subject:"Re\: \[PEIRCE\-L\] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God"

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

2019-02-06 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Matt, List:

I disagree.  The Proposition being expressed in ordinary language has
three *really
distinct* Subjects--paint, wetness, and freshness--which respectively fill
the blanks of its Continuous Predicate, "if _ possesses the character
of _, then it possesses the character of _."  Each of these
Subjects is something *other than* the other two, although the different
Possibles are obviously instantiated in the same Existent.  Wetness is
(often, but not always) an *Index *of freshness; paint is wet because it is
fresh, not fresh because it is wet.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Feb 6, 2019 at 3:21 PM Matt Faunce 
wrote:

> On Feb 6, 2019, at 4:09 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> Again, the obvious strategy for defeating my major premise is simply to
> provide a single counterexample--something that we can agree Peirce would
> have acknowledged to be a Sign, but that is *not *determined by an Object
> other than itself.
>
> Here's an example of a sign and object being "other" by a formal
> distinction and not a real distinction:
>
>
> A sign of fresh paint is its wetness.
>
>
> Matt
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

2019-02-06 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Matt, List:

Thank you for the additional clarifications.  As I see it, my major premise
is not a *generalization *at all, it is a *definition*--something that is *not
*determined by an Object other than itself *cannot *be properly called a
Sign.  In other words, it is *essential *to the Peircean concept of a Sign
that it *represents *its Object to its Interpretant, or (more generally)
*mediates *between its Object and its Interpretant, each correlate
being *really
distinct* from the other two.

CSP:  I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being,
which mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both
determined by the object *relatively to the interpretant*, and determines
the interpretant *in reference to the object*, in such wise as to cause the
interpretant to be determined by the object through the mediation of this
"sign."
The object and the interpretant are thus merely the two correlates of the
sign; the one being antecedent, the other consequent of the sign. (EP
2:410; 1907)

Hence your latest syllogism *does not* parallel mine; something that is *not
*ephemeral *can *nevertheless be properly called real, as long as it is as
it is regardless of what any individual mind or finite group of minds
thinks about it.  Addressing your new point, based on this (Peirce's)
definition of "real," I also reject the equivalence of "really distinct"
with "existentially distinct."  I have stated repeatedly and provided
citations from Peirce for what "other than" means in this context--the
Object that determines *any *Sign must be *external *to, *independent *of,
and *unaffected *by that Sign.

Again, the obvious strategy for defeating my major premise is simply to
provide a single counterexample--something that we can agree Peirce would
have acknowledged to be a Sign, but that is *not *determined by an Object
other than itself.  As for my minor premise, I am working on a rather long
post for a new thread further exploring the manuscript that contains
Peirce's "theorem" of the "science of semeiotics," which I hope to finish
soon.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Feb 6, 2019 at 1:25 PM Matt Faunce 
wrote:

>
> On Feb 3, 2019, at 6:49 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> MF:  Yes, in my counter argument I rejected the part of Peirce's
> generalization that included the whole universe as a sign.
>
>
> I thought that you were rejecting the major premise, not the minor
> premise.
>
> I was talking about your major premise, For an example of why, I offer the
> following syllogism, then I draw some parallels with yours. Starting with
> "Furthermore" I add a new point to consider.
>
>
> Every real thing is ephemeral.
>
> God is a real thing.
>
> God is ephemeral.
>
> What we call God is a natural thing.
>
>
> In the major premise, you will probably reject the over generalization. By
> generalizing the subject, "real thing", out to include 'every' real thing,
> I include God as one of the subjects qualified by the predicate. Yes, God
> was introduced in the minor premise, but I designed this syllogism to have
> its major premise over-generalize so to include God as subject to the
> predicate, "is ephemeral".
>
>
> Here's your syllogism.
>
>
> * Every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself.
>
> * The entire Universe is a Sign.
>
> * Therefore, the entire Universe is determined by an Object other than
> itself.
>
> * And this we call God.
>
>
> I said, "I rejected the part of Peirce's generalization that included the
> whole universe as a sign." This meant,
>
>
> In the major premise, I reject the over generalization. By generalizing
> the subject, "Sign", out to include 'every' sign, you (and presumably
> Peirce) include the Universe as one of the subjects qualified by the
> predicate. Yes, the Universe was introduced in the minor premise, but it
> appears that you subconsciously, but nonetheless gratuitously, designed
> this syllogism to have its major premise over-generalized so to include the
> Universe as subject to the predicate, "is determined by an Object other
> than itself."
>
>
> Furthermore, I question your assumption of what "other than" can mean.
>
>
> Peirce acknowledged two traditional ways of classifying otherness: by a
> 'real distinction' and by a 'formal distinction'. (The term, "real", in
> 'real distinction', is an unfortunate term which really means existent.)
> For example, a single triangle drawn in blue on a page has these two
> formally distinguished elements, blueness and triangleness. These elements
> are "other than" each other only by a formal distinction; there is no 'real
> distinction' between them.
>
>
> If you accept the idea that God is real but not existent, then you can't
> say He, as the object of the universe, is distinguished from the universe
> by a "real (existent) distinction". So that

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

2019-02-06 Thread Jerry LR Chandler

List, Stephen
> On Feb 4, 2019, at 11:49 AM, Stephen Curtiss Rose  wrote:
> 
> L root is not on my radar. Does it have something to do with servers. 
> Transcendence is in my view a positioning of something above something else. 
> It is a verb mainly. It precedes predicates. As a thing in itself I see it as 
> related to non-local consciousness. I do not see it as a major term other 
> than an indication of scope. The limits of scope are themselves opaque. 
> Scales the same. The nature of transcendence is nothing beyond its function 
> as a localizer unless you wish to call it a quality of being, which I would 
> not do. 
>  
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose 
Hmm…
Behind CSP view of the continuity of predicates, the nature of his logical 
graphs and the nature of evolution is transcendence.
How does your view account for emergence?

Cheers
Jerry



> 
> On Mon, Feb 4, 2019 at 11:58 AM Jerry LR Chandler 
> mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com>> wrote:
> Stephen:
> 
> The nature of transcendence is an intriguing challenge in most disciplines 
> because of the meaning of its L. root.
> 
> Can you clarify how transcendence relates to the scope and scale of 
> predicates?
> 
> Cheers
> Jerry
> 
> Sent from my iPad
> 
> On Feb 4, 2019, at 5:30 AM, Stephen Curtiss Rose  > wrote:
> 
>> Transcendence is half a binary. Binaries are all suspect. Generally they can 
>> be assumed to be one rather than two. Explicitly there is no way to assume a 
>> creator without assuming that a triadic reality exists in which Love, for 
>> example, is both what binary language calls transcendent and immanent. Other 
>> suspect binaries are heart/mind and physical/metaphysical. To accept any 
>> half as the truth is to miss what is the case. A triadic view would see such 
>> "opposites" not as either-or's, but as part of the same universal sea which 
>> we can perceive only in part and which we experience as evolving, 
>>  
>> amazon.com/author/stephenrose 
>> 
>> 
>> On Sun, Feb 3, 2019 at 2:13 PM Edwina Taborsky > > wrote:
>> Helmut, list
>> 
>> I don't agree with any kind of transcendental force/agency - so, I wouldn't 
>> agree with either panentheism or theism, both of which assume an agential 
>> force that transcends time and space. My problem with pantheism, which does 
>> NOT have this transcendental agency but instead, refers o an 'immanent 
>> agent' , is - what is their definition of 'god'?
>> 
>> I don't think that psychology or semiotics can stop people from acting out 
>> their emotional natures!
>> 
>> Edwina
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> On Sun 03/02/19 1:57 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de 
>>  sent:
>> 
>> Edwina, list,
>> You wrote: "I think that the ills of society are caused by the human 
>> psychological nature - nothing to do with either religion or science and 
>> following either will not change the effects of a bad psychological nature. 
>> That is - the 'deadly sins' of greed, lust, pride , envy, gluttony, wrath 
>> and sloth are psychological and can only be dealt with by deliberate 
>> personal reasoning and action. Neither science nor religion plays any role."
>>  
>> I think, that these sins are of psychological and systemical and semiotic 
>> nature. Therefore, sciences like psychology, systems theory and semiotics 
>> can play a role. However, they cannot change human instinctive nature in the 
>> way that they (the sciences) could take away the reasons for these sins, but 
>> can help people (also people in leading positions) to reflect their 
>> proneness to them, how they can better overcome them and watch their own 
>> behaviour (civilize them).
>>  
>> Religions play the role, that they reduce the sins inside the belief 
>> community, but amplify them between the belief communities.
>>  
>> Separate theologies cannot help, I think, but some kind of meta-theology 
>> can. Atheists and theists will not change their beliefs, but to get them 
>> round the conference table, I think it is good to reduce (temporarily for 
>> this purpose) the God-concept to the common denominator "pantheism", or 
>> "panentheism". I think, "panentheism" is better, because it does not deny 
>> every kind of separatedness or otherness of God, so cannot be denounced by 
>> theists as completely atheistic.
>>  
>> Best,
>> Helmut
>>  
>>  03. Februar 2019 um 15:24 Uhr
>> "Edwina Taborsky"
>> wrote:
>>  
>> Gary R
>> 
>> 1] Just a comment on your view of the role of science and religion in a 
>> society.
>> 
>> I don't agree that the cause of the 'ills' of society is a 'limited view of 
>> god' or a chasm between science and religion. Such a viewpoint suggests that 
>> atheism, my view, 'contributes to the ills of society' - and of course I 
>> wouldn't agree with that.
>> 
>> Religion, of any type, is a belief system. You either believe in it - or 
>> not. There is no

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

2019-02-06 Thread Matt Faunce

> On Feb 3, 2019, at 6:49 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
> 
> MF:  Yes, in my counter argument I rejected the part of Peirce's 
> generalization that included the whole universe as a sign.
> 
> I thought that you were rejecting the major premise, not the minor premise.  

I was talking about your major premise, For an example of why, I offer the 
following syllogism, then I draw some parallels with yours. Starting with 
"Furthermore" I add a new point to consider.

Every real thing is ephemeral. 
God is a real thing. 
God is ephemeral.
What we call God is a natural thing.

In the major premise, you will probably reject the over generalization. By 
generalizing the subject, "real thing", out to include 'every' real thing, I 
include God as one of the subjects qualified by the predicate. Yes, God was 
introduced in the minor premise, but I designed this syllogism to have its 
major premise over-generalize so to include God as subject to the predicate, 
"is ephemeral". 

Here's your syllogism.

* Every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself.
* The entire Universe is a Sign.
* Therefore, the entire Universe is determined by an Object other than itself.
* And this we call God.

I said, "I rejected the part of Peirce's generalization that included the whole 
universe as a sign." This meant, 

In the major premise, I reject the over generalization. By generalizing the 
subject, "Sign", out to include 'every' sign, you (and presumably Peirce) 
include the Universe as one of the subjects qualified by the predicate. Yes, 
the Universe was introduced in the minor premise, but it appears that you 
subconsciously, but nonetheless gratuitously, designed this syllogism to have 
its major premise over-generalized so to include the Universe as subject to the 
predicate, "is determined by an Object other than itself."

Furthermore, I question your assumption of what "other than" can mean.

Peirce acknowledged two traditional ways of classifying otherness: by a 'real 
distinction' and by a 'formal distinction'. (The term, "real", in 'real 
distinction', is an unfortunate term which really means existent.) For example, 
a single triangle drawn in blue on a page has these two formally distinguished 
elements, blueness and triangleness. These elements are "other than" each other 
only by a formal distinction; there is no 'real distinction' between them.

If you accept the idea that God is real but not existent, then you can't say 
He, as the object of the universe, is distinguished from the universe by a 
"real (existent) distinction". So that leaves the possibility that God and the 
Universe are formal distinctions. Pantheism fits the bill here. You offered 
another explanation, viz., transcendence of all three universes, but doesn't 
that exclude His reality? Or wouldn't 'reality' need to be redefined to 
accommodate this transcendence?

Matt

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Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

2019-02-04 Thread Jerry LR Chandler

Stephen:

The nature of transcendence is an intriguing challenge in most disciplines 
because of the meaning of its L. root.

Can you clarify how transcendence relates to the scope and scale of predicates?

Cheers
Jerry

Sent from my iPad

> On Feb 4, 2019, at 5:30 AM, Stephen Curtiss Rose  wrote:
> 
> Transcendence is half a binary. Binaries are all suspect. Generally they can 
> be assumed to be one rather than two. Explicitly there is no way to assume a 
> creator without assuming that a triadic reality exists in which Love, for 
> example, is both what binary language calls transcendent and immanent. Other 
> suspect binaries are heart/mind and physical/metaphysical. To accept any half 
> as the truth is to miss what is the case. A triadic view would see such 
> "opposites" not as either-or's, but as part of the same universal sea which 
> we can perceive only in part and which we experience as evolving, 
>  
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
> 
> 
>> On Sun, Feb 3, 2019 at 2:13 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
>> Helmut, list
>> 
>> I don't agree with any kind of transcendental force/agency - so, I wouldn't 
>> agree with either panentheism or theism, both of which assume an agential 
>> force that transcends time and space. My problem with pantheism, which does 
>> NOT have this transcendental agency but instead, refers o an 'immanent 
>> agent' , is - what is their definition of 'god'?
>> 
>> I don't think that psychology or semiotics can stop people from acting out 
>> their emotional natures!
>> 
>> Edwina
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> On Sun 03/02/19 1:57 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
>> 
>> Edwina, list,
>> You wrote: "I think that the ills of society are caused by the human 
>> psychological nature - nothing to do with either religion or science and 
>> following either will not change the effects of a bad psychological nature. 
>> That is - the 'deadly sins' of greed, lust, pride , envy, gluttony, wrath 
>> and sloth are psychological and can only be dealt with by deliberate 
>> personal reasoning and action. Neither science nor religion plays any role."
>>  
>> I think, that these sins are of psychological and systemical and semiotic 
>> nature. Therefore, sciences like psychology, systems theory and semiotics 
>> can play a role. However, they cannot change human instinctive nature in the 
>> way that they (the sciences) could take away the reasons for these sins, but 
>> can help people (also people in leading positions) to reflect their 
>> proneness to them, how they can better overcome them and watch their own 
>> behaviour (civilize them).
>>  
>> Religions play the role, that they reduce the sins inside the belief 
>> community, but amplify them between the belief communities.
>>  
>> Separate theologies cannot help, I think, but some kind of meta-theology 
>> can. Atheists and theists will not change their beliefs, but to get them 
>> round the conference table, I think it is good to reduce (temporarily for 
>> this purpose) the God-concept to the common denominator "pantheism", or 
>> "panentheism". I think, "panentheism" is better, because it does not deny 
>> every kind of separatedness or otherness of God, so cannot be denounced by 
>> theists as completely atheistic.
>>  
>> Best,
>> Helmut
>>  
>>  03. Februar 2019 um 15:24 Uhr
>> "Edwina Taborsky"
>> wrote:
>>  
>> Gary R
>> 
>> 1] Just a comment on your view of the role of science and religion in a 
>> society.
>> 
>> I don't agree that the cause of the 'ills' of society is a 'limited view of 
>> god' or a chasm between science and religion. Such a viewpoint suggests that 
>> atheism, my view, 'contributes to the ills of society' - and of course I 
>> wouldn't agree with that.
>> 
>> Religion, of any type, is a belief system. You either believe in it - or 
>> not. There is no evidence. Its axioms are infallible and outside of debate. 
>> Science is subject to empirical objective and repeatable evidence - and its 
>> axioms are fallible.
>> 
>> I don't see how anything can 'bridge this gap'.
>> 
>> I think that the ills of society are caused by the human psychological 
>> nature - nothing to do with either religion or science and following either 
>> will not change the effects of a bad psychological nature. That is - the 
>> 'deadly sins' of greed, lust, pride , envy, gluttony, wrath and sloth are 
>> psychological and can only be dealt with by deliberate personal reasoning 
>> and action. Neither science nor religion plays any role.
>> 
>> And therefore - nothing to do with gunpowder, fossil fuels or Facebook. If 
>> mankind didn't have gunpowder - he's use spears, arrows and poisons...to 
>> deal with his greed, envy, wrath etc. Fossil fuels have enabled the growth 
>> of technologies that have benefited mankind - from medical care, to heating 
>> and cooling our homes, to better sanitation and health and water supplies, 
>> to enabling more people to be provided with food and care, and travel and so 
>> on. As for Facebook - no

Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

2019-02-03 Thread Helmut Raulien

Edwina, list,

why not? If people, due to psychology, sociology and semiotics, are more able to watch and understand their own and other´s consciousnesses and the mechanisms of groupthink and group-dynamics, i.e. gather commonly called "wisdom", why should that not make them more peaceful?

The "transcendent" I assume rather in a Kantian way. I guess it cannot be completely deduced, but only in- and abduced, because it is the properties of a system that is unique, because it is the biggest possible system (the universe, or the universe plus some thing/body/mind). As such it has no equal-rank or superior systems.

But in- and abduction are also scientifically justified means, though bearing a rest of speculation. That is it for me, speculation, not belief, about the unique properties of the biggest possible system. And I do not forbid anybody to call the biggest possible system "God". Better one word than three.

Best, Helmut

03. Februar 2019 um 20:13 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky" wrote:

Helmut, list

I don't agree with any kind of transcendental force/agency - so, I wouldn't agree with either panentheism or theism, both of which assume an agential force that transcends time and space. My problem with pantheism, which does NOT have this transcendental agency but instead, refers o an 'immanent agent' , is - what is their definition of 'god'?

I don't think that psychology or semiotics can stop people from acting out their emotional natures!

Edwina

On Sun 03/02/19 1:57 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:

Edwina, list,

You wrote: "I think that the ills of society are caused by the human psychological nature - nothing to do with either religion or science and following either will not change the effects of a bad psychological nature. That is - the 'deadly sins' of greed, lust, pride , envy, gluttony, wrath and sloth are psychological and can only be dealt with by deliberate personal reasoning and action. Neither science nor religion plays any role."

I think, that these sins are of psychological and systemical and semiotic nature. Therefore, sciences like psychology, systems theory and semiotics can play a role. However, they cannot change human instinctive nature in the way that they (the sciences) could take away the reasons for these sins, but can help people (also people in leading positions) to reflect their proneness to them, how they can better overcome them and watch their own behaviour (civilize them).

Religions play the role, that they reduce the sins inside the belief community, but amplify them between the belief communities.

Separate theologies cannot help, I think, but some kind of meta-theology can. Atheists and theists will not change their beliefs, but to get them round the conference table, I think it is good to reduce (temporarily for this purpose) the God-concept to the common denominator "pantheism", or "panentheism". I think, "panentheism" is better, because it does not deny every kind of separatedness or otherness of God, so cannot be denounced by theists as completely atheistic.

Best,

Helmut

03. Februar 2019 um 15:24 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"

wrote:

Gary R

1] Just a comment on your view of the role of science and religion in a society.

I don't agree that the cause of the 'ills' of society is a 'limited view of god' or a chasm between science and religion. Such a viewpoint suggests that atheism, my view, 'contributes to the ills of society' - and of course I wouldn't agree with that.

Religion, of any type, is a belief system. You either believe in it - or not. There is no evidence. Its axioms are infallible and outside of debate. Science is subject to empirical objective and repeatable evidence - and its axioms are fallible.

I don't see how anything can 'bridge this gap'.

I think that the ills of society are caused by the human psychological nature - nothing to do with either religion or science and following either will not change the effects of a bad psychological nature. That is - the 'deadly sins' of greed, lust, pride , envy, gluttony, wrath and sloth are psychological and can only be dealt with by deliberate personal reasoning and action. Neither science nor religion plays any role.

And therefore - nothing to do with gunpowder, fossil fuels or Facebook. If mankind didn't have gunpowder - he's use spears, arrows and poisons...to deal with his greed, envy, wrath etc. Fossil fuels have enabled the growth of technologies that have benefited mankind - from medical care, to heating and cooling our homes, to better sanitation and health and water supplies, to enabling more people to be provided with food and care, and travel and so on. As for Facebook - no comment...other than gossip is gossip.

2] I will not get into any discussion about JAS's view of god and Peirce - since I disagree with his interpretation and consider that his own personal theism plays a large role in that outline.

My caution is that semiosis is a rational

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

2019-02-03 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Matt, List:

Thanks for the clarifications.

MF:   Just as the character of points in the outer borderline of a black
dot doesn't follow the same logic which determines the character of the
points in the interior of the dot ...

In my view, the mistake here is not recognizing that the borderline is a
*discontinuity*; and that neither it, nor the black dot, nor (for that
matter) the white plane outside the black dot is *composed *of discrete
dimensionless (and therefore colorless) points.  Any arbitrarily small but
finite area that we designate *within *the dot is black; any such area that
we designate *outside *the dot is white; and any such area that we
designate *along *the borderline is partially black and partially white.

MF:  ... the character of the whole collective of all signs, i.e., the
whole universe, doesn't follow the same the same logic which determines the
character of the signs interior to the universe.

Why not?  Peirce did not say that the Universe is *like *a Sign, or that it
is *merely *"the whole collective of all signs," but that it *is *a Sign
(Representamen).  He also held that *any *complex of connected Signs
constitutes *one *Sign.  What color is the dot?  If we isolate a smaller
dot within that dot, what color is it?  What color will *any *dot be, if it
is composed *entirely *of smaller black dots?  We can thus revise your
premise accordingly to something that is not problematic--"Every dot making
up a larger black dot is black."

MF:  Yes, in my counter argument I rejected the part of Peirce's
generalization that included the whole universe as a sign.

I thought that you were rejecting the major premise, not the minor
premise.  In any case, I am not proposing that the *entire *Universe as a
Sign is a collection of discrete Instances--if anything, that would be "the
universe of existents" only--but that it is a *semiosic continuum*; its
material parts are continuous Signs, whose material parts are continuous
Types, whose material parts are their indefinite and inexhaustible *potential
*Instances.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Sun, Feb 3, 2019 at 4:43 PM Matt Faunce 
wrote:

> First off, please ignore my second from last paragraph in my previous
> post, as I didn't flesh out my ideas very well.
>
> Further comments below.
>
> On Feb 3, 2019, at 5:13 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> Matt, List:
>
> Which of the Five Ways of Aquinas includes only premises that "can
> possibly have a shred of inductive support"?  They are not intended to
> persuade non-theists to become theists, but rather to demonstrate how
> certain combinations of other beliefs *warrant *or even *require *theism.
> As I stated previously, that is also my objective here.
>
> On the other hand, my first premise is *falsifiable*, at least in
> principle.  All we need is one counterexample--a single Sign that is
> *not *determined by an Object other than itself.  Can you suggest one?
> Your proposed revision--"every Sign save the universe-as-a-whole is
> determined by an Object other than itself"--not only begs the question, but
> also amounts to special pleading.
>
> The special pleading was specifically this analogy: Just as the character
> of points in the outer borderline of a black dot doesn't follow the same
> logic which determines the character of the points in the interior of the
> dot, the character of the whole collective of all signs, i.e., the whole
> universe, doesn't follow the same the same logic which determines the
> character of the signs interior to the universe.
>
> The support that I offered for my two premises consisted entirely of
> quotes from Peirce's writings.  Someone who rejects his definitions of Sign
> and Object--which require the latter to be *external *to, *independent *of,
> and *unaffected *by the former--will obviously reject my argumentation
> out of hand.  Likewise, someone who denies that the entire Universe is a
> Sign will just as readily dismiss it.
>
> Yes, in my counter argument I rejected the part of Peirce's generalization
> that included the whole universe as a sign. I'm not that wedded to this
> rejection; I just think it should be considered.
>
> However, in either case, it should be acknowledged that one is deviating
> from Peirce's own explicitly stated views; i.e., that he was *incorrect *to
> affirm one or both of those propositions.  Then the question becomes what
> ramifications this has for his (and our) understanding of Signs and the
> Universe.
>
> Yes. I agree.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Sun, Feb 3, 2019 at 3:34 PM Matt Faunce 
> wrote:
>
>> On Feb 3, 2019, at 3:55 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
>> wrote:
>>
>> My argument is deductively valid, so in order to disagree with its
>> conclusion, one must also disagree with at least one of its premises.  With
>> which of those premises do you specifically

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

2019-02-03 Thread Matt Faunce

First off, please ignore my second from last paragraph in my previous post, as 
I didn't flesh out my ideas very well.

Further comments below.

> On Feb 3, 2019, at 5:13 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
> 
> Matt, List:
> 
> Which of the Five Ways of Aquinas includes only premises that "can possibly 
> have a shred of inductive support"?  They are not intended to persuade 
> non-theists to become theists, but rather to demonstrate how certain 
> combinations of other beliefs warrant or even require theism.  As I stated 
> previously, that is also my objective here.
> 
> On the other hand, my first premise is falsifiable, at least in principle.  
> All we need is one counterexample--a single Sign that is not determined by an 
> Object other than itself.  Can you suggest one?  Your proposed 
> revision--"every Sign save the universe-as-a-whole is determined by an Object 
> other than itself"--not only begs the question, but also amounts to special 
> pleading.
> 

The special pleading was specifically this analogy: Just as the character of 
points in the outer borderline of a black dot doesn't follow the same logic 
which determines the character of the points in the interior of the dot, the 
character of the whole collective of all signs, i.e., the whole universe, 
doesn't follow the same the same logic which determines the character of the 
signs interior to the universe.

> The support that I offered for my two premises consisted entirely of quotes 
> from Peirce's writings.  Someone who rejects his definitions of Sign and 
> Object--which require the latter to be external to, independent of, and 
> unaffected by the former--will obviously reject my argumentation out of hand. 
>  Likewise, someone who denies that the entire Universe is a Sign will just as 
> readily dismiss it.
> 

Yes, in my counter argument I rejected the part of Peirce's generalization that 
included the whole universe as a sign. I'm not that wedded to this rejection; I 
just think it should be considered.

> However, in either case, it should be acknowledged that one is deviating from 
> Peirce's own explicitly stated views; i.e., that he was incorrect to affirm 
> one or both of those propositions.  Then the question becomes what 
> ramifications this has for his (and our) understanding of Signs and the 
> Universe.
> 

Yes. I agree.

> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> 
>> On Sun, Feb 3, 2019 at 3:34 PM Matt Faunce  
>> wrote:
>>> On Feb 3, 2019, at 3:55 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
>>> wrote:
>>> My argument is deductively valid, so in order to disagree with its 
>>> conclusion, one must also disagree with at least one of its premises.  With 
>>> which of those premises do you specifically disagree, and why?  
>> Jon, here's my 2 cents.
>> 
>> I don't think your inclusion of "every" in your major premise, "every Sign 
>> is determined by an Object other than itself," can possibly have a shred of 
>> inductive support. That is, I think your major premise is a mere hypothesis.
>> 
>> I wonder if your major premise is analogous to this: "Every point making a 
>> black dot is black." Here I'm referring to a black area on an otherwise 
>> white plane. According to bivalent logic it is either true or false that a 
>> given point making up the black dot is black—and we'd have to say "true." 
>> But, Peirce discovered tri-valent logic by wondering about the color of the 
>> outer borderline of the dot separating the black dot from the white 
>> surroundings, and determined that, since no point in the line can be half 
>> black and half white, and since you can't butt two points up together (one 
>> point in the white line surrounding the dot and the other point at the outer 
>> black line of the dot abutting the white line) with no room in between, the 
>> borderline's color must be indeterminate. So, the logic by which everyone 
>> thought the major premise, "every point making a black dot is black", was 
>> secure, was in fact not applicable to that outer edge, and therefore the 
>> inclusion of "every" is specious. I think that it may be, by analogy, that 
>> the logic by which you think the major premise, "every Sign is determined by 
>> an Object other than itself", is secure, is likewise not applicable to your 
>> task. I can accept this revision: "every Sign save the universe-as-a-whole 
>> is determined by an Object other than itself," but that's not useful for 
>> your task.
>> 
>> The mere possibility that your major premise, "Every Sign is determined by 
>> an Object other than itself", is analogous to this major premise, "Every 
>> point making a black dot is black", means that your major premise is a mere 
>> hypothesis. It's not inductively supported because you can't possibly assign 
>> a probability to the status of the analogy, for example, "the probably that 
>> the analogy holds is

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

2019-02-03 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Matt, List:

Which of the Five Ways of Aquinas includes only premises that "can possibly
have a shred of inductive support"?  They are not intended to persuade
non-theists to become theists, but rather to demonstrate how certain
combinations of other beliefs *warrant *or even *require *theism.  As I
stated previously, that is also my objective here.

On the other hand, my first premise is *falsifiable*, at least in
principle.  All we need is one counterexample--a single Sign that is
*not *determined
by an Object other than itself.  Can you suggest one?  Your proposed
revision--"every Sign save the universe-as-a-whole is determined by an
Object other than itself"--not only begs the question, but also amounts to
special pleading.

The support that I offered for my two premises consisted entirely of quotes
from Peirce's writings.  Someone who rejects his definitions of Sign and
Object--which require the latter to be *external *to, *independent
*of, and *unaffected
*by the former--will obviously reject my argumentation out of hand.
Likewise, someone who denies that the entire Universe is a Sign will just
as readily dismiss it.

However, in either case, it should be acknowledged that one is deviating
from Peirce's own explicitly stated views; i.e., that he was *incorrect *to
affirm one or both of those propositions.  Then the question becomes what
ramifications this has for his (and our) understanding of Signs and the
Universe.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Feb 3, 2019 at 3:34 PM Matt Faunce 
wrote:

> On Feb 3, 2019, at 3:55 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> My argument is deductively valid, so in order to disagree with its
> conclusion, one must also disagree with at least one of its premises.  With
> which of those premises do you specifically disagree, and why?
>
> Jon, here's my 2 cents.
>
>
> I don't think your inclusion of "every" in your major premise, "every Sign
> is determined by an Object other than itself," can possibly have a shred of
> inductive support. That is, I think your major premise is a mere hypothesis.
>
>
> I wonder if your major premise is analogous to this: "Every point making a
> black dot is black." Here I'm referring to a black area on an otherwise
> white plane. According to bivalent logic it is either true or false that a
> given point making up the black dot is black—and we'd have to say "true."
> But, Peirce discovered tri-valent logic by wondering about the color of the
> outer borderline of the dot separating the black dot from the white
> surroundings, and determined that, since no point in the line can be half
> black and half white, and since you can't butt two points up together (one
> point in the white line surrounding the dot and the other point at the
> outer black line of the dot abutting the white line) with no room in
> between, the borderline's color must be indeterminate. So, the logic by
> which everyone thought the major premise, "every point making a black dot
> is black", was secure, was in fact not applicable to that outer edge, and
> therefore the inclusion of "every" is specious. I think that it may be, by
> analogy, that the logic by which you think the major premise, "every Sign
> is determined by an Object other than itself", is secure, is likewise not
> applicable to your task. I can accept this revision: "every Sign save the
> universe-as-a-whole is determined by an Object other than itself," but
> that's not useful for your task.
>
>
> The mere possibility that your major premise, "Every Sign is determined by
> an Object other than itself", is analogous to this major premise, "Every
> point making a black dot is black", means that your major premise is a mere
> hypothesis. It's not inductively supported because you can't possibly
> assign a probability to the status of the analogy, for example, "the
> probably that the analogy holds is 25%." It would be like determining the
> color content of beans in a bag after randomly sampling a percentage of
> beans from all but the bottom layer of the bag. The probability that you
> assign to your induction doesn't apply to the contents of the whole bag but
> only to the area from which you were capable of sampling. If you pulled all
> white beans, the statement, "all the beans in the bag are white", must
> still be treated as a hypothesis. (I'm not considering that you have a clue
> as to how the beans got into the bag, as that would be useful information;
> all that you could include in your induction about how the universe got
> here are further hypotheses.)
>
>
> A valid syllogism that has a hypothetical major premise has a hypothetical
> conclusion. So your deduction begs the question: Can the reality of God be
> logically supported?
>
>
> Matt
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

2019-02-03 Thread Matt Faunce

On Feb 3, 2019, at 3:55 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:

> My argument is deductively valid, so in order to disagree with its 
> conclusion, one must also disagree with at least one of its premises.  With 
> which of those premises do you specifically disagree, and why?  
> 

Jon, here's my 2 cents.

I don't think your inclusion of "every" in your major premise, "every Sign is 
determined by an Object other than itself," can possibly have a shred of 
inductive support. That is, I think your major premise is a mere hypothesis.

I wonder if your major premise is analogous to this: "Every point making a 
black dot is black." Here I'm referring to a black area on an otherwise white 
plane. According to bivalent logic it is either true or false that a given 
point making up the black dot is black—and we'd have to say "true." But, Peirce 
discovered tri-valent logic by wondering about the color of the outer 
borderline of the dot separating the black dot from the white surroundings, and 
determined that, since no point in the line can be half black and half white, 
and since you can't butt two points up together (one point in the white line 
surrounding the dot and the other point at the outer black line of the dot 
abutting the white line) with no room in between, the borderline's color must 
be indeterminate. So, the logic by which everyone thought the major premise, 
"every point making a black dot is black", was secure, was in fact not 
applicable to that outer edge, and therefore the inclusion of "every" is 
specious. I think that it may be, by analogy, that the logic by which you think 
the major premise, "every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself", 
is secure, is likewise not applicable to your task. I can accept this revision: 
"every Sign save the universe-as-a-whole is determined by an Object other than 
itself," but that's not useful for your task.

The mere possibility that your major premise, "Every Sign is determined by an 
Object other than itself", is analogous to this major premise, "Every point 
making a black dot is black", means that your major premise is a mere 
hypothesis. It's not inductively supported because you can't possibly assign a 
probability to the status of the analogy, for example, "the probably that the 
analogy holds is 25%." It would be like determining the color content of beans 
in a bag after randomly sampling a percentage of beans from all but the bottom 
layer of the bag. The probability that you assign to your induction doesn't 
apply to the contents of the whole bag but only to the area from which you were 
capable of sampling. If you pulled all white beans, the statement, "all the 
beans in the bag are white", must still be treated as a hypothesis. (I'm not 
considering that you have a clue as to how the beans got into the bag, as that 
would be useful information; all that you could include in your induction about 
how the universe got here are further hypotheses.)

A valid syllogism that has a hypothetical major premise has a hypothetical 
conclusion. So your deduction begs the question: Can the reality of God be 
logically supported?

Matt
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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

2019-02-03 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Edwina, List:

ET:  Religion, of any type, is a belief system. You either believe in it -
or not. There is no evidence. Its axioms are infallible and outside of
debate. Science is subject to empirical objective and repeatable evidence -
and its axioms are fallible.

This comparison is a caricature, at best; and in any case, what is claimed
here about religion applies equally to atheism.  The issue is not an *absence
*of evidence, but different *evaluations *of the evidence.  Each of us has
a belief system--a worldview--that governs how we understand the Universe
and go about living our lives accordingly (belief = habit).  Changing from
one worldview to another is *possible*, but always requires some kind of
*conversion*--the abandonment of one set of axioms for another.

CSP:  We must begin with all the prejudices which we actually have when we
enter upon the study of philosophy. These prejudices are not to be
dispelled by a maxim, for they are things which it does not occur to us *can
*be questioned ... A person may, it is true, in the course of his studies,
find reason to doubt what he began by believing; but in that case he doubts
because he has a positive reason for it ... (CP 5.265, EP 1:29; 1868)

What Peirce elsewhere called "the Outward Clash" is sometimes sufficient to
bring this about--the realization that some of our core beliefs are *false*,
based on their incompatibility with our observations and experiences.  One
of his great insights was that the scientific method is how we *all *go
about testing and revising our beliefs, even the most mundane among them;
but we generally do so in ways that are not nearly as *logically rigorous*
as science itself typically demands.

ET:  I will not get into any discussion about JAS's view of god and Peirce
- since I disagree with his interpretation and consider that his
own personal theism plays a large role in that outline.

My argument is deductively valid, so in order to disagree with its
conclusion, one must also disagree with at least one of its premises.  With
which of those premises do you specifically disagree, and why?  In
addition, please elaborate on the "large role" that you consider my
personal theism to be playing here.  Is it causing me to misrepresent
something?  If so, what?  Finally, are you suggesting that your own
personal atheism somehow plays no role whatsoever in your interpretation of
Peirce?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Feb 3, 2019 at 8:24 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Gary R
>
> 1] Just a comment on your view of the role of science and religion in a
> society.
>
> I don't agree that the cause of the 'ills' of society is a 'limited view
> of god' or a chasm between science and religion. Such a viewpoint suggests
> that atheism, my view, 'contributes to the ills of society' - and of course
> I wouldn't agree with that.
>
> Religion, of any type, is a belief system. You either believe in it - or
> not. There is no evidence. Its axioms are infallible and outside of debate.
> Science is subject to empirical objective and repeatable evidence - and its
> axioms are fallible.
>
> I don't see how anything can 'bridge this gap'.
>
> I think that the ills of society are caused by the human psychological
> nature - nothing to do with either religion or science and following either
> will not change the effects of a bad psychological nature. That is -
> the 'deadly sins' of greed, lust, pride , envy, gluttony, wrath and sloth
> are psychological and can only be dealt with by deliberate personal
> reasoning and action. Neither science nor religion plays any role.
>
> And therefore - nothing to do with gunpowder, fossil fuels or Facebook. If
> mankind didn't have gunpowder - he's use spears, arrows and poisons...to
> deal with his greed, envy, wrath etc. Fossil fuels have enabled the growth
> of technologies that have benefited mankind - from medical care, to
> heating and cooling our homes, to better sanitation and health and water
> supplies, to enabling more people to be provided with food and care, and
> travel and so on. As for Facebook - no comment...other than gossip is
> gossip.
>
> 2] I will not get into any discussion about JAS's view of god and Peirce -
> since I disagree with his interpretation and consider that his own personal
> theism plays a large role in that outline.
>
> My caution is that semiosis is a rational action, an action, as Peirce
> said, of Mind - and we should be careful how we define Mind.
>
> Edwina
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

2019-02-03 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Gary R., List:

GR:  One has at least to admit, I think, in positing the Universe as Sign
(Symbol) and God as the Object of that Sign, that both are wholly unique,
that they are atypical, even peculiar among all other Signs and Objects:
that they are, indeed, sui generis both in themselves, so to speak, and in
their relationship.

I agree.  As Aquinas also recognized, all our language about God is
necessarily *analogical *to some degree.

GR:  As for *panentheism*, it is generally held that it is an attempt to
avoid *separating *God from a (created) universe (as theism does) while at
the same time not *identifying* God with the universe (pantheism).
Pan*en*theism,
as you know, holds that God not only *pervades* the cosmos and all that
this universe includes and involves, but also *transcends* it in the sense
of simultaneously being beyond space and time.

Yes, but if we agree that Peirce considered the Universe to be a Sign, then
I still do not see how panentheism can be reconciled with his explicit
descriptions of the Object as *external *to, *independent *of, and *unaffected
*by the Sign.

GR:  ... perhaps the panentheistic notion that God creates but *also*
transcends
space and time can help in your "attempt to revise the major premise
accordingly in order to obtain a compatible conclusion."

That burden must be borne by a panentheist, or at least someone who wants
to classify Peirce as a panentheist.  The latter task is made even more
difficult--impossible, in my view--by Peirce's very explicit statements to
the contrary in several early drafts for "A Neglected Argument."

CSP:  … Who, out of Nothing, less than a blank, is creating all three
Universes of experience. I do *not *mean, then, a "soul of the World" or an
intelligence is "immanent" in Nature, but is the Creator of the three
Universes of minds, of matter, and of ideal possibilities, and of
everything in them. (R 843:11[1])

CSP:  Indeed, meaning by "God," as throughout this paper will be meant, the
Being whose Attributes are, in the main, those usually ascribed to Him,
Omniscience, Omnipotence, Infinite Benignity, a Being *not *"immanent in"
the Universes of Matter, Mind, and Ideas, but the Sole Creator of every
content of them without exception … (R 843:18&20[1-2])

CSP:  But I had better add that I do *not *mean by God a being merely
"immanent in Nature," but I mean that Being who has created every content
of the world of ideal possibilities, of the world of physical facts, and
the world of all minds, without any exception whatever. (R 843:25[4])

In all three cases, the emphasis on "not" is in the original manuscript.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Feb 2, 2019 at 10:55 PM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jon, list,
>
> Jon wrote:
>
> I am curious to learn exactly how you . . . would define panentheism in
> this context, as contrasted with theism, and then attempt to revise the
> major premise accordingly in order to obtain a compatible conclusion.
> Peirce explicitly described the Object as "something external to and
> independent of the sign" . . ., rather than something *greater than *but
> still somehow *inclusive of *the Sign; and he also stated plainly, "In
> its relation to the Object, the Sign is passive ... the Object remaining
> unaffected". . .
>
>
> One has at least to admit, I think, in positing the Universe as Sign
> (Symbol) and God as the Object of that Sign, that both are *wholly*
> unique, that they are atypical, even peculiar among *all* other Signs and
> Objects: that they are, indeed, sui generis both in themselves, so to
> speak, and in their relationship.
>
> As for *panentheism*, it is generally held that it is an attempt to avoid 
> *separating
> *God from a (created) universe (as theism does) while at the same time
> not *identifying* God with the universe (pantheism). Pan*en*theism, as
> you know, holds that God not only *pervades* the cosmos and all that this
> universe includes and involves, but also *transcends* it in the sense of
> simultaneously being beyond space and time.
>
> [In my view it is *possible *that the God of *all possible Universes*
> this Cosmos is not necessarily to be identified with the *God of our
> Universe*. I'll admit, however, that that sounds a bit odd even to me;
> yet I've been entertaining the idea for many years now (this is not, btw,
> an argument for the multi-universe theories prevalent in our time)].
>
> JAS: Frankly, I am seeking not only to argue for Peirce's views about God,
> but also to demonstrate that his views about Signs and the Universe
> *warranted *those views about God--perhaps even *required *them.
>
>
> I agree with you that at first blush that Peirce's views about Signs and
> the Universe "warrant, perhaps even require" something like the theistic
> view you've been arguing for. Yet, while I think the pantheistic

Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

2019-02-03 Thread Edwina Taborsky

 

Helmut, list

I don't agree with any kind of transcendental force/agency - so, I
wouldn't agree with either panentheism or theism, both of which
assume an agential force that transcends time and space. My problem
with pantheism, which does NOT have this transcendental agency but
instead, refers o an 'immanent agent' , is - what is their definition
of 'god'?

I don't think that psychology or semiotics can stop people from
acting out their emotional natures!

Edwina
 On Sun 03/02/19  1:57 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
  Edwina, list, You wrote: "I think that the ills of society are
caused by the human psychological nature - nothing to do with either
religion or science and following either will not change the effects
of a bad psychological nature. That is - the 'deadly sins' of greed,
lust, pride , envy, gluttony, wrath and sloth are psychological and
can only be dealt with by deliberate personal reasoning and action.
Neither science nor religion plays any role."   I think, that these
sins are of psychological and systemical and semiotic nature.
Therefore, sciences like psychology, systems theory and semiotics can
play a role. However, they cannot change human instinctive nature in
the way that they (the sciences) could take away the reasons for
these sins, but can help people (also people in leading positions) to
reflect their proneness to them, how they can better overcome them and
watch their own behaviour (civilize them).   Religions play the role,
that they reduce the sins inside the belief community, but amplify
them between the belief communities.   Separate theologies cannot
help, I think, but some kind of meta-theology can. Atheists and
theists will not change their beliefs, but to get them round the
conference table, I think it is good to reduce (temporarily for this
purpose) the God-concept to the common denominator "pantheism", or
"panentheism". I think, "panentheism" is better, because it does not
deny every kind of separatedness or otherness of God, so cannot be
denounced by theists as completely atheistic.   Best, Helmut 03.
Februar 2019 um 15:24 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky"  wrote:
  Gary R 

1] Just a comment on your view of the role of science and religion
in a society. 

I don't agree that the cause of the 'ills' of society is a 'limited
view of god' or a chasm between science and religion. Such a
viewpoint suggests that atheism, my view, 'contributes to the ills of
society' - and of course I wouldn't agree with that. 

Religion, of any type, is a belief system. You either believe in it
- or not. There is no evidence. Its axioms are infallible and outside
of debate. Science is subject to empirical objective and repeatable
evidence - and its axioms are fallible. 

I don't see how anything can 'bridge this gap'. 

I think that the ills of society are caused by the human
psychological nature - nothing to do with either religion or science
and following either will not change the effects of a bad
psychological nature. That is - the 'deadly sins' of greed, lust,
pride , envy, gluttony, wrath and sloth are psychological and can
only be dealt with by deliberate personal reasoning and action.
Neither science nor religion plays any role. 

And therefore - nothing to do with gunpowder, fossil fuels or
Facebook. If mankind didn't have gunpowder - he's use spears, arrows
and poisons...to deal with his greed, envy, wrath etc. Fossil fuels
have enabled the growth of technologies that have benefited mankind -
from medical care, to heating and cooling our homes, to better
sanitation and health and water supplies, to enabling more people to
be provided with food and care, and travel and so on. As for Facebook
- no comment...other than gossip is gossip. 

2] I will not get into any discussion about JAS's view of god and
Peirce - since I disagree with his interpretation and consider that
his own personal theism plays a large role in that outline. 

My caution is that semiosis is a rational action, an action, as
Peirce said, of Mind - and we should be careful how we define Mind.  

Edwina
 On Sat 02/02/19 11:54 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:Jon, list,   Jon wrote:  I am curious to learn
exactly how you . . . would define panentheism in this context, as
contrasted with theism, and then attempt to revise the major premise
accordingly in order to obtain a compatible conclusion.  Peirce
explicitly described the Object as  "something external to and
independent of the sign" . . ., rather than something  greater than
but still somehow inclusive of the Sign; and he also stated plainly,
"In its relation to the Object, the Sign is passive ... the Object
remaining unaffected". . .  One has at least to admit, I
think, in positing the Universe as Sign (Symbol) and God as the
Object of that Sign, that both are wholly unique, that they are
atypical, even

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

2019-02-03 Thread Stephen Curtiss Rose

I see all earthly ills as the  product of fear leading to the refusal to
use freedom to overcome it and treat others as you would be treated. When
freedom chooses courses or values that descend from selfishness, exclusion
and ganging up all the way to inflicting injury and death you have the
history of human ills. These are magnified when active values -- tolerance,
helpfulness and democracy -- are defied and power coalesces in the hands of
those who abuse it. Wide rulers are rare for a reason.
amazon.com/author/stephenrose


On Sun, Feb 3, 2019 at 9:24 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Gary R
>
> 1] Just a comment on your view of the role of science and religion in a
> society.
>
> I don't agree that the cause of the 'ills' of society is a 'limited view
> of god' or a chasm between science and religion. Such a viewpoint suggests
> that atheism, my view, 'contributes to the ills of society' - and of course
> I wouldn't agree with that.
>
> Religion, of any type, is a belief system. You either believe in it - or
> not. There is no evidence. Its axioms are infallible and outside of debate.
> Science is subject to empirical objective and repeatable evidence - and its
> axioms are fallible.
>
> I don't see how anything can 'bridge this gap'.
>
> I think that the ills of society are caused by the human psychological
> nature - nothing to do with either religion or science and following either
> will not change the effects of a bad psychological nature. That is -
> the 'deadly sins' of greed, lust, pride , envy, gluttony, wrath and sloth
> are psychological and can only be dealt with by deliberate personal
> reasoning and action. Neither science nor religion plays any role.
>
> And therefore - nothing to do with gunpowder, fossil fuels or Facebook. If
> mankind didn't have gunpowder - he's use spears, arrows and poisons...to
> deal with his greed, envy, wrath etc. Fossil fuels have enabled the growth
> of technologies that have benefited mankind - from medical care, to
> heating and cooling our homes, to better sanitation and health and water
> supplies, to enabling more people to be provided with food and care, and
> travel and so on. As for Facebook - no comment...other than gossip is
> gossip.
>
> 2] I will not get into any discussion about JAS's view of god and Peirce -
> since I disagree with his interpretation and consider that his own personal
> theism plays a large role in that outline.
>
> My caution is that semiosis is a rational action, an action, as Peirce
> said, of Mind - and we should be careful how we define Mind.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Sat 02/02/19 11:54 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Jon, list,
>
> Jon wrote:
>
> I am curious to learn exactly how you . . . would define panentheism in
> this context, as contrasted with theism, and then attempt to revise the
> major premise accordingly in order to obtain a compatible conclusion.
> Peirce explicitly described the Object as  "something external to and
> independent of the sign" . . ., rather than something greater than but
> still somehow inclusive of the Sign; and he also stated plainly, "In its
> relation to the Object, the Sign is passive ... the Object remaining
> unaffected". . .
>
>
> One has at least to admit, I think, in positing the Universe as Sign
> (Symbol) and God as the Object of that Sign, that both are wholly unique,
> that they are atypical, even peculiar among all other Signs and Objects:
> that they are, indeed, sui generis both in themselves, so to speak, and in
> their relationship.
>
> As for panentheism, it is generally held that it is an attempt to avoid 
> separating
> God from a (created) universe (as theism does) while at the same time not
> identifying God with the universe (pantheism). Panentheism, as you know,
> holds that God not only pervades the cosmos and all that this universe
> includes and involves, but also transcends it in the sense of
> simultaneously being beyond space and time.
>
> [In my view it is possible that the God of all possible Universes this
> Cosmos is not necessarily to be identified with the God of our Universe.
> I'll admit, however, that that sounds a bit odd even to me; yet I've been
> entertaining the idea for many years now (this is not, btw, an argument for
> the multi-universe theories prevalent in our time)].
>
> JAS: Frankly, I am seeking not only to argue for Peirce's views about God,
> but also to demonstrate that his views about Signs and the Universe
> warranted those views about God--perhaps even  required them.
>
>
> I agree with you that at first blush that Peirce's views about Signs and
> the Universe "warrant, perhaps even require" something like the theistic
> view you've been arguing for. Yet, while I think the pantheistic view has
> been generally debunked, perhaps the panentheistic notion that God creates
> but  also transcends space and time can help in your "attempt to revise
> the major premise accordingly in order to obtain a compatible conclusion."
>

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

2019-02-03 Thread Helmut Raulien

Edwina, list,

Religions play the role, that they reduce the sins inside the belief community, but amplify them between the belief communities.

Best,

Helmut

03. Februar 2019 um 15:24 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"

wrote:

Gary R

1] Just a comment on your view of the role of science and religion in a society.

I don't see how anything can 'bridge this gap'.

2] I will not get into any discussion about JAS's view of god and Peirce - since I disagree with his interpretation and consider that his own personal theism plays a large role in that outline.

My caution is that semiosis is a rational action, an action, as Peirce said, of Mind - and we should be careful how we define Mind.

Edwina

On Sat 02/02/19 11:54 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:

Jon, list,

Jon wrote:

I am curious to learn exactly how you . . . would define panentheism in this context, as contrasted with theism, and then attempt to revise the major premise accordingly in order to obtain a compatible conclusion. Peirce explicitly described the Object as "something external to and independent of the sign" . . ., rather than something greater than but still somehow inclusive of the Sign; and he also stated plainly, "In its relation to the Object, the Sign is passive ... the Object remaining unaffected". . .

One has at least to admit, I think, in positing the Universe as Sign (Symbol) and God as the Object of that Sign, that both are wholly unique, that they are atypical, even peculiar among all other Signs and Objects: that they are, indeed, sui generis both in themselves, so to speak, and in their relationship.

As for panentheism, it is generally held that it is an attempt to avoid separating God from a (created) universe (as theism does) while at the same time not identifying God with the universe (pantheism). Panentheism, as you know, holds that God not only pervades the cosmos and all that this universe includes and involves, but also transcends it in the sense of simultaneously being beyond space and time.

[In my view it is possible that the God of all possible Universes this Cosmos is not

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

2019-02-03 Thread Edwina Taborsky

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Gary R

1] Just a comment on your view of the role of science and religion
in a society.

I don't agree that the cause of the 'ills' of society is a 'limited
view of god' or a chasm between science and religion. Such a
viewpoint suggests that atheism, my view, 'contributes to the ills of
society' - and of course I wouldn't agree with that.

Religion, of any type, is a belief system. You either believe in it
- or not. There is no evidence. Its axioms are infallible and outside
of debate. Science is subject to empirical objective and repeatable
evidence - and its axioms are fallible.

I don't see how anything can 'bridge this gap'.

I think that the ills of society are caused by the human
psychological nature - nothing to do with either religion or science
and following either will not change the effects of a bad
psychological nature. That is - the 'deadly sins' of greed, lust,
pride , envy, gluttony, wrath and sloth are psychological and can
only be dealt with by deliberate personal reasoning and action.
Neither science nor religion plays any role.

And therefore - nothing to do with gunpowder, fossil fuels or
Facebook. If mankind didn't have gunpowder - he's use spears, arrows
and poisons...to deal with his greed, envy, wrath etc. Fossil fuels
have enabled the growth of technologies that have benefited mankind -
from medical care, to heating and cooling our homes, to better
sanitation and health and water supplies, to enabling more people to
be provided with food and care, and travel and so on. As for Facebook
- no comment...other than gossip is gossip.

2] I will not get into any discussion about JAS's view of god and
Peirce - since I disagree with his interpretation and consider that
his own personal theism plays a large role in that outline. 

My caution is that semiosis is a rational action, an action, as
Peirce said, of Mind - and we should be careful how we define Mind. 

Edwina
 On Sat 02/02/19 11:54 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Jon, list,
 Jon wrote:I am curious to learn exactly how you . . . would define
panentheism in this context, as contrasted with theism, and then
attempt to revise the major premise accordingly in order to obtain a
compatible conclusion.  Peirce explicitly described the Object as 
"something external to and independent of the sign" . . ., rather
than something greater than but still somehow inclusive of the Sign;
and he also stated plainly, "In its relation to the Object, the Sign
is passive ... the Object remaining unaffected". . .
 One has at least to admit, I think, in positing the Universe as Sign
(Symbol) and God as the Object of that Sign, that both are wholly
unique, that they are atypical, even peculiar among all other Signs
and Objects: that they are, indeed, sui generis both in themselves,
so to speak, and in their relationship.
  As for panentheism, it is generally held that it is an attempt to
avoid separating God from a (created) universe (as theism does) while
at the same time not identifying God with the universe (pantheism).
Panentheism, as you know, holds that God not only pervades the cosmos
and all that this universe includes and involves, but also transcends
it in the sense of simultaneously being beyond space and time. 
  [In my view it is possible that the God of all possible Universes
this Cosmos is not necessarily to be identified with the God of our
Universe. I'll admit, however, that that sounds a bit odd even to me;
yet I've been entertaining the idea for many years now (this is not,
btw, an argument for the multi-universe theories prevalent in our
time)].
  JAS: Frankly, I am seeking not only to argue for Peirce's views
about God, but also to demonstrate that his views about Signs and the
Universe warranted those views about God--perhaps even  required them.
 I agree with you that at first blush that Peirce's views about Signs
and the Universe "warrant, perhaps even require" something like the
theistic view you've been arguing for. Yet, while I think the
pantheistic view has been generally debunked, perhaps the
panentheistic notion that God creates but  also transcends space and
time can help in your "attempt to revise the major premise
accordingly in order to obtain a compatible conclusion."
 Finally, in my view, historically and to this day, our idea of God
has been far too small, far too limited, and often dogmatic and
doctrinaire, striking some (but not all) scientists as at least naive
and typically incompatible with science. I think these limited views
of God have in ways contributed to many of the "wicked problems" of
our world, not the least of which is the chasm that has been
developing for centuries between science and religion. It should be
noted, however, that science, at least as it has led to the
development of socially and environmentally problematic technologies

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

2019-02-02 Thread Gary Richmond

Jon, list,

Jon wrote:

I am curious to learn exactly how you . . . would define panentheism in
this context, as contrasted with theism, and then attempt to revise the
major premise accordingly in order to obtain a compatible conclusion.
Peirce explicitly described the Object as "something external to and
independent of the sign" . . ., rather than something *greater than *but
still somehow *inclusive of *the Sign; and he also stated plainly, "In its
relation to the Object, the Sign is passive ... the Object remaining
unaffected". . .

One has at least to admit, I think, in positing the Universe as Sign
(Symbol) and God as the Object of that Sign, that both are *wholly* unique,
that they are atypical, even peculiar among *all* other Signs and Objects:
that they are, indeed, sui generis both in themselves, so to speak, and in
their relationship.

As for *panentheism*, it is generally held that it is an attempt to
avoid *separating
*God from a (created) universe (as theism does) while at the same time not
*identifying* God with the universe (pantheism). Pan*en*theism, as you
know, holds that God not only *pervades* the cosmos and all that this
universe includes and involves, but also *transcends* it in the sense of
simultaneously being beyond space and time.

[In my view it is *possible *that the God of *all possible Universes* this
Cosmos is not necessarily to be identified with the *God of our Universe*.
I'll admit, however, that that sounds a bit odd even to me; yet I've been
entertaining the idea for many years now (this is not, btw, an argument for
the multi-universe theories prevalent in our time)].

JAS: Frankly, I am seeking not only to argue for Peirce's views about God,
but also to demonstrate that his views about Signs and the Universe
*warranted *those views about God--perhaps even *required *them.

I agree with you that at first blush that Peirce's views about Signs and
the Universe "warrant, perhaps even require" something like the theistic
view you've been arguing for. Yet, while I think the pantheistic view has
been generally debunked, perhaps the panentheistic notion that God creates
but *also* transcends space and time can help in your "attempt to revise
the major premise accordingly in order to obtain a compatible conclusion."

Finally, in my view, historically and to this day, our idea of God has been
far too small, far too limited, and often dogmatic and doctrinaire,
striking some (but not all) scientists as at least naive and typically
incompatible with science. I think these limited views of God have in ways
contributed to many of the "wicked problems" of our world, not the least of
which is the chasm that has been developing for centuries between science
and religion. It should be noted, however, that science, at least as it has
led to the development of socially and environmentally problematic
technologies (for example, gun powder, fossil fuels, Facebook), has itself
contributed to the emergence of a number of horrifying"wicked problems.

I believe that Peirce's science, phenomenology, logic as semeiotic,
cosmology, scientific metaphysics, and theological insights might in time
help us to bridge the gap between religion and science, perhaps to finally
contribute evenkmj to solving some of those "wicked problems."

Best,

Gary

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*

*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Feb 2, 2019 at 7:30 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> Thank you for your very kind words.  I look forward to further feedback
> and discussion.
>
> I actually debated formatting the summary just as you proposed, but
> ultimately decided to add the fourth bullet as tacit acknowledgement that
> identifying God as the Object that determines the Universe as a Sign is not
> strictly entailed by the syllogism itself.  Instead, it follows from the
> other considerations that I highlighted toward the end of my original post.
>
> I am curious to learn exactly how you (or others) would define panentheism
> in this context, as contrasted with theism, and then attempt to revise the
> major premise accordingly in order to obtain a compatible conclusion.
> Peirce explicitly described the Object as "something external to and
> independent of the sign" (R 145; 1905), rather than something *greater
> than *but still somehow *inclusive of *the Sign; and he also stated
> plainly, "In its relation to the Object, the Sign is passive ... the
> Object remaining unaffected" (EP 2:544n22; 1906).
>
> Frankly, I am seeking not only to argue for Peirce's views about God, but
> also to demonstrate that his views about Signs and the Universe
> *warranted *those views about God--perhaps even *required *them.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Sat, Feb 2, 2019 at

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

2019-02-02 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Gary R., List:

Thank you for your very kind words.  I look forward to further feedback and
discussion.

I actually debated formatting the summary just as you proposed, but
ultimately decided to add the fourth bullet as tacit acknowledgement that
identifying God as the Object that determines the Universe as a Sign is not
strictly entailed by the syllogism itself.  Instead, it follows from the
other considerations that I highlighted toward the end of my original post.

I am curious to learn exactly how you (or others) would define panentheism
in this context, as contrasted with theism, and then attempt to revise the
major premise accordingly in order to obtain a compatible conclusion.
Peirce explicitly described the Object as "something external to and
independent of the sign" (R 145; 1905), rather than something *greater than
*but still somehow *inclusive of *the Sign; and he also stated plainly, "In
its relation to the Object, the Sign is passive ... the Object remaining
unaffected" (EP 2:544n22; 1906).

Frankly, I am seeking not only to argue for Peirce's views about God, but
also to demonstrate that his views about Signs and the Universe
*warranted *those
views about God--perhaps even *required *them.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Feb 2, 2019 at 4:56 PM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jon, list,
>
> This is, in my opinion, a most impressive semeiotic argument (really, an
> extended *argumentation* in Peirce's sense) for the Reality of God. This
> is to say that it would seem to me to be an explication of Peirce's (and, I
> assume, your) religious views as they relate to his sign theory,
> representing a kind of outline of a *Peircean semeiotic theology (*of
> course Peirce himself sometimes argued *contra* the theologians). It
> brings together, at least as far as I can tell, *the most salient
> passages *in Peirce relating to that argument in a forceful logical tour
> de force. I have read many papers and several books on Peirce's religious
> views, but I have found them all significantly wanting in some respects.
> So, I'm eagerly anticipating studying your argumentation to see how it
> holds up upon examination.
>
> For now, my only very, very slight 'adjustment' to your post would be to
> make your four summary points, three, since they obviously constitute a
> syllogism. So:
>
>- Every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself.
>- The entire Universe is a Sign.
>- Therefore, the entire Universe is determined by an Object other than
>itself; and this we call God.
>
> I can imagine that you'll get all sorts of push back from this deductive
> argument, for example, from those who consider themselves panentheists. But
> the response to that *sort *of difference of opinion is simply that what
> you're arguing for is *Peirce's view of the matter*, one which sees God
> as the Creator of the Three Universes; and how this is clearly intimately
> tied up with his theory of signs.
>
> As for purely logical issues that may arise upon examination of your
> deductive argument, you'll have to take these as they come, I suppose. And
> some will surely argue that such a deductive argument can only be of so
> much value since, as they might see it, faith in God is not essentially a
> logical matter. But for those philosophers and semioticians who already
> hold a Creator view of God, the argument surely offers considerable support.
>
> I have only read your argument twice so far, and have not yet seen any
> logical flaws; of course others may. However, the very clarity of your
> argumentation makes me wonder anew about my own view of this matter. I
> have, perhaps, once again begun to reflect on my own tendencies toward
> panentheism. I had previously thought that my religious views were quite
> close to Peirce's. But since I find your argument as following logically
> and naturally from Peirce's semeiotic, the intra-personal tension it's
> creating--between theism and panentheism--can only be of value to me in the
> long run.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>
> *718 482-5690*
>
>>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

2019-02-02 Thread Stephen Curtiss Rose

Jon, Gary

I suggest that while signs point to the Light or whatever universal name we
use to refer to the Cause, Creator, Force, etc.that it is this source that
makes semiotics the realization that it is -- in other words the basis of
Peirce's statement that all thought is in signs. I see semiotics as the
basis for a co-creation understanding. I am not objecting to these posts,
merely suggesting that it may not be in the nature of thought alone that
the unfathomable Reality can be be ir is perceived. It is in the nature of
the so-called subjective realm. These terms are inadequate because there is
ultimately no division between truthful science and truthful metaphysics,
heart and mind, heaven and earth. Etc.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose


On Sat, Feb 2, 2019 at 5:56 PM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jon, list,
>
> This is, in my opinion, a most impressive semeiotic argument (really, an
> extended *argumentation* in Peirce's sense) for the Reality of God. This
> is to say that it would seem to me to be an explication of Peirce's (and, I
> assume, your) religious views as they relate to his sign theory,
> representing a kind of outline of a *Peircean semeiotic theology (*of
> course Peirce himself sometimes argued *contra* the theologians). It
> brings together, at least as far as I can tell, *the most salient
> passages *in Peirce relating to that argument in a forceful logical tour
> de force. I have read many papers and several books on Peirce's religious
> views, but I have found them all significantly wanting in some respects.
> So, I'm eagerly anticipating studying your argumentation to see how it
> holds up upon examination.
>
> For now, my only very, very slight 'adjustment' to your post would be to
> make your four summary points, three, since they obviously constitute a
> syllogism. So:
>
>- Every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself.
>- The entire Universe is a Sign.
>- Therefore, the entire Universe is determined by an Object other than
>itself; and this we call God.
>
> I can imagine that you'll get all sorts of push back from this deductive
> argument, for example, from those who consider themselves panentheists. But
> the response to that *sort *of difference of opinion is simply that what
> you're arguing for is *Peirce's view of the matter*, one which sees God
> as the Creator of the Three Universes; and how this is clearly intimately
> tied up with his theory of signs.
>
> As for purely logical issues that may arise upon examination of your
> deductive argument, you'll have to take these as they come, I suppose. And
> some will surely argue that such a deductive argument can only be of so
> much value since, as they might see it, faith in God is not essentially a
> logical matter. But for those philosophers and semioticians who already
> hold a Creator view of God, the argument surely offers considerable support.
>
> I have only read your argument twice so far, and have not yet seen any
> logical flaws; of course others may. However, the very clarity of your
> argumentation makes me wonder anew about my own view of this matter. I
> have, perhaps, once again begun to reflect on my own tendencies toward
> panentheism. I had previously thought that my religious views were quite
> close to Peirce's. But since I find your argument as following logically
> and naturally from Peirce's semeiotic, the intra-personal tension it's
> creating--between theism and panentheism--can only be of value to me in the
> long run.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary
>
>
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>
> *718 482-5690*
>
>
> On Sat, Feb 2, 2019 at 4:10 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
>> List:
>>
>> One of Peirce's last published articles was "A Neglected Argument for the
>> Reality of God," and he made his theism--idiosyncratic though it
>> was--unmistakably clear in its very first sentence.
>>
>> CSP:  The word "God," so capitalized (as we Americans say), is *the 
>> *definable
>> proper name, signifying *Ens necessarium*; in my belief Really creator
>> of all three Universes of Experience. (CP 6.452, EP 2:434; 1908)
>>
>>
>> The "Neglected Argument" itself is a *retroductive *one, resulting in a 
>> *plausible
>> *explanatory hypothesis, rather than a conclusion that follows *necessarily
>> *from "definitely formulated premisses" (CP 6.456, EP 2:435; 1908).
>> However, I would like to offer a *deductive *"argumentation" of the
>> latter nature, in accordance with representative statements from Peirce's
>> other late writings.
>>
>> The *major premise* is that every Sign is determined by an Object other
>> than itself.
>>
>> CSP:  The object is something external to and independent of the sign
>> which determines in the sign an element corresponding to itself ... (R 145;
>> 1905)
>>
>>
>> CSP:  ... [a sign] must be determined to correspond, according to some
>> principle, and by some species of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

2019-02-02 Thread Gary Richmond

Jon, list,

This is, in my opinion, a most impressive semeiotic argument (really, an
extended *argumentation* in Peirce's sense) for the Reality of God. This is
to say that it would seem to me to be an explication of Peirce's (and, I
assume, your) religious views as they relate to his sign theory,
representing a kind of outline of a *Peircean semeiotic theology (*of
course Peirce himself sometimes argued *contra* the theologians). It brings
together, at least as far as I can tell, *the most salient passages *in
Peirce relating to that argument in a forceful logical tour de force.
I have read many papers and several books on Peirce's religious views, but
I have found them all significantly wanting in some respects. So, I'm
eagerly anticipating studying your argumentation to see how it holds up
upon examination.

For now, my only very, very slight 'adjustment' to your post would be to
make your four summary points, three, since they obviously constitute a
syllogism. So:

   - Every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself.
   - The entire Universe is a Sign.
   - Therefore, the entire Universe is determined by an Object other than
   itself; and this we call God.

I can imagine that you'll get all sorts of push back from this deductive
argument, for example, from those who consider themselves panentheists. But
the response to that *sort *of difference of opinion is simply that what
you're arguing for is *Peirce's view of the matter*, one which sees God as
the Creator of the Three Universes; and how this is clearly intimately tied
up with his theory of signs.

As for purely logical issues that may arise upon examination of your
deductive argument, you'll have to take these as they come, I suppose. And
some will surely argue that such a deductive argument can only be of so
much value since, as they might see it, faith in God is not essentially a
logical matter. But for those philosophers and semioticians who already
hold a Creator view of God, the argument surely offers considerable support.

I have only read your argument twice so far, and have not yet seen any
logical flaws; of course others may. However, the very clarity of your
argumentation makes me wonder anew about my own view of this matter. I
have, perhaps, once again begun to reflect on my own tendencies toward
panentheism. I had previously thought that my religious views were quite
close to Peirce's. But since I find your argument as following logically
and naturally from Peirce's semeiotic, the intra-personal tension it's
creating--between theism and panentheism--can only be of value to me in the
long run.

Best,

Gary

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*

*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Feb 2, 2019 at 4:10 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> List:
>
> One of Peirce's last published articles was "A Neglected Argument for the
> Reality of God," and he made his theism--idiosyncratic though it
> was--unmistakably clear in its very first sentence.
>
> CSP:  The word "God," so capitalized (as we Americans say), is *the *definable
> proper name, signifying *Ens necessarium*; in my belief Really creator of
> all three Universes of Experience. (CP 6.452, EP 2:434; 1908)
>
>
> The "Neglected Argument" itself is a *retroductive *one, resulting in a 
> *plausible
> *explanatory hypothesis, rather than a conclusion that follows *necessarily
> *from "definitely formulated premisses" (CP 6.456, EP 2:435; 1908).
> However, I would like to offer a *deductive *"argumentation" of the
> latter nature, in accordance with representative statements from Peirce's
> other late writings.
>
> The *major premise* is that every Sign is determined by an Object other
> than itself.
>
> CSP:  The object is something external to and independent of the sign
> which determines in the sign an element corresponding to itself ... (R 145;
> 1905)
>
>
> CSP:  ... [a sign] must be determined to correspond, according to some
> principle, and by some species of causation, with something else, called
> its Object. (R 283:109; 1905)
>
>
> CSP:  A Sign is a Cognizable that, on the one hand, is so determined
> (i.e., specialized, *bestimmt*) by something *other than itself*, called
> its Object ... (CP 8.177, EP 2:492; 1909)
>
> CSP:  I start by defining what I mean by a Sign. It is something
> determined by something else, its Object ... (EP 2:500; 1909)
>
>
> Anticipating the outcome, one might expect instead the assertion that
> every Sign requires an *utterer*; but Peirce explicitly denied this, even
> while just as explicitly acknowledging God as Creator.
>
> CSP:  But why argue, when signs without utterers are often employed? I
> mean such signs as symptoms of disease, signs of the weather, groups of
> experiences serving as premisses, etc. (EP 2:403; 1907)
>
> CSP:  But it appears to me that all symptoms of disease, signs of weather,
> etc., have no utterer. For I do not think we can properly

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

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