Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism
> On Feb 6, 2017, at 8:01 PM, Stephen C. Rosewrote: > > Here is my answer. Triadic thinking is conscious consideration by > individuals. The first stage is that vague reality that comes up as a sign > and ends up becoming more likely a word than anything else. That enables > consideration, a second stage, an indexical query, sort of. For me that is a > list of values which are in effect an index of what Peirce called memorial > maxims. What Jeff calls metaphysical refers to the third stage which is > indeed the effect or action or expression that results from the consideration > of the first, the sign. That is the effect, the practical outcome of the > triadic consideration. For Peirce is this not the sine qua non of inquiry > itself? I’m not sure I’d agree with the conscious part. What’s so interesting to me in Peirce’s semiotic is the place of continuity which presupposes a kind of unconscious/hidden aspect to all sign processes. Likewise his externalism makes me think that most of what happens happens outside of consciousness. That’s not to say his semiotic isn’t extremely useful for thinking through conscious deliberation but I think the consequence of that analysis will always be that a lot more is going on. > Any way you slice it I cannot help thinking that this is what Brent was > trying to understand in his generally maligned biography of Peirce. It was > that chapter toward the end that helped me to see it. And I think Brent was > also, like me, fishing for the actual reason why Peirce could make the > outlandish claim that he would be built on like Aristotle. In any case, I > want to at least establish my question as legitimate. What does this all aim > at if not the way a practical person thinks, which would need to be taught to > replace the largely binary understandings that permeate culture and > understanding generally. I must have missed a post. I assume you mean Joseph Brent’s biography. I confess I’ve not read it. Could you possibly summarize that? I’m missing something here. (Undoubtedly my fault - my apologies I sometimes can’t keep up with the list and never quite find the time to go back and catch up) - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism
> On Feb 6, 2017, at 5:25 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard> wrote: > > If we try to understand the differences between positions that, like Mill's, > are more radically nominalist in orientation and those, like Peirce's, that > are more radically realist, by focusing solely on matters of metaphysics, > then we will find that the nominalists can say many of the things that the > realists say--but in more limited terms that seem to presuppose less (which > is a virtue, no doubt). I’ll confess it’s been a while since I last studied Mill in any depth, but going by my distant memory I’d say the bigger facet between Mill and Peirce is vagueness. That is much of Mill’s writing presupposes that the entities in question are present in some way to consciousness or at least to some logical analysis. Peirce in contrast has a very significant logic of vagueness such that some properties are indeterminate but not available to the inquirer. This obviously problematizes Mill’s meta-ethic. My distant memory is that it also is a problem for his epistemology. His associationism I just don’t remember well at all so that may avoid this problem but I’d not be shocked to discover that depends upon fully determinate parts out of which larger knowledge is built. (My distance memory is that Mill is somewhat similar to Husserl & Russell in therms of knowledge by acquaintance but I might be completely wrong on that) That’s somewhat of a tangent to your point but I raise it more to note that there are other elements of logic/metaphysics that are pretty crucial in distinguishing Peirce from his rough contemporaries. In a sense the nominalist presupposes less, but there are practical implications for what they do presuppose and often they presuppose more than Peirce. (The common assumption of completeness that really didn’t come under sustained attack until the mid to late 20th century is an example) I think externalism is an other example of this. Admittedly those who allow for robust knowledge by acquaintance can do more here. But I think that a more robust externalism is pretty important metaphysically although that does become significant in the more early 20th century with Sartre, Heidegger and others. (The reemergence of pragmatism as strong position with Putnam and others also comes to question these assumptions) All of this is a round about way of saying I’m pretty skeptical the issue is always realism/nominalism. I think I’d want to see a solid argument to think it’s not dwarfed by other factors. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism
I keep wondering to what these wonderful posts refer. I am not being ironical or sarcastic. Jeff's first paragraph sweeping description of first, second and third is beautiful. But to what does it refer? What is its practical effect? How is it used? Here is my answer. Triadic thinking is conscious consideration by individuals. The first stage is that vague reality that comes up as a sign and ends up becoming more likely a word than anything else. That enables consideration, a second stage, an indexical query, sort of. For me that is a list of values which are in effect an index of what Peirce called memorial maxims. What Jeff calls metaphysical refers to the third stage which is indeed the effect or action or expression that results from the consideration of the first, the sign. That is the effect, the practical outcome of the triadic consideration. For Peirce is this not the sine qua non of inquiry itself? Any way you slice it I cannot help thinking that this is what Brent was trying to understand in his generally maligned biography of Peirce. It was that chapter toward the end that helped me to see it. And I think Brent was also, like me, fishing for the actual reason why Peirce could make the outlandish claim that he would be built on like Aristotle. In any case, I want to at least establish my question as legitimate. What does this all aim at if not the way a practical person thinks, which would need to be taught to replace the largely binary understandings that permeate culture and understanding generally. amazon.com/author/stephenrose On Mon, Feb 6, 2017 at 7:25 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > Clark, List, > > > The central point I am making is that Peirce works out conceptions > concerning the nature of the real first and foremost within the context of > the normative theory of logic. He develops a nominal conception of the real > that is needed for the sake of an account of deduction, and then he moves > to richer notions as he tries to classify, explain and justify principles > of synthetic inference. With that in hand, he then turns to questions of > metaphysics. > > > If we try to understand the differences between positions that, like > Mill's, are more radically nominalist in orientation and those, like > Peirce's, that are more radically realist, by focusing solely on matters of > metaphysics, then we will find that the nominalists can say many of the > things that the realists say--but in more limited terms that seem to > presuppose less (which is a virtue, no doubt). Having said that, the > differences come to the fore when we shift attention from the character of > the conclusions we have already drawn in metaphysics (or in the special > sciences) to inquiries in the normative sciences about the ideals and > principles that ought to govern inquiry. > > > On that front, I believe the differences between these types of > positions are quite striking--and it is much easier to see that there are > real practical differences between the views with respect to understanding > how we ought to engage in inquiry (including inquiry in the normative > theory of logic itself). Having seen the differences more clearly from > within the context of the logical theory, it is considerably easier to > engage in the disputes in metaphysics with some assurance that we are > engaged in real disputes over questions that really matter. > > > When it comes to matters of methodology and putting the pieces in their > proper order, I support these sorts of moves. > > > --Jeff > > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354> > > > -- > *From:* Clark Goble> *Sent:* Monday, February 6, 2017 5:12 PM > *To:* Peirce-L > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism > > > On Feb 6, 2017, at 11:36 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < > jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > > As an example, why don't we compare historical examples of nominalist and > realist positions in logic, such as what we find in Mill's *System of > Logic* and Peirce's logical theory. When we do, we find very different > philosophical accounts of the principles that govern valid reasoning. > > > Do you think these end up being tied to nominalism? I’d be extremely > interested if you can give some examples of that. I confess I’m skeptical > since to my eyes from a logical perspective there’s not a lot of difference > between a real general and a term indexing to a bunch of real particulars. > Now the logical properties of various notions of infinity do of course > matter a great deal. There you find say an Aristotilean potential infinity > playing a very different role. But I think many nominalists are perfectly > content to allow terms to refer to an infinite number of entities even if > some are more like mathematical constructivists requiring a bit more care. > > As I
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism
Dear list: It is statements like the following that makes the whole matter of adopting CP 5.189 and not CP 5.402 that much more baffling. “When it comes to matters of methodology and putting the pieces in their proper order, I support these sorts of moves.” ~Jeff Oh well, I suppose this yet another instance where "The reason is that these several objects are not equally obvious to us. …so let us now discuss the method to be adopted in tracing the elements predicated as constituting the definable form. Now since we have shown above that attributes predicated as belonging to the essential nature are necessary and that universals are necessary, and since the attributes which we select as inhering in triad, or in any other subject whose attributes we select in this way, are predicated as belonging to its essential nature, triad will thus possess these attributes necessarily. Divisions according to differentiae are a useful accessory to this method. But, in fact, the order in which the attributes are predicated does make a difference — it matters whether we say animal-tame-biped, or biped-animal-tame. In establishing a definition by division one should keep three objects in view: (1) the admission only of elements in the definable form, (2) the arrangement of these in the right order, (3) the omission of no such elements. The right order will be achieved if the right term is assumed as primary, and this will be ensured if the term selected is predicable of all the others but not all they of it; since there must be one such term. On the other hand, in so far as the One results from composition (by a consilience of the Many), whereas they result from disintegration the Many are more ‘elementary’ than the One, and prior to it in their nature.” ~Aristotle Best, Jerry R On Mon, Feb 6, 2017 at 6:25 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > Clark, List, > > > The central point I am making is that Peirce works out conceptions > concerning the nature of the real first and foremost within the context of > the normative theory of logic. He develops a nominal conception of the real > that is needed for the sake of an account of deduction, and then he moves > to richer notions as he tries to classify, explain and justify principles > of synthetic inference. With that in hand, he then turns to questions of > metaphysics. > > > If we try to understand the differences between positions that, like > Mill's, are more radically nominalist in orientation and those, like > Peirce's, that are more radically realist, by focusing solely on matters of > metaphysics, then we will find that the nominalists can say many of the > things that the realists say--but in more limited terms that seem to > presuppose less (which is a virtue, no doubt). Having said that, the > differences come to the fore when we shift attention from the character of > the conclusions we have already drawn in metaphysics (or in the special > sciences) to inquiries in the normative sciences about the ideals and > principles that ought to govern inquiry. > > > On that front, I believe the differences between these types of > positions are quite striking--and it is much easier to see that there are > real practical differences between the views with respect to understanding > how we ought to engage in inquiry (including inquiry in the normative > theory of logic itself). Having seen the differences more clearly from > within the context of the logical theory, it is considerably easier to > engage in the disputes in metaphysics with some assurance that we are > engaged in real disputes over questions that really matter. > > > When it comes to matters of methodology and putting the pieces in their > proper order, I support these sorts of moves. > > > --Jeff > > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354> > > > -- > *From:* Clark Goble> *Sent:* Monday, February 6, 2017 5:12 PM > *To:* Peirce-L > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism > > > On Feb 6, 2017, at 11:36 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < > jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > > As an example, why don't we compare historical examples of nominalist and > realist positions in logic, such as what we find in Mill's *System of > Logic* and Peirce's logical theory. When we do, we find very different > philosophical accounts of the principles that govern valid reasoning. > > > Do you think these end up being tied to nominalism? I’d be extremely > interested if you can give some examples of that. I confess I’m skeptical > since to my eyes from a logical perspective there’s not a lot of difference > between a real general and a term indexing to a bunch of real particulars. > Now the logical properties of various notions of infinity do of course > matter a great deal. There you find say an Aristotilean
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism
Clark, List, The central point I am making is that Peirce works out conceptions concerning the nature of the real first and foremost within the context of the normative theory of logic. He develops a nominal conception of the real that is needed for the sake of an account of deduction, and then he moves to richer notions as he tries to classify, explain and justify principles of synthetic inference. With that in hand, he then turns to questions of metaphysics. If we try to understand the differences between positions that, like Mill's, are more radically nominalist in orientation and those, like Peirce's, that are more radically realist, by focusing solely on matters of metaphysics, then we will find that the nominalists can say many of the things that the realists say--but in more limited terms that seem to presuppose less (which is a virtue, no doubt). Having said that, the differences come to the fore when we shift attention from the character of the conclusions we have already drawn in metaphysics (or in the special sciences) to inquiries in the normative sciences about the ideals and principles that ought to govern inquiry. On that front, I believe the differences between these types of positions are quite striking--and it is much easier to see that there are real practical differences between the views with respect to understanding how we ought to engage in inquiry (including inquiry in the normative theory of logic itself). Having seen the differences more clearly from within the context of the logical theory, it is considerably easier to engage in the disputes in metaphysics with some assurance that we are engaged in real disputes over questions that really matter. When it comes to matters of methodology and putting the pieces in their proper order, I support these sorts of moves. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 From: Clark GobleSent: Monday, February 6, 2017 5:12 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism On Feb 6, 2017, at 11:36 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard > wrote: As an example, why don't we compare historical examples of nominalist and realist positions in logic, such as what we find in Mill's System of Logic and Peirce's logical theory. When we do, we find very different philosophical accounts of the principles that govern valid reasoning. Do you think these end up being tied to nominalism? I'd be extremely interested if you can give some examples of that. I confess I'm skeptical since to my eyes from a logical perspective there's not a lot of difference between a real general and a term indexing to a bunch of real particulars. Now the logical properties of various notions of infinity do of course matter a great deal. There you find say an Aristotilean potential infinity playing a very different role. But I think many nominalists are perfectly content to allow terms to refer to an infinite number of entities even if some are more like mathematical constructivists requiring a bit more care. As I think I said a week or two ago when we get to set theory things may get a bit trickier since of course famously allowing loose set membership leads to paradoxes. Perhaps one can make a stronger argument in set theory and set construction that realism vs. nominalism matters far more. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism
> On Feb 6, 2017, at 11:09 AM, Eric Charles> wrote: > > There, as now, I'm not convinced that being a nominalist or realist would > adhere one to a particular sense of right or wrong in such a case. I would > imagine it was relatively trivial to argue in favor of, or against, dividing > the field in such a way, from either side, if your unrelated biases > predisposed you one way or the other. Nominalism and the more minority view of realism are still both very broad categories. Lots of different views can be found under each category. That’s partially why, as Ben noted, it’s hard to draw out implications. While I’m a big believer in looking at the cash value of an idea, with nominalism I’m not as convinced as some there is one. I mentioned the problem of what is changeable. I think a second consideration is a certain overskepticism towards generalities we find in nature. However the reality is that the examples I gave of skepticism towards certain regularities science finds really aren’t due to nominalism. People completely ignorant of nominalism can make those same mistakes. Especially if there are political incentives towards doing so. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism
Jeff, List: Peirce's architectonic required that metaphysics must derive its principles from logic, rather than the other way around. My impression is that there is not consensus on this arrangement, and in particular, that at least some nominalists would insist that metaphysics is more basic than logic. Once again, the question arises--what practical difference does it make? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Feb 6, 2017 at 12:36 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > Eric, Ben, List, > > Would it make any difference if, in addition to the different > interpretations of the regularities concerning the apples in the orchard, > we also included different interpretations of the principles of reasoning? > As an example, why don't we compare historical examples of nominalist and > realist positions in logic, such as what we find in Mill's *System of > Logic* and Peirce's logical theory. When we do, we find very different > philosophical accounts of the principles that govern valid reasoning. Does > the adoption of these different theories of reasoning lead to different > practical results when it comes to criticizing and evaluating the abductive > and inductive inferences in virtue of which one formulates and tests > hypotheses concerning the regularities we observe with respect to such > things as apples in an orchard or bags of beans in a barn? > > To what extent can we evaluate the adequacy of competing metaphysical > theories without also taking into account the theories of logic from which > they derive their structure and much of their content. > > --Jeff > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354> > > -- > *From:* Eric Charles> *Sent:* Monday, February 6, 2017 11:09 AM > *To:* Benjamin Udell > *Cc:* Peirce-L > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism > > Ben, > There was an attempt, on the earlier thread I initiated, to provide an > example similar to your east-west divide of the apple field. There, as now, > I'm not convinced that being a nominalist or realist would adhere one to a > particular sense of right or wrong in such a case. I would imagine it was > relatively trivial to argue in favor of, or against, dividing the field in > such a way, from either side, if your unrelated biases predisposed you one > way or the other. > > I could, as a nominalist, insist that though the division be an arbitrary > convention, we follow the rule none the less. I also could insist, as a > realist, that east-west is far more than a *mere* convention of language, > and explain the logic of using it as a criteria. > > Similarly I could, as a nominalist, insist that the arbitrary convention > of east-west have no hold over my ability to pick apples where I please. I > could also insist, as a realist, that east-west, while having a local > relative meaning has no global meaning that would allow it to serve as a > useful arbiter in this case. > > Etc., etc. > > Whether or not 'generals' are 'real' doesn't necessitate my using - or > rejecting the use of - those concepts in such an abstracted example. Or, to > phrase it differently, whether I suspect that, in the end times, the > opinion of honest investigators will allow for 'east' and 'west', doesn't > matter a lick to how divide up the field right now. This is similar to the > how we can have fruitful discussions about the impact of race in America, > and solutions to the problems race-based thinking has caused, all while > also acknowledging that 'race' is a BS concept, which is likely to be done > away with by honest inquirers long before the end times are here. > > If you think that being a nominalist is likely to correspond to certain > other tendencies, based on your observations of the distribution of ideas > we happen to see in current society, that is another matter all together. > Such matters are not logical consequences of adopting one view or the > other, they are happenstance correlates, and so (as far as I understand it) > would not count for Peirce's pragmatic maxim. > > --- > Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. > Supervisory Survey Statistician > U.S. Marine Corps > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism
o~o~o~o~o~o~o On 2/6/2017 9:31 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: JAS:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-02/msg00043.html Is it right to say that “generals are constituted of individuals”? For Peirce, generality is continuity, and my understanding is that no continuum is “constituted of individuals”, since no collection of individuals is truly continuous. o~o~o~o~o~o~o Jon, List, I would be content to say that, in the same vein I might say, “the real line is a continuum constituted of individual points”. If it's merely the word “constituted” that is causing difficulty then I would substitute “consisting” and it would mean the same thing for all practical mathematical and scientific purposes: “the real line is a continuum consisting of individual points”. Continuity is a matter of the relations among individual points not a matter of their ontologies per se. An adequate discussion of mathematical continua and their relation to physical continua and whether there really are such things would make for a long and diverting digression at this point, but it's not really called for since the concept of continuity that Peirce relates to logical generality does not demand the full power of those sorts of continua but only a logical sort of continuity that is more general or simply weaker, depending on your point of view. I know I've remarked on this point before ... so let me go hunt that up ... o~o~o~o~o~o~o JA:https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2014/11/09/continuity-generality-infinity-law-synechism-1/ The concept of continuity that Peirce highlights in his synechism is a logical principle that is somewhat more general than the concepts of either mathematical or physical continua. Peirce’s concept of continuity is better understood as a concept of lawful regularity or parametric variation. As such, it is basic to the coherence and utility of science, whether classical, relativistic, quantum mechanical, or any conceivable future science that deserves the name. (As Aristotle already knew.) Perhaps the most pervasive examples of this brand of continuity in physics are the “correspondence principles” that describe the connections between classical and contemporary paradigms. The importance of lawful regularities and parametric variations is not diminished one bit in passing from continuous mathematics to discrete mathematics, nor from theory to application. Here are some further points of information, the missing of which seems to lie at the root of many recent disputes on the Peirce List: It is necessary to distinguish the mathematical concepts of continuity and infinity from the question of their physical realization. The mathematical concepts retain their practical utility for modeling empirical phenomena quite independently of the (meta-)physical question of whether these continua and cardinalities are literally realized in the physical universe. This is equally true of any other domain or level of phenomena — chemical, biological, mental, social, or whatever. As far as the mathematical concept goes, continuity is relative to topology. That is, what counts as a continuous function or transformation between spaces is relative to the topology under which those spaces are considered and the same spaces may be considered under many different topologies. What topology makes the most sense in a given application is another one of those abductive matters. o~o~o~o~o~o~o inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism -
> On Feb 6, 2017, at 7:19 AM, Edwina Taborskywrote: > > Yes, I agree with your outline of the neglect of Aristotle during the period > when the Church controlled knowledge - and the 13th c. re-emergence of his > works [Aquinas etc].. I’m not sure it’s quite that simple. A lot of the texts, for whatever reason, simply weren’t widely available. I’d add that they heyday of Aristotle in the 13th century was still a period of Church controlled knowledge - thus the various condemnations at the University of Paris largely tied to Aristotelian works. Even those who became dominant in this era (Scotus and Ockham) arguably did so because they engaged with Aristotle and frequently disagreed with him. So that’s not really neglect. It’s later as Aquinas becomes more popular (he was always popular with the Dominicans) that an Aristotilean fused Christianity becomes more acceptable. Although of course other major figures from the early 13th century like Albertus Magnus were thoroughly engaged with Aristotle. Anyway I think while one can blame the church for the condemnations at Paris it’s unfair to blame them for a lack of engagement with Aristotle. And the condemnations occurred precisely because everyone had engaged seriously with him. One should also note that the identities of Plato and Aristotle weren’t always clear in the texts. That affected how people read them. The relative clarity of who wrote what we have today is of much more recent development. I’m not sure the timing on all that but I assume it’s a product of early modernism even if some roots go back earlier. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism
Eric, Jon S., list, I don't think that the nominalist and realist views are symmetrical as you suggest with regard to generals and individuals. A Peircean realist will say that individuals have some generality but still can only be in one place at a time, unlike "more-general" generals, and would never say that every term designating an individual is a mere _/flatus vocis/_ as many a nominalist has called every general term. The individual in Peirce's view is not a mere construct but instead is forced indexically on a mind by reaction and resistance. Peirce somewhere also says that a universe of discourse is likewise distinguished indexically. For Peirce, the individual is the reactive/resistant, and reaction/resistance is Secondness, a basic phaneroscopic category. Let's bring into your apple-picker scenario some non-extraneous generals that would make a difference between the two apple pickers. For example, they get into an argument about which apples each of them is allowed to pick. Apple picker Alf says that he's allowed to pick any apples only in the eastern area and that apple picker Beth is allowed to pick any apples only in the western area, while Beth says that each of them should be able to pick any apples anywhere in the area. Alf says that the rules prescribe the east-west split, while Beth says that those rules are unfair and should be ignored or evaded. Alf says not that the rules are fair but instead that there is no such thing as "fair" apart from what the rules state in individual documents or announcements. Beth doesn't expound a full-blown doctrine of either natural law or revolutionary justice, but simply insists, "fair is fair." I won't say that Alf is a strict nominalist and Beth a strict scholastic realist, but just that they tend respectively toward nominalism (Alf) and realism (Beth). At their respective worsts, Alf promotes conformity with a cruel and unjust regime, while Beth promotes the breakdown of the rule of law. Alf's attitude is more congenial to the idea that there is no idea of fairness above that of the state. On the other hand, some nominalists would argue that nominalism and the more-nominalistic brands of positivism are at least a good holding action against the militant ideas that contributed to the vast bloodshed in the 20th Century. My picture doesn't quite converge with Edwina's picture but I don't mean to deny her picture either. Nominalism and realism are pretty general ideas that could get rooted in practice in disparate ways. I once read a web page where somebody argued that HTML markup that complies with official, explicit HTML standards is right "by definition." This was as if the standards themselves had not been devised according to some more general and probably less definite idea of what standards should be like and as if there could be no idea of HTML rightness that would require the revision of the official, explicit standards promulgated on individual dates in specific documents by the World Wide Web Consortium. Now, for a while the Mozilla Firefox browser adhered to the standards in certain cases where the standards were problematic. I don't think that the Firefox designers denied the need for revised standards, based on a more general idea of standards, but they didn't like the idea of rebellion by browser designers (such rebellion does make it more difficult to design web pages that work in all browsers). But they took this "letter of the law" attitude to an extreme. (I'm thinking in particular of how Firefox treated two or more directly successive hyphens in a hidden comment - IIRC, it treated them as a hidden comment's closing tag (except the double hyphen in the opening tag), whereas other browsers and most webpage designers treated -->, a double hyphen followed directly by a greater-than sign, as the one and only way to do a hidden comment's closing tag. For a while I found myself deleting or replacing with equals-signs many strings of hyphens that Joe Ransdell had placed between hidden-comment tags at Arisbe. Anyway, Mozilla finally gave in and said something like "We don't have to change our browser for this, but we will.") Best, Ben On 2/6/2017 9:58 AM, Eric Charles wrote: JS said: In other words, the nominalist says that reality consists entirely of individuals, so generals are only names we use to facilitate discourse; while the (Peircean) realist says that reality consists entirely of generals, so individuals are only names we use to facilitate discourse. If so, how does this help answer Eric's original question about the practical differences that one view manifests relative to the other? Uh oh. I was rather satisfied with having decided, aided by the list discussion, that - from a pragmatist perspective - nominalists were /just/ people who denied that collective inquiry into categories leads to convergence of ideas. But now (here and elsewhere)
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism
Edwina, List: I agree with your comments, but they involve a shift in the meaning of "individual" from "singular subject" (logical/metaphysical) to "human being" (social/political). What I take Eric to be asking--and what has come to interest me, as well--is whether there are other "conceivable practical effects" (CP 5.196; 1903) that are clearly different between these two concepts. - Extreme nominalism = reality consists entirely of individuals, so there are no real generals; just concepts/names that we use to think/talk about things that are similar in some way. - Extreme realism = reality consists entirely of generals, so there are no real individuals; just concepts/names that we use to think/talk about things that are distinct in some way. Given Peirce's nearly lifelong crusade against all forms of nominalism, it seems like we should be able to identify additional "conditional experiential consequences" (CP 6.470; 1908) that sharply distinguish it from his own "extreme scholastic realism" (CP 8.208; c. 1905). I think you are probably on the right track with the idea that science studies objects in their generality, rather than their individuality. I also keep coming back to the related notion that nominalism accepts aspects of reality as incognizable and laws of nature as inexplicable, thus blocking the way of inquiry. Regards, Jon S. On Mon, Feb 6, 2017 at 10:09 AM, Edwina Taborskywrote: > Eric - great fun. > > But, both the nominalist and the realist, when dealing with individual > 'things', acknowledge that those individual things exist in time and space. > So, both can pick those apples quite happily in a similar fashion. [And > after all, that is one valid definition of 'realism']. And in all > probability, neither cares about such irrelevant ideas as 'generals'. So, > does the concept of 'general' have any value? > > I think so - not when one is busy at quantifying individual 'things'. But, > when one is dealing with concepts which are common to a number of things > and have continuity over time and space, such as 'wise', various moral > concepts, and general concepts such as 'tree', 'water'..etc.. then, > philosophical realism moves in to declare that these concepts have a > general reality that is articulated in individual instantiations. > TREE--->this particular tree. > > What's the point? As you say, in daily life it makes no difference. But I > think that it does, socially and politically. Realism removes the > individual as the key agent of thought and moves the community, the > long-term community, into that role. It prevents subjective relativism, > prevents the notion that each individual can directly and individually > perfectly KNOW the world and insists instead on that community of scholars > and indeed, denies full knowledge...because, realism says that information > is not found in ONE individual object but in the GENERALITY of objects, and > as such, requires a different approach than direct singular observation. > > I think the difference is important in the societal and political effects > of the two different approaches. I don't think that there is any great > difference in actual knowledge of our external world. > > Edwina > > - Original Message - > *From:* Eric Charles > *To:* Peirce List > *Cc:* Nicholas Thompson (Google Docs) > *Sent:* Monday, February 06, 2017 9:58 AM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism > > JS said: In other words, the nominalist says that reality consists > entirely of individuals, so generals are only names we use to facilitate > discourse; while the (Peircean) realist says that reality consists entirely > of generals, so individuals are only names we use to facilitate discourse. > If so, how does this help answer Eric's original question about the > practical differences that one view manifests relative to the other? > > Uh oh. > > I was rather satisfied with having decided, aided by the list > discussion, that - from a pragmatist perspective - nominalists were *just* > people who denied that collective inquiry into categories leads to > convergence of ideas. But now (here and elsewhere) Nominalists are again > being attributed more positive beliefs, and my original question > resurfaces: What difference does it make? That is, what > distinction-of-consequences allows us to consider the ideas to be > different. This seems like the context in which parables are helpful. > > - > > Imagine if you will, two apple pickers. They both pick apples, fill > baskets, and deliver the baskets to the back of nearby trucks. At the end > of the day, they get paid based on the number of baskets they deliver to > the truck. "Look at how similar those two are," you say to yourself one > day while watching them. > > "Heck no," someone next to you says, and you realize you must have been
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism -
> On Feb 5, 2017, at 11:12 PM, John F Sowawrote: > > At the beginning of the 13th c, the translations of Aristotle > were denounced by theologians who had a vested interest in Plato. > The fact that they were translated from Arabic sources also raised > suspicions of heresy. But scientists such as Roger Bacon were > inspired by the science, and Thomas Aquinas made Aristotle safe > for Christianity. To be fair there were some theological reasons they were distrustful of the new innovations in scholastic thinking by Aristotle. A lot of the condemnations of 1210-1277 have fairly compelling reasons behind them (even if we don’t in the least buy the theology they were defending). Some seem a bit silly admittedly, like the debate about whether there was a single shared intellect or separate intellects for each person. (Roughly a debate about whether propositions were individual or shared - although it often came to have a form more akin to what platonic mystics asserted of a shared mind) It’s interesting that the greatest of the Aristotilean influenced scholastics, Aquinas, really had his heyday in the early Renaissance rather than during his life or the immediate years following. > Crosby, Alfred W. (1997) The Measure of Reality: Quantification > and Western Society, 1250-1600, Cambridge University Press. > > Sample factoid: In 1275, there were no mechanical clocks in Europe. > By 1300, every town of any size had a church with a clock tower, > and neighboring towns were competing with each other in building > the most elaborate clocks. The European emphasis on measuring time > is a major difference between European civilizations and traditional > societies everywhere else. And it started in the 13th c. This is an important feature often overlooked. It’s very hard to do reproducible empirical studies without accurate time keeping. There were some primitive methods like using hour glasses but having ubiquitous and synchronizable clocks probably transformed the world more than anything else before the age of steam and plumbing. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism -
On 2/6/2017 9:19 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: I myself tend to view causality as more economic and population-size driven than ideologically driven. I agree. In fact, that's a major reason why the Homo saps were so far ahead of the neanderthals in technology: they had a warmer climate in Africa that made food more abundant to support a larger population. The most rapid advances occurred after the development of farming, when the food supply and population grew rapidly. Bernal's "The Extension of Man'- a very detailed outline of technology development 'extending' man's physical capacities to interact with the world... In places where the two overlapped (middle east), the neanderthals adopted the new technology. And the anthropologists today are discovering innovations that the neanderthals had invented on their own (some of which the anthropologists still have not been able to duplicate with the kind of technology available then). "the development of capitalism as the leading method of production also witnessed that of experiment and calculation as the new method of natural science" I wasn't considering the metaphysical differences between Plato and Aristotle, but the different emphasis on the value of observation and record keeping. The "experiment and calculation" was introduced a century before banking and capitalism. (And both depended on Arabic numerals, which the Muslims adopted from the Hindus, who were influenced by the Chinese number system.) Plato was a mathematician, who considered the mathematical forms as the ideal source of knowledge. But Aristotle's father was a physician who emphasized careful observation and detailed record keeping of what was observed and the results of various procedures. Aristotle was a pioneer in experimental science. A famous example is his experiment with chicken eggs. He and his students collected a batch of eggs laid on the same day. Then they broke open one egg each day and made detailed observations of the embryos. Philosophically, Galen was more of a Platonist, but he was very strongly influenced by Aristotle's biological writings. When the Arabs took over the middle east, they weren't interested in Greek literature. Greek medicine (Galen) was their first interest, and that led them to Aristotle and Greek science and mathematics. By the 11th c, Arabic technology and economic power was the greatest in the world. But the crusaders (AKA Christian terrorists) came from a primitive civilization (Europe) and were amazed at the glories of Muslim economic achievements. Unfortunately, those invasions gave the Islamic conservatives the upper hand. They squelched the liberals with their "infidel" books. They burned libraries, banished teachers, and destroyed their own economic and technological foundation. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism
Eric - great fun. But, both the nominalist and the realist, when dealing with individual 'things', acknowledge that those individual things exist in time and space. So, both can pick those apples quite happily in a similar fashion. [And after all, that is one valid definition of 'realism']. And in all probability, neither cares about such irrelevant ideas as 'generals'. So, does the concept of 'general' have any value? I think so - not when one is busy at quantifying individual 'things'. But, when one is dealing with concepts which are common to a number of things and have continuity over time and space, such as 'wise', various moral concepts, and general concepts such as 'tree', 'water'..etc.. then, philosophical realism moves in to declare that these concepts have a general reality that is articulated in individual instantiations. TREE--->this particular tree. What's the point? As you say, in daily life it makes no difference. But I think that it does, socially and politically. Realism removes the individual as the key agent of thought and moves the community, the long-term community, into that role. It prevents subjective relativism, prevents the notion that each individual can directly and individually perfectly KNOW the world and insists instead on that community of scholars and indeed, denies full knowledge...because, realism says that information is not found in ONE individual object but in the GENERALITY of objects, and as such, requires a different approach than direct singular observation. I think the difference is important in the societal and political effects of the two different approaches. I don't think that there is any great difference in actual knowledge of our external world. Edwina - Original Message - From: Eric Charles To: Peirce List Cc: Nicholas Thompson (Google Docs) Sent: Monday, February 06, 2017 9:58 AM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism JS said: In other words, the nominalist says that reality consists entirely of individuals, so generals are only names we use to facilitate discourse; while the (Peircean) realist says that reality consists entirely of generals, so individuals are only names we use to facilitate discourse. If so, how does this help answer Eric's original question about the practical differences that one view manifests relative to the other? Uh oh. I was rather satisfied with having decided, aided by the list discussion, that - from a pragmatist perspective - nominalists were just people who denied that collective inquiry into categories leads to convergence of ideas. But now (here and elsewhere) Nominalists are again being attributed more positive beliefs, and my original question resurfaces: What difference does it make? That is, what distinction-of-consequences allows us to consider the ideas to be different. This seems like the context in which parables are helpful. - Imagine if you will, two apple pickers. They both pick apples, fill baskets, and deliver the baskets to the back of nearby trucks. At the end of the day, they get paid based on the number of baskets they deliver to the truck. "Look at how similar those two are," you say to yourself one day while watching them. "Heck no," someone next to you says, and you realize you must have been speaking your thoughts. You look inquisitively at the interlocutor, and he continues. "I've known those two my entire life, and they couldn't be more different. One is a nominalist, and the other is a Peircian realist." You continue to look inquisitively, and the stranger goes on. "You see, Bill, on the left there, he doesn't believe that categories or generalities like 'apple' exist at all. He conceives of himself as picking up distinctly individual objects, and collecting them into baskets, with each basket being distinct in every way from the next basket. He sometimes points out, for example, that the 'red' color is not identical between any two picked-objects, and that any two containers of picked-objects are mind bogglingly different at an atomic level. The whole notion that he is collecting 'apples' into 'baskets' that have any equivalence at all is just, he insists, a weird language game we have agreed to play, and doesn't correspond at all with reality." After that barrage of ideas, the man settles into silence, watching the pickers. "... and?..." you ply. "Well, you see," he continued, after some thought, "in contrast, Jim, over there on the right, believes that only generals are real, and the idea that these apples are individuals is the flaw in our thinking. After all, what makes 'that apple' any less misleading than any other label of individuality. What about 'that apple' will be the same when it gets to the store shelf? Heck, he would even claim that it is odd to believe that Bill-on-the-left is the same person he was a year ago.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism
JS said: In other words, the nominalist says that reality consists entirely of individuals, so generals are only names we use to facilitate discourse; while the (Peircean) realist says that reality consists entirely of generals, so individuals are only names we use to facilitate discourse. If so, how does this help answer Eric's original question about the practical differences that one view manifests relative to the other? Uh oh. I was rather satisfied with having decided, aided by the list discussion, that - from a pragmatist perspective - nominalists were *just* people who denied that collective inquiry into categories leads to convergence of ideas. But now (here and elsewhere) Nominalists are again being attributed more positive beliefs, and my original question resurfaces: What difference does it make? That is, what distinction-of-consequences allows us to consider the ideas to be different. This seems like the context in which parables are helpful. - Imagine if you will, two apple pickers. They both pick apples, fill baskets, and deliver the baskets to the back of nearby trucks. At the end of the day, they get paid based on the number of baskets they deliver to the truck. "Look at how similar those two are," you say to yourself one day while watching them. "Heck no," someone next to you says, and you realize you must have been speaking your thoughts. You look inquisitively at the interlocutor, and he continues. "I've known those two my entire life, and they couldn't be more different. One is a nominalist, and the other is a Peircian realist." You continue to look inquisitively, and the stranger goes on. "You see, Bill, on the left there, he doesn't believe that categories or generalities like 'apple' exist at all. He conceives of himself as picking up distinctly individual objects, and collecting them into baskets, with each basket being distinct in every way from the next basket. He sometimes points out, for example, that the 'red' color is not identical between any two picked-objects, and that any two containers of picked-objects are mind bogglingly different at an atomic level. The whole notion that he is collecting 'apples' into 'baskets' that have any equivalence at all is *just*, he insists, a weird language game we have agreed to play, and doesn't correspond at all with reality." After that barrage of ideas, the man settles into silence, watching the pickers. "... and?..." you ply. "Well, you see," he continued, after some thought, "in contrast, Jim, over there on the right, believes that only generals are real, and the idea that these apples are individuals is the flaw in our thinking. After all, what makes 'that apple' any less misleading than any other label of individuality. What about 'that apple' will be the same when it gets to the store shelf? Heck, he would even claim that it is odd to believe that Bill-on-the-left is the same person he was a year ago. Bill-on-the-left has the properties of being a singular thing, but the identity label itself is just convenient ways to refer to complex composite beings, and don't get at any sort of 'essence' at all. Those individual names are *just*, he insist, a weird linguistic device to facilitate discourse. Quite to the contrary, Jim would insist, if there is anything going on here that honest inquirers would agree about after the dust settles, it is that 'apples' were put in 'baskets', and that makes those generals real." "Huh," you insist, "that is all very fascinating, but I can detect no difference in their behavior that would correspond to such a dramatic seeming difference in thinking. Do they not both pick, and bucket, and deliver in the same manner? And wait in the same line, in the same way, to receive the same pay, with the same sullenness?" "Well yes," says the stranger, "but trust me, they are very, very different. As I said, one is a nominalist, and the other a realist in the pragmatic vein. Men with such contrasting sets of ideas couldn't be more different." "Huh," you repeat, "aside from the words and phrases they would invoke in a conversation about the specific topic you brought up, what conditions could we arrange so as to see the difference in belief manifest as clear differences in behavior? (Granting probability, and all that.) " "Well, you couldn't," says the stranger, "they are differences in belief, not differences in habit." "Ah," you reply confidently, "it is too bad your thinking is not as clear as mine. Belief is habit. As such, if there is no difference in habit between the two that would - granted probability, and all that - manifest itself under some arranged circumstances, then the two beliefs are equivalent, no matter what the words might mislead you into thinking. Thus, if you don't mind, I'll continue to think that the two people are very similar." Another long pause ensued, and the man offered, sounding less certain, "Well, I suppose they would relatively-reflexively complain differently,
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism
Jon A., List: Is it right to say that "generals are constituted of individuals"? For Peirce, generality is continuity, and my understanding is that no continuum is "constituted of individuals," since no collection of individuals is truly continuous. Regards, Jon S. On Mon, Feb 6, 2017 at 8:18 AM, Jon Awbreywrote: > Jon, List, > > I've been sticking to the minimal term set of “generals” > and “individuals”, partly because several years of real > and functional analysis and topology have attached other > meanings to words like “continuous” and “singular” that, > even though Peirce anticipated many aspects of them, > would divert us too much if I interjected them here. > > But, more importantly, I want to avoid the illusion > that we can escape the bounds of semiotic relativity > by introducing any number of ontological distinctions. > > This leaves where we always are, signing in a sign relation > as fish swim in a sea, partly aware our local environment, > dimly conscious of the vastness beyond. In that semiotic > setting all our signs have general or plural denotations > and connotations. It is only in relation to one another > that signs can be sorted in accord with the ways that > some of their senses subsume the senses of others. > > The language of instances and instantiations can be useful here, > allowing us to express the idea that generals are constituted of > individuals but individuals are constituted of further instances. > > Regards, > > Jon > > > On 2/3/2017 12:36 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > >> Jon A., List: >> >> These comments strike me as getting to the heart of the matter. >> >> JA: It is a maxim of nominal(istic) thinking that we should not mistake >> a general name for the name of a general. But should we then turn around >> and mistake an individual name for the name of an individual? >> >> JA: Peirce makes the status of being an individual relative to discourse, >> that is, a context of discussion or a specified universe of discourse, >> and so he makes individuality an interpretive attribute rather than >> an ontological essence. >> >> JA: This does nothing less than subvert the very basis of the controversy >> between nominalism and realism by dispelling the illusion of nominal >> thinkers that the denotations of individual terms are necessarily any less >> ideal than the denotations of general terms. Whether signs are secure in >> their denotations has to be determined on more solid practical grounds >> than >> mere grammatical category. >> >> Am I right to interpret this as supporting the notion that all individuals >> are general (to some degree), rather than truly singular (determinate in >> every conceivable respect)? In other words, the nominalist says that >> reality consists entirely of individuals, so generals are only names we >> use >> to facilitate discourse; while the (Peircean) realist says that reality >> consists entirely of generals, so individuals are only names we use to >> facilitate discourse. If so, how does this help answer Eric's original >> question about the practical differences that one view manifests relative >> to the other? >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism -
John- I fully agree. Yes, I agree with your outline of the neglect of Aristotle during the period when the Church controlled knowledge - and the 13th c. re-emergence of his works [Aquinas etc].. Although I myself tend to view causality as more economic and population-size driven than ideologically driven. That is, I think that Aristotle's re-emergence was linked to the rise in population of that era and the need to provide more means of wealth production than the local feudal holding. Your Crosby book sounds exactly right. I'll try to get ahold of it. The sources I've used are J.D. Bernal's five volumes of 'Science in History'. In this era, it's Vol. 2..the era of the beginning of market trade...and 'money payments rather than forced services' and.."the development of capitalism as the leading method of production also witnessed that of experiment and calculation as the new method of natural science" . These volumes detail the emergence and development of all kinds of methods of 'measuring the world'. Bookkeeping and banking methods would have been vital to the development of larger economies and trade. Then, there's J.D. Bernal's "The Extension of Man'- a very detailed outline of technology development 'extending' man's physical capacities to interact with the world...i.e., moving away from basic human labour, to adding more power, via such things as the horse harness, water mills, the compass, the magnet And, Fernand Braudel's volumes on 'Civilization and Capitalism', Particularly Vol 1, 'The Structures of Everyday life, which focuses on population sizes and economies. And Vol.3, 'The Perspective of the World', which focuses on economics, city-states, and technology. Ideologically - one saw the emergence of a focus on the individual capacity to observe and reason. Edwina - Original Message - From: "John F Sowa"To: Sent: Monday, February 06, 2017 1:12 AM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism - On 2/5/2017 12:38 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: that knowledge is derived from the evidence of the senses, is as old as Aristotle - who espoused just that [along with the use of reason]. But as a societal force, with its insistence that the individual and that individual's direct contact with the world, is the source of knowledge - that emerged, in my view, from at least the 13th century I agree, but I'd add that the rediscovery of Aristotle in the 13th c led to revolutionary innovations in logic and science. Before the 12th c translations of Aristotle from Arabic to Latin, Plato and Neoplatonism had the strongest influence on the Greek Church Fathers -- and through them -- the Latins. At the beginning of the 13th c, the translations of Aristotle were denounced by theologians who had a vested interest in Plato. The fact that they were translated from Arabic sources also raised suspicions of heresy. But scientists such as Roger Bacon were inspired by the science, and Thomas Aquinas made Aristotle safe for Christianity. As an interesting history of the upsurge in observation and measurement in the 13th c and later, I suggest Crosby, Alfred W. (1997) The Measure of Reality: Quantification and Western Society, 1250-1600, Cambridge University Press. Sample factoid: In 1275, there were no mechanical clocks in Europe. By 1300, every town of any size had a church with a clock tower, and neighboring towns were competing with each other in building the most elaborate clocks. The European emphasis on measuring time is a major difference between European civilizations and traditional societies everywhere else. And it started in the 13th c. Although Aristotle didn't say much about music or money, the emphasis on logical notation and measurement also inspired the development of modern musical notation, bookkeeping, and banking. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism
Jon, List, I've been sticking to the minimal term set of “generals” and “individuals”, partly because several years of real and functional analysis and topology have attached other meanings to words like “continuous” and “singular” that, even though Peirce anticipated many aspects of them, would divert us too much if I interjected them here. But, more importantly, I want to avoid the illusion that we can escape the bounds of semiotic relativity by introducing any number of ontological distinctions. This leaves where we always are, signing in a sign relation as fish swim in a sea, partly aware our local environment, dimly conscious of the vastness beyond. In that semiotic setting all our signs have general or plural denotations and connotations. It is only in relation to one another that signs can be sorted in accord with the ways that some of their senses subsume the senses of others. The language of instances and instantiations can be useful here, allowing us to express the idea that generals are constituted of individuals but individuals are constituted of further instances. Regards, Jon On 2/3/2017 12:36 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: Jon A., List: These comments strike me as getting to the heart of the matter. JA: It is a maxim of nominal(istic) thinking that we should not mistake a general name for the name of a general. But should we then turn around and mistake an individual name for the name of an individual? JA: Peirce makes the status of being an individual relative to discourse, that is, a context of discussion or a specified universe of discourse, and so he makes individuality an interpretive attribute rather than an ontological essence. JA: This does nothing less than subvert the very basis of the controversy between nominalism and realism by dispelling the illusion of nominal thinkers that the denotations of individual terms are necessarily any less ideal than the denotations of general terms. Whether signs are secure in their denotations has to be determined on more solid practical grounds than mere grammatical category. Am I right to interpret this as supporting the notion that all individuals are general (to some degree), rather than truly singular (determinate in every conceivable respect)? In other words, the nominalist says that reality consists entirely of individuals, so generals are only names we use to facilitate discourse; while the (Peircean) realist says that reality consists entirely of generals, so individuals are only names we use to facilitate discourse. If so, how does this help answer Eric's original question about the practical differences that one view manifests relative to the other? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Feb 3, 2017 at 10:44 AM, Jon Awbreywrote: >> [ https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-02/msg00017.html ] o~o~o~o~o~o~o March 2015 JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2015-03/msg00099.html Because it has come up once again, let me just mention one more time why I think Peirce's theory of individuals has such a radical bearing on the whole question of nominalism vs. realism. It is a maxim of nominal(istic) thinking that we should not mistake a general name for the name of a general. But should we then turn around and mistake an individual name for the name of an individual? Peirce makes the status of being an individual relative to discourse, that is, a context of discussion or a specified universe of discourse, and so he makes individuality an interpretive attribute rather than an ontological essence. This does nothing less than subvert the very basis of the controversy between nominalism and realism by dispelling the illusion of nominal thinkers that the denotations of individual terms are necessarily any less ideal than the denotations of general terms. Whether signs are secure in their denotations has to be determined on more solid practical grounds than mere grammatical category. ... o~o~o~o~o~o~o inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .