Roger says that mind and body are completely contrary substances
Richard replies what is dualism if not that?
On Mon, Nov 5, 2012 at 6:43 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote:
Hi Craig Weinberg
The dualisms will work as fictions as long as you don't take
them too seriously.
But keep
On Monday, November 5, 2012 6:45:50 AM UTC-5, rclough wrote:
Hi Craig Weinberg
The dualisms will work as fictions as long as you don't take
them too seriously.
But keep in mind:
IMHO all of those dualist positions are not logically valid.
Instead, they are phoney attempts to
. -Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content -
From: Craig Weinberg
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-05, 08:04:04
Subject: Re: Dualism as a cover-up solution to the mind-body problem
On Monday, November 5, 2012 6:45:50 AM UTC-5, rclough wrote:
Hi Craig Weinberg
Time: 2012-11-05, 08:04:04
Subject: Re: Dualism as a cover-up solution to the mind-body problem
On Monday, November 5, 2012 6:45:50 AM UTC-5, rclough wrote:
Hi Craig Weinberg
The dualisms will work as fictions as long as you don't take
them too seriously.
But keep
On 11/5/2012 9:01 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I don't know that I'm a philosopher, but it seems to me that I have
come to a conclusion.
Craig
On Monday, November 5, 2012 8:13:38 AM UTC-5, rclough wrote:
Hi Craig Weinberg
What they say about economists is also
appropriate to say
the end. -Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content -
From: Craig Weinberg
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-05, 09:01:10
Subject: Re: Re: Dualism as a cover-up solution to the mind-body problem
I don't know that I'm a philosopher, but it seems to me that I have come
-11-05, 09:22:15
Subject: Re: Dualism as a cover-up solution to the mind-body problem
On 11/5/2012 9:01 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I don't know that I'm a philosopher, but it seems to me that I have come to a
conclusion.
Craig
On Monday, November 5, 2012 8:13:38 AM UTC-5, rclough wrote:
Hi
-11-05, 06:53:07
Subject: Re: Dualism as a cover-up solution to the mind-body problem
Roger says that mind and body are completely contrary substances
Richard replies what is dualism if not that?
On Mon, Nov 5, 2012 at 6:43 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Craig Weinberg
The dualisms
javascript:
11/5/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content -
*From:* Craig Weinberg javascript:
*Receiver:* everything-list javascript:
*Time:* 2012-11-05, 09:01:10
*Subject:* Re: Re: Dualism as a cover-up solution
On May 12, 8:00 pm, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sat, May 12, 2012 at 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote:
On 5/12/2012 10:19 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
On Sat, May 12, 2012 at 9:20 AM, scerir sce...@libero.it wrote:
A few quotes below to dualism
Hi Stephen,
On 14 May 2012, at 19:16, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 5/14/2012 4:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 May 2012, at 23:19, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 13.05.2012 15:09 Bruno Marchal said the following:
On 12 May 2012, at 14:59, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 12.05.2012 13:33 Bruno
On 14 May 2012, at 22:41, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 14.05.2012 10:29 Bruno Marchal said the following:
On 13 May 2012, at 23:19, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
...
Yet, I guess that even not all physicists believe in multiverse.
When
you convince all physicists that multivers exists, I will
On 5/15/2012 5:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi Stephen,
On 14 May 2012, at 19:16, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 5/14/2012 4:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 May 2012, at 23:19, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
Do you mean that when all chemists accept the multiverse
interpretation, they will start
On 13 May 2012, at 23:19, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 13.05.2012 15:09 Bruno Marchal said the following:
On 12 May 2012, at 14:59, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 12.05.2012 13:33 Bruno Marchal said the following:
Evgenii,
All this is well known. Copenhagen theory, or unique-universe
theory
are
On 5/14/2012 4:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 May 2012, at 23:19, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 13.05.2012 15:09 Bruno Marchal said the following:
On 12 May 2012, at 14:59, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 12.05.2012 13:33 Bruno Marchal said the following:
Evgenii,
All this is well known.
On 14.05.2012 10:29 Bruno Marchal said the following:
On 13 May 2012, at 23:19, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
...
Yet, I guess that even not all physicists believe in multiverse. When
you convince all physicists that multivers exists, I will start
thinking about it.
On reality, usually all humans
On 13.05.2012 04:38 meekerdb said the following:
On 5/12/2012 4:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Evgenii,
All this is well known. Copenhagen theory, or unique-universe theory
are non computationalist dualist theories.
Not all of them, at least not in the sense of dualist you mean. Adrian
Kent has
On 12 May 2012, at 14:59, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 12.05.2012 13:33 Bruno Marchal said the following:
Evgenii,
All this is well known. Copenhagen theory, or unique-universe
theory
are non computationalist dualist theories.
But as Shimony has shown, the idea that consciousness collapse the
On 13 May 2012, at 04:38, meekerdb wrote:
On 5/12/2012 4:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Evgenii,
All this is well known. Copenhagen theory, or unique-universe
theory are non computationalist dualist theories.
Not all of them, at least not in the sense of dualist you mean.
Adrian Kent has
On 13.05.2012 15:09 Bruno Marchal said the following:
On 12 May 2012, at 14:59, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 12.05.2012 13:33 Bruno Marchal said the following:
Evgenii,
All this is well known. Copenhagen theory, or unique-universe theory
are non computationalist dualist theories.
But as Shimony
On 12.05.2012 13:33 Bruno Marchal said the following:
Evgenii,
All this is well known. Copenhagen theory, or unique-universe theory
are non computationalist dualist theories.
But as Shimony has shown, the idea that consciousness collapse the wave
leads to many difficulties, like non local
On Sat, May 12, 2012 at 9:20 AM, scerir sce...@libero.it wrote:
A few quotes below to dualism from Max Velmans.
Evgenii
H. Kragh (Dirac: a Scientific Biography, Cambridge U.P., 1990) reports
a 1927 discussion between Dirac, Heisenberg and Born, about what
actually gives rise to the so
On 5/12/2012 10:19 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
On Sat, May 12, 2012 at 9:20 AM, scerir sce...@libero.it
mailto:sce...@libero.it wrote:
A few quotes below to dualism from Max Velmans.
Evgenii
H. Kragh (Dirac: a Scientific Biography, Cambridge U.P., 1990)
reports
a 1927
On Sat, May 12, 2012 at 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote:
On 5/12/2012 10:19 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
On Sat, May 12, 2012 at 9:20 AM, scerir sce...@libero.it wrote:
A few quotes below to dualism from Max Velmans.
Evgenii
H. Kragh (Dirac: a Scientific Biography,
On 5/12/2012 4:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Evgenii,
All this is well known. Copenhagen theory, or unique-universe theory are non
computationalist dualist theories.
Not all of them, at least not in the sense of dualist you mean. Adrian Kent has proposed
a one-universe theory which doesn't
Stephen:
2 corrections and a remark to my own text:
#1: I wrote: *are those laws' really so true, or only a (statistical)
deduction of data we so far happened to observe?*
I would add: ...and explained according to THAT level of knowldge...
#2: I really believ that Descartes 'invented' and
Hi Jason,
Interleaving...
On 8/29/2011 8:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Aug 29, 2011, at 12:00 AM, Stephen P. King
stephe...@charter.net wrote:
On 8/28/2011 11:06 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
Capillary action is not a violation of the laws of physics. What
about substance monism
On 8/29/2011 6:05 PM, John Mikes wrote:
Stephen and Jason,
interesting discours, but you use concepts that beg for my questioning.
Dualism may be an observation based on phenomena we misunderstand and
explain to the level of present theories. A violation of the laws of
physics asks: are those
Stephen and Jason,
interesting discours, but you use concepts that beg for my questioning.
Dualism may be an observation based on phenomena we misunderstand and
explain to the level of present theories. A violation of the laws of
physics asks: are those laws' really so true, or only a
On 8/28/2011 11:06 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
Capillary action is not a violation of the laws of physics. What
about substance monism precludes any life form from existing?
Also are you saying you are a substance dualist?
Hi,
Is 'substance dualism' the only form of dualism? Maybe you
So far the responses here have not been as hostile as I feared :)
--- On Sat, 2/7/09, Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com wrote:
are you open to the idea
that there might be truths about subjectivity (such as
truths about what philosophers call 'qualia') which
cannot be reduced to purely
Le 24-juin-05, à 22:43, Pete Carlton a écrit :
(Sorry for the delay; I like to spend several hours writing here but I
have had meetings to attend etc..)
On Jun 22, 2005, at 4:19 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
Bruno wrote
There are two *physical* issues here.
1) The simplest one is that if you
Le 22-juin-05, à 13:19, Brent Meeker a écrit :
-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, June 22, 2005 8:16 AM
To: Pete Carlton
Cc: EverythingList
Subject: Re: Dualism and the DA
Le 21-juin-05, à 21:21, Pete Carlton a écrit :
snip
Now
Le 22-juin-05, à 21:26, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
x-tad-biggerActually, it occurred to me lately that saying everything happens may be the same as the paradox of the set of all sets.
/x-tad-bigger
That is indeed close to may critics of Tegmark. But as you know logician have made progress in
(Sorry for the delay; I like to spend several hours writing here but I have had meetings to attend etc..)On Jun 22, 2005, at 4:19 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:There are two *physical* issues here.1) The simplest one is that if you agree with the comp indeterminacy(or similar) you get an explanation of
Le 21-juin-05, à 21:21, Pete Carlton a écrit :
I think the practical differences are large, as you say, but I
disagree that it points to a fundamental metaphysical difference. I
think what appears to be a metaphysical difference is just the
breakdown of our folk concept of I. Imagine a
-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, June 22, 2005 8:16 AM
To: Pete Carlton
Cc: EverythingList
Subject: Re: Dualism and the DA
Le 21-juin-05, à 21:21, Pete Carlton a écrit :
I think the practical differences are large, as you say, but I
Brent Meeker:
The fact that all these metaphysical problems and bizarre results are predictedby assuming *everything happens* implies to me that *everything happens* islikely false. I'm not sure what the best alternative is, but I like RolandOmnes view point that QM is a probabilistic theory and
On Jun 20, 2005, at 10:44 AM, Hal Finney wrote:Pete Carlton writes: snip-- we don't need to posit any kind of dualism to paper over it, we just have to revise our concept of "I". Hal Finney wrote:Copies seem a little more problematic. We're pretty cavalier aboutcreating and destroying them in
On Mon, Jun 20, 2005 at 12:01:48AM -0700, Jonathan Colvin wrote:
Russell Standish wrote:
(JC) If you want to insist that What would it be like to be a bat is
equivalent to the question What would the universe be like
if I had
been a bat rather than me?, it is very hard to see what
Le 19-juin-05, à 02:39, Jonathan Colvin a écrit :
I'm sure the one in Moscow will also answer that he feels really to be the
one in Moscow.
OK.
But what you haven't answered is in what way the universe is
any different under circumstance (A) than (B). This is because there is
surely *no*
Jonathan Colvin writes:
This is, I think, the crux of the reference class issue with the DA. My (and
your) reference class can not be merely conscious observers or all
humans, but must be something much closer to someone (or thing) discussing
or aware of the DA). I note that this reference
On Jun 17, 2005, at 10:17 PM, Russell Standish wrote:snipI still find it hard to understand this argument. The question "Whatis it like to be a bat?" still has meaning, but is probablyunanswerable (although Dennett, I notice considers it answerable,contra Nagel!)Dennett considers it answerable,
Pete Carlton writes:
I think the second question, where will I be in the next
duplication, is also meaningless. I think that if you know all the
3rd-person facts before you step into the duplicator - that there
will be two doubles made of you in two different places, and both
doubles
I have just waved my magic wand, and lo! Jonathan Colvin has been changed
body and mind into Russell Standish and placed in Sydney, while Russell
Standish has been changed into Jonathan Colvin and placed somewhere on the
coastal US. If anyone else covets a particular person's wealth or
-
From: Jonathan Colvin [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: 'Hal Finney' [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Friday, June 17, 2005 4:34 PM
Subject: RE: Dualism and the DA
Hal Finney wrote:
It's an interesting question as to how far we can comfortably
or meaningfully take counterfactuals
Le 17-juin-05, 19:44, Jonathan Colvin a crit :
Bruno wrote:
Note that the question why am I me and not my brother is
strictly equivalent with why am I the one in Washington and
not the one in Moscow after a WM duplication. It is strictly
unanswerable. Even a God could not give an adequate
Russell Standish wrote:
On What would it be like to have been born someone else, how
does this differ from What is it like to be a bat?
Presumably Jonathon Colvin would argue that this latter
question is meaningless, unless immaterial souls existed.
I still find it hard to understand this
Bruno wrote:
Note that the question why am I me and not my brother is strictly
equivalent with why am I the one in Washington and not the one in
Moscow after a WM duplication. It is strictly unanswerable. Even a
God could not give an adequate explanation (assuming c.).
(JC) Ok, does
Le Dimanche 19 Juin 2005 02:39, Jonathan Colvin a crit:
the dualism comes from reifying the 3rd
person independent universe, and if we accept only the 1st person as
real, there is no dualism. It is quite a metaphysical leap, though, to
discard the 3rd person universe. I'd like to know how to
Russell Standish wrote:
Well, actually I'd say the fist *is* identical to the hand.
At least,
my fist seems to be identical to my hand.
Even when the hand is open
Define fist. You don't seem to be talking about a thing,
but some
sort of Platonic form. That's an expressly
Jonathan Colvin writes:
In the process of writing this email, I did some googling, and it seems my
objection has been independantly discovered (some time ago). See
http://hanson.gmu.edu/nodoom.html
In particular, I note the following section, which seems to mirror my
argument rather
Note that the question why am I me and not my brother is strictly
equivalent with why am I the one in Washington and not the one in
Moscow after a WM duplication. It is strictly unanswerable. Even a God
could not give an adequate explanation (assuming c.).
Bruno
Le 16-juin-05, 23:02,
Ok, does that not imply that it is a meaningless question? If you want to
insist that this question is meaningful, I don't see how this is possible
without assuming a dualism of some sort (exactly which sort I'm trying to
figure out).
If the material universe is identical under situation (A) (I
Hal Finney wrote:
It's an interesting question as to how far we can comfortably
or meaningfully take counterfactuals. At some level it is
completely mundane to say things like, if I had taken a
different route to work today, I wouldn't have gotten caught
in that traffic jam. We aren't thrown
Hal Finney wrote:
Jonathan Colvin writes:
In the process of writing this email, I did some googling, and it
seems my objection has been independantly discovered (some
time ago).
See http://hanson.gmu.edu/nodoom.html
In particular, I note the following section, which seems to
mirror my
On Jun 17, 2005, at 10:24 AM, Hal Finney wrote:
Does it make sense for Jobs to say, who would I have been if that had
happened?
Yes, it makes sense, but only because we know that the phrase Who
would I have been, uttered by Steve Jobs, is just a convenient way
for expressing a
On What would it be like to have been born someone else, how does
this differ from What is it like to be a bat?
Presumably Jonathon Colvin would argue that this latter question is
meaningless, unless immaterial souls existed.
I still find it hard to understand this argument. The question What
is
On Wed, Jun 15, 2005 at 10:30:11PM -0700, Jonathan Colvin wrote:
Nope, I'm thinking of dualism as the mind (or consciousness) is separate
from the body. Ie. The mind is not identical to the body.
These two statements are not equivalent. You cannot say that the fist
is separate from the
Russell Standish wrote:
Nope, I'm thinking of dualism as the mind (or consciousness) is
separate from the body. Ie. The mind is not identical to the body.
These two statements are not equivalent. You cannot say that
the fist is separate from the hand. Yet the fist is not
identical to the
On Thu, Jun 16, 2005 at 01:02:11AM -0700, Jonathan Colvin wrote:
Russell Standish wrote:
Nope, I'm thinking of dualism as the mind (or consciousness) is
separate from the body. Ie. The mind is not identical to the body.
These two statements are not equivalent. You cannot say that
the
Dear Joanthan,
- Original Message -
From: Jonathan Colvin [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: 'Stephen Paul King' [EMAIL PROTECTED];
everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Thursday, June 16, 2005 1:14 AM
Subject: RE: Dualism and the DA
Stephen Paul King wrote:
Pardon the intrusion, but in your
Russell Standish wrote:
Nope, I'm thinking of dualism as the mind (or consciousness) is
separate from the body. Ie. The mind is not identical to
the body.
These two statements are not equivalent. You cannot say
that the fist
is separate from the hand. Yet the fist is not identical
Le Jeudi 16 Juin 2005 10:02, Jonathan Colvin a crit:
Switch the question. Why aren't you me (Jonathan Colvin)? I'm conscious
(feels like I am, anyway).
Hi Jonathan,
I think you do not see the real question, which can be formulated (using your
analogy) by :
Why (me as) Russell Standish is
Quentin wrote:
Switch the question. Why aren't you me (Jonathan Colvin)? I'm
conscious (feels like I am, anyway).
I think you do not see the real question, which can be
formulated (using your
analogy) by :
Why (me as) Russell Standish is Russell Standish rather
Jonathan Colvin ? I (as RS)
Dear Jonathan,
- Original Message -
From: Jonathan Colvin [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: 'Stephen Paul King' [EMAIL PROTECTED];
everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Thursday, June 16, 2005 9:15 PM
Subject: RE: Dualism
snip
[SPK]
The same kind of mutual constraint that exist between a
given
Dear Jonathan,
Pardon the intrusion, but in your opinion does every form of dualism
require that one side of the duality has properties and behaviors that are
not constrained by the other side of the duality, as examplified by the idea
of randomly emplaced souls?
The idea that all
Russel Standish wrote:
Since it is coming from Nick B., over-exhaustive :) I don't think
anybody, Nick included, has yet come up with a convincing way to
define appropriate reference classes. Absent this, the only way to
rescue the DA seems to be a sort of dualism (randomly
emplaced souls
Stephen Paul King wrote:
Pardon the intrusion, but in your opinion does every form
of dualism require that one side of the duality has properties
and behaviors that are not constrained by the other side of
the duality, as examplified by the idea of randomly emplaced souls?
The idea that
Russel Standish wrote:
It seems to me that to believe we are randomly emplaced
souls, whether
or not they existed elsewhere beforehand, is to perforce embrace a
species of dualism.
Exactly what species of dualism? Dualism usually means that
minds and brains are distinct orthogonal things,
At 15:38 16/01/04 -0500, Jesse Mazer wrote:
Is Chalmers really a dualist? Although he does label his views this way at
times, from his writings he does not seem to believe in matter per se,
rather he thinks the fundamental stuff of reality is likely to be
something like information which has
On 17 January 2004 Doug Porpora wrote:
*quote*
Norman and Bruno: I myself am not defending a dualist position (body +
soul, mind, whatever). I am prepared to say the body is the only substance
that exists. That does not mean its behavior is explainable in terms of
physics alone.
Yes, I
AM
Subject: RE: dualism
On 17 January 2004 Doug Porpora wrote:
*quote*
Norman and Bruno: I myself am not defending a dualist position (body +
soul, mind, whatever). I am prepared to say the body is the only
substance
that exists. That does not mean its behavior is explainable in terms
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