Edwina, List: ET: They [the categories] are universal in that their actions don't change according to the time, place and what is being organized/formed by these categories.
Peirce's categories do not perform "actions" by which they "organize/form" anything. ET: 1ns is always that burst of sensation; that unanalyzed experience of qualities. 2ns always includes differentiation of 'this' from 'that'. 3ns includes commonalities of laws. Such narrow and rigid definitions are antithetical to Peirce's multifaceted deployment of his categories in a variety of contexts. Moreover, 1ns is *never* "sensation" or "experience"; it is qualitative possibility *in itself*, not embodied in anything. ET: Of course, the categories do not 'exist' per se, but are explanations of how matter is organized. That is not what Peirce's categories are, either. They are the irreducible elements of whatever could be present to the mind. ET: Nothing functions in isolation. Indeed, but Peirce's categories are what we discover by *analyzing *whatever could be present to the mind such that we *prescind *1ns from 2ns and 3ns, and 2ns from 3ns. ET: I have no problem - and perhaps I am deluding myself- with understanding 1ns as the 'instantaneous present'. An example would be the sensation of touching the hot stove ... There is nothing *instantaneous *about the sensation of touching a hot stove. It takes time for heat to transfer from the stove to one's finger. It takes time for that heat to cause damage to the skin. It takes time for the nerve endings in the skin to detect this damage. It takes time for the resulting nerve impulses to make their way to the brain. It takes time for the brain to process them and generate the sensation of pain. That sensation itself is 2ns, not 1ns. The *quality *of the pain, prescinded from any *actual *sensation of it, is 1ns. Rather than instantaneous, it is *timeless*. ET: [By the way, I don't consider the ordinality of First, Second, Third to refer to the categories]. Why not? Peirce did, in certain contexts. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Mar 9, 2021 at 1:10 PM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > Mike, list > > I think we are talking past each other and possibly saying the same thing. > > Let's see....how to phrase it. > > In my view, the categories are 'universal' in that they apply to all > of the universe. They are universal in that their actions don't change > according to the time, place and what is being organized /formed by these > categories. 1ns is always that burst of sensation; that unanalyzed > experience of qualities. 2ns always includes differentiation of 'this' from > 'that'. 3ns includes commonalities of laws. > > Of course, the categories do not 'exist' per se, but are explanations of > how matter is organized. In this sense - the category of 1ns is > 'contextual' in that it refers to how, for example, a cell in interaction > with another cell functions as an 'explosive burst of unanalyzed data'. If > we refer to it in the mode of 2ns, this same cell's data burst would > function as a differential force between it and another cell. If we refer > to it in the mode of 3ns, the interaction would be one of sing that data > burst to find commonality between the two cells. > > My reason for pointing out that 1ns is expressed within an interaction > [which suggest 2ns] - is that I consider that no sign [the triad] functions > in isolation. Nothing functions in isolation. The difference between 1ns > and 2ns interaction is that, in 2ns, the two entities are 'aware' [and this > does not mean intellectual consciousness] enough to have moved into a > reaction. So, in 1ns, the cell provides an explosive burst of data. In 2ns, > this data is reacted to..again, not necessarily consciously or > intellectually. A windmill reacting to the wind is in a mode of 2ns. ..with > the wind as a burst of energy/1ns. > > Now - is this what you mean by 'contextual'? I'd agree with the > 'enumeration of tests' to recognize the mode.. > > I'd agree with the Big Bang emergence - as outlined [1.412] by Peirce, > which seems to be 1ns then the differentiation of 2ns and then, the > acknowledgment of commonalities and the development of shared habits of > organization. And yes, the components of the proto-sign would be before > matter, with matter understood as at first operative within 2ns. > > I have no problem - and perhaps I am deluding myself- with understanding > 1ns as the 'instantaneous present'. An example would be the sensation of > touching the hot stove [I admit I've just baked a rhubarb crumble and have > that experience]...but it is an experience of pure sensation without > consciousness of 'what' it is. Firstness in this sense is an informational > explosion but without any sense of differentiation between cause and > result; no sense of 'me' vs 'other; no awareness of specifics...and I'd bet > that a fair amount of entropic dissipation of data occurs before the > interaction moves into 2ns [and consciousness] of 'ouch' and..into 3ns > and the conclusion that this 'ouch' resulted from that hot baking pan. > > [By the way, I don't consider the ordinality of First, Second, Third to > refer to the categories]. > > Again, I think we are saying the same thing...not sure... > > Edwina >
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