RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

[gnox]

Jeff, list,

 

To answer your double question at the end, for me your analysis hits pretty
close to the 'sweet spot' between the obvious and the dubious, or between
the already-known and the incomprehensible. But it's complex enough that I
will have to experiment some more with applying it to current readings of
Peirce texts. So all I give here is some preliminary comments.

 

Your diagram of dichotomies below is based on the 1896 "Logic of
Mathematics" and I haven't looked closely at that for awhile; but at first
glance, it's a bit startling to see "chemistry" given as a subdivision of
Laws of Psychics (rather than Physics), even if you're only referring to
organic chemistry. (or to neurochemistry, even.) I'll have to take a closer
look at how "chemistry" is defined in this context.

 

Your third class of genuine triadic relations adheres closely to the Lowell
3 text:

"3. Representations: the first correlate is thought playing the role of a
first, the second correlate is thought playing the role of a second, and the
third correlate is thought playing the role of a third, and the first
mediates the relationship between the second and third--and so on in an
iterative pattern."

But the last part is startling at first because we have a first rather than
a third doing the mediation; but as Lowell 3 says, Mediation is a (more or
less adequate) name for the Firstness of Thirdness. It is First in respect
to the other two correlates, but it is nevertheless Thought, or Thirdness. I
remember when Vinicius Romanini pointed out to me that in the manuscript of
NDTR, Peirce at first had written that the Sign was the Third correlate of
the triadic relation, but then crossed it out and wrote "First" correlate
instead. It's confusing because the Firstness of Thirdness is both Firstness
and Thirdness, but in different respects. I think your "iterative pattern"
idea has the potential to clear up this kind of confusion. I didn't know
what you meant by it at first, and I'm still not sure, but it reminds me of
a fractal pattern, which of course is generated iteratively - and your "and
so on" refers to the process continuing with discrete iterations. And that's
about as far as I've taken the idea.

 

I'll have to stop here for now, as the grandson just arrived for a visit and
that will make it hard to keep a line of thought on track. I also want to
have a closer look at Gary R's post in this thread . not right now though.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] 
Sent: 10-Jan-18 14:19
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

 

Gary F, John S, List, all,

I'm glad to hear some of the suggestions might have been helpful--at least
to Gary F. The same goes for the transcriptions he has been posting of the
Lowell Lectures and the thoughtful comments that he, John and many others
have been making about the contents of those lectures.

Reflecting on the classification of relations in "The Logic of Mathematics,
an attempt..." in light of the essays and lectures written around 1903,
including NDDR, NDTR, and the Lowell Lectures, I wanted to venture an
interpretative hypothesis about how we might understand his account of the
relations that are involved in the different classes of genuine triadic
relations that he characterizes.

Peirce distinguishes between three main classes of genuine triadic
relations. We can separate the three based on what is serving in the place
of the first, second and third correlates of such relations. As such, we
have:

1.  Laws of quality:  the first and second correlates are qualities, and the
third correlate is a law governing the relations between those qualities
(e.g., Newton's laws of color). 

2. Laws of fact:  the first and second correlates are facts, and the third
correlate is a law governing the relations between those facts (e.g., the
nomological laws of dynamics, the classificatory laws of chemistry, etc.)

3. Representations: the first correlate is thought playing the role of a
first, the second correlate is thought playing the role of a second, and the
third correlate is thought playing the role of a third, and the first
mediates the relationship between the second and third--and so on in an
iterative pattern.

Up until now, I've largely thought about these three general classes
separately and have tried to understand each on its own terms. Given the
complexities involved in his account of the different classes of triadic
relations involved in the laws of fact, it has been difficult to get a clear
sense of what Peirce is drawing on as a basis for the classificatory system.
Here is a diagram of part of the classification that he provides for genuine
triadic relations under the laws of fact in "The Logic of Mathematics, an
attempt...".



Looking back at "A Guess at the Riddle" and the drafts that for

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

[Gary Richmond]

ular kind of pattern.
>
> If this is on the right track, then I think it provides a pattern that
> naturally fits with his account of representations as thoroughly genuine
> triadic relations.
>
> Here are two questions:
>
> i) Does *any* of this make sense as an interpretation of Peirce's
> classification of genuine triadic relations in these essays and lectures
> written between 1896-1903--focusing on the kinds of correlates that are
> involved?
>
> ii) If it does, then was the general idea already obvious to others?
>
> --Jeff
>
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354>
> --
> *From:* g...@gnusystems.ca <g...@gnusystems.ca>
> *Sent:* Wednesday, January 10, 2018 4:47:10 AM
>
> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11
>
>
> Jeff,
>
>
>
> Many thanks for this and your other post from yesterday — both are very
> helpful, to me at least, in rethinking some core semiotic issues. I hope
> everyone who is following the Lowells is reading them carefully. 1903 was
> the year that Peirce made some major advances in semeiotics, and with your
> help I’m beginning to see more clearly how these advances developed out of
> his earlier work in logic, and how he fine-tuned them in the next few
> years. In particular, I may have to revise what I wrote in *Turning Signs*
> about “genuine and degenerate symbols.”
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu
> <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>]
> *Sent:* 9-Jan-18 12:22
> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11
>
> Gary F., List,
>
> Let me respond to one of the major points you've raised. You say:
>
> "This is an interesting sidelight on the concept of degeneracy as it
> applies to triadic relations, and to semiosis. In the “Logic of
> Mathematics” (I assume you mean the c.1896 one, subtitled “An Attempt to
> Develop My Categories From Within”), according to your outline, some
> triadic relations are more “thoroughly” genuine than others, and your
> outline seems to be consistent with Lowell 3.11. But there are ambiguities
> lurking in your last sentence, which says that “thoroughly genuine triadic
> relations can be distinguished from triadic relations that are not
> *thoroughly *genuine on the grounds that the latter [i.e. those *not* 
> thoroughly
> genuine] take qualities, objects and/or facts as the first and second
> correlates--and not thoughts of those things.”
>
> Lowell 3.11 says that  in *genuine* Thirdness “Thought” can take all
> three categorial roles (as “mere Idea,” as event and as “governing”
> events). But if we regard the “thought of a thing” as a *reference* to
> it, and consider “mere *reference*” to be a *degenerate* Secondness as in
> CP 1.535, then we’d be saying that genuine Thirdness must involve
> degenerate Secondness, which doesn’t seem right. This is the kind of thing
> that makes it hard to judge whether Peirce’s texts are consistent with each
> other or not — or whether we know what he’s talking about or not, when he
> uses terms like “Thought.”
>
> As far as I can tell, Peirce often uses the word "reference" in a very
> broad way. Having said that, I don't see a problem in saying that a genuine
> thirdness might involve a degenerate secondness. That is, I don't see any
> problem in saying, for example, that a symbolic argument involves a "mere
> reference" (e.g., the reference of an iconic, rhematic, qualisign to its
> ground) as a type of *modal * dyadic relation. After all, from early on
> in the lectures leading up to the "New List", Peirce is keen to point out
> that symbolic arguments involve a triple reference to (1) ground,
> (2) object and (3) interpretant.
>
> For my part, I don't believe that Peirce later rejects this key insight
> (e.g., as Cathy Legg and Bill McCurdy have suggested to me in
> conversation). When it comes to the triple reference that is part and
> parcel of a symbolic argument, I think that only the first of the three
> relations is a "mere reference," because it is the only relation of the
> three that is based on a representation in the interpretant (i.e., the
> conclusion of the argument) of the rhematic qualisigns in the propositions
> that form the premisses standing in relations of similarity to the object.
>
> In fact, this very relation of "mere reference" is essential to the
> validity of some arguments--especially those that are abductive in form.
> The reason is that these argument rely heavily on the
>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

rce's classification 
of genuine triadic relations in these essays and lectures written between 
1896-1903--focusing on the kinds of correlates that are involved?

ii) If it does, then was the general idea already obvious to others?

--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: g...@gnusystems.ca <g...@gnusystems.ca>
Sent: Wednesday, January 10, 2018 4:47:10 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

Jeff,

Many thanks for this and your other post from yesterday — both are very 
helpful, to me at least, in rethinking some core semiotic issues. I hope 
everyone who is following the Lowells is reading them carefully. 1903 was the 
year that Peirce made some major advances in semeiotics, and with your help I’m 
beginning to see more clearly how these advances developed out of his earlier 
work in logic, and how he fine-tuned them in the next few years. In particular, 
I may have to revise what I wrote in Turning Signs about “genuine and 
degenerate symbols.”

Gary f.

From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu]
Sent: 9-Jan-18 12:22
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11
Gary F., List,
Let me respond to one of the major points you've raised. You say:
"This is an interesting sidelight on the concept of degeneracy as it applies to 
triadic relations, and to semiosis. In the “Logic of Mathematics” (I assume you 
mean the c.1896 one, subtitled “An Attempt to Develop My Categories From 
Within”), according to your outline, some triadic relations are more 
“thoroughly” genuine than others, and your outline seems to be consistent with 
Lowell 3.11. But there are ambiguities lurking in your last sentence, which 
says that “thoroughly genuine triadic relations can be distinguished from 
triadic relations that are not thoroughly genuine on the grounds that the 
latter [i.e. those not thoroughly genuine] take qualities, objects and/or facts 
as the first and second correlates--and not thoughts of those things.”
Lowell 3.11 says that  in genuine Thirdness “Thought” can take all three 
categorial roles (as “mere Idea,” as event and as “governing” events). But if 
we regard the “thought of a thing” as a reference to it, and consider “mere 
reference” to be a degenerate Secondness as in CP 1.535, then we’d be saying 
that genuine Thirdness must involve degenerate Secondness, which doesn’t seem 
right. This is the kind of thing that makes it hard to judge whether Peirce’s 
texts are consistent with each other or not — or whether we know what he’s 
talking about or not, when he uses terms like “Thought.”
As far as I can tell, Peirce often uses the word "reference" in a very broad 
way. Having said that, I don't see a problem in saying that a genuine thirdness 
might involve a degenerate secondness. That is, I don't see any problem in 
saying, for example, that a symbolic argument involves a "mere reference" 
(e.g., the reference of an iconic, rhematic, qualisign to its ground) as a type 
of modal  dyadic relation. After all, from early on in the lectures leading up 
to the "New List", Peirce is keen to point out that symbolic arguments involve 
a triple reference to (1) ground, (2) object and (3) interpretant.
For my part, I don't believe that Peirce later rejects this key insight (e.g., 
as Cathy Legg and Bill McCurdy have suggested to me in conversation). When it 
comes to the triple reference that is part and parcel of a symbolic argument, I 
think that only the first of the three relations is a "mere reference," because 
it is the only relation of the three that is based on a representation in the 
interpretant (i.e., the conclusion of the argument) of the rhematic qualisigns 
in the propositions that form the premisses standing in relations of similarity 
to the object.
In fact, this very relation of "mere reference" is essential to the validity of 
some arguments--especially those that are abductive in form. The reason is that 
these argument rely heavily on the interpreter noting relations of similarity 
between the qualities that are represented in the predicates that are expressed 
in the premisses and conclusion of this type of argument.
These last rather compressed suggestions are expressed in an attempt to 
indicate that I take the detailed points Peirce to be making about the kinds of 
relations that are involved in semiotic processes are not minor--even if I 
don't understand them very well just yet. Rather, I take them to be central for 
his explanations of what is essential for the validity of different kinds of 
arguments, and I'm trying to get a clearer grasp of why these points about the 
different kinds of relations that are involved are essential parts of the 
explanations.
--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Depa

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

[gnox]

Jeff,

 

Many thanks for this and your other post from yesterday - both are very
helpful, to me at least, in rethinking some core semiotic issues. I hope
everyone who is following the Lowells is reading them carefully. 1903 was
the year that Peirce made some major advances in semeiotics, and with your
help I'm beginning to see more clearly how these advances developed out of
his earlier work in logic, and how he fine-tuned them in the next few years.
In particular, I may have to revise what I wrote in Turning Signs about
"genuine and degenerate symbols."

 

Gary f.

 

From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] 
Sent: 9-Jan-18 12:22
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

Gary F., List, 

Let me respond to one of the major points you've raised. You say: 

"This is an interesting sidelight on the concept of degeneracy as it applies
to triadic relations, and to semiosis. In the "Logic of Mathematics" (I
assume you mean the c.1896 one, subtitled "An Attempt to Develop My
Categories From Within"), according to your outline, some triadic relations
are more "thoroughly" genuine than others, and your outline seems to be
consistent with Lowell 3.11. But there are ambiguities lurking in your last
sentence, which says that "thoroughly genuine triadic relations can be
distinguished from triadic relations that are not thoroughly genuine on the
grounds that the latter [i.e. those not thoroughly genuine] take qualities,
objects and/or facts as the first and second correlates--and not thoughts of
those things."

Lowell 3.11 says that  in genuine Thirdness "Thought" can take all three
categorial roles (as "mere Idea," as event and as "governing" events). But
if we regard the "thought of a thing" as a reference to it, and consider
"mere reference" to be a degenerate Secondness as in CP 1.535, then we'd be
saying that genuine Thirdness must involve degenerate Secondness, which
doesn't seem right. This is the kind of thing that makes it hard to judge
whether Peirce's texts are consistent with each other or not - or whether we
know what he's talking about or not, when he uses terms like "Thought."

As far as I can tell, Peirce often uses the word "reference" in a very broad
way. Having said that, I don't see a problem in saying that a genuine
thirdness might involve a degenerate secondness. That is, I don't see any
problem in saying, for example, that a symbolic argument involves a "mere
reference" (e.g., the reference of an iconic, rhematic, qualisign to its
ground) as a type of modal  dyadic relation. After all, from early on in the
lectures leading up to the "New List", Peirce is keen to point out that
symbolic arguments involve a triple reference to (1) ground, (2) object and
(3) interpretant. 

For my part, I don't believe that Peirce later rejects this key insight
(e.g., as Cathy Legg and Bill McCurdy have suggested to me in conversation).
When it comes to the triple reference that is part and parcel of a symbolic
argument, I think that only the first of the three relations is a "mere
reference," because it is the only relation of the three that is based on a
representation in the interpretant (i.e., the conclusion of the argument) of
the rhematic qualisigns in the propositions that form the premisses standing
in relations of similarity to the object. 

In fact, this very relation of "mere reference" is essential to the validity
of some arguments--especially those that are abductive in form. The reason
is that these argument rely heavily on the interpreter noting relations of
similarity between the qualities that are represented in the predicates that
are expressed in the premisses and conclusion of this type of argument.

These last rather compressed suggestions are expressed in an attempt to
indicate that I take the detailed points Peirce to be making about the kinds
of relations that are involved in semiotic processes are not minor--even if
I don't understand them very well just yet. Rather, I take them to be
central for his explanations of what is essential for the validity of
different kinds of arguments, and I'm trying to get a clearer grasp of why
these points about the different kinds of relations that are involved are
essential parts of the explanations.

--Jeff

 

Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

 

  _  

From: g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>  <g...@gnusystems.ca
<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> >
Sent: Tuesday, January 9, 2018 6:59 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> 
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11 

 

Jeff, list,

This is an interesting sidelight on the concept of degeneracy as it applies
to triadic

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary F., List,

Let me respond to one of the major points you've raised. You say:

"This is an interesting sidelight on the concept of degeneracy as it applies to 
triadic relations, and to semiosis. In the “Logic of Mathematics” (I assume you 
mean the c.1896 one, subtitled “An Attempt to Develop My Categories From 
Within”), according to your outline, some triadic relations are more 
“thoroughly” genuine than others, and your outline seems to be consistent with 
Lowell 3.11. But there are ambiguities lurking in your last sentence, which 
says that “thoroughly genuine triadic relations can be distinguished from 
triadic relations that are not thoroughly genuine on the grounds that the 
latter [i.e. those not thoroughly genuine] take qualities, objects and/or facts 
as the first and second correlates--and not thoughts of those things.”

Lowell 3.11 says that  in genuine Thirdness “Thought” can take all three 
categorial roles (as “mere Idea,” as event and as “governing” events). But if 
we regard the “thought of a thing” as a reference to it, and consider “mere 
reference” to be a degenerate Secondness as in CP 1.535, then we’d be saying 
that genuine Thirdness must involve degenerate Secondness, which doesn’t seem 
right. This is the kind of thing that makes it hard to judge whether Peirce’s 
texts are consistent with each other or not — or whether we know what he’s 
talking about or not, when he uses terms like “Thought.”

As far as I can tell, Peirce often uses the word "reference" in a very broad 
way. Having said that, I don't see a problem in saying that a genuine thirdness 
might involve a degenerate secondness. That is, I don't see any problem in 
saying, for example, that a symbolic argument involves a "mere reference" 
(e.g., the reference of an iconic, rhematic, qualisign to its ground) as a type 
of modal  dyadic relation. After all, from early on in the lectures leading up 
to the "New List", Peirce is keen to point out that symbolic arguments involve 
a triple reference to (1) ground, (2) object and (3) interpretant.

For my part, I don't believe that Peirce later rejects this key insight (e.g., 
as Cathy Legg and Bill McCurdy have suggested to me in conversation). When it 
comes to the triple reference that is part and parcel of a symbolic argument, I 
think that only the first of the three relations is a "mere reference," because 
it is the only relation of the three that is based on a representation in the 
interpretant (i.e., the conclusion of the argument) of the rhematic qualisigns 
in the propositions that form the premisses standing in relations of similarity 
to the object.

In fact, this very relation of "mere reference" is essential to the validity of 
some arguments--especially those that are abductive in form. The reason is that 
these argument rely heavily on the interpreter noting relations of similarity 
between the qualities that are represented in the predicates that are expressed 
in the premisses and conclusion of this type of argument.

These last rather compressed suggestions are expressed in an attempt to 
indicate that I take the detailed points Peirce to be making about the kinds of 
relations that are involved in semiotic processes are not minor--even if I 
don't understand them very well just yet. Rather, I take them to be central for 
his explanations of what is essential for the validity of different kinds of 
arguments, and I'm trying to get a clearer grasp of why these points about the 
different kinds of relations that are involved are essential parts of the 
explanations.

--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: g...@gnusystems.ca <g...@gnusystems.ca>
Sent: Tuesday, January 9, 2018 6:59 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

Jeff, list,

This is an interesting sidelight on the concept of degeneracy as it applies to 
triadic relations, and to semiosis. In the “Logic of Mathematics” (I assume you 
mean the c.1896 one, subtitled “An Attempt to Develop My Categories From 
Within”), according to your outline, some triadic relations are more 
“thoroughly” genuine than others, and your outline seems to be consistent with 
Lowell 3.11. But there are ambiguities lurking in your last sentence, which 
says that “thoroughly genuine triadic relations can be distinguished from 
triadic relations that are not thoroughly genuine on the grounds that the 
latter [i.e. those not thoughly genuine] take qualities, objects and/or facts 
as the first and second correlates--and not thoughts of those things.”

Lowell 3.11 says that  in genuine Thirdness “Thought” can take all three 
categorial roles (as “mere Idea,” as event and as “governing” events). But if 
we regard the “thought of a thing” as a reference to it, and consider “mere 
reference” to be a degenerate

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

[gnox]

Jeff, list,

 

This is an interesting sidelight on the concept of degeneracy as it applies
to triadic relations, and to semiosis. In the “Logic of Mathematics” (I
assume you mean the c.1896 one, subtitled “An Attempt to Develop My
Categories From Within”), according to your outline, some triadic relations
are more “thoroughly” genuine than others, and your outline seems to be
consistent with Lowell 3.11. But there are ambiguities lurking in your last
sentence, which says that “thoroughly genuine triadic relations can be
distinguished from triadic relations that are not thoroughly genuine on the
grounds that the latter [i.e. those not thoughly genuine] take qualities,
objects and/or facts as the first and second correlates--and not thoughts of
those things.” 

 

Lowell 3.11 says that  in genuine Thirdness “Thought” can take all three
categorial roles (as “mere Idea,” as event and as “governing” events). But
if we regard the “thought of a thing” as a reference to it, and consider
“mere reference” to be a degenerate Secondness as in CP 1.535, then we’d be
saying that genuine Thirdness must involve degenerate Secondness, which
doesn’t seem right. This is the kind of thing that makes it hard to judge
whether Peirce’s texts are consistent with each other or not — or whether we
know what he’s talking about or not, when he uses terms like “Thought.”

 

Another sidelight comes up in this bit from Turning Signs which quotes the
Syllabus. (I’ve been reading “Sundry Logical Conceptions” in parallel with
Lowell 3, hoping that they explain each other to some degree.) Here it is:

 

[[ According to  <http://gnusystems.ca/TS/xpt.htm#tention> Chapter 7, a
genuine symbol is one which actively and experientially connects an idea (or
First) with some thing, event or fact (or Second), so that its Interpretant
inhabits a more well-informed system. Peirce sometimes says that the symbol,
‘defined as a sign which is fit to serve as such simply because it will be
so interpreted’ (EP2:307), is the ‘genuine sign,’ while the index is
‘degenerate’ and the icon doubly so (EP2:306). But he also sometimes
distinguishes between genuine and degenerate symbols. In any case, the
information conveyed by a symbol depends on the involvement of both icons
and index in it.

A Symbol is a law, or regularity of the indefinite future. Its Interpretant
must be of the same description; and so must be also the complete immediate
Object, or meaning. But a law necessarily governs, or “is embodied in”
individuals, and prescribes some of their qualities. Consequently, a
constituent of a Symbol may be an Index, and a constituent may be an Icon. A
man walking with a child points his arm up into the air and says, “There is
a balloon.” The pointing arm is an essential part of the Symbol without
which the latter would convey no information. But if the child asks, “What
is a balloon,” and the man replies, “It is something like a great big soap
bubble,” he makes the image a part of the Symbol. Thus, while the complete
Object of a Symbol, that is to say, its meaning, is of the nature of a law,
it must denote an individual, and must signify a character. A genuine Symbol
is a Symbol that has a general meaning. There are two kinds of degenerate
Symbols, the Singular Symbol whose Object is an existent individual, and
which signifies only such characters as that individual may realize; and the
Abstract Symbol, whose only Object is a character. — Peirce (EP2:274-5) ]]

 

In these matters of genuineness and degeneracy, so far I haven’t seen a good
reason to abandon my belief that Peirce is consistent with himself (unless
he himself says otherwise) and that my glosses on Peirce, like those I’m
posting here, are consistent with Peirce. But I also continue to believe in
Peirce’s fallibility, and even more strongly in my own fallibility. For
instance, I’m not sure what to make of Peirce’s saying here that the “Object
of a Symbol” is “its meaning,” since I’d be more likely to say that its
Interpretant is its meaning. But I’m posting all this in the hope of further
clarification of the nature of semiosis — and not as mere exegesis of
Peirce.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] 
Sent: 8-Jan-18 17:41
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

 

Gary F, List,

 

In the "Logic of Mathematics," Peirce makes a distinction between the
general class of genuinely triadic relations, and the species that are
thoroughly genuine in their triadic character. Here is a way of
characterizing the difference between the two.

 

In all genuinely triadic relations, a general rule is the third correlate,
and that rule governs the relations between the first and second correlates.
Consequently, there are three kinds of genuinely triadic relations--and they
can be distinguished on the basis of the character of the first and second
correlates that are governed by the rule:

 

1. The laws of quality a

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

[Jerry Rhee]

Helmut, list,



In response to “.. failed to consider the possibility that all philosophers
form a class by themselves, or that what unites all genuine philosophers is
more important than what unites a given philosopher with a particular group
of non-philosophers”,



you said:
I also think, that philosophers are not a class. Everybody is a philosopher
somehow..



I am sure you are right.

I am also sure there can never ever have been a genuine philosopher in all
of human history..  so why *even* bother with talk about genuine philosophy?



Best,
Jerry R

On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 4:14 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:

>
> Jerry, List,
> I think there are essential distinctions between the experience that is
> written in the genes (instincts), epigenetic dispositions, and that which
> is written in in the memory of the brain, like cultural experience. I also
> think, that philosophers are not a class. Everybody is a philosopher
> somehow, and every philosopher is a non-philosopher somehow too, especially
> Nietzsche.
> Best,
> Helmut
>  08. Januar 2018 um 01:31 Uhr
> *Von:* "Jerry Rhee" <jerryr...@gmail.com>
>
>
> Btw,
>
>
>
> “cask of memory”, Nietzsche
>
> “This is man”, Peirce
>
> “glassy essence, like an angry ape”, Shakespeare
>
>
>
> “.. failed to consider the possibility that all philosophers form a class
> by themselves, or that what unites all genuine philosophers is more
> important than what unites a given philosopher with a particular group of
> non-philosophers”, Strauss
>
>
>
> Best wishes,
> Jerry Rhee
>
> On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 5:49 PM, Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> Dear list,
>>
>>
>>
>> Is my experience but of yesterday?
>>
>> It is long ago that I experienced the reasons for mine opinions.
>>
>>
>>
>> This is man,
>>
>> ". . . proud man,
>> Most ignorant of what he's most assured,
>> His glassy essence, like an angry ape.."
>>
>>
>>
>> Best,
>> Jerry R
>>
>> On Sat, Jan 6, 2018 at 6:49 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> Gene, Gary f, list,
>>>
>>> Gene wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> It seems to me that one can also say that some elements of our
>>> experience are primate experience, and also even mammal experience, rather
>>> than specifically human experience. And perhaps these prejudices need to be
>>> bracketed out in scientific experience as well.
>>>
>>>
>>> But aren't such primate, mammalian and material 'elements' immediately
>>> *filtered*, so to speak, through our* human being* in order to count as *our
>>> experience, *experience in Peirce's sense in the material under
>>> discussion?
>>>
>>> So, while it's true that my pain in stubbing my toe is surely mammalian
>>> pain, I immediately, quasi-necessarily turn it into *human* *experience*.
>>> I say to myself "ouch!" (the pain is symbolized), "my right big toe" (the
>>> pain is immediately localized in human terms), etc. Such human
>>> symbolization allows us to not only experience, but also importantly to
>>> reflect on our experience in order to, come to better understandings of the
>>> nature of physical pain, to, for example, discover means to control it
>>> medically for not only humans, but for primates, other mammals, etc.
>>>
>>> Best,
>>>
>>> Gary R
>>>
>>>
>>> [image: Gary Richmond]
>>>
>>> *Gary Richmond*
>>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>>> *Communication Studies*
>>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>>> *718 482-5690*
>>>
>>> On Sat, Jan 6, 2018 at 3:28 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Gene,
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Yes — for me it goes without saying that humans are mammals and
>>>> primates, but now that you’ve said it, I agree.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The Nietszche quote does seem timely in some respects … likewise this
>>>> bit from the *Avatamsaka Sutra* that I quoted on my blog the other
>>>> day: “There is not a single sentient being who is not fully endowed with
>>>> the knowledge of the enlightened; it is just that because of deluded
>>>> notions, erroneous thinking, and attachments, they are unable to realize
>>>> it.”
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
&g

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary F, List,


In the "Logic of Mathematics," Peirce makes a distinction between the general 
class of genuinely triadic relations, and the species that are thoroughly 
genuine in their triadic character. Here is a way of characterizing the 
difference between the two.


In all genuinely triadic relations, a general rule is the third correlate, and 
that rule governs the relations between the first and second correlates. 
Consequently, there are three kinds of genuinely triadic relations--and they 
can be distinguished on the basis of the character of the first and second 
correlates that are governed by the rule:


1. The laws of quality are general rules that governs the relations between 
qualities;

2. The laws of fact are general rules that governs the relations between facts, 
where each fact involves existing objects having various qualities;

3. Representations involve general rules that govern the relations between a 
thought playing the role of a first and a thought playing the role of a second.


As such, I am working on the assumption that, when it comes to thoroughly 
genuine triadic relations, all three correlates have the character of thoughts. 
What is more, these thoroughly genuine triadic relations  can be distinguished 
from triadic relations that are not thoroughly genuine on the grounds that the 
latter take qualities, objects and/or facts as the first and second 
correlates--and not thoughts of those things.




--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: g...@gnusystems.ca <g...@gnusystems.ca>
Sent: Monday, January 8, 2018 3:13:25 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

One more comment on Lowell 3.11 before we move on:

When we analyze a Genuine Thirdness, or the operation of a Sign, we find 
Thought playing three different roles, which we might call the Firstness of 
Thought (“which is such as it is positively and regardless of anything else”), 
its Secondness (“which is as it is in a second something's being as it is”), 
and its Thirdness (“whose being consists in its bringing about a secondness”) — 
those definitions are from the Syllabus (EP2:267). Experience and Information 
are two names for the Secondness of Thought, i.e. Thought as Event, as 
something that happens when two subjects enter into dyadic relations with one 
another. An experiencing “subject” and an experienced “object,” for example, 
are each what they are in that moment because the other is what it is at that 
time.

“Information” here, as usual in Peirce, is not something that can be quantified 
in numbers of bits or megabytes, but an event that leaves some quasi-mind more 
informed about the Other than it was before the informing event. The event is a 
change in a “state of information,” as Peirce often puts it. But the “subject” 
or “mind” who is informed by this event must continue to be the same system or 
entity in order to be changed or informed by it; and if there is any regularity 
governing the information process, it must also continue in its generality, its 
ability to continue bringing about such events in the future. That is its 
Thirdness — which necessarily involves its Secondness and Firstness, as Peirce 
has already explained. Likewise a triadic relation can always be seen as a 
single relation involving three “subjects,” which in Peircean semiotics are 
called Sign, Object and Interpretant.

The analysis can be continued: the sign in itself can have three modes of 
being; the sign-object relation likewise be predominantly monadic, dyadic or 
triadic; and the interpretant can represent that relation in three different 
ways. Peirce gives much more of this further analysis in the Syllabus, both in 
the “speculative Grammar” section and the “Nomenclature and Divisions of 
Triadic Relations,” which culminates in the famous tenfold classification of 
sign types. But all this analysis depends on an understanding of Genuine 
Thirdness. So here again is the paragraph on this that I’ve been paraphrasing 
from Lowell 3:

[CP 1.537] Now in Genuine Thirdness, the First, the Second, and the Third are 
all three of the nature of thirds, or Thought, while in respect to one another 
they are First, Second, and Third. The First is Thought in its capacity as mere 
Possibility; that is, mere Mind capable of thinking, or a mere vague idea. The 
Second is Thought playing the rôle of a Secondness, or Event. That is, it is of 
the general nature of Experience or Information. The Third is Thought in its 
rôle as governing Secondness. It brings the Information into the Mind, or 
determines the Idea and gives it body. It is informing thought, or Cognition. 
But take away the psychological or accidental human element, and in this 
genuine Thirdness we see the operation of a Sign.

http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm }{ Peirce’s Lowell 

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

[Helmut Raulien]

 

Jerry, List,

I think there are essential distinctions between the experience that is written in the genes (instincts), epigenetic dispositions, and that which is written in in the memory of the brain, like cultural experience. I also think, that philosophers are not a class. Everybody is a philosopher somehow, and every philosopher is a non-philosopher somehow too, especially Nietzsche.

Best,

Helmut


 08. Januar 2018 um 01:31 Uhr
Von: "Jerry Rhee" <jerryr...@gmail.com>
 



Btw, 

 

“cask of memory”, Nietzsche

“This is man”, Peirce

“glassy essence, like an angry ape”, Shakespeare

 

“.. failed to consider the possibility that all philosophers form a class by themselves, or that what unites all genuine philosophers is more important than what unites a given philosopher with a particular group of non-philosophers”, Strauss

 

Best wishes, 
Jerry Rhee


 
On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 5:49 PM, Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> wrote:



Dear list,

 

Is my experience but of yesterday? 

It is long ago that I experienced the reasons for mine opinions.

 

This is man,

". . . proud man,
Most ignorant of what he's most assured,
His glassy essence, like an angry ape.."

 

Best,
Jerry R




 
On Sat, Jan 6, 2018 at 6:49 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote:



Gene, Gary f, list, 

 

Gene wrote: 

 


It seems to me that one can also say that some elements of our experience are primate experience, and also even mammal experience, rather than specifically human experience. And perhaps these prejudices need to be bracketed out in scientific experience as well.


 

But aren't such primate, mammalian and material 'elements' immediately filtered, so to speak, through our human being in order to count as our experience, experience in Peirce's sense in the material under discussion? 

 

So, while it's true that my pain in stubbing my toe is surely mammalian pain, I immediately, quasi-necessarily turn it into human experience. I say to myself "ouch!" (the pain is symbolized), "my right big toe" (the pain is immediately localized in human terms), etc. Such human symbolization allows us to not only experience, but also importantly to reflect on our experience in order to, come to better understandings of the nature of physical pain, to, for example, discover means to control it medically for not only humans, but for primates, other mammals, etc.

 

Best,

 

Gary R

 


 








 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

718 482-5690






 



On Sat, Jan 6, 2018 at 3:28 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:







Gene,

 

Yes — for me it goes without saying that humans are mammals and primates, but now that you’ve said it, I agree.

 

The Nietszche quote does seem timely in some respects … likewise this bit from the Avatamsaka Sutra that I quoted on my blog the other day: “There is not a single sentient being who is not fully endowed with the knowledge of the enlightened; it is just that because of deluded notions, erroneous thinking, and attachments, they are unable to realize it.” 

 

Gary f.

 

} The lord whose oracle is at Delphi neither speaks nor conceals, but gives signs. [Heraclitus] {

http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway

 

 

 

From: Eugene Halton [mailto:eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu]
Sent: 6-Jan-18 14:13
To: Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

 


Dear Gary F, 


     Your comment concludes:



     "That last sentence takes us to the crux of the challenge of Peircean semiotics and Peircean phenomenology: Experience is our only teacher in science, as he says elsewhere, and all of our experience is human experience — yet we are tasked to “take away the psychological or accidental human element” from our comprehension of the elements of the phenomenon, and specifically of semiosic phenomena. Nominalists and others will say it can’t be done; Peirce says “Why not?”



 



   As a quibble, it seems to me that one can also say that some elements of our experience are primate experience, and also even mammal experience, rather than specifically human experience. And perhaps these prejudices need to be bracketed out in scientific experience as well.



     Nietszche said something that may speak to Peirce’s words, though perhaps not completely parallel:



     "Your true educators and formative teachers reveal to you what the real raw material of your being is, something quite ineducable, yet in any case accessible only with difficulty, bound, paralyzed: your educators can be only your liberators." (Untimely Meditations III)



     Gene Halton



 




 




 

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To U

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

[gnox]

One more comment on Lowell 3.11 before we move on:

 

When we analyze a Genuine Thirdness, or the operation of a Sign, we find
Thought playing three different roles, which we might call the Firstness of
Thought (“which is such as it is positively and regardless of anything
else”), its Secondness (“which is as it is in a second something's being as
it is”), and its Thirdness (“whose being consists in its bringing about a
secondness”) — those definitions are from the Syllabus (EP2:267). Experience
and Information are two names for the Secondness of Thought, i.e. Thought as
Event, as something that happens when two subjects enter into dyadic
relations with one another. An experiencing “subject” and an experienced
“object,” for example, are each what they are in that moment because the
other is what it is at that time.

 

“Information” here, as usual in Peirce, is not something that can be
quantified in numbers of bits or megabytes, but an event that leaves some
quasi-mind more informed about the Other than it was before the informing
event. The event is a change in a “state of information,” as Peirce often
puts it. But the “subject” or “mind” who is informed by this event must
continue to be the same system or entity in order to be changed or informed
by it; and if there is any regularity governing the information process, it
must also continue in its generality, its ability to continue bringing about
such events in the future. That is its Thirdness — which necessarily
involves its Secondness and Firstness, as Peirce has already explained.
Likewise a triadic relation can always be seen as a single relation
involving three “subjects,” which in Peircean semiotics are called Sign,
Object and Interpretant. 

 

The analysis can be continued: the sign in itself can have three modes of
being; the sign-object relation likewise be predominantly monadic, dyadic or
triadic; and the interpretant can represent that relation in three different
ways. Peirce gives much more of this further analysis in the Syllabus, both
in the “speculative Grammar” section and the “Nomenclature and Divisions of
Triadic Relations,” which culminates in the famous tenfold classification of
sign types. But all this analysis depends on an understanding of Genuine
Thirdness. So here again is the paragraph on this that I’ve been
paraphrasing from Lowell 3: 

 

[CP 1.537] Now in Genuine Thirdness, the First, the Second, and the Third
are all three of the nature of thirds, or Thought, while in respect to one
another they are First, Second, and Third. The First is Thought in its
capacity as mere Possibility; that is, mere Mind capable of thinking, or a
mere vague idea. The Second is Thought playing the rôle of a Secondness, or
Event. That is, it is of the general nature of Experience or Information.
The Third is Thought in its rôle as governing Secondness. It brings the
Information into the Mind, or determines the Idea and gives it body. It is
informing thought, or Cognition. But take away the psychological or
accidental human element, and in this genuine Thirdness we see the operation
of a Sign. 

 

http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm }{ Peirce’s Lowell Lectures of 1903

 


-
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to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
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http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

[Jerry Rhee]

Btw,



“cask of memory”, Nietzsche

“This is man”, Peirce

“glassy essence, like an angry ape”, Shakespeare



“.. failed to consider the possibility that all philosophers form a class
by themselves, or that what unites all genuine philosophers is more
important than what unites a given philosopher with a particular group of
non-philosophers”, Strauss


Best wishes,
Jerry Rhee

On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 5:49 PM, Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Dear list,
>
>
>
> Is my experience but of yesterday?
>
> It is long ago that I experienced the reasons for mine opinions.
>
>
>
> This is man,
>
> ". . . proud man,
> Most ignorant of what he's most assured,
> His glassy essence, like an angry ape.."
>
>
>
> Best,
> Jerry R
>
> On Sat, Jan 6, 2018 at 6:49 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Gene, Gary f, list,
>>
>> Gene wrote:
>>
>> It seems to me that one can also say that some elements of our
>> experience are primate experience, and also even mammal experience, rather
>> than specifically human experience. And perhaps these prejudices need to be
>> bracketed out in scientific experience as well.
>>
>>
>> But aren't such primate, mammalian and material 'elements' immediately
>> *filtered*, so to speak, through our* human being* in order to count as *our
>> experience, *experience in Peirce's sense in the material under
>> discussion?
>>
>> So, while it's true that my pain in stubbing my toe is surely mammalian
>> pain, I immediately, quasi-necessarily turn it into *human* *experience*.
>> I say to myself "ouch!" (the pain is symbolized), "my right big toe" (the
>> pain is immediately localized in human terms), etc. Such human
>> symbolization allows us to not only experience, but also importantly to
>> reflect on our experience in order to, come to better understandings of the
>> nature of physical pain, to, for example, discover means to control it
>> medically for not only humans, but for primates, other mammals, etc.
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary R
>>
>>
>> [image: Gary Richmond]
>>
>> *Gary Richmond*
>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>> *Communication Studies*
>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>>
>> On Sat, Jan 6, 2018 at 3:28 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:
>>
>>> Gene,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Yes — for me it goes without saying that humans are mammals and
>>> primates, but now that you’ve said it, I agree.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The Nietszche quote does seem timely in some respects … likewise this
>>> bit from the *Avatamsaka Sutra* that I quoted on my blog the other day:
>>> “There is not a single sentient being who is not fully endowed with the
>>> knowledge of the enlightened; it is just that because of deluded notions,
>>> erroneous thinking, and attachments, they are unable to realize it.”
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Gary f.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> } The lord whose oracle is at Delphi neither speaks nor conceals, but
>>> gives signs. [Heraclitus] {
>>>
>>> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *From:* Eugene Halton [mailto:eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu]
>>> *Sent:* 6-Jan-18 14:13
>>> *To:* Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
>>> *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Dear Gary F,
>>>
>>>  Your comment concludes:
>>>
>>>  "That last sentence takes us to the crux of the challenge of
>>> Peircean semiotics and Peircean phenomenology: *Experience is our only
>>> teacher* in science, as he says elsewhere, and all of our experience is
>>> *human* experience — yet we are tasked to “take away the psychological
>>> or accidental human element” from our comprehension of the elements of the
>>> phenomenon, and specifically of semiosic phenomena. Nominalists and others
>>> will say it can’t be done; Peirce says “Why not?”
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>As a quibble, it seems to me that one can also say that some elements
>>> of our experience are primate experience, and also even mammal experience,
>>> rather than specifically human experience. And perhaps these prejudices
>>> need to be bracketed out in scientif

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



Is my experience but of yesterday?

It is long ago that I experienced the reasons for mine opinions.



This is man,

". . . proud man,
Most ignorant of what he's most assured,
His glassy essence, like an angry ape.."



Best,
Jerry R

On Sat, Jan 6, 2018 at 6:49 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Gene, Gary f, list,
>
> Gene wrote:
>
> It seems to me that one can also say that some elements of our experience
> are primate experience, and also even mammal experience, rather than
> specifically human experience. And perhaps these prejudices need to be
> bracketed out in scientific experience as well.
>
>
> But aren't such primate, mammalian and material 'elements' immediately
> *filtered*, so to speak, through our* human being* in order to count as *our
> experience, *experience in Peirce's sense in the material under
> discussion?
>
> So, while it's true that my pain in stubbing my toe is surely mammalian
> pain, I immediately, quasi-necessarily turn it into *human* *experience*.
> I say to myself "ouch!" (the pain is symbolized), "my right big toe" (the
> pain is immediately localized in human terms), etc. Such human
> symbolization allows us to not only experience, but also importantly to
> reflect on our experience in order to, come to better understandings of the
> nature of physical pain, to, for example, discover means to control it
> medically for not only humans, but for primates, other mammals, etc.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>
> On Sat, Jan 6, 2018 at 3:28 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:
>
>> Gene,
>>
>>
>>
>> Yes — for me it goes without saying that humans are mammals and primates,
>> but now that you’ve said it, I agree.
>>
>>
>>
>> The Nietszche quote does seem timely in some respects … likewise this
>> bit from the *Avatamsaka Sutra* that I quoted on my blog the other day:
>> “There is not a single sentient being who is not fully endowed with the
>> knowledge of the enlightened; it is just that because of deluded notions,
>> erroneous thinking, and attachments, they are unable to realize it.”
>>
>>
>>
>> Gary f.
>>
>>
>>
>> } The lord whose oracle is at Delphi neither speaks nor conceals, but
>> gives signs. [Heraclitus] {
>>
>> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* Eugene Halton [mailto:eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu]
>> *Sent:* 6-Jan-18 14:13
>> *To:* Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
>> *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11
>>
>>
>>
>> Dear Gary F,
>>
>>  Your comment concludes:
>>
>>  "That last sentence takes us to the crux of the challenge of
>> Peircean semiotics and Peircean phenomenology: *Experience is our only
>> teacher* in science, as he says elsewhere, and all of our experience is
>> *human* experience — yet we are tasked to “take away the psychological
>> or accidental human element” from our comprehension of the elements of the
>> phenomenon, and specifically of semiosic phenomena. Nominalists and others
>> will say it can’t be done; Peirce says “Why not?”
>>
>>
>>
>>As a quibble, it seems to me that one can also say that some elements
>> of our experience are primate experience, and also even mammal experience,
>> rather than specifically human experience. And perhaps these prejudices
>> need to be bracketed out in scientific experience as well.
>>
>>  Nietszche said something that may speak to Peirce’s words, though
>> perhaps not completely parallel:
>>
>>  "Your true educators and formative teachers reveal to you what the
>> real raw material of your being is, something quite ineducable, yet in any
>> case accessible only with difficulty, bound, paralyzed: your educators can
>> be only your liberators." (Untimely Meditations III)
>>
>>  Gene Halton
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> -
>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
>> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
>> BODY of the m

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

[Gary Richmond]

Gene, Gary f, list,

Gene wrote:

It seems to me that one can also say that some elements of our experience
are primate experience, and also even mammal experience, rather than
specifically human experience. And perhaps these prejudices need to be
bracketed out in scientific experience as well.


But aren't such primate, mammalian and material 'elements' immediately
*filtered*, so to speak, through our* human being* in order to count as *our
experience, *experience in Peirce's sense in the material under discussion?

So, while it's true that my pain in stubbing my toe is surely mammalian
pain, I immediately, quasi-necessarily turn it into *human* *experience*. I
say to myself "ouch!" (the pain is symbolized), "my right big toe" (the
pain is immediately localized in human terms), etc. Such human
symbolization allows us to not only experience, but also importantly to
reflect on our experience in order to, come to better understandings of the
nature of physical pain, to, for example, discover means to control it
medically for not only humans, but for primates, other mammals, etc.

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Jan 6, 2018 at 3:28 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:

> Gene,
>
>
>
> Yes — for me it goes without saying that humans are mammals and primates,
> but now that you’ve said it, I agree.
>
>
>
> The Nietszche quote does seem timely in some respects … likewise this bit
> from the *Avatamsaka Sutra* that I quoted on my blog the other day:
> “There is not a single sentient being who is not fully endowed with the
> knowledge of the enlightened; it is just that because of deluded notions,
> erroneous thinking, and attachments, they are unable to realize it.”
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> } The lord whose oracle is at Delphi neither speaks nor conceals, but
> gives signs. [Heraclitus] {
>
> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* Eugene Halton [mailto:eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu]
> *Sent:* 6-Jan-18 14:13
> *To:* Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11
>
>
>
> Dear Gary F,
>
>  Your comment concludes:
>
>  "That last sentence takes us to the crux of the challenge of
> Peircean semiotics and Peircean phenomenology: *Experience is our only
> teacher* in science, as he says elsewhere, and all of our experience is
> *human* experience — yet we are tasked to “take away the psychological or
> accidental human element” from our comprehension of the elements of the
> phenomenon, and specifically of semiosic phenomena. Nominalists and others
> will say it can’t be done; Peirce says “Why not?”
>
>
>
>As a quibble, it seems to me that one can also say that some elements
> of our experience are primate experience, and also even mammal experience,
> rather than specifically human experience. And perhaps these prejudices
> need to be bracketed out in scientific experience as well.
>
>  Nietszche said something that may speak to Peirce’s words, though
> perhaps not completely parallel:
>
>  "Your true educators and formative teachers reveal to you what the
> real raw material of your being is, something quite ineducable, yet in any
> case accessible only with difficulty, bound, paralyzed: your educators can
> be only your liberators." (Untimely Meditations III)
>
>  Gene Halton
>
>
>
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

[gnox]

Gene,

 

Yes — for me it goes without saying that humans are mammals and primates, but 
now that you’ve said it, I agree.

 

The Nietszche quote does seem timely in some respects … likewise this bit from 
the Avatamsaka Sutra that I quoted on my blog the other day: “There is not a 
single sentient being who is not fully endowed with the knowledge of the 
enlightened; it is just that because of deluded notions, erroneous thinking, 
and attachments, they are unable to realize it.” 

 

Gary f.

 

} The lord whose oracle is at Delphi neither speaks nor conceals, but gives 
signs. [Heraclitus] {

 <http://gnusystems.ca/wp/> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway

 

 

 

From: Eugene Halton [mailto:eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu] 
Sent: 6-Jan-18 14:13
To: Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

 

Dear Gary F, 

 Your comment concludes:

 "That last sentence takes us to the crux of the challenge of Peircean 
semiotics and Peircean phenomenology: Experience is our only teacher in 
science, as he says elsewhere, and all of our experience is human experience — 
yet we are tasked to “take away the psychological or accidental human element” 
from our comprehension of the elements of the phenomenon, and specifically of 
semiosic phenomena. Nominalists and others will say it can’t be done; Peirce 
says “Why not?”

 

   As a quibble, it seems to me that one can also say that some elements of our 
experience are primate experience, and also even mammal experience, rather than 
specifically human experience. And perhaps these prejudices need to be 
bracketed out in scientific experience as well.

 Nietszche said something that may speak to Peirce’s words, though perhaps 
not completely parallel:

 "Your true educators and formative teachers reveal to you what the real 
raw material of your being is, something quite ineducable, yet in any case 
accessible only with difficulty, bound, paralyzed: your educators can be only 
your liberators." (Untimely Meditations III)

 Gene Halton

 

 


-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

[Eugene Halton]

Dear Gary F,
 Your comment concludes:
 "That last sentence takes us to the crux of the challenge of Peircean
semiotics and Peircean phenomenology: *Experience is our only teacher* in
science, as he says elsewhere, and all of our experience is *human* experience
— yet we are tasked to “take away the psychological or accidental human
element” from our comprehension of the elements of the phenomenon, and
specifically of semiosic phenomena. Nominalists and others will say it
can’t be done; Peirce says “Why not?”

   As a quibble, it seems to me that one can also say that some elements of
our experience are primate experience, and also even mammal experience,
rather than specifically human experience. And perhaps these prejudices
need to be bracketed out in scientific experience as well.
 Nietszche said something that may speak to Peirce’s words, though
perhaps not completely parallel:
 "Your true educators and formative teachers reveal to you what the
real raw material of your being is, something quite ineducable, yet in any
case accessible only with difficulty, bound, paralyzed: your educators can
be only your liberators." (Untimely Meditations III)
 Gene Halton


On Jan 6, 2018 9:34 AM,  wrote:

> Gary R, I think that’s a good exposition of the “reference” issues,
> including some aspects of the matter that I hadn’t thought of.
>
>
>
> This is heartening because I find it difficult to write about these
> ‘categorial’ issues as they are presented in Lowell 3 — difficult because
> they take us back to the very basics of experience itself, or to the
> elements of the phenomenon, which is the other side of the same coin. The
> deeper we probe into this, the more vast the implications and the
> applications, and the harder it is to illustrate the conceptions with
> concrete examples, because any example that comes to mind (like Spike the
> cat) brings irrelevant or misleading associations along with it. Also, if
> the writer thinks about the reader’s response, he’s apt to say (as Peirce
> did earlier in Lowell 3), “It must be extremely difficult for those who
> are untrained to such analyses of conceptions to make any sense of all
> this.” But then other readers (on a list like this one) are likely to feel
> that they’ve heard it all before and want to skip ahead. Hence the writer’s
> despair. But I might as well stumble on regardless.
>
>
>
> Before probing further into Lowell 3.11, and specifically CP 1.536, I’d
> like to requote this bit from earlier in Lowell 3:
>
> [[ The secondness of the Second, whichever of the two objects be called
> the Second, is different from the Secondness of the first. That is to say
> it *generally* is so. To kill and to be killed are different. In case
> there is one of the two which there is good reason for calling the First,
> while the other remains the Second, it is that the Secondness is more
> accidental to the former than to the latter; that there is more or less
> approach to a state of things in which something, which is itself First,
> accidentally comes into a Secondness that does not really modify its
> Firstness, while its Second in this Secondness is something whose *being*
> is of the nature of Secondness and which has no Firstness separate from
> this.… The extreme kind of Secondness which I have just described is the
> relation of a *quality* to the *matter* in which that quality inheres.
> The mode of being of the quality is that of Firstness. That is to say, it
> is a possibility. It is related to the matter accidentally; and this
> relation does not change the quality at all, except that it imparts
> *existence,* that is to say, this very relation of inherence, to it. But
> the *matter,* on the other hand, has no being at all except the being a
> subject of qualities. This relation of really having qualities constitutes
> its *existence.* But if all its qualities were to be taken away, and it
> were to be left quality-less matter, it not only would not exist, but it
> would not have any positive definite possibility — such as an unembodied
> quality has. It would be nothing, at all.]  (CP 1.527)]
>
>
>
> Now, the very word “matter” has common associations that would make this
> line of thinking hard to follow. We are often inclined to think of “matter”
> as physical stuff, like the clay which an artisan or artist might shape
> into a bowl or a sculpture, or like the clay that God shaped into Adam in
> one of the *Genesis* stories. But clay already has *qualities* that make
> it *clay*. Can we imagine “quality-less matter” at all? Or an “unembodied
> quality”? If not, we can’t imagine a pure First or a pure Second either.
> Neither one could *exist* (as clay can exist) because  *existence* is the
> “very relation of inherence” of qualities in matter. So thinking of the
> quality as First and the matter as Second, we can say that the quality
> *determines* the matter to its existence.
>
>
>
> This is different from 

Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

List - I have a different view of a few concepts referred to in the
last few posts.

1] I consider that 'Degenerate Secondness' - or Secondness
functioning within the mode of Firstness is not a 'dyadic relation'
between the material object of a cat and the word 'cat' . To me,
that's a symbolic relation of two Signs [capital S, therefore, two
triads; one in a material format; the other in a symbolic format; one
is a material object; the other is a conceptual object].. What I
understand as Degenerate Secondness is a distinctive Form - since
Secondness is by definition, a mode of a clear perception of
Otherness - but a distinctive Form in which the focus is not on the
Whole Otherness of that Form but on its own inherent qualities. 

As Peirce points out, Secondness as Firstness [degenerate
Secondness] "is the relation of a quality to the matter in which that
quality inheres" 1.527. "the mode of  being of the quality is that of
Firstness". So, if one continue with the example of the cat, my view
is that the mode of 2-1 is not the symbolic word, but the 'quality'
of the cat: its softness, its fur, its purr. 

Whereas Pure or Genuine Secondness is, as Peirce wrote, "a single
fact about two objects'. It would be the cat as differentiated from
'Not-Cat'; i.e.,  the chair on which it is sitting. 

2] Gary F writes: 

" we can say that the quality  determines the matter to its
existence. "

I would instead define Secondness not as determined by Firstness but
as defined or determined by the spatial and temporal finiteness of its
qualities. It's the finiteness that I consider crucial to the mode of
Secondness. That's what gives Secondness its characteristic
'bruteness'. 

Edwina
 On Sat 06/01/18  9:34 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Gary R, I think that’s a good exposition of the “reference”
issues, including some aspects of the matter that I hadn’t thought
of. 
This is heartening because I find it difficult to write about these
‘categorial’ issues as they are presented in Lowell 3 —
difficult because they take us back to the very basics of experience
itself, or to the elements of the phenomenon, which is the other side
of the same coin. The deeper we probe into this, the more vast the
implications and the applications, and the harder it is to illustrate
the conceptions with concrete examples, because any example that comes
to mind (like Spike the cat) brings irrelevant or misleading
associations along with it. Also, if the writer thinks about the
reader’s response, he’s apt to say (as Peirce did earlier in
Lowell 3), “ It must be extremely difficult for those who are
untrained to such analyses of conceptions to make any sense of all
this.” But then other readers (on a list like this one) are likely
to feel that they’ve heard it all before and want to skip ahead.
Hence the writer’s despair.  But I might as well stumble on
regardless.
Before probing further into Lowell 3.11, and specifically CP 1.536,
I’d like to requote this bit from earlier in Lowell 3:  

[[ The secondness of the Second, whichever of the two objects be
called the Second, is different from the Secondness of the first.
That is to say it generally is so. To kill and to be killed are
different. In case there is one of the two which there is good reason
for calling the First, while the other remains the Second, it is that
the Secondness is more accidental to the former than to the latter;
that there is more or less approach to a state of things in which
something, which is itself First, accidentally comes into a
Secondness that does not really modify its Firstness, while its
Second in this Secondness is something whose  being is of the nature
of Secondness and which has no Firstness separate from this.… The
extreme kind of Secondness which I have just described is the
relation of a quality to the matter in which that quality inheres.
The mode of being of the quality is that of Firstness. That is to
say, it is a possibility. It is related to the matter accidentally;
and this relation does not change the quality at all, except that it
imparts existence, that is to say, this very relation of inherence,
to it. But the  matter, on the other hand, has no being at all except
the being a subject of qualities. This relation of really having
qualities constitutes its existence. But if all its qualities were to
be taken away, and it were to be left quality-less matter, it not only
would not exist, but it would not have any positive definite
possibility — such as an unembodied quality has. It would be
nothing, at all.]   (CP 1.527)]
Now, the very word “matter” has common associations that would
make this line of thinking hard to follow. We are often inclined to
think of “matter” as physical stuff, like the clay which an
artisan or artist might shape into a bowl or a sculpture, or like the
clay that God shaped into Adam in one of the  Genesis stories. But
clay 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

[gnox]

Gary R, I think that’s a good exposition of the “reference” issues, including 
some aspects of the matter that I hadn’t thought of. 

 

This is heartening because I find it difficult to write about these 
‘categorial’ issues as they are presented in Lowell 3 — difficult because they 
take us back to the very basics of experience itself, or to the elements of the 
phenomenon, which is the other side of the same coin. The deeper we probe into 
this, the more vast the implications and the applications, and the harder it is 
to illustrate the conceptions with concrete examples, because any example that 
comes to mind (like Spike the cat) brings irrelevant or misleading associations 
along with it. Also, if the writer thinks about the reader’s response, he’s apt 
to say (as Peirce did earlier in Lowell 3), “It must be extremely difficult for 
those who are untrained to such analyses of conceptions to make any sense of 
all this.” But then other readers (on a list like this one) are likely to feel 
that they’ve heard it all before and want to skip ahead. Hence the writer’s 
despair. But I might as well stumble on regardless.

 

Before probing further into Lowell 3.11, and specifically CP 1.536, I’d like to 
requote this bit from earlier in Lowell 3: 

[[ The secondness of the Second, whichever of the two objects be called the 
Second, is different from the Secondness of the first. That is to say it 
generally is so. To kill and to be killed are different. In case there is one 
of the two which there is good reason for calling the First, while the other 
remains the Second, it is that the Secondness is more accidental to the former 
than to the latter; that there is more or less approach to a state of things in 
which something, which is itself First, accidentally comes into a Secondness 
that does not really modify its Firstness, while its Second in this Secondness 
is something whose being is of the nature of Secondness and which has no 
Firstness separate from this.… The extreme kind of Secondness which I have just 
described is the relation of a quality to the matter in which that quality 
inheres. The mode of being of the quality is that of Firstness. That is to say, 
it is a possibility. It is related to the matter accidentally; and this 
relation does not change the quality at all, except that it imparts existence, 
that is to say, this very relation of inherence, to it. But the matter, on the 
other hand, has no being at all except the being a subject of qualities. This 
relation of really having qualities constitutes its existence. But if all its 
qualities were to be taken away, and it were to be left quality-less matter, it 
not only would not exist, but it would not have any positive definite 
possibility — such as an unembodied quality has. It would be nothing, at all.]  
(CP 1.527)]

 

Now, the very word “matter” has common associations that would make this line 
of thinking hard to follow. We are often inclined to think of “matter” as 
physical stuff, like the clay which an artisan or artist might shape into a 
bowl or a sculpture, or like the clay that God shaped into Adam in one of the 
Genesis stories. But clay already has qualities that make it clay. Can we 
imagine “quality-less matter” at all? Or an “unembodied quality”? If not, we 
can’t imagine a pure First or a pure Second either. Neither one could exist (as 
clay can exist) because  existence is the “very relation of inherence” of 
qualities in matter. So thinking of the quality as First and the matter as 
Second, we can say that the quality determines the matter to its existence. 

 

This is different from another kind of determination which is involved in a 
triadic relation. Peirce explains the difference in CP 1.536:

[[ We have here a First, a Second, and a Third. The first is a Positive 
Qualitative Possibility, in itself nothing more. The Second is an Existent 
thing without any mode of being less than existence, but determined by that 
First. A Third has a mode of being which consists in the Secondnesses that it 
determines, the mode of being of a Law, or Concept. Do not confound this with 
the ideal being of a quality in itself. A quality is something capable of being 
completely embodied. A Law never can be embodied in its character as a law 
except by determining a habit. A quality is how something may or might have 
been. A law is how an endless future must continue to be. ]]

 

If I read this right, Peirce is saying here that a First can determine a Second 
by being embodied here and now, and thus being accidentally involved in a 
Secondness while retaining its essential Firstness as a possibility; but a 
Third can attain or retain its essential Thirdness only by continuously 
determining Secondnesses, whenever the situation arises that makes this 
possible.

 

For me, this has an important bearing on the discussion we were having last 
year on the list about the “order of determination” in semiosis. Also on the 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

[Gary Richmond]

Gary f, list,


All of this is *very* interesting both from the standpoints of
phenomenology and of semiotics (and, it would seem, how they necessarily
involve each other). I don't know whether I have anything much to add to
what you've already written, but first let me see if I fully grasp your
meaning. You wrote:


Gf: [H]ow is this specialized usage [of "Reference"] related to the
ordinary usage of the common noun “reference” rooted in the verb “refer”?
For instance, when I type the term “cat” to *refer* to the cat who is
curled up on the sofa nearby, is there a dyadic relation between cat and
word which is an instance of Degenerate Secondness? Spike the cat (to give
him his *proper* name) is certainly an “existing individual,” and thus a
Second, but does the common noun belong to a different “category of being,”
a First which “is a mere First”? This may seem a trivial question, but it
is definitely a*semiotic* question, because a word is definitely a sign.
Now, semiosis is all about triadic relations; so what we are looking into
here is the role of degenerate Secondness in triadic relations. I
approached this topic several years ago in Chapter 7 of *Turning Signs*,
http://gnusystems.ca/TS/xpt.htm#tention, and though I still have my doubts
about it, I haven’t come up with any improvements. Regarding a sign, even a
symbol like “cat,” as a “First” is not really a problem in the light of
Peirce’s definition of the sign in the Syllabus (EP2:290-91) as “First
Correlate of a triadic relation.” But I’d like to know what other Peirceans
think on this issue.


I certainly agree that seeing 'a symbol like “cat,” as a “First” is not
really a problem in the light of Peirce’s definition of the sign. . . as
“First Correlate of a triadic relation" since from the standpoint of
semiotics this is a case of degenerate 2ns because an actual cat is an
Object and the word "cat" is but a sign. This seems clear enough, fairly
obvious, I think. But getting closer to the heart of the matter, you quoted
Peirce:


[[ . . . I always left these references out of account, notwithstanding
their manifest importance, simply because the algebras or other forms of
diagrammatization which I employed did not seem to afford me any means of
representing them. I need hardly say that the moment I discovered in the
*verso* of the sheet of Existential Graphs a representation of a universe
of possibility, I perceived that a *reference* would be represented by a
graph which should cross a cut, thus subduing a vast field of thought to
the governance and control of exact logic. ] CP 4.579 ] (1906)


In one sense the word "cat" is a mere possibility because there is a
"universe of possibility" as regards how the Object, 'cat,' might be
symbolized (e.g. by gatto, chat, Katze, etc.) as well as the name given to
any actual cat, in this case, Spike. Indeed, some actual cats given one
name by one owner are given another name by their next owner. And there are
other 'possibilities' as well.


Can we say that one loses the *genuine 2ns* of 'cat' unless one
*experiences* (say, actually looks at, pets, feels the claws of a cat
digging into his flesh, etc.) a real cat, say Spike? That "looking at"
*grounds* ones cat-reference in actuality==genuine 2ns (not just
facticity==degenerate 2ns). For example, one can imagine a person in a
place where there are no cats and, so, has never seen an actual cat, but
who has read extensively on cats, seen videos of cats, etc. This person
would not really have a 'sense' of catness at all, I don't believe (I also
just recalled those fanciful European visual depictions of Amerindians in
the years just following the 'discovery' of the New World based on verbal
descriptions of First Nation peoples).


This seems in line with what you wrote in Chapter 7 of your book,*Turning
Signs* http://gnusystems.ca/TS/xpt.htm#tention



Gf: The reader of philosophy should be aware that ‘mere reference’ is only
a ‘degenerate Secondness’ (CP 1.535, 1903). In order to fix her attention
on a dynamic object within the sphere of experience, she must translate an
‘abstractly expressed proposition into its precise meaning’ – but since she
can only do so by drawing upon her prior experience *with the terms
translated*, her reading is at risk of getting trapped *inside* the bubble
of language. ‘All degenerate seconds may be conveniently termed Internal,
in contrast to External seconds, which are constituted by external fact,
and are true actions of one thing upon another’ (EP1:254). Nor is it only
abstractions and fantasies which are subject to this *degeneracy*: the
representation of ‘facts’ in a ‘true’ story is equally degenerate, since it
can only *refer* symbolically to the dynamic object of the story, the
external facts. The difference between genuine and degenerate Secondness,
or external fact and internal reference, is the difference between living
through an event and imagining or recalling it.


So, if I have grasped you meaning in your 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

[gnox]

List,

 

Peirce’s recursive application of the categories seems to reach a climax
with the Firstness of Thirdness here, as he tells us that the “slight
glimpse” into phenomenology given so far in this lecture is intended “merely
to lead up to Thirdness and to the particular kind and aspect of thirdness
which is the sole object of logical study.”

 

But before we plunge into that, I’d like to point out a couple of questions
raised by Peirce’s reference here to the term “reference.” Summarizing his
previous remarks, he says that “genuine Secondness was found to be Action,
where First and Second are both true Seconds and the Secondness is something
distinct from them, while in Degenerate Secondness, or mere Reference, the
First is a mere First never attaining full Secondness.” He did not use the
term “reference” earlier in this lecture, but he did use it in the part of
the 1903 Syllabus devoted to dyadic relations, CP 3.572: “The broadest
division of dyadic relations is into those which can only subsist between
two subjects of different categories of being (as between an existing
individual and a quality) and those which can subsist between two subjects
of the same category. A relation of the former kind may advantageously be
termed a reference; a relation of the latter kind, a dyadic relation
proper.”

 

This seems consistent with the identification of “Reference” as “Degenerate
Secondness” — but what is “advantageous” about using the term “reference” in
this way? And how is this specialized usage related to the ordinary usage of
the common noun “reference” rooted in the verb “refer”? For instance, when I
type the term “cat” to refer to the cat who is curled up on the sofa nearby,
is there a dyadic relation between cat and word which is an instance of
Degenerate Secondness? Spike the cat (to give him his proper name) is
certainly an “existing individual,” and thus a Second, but does the common
noun belong to a different “category of being,” a First which “is a mere
First”? This may seem a trivial question, but it is definitely a semiotic
question, because a word is definitely a sign. Now, semiosis is all about
triadic relations; so what we are looking into here is the role of
degenerate Secondness in triadic relations. I approached this topic several
years ago in Chapter 7 of Turning Signs,
http://gnusystems.ca/TS/xpt.htm#tention, and though I still have my doubts
about it, I haven’t come up with any improvements. Regarding a sign, even a
symbol like “cat,” as a “First” is not really a problem in the light of
Peirce’s definition of the sign in the Syllabus (EP2:290-91) as “First
Correlate of a triadic relation.” But I’d like to know what other Peirceans
think on this issue.

 

There’s also a connection here with Peirce’s ‘epiphany’ about existential
graphs in 1906, when he said that: 

[[ in all my attempts to classify relations, I have invariably recognized,
as one great class of relations, the class of references, as I have called
them, where one correlate is an existent, and another is a mere possibility;
yet whenever I have undertaken to develop the logic of relations, I have
always left these references out of account, notwithstanding their manifest
importance, simply because the algebras or other forms of diagrammatization
which I employed did not seem to afford me any means of representing them. I
need hardly say that the moment I discovered in the verso of the sheet of
Existential Graphs a representation of a universe of possibility, I
perceived that a reference would be represented by a graph which should
cross a cut, thus subduing a vast field of thought to the governance and
control of exact logic. ] CP 4.579 ]

 

But I think this message is long enough already, and I’ll leave commenting
on the rest of Lowell 3.11 for later.

 

Gary f.

 

 

From: g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca] 
Sent: 3-Jan-18 12:28



 

Continuing from Lowell Lecture 3.10,
https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-low
ell-lecture-iii-3rd-draught/display/13928 :

 

 

[CP 1.533] To express the Firstness of Thirdness, the peculiar flavor or
color of mediation, we have no really good word. Mentality is, perhaps, as
good as any, poor and inadequate as it is. 

 

Here, then, are three kinds of Firstness, Qualitative Possibility,
Existence, Mentality, resulting from applying Firstness to the three
categories. We might strike new words for them: Primity, Secundity,
Tertiality. 

 

[534] There are also three other kinds of firstness which arise in a
somewhat similar way; namely, the idea of a simple original quality, the
idea of a quality essentially relative, such as that of being “an inch
long”; and the idea of a quality that consists in the way something is
thought or represented, such as the quality of being manifest. 

 

[535] I shall not enter into any exact analysis of these ideas. I only
wished to give you such slight glimpse as I could of the sort of questions
that busy 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

[Stephen C. Rose]

I concede your understanding of my drift but I would wonder, then, what
Peirce understands by continuity and for that matter how he would apply the
pragmatic maxim to ordinary decision making and understanding. The
allure of triadic to me is precisely its application to what seems to me to
be everything or reality.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Wed, Jan 3, 2018 at 1:42 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:

> Stephen,
>
>
>
> You don’t understand the purpose of these designations because you are
> trying to map them onto the temporal order of a process. In your triadic
> thinking, First, Second and Third are stages in the process, which follow
> one another in that order. Peirce’s phenomenology is very different, as I
> keep trying to tell you. He introduces it in Lowell 3 as “the science
> which describes the different kinds of elements that are always present in
> the Phenomenon, meaning by the Phenomenon whatever is before the mind in
> any kind of thought, fancy, or cognition of any kind.”
>
>
>
> As Peirce keeps on telling us, this phenomenology is not easy. You make it
> much harder when you try to map Peirce’s descriptions onto a different sort
> of object, for a purpose different from his. I’d suggest that if you want
> to understand what Peirce is talking about, you start again at the sentence
> I quoted above and read Lowell 3 again, but this time set aside your
> preconceptions instead of assuming that Peirce’s phenomenology is just
> another expression of your triadic thinking. And this time pay close
> attention to Peirce’s preliminary descriptions of Secondness, Firstness and
> Thirdness (he takes them in that order). That’s what I do when I don’t see
> the point of what Peirce has written: go back and read it again, setting
> aside my preconceptions enough to leave room for some new (to me)
> conceptions.
>
>
>
> It doesn’t always work, but it works often enough that I’m still learning
> new things from Peirce papers that I’ve read before. Anyway that’s my only
> suggestion, and *only* my suggestion.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Stephen C. Rose [mailto:stever...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 3-Jan-18 12:47
> *To:* Gary Fuhrman <g...@gnusystems.ca>
> *Cc:* Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11
>
>
>
> I do not understand how these designations have any fixed or even useful
> purpose apart from whatever the First may be. It seems to me that the First
> determines what follows just as the sum of First and Second impacts and is
> changed by the Third. The designation of three aspects of the third seems
> superfluous as the
>
>
>
> If the Sign is something pending and very much in need of a resolution --
> suggesting an action -- it will be modified or enhanced or amplified by its
> encounter with the Index (2) and when it is at 3 whatever it becomes is not
> a matter of fitting it to one of three modes or conditions. If it was
> germane to say what might be the outcomes of the triadic process I suppose
> Plan Purpose Intent might work but such terms would merely describe
> something already arrived at not something ordained or fixed.
>
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
>
>
> On Wed, Jan 3, 2018 at 12:28 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:
>
> Continuing from Lowell Lecture 3.10, https://fromthepage.com/
> jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-lowell-lecture-iii-3rd-
> draught/display/13928 :
>
> [CP 1.533] To express the Firstness of Thirdness, the peculiar flavor or
> color of mediation, we have no really good word. *Mentality* is, perhaps,
> as good as any, poor and inadequate as it is.
>
> Here, then, are three kinds of Firstness, Qualitative Possibility,
> Existence, Mentality, resulting from applying Firstness to the three
> categories. We might strike new words for them: Primity, Secundity,
> Tertiality.
>
> [534] There are also three other kinds of firstness which arise in a
> somewhat similar way; namely, the idea of a simple original quality, the
> idea of a quality essentially relative, such as that of being “an inch
> long”; and the idea of a quality that consists in the way something is
> thought or represented, such as the quality of being manifest.
>
> [535] I shall not enter into any exact analysis of these ideas. I only
> wished to give you such slight glimpse as I could of the sort of questions
> that busy the student of phenomenology, merely to lead up to Thirdness and
> to the particular kind and aspect of thirdness which is the sole object of
> logical study. I want first to show you what Genuine Thirdness is and what
> are its two degenerate forms. Now we found the genuine and degenerate forms
> of secondness b

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

[Stephen C. Rose]

I do not understand how these designations have any fixed or even useful
purpose apart from whatever the First may be. It seems to me that the First
determines what follows just as the sum of First and Second impacts and is
changed by the Third. The designation of three aspects of the third seems
superfluous as the

If the Sign is something pending and very much in need of a resolution --
suggesting an action -- it will be modified or enhanced or amplified by its
encounter with the Index (2) and when it is at 3 whatever it becomes is not
a matter of fitting it to one of three modes or conditions. If it was
germane to say what might be the outcomes of the triadic process I suppose
Plan Purpose Intent might work but such terms would merely describe
something already arrived at not something ordained or fixed.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Wed, Jan 3, 2018 at 12:28 PM,  wrote:

> Continuing from Lowell Lecture 3.10, https://fromthepage.com/
> jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-lowell-lecture-iii-3rd-
> draught/display/13928 :
>
>
>
>
>
> [CP 1.533] To express the Firstness of Thirdness, the peculiar flavor or
> color of mediation, we have no really good word. *Mentality* is, perhaps,
> as good as any, poor and inadequate as it is.
>
>
>
> Here, then, are three kinds of Firstness, Qualitative Possibility,
> Existence, Mentality, resulting from applying Firstness to the three
> categories. We might strike new words for them: Primity, Secundity,
> Tertiality.
>
>
>
> [534] There are also three other kinds of firstness which arise in a
> somewhat similar way; namely, the idea of a simple original quality, the
> idea of a quality essentially relative, such as that of being “an inch
> long”; and the idea of a quality that consists in the way something is
> thought or represented, such as the quality of being manifest.
>
>
>
> [535] I shall not enter into any exact analysis of these ideas. I only
> wished to give you such slight glimpse as I could of the sort of questions
> that busy the student of phenomenology, merely to lead up to Thirdness and
> to the particular kind and aspect of thirdness which is the sole object of
> logical study. I want first to show you what Genuine Thirdness is and what
> are its two degenerate forms. Now we found the genuine and degenerate forms
> of secondness by considering the full ideas of First and Second. Then the
> genuine Secondness was found to be Action, where First and Second are both
> true Seconds and the Secondness is something distinct from them, while in
> Degenerate Secondness, or mere Reference, the First is a mere First never
> attaining full Secondness.
>
>
>
> [536] Let us proceed in the same way with Thirdness. We have here a
> First, a Second, and a Third. The first is a Positive Qualitative
> Possibility, in itself nothing more. The Second is an Existent thing
> without any mode of being less than existence, but determined by that
> First. A *Third* has a mode of being which consists in the Secondnesses
> that it determines, the mode of being of a Law, or Concept. Do not confound
> this with the ideal being of a quality in itself. A quality is something
> capable of being completely embodied. A Law never can be embodied in its
> character as a law except by determining a habit. A quality is how
> something may or might have been. A law is how an endless future must
> continue to be.
>
>
>
> [537] Now in Genuine Thirdness, the First, the Second, and the Third are
> all three of the nature of thirds, or Thought, while in respect to one
> another they are First, Second, and Third. The First is Thought in its
> capacity as mere Possibility; that is, mere *Mind* capable of thinking,
> or a mere vague idea. The *Second* is Thought playing the rôle of a
> Secondness, or Event. That is, it is of the general nature of *Experience*
> or *Information.* The Third is Thought in its rôle as governing
> Secondness. It brings the Information into the Mind, or determines the Idea
> and gives it body. It is informing thought, or *Cognition.* But take away
> the psychological or accidental human element, and in this genuine
> Thirdness we see the operation of a Sign.
>
>
>
> http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm }{ Peirce’s Lowell Lectures of 1903
>
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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[PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

[gnox]

Continuing from Lowell Lecture 3.10,
https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-low
ell-lecture-iii-3rd-draught/display/13928 :

 

 

[CP 1.533] To express the Firstness of Thirdness, the peculiar flavor or
color of mediation, we have no really good word. Mentality is, perhaps, as
good as any, poor and inadequate as it is. 

 

Here, then, are three kinds of Firstness, Qualitative Possibility,
Existence, Mentality, resulting from applying Firstness to the three
categories. We might strike new words for them: Primity, Secundity,
Tertiality. 

 

[534] There are also three other kinds of firstness which arise in a
somewhat similar way; namely, the idea of a simple original quality, the
idea of a quality essentially relative, such as that of being “an inch
long”; and the idea of a quality that consists in the way something is
thought or represented, such as the quality of being manifest. 

 

[535] I shall not enter into any exact analysis of these ideas. I only
wished to give you such slight glimpse as I could of the sort of questions
that busy the student of phenomenology, merely to lead up to Thirdness and
to the particular kind and aspect of thirdness which is the sole object of
logical study. I want first to show you what Genuine Thirdness is and what
are its two degenerate forms. Now we found the genuine and degenerate forms
of secondness by considering the full ideas of First and Second. Then the
genuine Secondness was found to be Action, where First and Second are both
true Seconds and the Secondness is something distinct from them, while in
Degenerate Secondness, or mere Reference, the First is a mere First never
attaining full Secondness. 

 

[536] Let us proceed in the same way with Thirdness. We have here a First, a
Second, and a Third. The first is a Positive Qualitative Possibility, in
itself nothing more. The Second is an Existent thing without any mode of
being less than existence, but determined by that First. A Third has a mode
of being which consists in the Secondnesses that it determines, the mode of
being of a Law, or Concept. Do not confound this with the ideal being of a
quality in itself. A quality is something capable of being completely
embodied. A Law never can be embodied in its character as a law except by
determining a habit. A quality is how something may or might have been. A
law is how an endless future must continue to be. 

 

[537] Now in Genuine Thirdness, the First, the Second, and the Third are all
three of the nature of thirds, or Thought, while in respect to one another
they are First, Second, and Third. The First is Thought in its capacity as
mere Possibility; that is, mere Mind capable of thinking, or a mere vague
idea. The Second is Thought playing the rôle of a Secondness, or Event. That
is, it is of the general nature of Experience or Information. The Third is
Thought in its rôle as governing Secondness. It brings the Information into
the Mind, or determines the Idea and gives it body. It is informing thought,
or Cognition. But take away the psychological or accidental human element,
and in this genuine Thirdness we see the operation of a Sign. 

 

http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm }{ Peirce’s Lowell Lectures of 1903

 


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