在 2016年11月15日星期二 UTC+8上午8:51:25,Kathleen Wilson写道:
> On Friday, October 28, 2016 at 7:29:56 AM UTC-7, wangs...@gmail.com wrote:
> > We have uploaded the lastest translantion of CP/CPS.
> > CP: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=8805543
> > CPS:
On Wednesday, August 3, 2016 at 2:45:23 PM UTC-7, Kathleen Wilson wrote:
> This request from Guangdong Certificate Authority (GDCA) is to include the
> "GDCA TrustAUTH R5 ROOT" certificate, turn on the Websites trust bit, and
> enabled EV treatment.
>
> GDCA is a nationally recognized CA that
On Tuesday, November 15, 2016 at 12:37:56 AM UTC-8, Thijs Alkemade wrote:
> On 13 Nov 2016, at 10:08, Percy wrote:
> >
> > I just found out that Apple doesn't limit "CA 沃通免费SSL证书 G2" intermediate CA
> > even though Apple limited "WoSign CA Free SSL Certificate G2"
On 13 Nov 2016, at 10:08, Percy wrote:
>
> I just found out that Apple doesn't limit "CA 沃通免费SSL证书 G2" intermediate CA
> even though Apple limited "WoSign CA Free SSL Certificate G2" intermediate
> CA. An example of site signed by"CA 沃通免费SSL证书 G2" intermediate CA is
>
On 15/11/16 05:39, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
> I think it'd be useful to resolve the questions I asked on this thread
> -
> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/ZMUjQ6xHrDA/ySofsF_PAgAJ
> - to figure out what Mozilla expects/wants of TCSCs with respect to
> the BRs, as that seems
On Tuesday, November 15, 2016 at 6:03:07 AM UTC-5, wangs...@gmail.com wrote:
> 在 2016年11月15日星期二 UTC+8上午8:51:25,Kathleen Wilson写道:
> > On Friday, October 28, 2016 at 7:29:56 AM UTC-7, wangs...@gmail.com wrote:
> > > We have uploaded the lastest translantion of CP/CPS.
> > > CP:
在 2016年11月15日星期二 UTC+8下午7:03:07,wangs...@gmail.com写道:
> 在 2016年11月15日星期二 UTC+8上午8:51:25,Kathleen Wilson写道:
> > On Friday, October 28, 2016 at 7:29:56 AM UTC-7, wangs...@gmail.com wrote:
> > > We have uploaded the lastest translantion of CP/CPS.
> > > CP:
On 15/11/2016 18:10, Han Yuwei wrote:
在 2016年11月15日星期二 UTC+8下午7:03:07,wangs...@gmail.com写道:
在 2016年11月15日星期二 UTC+8上午8:51:25,Kathleen Wilson写道:
On Friday, October 28, 2016 at 7:29:56 AM UTC-7, wangs...@gmail.com wrote:
We have uploaded the lastest translantion of CP/CPS.
CP:
On Tue, Nov 15, 2016 at 7:25 AM, Kurt Roeckx wrote:
>
> - If it's an enterprise root they need to switch to SHA-2
This is a lot easier said than done for many organizations. Depending
on the CA software this might be a small configuration change or might
involve a very large
在 2016年11月15日星期二 UTC+8下午5:53:19,Gervase Markham写道:
> On 15/11/16 08:39, Percy wrote:
> > I posted on the solidot (Chinese Slashdot) about this. The majority
> > comments want the application rejected.
> >
On 2016-11-15 16:19, Gervase Markham wrote:
On 15/11/16 12:20, jansomar...@gmail.com wrote:
I would step in to your discussion if you don't mind. My question is
very similar to the original one but in regards to internal usage of
SHA-1 signed certs. We are running large number of network devs
Agree with Gerv & Tony,
More patience should be given if they want to improve.
And I don’t think “I posted on the solidot (Chinese Slashdot) about this. The
majority comments want the application rejected. “is enough to be the reason to
reject the request.
For many Chinese companies, they do
在 2016年11月16日星期三 UTC+8上午1:11:05,Han Yuwei写道:
> 在 2016年11月15日星期二 UTC+8下午7:03:07,wangs...@gmail.com写道:
> > 在 2016年11月15日星期二 UTC+8上午8:51:25,Kathleen Wilson写道:
> > > On Friday, October 28, 2016 at 7:29:56 AM UTC-7, wangs...@gmail.com wrote:
> > > > We have uploaded the lastest translantion of CP/CPS.
在 2016年11月16日星期三 UTC+8上午6:35:22,Kathleen Wilson写道:
> On Tuesday, November 15, 2016 at 10:41:28 AM UTC-8, Peter Bowen wrote:
> > I think Mozilla needs to update its guidance to CAs. The information
> > checklist directions
> >
On Tue, Nov 15, 2016 at 3:02 AM, wrote:
>
> Because we misunderstand that we only need to provide the related chapters of
> CP/CPS in English, and non-related sections are not required. We are terribly
> sorry that we misinterpreted your requirement and upload an
Here's a summary of the audit reminder emails that were sent today.
The following is now automatically generated when the audit reminder emails get
sent.
Forwarded Message
Subject: Summary of November 2016 Audit Reminder Emails
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2016 20:00:42 + (GMT)
Li-Chun CHEN from Chunghwa Telecom would like to push for a UI
improvement to properly display subject information in certificate
details for FF (and others). In order to assist him, I prepared some
text to be included in an improvement bug for Mozilla products and will
try sending similar
On Tuesday, November 15, 2016 at 10:41:28 AM UTC-8, Peter Bowen wrote:
> I think Mozilla needs to update its guidance to CAs. The information
> checklist directions
> (https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Information_checklist#Verification_Policies_and_Practices)
> says "If the CP/CPS documents are not in
On Tue, Nov 15, 2016 at 04:27:09PM +0100, Gervase Markham wrote:
> I certainly think our view of redaction will be driven by use cases.
> AIUI, you are strongly encouraging use cases to be brought to the IETF.
> However, if 6962bis is in Last Call, and won't be updated, is the TRANS
> group still
On Tuesday, 15 November 2016 09:35:17 UTC, Jakob Bohm wrote:
> The HTTPS-everywhere tendency, including the plans of some people to
> completely remove unencrypted HTTP from implementations, makes it
> necessary for non-public stuff connected to the Internet to get
> Internet-compatible TLS
This request from Symantec is to only enable the Email trust bit for the
following 4 root certificates that will eventually replace the VeriSign-brand
class 1 and 2 root certs that are currently included in NSS.
1) Symantec Class 1 Public Primary Certification Authority - G6
2) Symantec Class 2
Hello Guys,
I would step in to your discussion if you don't mind. My question is very
similar to the original one but in regards to internal usage of SHA-1 signed
certs. We are running large number of network devs acting as a proxy and users
need to authenticate in order to access some of the
On Tue, Nov 15, 2016 at 7:27 AM, Gervase Markham wrote:
> I certainly think our view of redaction will be driven by use cases.
> AIUI, you are strongly encouraging use cases to be brought to the IETF.
> However, if 6962bis is in Last Call, and won't be updated, is the TRANS
>
23 matches
Mail list logo