claim that material bodies are
extensive while mind is intensive -- which would be a dualism --
in favor of an Idealistic monism. Otherwise, being a dualism, they
cannot logically interact.
This also amounts to a rejection of pure materalism, a third
path, namely that everything consists
contrary substances,
and calling them a dualism is just a handy cover-up of the problem.
Only Leibniz can claim philosophical verity by treating boith
body and mind as mind (idealism). Materialist monists
hold that mind is physical, which is nonsense,
and the dualist coverup doesn't solve that absurdity
Roger says that mind and body are completely contrary substances
Richard replies what is dualism if not that?
On Mon, Nov 5, 2012 at 6:43 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote:
Hi Craig Weinberg
The dualisms will work as fictions as long as you don't take
them too seriously.
But keep
to get around the unresolveable
issue that mind and body are completely contrary substances,
and calling them a dualism is just a handy cover-up of the problem.
Only Leibniz can claim philosophical verity by treating boith
body and mind as mind (idealism). Materialist monists
hold that mind
. -Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content -
From: Craig Weinberg
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-05, 08:04:04
Subject: Re: Dualism as a cover-up solution to the mind-body problem
On Monday, November 5, 2012 6:45:50 AM UTC-5, rclough wrote:
Hi Craig Weinberg
Time: 2012-11-05, 08:04:04
Subject: Re: Dualism as a cover-up solution to the mind-body problem
On Monday, November 5, 2012 6:45:50 AM UTC-5, rclough wrote:
Hi Craig Weinberg
The dualisms will work as fictions as long as you don't take
them too seriously.
But keep
On 11/5/2012 9:01 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I don't know that I'm a philosopher, but it seems to me that I have
come to a conclusion.
Craig
On Monday, November 5, 2012 8:13:38 AM UTC-5, rclough wrote:
Hi Craig Weinberg
What they say about economists is also
appropriate to say
the end. -Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content -
From: Craig Weinberg
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-05, 09:01:10
Subject: Re: Re: Dualism as a cover-up solution to the mind-body problem
I don't know that I'm a philosopher, but it seems to me that I have come
-11-05, 09:22:15
Subject: Re: Dualism as a cover-up solution to the mind-body problem
On 11/5/2012 9:01 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I don't know that I'm a philosopher, but it seems to me that I have come to a
conclusion.
Craig
On Monday, November 5, 2012 8:13:38 AM UTC-5, rclough wrote:
Hi
Hi Richard Ruquist
Indeed, dualism is -- has to be-- science fiction.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
11/5/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content -
From: Richard Ruquist
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012
javascript:
11/5/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content -
*From:* Craig Weinberg javascript:
*Receiver:* everything-list javascript:
*Time:* 2012-11-05, 09:01:10
*Subject:* Re: Re: Dualism as a cover-up solution
On May 12, 8:00 pm, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sat, May 12, 2012 at 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote:
On 5/12/2012 10:19 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
On Sat, May 12, 2012 at 9:20 AM, scerir sce...@libero.it wrote:
A few quotes below to dualism
Hi Stephen,
On 14 May 2012, at 19:16, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 5/14/2012 4:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 May 2012, at 23:19, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 13.05.2012 15:09 Bruno Marchal said the following:
On 12 May 2012, at 14:59, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 12.05.2012 13:33 Bruno
On 14 May 2012, at 22:41, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 14.05.2012 10:29 Bruno Marchal said the following:
On 13 May 2012, at 23:19, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
...
Yet, I guess that even not all physicists believe in multiverse.
When
you convince all physicists that multivers exists, I will
On 5/15/2012 5:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi Stephen,
On 14 May 2012, at 19:16, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 5/14/2012 4:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 May 2012, at 23:19, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
Do you mean that when all chemists accept the multiverse
interpretation, they will start
On 13 May 2012, at 23:19, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 13.05.2012 15:09 Bruno Marchal said the following:
On 12 May 2012, at 14:59, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 12.05.2012 13:33 Bruno Marchal said the following:
Evgenii,
All this is well known. Copenhagen theory, or unique-universe
theory
are
On 5/14/2012 4:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 May 2012, at 23:19, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 13.05.2012 15:09 Bruno Marchal said the following:
On 12 May 2012, at 14:59, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 12.05.2012 13:33 Bruno Marchal said the following:
Evgenii,
All this is well known.
On 14.05.2012 10:29 Bruno Marchal said the following:
On 13 May 2012, at 23:19, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
...
Yet, I guess that even not all physicists believe in multiverse. When
you convince all physicists that multivers exists, I will start
thinking about it.
On reality, usually all humans
H. Kragh (Dirac: a Scientific Biography, Cambridge U.P., 1990) reports
a 1927 discussion between Dirac, Heisenberg and Born, about what
actually gives rise to the so called collapse (reduction of waves packet).
Dirac said that it is 'Nature' that makes the choice (of measurement
outcome). Born
On 5/12/2012 11:21 PM, scerir wrote:
H. Kragh (Dirac: a Scientific Biography, Cambridge U.P., 1990) reports
a 1927 discussion between Dirac, Heisenberg and Born, about what
actually gives rise to the so called collapse (reduction of waves packet).
Dirac said that it is 'Nature' that makes the
On 13.05.2012 04:38 meekerdb said the following:
On 5/12/2012 4:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Evgenii,
All this is well known. Copenhagen theory, or unique-universe theory
are non computationalist dualist theories.
Not all of them, at least not in the sense of dualist you mean. Adrian
Kent has
On 12 May 2012, at 14:59, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 12.05.2012 13:33 Bruno Marchal said the following:
Evgenii,
All this is well known. Copenhagen theory, or unique-universe
theory
are non computationalist dualist theories.
But as Shimony has shown, the idea that consciousness collapse the
On 12 May 2012, at 15:20, scerir wrote:
A few quotes below to dualism from Max Velmans.
Evgenii
H. Kragh (Dirac: a Scientific Biography, Cambridge U.P., 1990)
reports
a 1927 discussion between Dirac, Heisenberg and Born, about what
actually gives rise to the so called collapse (reduction
On 12 May 2012, at 22:54, meekerdb wrote:
On 5/12/2012 6:20 AM, scerir wrote:
A few quotes below to dualism from Max Velmans.
Evgenii
H. Kragh (Dirac: a Scientific Biography, Cambridge U.P., 1990)
reports
a 1927 discussion between Dirac, Heisenberg and Born, about what
actually gives
use of
Occam.
Bruno
On 12 May 2012, at 13:03, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
A few quotes below to dualism from Max Velmans.
Evgenii
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/05/quantum-dualist-interactionism.html
In Chapter 2, Conscious Souls, Brains and Quantum Mechanics there
is a nice section Quantum
On 13.05.2012 15:09 Bruno Marchal said the following:
On 12 May 2012, at 14:59, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 12.05.2012 13:33 Bruno Marchal said the following:
Evgenii,
All this is well known. Copenhagen theory, or unique-universe theory
are non computationalist dualist theories.
But as Shimony
A few quotes below to dualism from Max Velmans.
Evgenii
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/05/quantum-dualist-interactionism.html
In Chapter 2, Conscious Souls, Brains and Quantum Mechanics there is a
nice section Quantum Dualist Interactionism (p. 17 – 21) where Max
Velmans describes works
On 12.05.2012 13:33 Bruno Marchal said the following:
Evgenii,
All this is well known. Copenhagen theory, or unique-universe theory
are non computationalist dualist theories.
But as Shimony has shown, the idea that consciousness collapse the wave
leads to many difficulties, like non local
A few quotes below to dualism from Max Velmans.
Evgenii
H. Kragh (Dirac: a Scientific Biography, Cambridge U.P., 1990) reports
a 1927 discussion between Dirac, Heisenberg and Born, about what
actually gives rise to the so called collapse (reduction of waves packet).
Dirac said
On Sat, May 12, 2012 at 9:20 AM, scerir sce...@libero.it wrote:
A few quotes below to dualism from Max Velmans.
Evgenii
H. Kragh (Dirac: a Scientific Biography, Cambridge U.P., 1990) reports
a 1927 discussion between Dirac, Heisenberg and Born, about what
actually gives rise to the so
On 5/12/2012 6:20 AM, scerir wrote:
A few quotes below to dualism from Max Velmans.
Evgenii
H. Kragh (Dirac: a Scientific Biography, Cambridge U.P., 1990) reports
a 1927 discussion between Dirac, Heisenberg and Born, about what
actually gives rise to the so called collapse (reduction of waves
On 5/12/2012 10:19 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
On Sat, May 12, 2012 at 9:20 AM, scerir sce...@libero.it
mailto:sce...@libero.it wrote:
A few quotes below to dualism from Max Velmans.
Evgenii
H. Kragh (Dirac: a Scientific Biography, Cambridge U.P., 1990)
reports
a 1927
On Sat, May 12, 2012 at 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote:
On 5/12/2012 10:19 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
On Sat, May 12, 2012 at 9:20 AM, scerir sce...@libero.it wrote:
A few quotes below to dualism from Max Velmans.
Evgenii
H. Kragh (Dirac: a Scientific Biography
in our information.
Brent
Computationalism and Everett (QM without collapse) have no problems in that respect, and
line up well with the everything-like use of Occam.
Bruno
On 12 May 2012, at 13:03, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
A few quotes below to dualism from Max Velmans.
Evgenii
http
' and 'advertised' his *
dualism* to keep the soul figment of the faithful in his theory - in order
to escape the Inquisition. Spinozza was in a better position: he risked only
a 'shunning' from the Jewish community, what he got indeed.
About 'life'? biologists like to *know it(?)* within their conventional
precludes any life form from existing?
Also are you saying you are a substance dualist?
Hi,
Is 'substance dualism' the only form of dualism?
I suppose there is idealism (only mind) which would be a theory of no
substances. Also nothing precludes someone from postulating 3 types
of substances
On 8/29/2011 6:05 PM, John Mikes wrote:
Stephen and Jason,
interesting discours, but you use concepts that beg for my questioning.
Dualism may be an observation based on phenomena we misunderstand and
explain to the level of present theories. A violation of the laws of
physics asks: are those
Stephen and Jason,
interesting discours, but you use concepts that beg for my questioning.
Dualism may be an observation based on phenomena we misunderstand and
explain to the level of present theories. A violation of the laws of
physics asks: are those laws' really so true, or only a (statistical
On 8/28/2011 11:06 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
Capillary action is not a violation of the laws of physics. What
about substance monism precludes any life form from existing?
Also are you saying you are a substance dualist?
Hi,
Is 'substance dualism' the only form of dualism? Maybe you
physical statements? Are you
familiar with the ideas of philosopher David Chalmers, who
takes the latter position? He doesn't advocate
interactive dualism, where there's some kind of
soul-stuff that can influence matter--he assumes that the
physical world is causally closed, so all
physical events
Le 24-juin-05, à 22:43, Pete Carlton a écrit :
(Sorry for the delay; I like to spend several hours writing here but I
have had meetings to attend etc..)
On Jun 22, 2005, at 4:19 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
Bruno wrote
There are two *physical* issues here.
1) The simplest one is that if you
Can anyone explain http://chu.stanford.edu/guide.html#ratmech to me. Stephen
seems to think Pratt has solved the Caspar problem of dualism. It also
involves
http://www.meta-religion.com/Philosophy/Articles/Philosophy_of_the_mind/mind-bo
dy.htm by someone whose nom-de-internet is Cassiels Sophia
Le 22-juin-05, à 13:19, Brent Meeker a écrit :
-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, June 22, 2005 8:16 AM
To: Pete Carlton
Cc: EverythingList
Subject: Re: Dualism and the DA
Le 21-juin-05, à 21:21, Pete Carlton a écrit :
snip
Now
Le 22-juin-05, à 21:26, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
x-tad-biggerActually, it occurred to me lately that saying everything happens may be the same as the paradox of the set of all sets.
/x-tad-bigger
That is indeed close to may critics of Tegmark. But as you know logician have made progress in
(Sorry for the delay; I like to spend several hours writing here but I have had meetings to attend etc..)On Jun 22, 2005, at 4:19 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:There are two *physical* issues here.1) The simplest one is that if you agree with the comp indeterminacy(or similar) you get an explanation of
Le 21-juin-05, à 21:21, Pete Carlton a écrit :
I think the practical differences are large, as you say, but I
disagree that it points to a fundamental metaphysical difference. I
think what appears to be a metaphysical difference is just the
breakdown of our folk concept of I. Imagine a
-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, June 22, 2005 8:16 AM
To: Pete Carlton
Cc: EverythingList
Subject: Re: Dualism and the DA
Le 21-juin-05, à 21:21, Pete Carlton a écrit :
I think the practical differences are large, as you say, but I
Brent Meeker:
The fact that all these metaphysical problems and bizarre results are predictedby assuming *everything happens* implies to me that *everything happens* islikely false. I'm not sure what the best alternative is, but I like RolandOmnes view point that QM is a probabilistic theory and
On Jun 20, 2005, at 10:44 AM, Hal Finney wrote:Pete Carlton writes: snip-- we don't need to posit any kind of dualism to paper over it, we just have to revise our concept of "I". Hal Finney wrote:Copies seem a little more problematic. We're pretty cavalier aboutcreating and destr
On Mon, Jun 20, 2005 at 12:01:48AM -0700, Jonathan Colvin wrote:
Russell Standish wrote:
(JC) If you want to insist that What would it be like to be a bat is
equivalent to the question What would the universe be like
if I had
been a bat rather than me?, it is very hard to see what
the copies did not diverge (or the comp histories going through the states of those copies.
To insist that there *is* a difference surely requires some new kind of
dualism. Perhaps it is a valid dualism;
Not this one. Only the duality between 1 and 3 person is valid.
but I think it should
Jonathan Colvin writes:
This is, I think, the crux of the reference class issue with the DA. My (and
your) reference class can not be merely conscious observers or all
humans, but must be something much closer to someone (or thing) discussing
or aware of the DA). I note that this reference
you in two different places, and both doubles wil be psychologically identical at the time of their creation such that each will say they are you - then you know everything there is to know. There is no further question of "which one will I be"? This is simply a situation which pushes
; we don't need to posit any
kind of dualism to paper over it, we just have to revise our concept
of I.
I agree that this view makes sense. We come up with all these mind
bending and paradoxical thought experiments, and even though everyone
agrees about every fact of the third-person
Russell Standish wrote:
(JC) If you want to insist that What would it be like
to be a bat
is equivalent to the question What would the universe be like
if I had
been a bat rather than me?, it is very hard to see what the
answer could be. Suppose you
*had* been a bat
- Original Message -
From: Jonathan Colvin [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: 'Russell Standish' [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: 'EverythingList' everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Monday, June 20, 2005 09:52 PM
Subject: Reference class (was dualism and the DA)
Russell Standish wrote:
(JC) If you want
I have just waved my magic wand, and lo! Jonathan Colvin has been changed
body and mind into Russell Standish and placed in Sydney, while Russell
Standish has been changed into Jonathan Colvin and placed somewhere on the
coastal US. If anyone else covets a particular person's wealth or
artifact.
#2: Over the millennia faith-strategists invented dualism to imply something
that 'survives' us and can be praised or punished just to secure the grip of
'faith' (organizations?) on the 'faithful, aoup carrying such memes over
millennia. It was not an esoteric thought: the basic reductionist
explanation (assuming c.).
Ok, does that not imply that it is a meaningless question?
Not at all.
If you want to
insist that this question is meaningful, I don't see how this is
possible
without assuming a dualism of some sort (exactly which sort I'm trying
to
figure out).
If the material
?.
Certainly, assuming immaterial souls or a similar identity dualism, (and
that I am my soul, not my body), and that bats have souls like people, it
is a meaningful question to ask why am I me rather than a bat, or to state
that I could have been a bat, because my soul could have been placed in a
bat
that not imply that it is a meaningless question?
Not at all.
If you want to
insist that this question is meaningful, I don't see how this is
possible without assuming a dualism of some sort (exactly which sort
I'm trying to figure out).
If the material universe is identical under situation
Le Dimanche 19 Juin 2005 02:39, Jonathan Colvin a crit:
the dualism comes from reifying the 3rd
person independent universe, and if we accept only the 1st person as
real, there is no dualism. It is quite a metaphysical leap, though, to
discard the 3rd person universe. I'd like to know how
my
body (ie. Dualism)?
I have just finished Daniel Dennett's book Consciousness
Explained, and gives rather good account of how this is
possible. As our minds develop, first prelingually, and then
as language gains hold, our self, the I you refer to,
develops out of a web of thoughts
Jonathan Colvin writes:
In the process of writing this email, I did some googling, and it seems my
objection has been independantly discovered (some time ago). See
http://hanson.gmu.edu/nodoom.html
In particular, I note the following section, which seems to mirror my
argument rather
Note that the question why am I me and not my brother is strictly
equivalent with why am I the one in Washington and not the one in
Moscow after a WM duplication. It is strictly unanswerable. Even a God
could not give an adequate explanation (assuming c.).
Bruno
Le 16-juin-05, 23:02,
Ok, does that not imply that it is a meaningless question? If you want to
insist that this question is meaningful, I don't see how this is possible
without assuming a dualism of some sort (exactly which sort I'm trying to
figure out).
If the material universe is identical under situation (A) (I
Hal Finney wrote:
It's an interesting question as to how far we can comfortably
or meaningfully take counterfactuals. At some level it is
completely mundane to say things like, if I had taken a
different route to work today, I wouldn't have gotten caught
in that traffic jam. We aren't thrown
other people. This seemed to be one of the foundations
of their disagreement.
I think Robin is assuming (as I do) that the only way counterfactuals such
as I could have been someone/something else make sense, absent dualism, is
if we adopt a strictly physical identity theory (ie. The atoms in my
On Jun 17, 2005, at 10:24 AM, Hal Finney wrote:
Does it make sense for Jobs to say, who would I have been if that had
happened?
Yes, it makes sense, but only because we know that the phrase Who
would I have been, uttered by Steve Jobs, is just a convenient way
for expressing a
On What would it be like to have been born someone else, how does
this differ from What is it like to be a bat?
Presumably Jonathon Colvin would argue that this latter question is
meaningless, unless immaterial souls existed.
I still find it hard to understand this argument. The question What
is
On Wed, Jun 15, 2005 at 10:30:11PM -0700, Jonathan Colvin wrote:
Nope, I'm thinking of dualism as the mind (or consciousness) is separate
from the body. Ie. The mind is not identical to the body.
These two statements are not equivalent. You cannot say that the fist
is separate from the hand
Russell Standish wrote:
Nope, I'm thinking of dualism as the mind (or consciousness) is
separate from the body. Ie. The mind is not identical to the body.
These two statements are not equivalent. You cannot say that
the fist is separate from the hand. Yet the fist is not
identical
On Thu, Jun 16, 2005 at 01:02:11AM -0700, Jonathan Colvin wrote:
Russell Standish wrote:
Nope, I'm thinking of dualism as the mind (or consciousness) is
separate from the body. Ie. The mind is not identical to the body.
These two statements are not equivalent. You cannot say
Dear Joanthan,
- Original Message -
From: Jonathan Colvin [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: 'Stephen Paul King' [EMAIL PROTECTED];
everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Thursday, June 16, 2005 1:14 AM
Subject: RE: Dualism and the DA
Stephen Paul King wrote:
Pardon the intrusion, but in your
Russell Standish wrote:
Nope, I'm thinking of dualism as the mind (or consciousness) is
separate from the body. Ie. The mind is not identical to
the body.
These two statements are not equivalent. You cannot say
that the fist
is separate from the hand. Yet the fist is not identical
Le Jeudi 16 Juin 2005 10:02, Jonathan Colvin a crit:
Switch the question. Why aren't you me (Jonathan Colvin)? I'm conscious
(feels like I am, anyway).
Hi Jonathan,
I think you do not see the real question, which can be formulated (using your
analogy) by :
Why (me as) Russell Standish is
sample from the set of all observers
in our reference class. This is NOT the same as an ontological statement to
the effect that we *are* random observers, which seems hard to justify
unless we assume a species of dualism.
Jonathan Colvin
Dear Jonathan,
- Original Message -
From: Jonathan Colvin [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: 'Stephen Paul King' [EMAIL PROTECTED];
everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Thursday, June 16, 2005 9:15 PM
Subject: RE: Dualism
snip
[SPK]
The same kind of mutual constraint that exist between a
given
to be a sort of dualism (randomly emplaced souls etc).
Nooo! - the DA does not imply dualism. The souls do not need to exist
anywhere else before being randomly emplaced.
Cheers
--
*PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry
Dear Jonathan,
Pardon the intrusion, but in your opinion does every form of dualism
require that one side of the duality has properties and behaviors that are
not constrained by the other side of the duality, as examplified by the idea
of randomly emplaced souls?
The idea that all
Russel Standish wrote:
Since it is coming from Nick B., over-exhaustive :) I don't think
anybody, Nick included, has yet come up with a convincing way to
define appropriate reference classes. Absent this, the only way to
rescue the DA seems to be a sort of dualism (randomly
emplaced souls
Stephen Paul King wrote:
Pardon the intrusion, but in your opinion does every form
of dualism require that one side of the duality has properties
and behaviors that are not constrained by the other side of
the duality, as examplified by the idea of randomly emplaced souls?
The idea
Russel Standish wrote:
It seems to me that to believe we are randomly emplaced
souls, whether
or not they existed elsewhere beforehand, is to perforce embrace a
species of dualism.
Exactly what species of dualism? Dualism usually means that
minds and brains are distinct orthogonal things
Dear Jonathan,
Non-separateness and identity are not the same thing! Your argument
against dualism assumes that the duals are somehow separable and
non-mutually dependent and thus lacking a linking mechanism dualism fails as
a viable theory. On the other hand, once we see the flaw
Stephen Paul King wrote:
Dear Jonathan,
Non-separateness and identity are not the same thing!
Your argument
against dualism assumes that the duals are somehow separable and
non-mutually dependent and thus lacking a linking mechanism dualism
fails as
a viable theory. On the other hand, once we
Dear Joao,
Your point is well taken! My failure was to
point out that my 'rant' was against those that would claim that dualism can
never be a viable alternative, especially to a
Numbers-are-all-that-exists-monism.Thank you for pointingout that
such is calledPythagorianism.
OTOH, I see
,
Your point is well taken! My failure was to point out that my 'rant' was
against those that would claim that dualism can never be a viable alternative,
especially to a Numbers-are-all-that-exists-monism. Thank you for pointing
out that such is called Pythagorianism.
OTOH, I see a failure in
]
Sent: Friday, May 20, 2005 1:13 PM
Subject: Re: In defense of Dualism
(typos corrected)
Dear Stephen,
I think I catch your point. As it happens the distinction Being/Becoming
(as Form/Substance) are very Aristotelian, both in origin and in the way
we use them. If the distinction has any m
From: Joao Leao
Our access to mathematical archetypes is in
this sense a map to help us make our way back
to the garden, as Joni Mitchell (that great
Platonist) would put it!
If I remember well - but I studied all that 35
years ago - Aristotle called all that 'hylomorphism',
from hule =
I am not sure that the Aristotelic term applied
to this. I see hylemorphism as the position that
matter beggets form (rather the other way
around which is the more platonic position).
I think it applies fully to the group of attempts
to build Relational (Classical and Quantum)
Theories of
, there is a difference between the objective
mathematical description of an observer-moment and the subjective
what-it-is-like-to-be of the observer-moment corresponding to that
description. There's a case for calling this dualism, but also a case
for labelling it as a monist theory, an eliminative
On 17 January 2004 Doug Porpora wrote:
*quote*
Norman and Bruno: I myself am not defending a dualist position (body +
soul, mind, whatever). I am prepared to say the body is the only substance
that exists. That does not mean its behavior is explainable in terms of
physics alone.
Yes, I
Dear Stathis,
For an alternative approach to dualism see:
http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/pratt95rational.html
Kindest regards,
Stephen
- Original Message -
From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Saturday, January 17, 2004 12:40
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