no interpretant."

So it seems to me that (122915-1) establishes the concept of a *dyadic sign*
.

Therefore,

"Not all signs are triadic."
  (122915-2)

as some Peirceans on this list seem to believe.

All the best.

Sung









"

On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 9:00 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Sung, List:
>
> Yes, I meant legisign not dicisign.  Thanks for the correction.
>
> You asserted that it is "non-Peircean" to think that something non-triadic
> CANNOT be a sign.  If this is true, then Peirce's writings must identify
> something non-triadic that CAN be a sign.  I asked you to provide such a
> citation.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 6:47 AM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:
>
>> Hi Jon,
>>
>> You wrote:
>>
>> "Every sign is either a qualisign, a sinsign, or a dicisign; . . . "
>> (122915-1)
>>
>> Did you mean to say "legisign: instead of "dicisign" ?  It is my
>> understanding that "dicisign" is the interpretan of a sinsign.
>>
>> "Please indicate where in Peirce's writings that he EVER defines
>> something  (122915-2)
>> that is dyadic or otherwise non-triadic as a "sign."
>>
>> Can you re-phrase (122915-2) ?
>>
>> All the best.
>>
>> Sung
>>
>> On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 11:08 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Sung, List:
>>>
>>> The nine terms that you list are not really TYPES of signs; rather, each
>>> one is a label for a single ASPECT of a given sign.  Every sign is either a
>>> qualisign, a sinsign, or a dicisign; every sign is either an icon, an
>>> index, or a symbol; and every sign is either a rheme, a dicent, or an
>>> argument.  However, any one of these labels is an INCOMPLETE description,
>>> with the exception of qualisign (which entails icon and rheme) and argument
>>> (which entails legisign and symbol); and even those are incomplete once we
>>> start taking additional trichotomies into account.
>>>
>>> Please indicate where in Peirce's writings that he EVER defines
>>> something that is dyadic or otherwise non-triadic as a "sign."
>>>
>>> It seems rather obvious that "reading Peirce extensively does not
>>> GUARANTEE that the reader will come away with a correct understanding of
>>> Peirce," and I doubt that anyone on the List would dispute this.  However,
>>> I suspect that reading Peirce extensively does render one MORE LIKELY to
>>> come away with a correct understanding of his thought that reading him only
>>> to a limited extent.  Just my opinion, of course.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>>
>>> On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 6:22 PM, Sungchul Ji 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 Edwina,

 You wrote:

 "Furthermore, the 9 Relations are NOT signs."
   (122815-1)

 (*1*)  Edwina, as you well know, Peirce gave the following "names" to
 the 9 relations:

 1) quali*sign,*
 2) sin*sign*,
 3) legi*sign*.
 4) icon,
 5) index,
 6) symbol,
 7) rheme,
 8) dici*sign*, and
 9) argument.

 If these are not "signs" as you claim, do you think Peirce made
 mistakes when he referred to 4  (i.e., 1, 2, 3, and 8) out of the 9
 relations as "signs " ?

 (*2*)  The problem with your reasoning here, as I can tell, seems to
 be that you think "sign" has always one meaning, i.e., something genuinely
 triadic.  So if something is not triadic  (e.g., the 9 dyadic relations
 above), that something cannot be a sign.  I think such a mode of thinking
  is not only fallacious but also non-Peircean.

 (*3*) If my claim that your understanding of the 9 types of signs is
 fallacious turns out to be correct, this may provide , IMHO, an interesting
 lesson  and warning for all Peircean scholars:

 "Reading Peirce extensively does not guarantee that the
 (122815-2)
 reader will come away with a correct understanding of Peirce."

 If (122815-2) proves to be true, upon further critical scrutiny, we may
 be able to identify possible reasons for why this statement may be true.
 One possibility that occurs to me, in analogy to the Heisenberg Uncertainty
 Principle in physics, is something like the following:

 "It is impossible to simultaneously determine the object
   (122815-3)
 and the interpretant of a sign with arbitrary

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy -- Sign

2015-12-29 Thread Stephen C. Rose

It is hard for me to know all these distinctions both for lack of knowledge
and some unwillingness to concede that we cannot have a commonsense
Philosophy that is capable of exerting broad influence It is not hard to
imagine that many are shell-shocked by the way reductions of philosophy
most probably influenced the last centuries. Binary thinking for the most
part I feel. And egregious dualisms that persist. Triadic Philosophy is an
attempt to take what was ruined by binary thinking and the formation of
violent orthodoxies and universalize the best values and make them the
basis for future pedagogy and policy. I have neither the status nor the
pedigree to do this but I persist in believing that ideas are more
important than personalities. Snow is always cited when we speak of
breakdowns of thought. I think this can be said to now be terminal. I feel
rather oddly that out of  the wilderness of the Web will come the
philosophy that for better or worse dominates the way things get done from
now on. Also that Peirce is the author of it. Or should be.

Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU Art: http://buff.ly/1wXAxbl
Gifts: http://buff.ly/1wXADj3

On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 11:49 AM, Søren Brier  wrote:

> Dear John and Stephen
>
>
>
> I think there is an ontological difference between your views as Deacon
> and to a certain degree Stjernfelt’ s views are based on ,to me unclear
> “scientific worldviews”, which in the end means physicalism. None of them
> has taken a clear opposition to physicalism. They are not mechanical
> materialist but believe in thermodynamic self-organization through
> Prigogine’s non-equilibrium thermodynamics. Deacon is close to general
> system theory but does not accept it openly probably because Bertalanffy
> was an organicist and therefore not compatible with the physicalist
> scientific worldview. Never the less he endorse a developmental theory
> combined with evolution theory from matter, over objective information to
> icons. Stuart Kaufmann seems also to attempt to make signs emerge from a
> physicalist worldview.  Stjernfelt seem to run a standard scientific
> ontology parallel with a Peircean semiotic as far as I can read, never
> going into self-organization and theories of emergence.  But in my view a
> Peircean icon does not work without his whole pragmaticist  philosophy with
> its foundation in his hylozoist, thycistic ontology, combined with his
>  aesthetics, ethics and semiotic logic as the base of his phaneroscopic
> epistemology. There are a lot of attempts to use Peirce’s semiotics and
> pragmaticism on other philosophical foundations than the one he
> painstakingly developed over his life. One of the more obvious is
> Barbieri’s codebiology, but he is so honest and explicit in his
> argumentation that it is possible to discuss it, as I have done in the
> attached article from *Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology*. Am
> I wrong?
>
>
>
> Best
>
>   Søren
>
>
>
>
>
> *Fra:* John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za]
> *Sendt:* 29. december 2015 04:13
> *Til:* Stephen C. Rose; Peirce List
> *Emne:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy -- Sign
>
>
>
> Stephen, List,
>
>
>
> That is similar to Terry Deacon’s view in *The Symbolic Species* (1997),
> and also later in *Incomplete Nature* (2012). He argues that the
> evolution of symbols starts with icons, icons combine to form indexes, and
> we end up with, in humans, full symbols. Frederick Stjernflelt takes issue
> with this (*Diagrammatology*, chapter 11, 2007; *Natural Propositions*,
> chapter 6, 2014), arguing that dicisigns can be found, and are needed,
> right back to the beginning of signs in biology, so that (proto)symbolic
> symbols and arguments as well are original, both factually and as a
> requirement for understanding how signs evolved. I am currently inclined to
> agree with Stjernfelt (Collier, 2014, *Signs without minds*. V. Romanini,
> E. Fernández (eds.), Peirce and Biosemiotics, Biosemiotics 11), though I
> didn’t know about his work at the time.
>
>
>
> John Collier
>
> Professor Emeritus, UKZN
>
> http://web.ncf.ca/collier
>
>
>
> *From:* Stephen C. Rose [mailto:stever...@gmail.com ]
>
> *Sent:* Tuesday, 29 December 2015 3:47 AM
> *To:* Peirce List
> *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy -- Sign
>
>
>
> I see a sign as something that emerges in the vague penumbra called First
> or by me Reality. It is named and acquires identity rising from its primal
> being. It naturally encounters a blunt index of truths which I call Ethics
> (Second) and is composed of Values (not virtues) and from there it passes
> through a the doorway to the Third which I call Aesthetics and understand
> to be the point at which the consideration, which this is, evolves into
> expression and action. In terms of Peirce's maxim this Third is the the
> substance of the matter. When I see folk discussing signs and firsts and
> seconds and thirds in highly complex ways I do not think I am thereby
> missing the possibilit

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - meta-languages and propositions of triadicity

2015-12-29 Thread John Collier

The interpretant is a sign, so of course it is triadic.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: sji.confor...@gmail.com [mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com] On Behalf Of 
Sungchul Ji
Sent: Tuesday, 29 December 2015 2:34 PM
To: PEIRCE-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - 
meta-languages and propositions of triadicity

Jon A, List,

Your excellent quote

". . . . the Interpretant, or Third, cannot stand in a mere dyadic relation to 
the Object,(122915-1)
but must stand in such a relation to it as the Representamen itself does."

indicates that the Interpretant is triadic as well, just like the Representamen 
is.  But in the following quote I cited yesterday, Peirce said:

" . . . (A, or a sign; my addition) is also in a triadic relation to B for a 
purely   (122915-2)
passive correlate, C, this triadic relation being such as to determine C to
be in a dyadic relation, µ, to B," (emphasis added)

30 - 1905 - SS. pp. 192-193 - Letter to Lady Welby (Draft) presumably July 1905 
.

So then anything (generally in a mathematical sense) is a priman (not a priman 
element generally) and we might define a sign as follows:

"A "sign" is anything, A, which,

(1) in addition to other characters of its own,

(2) stands in a dyadic relation Þ, to a purely active correlate, B,

(3) and is also in a triadic relation to B for a purely passive correlate, C, 
this triadic relation being such as to determine C to be in a dyadic relation, 
µ, to B, the relation µ corresponding in a recognized way to the relation Þ."

Retrieved from http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM

Statements (122915-1) and (122915-2) are clearly contradictory, just as the 
following two statements are with respect to the ambiguous picture, P, shown in 
Figure 1:

"A is a lion and not a cat."
  (122915-3)

"A is a cat and not a lion."
  (122915-4)

[Inline image 1]

Figure 1. An ambiguous picture. retrieved from the Internet.

But in reality

"A is both a lion and a cat."   
(122915-5)

It seems to me that there are two possible explanations for the seeming 
contradiction revealed in Peirce's writings, (122915-1) and (122915-2):
(i)  Peirce contradicted himself.   
  (122915-6)

(ii) Peirce (most likely unknowingly or unconsciously) prescinded   
   (122915-7)
the dyadic aspect of the triadic sign.

Possibility (ii) is consistent with what I called yesterday the "Peirce 
uncertainty principle" (PUP) or "Semiotic uncertainty principle" (PUP) in 
analogy to the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle.   I now suggest that a 
stronger version of PUP or SUP would be

"All signs are ambiguous to varying degrees."   
  (122915-8)

which may be referred to as the "Sign Uncertainty Principle" (SUP)

where the letter S is ambiguous.

All the best.

Sung

On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 10:28 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote:
Edwina, List:

Is it not the case, at least according to Peirce, that the interpretant-object 
relation is necessarily the same as the representamen-object relation?  If so, 
then there is no need for a separate trichotomy to characterize it.

"A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic 
relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a 
Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its 
Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.  The triadic relation is 
genuine, that is, its three members are bound together by it in a way that does 
not consist in any complexus of dyadic relations.  That is the reason that the 
Interpretant, or Third, cannot stand in a mere dyadic relation to the Object, 
but must stand in such a relation to it as the Representamen itself does." 
(EP2:272-273)

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 7:14 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote:
John, list:
That's an extremely interesting suggestion, that the 'third relation' is that 
between the interpretant and the object. I have trouble with that, as the 9 
relations (parameters according to Gary R) which are differentiated in terms of 
the modal category, do not refer to this interpretant-object relation.

They refer to the representamen-in-itself, which I consider to be a 
relation-of-depth (providing an evol

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - meta-languages and propositions of triadicity

Jon - I see the representamen as 'Being thus connected with three things, the 
ground, the object, and the interpretant" 2.229.  These, in my view, are the 
three relations. The representamen is the key agent, for ALL three of these 
'connections' or relations must involve the representamen. 

There is the representamen "as it is in itself' (and we have three terms for 
its nature as it is in itself: qualsign, sinsign, legisign) 8.334.  And, the R 
"in respect to their relations to their dynamic objects" 8.335 (icon, index, 
symbol); and the R 'in regard to its relation to its signified interpretant" 
8.337 (rheme, dicent, argument). 

I see the R-O and R-I relations as providing breadth, while the R-R relation 
provides depth. The Representamen is a key agent/function in the semiosic 
process; it is not a mechanical transference of object data to interpretation. 
It is the ground, the evolved set of habits, the knowledge base of the system 
in which semiosis is taking place. It transforms input data from the object via 
its knowledge-mediation...to result in an interpretation.  As Peirce writes, "a 
sign mediates between the interpretant sign and its object" 8.332 - 
understanding the first term of 'sign' here as the representamen. Without this 
key process that is the role of the Representamen - our world would have no 
habits of organization, it would be pure randomness. And as Peirce also pointed 
out, these habits evolve...

As Peirce wrote in the quote you provided, there are THREE nodes: 
representamen, object, interpretant.

Now, the interaction between the Interpretant and the Object is not, to my 
view, within the first basic triad. Note that it does NOT involve the 
Representamen - which I consider a necessary semiosic process. It provides a 
necessary inductive reference whereby the Interpretant does not stand alienated 
from objective reality but must - not necessarily now - but at some time in the 
future - reference that object truthfully. How does it do this? By generating 
more triadic signs; that is, the Interpretant generates more triadic signs.

As he points out, the I-O can't be a dyadic relation; and it can't mimic the 
R-O relationInstead, the Interpretant "must be capable of determining a 
Third (Interpretant) on its own, but besides that, it must have a second 
triadic relation in which the Representamen, or rather the relation thereof to 
its Object, shall be its own (the Third's) Object, and must be capable of 
determining a Third (Interpretant). All this must be equally be true of the 
Third's Thirds and so on endlessly..EPp 273. 

The way I read this, is that the Interpretant, a result of that first basic 
semiosic triad, then generates more triads - thus, involving the Representamen 
- and more Interpretants, to arrive at, in some future time, the truth of the 
Object.

Edwina

- Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky ; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 
  Sent: Monday, December 28, 2015 10:28 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - 
meta-languages and propositions of triadicity


  Edwina, List:


  Is it not the case, at least according to Peirce, that the 
interpretant-object relation is necessarily the same as the 
representamen-object relation?  If so, then there is no need for a separate 
trichotomy to characterize it.


  "A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic 
relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a 
Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its 
Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.  The triadic relation is 
genuine, that is, its three members are bound together by it in a way that does 
not consist in any complexus of dyadic relations.  That is the reason that the 
Interpretant, or Third, cannot stand in a mere dyadic relation to the Object, 
but must stand in such a relation to it as the Representamen itself does." 
(EP2:272-273)


  Regards,


  Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
  Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
  www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt


  On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 7:14 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

John, list:
That's an extremely interesting suggestion, that the 'third relation' is 
that between the interpretant and the object. I have trouble with that, as the 
9 relations (parameters according to Gary R) which are differentiated in terms 
of the modal category, do not refer to this interpretant-object relation. 

They refer to the representamen-in-itself, which I consider to be a 
relation-of-depth (providing an evolved over time generalization/set of 
habits); then, to the relation between the representamen-object; and the 
relation between the representamen-interpretant.
I consider the representamen, which must act as 'mind-mediator' a vital 
relation, bringing its informational depth to deal w

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Sung, List:

Yes, I meant legisign not dicisign.  Thanks for the correction.

You asserted that it is "non-Peircean" to think that something non-triadic
CANNOT be a sign.  If this is true, then Peirce's writings must identify
something non-triadic that CAN be a sign.  I asked you to provide such a
citation.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 6:47 AM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:

> Hi Jon,
>
> You wrote:
>
> "Every sign is either a qualisign, a sinsign, or a dicisign; . . . "
> (122915-1)
>
> Did you mean to say "legisign: instead of "dicisign" ?  It is my
> understanding that "dicisign" is the interpretan of a sinsign.
>
> "Please indicate where in Peirce's writings that he EVER defines
> something  (122915-2)
> that is dyadic or otherwise non-triadic as a "sign."
>
> Can you re-phrase (122915-2) ?
>
> All the best.
>
> Sung
>
> On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 11:08 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Sung, List:
>>
>> The nine terms that you list are not really TYPES of signs; rather, each
>> one is a label for a single ASPECT of a given sign.  Every sign is either a
>> qualisign, a sinsign, or a dicisign; every sign is either an icon, an
>> index, or a symbol; and every sign is either a rheme, a dicent, or an
>> argument.  However, any one of these labels is an INCOMPLETE description,
>> with the exception of qualisign (which entails icon and rheme) and argument
>> (which entails legisign and symbol); and even those are incomplete once we
>> start taking additional trichotomies into account.
>>
>> Please indicate where in Peirce's writings that he EVER defines something
>> that is dyadic or otherwise non-triadic as a "sign."
>>
>> It seems rather obvious that "reading Peirce extensively does not
>> GUARANTEE that the reader will come away with a correct understanding of
>> Peirce," and I doubt that anyone on the List would dispute this.  However,
>> I suspect that reading Peirce extensively does render one MORE LIKELY to
>> come away with a correct understanding of his thought that reading him only
>> to a limited extent.  Just my opinion, of course.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>> On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 6:22 PM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:
>>
>>> Edwina,
>>>
>>> You wrote:
>>>
>>> "Furthermore, the 9 Relations are NOT signs."
>>> (122815-1)
>>>
>>> (*1*)  Edwina, as you well know, Peirce gave the following "names" to
>>> the 9 relations:
>>>
>>> 1) quali*sign,*
>>> 2) sin*sign*,
>>> 3) legi*sign*.
>>> 4) icon,
>>> 5) index,
>>> 6) symbol,
>>> 7) rheme,
>>> 8) dici*sign*, and
>>> 9) argument.
>>>
>>> If these are not "signs" as you claim, do you think Peirce made mistakes
>>> when he referred to 4  (i.e., 1, 2, 3, and 8) out of the 9 relations as
>>> "signs " ?
>>>
>>> (*2*)  The problem with your reasoning here, as I can tell, seems to be
>>> that you think "sign" has always one meaning, i.e., something genuinely
>>> triadic.  So if something is not triadic  (e.g., the 9 dyadic relations
>>> above), that something cannot be a sign.  I think such a mode of thinking
>>>  is not only fallacious but also non-Peircean.
>>>
>>> (*3*) If my claim that your understanding of the 9 types of signs is
>>> fallacious turns out to be correct, this may provide , IMHO, an interesting
>>> lesson  and warning for all Peircean scholars:
>>>
>>> "Reading Peirce extensively does not guarantee that the
>>> (122815-2)
>>> reader will come away with a correct understanding of Peirce."
>>>
>>> If (122815-2) proves to be true, upon further critical scrutiny, we may
>>> be able to identify possible reasons for why this statement may be true.
>>> One possibility that occurs to me, in analogy to the Heisenberg Uncertainty
>>> Principle in physics, is something like the following:
>>>
>>> "It is impossible to simultaneously determine the object
>>> (122815-3)
>>> and the interpretant of a sign with arbitrary precision."
>>>
>>> Or,
>>>
>>> "The more accurately one can define the object of a sign, the
>>> (122815-4)
>>> less accurately can one define its interpretant, and *vice versa*."
>>>
>>> If (122815-3) and (122815-4) prove to be valid in the future, we may
>>> refer to them as the "Peircean uncertainty Principle" (PUP) or the
>>> "semiotic uncertainty principle" (SUP).
>>>
>>> Are there any Peircean experts on this list who knows whether or not
>>> Peirce discussed any topic in his extensive writings that may be related to
>>> what is here referred to as PUP or SUP?
>>>
>>> One indirect support for the PUP may be provided the by intense debates
>>> we have witnessed in recent months on this list about the true nature of
>>> the Peircean sign among the acknowledge leaders of the semiotic community,

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Hi Jon,

You wrote:

"Every sign is either a qualisign, a sinsign, or a dicisign; . . . "
  (122915-1)

Did you mean to say "legisign: instead of "dicisign" ?  It is my
understanding that "dicisign" is the interpretan of a sinsign.


"Please indicate where in Peirce's writings that he EVER defines something
 (122915-2)
that is dyadic or otherwise non-triadic as a "sign."

Can you re-phrase (122915-2) ?

All the best.

Sung


On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 11:08 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:

> Sung, List:
>
> The nine terms that you list are not really TYPES of signs; rather, each
> one is a label for a single ASPECT of a given sign.  Every sign is either a
> qualisign, a sinsign, or a dicisign; every sign is either an icon, an
> index, or a symbol; and every sign is either a rheme, a dicent, or an
> argument.  However, any one of these labels is an INCOMPLETE description,
> with the exception of qualisign (which entails icon and rheme) and argument
> (which entails legisign and symbol); and even those are incomplete once we
> start taking additional trichotomies into account.
>
> Please indicate where in Peirce's writings that he EVER defines something
> that is dyadic or otherwise non-triadic as a "sign."
>
> It seems rather obvious that "reading Peirce extensively does not
> GUARANTEE that the reader will come away with a correct understanding of
> Peirce," and I doubt that anyone on the List would dispute this.  However,
> I suspect that reading Peirce extensively does render one MORE LIKELY to
> come away with a correct understanding of his thought that reading him only
> to a limited extent.  Just my opinion, of course.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 6:22 PM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:
>
>> Edwina,
>>
>> You wrote:
>>
>> "Furthermore, the 9 Relations are NOT signs."
>> (122815-1)
>>
>> (*1*)  Edwina, as you well know, Peirce gave the following "names" to
>> the 9 relations:
>>
>> 1) quali*sign,*
>> 2) sin*sign*,
>> 3) legi*sign*.
>> 4) icon,
>> 5) index,
>> 6) symbol,
>> 7) rheme,
>> 8) dici*sign*, and
>> 9) argument.
>>
>> If these are not "signs" as you claim, do you think Peirce made mistakes
>> when he referred to 4  (i.e., 1, 2, 3, and 8) out of the 9 relations as
>> "signs " ?
>>
>> (*2*)  The problem with your reasoning here, as I can tell, seems to be
>> that you think "sign" has always one meaning, i.e., something genuinely
>> triadic.  So if something is not triadic  (e.g., the 9 dyadic relations
>> above), that something cannot be a sign.  I think such a mode of thinking
>>  is not only fallacious but also non-Peircean.
>>
>> (*3*) If my claim that your understanding of the 9 types of signs is
>> fallacious turns out to be correct, this may provide , IMHO, an interesting
>> lesson  and warning for all Peircean scholars:
>>
>> "Reading Peirce extensively does not guarantee that the
>>   (122815-2)
>> reader will come away with a correct understanding of Peirce."
>>
>> If (122815-2) proves to be true, upon further critical scrutiny, we may
>> be able to identify possible reasons for why this statement may be true.
>> One possibility that occurs to me, in analogy to the Heisenberg Uncertainty
>> Principle in physics, is something like the following:
>>
>> "It is impossible to simultaneously determine the object
>> (122815-3)
>> and the interpretant of a sign with arbitrary precision."
>>
>> Or,
>>
>> "The more accurately one can define the object of a sign, the
>>   (122815-4)
>> less accurately can one define its interpretant, and *vice versa*."
>>
>> If (122815-3) and (122815-4) prove to be valid in the future, we may
>> refer to them as the "Peircean uncertainty Principle" (PUP) or the
>> "semiotic uncertainty principle" (SUP).
>>
>> Are there any Peircean experts on this list who knows whether or not
>> Peirce discussed any topic in his extensive writings that may be related to
>> what is here referred to as PUP or SUP?
>>
>> One indirect support for the PUP may be provided the by intense debates
>> we have witnessed in recent months on this list about the true nature of
>> the Peircean sign among the acknowledge leaders of the semiotic community,
>> including Gary R, Gary F, Edwina, Jeff, Jon, and others.
>>
>> All the best.
>>
>> Sung
>>
>


-- 
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.

Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701

www.conformon.net

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - meta-languages and propositions of triadicity