Thanks for your reply, Stephen.... Process Philosophy is something new (as
such) to me... so I looked it up in a pretty good Philosophical
encyclopedia....Does the article below do it ("Process Philosophy")
justice, more or less?
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/process-philosophy/
The "founding" notion seems to be that Process is diverse from Substance,
as a principle of order or organization....
Very naively on my part.....I ask....and challenge....In seeking to
supplant "Substance" with Process... what happens to all that the
"Substance" folks... thinkers and scientists... have discovered and
learned... about... Physical Matter and .. Thought... ?
Is all that "stuff" useless and for naught?... I mean, I guess, what do the
Processists replace each and every bit of that "learned" stuff with?
But, I will look more into it... read the abstract you gave and try to
respond better to your replies, Stephen... At first blush, looking at the
Stanford Encyclopedia article above... it looks to me like Process
Philosophy has much in common (as method, at least) with what
phenomenologists like to do... "Bracketing"
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/
Personally... I don't much care for phenomenology....just saying... I think
it is too "internal" and cerebrally based... doesn't really look at the
external "thing" (physical thing especially) under examination for its own
explanations of itself (i.e., not "empirical" or inductive [GOOD IMO] but
instead abstractly "logical" and deductive[BAD IMO])
On Thursday, December 27, 2012 6:58:31 PM UTC-5, stephenk wrote:
>
> On 12/27/2012 12:59 PM, nominal9 wrote:
>
> Antiplatonist, Stephen?.... Well that begs the question... how much so
> (are you different from Plato)? Consider that "if" a Platonist maintains a
> Subjective view of Concepts and a Subjective view of References, then you
> could be antiplatonist either in the whole (Realist) or in part, halfway in
> two directions (Nominalist or Phenomenologist)... it's just the range of
> possibilities in my way of looking at it....
>
> Platonist ...................................................Realist
> Concept (Subjective) / Reference (Subjective)---Concept (Objective) /
> Reference (Objective)
>
> Nominalist.................................................Phenomenologist
> Concept (Subjective) / Reference (Objective)-----Concept (Objective) /
> Reference (Subjective)
>
> I don't want to get bothersome with this, but what and how is it that you
> don't like about the Platonist view
>
>
> Hi nominal9,
>
> The entire idea of a priori definiteness of properties and the
> corresponding tacit idea that consciousness is passive; that the content of
> our consciousness is merely poured into us, metaphorically speaking. OTOH,
> the sins of the nominalists are too many to count... Present company
> excluded...
>
> Process Philosophy tells us that there are no fundamental objects, all
> is process or product of process, this answers the dichotomy between
> universalism and nominalism - showing it to be false, so why bother with
> it? Unless we wish to dive into the depths of semantics...
>
> and how it regards this whole question brought up by Henri Bergson...
> does it have to do with the notion of "Spirit"?
>
>
> I have not quite grasped Bergson's point. I see the spirit as
> something corresponding to potential energy for mind... if it is even a
> necessary concept.
>
> Let me start it this way.. how and what would you consider or define
> "Spirit" to be... a Concept(idea) or a Reference(Matter)?.... and next
> would you consider "Spirit" to be Subjective or Objective?... harder
> yet... what do you think Bergson says "Spirit" is and do you agree or
> disagree with him?
>
>
> I say: Start over. Are we trying to rehabilitate Bergson or addressing
> the problem that he was trying to solve? I like this rehabilitation of
> Cartesian dualism <http://boole.stanford.edu/pub/ratmech.pdf>, viewed
> from the p.o.v. of process philosophy. My initial comment was that I
> thought Bergson had the directions "spirit" coming from the past, where
> Pratt (in the refereed paper) shows how it looks back on the past. A tiny
> but important difference, but I don't wish to spit hairs...
>
>
> On Saturday, December 22, 2012 1:05:35 PM UTC-5, stephenk wrote:
>>
>> On 12/22/2012 11:37 AM, nominal9 wrote:
>>
>> I read your post Craig.... I'm still trying to "unfold" it in my
>> thinking.....
>> Happy Holidays, in any event, for now....
>> I will try to get back to answer more fully to your post, but... let me
>> think about it... Maybe, to help me better understand you, could you
>> self-identify your points as being consistent (more or less) with other
>> known writers or philosophers, including some branch thereof like
>> Phenomenologists, Idealist, Realist, Nominalist... or other?
>>
>>
>> Antiplatonists? ;-)
>>
>> Happy Holidays to you too, stephen....
>>
>>
>> Happy Holidays to you as well.
>>
>>
>> On Friday, December 21, 2012 1:28:07 AM UTC-5, stephenk wrote:
>>>
>>> On 12/20/2012 12:50 PM, nominal9 <nom...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>>> > *Matter and Memory*
>>> > >From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
>>> > Jump to: navigation
>>> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matter_and_Memory#mw-head><http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matter_and_Memory#mw-head>
>>> ,
>>> > search
>>> > <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matter_and_Memory#p-search><http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matter_and_Memory#p-search>
>>> >��
>>> > The spirit is the abode of the past, the body
>>> > of the present; the soul or spirit always anchored in the past, not
>>> > residing in the present; lodged in the past and contemplating the
>>> present.
>>> > To have or take conscience of anything, means looking at it from the
>>> > viewpoint of the past, in light of the past.
>>>
>>> Hi nominal9,
>>>
>>> ��� Doesn't this seem backward somehow? Spirit should be
>>> considered to be in the future, looking back through the present to the
>>> Past, making sure that the body never behaves now in a way that is
>>> inconsistent with its past behavior.
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
> --
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
>
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