On 6/3/2019 4:21 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
my definition of Atheism as a belief that the Universe is grounded
in Mind, a rational force, most certainly includes 3ns. But does NOT
include any metaphysical external agent/Object - aka, God.
But if you gave that force some name, such as Mens,
Jon and Edwina,
Your debate depends entirely on the definition of God. There is
sufficient evidence that Peirce believed in a definition that was
within the broad range of what is called Christianity.
But it is also consistent with the broader range that encompasses
the fundamental beliefs of
On 5/29/2019 3:54 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
those who are adverse to theology might consider skipping
reading this post.
I am not averse to good theology, but I am strongly opposed to
attributing anything to Peirce that he did not explicitly write.
Anybody has a right to express their own
Jeff,
We agree. And thanks for citing the article about Riemann's hypothesis.
The only point I would ask: Please don't try to harmonize me -- i.e.,
put me in a mental straitjacket.
JBD
I've raised some questions about John Sowa's remarks about First
Order Predicate Logic being paradigmatic
I received an offline comment about harmonizing, which raises
some important issues.
Offline
I wonder if JAS picked up the "harmonizing" idea from Robert Brandom.
I don't see any such reference in his paper, but Brandom's work is
widely referenced by Peirceans. Although Brandom does not
Jon AS, Gary F, Edwina,
Peirce's classification of the sciences (1903 with refinements before
and after) has never been surpassed or even approximated by anyone
in the past century. I believe it's fundamental to understanding
many issues about science, engineering, philosophy, *and* religion.
Jon AS and Jerry LRC,
I changed the subject line to emphasize the danger of putting
anyone in a mental straitjacket by "harmonizing and synthesizing"
their writings, opinions, or way of life.
But first, I'll say that I enjoyed the following article by Jon:
"A Neglected Additament: Peirce on
Edwina and Gary R,
I endorse Edwina's caveats. Her examples are among the "puffy clouds"
that create ambiguities in any reasoning stated in ordinary language.
After half a century of using and inventing symbolic logics, Peirce
could keep the distinctions clear in his own mind, but any excerpt
On 5/20/2019 4:27 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
If each of my premisses is true, and the form of my argumentation
is valid --which it unquestionably is, as demonstrated below --
then the conclusion must also be true; i.e., my argumentation
is sound.
That is the most anti-Peircean dogma
Jon,
Anyone is welcome to claim that Satan (or anything else) is that
Object [of the semeiotic proof], but thereby accepts the burden
of making a case for it based on the attributes that such an Object
must have. I suspect that it would amount to nothing more than
equating the proper names
Gary F,
Thank you for a post that doesn't go off the "deep end" by attributing
arguments to Peirce that he never stated, implied, ot even hinted.
GF
any knowledge that any mind can have of God must consist of
predicates attributed to the real Subject we call “God” — which
name, says Peirce, is
On 5/18/2019 12:30 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
If someone wishes to claim that a particular statement is being
taken out of context, then that person has the burden of showing
that this is the case, not merely /asserting/ it.
Absolutely! That is an essential part of the methodeutic.
what I
On 5/18/2019 11:47 AM, Stephen Curtiss Rose wrote:
There is the All or the Infinite (Dodson) or God or any other
name for an inner light in each one of us which is connected to
the absolute. Anything else complexifies, or even worse, erects
a route by which enlightenment must be attained with
On 5/18/2019 10:48 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
On Peirce's account, if the Universe has /any effect at all/ on God,
then it /cannot/ be a Sign whose Object is God. Do you therefore deny
that the Universe is a Sign? Or do you view something other than God as
its Object? Or do you simply
Edwina and Jon,
ET
And again - all we are doing is quoting the same passages to each
other, and interpreting them in different ways. I suggest we allow
each other the 'grace' to do this - rather than insisting that one
or the other is 'right' - and the other is a 'misinterpretation.
Yes. The
On 5/15/2019 4:59 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
All I can say is to reiterate that this does not represent
Peirce's view: for him the rock /is/ the Object of the icon
whatever physio-psychologically is going on in the interpreter;
it is, in a word, a matter of logic not of psychology. To see
it
On 5/15/2019 3:45 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
AS: No, that answer is obviously /incorrect/, since every
Sign--including every Sinsign or Token--is determined by an Object
/other than itself/.
I do not see how Jon's conclusion can be avoided: /Every/ Sign /must/
have an Object /other than
Jon and Edwina,
JAS
Peirce wrote that "the Universe is a vast representamen", which
"is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs"
(CP 5.448n, EP 2:394; 1906).
That sounds to me like "the aggregate formed by a sign and all
the signs which its occurrence carries with it,"
On 5/12/2019 5:50 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
I made a case on-List that what Peirce described as "the perfect Sign"
in R 283 (partially published as EP 2:545n25; 1906) is the Universe.
If Peirce had meant that, it's likely that he would have said so.
The absence of such a statement is good
Jeff, Mike, and Jon,
Mathematics is diagrammatic reasoning, and EGs are a version of
logic that uses a more flexible and versatile system of diagrams
than Peirce's algebra of 1885 or any algebra since then.
But the diagrams are fundamental. Any words used to describe
the diagrams are useful
Jeff and Jon,
To clarify these issues, search CP for every occurrence of
"A gives B". Peirce states the issues in different ways,
but the following example illustrates the general principle:
A triad may be explicated into a triadic tetrad. Thus, A gives B
to C becomes A makes the covenant D
Jon,
That is important. Do you have a citation?
JAS
I recently came across some research suggesting that the manuscript
pages for Peirce's "tutorial" on EGs were misfiled with R 514, and
do not actually date to 1909; rather, he likely wrote the material
either shortly before or at the same
On 5/2/2019 11:09 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
I intend to explore further the analogy that he drew between this
and continuous semeiosis vs. definite Propositions, which amount to
instantaneous snapshots of Arguments as captured by EGs on a Sheet
of Assertion.
The continuous predicates have
On 5/1/2019 7:06 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
Peirce's fundamental hypotheses concerning the nature of time
and space--and the relations between them--may very well run
deeper and look further towards the future than what Einstein
had to offer.
To a large extent that is true. Peirce knew
On 4/18/2019 11:27 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Now, when we say that a flower /is /blue, I agree that we are not
claiming that a flower /is identical to/ blueness; instead, we are
saying that a flower /possesses the character of/ blueness. Likewise,
there is a sense in which we can say that a
Edwina,
I changed the subject line to emphasize fallibility. See below
for some quotations in which Peirce admits his own limitations.
Peirce would *never* say that any universal principle is the
absolutely final truth. But he did say that it's possible to
detect falsehood. One example is
Jeff, Edwina, and Gary R,
Peirce frequently said that he thinks in diagrams and that he has
considerable difficulty in translating his thoughts into words.
When Peirce or anybody else is doing diagrammatic reasoning, some
words may be helpful as explanations. But as soon as we are clear
about
Folks,
The clearest test for a genuine Thirdness is the presence of some
intentionality -- of some animate being or of some law of nature.
I like the examples Peirce cited in CP 1.366 below.
General principle: Intentionality by some animate agent is always
a genuine Thirdness. That agent may
Gary F and Jon AS,
GF
I’ve just been on a wild goose chase trying to check out Peirce’s
cryptic remarks about his choice of “blot” in L 376.
I checked Cora's etymological dictionaries. The one that traces
Greek roots to Indo-European doesn't mention φλἀω. Another says
that φλἀω is rare in
Gary F, Jon AS,
I know what Peirce wrote about efficiency. But I also know that
he was the author of "Logical Machines" (1887) and that he urged
Oscar Mitchell to consider electrical circuits as a more efficient
basis for designing logical machines. For those reasons, Peirce
has been called a
Jon AS, Gary F, and Jeff,
When we're talking about classical first-order logic, the semantics
of every precisely defined notation for the past 140 years has a
precisely defined mapping to and from every other version. On this
point, there are no controversial issues. The mapping is either
Gary F,
The introduction of the term “blot” for “the simplest part of speech
which this syntax contemplates” is especially interesting, as I’d never
seen it before (although he did use the term “blot” in 1903 to explain
why a cut should be read as negation).
The word 'blot' is a short name
Folks,
I have repeatedly said that Peirce's description of existential
graphs in 1909-1911 was his final preferred version.
I'm happy to report that he explicitly said so in a letter
to Risteen, MS L 376, December 6, 1911:
An account of [the syntax of existential graphs] was given in the
Jeff and Dan,
We have to distinguish "a priori" in a logical sense from "innate" in
a biological sense. Peirce interpreted the word 'innate' as learned
from the experience of previous generations. That may be a priori
for an individual, but it's a posteriori for the species.
JBD
It is worth
This morning, I remembered some case studies of people who were
blind from early childhood and later recovered their sight.
Those studies cast doubt on Kant's claim that people have a
complete innate theory of space and time. The brain may have
innate structure that facilitates learning about
Gary F, Jeff BD, Dan,
GF
could it be you’re thinking of Peirce’s “Logic of Quantity,”
1893 (CP 4.85-92)
Kant declares that the question of his great work is “How are
synthetical judgments a priori possible?” By a priori he means
universal; by synthetical, experiential (i.e., relating to
On 4/7/2019 1:59 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
As an example of an /a priori/ element in moral cognition, consider
the role of the /feeling/ of respect in deliberation about the what is
required as a matter of duty. As an example of an a priori element in
aesthetic judgment, consider the
Edwina and Jerry R,
ET
That's exactly my point - as you say: "Any ontology that is not
designed for some purpose or intention has no purpose"
Yes. Ontolog Forum (the source of original notes I was addressing)
has a very clear purpose: Represent knowledge about some subject
in a logical form
Pat C, Matthew, Phil M, and Jon A,
Basic issue: How do we determine whether two things that we
experience on different occasions (or that we describe in
different ways) are "the same"?
For example, suppose we describe something as a vase, and somebody
else describes it as a lump of clay. Are
Jon AS, Francesco, Gary R, Gary F, Jerry LRC, and List,
I haven't had time to respond to the recent notes, but I dug into
more of Peirce's writings. There is much more to say. But in
this note, I'll recommend an article Jon cited, and show how the
quotation cited by Francesco clarifies the
Jon AS and Gary R,
JAS: The new thread title is alarmist hyperbole.
GR: I strongly agree
My word 'danger' is mild compared to the vehement denunciation that
Peirce would pronounce if anybody would introduce a contradiction
in his system of semeiotic. Peirce-List should be alarmed.
Among
Edwina, Jon AS, Gary R, and List,
I apologize if anyone was offended by the release of excerpts from
offline notes. My only excuse is that I sent it at 2:10 AM. The
next morning, I was surprised that I had hit SEND.
The conclusion of that note is far more important than a debating
point. I
Jerry and Joe,
I'll say more about related issues in the thread on ambiguities.
But I just wanted to comment on these points:
JAS: you throw everything possible into the predicate, leaving only
an indicated subject; I throw everything possible into the subject,
leaving only a continuous
Jon and I had an offline exchange. He sent me a list of offline
comments by readers who were also misled by the ambiguity in the
word 'subject'. See the *anonymous* comments below.
A mistaken interpretation of just one word is not a big deal.
But Jon's claim that a subject could be a Seme
On 3/21/2019 5:58 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
JFS: No version of logic after syllogisms made a binary distinction
between subject and predicate.
That statement is false. According to my dictionary, a "subject"
is defined as "the term of a logical proposition that denotes the
entity of which
On 3/21/2019 11:59 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Natural languages are anything but precise, and as Peirce himself
affirmed, even in logic the dividing line between the subject and
predicate within any given proposition is somewhat arbitrary.
That statement is partly false, and rest is
On 3/20/2019 10:57 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Peirce did not say, "Every sentence in English contains a grammatical
subject and a grammatical predicate"; he said, "Every proposition
contains a Subject and a Predicate."
You're grasping at straws to salvage a lost cause.
The title of the
On 3/20/2019 11:37 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
I thought a Medad was (by definition) a graph with no loose ends.
NEM 3:164 (or p. 4 of eg1911.pdf) says
"A graph or graph instance having 0 peg is a Medad."
There are many places were Peirce says that a line of identity,
by itself asserts
On 3/17/2019 11:12 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
the apparent contradiction was between saying that a percept "does not
stand for anything" (1903) and saying that "a Percept is a Seme" (1906).
That contradiction is the result of claiming that a Seme is a subject.
As a First, a Seme is pure
Gary F, Francesco, and Jon AS,
The puzzle is solved. I thank all three of you for forcing me
to consider more passages by Peirce. They show how and why EGs
are the Bedrock that determines where the stones fit in the mosaic.
I took a fair amount of time to write this note because I plan
to
Francesco and Jerry LRC,
Thanks for both of your comments. They are critical for resolving
these issues.
FB
In R 295, a draft of the "Prolegomena", Peirce says:
CSP: The first member of the triplet, the “Seme,” embraces the
logical Term, the Subject or Object of a sentence, everything
of any
Gary F and Jon AS,
GF
Peirce’s classification of sciences is itself ambiguous...
Hence the significance of Peirce claiming that logicians will have
to study “the physiology of signs” simply because nobody else is
going to do it (R 499 as quoted by Bellucci). This complicates the
traditional
Gary F and Jon AS.
GF
As for [the disputes], rather than taking sides on the issue, I
prefer to attribute the dispute itself to the ambiguity of the
words “phenomenology” and “semeiotic.”
I agree. I'm writing a longer note that gets into some important
issues that André De Tienne raises his
Gary R, Jon AS, and Gary F,
Peirce's 1903 Outline Classification of the Sciences (CP 1.180 - 202)
is his last complete version. I used it as the specification for nearly
every solid and dotted line in the attached cspsci.png. I took into
account some of his earlier writings in order to
On 3/9/2019 3:24 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
After all, Peirce sometimes suggests that the quasi-equivalent to
pragmatism in 'ordinary' speech and thinking is critical-common
sense. And, indeed, pragmaticism itself would seem to depend on it.
I agree. Homo saps and their ancestors have existed
Gary R and Jon AS,
Two comments on your comments.
GR
I would deeply question your placing semeiotics below phaneroscopy
in such a diagram--applications of normative logic can occur in
any science save mathematics.
That's true. But all the data of *every* science comes from some
observation
On 3/5/2019 4:15 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
the newly transcribed Bedrock manuscript concerning the role
of subjects and predicates in the Bedrock as contrasted with
the Artificial Intelligent Interpretations of John Sowa.
There is much more to say about the Bedrock, but I just wanted
to
I came across a new web site at Harvard that is dedicated
to the Peirce papers and related issues:
https://library.harvard.edu/collections/charles-s-peirce-papers
You can explore the collections of "More than 100,000 pages of
working notes and drafts by the influential philosopher and
On 2/27/2019 12:32 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
I focused on representing Propositions, rather than the process
of reasoning; and then I decided accordingly to call the resulting
diagrams Propositional Graphs, rather than Modified Existential Graphs.
The notation for every version of logic from
On 2/26/2019 12:45 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Why should anyone /presuppose /that your analysis is somehow
/intrinsically /more accurate than mine?
They shouldn't presuppose anything. They can just look at the proof.
I showed that your interpretation of Peirce was inconsistent with
what he
On 2/26/2019 9:49 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
I am not /your /student, and we are /both /students of Peirce.
Yes. But you have a lot to learn about recognizing the precision
in Peirce's writings. If you prefer, I won't call you a student.
I'll call you a "loose thinker".
I am not willing
On 2/26/2019 7:34 AM, Stephen Curtiss Rose wrote:
"Because Peirce was very precise in what he wrote, and he had
no sympathy with people who misrepresented what he was saying."
That seems a mite broad.
Many people, including me, have found that in most publications,
even by prominent Peirce
On 2/25/2019 9:04 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Why not just accept the fact (as I have) that we are pursuing different
purposes, and therefore adopting different approaches accordingly? Why
insist that I /must /adhere to /your /analysis of propositions and /your
/preference for unmodified EGs?
On 2/20/2019 12:40 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
As Gary F. already pointed out, only when someone insists on
interpreting them as if they were /ordinary /EGs
Yes. I acknowledged that. I suggest that you convert MEGs
to conventional EGs by using the triad Rel.
Please *study* my last two
On 2/20/2019 12:22 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
GF: I can’t find any trace of /phaneroscopic/ observation in that
presentation, at the conclusion or anywhere else. What I see throughout
is /observation of diagrams/ as a key element of formal or deductive logic,
Yes. That was not the focus
On 2/20/2019 9:20 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
What you’ve said about Jon’s MEGs, though, is true only if we read the
lines in those diagrams as Lines of Identity; and the main modification
Jon made was to read the lines NOT as Lines of Identity but as Lines of
Relation.
I agree. But it
Edwina, Gary R, and Jon AS,
Finally, this thread has reached the dénoument, when the pieces
fall into place and the mysterious knots are untied.
Every so-called Modified EG (MEG) is false. The file brutus.png
shows how to replace MEGs with ordinary EGs that satisfy all of
Peirce's criteria.
On 2/14/2019 11:59 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
So far I think, that the sheet of assertion means to symbolize a
universe with clear true/false rules. But what, if every subject
(at least, if the subjects are organisms) has its own universe
(speaking with Uexküll and the constructivists)?
I'm
I started to reply to some of the issues in recent notes. And I
realized that some examples would help clarify the many issues about
continuity and semiosis.
For the first example, see the attached diagram frere2.gif. At
the top is traditional notation for one bar of music. That diagram
On 2/2/2019 8:16 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Peirce did not introduce the concept of the Continuous Predicate until
1908, so anything that he wrote about Propositions prior to that
reflects a different analysis--presumably the same one adopted in modern
predicate logic, which you continue to
Jon AS, list
I changed the subject line to emphasize the conclusion.
To see the evolution of Peirce's ideas, look at the chronological
developments. In 1903, Peirce defined the word 'seme' in a way
that is inconsistent with what he wrote in 1906:
An Index or Seme is a Representamen whose
Stephen and Jon,
SCR
I have longed for some sense that there could be conversation
that recognizes the efforts of persons like me who have labored
considerably to create a more general and universal understanding
that will resonate with ordinary readers.
I agree that those issues are far more
Jon AS,
I suppose that I could invent my own word, but that would
violate Peirce's ethics of terminology in the other direction,
since he already created a suitable one--which happens to have
the advantage of being the root of "semiosis" and "sem(e)iotic."
In his article on the ethics of
On 1/29/2019 8:49 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
my view is that Peirce's analytic framework is logical, rational
and yes, extremely simple, even basic, in its pragmatic workability
to explain the cognitive, biological and physico-chemical realms.
Insisting on 'this term' and not 'that term' moves
I received an offline note from an author who has written books
and papers about issues related to the recent discussions.
On the neglect of Peirce's writings by modern philosophers,
the author wrote:
You're certainly right. The reason is probably Peirce's forbidding
terminology and the serious
Helmut and Jon,
HR
But what is an *argument" with the "is" used for identity,
like "is and only is", or "exactly is"?
I agree that more detail is required for a definition of 'argument'.
Every argument includes a sequence of propositions, but an arbitrary
sequence of propositions is not an
Jon AS,
In modern predicate logic, is the variable a predicate, a proposition,
or an argument (in Peirce's sense)? Clearly none of these, so either
a fourth division is required or the first one must be widened.
Every sentence in every version of logic, formal or informal,
consists of
On 1/27/2019 12:36 AM, Gary Richmond wrote:
I might quibble with the language "/pure/ index"--is there such a thing?
I support the quibble. Just look at any index, such as a weather vane.
It has an arrow that points in the direction of the wind.
And that arrow resembles (is an icon of) the
Jon AS,
the subject matter here is not limited to logic as the science
of Symbols--it is semeiotic as the science of all Signs.
In the quotations below, logic is "another name for semiotic."
All theories, including every version of logic and semiotic, are
stated in symbols, but symbols can be
Edwina and Jon AS,
I think that this transformative semiosis is what should be emphasized,
since its infrastructure is a powerful speculative framework, which can
be used with great effect in examining and explaining not only
linguistic evolution and cognitive processes but also biological
I came across a diagram that shows the patterns of references
to various philosophers in publications from 1950 to the present:
https://homepage.univie.ac.at/noichlm94/img/struct_phil_iii/full_struct.pdf
See below for a description of how that diagram was derived.
Most of the references are to
Jon AS and Jerry LRC,
JAS
I see the difference between a Rheme and a Seme (now a Term)...
Peirce mentioned the word 'term' only in the first sentence
of CP 4.538. I suspect that he used that word because most
of his readers were familiar with syllogisms.
But today, predicate calculus is the
Jon AS,
after introducing Seme/Pheme/Delome in 1906, did Peirce ever use
term/proposition/argument when referring to non-Symbols? What
about when referring to Existential Graphs?
CP 4.538 (copied below) is from a 1906 Monist article about EGs.
That paragraph and a few after it seem to be the
Jon AS and Jerry LRC,
JAS
A familiar logical triplet is Term, Proposition, Argument. In order
to make this a division of all signs, the first two members have
to be much widened. (CP 4.538; 1906)
If term and proposition were likewise synonymous with Seme and Pheme,
respectively, then why did
Jerry LRC and Jon AS,
JLRC
I will stick with term, proposition and argument for general usage.
The stretch of meaning to geometric terms with deep importance in
mathematics is not, in my view warranted.
I agree.
Peirce was very familiar with Cantor's writings and related issues
in 19th c.
On 1/14/2019 10:27 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Perhaps that is why John Sowa found the terminology of "continuous
semiosis" objectionable, despite his acceptance of "the continuity
of semiosis."
Actually, my only objection to the term 'continuous semiosis' is
that it's redundant. If the
Edwina,
I agree with the points in your notes this morning:
the 'material parts' of a Sign are its existence in space and time;
a Sign, that triad, whether functioning as an insect or the word for
that insect - is 'material' in that it exists in space and time.
I think that the two phrases in
Jerry R and Jeff BD,
I would never stop anybody from discussing anything they wish.
But Peirce objected to people who took his words ('pragmatism', for
example) and used them in ways that were inconsistent with the way
he defined them.
JR
Correct me if I’m wrong, but isn’t semiosis a greek
Folks,
The discussion in this thread suggests the following points:
1. Peirce used the terms 'continuous' and 'semiosis', but there
is no evidence that he used the terms 'continuous semiosis' or
'continuity of semiosis'.
2. Since Peirce said that anything continuous must have
Edwina and Gary R,
ET
I don't see the term 'continuous semiosis' to mean the history
of that chair and its uses.
I just cited Whitehead's example to show how he related an abstract
discussion to a familiar example. I was just asking for any kind
of example.
ET
our universe is continuously
On 1/12/2019 1:36 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
To actually discern individuals, we have to move into the 'hic et nunc'
of 'now-time' - which deliberately isolates itself from any continuity.
I was asking for an example that could involve a range of individuals
or it could be some individual over
Can anyone give an example of continuous semiosis in language
or reasoning?
I searched for all occurrences of 'continuous' in CP and EP2.
None of those occurrences were applied to the word 'semiosis'.
I also searched for all occurrences of 'semiosis', and none of them
occurred in the same
Stephen,
That list of titles sounded intriguing. I didn't have time to watch
all of them, but the first was enough to make me worry about having
a happy new year:
Propaganda & Art: How we process information when we aren't thinking
But I recommend it anyway:
On 12/18/2018 12:35 PM, Stephen Curtiss Rose wrote:
Henceforth I will try to confine this to topics explicitly given
a subject line Triadic Philosophy.
That's good.
My only point is that there are two distinct questions, and
it's important to be clear about which one is being discussed:
1.
On 12/18/2018 7:04 AM, Stephen Curtiss Rose wrote:
[JFS] A monad P says "This chunk of experience is a P."
A dyad R says "This chunk is related to that chunk by R."
A triad M says "The mediator M relates this chunk to that chunk."
I would suggest:
A monad is stands on its own, a subject,
On 12/17/2018 4:30 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
Possibly what I’m saying here is not much different from what you meant,
Yes. We mostly agree on the issues with some variations in terminology.
When I said "The categories of 1ns, 2ns, 3ns are ways of classifying
experiences in the
Gary F, Edwina, Jon AS
GF
My suggestion is that Peirce’s three categories or “elements” can be
regarded as elements of Aristotelian Form: Quality is the Firstness
of Form, Actuality is the Secondness of Form, and Growth is the
Thirdness of Form. As for Aristotelian Matter, it is simply
In discussing quasimind, it's important to consider Aristotle's
hierarchy of psyches in _De Anima_. Since Peirce was familiar with
Aristotle, that hierarchy may have had some influence on his views:
1. Vegetative psyche of plants.
2. Sensitive psyche of sessile animals like sponges and
.
The references include some introductory and some more advanced
articles. Most of them have URLs.
John
__
Diagrammatic Reasoning With EGs and EGIF
John F. Sowa
Abstract. Diagrammatic reasoning dominated mathematics until
On 11/2/2018 10:45 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
JFS: I challenge anybody to find an example for which rheme and
dicisign have a more general meaning than predicate and proposition.
I provided one already--a rheme can be (and often is) a subject,
rather than a predicate; and at the limit of
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