This is from the net somewhere (I forget). Many process philosophers, following the lead of David Ray Griffin, refer to their own work as “constructive postmodernism” in order to differentiate it from the deconstruction program of Jacques Derrida, Jean-François Lyotard, Michel Foucault, and others. The latter movements seek to dismantle the notions of system, self, God, purpose, meaning, reality, and truth in order to prevent, among other things, oppressive totalities and hegemonic narratives that arose in the Modern period. Constructive postmodernism, on the other hand, seeks emancipation from the negative aspects of modernity through revision rather than elimination. Constructive postmodernism seeks to revise and re-synthesize the insights and positive features of Modernity into a post-anthropocentric, post-individualistic, post-materialist, post- nationalist, post-patriarchal, and post-consumerist worldview. For example, modernity’s worship of scientific achievement, combined with lingering Aristotelian doctrines of substance and efficient causation may have led to a mechanistic materialist worldview. Deconstructive postmodernism would combat this worldview by undermining the efficacy of science, claiming that all observational statements are actually about our own culturally-constituted conceptual scheme, not about an independently real world. Constructive postmodernism seeks instead to leave natural science intact, because empirical observation itself produces evidence against mechanism and materialism when it takes in a sufficiently broad data set (that is, all of human experience, and not just experience of “physical” objects).
My own interest in process philosophy came because I can't stand fundamentalist metaphysics, including attempts to do away with it altogether (logical positivism), but really can't stand simple grand narratives foisted on us first as kids and later through culture and media. I'm as sure as I can be that we have never been modern and don't live in any 'after-world' of this. Incredulity towards metanarratives always seems to come in language that supports/creates/ sustains a myriad of hidden grand-narratives.in a manufactured silence (perhaps as Skype transmits 'nothing' in packets). Something of Whitehead's 'experiments are occasions of experience' seems to remain in Deutsch's constructor theory. In some way I want to reject skill with words - yet think of recent experiments that have created 'negative Kelvin' and the negative temperatures being higher than absolute zero - and one knows this is impossible. Yet I doubt elaboration in such is anything like the control frauds of most religion and economics. On 4 Jan, 09:05, "Stephen P. King" <stephe...@charter.net> wrote: > On 1/3/2013 6:35 PM, nominal9 wrote: > > > Hello Stephen, > > I'm sorry to be so late in replying, but with the holidays and also > > with trying to delve a bit deeper into process philosophy wanted to > > wait until; I had soemthing with sense to say. > > Hi! > > Its OK, I have been a bit distracted and busy as well. > > > First, let me say at the > > outset that I've noticed some Process "folks" agree to the distinction > > between, Physicality and mind but they don't think the physicality is > > restricted to unmoving or shall we say.... confined substance (I > > think, I ask if you agree). > > I define the physical in a straightforward way: that which can be > measured and witnessed to exist physically. We can split hairs on this > later. ;-) > > > I have no problem at all with this... as > > long as the "physicality" / mind distinction is maintaned in some > > manner, I agree with that. > > Are you familiar with Descartes' failed substance dualism ontology? > It failed for two reasons: it assumed that mind and body are substances > and it ignored the question: How do minds interact with each other. I > found a partial solution to those two failures. This discussion leads to > that proposal. > > > That leads me to my second overall > > observation . That is, even inside Process Philosophy you appear to > > get those who follow various "bents" that I call Idealist or Realist > > or Phenomenological or Nominalist. > > Yeah, there are always spectra of adherents to/of a point of view, > seems natural. > > > I still have to read Hole argument and Prigonine, so I'm still in the > > dark but maybe you can expalin to me (scientifically ignorant in large > > part, as I am) how quantum mechanics makes or allows stuff to > > vanish?... > > The Hole argument shows the implausibility of the idea that there > is a difference that can be known between the perception that the > physical world is actually in a singleton state or in a superposition of > almost identical states states, but from an argument that does not have > anything to do with quantum physics per se. It has to do with Leibniz > equivalence. > Seehttp://www.oliverpooley.org/uploads/7/7/5/9/7759400/handout5.pdffor > detail > orhttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spacetime-holearg/Leibniz_Equivalen... > for the more laymanish explanation. > > > Let me ask my question this way... is the "disappeared > > stuff" or component that Quantum Mechanics accounts for but can"t > > "see"....definitely absent or NOT there at all ? > > Slow down a bit, I think I understand your question, but let me be > sure. The 'disappeared stuff', is it something that was there and now is > not there"? QM describes quantities that have no physical realizable > aspect in the ordinary sense of a thing that you might hold in your > hand, but the world is full of 'stuff' that we cannot perceive directly; > it does not make that stuff 'invisible' or different, no? > QM demands that we do not assume a preference of a descriptive mode > of observation, no "privileged point of view" in the sense of a precise > description of the state of affairs of our world that can be known by a > finite physical entity. Relativity does the same thing, but is a > different way. Both theories together tell us that there is no such > thing as a privileged observer nor that that observer might perceive if > it actually existed. This was implications on realism. The first puts > limits on men, the second puts limits on 'gods' and daemons. ;-) > > > or is it > > "disappeared" because, at our current stage of knowledge we lack the > > "sense" instrument to be able to show the "disappeared" stuff to us... > > Sorta, yeah, but how far before sufficiently advanced technology of > "state of knowledge" is indistinguishable from magic? There reaches a > point where our theories themselves are subject to rules... Logic! > > > The analogy I make is to the notion of telescopes and especially > > microscopes... before they were developed, human knowledge had no idea > > of germs... or atoms... etc.Is there a chance, even way out there in > > advanced knowledge that the disappeared will appear to those who've > > made the right sense tools... or genetically evolved them... > > OK. But did this change in anyway the 'true nature' of the world? > > > HAR....In > > other words, is the Process part of quantum mechanics (or other > > topics) just an explanation of theory.. > > No, there is process built into it. The unitary evolution of the > wave function (or mathematical equivalent) is an irreducible process in > QM. The only thing that corresponds to it in everyday experience is the > flow of events that one is conscious of, after we abstract away the > parts that are self-referential. Think of how the world might appear to > the simplest life form... Could it be conscious at a very simple level? > It is hard to think of this, we are so habituated to think in > self-referential terms... > > > or is it an established > > "observable" that will not evewr sustain any categorization as > > substance (even as force) whatsover... never ever...? > > It had better not or one would be peddling a load of mysterianism > <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_mysterianism> or worse! > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Dec 28 2012, 1:49 pm, "Stephen P. King" <stephe...@charter.net> > > wrote: > >> On 12/28/2012 12:10 PM, nominal9 wrote: > > >>> Thanks for your reply, Stephen.... Process Philosophy is something new > >>> (as such) to me... so I looked it up in a pretty good Philosophical > >>> encyclopedia....Does the article below do it ("Process Philosophy") > >>> justice, more or less? > >> Hi N9, > > >> OK to shorten your handle? Yes, the article > >> @http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/process-philosophy/isgreat, hitting > >> all the notes requires for at least an introduction. > > >>>http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/process-philosophy/ > >>> The "founding" notion seems to be that Process is diverse from > >>> Substance, as a principle of order or organization.... > >> Right. You might also wish to read the article (by the same people) > >> on Substance:http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/ > > >>> Very naively on my part.....I ask....and challenge....In seeking to > >>> supplant "Substance" with Process... what happens to all that the > >>> "Substance" folks... thinkers and scientists... have discovered and > >>> learned... about... Physical Matter and .. Thought... ? > >> What forced me to P.P. is the Hole argument of General > >> Relativity:http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spacetime-holearg/Itargues in > >> powerful ways against the notion of substance as ontologically > >> primitive. If space-time itself cannot be consistently defined as a > >> substance and the "stuffness" of my desk vanishes when I examine it > >> closely enough, as we learn from Quantum Mechanics, what is the point to > >> the very idea of a ontologically primitive substance? What does > >> "substance" do, other than act as a "bearer of properties" that some how > >> binds those properties together? Is there a better way of doing ontology > >> that allows an epistemology to be constructed that "makes sense" given > >> what our amazingly accurate physics theories tell us? > > >>> Is all that "stuff" useless and for naught?... I mean, I guess, what > >>> do the Processists replace each and every bit of that "learned" stuff > >>> with? > >> Processes generates "products": relatively invariant patterns of > >> relations. Ever read any Prigogine or any articles on dissipative > >> structures? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ilya_Prigogine > > >>> But, I will look more into it... read the abstract you gave and try to > >>> respond better to your replies, Stephen... At first blush, looking at > >>> the Stanford Encyclopedia article above... it looks to me like Process > >>> Philosophy has much in common (as method, at least) with what > >>> phenomenologists like to do... "Bracketing" > >> Right. Bracketing is a good way of looking at this as it allows for > >> the explicit reference to context, boundary and constraints. One reason > >> I like it is that it helps avoid tacit assumptions of omniscience. > > >>>http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/ > >>> Personally... I don't much care for phenomenology....just saying... I > >>> think it is too "internal" and cerebrally based... doesn't really look > >>> at the external "thing" (physical thing especially) under examination > >>> for its own explanations of itself (i.e., not "empirical" or inductive > >>> [GOOD IMO] but instead abstractly "logical" and deductive[BAD IMO]) > >> Yes, I agree. > > -- > Onward! > > Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Epistemology" group. To post to this group, send email to epistemology@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to epistemology+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/epistemology?hl=en.
