> Interesting bit from what appears to be the original draft charter, > circulated at the DKIM BOF, November 2005: > > > The DKIM working group will produce specifications > > that permit authentication of message headers during transit,
DKIM signature headers have effectively become a type of logging, used for troubleshooting multiple things that ultimately relate to how the message was perceived during transit. Being able to troubleshoot transit issues surely has a reasonable requirement to be able to access information like signatures and headers post transit, and I don't think the fact that this bit of the charter necessarily contradicts that. How would "during transit" imply that header information should be removed/deleted/handled post-transit in a certain way different from today, especially given the common use case of using it to troubleshoot what happened during transit? I don't see an incompatibility here; it feels like a stretch to me. That the charter said "during transit" is a perfectly fine and accurate response that misses the point slightly -- that other folks did and do see the value of post-transit use of DKIM, and that there is significant usage of it in this way today, and to me, it seems unreasonable to wholly discount that. Perhaps the documentation doesn't align with common usage. Point granted, but simply holding up a sign that says that and implying that this thus solves some level of the problem doesn't seem right to me. There'd be an awful lot of existing, current usage to unwind there to get back to your desired square one, and I'd argue that there's value and utility to lose by doing so. Cheers, Al Iverson -- Al Iverson / Deliverability blogging at www.spamresource.com Subscribe to the weekly newsletter at wombatmail.com/sr.cgi DNS Tools at xnnd.com / (312) 725-0130 / Chicago (Central Time) _______________________________________________ Ietf-dkim mailing list Ietf-dkim@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-dkim
