Re: Free Will Universe Model - James Tagg

2014-05-18 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 18 May 2014, at 21:37, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Sunday, May 18, 2014 1:56:48 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 18 May 2014, at 17:43, Craig Weinberg wrote:

Free Will Universe Model: Non-computability and its relationship to  
the ‘hardware’ of our Universe


I saw his poster presentation at the TSC conference in Tucson and  
thought it was pretty impressive. I'm not qualified to comment on  
the math, but I don't see any obvious problems with his general  
approach:


http://jamestagg.com/2014/04/26/free-will-universe-paper-text-pdf/

Some highlights:


Some Diophantine equations are easily solved
automatically, for example:
∃𝑥, ∃𝑦 𝑥² = 𝑦² , 𝑥 & 𝑦 ∈ ℤ
Any pair of integers will do, and a computer programmed
to step through all the possible solutions will find one
immediately at ‘1,1’. An analytical tool such as Mathematica,
Mathcad or Maple would also immediately give symbolic
solutions to this problem therefore these can be solved
mechanically. But, Hilbert did not ask if ‘some’ equations
could be solved, he asked if there was a general way to solve
any Diophantine equation.

...
Consequence
In 1995 Andrew Wiles – who had been secretly working on
Fermat’s ‘arbitrary equation’ since age eight – announced he
had found a proof. We now had the answers to both of our
questions: Fermat’s last theorem is provable (therefore
obviously decidable) and no algorithm could have found this
proof. This leads to a question; If no algorithm can have
found the proof what thought process did Wiles use to answer
the question: Put another way, Andrew Wiles can not be a
computer.

Also, he is the inventor of the LCD touchscreen, so that gives him  
some credibility as well.


http://www.trustedreviews.com/news/i-never-expected-them-to-take-off-says-inventor-of-the-touchscreen-display


You will not convince Andrew Wiles or anyone with argument like that.

1) it is an open question if the use of non elementary means can be  
eliminated from Wiles proof. Usually non elementary means are  
eliminated after some time in Number theory, and there are  
conjectures that this could be a case of general law.

2) machine can use non elementary means in searching proofs too.

Does computationalism necessarily include all that is done by what  
we consider machines,


Only digital machines.



or does computationalism have to be grounded, by definition, in  
elementary means?


It does not, but always can, by Church Thesis.






You did not provide evidence that they cannot do that.

His evidence was the negative answer to Hilbert's 10th problem.



By using Church thesis. The proof consists in showing that the 10th  
problem of Hilbert is Turing complete. Diophantine polynomials are  
Turing universal. See below for an example of UD written as a system  
of Diophantine equations (exponent are abbreviation here(*)






And you could'nt as a machine like ZF, or ZF + kappa, can prove  
things with quite non elementary means.


What theory addresses the emergence of non elementary means?


Mathematical logic, theoretical computer science.



Maybe there is something about the implementation of those machines  
which is introducing it rather than computational factors?


?

Bruno


(*)
Nu = ((ZUY)^2 + U)^2 + Y

ELG^2 + Al = (B - XY)Q^2

Qu = B^(5^60)

La + Qu^4 = 1 + LaB^5

Th +  2Z = B^5

L = U + TTh

E = Y + MTh

N = Q^16

R = [G + EQ^3 + LQ^5 + (2(E - ZLa)(1 + XB^5 + G)^4 + LaB^5 + +  
LaB^5Q^4)Q^4](N^2 -N)

 + [Q^3 -BL + L + ThLaQ^3 + (B^5 - 2)Q^5] (N^2 - 1)

P = 2W(S^2)(R^2)N^2

(P^2)K^2 - K^2 + 1 = Ta^2

4(c - KSN^2)^2 + Et = K^2

K = R + 1 + HP - H

A = (WN^2 + 1)RSN^2

C = 2R + 1 Ph

D = BW + CA -2C + 4AGa -5Ga

D^2 = (A^2 - 1)C^2 + 1

F^2 = (A^2 - 1)(I^2)C^4 + 1

(D + OF)^2 = ((A + F^2(D^2 - A^2))^2 - 1)(2R + 1 + JC)^2 + 1

(unknowns range on the non negative integers (= 0 included)
31 unknowns: A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q, R, S,  
T, W, Z, U, Y, Al, Ga, Et, Th, La, Ta, Ph, and two parameters:  Nu and  
X. The polynomial emulates the universal question "X is in w_Nu", or
"phi_Nu(X) stops".




Craig


Bruno






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Re: So, a new kind of non-boolean, non-digital, computer architecture

2014-05-18 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 18 May 2014, at 21:16, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:


Does this computer architecture assume not-comp?


No. Elementary arithmetic emulates n-synchronized oscillators for all  
n, even infinite enumerable set of oscillators. You would need a  
continuum of oscillators, with an explicit special non computable  
hamiltonian. Today, there is nothing in nature which would threat  
comp, except the collapse of the wave packet in theories where this is  
a physical phenomenon. Even in that case, it would be a computation  
with oracle, and not change much of the consequences. Anyway, I am not  
sure I can make sense of the wave collapse being a physical  
phenomenon, and even less that this play a role in the brain  
computation.


Bruno




15046Synchronized oscillators may allow for computing that works  
like the brain


Expand Messages
richard ruquist
May 15 2:09 PM
View Source
 0 Attachment
Synchronized oscillators may allow for computing that works like the  
brain

May 15, 2014


This is a cartoon of an oscillating switch, the basis of a new type  
of low-power analog computing (credit: Credit: Nikhil Shukla, Penn  
State)
Computing is currently based on binary (Boolean) logic, but a new  
type of computing architecture created by electrical engineers at  
Penn State stores information in the frequencies and phases of  
periodic signals and could work more like the human brain.
It would use a fraction of the energy necessary for today's  
computers, according to the engineers.
To achieve the new architecture, they used a thin film of vanadium  
oxide on a titanium dioxide substrate to create an oscillating  
switch. Vanadium dioxide is called a "wacky oxide" because it  
transitions from a conducting metal to an insulating semiconductor  
and vice versa with the addition of a small amount of heat or  
electrical current.

Biological synchronization for associative processing
Using a standard electrical engineering trick, Nikhil Shukla,  
graduate student in electrical engineering, added a series resistor  
to the oxide device to stabilize oscillations. When he added a  
second similar oscillating system, he discovered that, over time,  
the two devices began to oscillate in unison, or synchronize.
This coupled system could provide the basis for non-Boolean  
computing. Shukla worked with Suman Datta, professor of electrical  
engineering, and co-advisor Roman Engel-Herbert, assistant professor  
of materials science and engineering, Penn State. They reported  
their results May 14 in Scientific Reports (open access).
"It's called a small-world network," explained Shukla. "You see it  
in lots of biological systems, such as certain species of fireflies.  
The males will flash randomly, but then for some unknown reason the  
flashes synchronize over time." The brain is also a small-world  
network of closely clustered nodes that evolved for more efficient  
information processing.
"Biological synchronization is everywhere," added Datta. "We wanted  
to use it for a different kind of computing called associative  
processing, which is an analog rather than digital way to compute."
An array of oscillators can store patterns -- for instance, the color  
of someone's hair, their height and skin texture. If a second area  
of oscillators has the same pattern, they will begin to synchronize,  
and the degree of match can be read out, without consuming a lot of  
energy and requiring a lot of transistors, as in Boolean computing.

A neuromorphic computer chip
Datta is collaborating with Vijay Narayanan, professor of computer  
science and engineering, Penn State, in exploring the use of these  
coupled oscillations to solve visual recognition problems more  
efficiently than existing embedded vision processors.
Shukla and Datta called on the expertise of Cornell University  
materials scientist Darrell Schlom to make the vanadium dioxide thin  
film, which has extremely high quality similar to single crystal  
silicon. Arijit Raychowdhury, computer engineer, and Abhinav Parihar  
graduate student, both of Georgia Tech, mathematically simulated the  
nonlinear dynamics of coupled phase transitions in the vanadium  
dioxide devices.
Parihar created a short video simulation of the transitions, which  
occur at a rate close to a million times per second, to show the way  
the oscillations synchronize. Venkatraman Gopalan, professor of  
materials science and engineering, Penn State, used the Advanced  
Photon Source at Argonne National Laboratory to visually  
characterize the structural changes occurring in the oxide thin film  
in the midst of the oscillations.
Datta believes it will take seven to 10 years to scale up from their  
current network of two-three coupled oscillators to the 100 million  
or so closely packed oscillators required to make a neuromorphic  
computer chip.
One of the benefits of the novel device is that it will use only  
about one percent of the energy of digital computing, allowing for  
n

RE: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-18 Thread Colin Hales
Hi Folk,

A little more you may find interesting.



RE: The much-discussed arXiv paper

Maguire, Phil, Moser Philippe, Maguire, Rebecca and Griffith, Virgil 2014

'Is Consciousness Computable? Quantifying Integrated Information Using
Algorithmic Information Theory'.

http://arxiv.org/abs/1405.0126v1)

Now there’s an article in New Scientist

http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg9692.800-sentient-robots-not-possible-if-you-do-the-maths.html#.U3liRihGO5L

*‘Sentient robots? Not possible if you do the maths’*



The headline should read:



*‘Sentient robots? Not possible if you use computers’*



Breathtaking blindspot revealed yet again: The presupposition that real AGI
involves formal computing.

Here I am building a robot brain that does not use computing, and New
Scientist guy doesn’t even realise the possibility.

This presupposition is so completely trained-in it’s  its..







I have been watching this for >10 years now.

I expect COMP to circle the toilet for a little while yet and then the
penny will drop. I guess.. 1-2 years?



Don’t despair: Brilliant (AGI) robots will happen! They just won’t use
computing as their main cognitive architecture.

Why anyone should be upset about this change of fortune beats me.



Cheers

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-18 Thread meekerdb

On 5/18/2014 6:26 PM, LizR wrote:
On 19 May 2014 05:12, spudboy100 via Everything List > wrote:


So you do not have a testable, falsifiable, theory Bruno. Not in the 
scientific
sense.  No one calls you on this.here.but then again.let's 
face it
no one answered my question either. But other thereall you'll 
accomplish
with this hubris is to be ignored and written off. Which you probably 
are, by
and large. And...I wanted to add value for youfor my part I would 
actually
question the way your friends write you a pass about this, because this 
is one
tiny goldfish bowl dude.


I don't think Bruno claims to have a testable scientific theory. He claims to have a 
logical argument applied to the assumption made by most scientists who believe in 
primary materialism - that consciousness is computable. Given this assumption and a 
couple of others, he argues to a certain conclusion, which is that primary materialism 
fails.


Not that it fails, but that it's dispensable; that matter may be necessary for our 
existence (when I've argued for that point I think he has agreed) but if so it is 
derivable from the computations of the UD, so it's not primary.  I'm not sure he's wrong, 
but I'm not convinced by his MGA or Maudlin's Olympia argument.  I think that for them to 
go through, to show that consciousness can be instantiated with no physical action, 
depends on anticipating all possible counterfactuals, i.e. simulating a "world" which the 
consciousness is relative to.  I think that to simulate consciousness within a simulated 
world removes the distinction of "simulated" and the argument becomes vacuous.  Simulated 
physics is happening in that simulated world and the simulated consciousness depends on 
it.  Now if Bruno can predict some new testable physics from comp, that would be great - 
but that's a high bar indeed.


His main interest is the mind-body problem; and my interest in that problem is more from 
an engineering viewpoint.  What does it take to make a conscious machine and what are the 
advantages or disadvantages of doing so.  Bruno says a machine that can learn and do 
induction is conscious, which might be testable - but I think it would fail.  I think that 
might be necessary for consciousness, but for a machine to appear conscious it must be 
intelligent and it must be able to act so as to convince us that it's intelligent.


Brent



Hence surely he is in the position of someone testing a scientific theory, rather than 
claiming to have one?


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Re: Free Will Universe Model - James Tagg

2014-05-18 Thread Russell Standish
On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 07:01:01PM -0700, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> 
> 
> On Sunday, May 18, 2014 9:34:40 PM UTC-4, Russell Standish wrote:
> > This doesn't follow. An evolutionary algorithm with a real random 
> > source, can potentially stumble upon any solution, not just ones for 
> > which no algorithm can find. There even remains some doubt that "real 
> > randomness" is required, so long as the entropy of the random source 
> > is sufficiently high. 
> >
> 
> The Wiles proof didn't have a random source though, it was developed 
> intentionally.

The proof doesn't but Wiles probably did (in his brain, presumably, although he
could have used a coin or something else).

>  
> 
> >
> > In COMP, the universal dovetailer provides plenty of real randomness 
> > from the subjective point of view, that can be harnessed. Perhaps 
> > that's exactly what Andrew Wiles did. (In fact, I really rather think 
> > he did - my proofs, which are not so grand as Andrew's, usually 
> > involve some "divine spark of inspiration", which is just another term 
> > for rolling a random number generator). 
> >
> 
> You're still the one intentionally doing the rolling.
> 

That makes no sense. Rolling an RNG is a mechanical process, if ever
there was one. Intention to solve Fermat's last theorem is outside the
scope of the claim.

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au

 Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret 
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Re: TRONNIES

2014-05-18 Thread LizR
On 19 May 2014 13:05, Russell Standish  wrote:

> On Mon, May 19, 2014 at 10:02:25AM +1200, LizR wrote:
> >
> > I don't know the maths, but I think I understand the principle. General
> > relativity predicts that space in the vicinity of massive bodies is
> curved,
> > or non-Euclidean, like the surface of a sphere or a saddle. This will
> > effectively change the value of pi, as defined as the ratio of a circle's
> > circumference to its diameter, and make the angles of a triangle sum to a
> > value ofther than 180 degrees. You can see this on the surface of the
> Earth
>
> Yes, except that conventionally pi is a constant, so you should be
> saying that the ratio of tyhe circumference to diameter becomes less than
> pi. Just a small nit picked.
>

Sure. That's why I added "as defined by..." But yes, come to think of it, I
probably shouldn't have mentioned pi, which is of course a mathematical
CONSTANT.

Oops.

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Re: Free Will Universe Model - James Tagg

2014-05-18 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Sunday, May 18, 2014 9:34:40 PM UTC-4, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 08:43:23AM -0700, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
> > Free Will Universe Model: Non-computability and its relationship to the 
> > ‘hardware’ of our Universe 
> > 
> > I saw his poster presentation at the TSC conference in Tucson and 
> thought 
> > it was pretty impressive. I'm not qualified to comment on the math, but 
> I 
> > don't see any obvious problems with his general approach: 
> > 
> > http://jamestagg.com/2014/04/26/free-will-universe-paper-text-pdf/ 
> > 
> > Some highlights: 
> > 
> > 
> > Some Diophantine equations are easily solved 
> > > automatically, for example: 
> > > ∃𝑥, ∃𝑦 𝑥² = 𝑦² , 𝑥 & 𝑦 ∈ ℤ 
> > > Any pair of integers will do, and a computer programmed 
> > > to step through all the possible solutions will find one 
> > > immediately at ‘1,1’. An analytical tool such as Mathematica, 
> > > Mathcad or Maple would also immediately give symbolic 
> > > solutions to this problem therefore these can be solved 
> > > mechanically. But, Hilbert did not ask if ‘some’ equations 
> > > could be solved, he asked if there was a general way to solve 
> > > any Diophantine equation. 
> > > 
> > > ... 
> > > *Consequence* 
> > > In 1995 Andrew Wiles – who had been secretly working on 
> > > Fermat’s ‘arbitrary equation’ since age eight – announced he 
> > > had found a proof. We now had the answers to both of our 
> > > questions: Fermat’s last theorem is provable (therefore 
> > > obviously decidable) and no algorithm could have found this 
> > > proof. This leads to a question; If no algorithm can have 
> > > found the proof what thought process did Wiles use to answer 
> > > the question: Put another way, Andrew Wiles can not be a 
> > > computer. 
> > > 
> > 
>
> This doesn't follow. An evolutionary algorithm with a real random 
> source, can potentially stumble upon any solution, not just ones for 
> which no algorithm can find. There even remains some doubt that "real 
> randomness" is required, so long as the entropy of the random source 
> is sufficiently high. 
>

The Wiles proof didn't have a random source though, it was developed 
intentionally.
 

>
> In COMP, the universal dovetailer provides plenty of real randomness 
> from the subjective point of view, that can be harnessed. Perhaps 
> that's exactly what Andrew Wiles did. (In fact, I really rather think 
> he did - my proofs, which are not so grand as Andrew's, usually 
> involve some "divine spark of inspiration", which is just another term 
> for rolling a random number generator). 
>

You're still the one intentionally doing the rolling.

Thanks
 

>
> Cheers 
>
> -- 
>
>  
>
> Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) 
> Principal, High Performance Coders 
> Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpc...@hpcoders.com.au 
> University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au 
>
>  Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret 
>  (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) 
>  
>
>

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-18 Thread Platonist Guitar Cowboy
On Mon, May 19, 2014 at 12:15 AM,  wrote:

>
> On Sunday, May 18, 2014 10:55:03 PM UTC+1, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 7:22 PM,  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, May 18, 2014 2:57:02 PM UTC+1, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:




 On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 5:41 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:

> Hibbs,
> I do not often share your opinion, but in this instance I do. It seems
> to me that Bruno's principal argument for comp is that it predicts MWI. 
> Yet
> MWI itself is not falsifiable or testable.
>
>  And I think MWI fails the measure problem despite the Gleason
> Theorem. I think it is a mistake for Bruno to connect comp to MWI. Comp
> like string theory is so rich in results that I suggest that it could as
> well predict a single world.
>
> However, I do appreciate Bruno's intellect and humility, a rare
> combination.
>

 You do?

 Then why participate in this tedious, repetitive carousel of personal
 attacks (pointing to flaws without precision, just hand waving that there
 is one and/or attacking Bruno on personal level) of everybody who hasn't
 red the original thesis, the literature they are based on, and the papers
 that build, clarify, or expand on the consequences; while pretending to
 presuppose their content and invalidating them disingenuously?

 Everybody here should know by now that these "attacks" don't lead
 anywhere because off topic by nature and that comp makes your head spin in
 disbelief at first recognizing possibilities and implications. That's not
 an argument and neither are personal judgements and attacks of this sort.
 The real time wasters. PGC

>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Quite a spew for someone that didn't look closely to in the first place
>>> make a say. There's no profile of maliceI've only ever had one major
>>> criticism of Bruno's theorizing, and I've tried hard to say it well enough
>>> for him that he can move past this.
>>>
>>> It is totally independent of theory - his or anyone's. It's about
>>> falsification that's all. He understands this wrongly...he conceives of it
>>> thing with many variant .,,.but this the bedrock of science, it's an
>>> hard to vary thing.
>>>
>>> I understand youyou status-sniff so twill not have read any of my
>>> descriptions.  Had you of, you'd not entertain poor motivation this keenly,
>>> because endless tries to say it better, a single - just one - major
>>> criticism, is not the profile for that.
>>>
>>> Why not you have a go at my post previous to this, in which despite his
>>> allegation of vaguery, I go a few steps further than anyone else I'm aware
>>> of around here, to make more explicit the end to end structure of
>>> falsifiability as it is, in Science. I say.
>>>
>>> How about you give me that say, and suffer reading the points, and
>>> should you find disagreement, let me know. If possible also be less of a
>>> turd-sniffer PGC. There's a of formula.
>>>
>>
>> Thank you for proving my point by making matters clear. PGC
>>
>
> I don't think you had a distinctive point did you?
>

I thought I did: that an absolutist truth assignment to comp, or any
complete notion of reality for that matter, principally escapes my
understanding when it takes on these rhetorical forms with vague, if any,
association to some frame of reference. Especially when its complex
imbrication in form of personal attacks etc. obscures apparently a point or
set of points you want to make.

I know Richard is working from particular Calabi Yau manifolds on String
level. But neither this nor comp (or any other foray into discourse on
"ultimates") has some complete verification, or states some ultimate final
approach in the depths of prediction, falsifiability and their funky
relationship to explanatory force. You like Deutsch; I think he's cool with
this, even advocating explanation over prediction, in one of the opening
chapters of FOR, if I am not mistaken.

Thus, you or Richard declaring "false" in the ways that I could parse in
this thread, didn't convince me trivially for lack of reference. It's not
clear what theory, theology, frame you are even arguing from; so how could
one assess your statements, apparently comp related, when this or your
position to Step 0 isn't clear? Screaming false + complex personal attacks
is hardly convincing. PGC


> You haven't read my side of things, you apparently disallow that something
> like prediction/falsification is as important to me as your comp
> envisionings are to you. Or to Bruno. You seem to visualize a sort of
> pecking order perhaps, in which the value of Bruno's passion or yours, for
> comp and infinite worlds and dreams and so on is embued with greater value,
> than Science as I see it, proper, has deep resonance with me. You vomited a
> number of allegations over me, when in fact I've made all the effort to
> make my case and I've neve

Re: Free Will Universe Model - James Tagg

2014-05-18 Thread LizR
On 19 May 2014 07:37, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>
>
>> You did not provide evidence that they cannot do that.
>>
>
> His evidence was the negative answer to Hilbert's 10th problem.
>
> To be exact, it's claimed to be *how he arrived at* that answer. The
extract says that he arrived at a proof that "no algorithm could have
found". How did he find it? The paper is far too high powered for my little
brain, so I am hoping for an answer for dummies. Did he decide that the
answer might have some particular form using intuition, say, tried it, and
found it worked? How did he (or anyone) then show there was no algorithm
for finding it?

(This is reminiscent of "The Emperor's New Mind", which IIRC attempts to
prove that some gifted mathematicians are not machines!)

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Re: Free Will Universe Model - James Tagg

2014-05-18 Thread Russell Standish
On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 08:43:23AM -0700, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> Free Will Universe Model: Non-computability and its relationship to the 
> ‘hardware’ of our Universe
> 
> I saw his poster presentation at the TSC conference in Tucson and thought 
> it was pretty impressive. I'm not qualified to comment on the math, but I 
> don't see any obvious problems with his general approach:
> 
> http://jamestagg.com/2014/04/26/free-will-universe-paper-text-pdf/
> 
> Some highlights:
> 
> 
> Some Diophantine equations are easily solved
> > automatically, for example:
> > ∃𝑥, ∃𝑦 𝑥² = 𝑦² , 𝑥 & 𝑦 ∈ ℤ
> > Any pair of integers will do, and a computer programmed
> > to step through all the possible solutions will find one
> > immediately at ‘1,1’. An analytical tool such as Mathematica,
> > Mathcad or Maple would also immediately give symbolic
> > solutions to this problem therefore these can be solved
> > mechanically. But, Hilbert did not ask if ‘some’ equations
> > could be solved, he asked if there was a general way to solve
> > any Diophantine equation. 
> >
> > ...
> > *Consequence*
> > In 1995 Andrew Wiles – who had been secretly working on
> > Fermat’s ‘arbitrary equation’ since age eight – announced he
> > had found a proof. We now had the answers to both of our
> > questions: Fermat’s last theorem is provable (therefore
> > obviously decidable) and no algorithm could have found this
> > proof. This leads to a question; If no algorithm can have
> > found the proof what thought process did Wiles use to answer
> > the question: Put another way, Andrew Wiles can not be a
> > computer.
> >
> 

This doesn't follow. An evolutionary algorithm with a real random
source, can potentially stumble upon any solution, not just ones for
which no algorithm can find. There even remains some doubt that "real
randomness" is required, so long as the entropy of the random source
is sufficiently high.

In COMP, the universal dovetailer provides plenty of real randomness
from the subjective point of view, that can be harnessed. Perhaps
that's exactly what Andrew Wiles did. (In fact, I really rather think
he did - my proofs, which are not so grand as Andrew's, usually
involve some "divine spark of inspiration", which is just another term
for rolling a random number generator).

Cheers

-- 


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Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au

 Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret 
 (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html)


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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-18 Thread LizR
On 19 May 2014 05:12, spudboy100 via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

>
>
>> So you do not have a testable, falsifiable, theory Bruno. Not in the
>> scientific sense.  No one calls you on this.here.but then
>> again.let's face it no one answered my question either. But other
>> thereall you'll accomplish with this hubris is to be ignored and
>> written off. Which you probably are, by and large. And...I wanted to add
>> value for youfor my part I would actually question the way your friends
>> write you a pass about this, because this is one tiny goldfish bowl dude.
>>
>
I don't think Bruno claims to have a testable scientific theory. He claims
to have a logical argument applied to the assumption made by most
scientists who believe in primary materialism - that consciousness is
computable. Given this assumption and a couple of others, he argues to a
certain conclusion, which is that primary materialism fails.

Hence surely he is in the position of someone testing a scientific theory,
rather than claiming to have one?

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Re: The end to end structure associated wit Falsification

2014-05-18 Thread Russell Standish
On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 04:10:24PM -0700, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:
> I'm going to bullet point the key, hard-to-vary, components that may or may 
> not result in falsification. In doing so, I will be stating not my personal 
> preference, but the long standing convention. In light of this faithfulness 
> simply to what it actually is, I feel a little aggrieved by the stream of 
> unrelenting dismissiveness, resorts to claims of unintelligibility on my 
> part, allegations of ill motivation, irrelevance and the rest of it. 
>  
> So I will bullet point it here, very briefly. And if the same individuals 
> want to continue the way they are going, I shall suggest they put their 
> money where their mouths are, and lay cash wager which one of us is 
> correct, and we shall take our dispute to some of the major and 
> esteemed leading scientists of our time. And then we shall see. 
>  
> Falsification. 
>  
> 1. A precise, non-trivial prediction must be found in a theory, with the 
> following two key characteristics: It says something NEW about the 
> world, that goes over and above an Explanation of that which we 
> already know. 

This is probably too big a bar, although clearly a theory that jumps
this hurdle will be more interesting.

Given the new theory and an incumbant with with equal predictive power
(ie no new testable predictions on which the theories differ), we can
still discriminate on based on Occam's razor. Initially, heliocentrism
actually performed less well than Ptolemy's epicycle theory, but did
much better on Occam.

Clearly, COMP has not yet jumped that bar. Potentially it may do so,
once all the consequences of the X_1 modal logic is worked out. So I
wouldn't crack the champagne, but it is reasonable to pursue working
out the consequence of X_1. It's just not going to be me - I'm too far
behind the 8 ball on that one :).

> Second, that it may be formulated with complete separation 
> and independence from the theory from which it spawns, and stated entirely 
> within the pre-existing realm of the incumbent hard won knowledge already 
> in place. This is the first layer of separation. The theory from the 
> prediction, the prediction in terms of the incumbent theory of the world. 
>  

Yes - this makes sense.


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Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
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Re: The Evolutionary Tree of Religion

2014-05-18 Thread meekerdb

On 5/18/2014 5:40 PM, LizR wrote:

On 17 May 2014 10:06, John Mikes mailto:jami...@gmail.com>> 
wrote:

Dear Liz, thanks for your care to reflect upon my text and I apologize for 
my LATE
 REPLY.
You ask about my opinion on Tegmark's "math-realism" - well, if it were 
REALISM
indeed, he would not have had to classify it 'mathemaitcal'. I consider it 
a fine
sub chapter to ideas about *realism* what we MAY NOT KNOW at our present 
level.
Smart Einstein etc. may have invented 'analogue' relativity etc., it does 
not
exclude all those other ways Nature may apply beyond our present knowledge.
Our ongoing 'scientific thinking' - IS - inherently mathematical, so 
wherever you
look you find it in the books.


I assume the implication of what you're saying here is that the reason physics appears 
mathematical is because that's the way we think. I suspect most physicists would say the 
opposite - that we think that way because that's how nature works (or at least that's 
how it appears to work so far). If one is going to take the position that maths is a 
human invention, then one has the hard problem of explaining why maths is so 
"unreasonably effective" in physics while no other system of thought comes close.


Not at all.  A lot of math was invented to describe theories of physics.  If you have some 
idea of how the world is, e.g. it consists of persistent identifiable objects, or all 
matter pulls on other matter; And you want to work out the consequences of the idea and 
make it precise with no inconsistencies - you've invented some math (unless you can apply 
some that's already invented - see Norm Levitt's quip).



I did not find so far a /natural spot/ self-calculating 374 pieces of 
something. and
draw conclusions of it NOT being 383. Nature was quite well before humans 
invented
the decimal system, or the zero.



And human invented the */decimal/* system long before they invented the binary system 
because...



And please, do not call it a 'discovery'. Nowhere in Nature are groupings of
decimally arranged units presented for processing/registration.



I think I have one here ready to hand.



I'm not sure what you mean here. (I /think/ you may be confusing the fact that 1+1=2 
with the statement "1+1=2") Regardless of the notation we happen to use, there are 
numbers in nature - pi, the ratios of the strengths of various fundamental forces and 
masses, etc. Also, various mathematical theorems have been discovered by different 
people using different approaches, yet they reach the same result. And there are lots of 
open questions in maths, some with a $1 million prize attached - it's obviously hard for 
people to make discoveries in maths, or those prizes would have been claimed long ago.


All of which implies that maths is something that is discovered, and indeed could be 
discovered independently in different cultures, times, places - and on different planets 
or in different universes.


I think it only implies that some parts of math are "discovered" like counting (which was 
discovered by evolution) and when people invented language and logically inference and 
concepts like "successor" and "..." they "discovered" there was a lot more math they could 
infer.



Unless you 'discover' within the human mind.


Well, yes, just like you will "discover" any concept within a mind, by definition. (Or I 
guess within textbooks, in a codified form). The evidence seems fairly strong that you 
will discover the same mathematical concepts within ANY mind which looks into the 
subject, and has sufficient ingenuity to work out the answers to various questions, 
because mathematical truths appear to be universal (e.g. Pythagoras' theorem didn't only 
work for the Ancient Greeks, 17 will always be prime, the square root of 2 will always 
be irrational, etc). Only minds can appreciate these facts, just as only minds can 
discover the law of universal gravitation.


Which is a strange thing to say since it turned out there was no such thing as the law of 
universal gravitation; it was just an approximation to another theory, general relativity, 
which we're pretty sure is wrong but we just haven't been able to invent a better one.  So 
how is a non-existent law "discovered"?


Brent


Your closing phrase "doesn't mean that it isn't inherently mathematical" is 
true as
to the content it states. It also does not mean that it may not be anything 
else beyond.


Of course, there may always be something else beyond, even given a TOE we can't be sure 
this isn't the case. (There is however no evidence whatsoever to suggest that 1+1 will 
ever not equal 2.)



It was a pleasure to follow your argumentation.


Likewise, although I'm not sure I followed all of it.


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Re: So, a new kind of non-boolean, non-digital, computer architecture

2014-05-18 Thread LizR
On 19 May 2014 07:16,  wrote:

> Does this computer architecture assume not-comp?
>

I don't know, but I would think not, because comp allows reality to be
digitised at any level (e.g. sub atomic) which wouldn't contradict the use
of oscillators.
This sounds a bit like what someone once told me about early computer
storage being done as sound waves that kept bouncing back and forth inside
some medium. (A large spring, I think.)

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Re: TRONNIES

2014-05-18 Thread Russell Standish
On Mon, May 19, 2014 at 10:02:25AM +1200, LizR wrote:
> 
> I don't know the maths, but I think I understand the principle. General
> relativity predicts that space in the vicinity of massive bodies is curved,
> or non-Euclidean, like the surface of a sphere or a saddle. This will
> effectively change the value of pi, as defined as the ratio of a circle's
> circumference to its diameter, and make the angles of a triangle sum to a
> value ofther than 180 degrees. You can see this on the surface of the Earth

Yes, except that conventionally pi is a constant, so you should be
saying that the ratio of tyhe circumference to diameter becomes less than
pi. Just a small nit picked.

Just about all of modern maths goes out the window if pi changes
value, as nearly happened in Indiana
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indiana_Pi_Bill) 

Actually, that is a rather instructive example of crackpottery!

Cheers

-- 


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Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au

 Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret 
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Re: Virtual Logic - Formal Arithmetic

2014-05-18 Thread LizR
On 19 May 2014 12:13, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 5/18/2014 4:23 PM, LizR wrote:
>
>  On 17 May 2014 11:05, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>>   On 5/16/2014 2:41 PM, LizR wrote:
>>
>>  On 16 May 2014 17:14, meekerdb  wrote:
>>
>>>  On 5/15/2014 10:04 PM, freqflyer07281972 wrote:
>>>
>>> So do you think there is some merit in Kauffman's conclusions? Do you
>>> think it is possible to reason about "the Void"? Or meaningful? Or useful?
>>>
>>>
>>>  Sure, it's possible to reason about anything.  Whether you can arrive
>>> at something useful is an open question - one can but try.  I like the late
>>> Norm Levitt's remark, "What is there? EVERYTHING! So what isn't there?
>>> NOTHING!"
>>>
>>
>>  Or one could paraphrase Russell Standish - What is there? NOTHING! -
>> Which is EVERYTHING!
>>
>>  I like Russell's version, which creates more of a *frisson*. Although I
>> assume Levitt is claiming the existence of a multiverse (EVERYTHING implies
>> that of course).
>>
>>
>>  I doubt that, Norm was rather a fan of Bohmian QM.
>>
>
>  I had the chance to talk to Jim Al-Kalili at the Auckland Writers
> Festival and I was surprised to find his favourite interpretation of QM is
> also the Bohm one, which hasn't been coming up much in Max Tegmark's polls
> of physicists recently. (I believe it's the multiverse but with one
> universe "more real" than all the others, or something similar).
>
>  Obviously I didn't have much to go on with Mr Levitt, just the quote you
> supplied, but ISTM "What is there? EVERYTHING!" could be taken to mean that
> everything that can exist exists (i.e. Everett). An alternative reading is
> that he is saying he thinks the universe is infinite, which also gives us
> everything that can exist. I'm not sure how else one can interpret
> "EVERYTHING" especially when it's emphasised like that.
>
>
> You're reading to much into it.  Norm wasn't involved the everythingism of
> Tegmark and Marchal.  He was making a tongue-in-cheek paraphrase of W. V.
> O. Quine's, "Nonbeing must in some sense be, otherwise what is it that
> there is not?"  Norm was interested in defending the existence of a
> Platonic realm of mathematics, but one that "existed" in a different way
> than the material world.
>

Like I said, you didn't provide much to go on.

>
> Brent
> "The duty of abstract mathematics, as I see it, is precisely to
> expand our capacity for hypothesizing possible ontologies."
>  --- Norm Levitt
>

Max T has definitely adhere to that.

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Re: The Evolutionary Tree of Religion

2014-05-18 Thread LizR
On 17 May 2014 10:06, John Mikes  wrote:

> Dear Liz, thanks for your care to reflect upon my text and I apologize for
> my LATE  REPLY.
> You ask about my opinion on Tegmark's "math-realism" - well, if it were
> REALISM
> indeed, he would not have had to classify it 'mathemaitcal'. I consider it
> a fine sub chapter to ideas about *realism* what we MAY NOT KNOW at our
> present level.
> Smart Einstein etc. may have invented 'analogue' relativity etc., it does
> not exclude all those other ways Nature may apply beyond our present
> knowledge.
> Our ongoing 'scientific thinking' - IS - inherently mathematical, so
> wherever you look you find it in the books.
>

I assume the implication of what you're saying here is that the reason
physics appears mathematical is because that's the way we think. I suspect
most physicists would say the opposite - that we think that way because
that's how nature works (or at least that's how it appears to work so far).
If one is going to take the position that maths is a human invention, then
one has the hard problem of explaining why maths is so "unreasonably
effective" in physics while no other system of thought comes close.

>
> I did not find so far a *natural spot* self-calculating 374 pieces of
> something. and draw conclusions of it NOT being 383. Nature was quite well
> before humans invented the decimal system, or the zero. And please, do not
> call it a 'discovery'. Nowhere in Nature are groupings of decimally
> arranged units presented for processing/registration.
>

I'm not sure what you mean here. (I *think* you may be confusing the fact
that 1+1=2 with the statement "1+1=2") Regardless of the notation we happen
to use, there are numbers in nature - pi, the ratios of the strengths of
various fundamental forces and masses, etc. Also, various mathematical
theorems have been discovered by different people using different
approaches, yet they reach the same result. And there are lots of open
questions in maths, some with a $1 million prize attached - it's obviously
hard for people to make discoveries in maths, or those prizes would have
been claimed long ago.

All of which implies that maths is something that is discovered, and indeed
could be discovered independently in different cultures, times, places -
and on different planets or in different universes.


> Unless you 'discover' within the human mind.
>

Well, yes, just like you will "discover" any concept within a mind, by
definition. (Or I guess within textbooks, in a codified form). The evidence
seems fairly strong that you will discover the same mathematical concepts
within ANY mind which looks into the subject, and has sufficient ingenuity
to work out the answers to various questions, because mathematical truths
appear to be universal (e.g. Pythagoras' theorem didn't only work for the
Ancient Greeks, 17 will always be prime, the square root of 2 will always
be irrational, etc). Only minds can appreciate these facts, just as only
minds can discover the law of universal gravitation.


> Your closing phrase "doesn't mean that it isn't inherently mathematical"
> is true as to the content it states. It also does not mean that it may not
> be anything else beyond.
>

Of course, there may always be something else beyond, even given a TOE we
can't be sure this isn't the case. (There is however no evidence whatsoever
to suggest that 1+1 will ever not equal 2.)

>
> It was a pleasure to follow your argumentation.
>

Likewise, although I'm not sure I followed all of it.

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Re: Virtual Logic - Formal Arithmetic

2014-05-18 Thread meekerdb

On 5/18/2014 4:23 PM, LizR wrote:

On 17 May 2014 11:05, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

On 5/16/2014 2:41 PM, LizR wrote:

On 16 May 2014 17:14, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>
wrote:

On 5/15/2014 10:04 PM, freqflyer07281972 wrote:

So do you think there is some merit in Kauffman's conclusions? Do you 
think it
is possible to reason about "the Void"? Or meaningful? Or useful?


Sure, it's possible to reason about anything.  Whether you can arrive at
something useful is an open question - one can but try.  I like the 
late Norm
Levitt's remark, "What is there? EVERYTHING! So what isn't there? 
NOTHING!"


Or one could paraphrase Russell Standish - What is there? NOTHING! - Which 
is
EVERYTHING!

I like Russell's version, which creates more of a /frisson/. Although I 
assume
Levitt is claiming the existence of a multiverse (EVERYTHING implies that 
of course).


I doubt that, Norm was rather a fan of Bohmian QM.


I had the chance to talk to Jim Al-Kalili at the Auckland Writers Festival and I was 
surprised to find his favourite interpretation of QM is also the Bohm one, which hasn't 
been coming up much in Max Tegmark's polls of physicists recently. (I believe it's the 
multiverse but with one universe "more real" than all the others, or something similar).


Obviously I didn't have much to go on with Mr Levitt, just the quote you supplied, but 
ISTM "What is there? EVERYTHING!" could be taken to mean that everything that can exist 
exists (i.e. Everett). An alternative reading is that he is saying he thinks the 
universe is infinite, which also gives us everything that can exist. I'm not sure how 
else one can interpret "EVERYTHING" especially when it's emphasised like that.


You're reading to much into it.  Norm wasn't involved the everythingism of Tegmark and 
Marchal.  He was making a tongue-in-cheek paraphrase of W. V. O. Quine's, "Nonbeing must 
in some sense be, otherwise what is it that there is not?"  Norm was interested in 
defending the existence of a Platonic realm of mathematics, but one that "existed" in a 
different way than the material world.


Brent
"The duty of abstract mathematics, as I see it, is precisely to
expand our capacity for hypothesizing possible ontologies."
 --- Norm Levitt

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Re: Virtual Logic - Formal Arithmetic

2014-05-18 Thread ghibbsa

On Monday, May 19, 2014 12:23:58 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:
>
> On 17 May 2014 11:05, meekerdb > wrote:
>
>>  On 5/16/2014 2:41 PM, LizR wrote:
>>  
>>  On 16 May 2014 17:14, meekerdb >wrote:
>>
>>>  On 5/15/2014 10:04 PM, freqflyer07281972 wrote:
>>>  
>>> So do you think there is some merit in Kauffman's conclusions? Do you 
>>> think it is possible to reason about "the Void"? Or meaningful? Or useful? 
>>>  
>>>
>>>  Sure, it's possible to reason about anything.  Whether you can arrive 
>>> at something useful is an open question - one can but try.  I like the late 
>>> Norm Levitt's remark, "What is there? EVERYTHING! So what isn't there? 
>>> NOTHING!"
>>>  
>>
>>  Or one could paraphrase Russell Standish - What is there? NOTHING! - 
>> Which is EVERYTHING!
>>
>>  I like Russell's version, which creates more of a *frisson*. Although I 
>> assume Levitt is claiming the existence of a multiverse (EVERYTHING implies 
>> that of course).
>>   
>>
>> I doubt that, Norm was rather a fan of Bohmian QM.
>>
>
> I had the chance to talk to Jim Al-Kalili at the Auckland Writers Festival 
> and I was surprised to find his favourite interpretation of QM is also the 
> Bohm one, which hasn't been coming up much in Max Tegmark's polls of 
> physicists recently. (I believe it's the multiverse but with one universe 
> "more real" than all the others, or something similar).
>
 
I love that guy. He is fare and way my favourite ever explainer of 
science...as in the documentaries he's made. He's so pure and he sort of 
bursts with true meant appreciation for the scientific pioneers...he can't 
help smiling when he speaks of some of them and their amazing 
exploits. He's the best, I think the smartest as well. And totally 
unselfpossessed. The others can't touch him. Either they barely can conceal 
their contempt for the scientific geniuses - like Deutsch in my view - or 
they are full of themselves to the point of it become a distraction for 
the viewer. Like what's his name, wonder's of the solar system guy. That 
being said, he's alright, I'm going to see him in a week or two. But 
Jimmy boy is a star.  

>
> Obviously I didn't have much to go on with Mr Levitt, just the quote you 
> supplied, but ISTM "What is there? EVERYTHING!" could be taken to mean that 
> everything that can exist exists (i.e. Everett). An alternative reading is 
> that he is saying he thinks the universe is infinite, which also gives us 
> everything that can exist. I'm not sure how else one can interpret 
> "EVERYTHING" especially when it's emphasised like that.
>  

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Re: Virtual Logic - Formal Arithmetic

2014-05-18 Thread LizR
On 17 May 2014 11:05, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 5/16/2014 2:41 PM, LizR wrote:
>
>  On 16 May 2014 17:14, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>>  On 5/15/2014 10:04 PM, freqflyer07281972 wrote:
>>
>> So do you think there is some merit in Kauffman's conclusions? Do you
>> think it is possible to reason about "the Void"? Or meaningful? Or useful?
>>
>>
>>  Sure, it's possible to reason about anything.  Whether you can arrive at
>> something useful is an open question - one can but try.  I like the late
>> Norm Levitt's remark, "What is there? EVERYTHING! So what isn't there?
>> NOTHING!"
>>
>
>  Or one could paraphrase Russell Standish - What is there? NOTHING! -
> Which is EVERYTHING!
>
>  I like Russell's version, which creates more of a *frisson*. Although I
> assume Levitt is claiming the existence of a multiverse (EVERYTHING implies
> that of course).
>
>
> I doubt that, Norm was rather a fan of Bohmian QM.
>

I had the chance to talk to Jim Al-Kalili at the Auckland Writers Festival
and I was surprised to find his favourite interpretation of QM is also the
Bohm one, which hasn't been coming up much in Max Tegmark's polls of
physicists recently. (I believe it's the multiverse but with one universe
"more real" than all the others, or something similar).

Obviously I didn't have much to go on with Mr Levitt, just the quote you
supplied, but ISTM "What is there? EVERYTHING!" could be taken to mean that
everything that can exist exists (i.e. Everett). An alternative reading is
that he is saying he thinks the universe is infinite, which also gives us
everything that can exist. I'm not sure how else one can interpret
"EVERYTHING" especially when it's emphasised like that.

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The end to end structure associated wit Falsification

2014-05-18 Thread ghibbsa
I'm going to bullet point the key, hard-to-vary, components that may or may 
not result in falsification. In doing so, I will be stating not my personal 
preference, but the long standing convention. In light of this faithfulness 
simply to what it actually is, I feel a little aggrieved by the stream of 
unrelenting dismissiveness, resorts to claims of unintelligibility on my 
part, allegations of ill motivation, irrelevance and the rest of it. 
 
So I will bullet point it here, very briefly. And if the same individuals 
want to continue the way they are going, I shall suggest they put their 
money where their mouths are, and lay cash wager which one of us is 
correct, and we shall take our dispute to some of the major and 
esteemed leading scientists of our time. And then we shall see. 
 
Falsification. 
 
1. A precise, non-trivial prediction must be found in a theory, with the 
following two key characteristics: It says something NEW about the 
world, that goes over and above an Explanation of that which we 
already know. Second, that it may be formulated with complete separation 
and independence from the theory from which it spawns, and stated entirely 
within the pre-existing realm of the incumbent hard won knowledge already 
in place. This is the first layer of separation. The theory from the 
prediction, the prediction in terms of the incumbent theory of the world. 
 
2. Second. The theorist has no SAY, more than any other person,  in how the 
prediction will be tested. The end to end process encapsulating all 
components involved in the eventual lead up to an observation event, is 
ENTIRELY outside the theory and the argumentations of the theorist. This is 
the second layer of separation,. 
 
3. Third, an even higher level of separation must be met, between the two 
strands of science, on the one side being the source of the prediction and 
on the other the source of the observation. As such, two distinctive 
paradigms of science are necessary. If one is theory deriving, the other is 
technological. If one is human creative, the other is empirical. If one 
field produces the prediction, another field tests the prediction. Like 
Physics, and astronomy. 
 
This is the multifolding degrees of separation that set us free from our 
own delusions and dreams and imagings, that had dominated our condition 
since the dawn of our and made us prisoners in palaces of ignorance which 
no human had ever broken free of. It was only with this, this extreme 
dedication to not believing a word of our own sayings, and trusting to 
no-one that they could know let alone control the huge assumptions we all 
would be sneaking through, without even knowing it, where there not these 
multiple layers of separation for the first time...maybe in the whole 
universeset a kind free and opened an age of objective discovery. 
 
This matters. A lot. To everyone, all humans. It matters when someone 
misconceives this fundamemental bedrock of science. It isn't ok for people 
to make up their own meanings for falsification. It isn't virtuous at all 
to write free passes. Because we could actually this precious beautiful 
thing. And then all we would have is what we had before. Dreams and 
delusions and priests and medicine men, and nothing that ever took root and 
grew. 
 
So I am passion for this. I love science. I am loyal to science. I'm fine 
with comp and whatever else anyone wants to believe. But let's remember and 
allow ourselves to be reminded what is fundamental to the scientific 
revolution. If someone needs to relearn the nature and distinctiveness of 
falsification, there's no shame in that. But it isn't right to make our own 
versions up, and say its the same, when it's stripped of the hard-to-vary 
fundamental character of separation
 
Let's lay bets if that's what it'll  take. If Bruno stands by his claims to 
falsifiability and the definitions he has attached to falsifiability. Let's 
go to it..we can go all the way. Let's see what leading scientific minds of 
our day think it is. 
 

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-18 Thread ghibbsa

On Sunday, May 18, 2014 10:55:03 PM UTC+1, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 7:22 PM, > wrote:
>
>>
>> On Sunday, May 18, 2014 2:57:02 PM UTC+1, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 5:41 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>>>
 Hibbs,
 I do not often share your opinion, but in this instance I do. It seems 
 to me that Bruno's principal argument for comp is that it predicts MWI. 
 Yet 
 MWI itself is not falsifiable or testable.
  
  And I think MWI fails the measure problem despite the Gleason Theorem. 
 I think it is a mistake for Bruno to connect comp to MWI. Comp like string 
 theory is so rich in results that I suggest that it could as well predict 
 a 
 single world.

 However, I do appreciate Bruno's intellect and humility, a rare 
 combination.

>>>
>>> You do?  
>>>
>>> Then why participate in this tedious, repetitive carousel of personal 
>>> attacks (pointing to flaws without precision, just hand waving that there 
>>> is one and/or attacking Bruno on personal level) of everybody who hasn't 
>>> red the original thesis, the literature they are based on, and the papers 
>>> that build, clarify, or expand on the consequences; while pretending to 
>>> presuppose their content and invalidating them disingenuously? 
>>>
>>> Everybody here should know by now that these "attacks" don't lead 
>>> anywhere because off topic by nature and that comp makes your head spin in 
>>> disbelief at first recognizing possibilities and implications. That's not 
>>> an argument and neither are personal judgements and attacks of this sort. 
>>> The real time wasters. PGC
>>>
>>  
>>  
>>  
>> Quite a spew for someone that didn't look closely to in the first place 
>> make a say. There's no profile of maliceI've only ever had one major 
>> criticism of Bruno's theorizing, and I've tried hard to say it well enough 
>> for him that he can move past this. 
>>  
>> It is totally independent of theory - his or anyone's. It's about 
>> falsification that's all. He understands this wrongly...he conceives of it 
>> thing with many variant .,,.but this the bedrock of science, it's an 
>> hard to vary thing.
>>  
>> I understand youyou status-sniff so twill not have read any of my 
>> descriptions.  Had you of, you'd not entertain poor motivation this keenly, 
>> because endless tries to say it better, a single - just one - major 
>> criticism, is not the profile for that. 
>>  
>> Why not you have a go at my post previous to this, in which despite his 
>> allegation of vaguery, I go a few steps further than anyone else I'm aware 
>> of around here, to make more explicit the end to end structure of 
>> falsifiability as it is, in Science. I say. 
>>  
>> How about you give me that say, and suffer reading the points, and should 
>> you find disagreement, let me know. If possible also be less of a 
>> turd-sniffer PGC. There's a of formula. 
>>
>
> Thank you for proving my point by making matters clear. PGC
>
 
I don't think you had a distinctive point did you? You haven't read my side 
of things, you apparently disallow that something 
like prediction/falsification is as important to me as your comp 
envisionings are to you. Or to Bruno. You seem to visualize a sort of 
pecking order perhaps, in which the value of Bruno's passion or yours, for 
comp and infinite worlds and dreams and so on is embued with greater value, 
than Science as I see it, proper, has deep resonance with me. You vomited a 
number of allegations over me, when in fact I've made all the effort to 
make my case and I've never blanket dismissed Bruno the way Bruno blanket 
dismisses me. You're side taking PGC, in way that is totally unfair and 
unexplained. I've done nothing to you. I strongly disagree with elements of 
Bruno's theorizing, notably his claims to falsifiability which are NOT 
true. We both feel strongly, and we both continue to choose to engage. It's 
not your business. Only one person has dramatically attacked someone, and 
that is you your attack on me. 
 
You'd be welcome to join the argument...you'd be welcome to account for 
what YOU think falsification means, if you do know what it means. If 
you had engaged with my position and through that come to a standing on the 
value and/or motivation of my stance, that also would be acceptable to me. *But 
jumping in, 
discrediting me with malign motivation, accusing me failing to know or care 
what Bruno's ideas are. And then coming back with the pompous 
self-fascinated retort when I quite fairly and right call you for what you 
are being -  a nose that sniffs around other peoples turds thinking 
they smell a lot worse than his own. You're an empty pair of trousers mate. 
* 
 
 

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Re: TRONNIES

2014-05-18 Thread LizR
On 19 May 2014 08:14, John Ross  wrote:

> I believe Albert Einstein misinterpreted the Michelson-Morley experiment.
> That experiment proved that the *measured *speed of light was always
> constant.  It did not prove that the actual speed of light is always
> constant.  I believe light travels in Coulomb grids  and our earth has a
> Coulomb grid that it carries with it as it moves through the Coulomb grid
> of the solar system and the solar system has a Coulomb grid that moves with
> it as it  moves our galaxy, etc.  See my discussion at page 45.
>

OK, this sounds vaguely similar to what is called frame dragging in general
relativity. It should have measurable consequences - I would expect light
that changes velocity as it enters the Earth's Coulomb grid to be
defocused, for example.

>
>
> Do you understand how Albert Einstein explained the advance of Mercury’s
> perihelion?  I certainly don’t.  Although I have no reason to believe that
> My theory would not also explain the advance.  I believe my theory explains
> gravity much better than Albert Einstein did.  You are right that I have
> more to work with than Einstein.  About 100 years of science.
>

I don't know the maths, but I think I understand the principle. General
relativity predicts that space in the vicinity of massive bodies is curved,
or non-Euclidean, like the surface of a sphere or a saddle. This will
effectively change the value of pi, as defined as the ratio of a circle's
circumference to its diameter, and make the angles of a triangle sum to a
value ofther than 180 degrees. You can see this on the surface of the Earth
- for very large triangles, say one with corners in Kenya, Singapore at at
the North Pole, the angles sum to more than 180 degrees. In the vicinity of
the Sun, space is curved sufficiently that (if I remember correctly) the
angles of a triangle sum to less than 180, and the value of pi is reduced
slightly. Hence an ellipse - e.g. the orbit described by a planet - will be
slightly distorted. Effectively there is slightly less space available for
the planet to move through, so the point at which it is closest to the Sun
will be slightly displaced - to where it would have been in "flat"
space-time, I think (that would be my guess, at least, due to the
conservation of momentum). This advances the perihelion, by a tiny amount
for Mercury, but in a sufficiently strong gravitational field it would
makes the orbit look like one drawn with a "Spirograph". You can visualise
this (or maybe someone has done a computer animation) for a steep gravity
well with space reduced to a curved 2D surface (what's called an embedding
diagram I believe) in which an object is orbitting - if the mass of the
central object is adjustable, you can make the well deeper and the sides
steeper, and you should see the ellipse start to rotate around the centre
more and more quickly as the space containing one end of it gets more and
more compressed. (I've tried googling for something like this but no one
appears to have done this specific animation, which imho would show what's
going on with perihelion advance rather intuitively.)

For an authorised (and of course much better) explanation, I recommend this
book:


Misner, Thorne, Wheeler - Gravitation (Freeman, 1973)

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-18 Thread Platonist Guitar Cowboy
On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 7:22 PM,  wrote:

>
> On Sunday, May 18, 2014 2:57:02 PM UTC+1, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 5:41 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>>
>>> Hibbs,
>>> I do not often share your opinion, but in this instance I do. It seems
>>> to me that Bruno's principal argument for comp is that it predicts MWI. Yet
>>> MWI itself is not falsifiable or testable.
>>>
>>>  And I think MWI fails the measure problem despite the Gleason Theorem.
>>> I think it is a mistake for Bruno to connect comp to MWI. Comp like string
>>> theory is so rich in results that I suggest that it could as well predict a
>>> single world.
>>>
>>> However, I do appreciate Bruno's intellect and humility, a rare
>>> combination.
>>>
>>
>> You do?
>>
>> Then why participate in this tedious, repetitive carousel of personal
>> attacks (pointing to flaws without precision, just hand waving that there
>> is one and/or attacking Bruno on personal level) of everybody who hasn't
>> red the original thesis, the literature they are based on, and the papers
>> that build, clarify, or expand on the consequences; while pretending to
>> presuppose their content and invalidating them disingenuously?
>>
>> Everybody here should know by now that these "attacks" don't lead
>> anywhere because off topic by nature and that comp makes your head spin in
>> disbelief at first recognizing possibilities and implications. That's not
>> an argument and neither are personal judgements and attacks of this sort.
>> The real time wasters. PGC
>>
>
>
>
> Quite a spew for someone that didn't look closely to in the first place
> make a say. There's no profile of maliceI've only ever had one major
> criticism of Bruno's theorizing, and I've tried hard to say it well enough
> for him that he can move past this.
>
> It is totally independent of theory - his or anyone's. It's about
> falsification that's all. He understands this wrongly...he conceives of it
> thing with many variant .,,.but this the bedrock of science, it's an
> hard to vary thing.
>
> I understand youyou status-sniff so twill not have read any of my
> descriptions.  Had you of, you'd not entertain poor motivation this keenly,
> because endless tries to say it better, a single - just one - major
> criticism, is not the profile for that.
>
> Why not you have a go at my post previous to this, in which despite his
> allegation of vaguery, I go a few steps further than anyone else I'm aware
> of around here, to make more explicit the end to end structure of
> falsifiability as it is, in Science. I say.
>
> How about you give me that say, and suffer reading the points, and should
> you find disagreement, let me know. If possible also be less of a
> turd-sniffer PGC. There's a of formula.
>

Thank you for proving my point by making matters clear. PGC


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Re: TRONNIES

2014-05-18 Thread ghibbsa

On Sunday, May 18, 2014 8:27:21 PM UTC+1, John Ross wrote:
>
> John Clark
>
>  
>
> I plan to  save your e-mails and maybe I will read some of them to the 
> audience if and when it turns out that I am correct and am awarded the 
> Nobel prize in Physics.  
>
>  
>
> By the way, none of the brilliant scientists have *tried* to convince me 
> that I am wrong.  They all skeptical but they have all encouraged me to 
> make predictions that can be tested.  In my book I make 101 predictions.  A 
> large number of them can be tested.  
>
 Another possibility is they presented with a number of apparently show 
stopping apparently falsification events, similar to the high value 
contributions of this kind for you, your betterment and benefit. You 
apparently are resolute in studiously ignoring all of it. You surely must 
see that, e.g. the 2 photons not three photons as you said, raises a major 
question about the veracity of your theory. That isn't going to go 
away..ever. You're going to have to answer it eventually because your 
theory will never be permitterd into the mainline, while you apparently are 
openly against it. 
 
What reason have you to think you would not have behaved exactly the same 
way with your scientist pals>?
 

>  
>

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-18 Thread ghibbsa

On Sunday, May 18, 2014 4:07:20 PM UTC+1, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 4:50 PM, Richard Ruquist 
> 
> > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 5:37 AM, Bruno Marchal 
>> > wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On 18 May 2014, at 05:41, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>>>
>>> Hibbs,
>>> I do not often share your opinion, but in this instance I do. It seems 
>>> to me that Bruno's principal argument for comp is that it predicts MWI.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The argument says that comp (believed by 99,9% of scientists today) 
>>> entails the MWI. OK.
>>>
>>
>> Not OK and not true. 
>>
>
> So the majority of scientists don't believe in concept of function or 
> mechanism (that comp aims to make precise and study the consequences of, 
> given its step 0 assumptions)?
>
 
Isn't this a case of constructively building an association? I don't know 
if 99% of scientists concur with computationalism or not, but that would be 
a different question than whether scientists believe in the concept of 
function and mechanism. In the same way that "do insurers support 
speculative litigation" would be a different question than "so insurers 
don't believe in rule of law?"
 
 
There's a lot of spectrum and a lot of scope for slide rules up and down 
it. I'd certainly be interested to know data on this if you have any, or 
should come into possession later ion, 
 

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RE: TRONNIES

2014-05-18 Thread John Ross
I believe Albert Einstein misinterpreted the Michelson-Morley experiment.  That 
experiment proved that the measured speed of light was always constant.  It did 
not prove that the actual speed of light is always constant.  I believe light 
travels in Coulomb grids  and our earth has a Coulomb grid that it carries with 
it as it moves through the Coulomb grid of the solar system and the solar 
system has a Coulomb grid that moves with it as it  moves our galaxy, etc.  See 
my discussion at page 45.

 

Do you understand how Albert Einstein explained the advance of Mercury’s 
perihelion?  I certainly don’t.  Although I have no reason to believe that My 
theory would not also explain the advance.  I believe my theory explains 
gravity much better than Albert Einstein did.  You are right that I have more 
to work with than Einstein.  About 100 years of science.

 

John R

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of LizR
Sent: Saturday, May 17, 2014 4:01 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: TRONNIES

 

On 18 May 2014 07:38, John Ross  wrote:

I believe there is a need for my model because I believe it is a great 
improvement over existing currently accepted models. 

 

I get that, but everyone with a theory believes that. I'm interested in the 
specific flaws with the standard model that it fixes, and / or the reasoning 
that leads you to believe that it is better. (The reasoning should be the 
reasoning, not just a description of the end result of the reasoning!)

 

For example, I believe special relativity addresses the problems that Maxwell's 
equations break down for an object moving near lightspeed, and the anomalous 
results of the Michelson-Morley experiment, while general relativity addresses 
the advance of Mercury's perihelion. They are both based on equivalence 
principles, SR being that no moving observers should be privileged, GR on the 
equivalence between aceleration and gravity (the apparently fortuitous fact 
that the mass values in F=ma and F=Gm/r^2, if I have those right, is the same). 
So you can see how Einstein used certain principles he believed to be 
fundamental to support his reasoning, and how the results fixed particular 
problems with the existing models. I would expect your theory to have similar 
theoretical and experimental underpinnings if it's to be taken seriously. 
You're probably in a better position than Einstein as far as time and resources 
go since he was working in the Swiss patent office at the time he developed SR, 
if I remember correctly.

 

My book should be in your hands in a very few days if it is not already there.  
I suggest you read it a decide for yourself whether it has any merit.  After 
you have read it, I suggest you give it to your son.  If you do so, warn him 
that his professors probably are great supporters of the standard model and 
relativity.  Also see my response to John Clark.

 

They are great supporters with good reason! But of course they know those 
theories can't both be correct... 

 

John Ross

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of LizR
Sent: Friday, May 16, 2014 2:36 PM


To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: TRONNIES

 

Apparently gamme rays are emitted by nuclei when they drop from an excited 
state to a lower energy state (much as a lower energy photon can be emitted 
when an electron in an atom moves from a high to a low energy state). Hence 
what the atom had beforehand was excess energy (in some form). I assume one of 
the particles making up the nucleus was in some state equivalent to an electron 
being in an outer electron shell, and drops into its ground state after a 
while. I can check with my son, who is studying nuclear physics at school at 
this very moment. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isomeric_transition#Decay_processes

 

I must say it is ominous that you are consistently failing to answer my 
questions about the reasoning behind all of this, but just picking on some 
small simple point each time and ignoring most of my posts. I'm beginning to 
wonder how much reasoning there actually was. I still don't know why you think 
there is a need for this model, what questions is answers that the original 
fails to, etc.

 

 

On 17 May 2014 03:44, John Ross  wrote:

A radioactive atom that decays with a gamma ray photon has within itself before 
it decays something that will be released as a gamma ray photon when it decays. 
 That something (I say that something is an entron) has a mass equivalent to 
the energy of the gamma  ray photon.  When the decay occurs the mass of the 
atom decreases by an amount equal to the  mass of the gamma ray photon and  the 
gamma ray photon leaves with a mass equivalent to the energy of the gamma ray 
photon.

 

How can you disagree with this simple logic?  In your analysis is that 
something “rest mass” and if it is not what is it?

 

JR

 

Re: Free Will Universe Model - James Tagg

2014-05-18 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Sunday, May 18, 2014 1:56:48 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 18 May 2014, at 17:43, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> Free Will Universe Model: Non-computability and its relationship to the 
> ‘hardware’ of our Universe
>
> I saw his poster presentation at the TSC conference in Tucson and thought 
> it was pretty impressive. I'm not qualified to comment on the math, but I 
> don't see any obvious problems with his general approach:
>
> http://jamestagg.com/2014/04/26/free-will-universe-paper-text-pdf/
>
> Some highlights:
>
>
> Some Diophantine equations are easily solved
>> automatically, for example:
>> ∃𝑥, ∃𝑦 𝑥² = 𝑦² , 𝑥 & 𝑦 ∈ ℤ
>> Any pair of integers will do, and a computer programmed
>> to step through all the possible solutions will find one
>> immediately at ‘1,1’. An analytical tool such as Mathematica,
>> Mathcad or Maple would also immediately give symbolic
>> solutions to this problem therefore these can be solved
>> mechanically. But, Hilbert did not ask if ‘some’ equations
>> could be solved, he asked if there was a general way to solve
>> any Diophantine equation. 
>>
>> ...
>> *Consequence*
>> In 1995 Andrew Wiles – who had been secretly working on
>> Fermat’s ‘arbitrary equation’ since age eight – announced he
>> had found a proof. We now had the answers to both of our
>> questions: Fermat’s last theorem is provable (therefore
>> obviously decidable) and no algorithm could have found this
>> proof. This leads to a question; If no algorithm can have
>> found the proof what thought process did Wiles use to answer
>> the question: Put another way, Andrew Wiles can not be a
>> computer.
>>
>
> Also, he is the inventor of the LCD touchscreen, so that gives him some 
> credibility as well.
>
>
> http://www.trustedreviews.com/news/i-never-expected-them-to-take-off-says-inventor-of-the-touchscreen-display
>  
>
>
> You will not convince Andrew Wiles or anyone with argument like that.
>
> 1) it is an open question if the use of non elementary means can be 
> eliminated from Wiles proof. Usually non elementary means are eliminated 
> after some time in Number theory, and there are conjectures that this could 
> be a case of general law.
> 2) machine can use non elementary means in searching proofs too.
>

Does computationalism necessarily include all that is done by what we 
consider machines, or does computationalism have to be grounded, by 
definition, in elementary means?
 

> You did not provide evidence that they cannot do that.
>

His evidence was the negative answer to Hilbert's 10th problem. 
 

> And you could'nt as a machine like ZF, or ZF + kappa, can prove things 
> with quite non elementary means.
>

What theory addresses the emergence of non elementary means? Maybe there is 
something about the implementation of those machines which is introducing 
it rather than computational factors?

Craig
 

>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
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RE: TRONNIES

2014-05-18 Thread John Ross
John Clark

 

I plan to  save your e-mails and maybe I will read some of them to the audience 
if and when it turns out that I am correct and am awarded the Nobel prize in 
Physics.  

 

By the way, none of the brilliant scientists have tried to convince me that I 
am wrong.  They all skeptical but they have all encouraged me to make 
predictions that can be tested.  In my book I make 101 predictions.  A large 
number of them can be tested.  

 

My offer to send you a free copy of my book still stands.  Maybe you can prove 
that some of my predictions are incorrect - based on observations, not existing 
theories. 

 

John Ross 

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of John Clark
Sent: Sunday, May 18, 2014 8:02 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: TRONNIES

 

On Sat, May 17, 2014 at 3:27 PM, John Ross  wrote

 

>  I am  a good friend of many brilliant scientist.  Most of them are also 
> skeptical of my theory, but none of them has convinced me of any basic errors 
> in my theory

 

I am not one bit surprised that none of those brilliant scientist could 
convince you that your theory is wrong, the defining characteristic of a 
crackpot is the inability to make the slightest change in ones views even in 
the face of overwhelming logic. Many, including me, have pointed out that your 
model is not stable because it would radiate electromagnetic waves and so 
things would spiral inward, and that your model violates the conservation of 
mass/energy, and that your model violates the conservation of momentum, and 
that your model violates the law of conservation of lepton number, and that 
your model explains absolutely nothing that had previously been unexplained, 
and that your model can not be used to calculate anything that had previously 
been incalculable (actually I have grave doubts your model can be used to 
calculate ANYTHING).  

All these devastating criticisms have had absolutely positively zero effect on 
you;  you don't even attempt to refute them other than to simply say "no it 
doesn't". And then just like all good crackpots you ignore logical argument and 
just keep on spouting the same old tired stuff.   

  John K Clark 

 

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So, a new kind of non-boolean, non-digital, computer architecture

2014-05-18 Thread ghibbsa
Does this computer architecture assume not-comp? 
 
15046Synchronized oscillators may allow for computing that works like the 
brain
*Expand Messages*

   - richard ruquist
   May 15 2:09 PM
   View Source
   -  0 Attachment
  - 
   Synchronized oscillators may allow for computing that works like the 
   brainMay 15, 2014
   [image: oscillating_switch]
   This is a cartoon of an oscillating switch, the basis of a new type of 
   low-power analog computing (credit: Credit: Nikhil Shukla, Penn State)
   Computing is currently based on binary (Boolean) logic, but a new type 
   of computing architecture created by electrical engineers at Penn 
State stores 
   information in the frequencies and phases of periodic signals and could 
   work more like the human brain.
   It would use a fraction of the energy necessary for today’s computers, 
   according to the engineers.
   To achieve the new architecture, they used a thin film of vanadium oxide 
   on a titanium dioxide substrate to create an oscillating switch. Vanadium 
   dioxide is called a “wacky oxide” because it transitions from a conducting 
   metal to an insulating semiconductor and vice versa with the addition of a 
   small amount of heat or electrical current.
   *Biological synchronization for associative processing*
   Using a standard electrical engineering trick, Nikhil Shukla, graduate 
   student in electrical engineering, added a series resistor to the oxide 
   device to stabilize oscillations. When he added a second similar 
   oscillating system, he discovered that, over time, the two devices began to 
   oscillate in unison, or synchronize.
   This coupled system could provide the basis for non-Boolean computing. 
   Shukla worked with Suman Datta, professor of electrical engineering, and 
   co-advisor Roman Engel-Herbert, assistant professor of materials science 
   and engineering, Penn State. They reported their results May 14 in 
*Scientific 
   Reports* (open access).
   “It’s called a small-world network,” explained Shukla. “You see it in 
   lots of biological systems, such as certain species of fireflies. The males 
   will flash randomly, but then for some unknown reason the flashes 
   synchronize over time.” The brain is also a small-world network of closely 
   clustered nodes that evolved for more efficient information processing.
   “Biological synchronization is everywhere,” added Datta. “We wanted to 
   use it for a different kind of computing called associative processing, 
   which is an analog rather than digital way to compute.”
   An array of oscillators can store patterns — for instance, the color of 
   someone’s hair, their height and skin texture. If a second area of 
   oscillators has the same pattern, they will begin to synchronize, and the 
   degree of match can be read out, without consuming a lot of energy and 
   requiring a lot of transistors, as in Boolean computing.
   *A neuromorphic computer chip*
   Datta is collaborating with Vijay Narayanan, professor of computer 
   science and engineering, Penn State, in exploring the use of these coupled 
   oscillations to solve visual recognition problems more efficiently than 
   existing embedded vision processors.
   Shukla and Datta called on the expertise of Cornell University materials 
   scientist Darrell Schlom to make the vanadium dioxide thin film, which has 
   extremely high quality similar to single crystal silicon. Arijit 
   Raychowdhury, computer engineer, and Abhinav Parihar graduate student, both 
   of Georgia Tech, mathematically simulated the nonlinear dynamics of coupled 
   phase transitions in the vanadium dioxide devices.
   Parihar created a short video simulation of the transitions, which occur 
   at a rate close to a million times per second, to show the way the 
   oscillations synchronize. Venkatraman Gopalan, professor of materials 
   science and engineering, Penn State, used the Advanced Photon Source at 
   Argonne National Laboratory to visually characterize the structural changes 
   occurring in the oxide thin film in the midst of the oscillations.
   Datta believes it will take seven to 10 years to scale up from their 
   current network of two-three coupled oscillators to the 100 million or so 
   closely packed oscillators required to make a neuromorphic computer chip.
   One of the benefits of the novel device is that it will use only about 
   one percent of the energy of digital computing, allowing for new ways to 
   design computers. Much work remains to determine if vanadium dioxide can be 
   integrated into current silicon wafer technology.
   The Office of Naval Research primarily supported this work. The National 
   Science Foundation’s Expeditions in Computing Award also supported this 
   work.
   --
   *Abstract of Scientific Reports paper*
   Strongly correlated phases exhibit collective carrier dynamics that if 
   properly harnessed can enable n

Re: Free Will Universe Model - James Tagg

2014-05-18 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 18 May 2014, at 17:43, Craig Weinberg wrote:

Free Will Universe Model: Non-computability and its relationship to  
the ‘hardware’ of our Universe


I saw his poster presentation at the TSC conference in Tucson and  
thought it was pretty impressive. I'm not qualified to comment on  
the math, but I don't see any obvious problems with his general  
approach:


http://jamestagg.com/2014/04/26/free-will-universe-paper-text-pdf/

Some highlights:


Some Diophantine equations are easily solved
automatically, for example:
∃𝑥, ∃𝑦 𝑥² = 𝑦² , 𝑥 & 𝑦 ∈ ℤ
Any pair of integers will do, and a computer programmed
to step through all the possible solutions will find one
immediately at ‘1,1’. An analytical tool such as Mathematica,
Mathcad or Maple would also immediately give symbolic
solutions to this problem therefore these can be solved
mechanically. But, Hilbert did not ask if ‘some’ equations
could be solved, he asked if there was a general way to solve
any Diophantine equation.

...
Consequence
In 1995 Andrew Wiles – who had been secretly working on
Fermat’s ‘arbitrary equation’ since age eight – announced he
had found a proof. We now had the answers to both of our
questions: Fermat’s last theorem is provable (therefore
obviously decidable) and no algorithm could have found this
proof. This leads to a question; If no algorithm can have
found the proof what thought process did Wiles use to answer
the question: Put another way, Andrew Wiles can not be a
computer.

Also, he is the inventor of the LCD touchscreen, so that gives him  
some credibility as well.


http://www.trustedreviews.com/news/i-never-expected-them-to-take-off-says-inventor-of-the-touchscreen-display


You will not convince Andrew Wiles or anyone with argument like that.

1) it is an open question if the use of non elementary means can be  
eliminated from Wiles proof. Usually non elementary means are  
eliminated after some time in Number theory, and there are conjectures  
that this could be a case of general law.
2) machine can use non elementary means in searching proofs too. You  
did not provide evidence that they cannot do that. And you could'nt as  
a machine like ZF, or ZF + kappa, can prove things with quite non  
elementary means.


Bruno






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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-18 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 18 May 2014, at 17:12, Richard Ruquist wrote:

It is easy to prove that "99.9% of scientists believe in MWI" is not  
true.


I said that 99,9 % of the scientists believe (more or less explicitly)  
in computationalism (in the weak sense I define by YD+CT).


Of course 99,9% of the scientists ignore today that computationalism  
makes materialism dubious. QM already makes boolean materialism  
dubious, and the notion of physical reality unclear.


I just extend Everett relative state vision on all computations,  
taking into account that the observer is a relative universal numbers,  
a Löbian one.




The polls taken at physics meetings indicate that less than 50% have  
such a belief.



Sure, for the quantum MWI, that oscillates a lot. But for comp,  
amazingly enough, the many-computations "ontology" is already provided  
by the weakest theory of arithmetic (Robinson arithmetic). 100% of the  
mathematicians agrees, as it is a theorem of very elementary  
arithmetic. Still, few meditates on this, and believes that the God  
Matter select their reality.
With comp, God does not select reality, it makes them happening. Only  
you select the reality.



Bruno



Gotta go.


On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 11:07 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy > wrote:




On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 4:50 PM, Richard Ruquist   
wrote:




On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 5:37 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 18 May 2014, at 05:41, Richard Ruquist wrote:


Hibbs,
I do not often share your opinion, but in this instance I do. It  
seems to me that Bruno's principal argument for comp is that it  
predicts MWI.



The argument says that comp (believed by 99,9% of scientists today)  
entails the MWI. OK.


Not OK and not true.

So the majority of scientists don't believe in concept of function  
or mechanism (that comp aims to make precise and study the  
consequences of, given its step 0 assumptions)?


What do they believe in then, according to you?

Prove it, Richard. Yelling "Not ok", is not sufficient. Same for the  
flaws you claim to have found. PGC



But it predicts much more than the MWI. It predicts, with the use of  
the classical definition of knowledge (used by most analytical  
philosopher), the precise possible logic of observability (Z1*, or  
S4Grz1, or X1*). In fact we get different physical realms (probably  
the physics in heaven, earth, and many intermediate realms, ...).



Yet MWI itself is not falsifiable or testable.


I disagree. If you assume mechanism, the two-slits experience is  
enough test of the MW or MC(*)for me. I use "world" is the sense of  
a reality as real as what I can observe here and now with quasi- 
certainty, not in the sense of some ontology, as you know "I  
believe" only in natural numbers, and in Einstein reality definition.


The two-slit experiment does not test MWI because the detectors all  
select the same world. All controlled experiments select a single  
world.


(*) MC = Many Computations.




 And I think MWI fails the measure problem despite the Gleason  
Theorem. I think it is a mistake for Bruno to connect comp to MWI.  
Comp like string theory is so rich in results that I suggest that  
it could as well predict a single world.


I doubt this.





However, I do appreciate Bruno's intellect and humility,


Thanks.



a rare combination.


I hope it is not. Comp predicts it is not. The more you know, the  
more you are aware of the bigness of what you don't know.


Bruno





Richard


On Sat, May 17, 2014 at 10:47 PM,  wrote:

On Thursday, May 15, 2014 7:48:26 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 14 May 2014, at 22:44, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:



On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 7:31:17 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 14 May 2014, at 03:29, meekerdb wrote:


On 5/13/2014 6:11 PM, LizR wrote:

On 14 May 2014 11:15, meekerdb  wrote:
On 5/13/2014 4:06 PM, LizR wrote:

On 14 May 2014 06:29, meekerdb  wrote:
On 5/12/2014 9:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Turing *emulation* is only meaningful in the context of  
emulating one part relative to another part that is not  
emulated, i.e. is "real".
If you say so. We can still listen to the machine, and compare  
with nature.
When we compare with nature we find that some things exist and  
some don't.


Like other worlds don't exist, or atoms don't exist ... the  
question about what exists hasn't been answered yet. Or indeed  
the question about what it means for something to exist.
So is it your view that no matter what comp predicts it's not  
falsified because it may be true somewhere else?


I find it hard to read that into what I wrote. (Unless "no  
matter what comp predicts" is a slightly awkward, but  
potentially rather funny, pun?)


But anyway, no that isn't my view. Either comp is true or it  
isn't, which is to say, either consciousness is Turing emulable  
at some level, or it isn't. And if it is, either there is some  
flaw in what Bruno derives from that assumption, or there isn't.


But the question is about how to test comp.  Bruno has off

Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-18 Thread ghibbsa

On Sunday, May 18, 2014 2:57:02 PM UTC+1, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 5:41 AM, Richard Ruquist 
> 
> > wrote:
>
>> Hibbs,
>> I do not often share your opinion, but in this instance I do. It seems to 
>> me that Bruno's principal argument for comp is that it predicts MWI. Yet 
>> MWI itself is not falsifiable or testable.
>>
>>  And I think MWI fails the measure problem despite the Gleason Theorem. I 
>> think it is a mistake for Bruno to connect comp to MWI. Comp like string 
>> theory is so rich in results that I suggest that it could as well predict a 
>> single world.
>>
>> However, I do appreciate Bruno's intellect and humility, a rare 
>> combination.
>>
>
> You do?  
>
> Then why participate in this tedious, repetitive carousel of personal 
> attacks (pointing to flaws without precision, just hand waving that there 
> is one and/or attacking Bruno on personal level) of everybody who hasn't 
> red the original thesis, the literature they are based on, and the papers 
> that build, clarify, or expand on the consequences; while pretending to 
> presuppose their content and invalidating them disingenuously? 
>
> Everybody here should know by now that these "attacks" don't lead anywhere 
> because off topic by nature and that comp makes your head spin in disbelief 
> at first recognizing possibilities and implications. That's not an argument 
> and neither are personal judgements and attacks of this sort. The real time 
> wasters. PGC
>
 
 
 
Quite a spew for someone that didn't look closely to in the first place 
make a say. There's no profile of maliceI've only ever had one major 
criticism of Bruno's theorizing, and I've tried hard to say it well enough 
for him that he can move past this. 
 
It is totally independent of theory - his or anyone's. It's about 
falsification that's all. He understands this wrongly...he conceives of it 
thing with many variant .,,.but this the bedrock of science, it's an 
hard to vary thing.
 
I understand youyou status-sniff so twill not have read any of my 
descriptions.  Had you of, you'd not entertain poor motivation this keenly, 
because endless tries to say it better, a single - just one - major 
criticism, is not the profile for that. 
 
Why not you have a go at my post previous to this, in which despite his 
allegation of vaguery, I go a few steps further than anyone else I'm aware 
of around here, to make more explicit the end to end structure of 
falsifiability as it is, in Science. I say. 
 
How about you give me that say, and suffer reading the points, and should 
you find disagreement, let me know. If possible also be less of a 
turd-sniffer PGC. There's a of formula. 

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-18 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 18 May 2014, at 16:50, Richard Ruquist wrote:





On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 5:37 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 18 May 2014, at 05:41, Richard Ruquist wrote:


Hibbs,
I do not often share your opinion, but in this instance I do. It  
seems to me that Bruno's principal argument for comp is that it  
predicts MWI.



The argument says that comp (believed by 99,9% of scientists today)  
entails the MWI. OK.


Not OK and not true.


OK. I can agree. What is a world anyway?

Nevertheless, it is easy, even in Robinson arithmetic, to prove the  
existence *all* finite piece of computations. Then assuming  
computationalism, we have already our problem.


My *relative* consciousness is determined by all computations in which  
I feel personally to survive (the global FPI on the sigma_1 complete  
part of the arithmetical reality).


From the first person views, seen in some 3 views, that is more  
coherent with a many worlds *views* of reality.


It is indeed an open problem if some type of computations winning the  
limit come to singularize a unique physical reality, defining somehow  
from inside a unique physical universe, but that becomes a very  
complex question.


There are deep relation between number theory and string theory, and  
knot theory too.  That might help to extracts more information for the  
lives of the relative universal numbers in Arithmetic.






But it predicts much more than the MWI. It predicts, with the use of  
the classical definition of knowledge (used by most analytical  
philosopher), the precise possible logic of observability (Z1*, or  
S4Grz1, or X1*). In fact we get different physical realms (probably  
the physics in heaven, earth, and many intermediate realms, ...).



Yet MWI itself is not falsifiable or testable.


I disagree. If you assume mechanism, the two-slits experience is  
enough test of the MW or MC(*)for me. I use "world" is the sense of  
a reality as real as what I can observe here and now with quasi- 
certainty, not in the sense of some ontology, as you know "I  
believe" only in natural numbers, and in Einstein reality definition.


The two-slit experiment does not test MWI because the detectors all  
select the same world. All controlled experiments select a single  
world.



From the first person points of view. That is correct, and predicted  
by computationalism (and by Everett in QM), the observer does not feel  
the split, nor the stopping.


QM is a relief for a classical computationalist, as it is a witness we  
do share a substitution level, and we do share a common universal  
history. QM protects comp from solipsism, and illustrates the  
existence of a solid first person plural. If ever god duplicate me, he  
duplicates you too. The quantum superposition are just very contagious.


Then the meta-arithmetical theorems (Gödel, Löb, Solovay, Boolos,  
Goldblatt, Visser) shows that a logic of certainties, for Löbian  
number are given by the Theaetetus definitions, which are also the  
simplest common sense notion, well, applied *from* the understanding  
of the UDA.


Incompleteness forces the machine to distinguish truth and belief, and  
forces the distinction between belief ([]p), knowledge ([]p & p), bet  
([]p & <>t), and normally you should get the physical laws on the bet  
on all sigma_1 sentences.


You do get indeed an arithmetical quantum logic (well, actually three,  
and even a graded set of quantum logics, for the []p & <><>p  
variants ...).


In fact on sigma_1, the subtleness of incompleteness, makes possible a  
non trivial marriage between symmetry

p -> []<>p,
and antisymmetry
[]([](p->[]p)->p)->p.
Actually those logics (with p representing sigma_1 sentences) have  
both the "trivial" axioms (false in  most modal logics)
 "p-> []p". It asserts the sigma_1 completeness of the universal  
machine (with [] = the box in G = Gödel's beweisbar), together with  
the "reflection" formula []p -> p.
They have p -> []p and [] -> p, but if "p->[]p" occurs at the G level,  
[] p -> p is only verified at the G* level, and []<>p does not  
collapse into p.


And S4Grz1 does not even lost the necessitation rule, having both [] 
([]p -> p) for p atomic, and [](p->p), but again []<>p does not  
collapse, and still gives a non trivial quantization of the  
arithmetical sigma_1 proposition.


I am a constructive mystic. I am telling you that truth, including the  
physical truth, is in your head, and (the modern constructive part):  
truth is in the head of all universal numbers. The Löbian number are  
the one who have enough imagination (induction power) to get that point.


All entities capable of believing in the Peano axioms can get that  
point. If patient and motivated enough, 'course.


That does not mean it is true, but it means that if, by the Church- 
Turing comp necessity, you survive with a digital brain or body, well  
in that case it is true (normally, if no invalid steps, etc.).


Bruno




(*) MC = Many Computations.




 An

Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-18 Thread spudboy100 via Everything List
Accordingto Deutsch, MWI is falsifiable, with some actions of a quantum 
computer. These would be the heavy hitters of QC, and not the lab toys we have 
today, but we'd potentially have access to electrons in parallel cosmii. 
 


 Bruno's principal argument for comp is that it predicts MWI. Yet MWI itself is 
not falsifiable or testable.

 

 

 

-Original Message-
From: Richard Ruquist 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Sat, May 17, 2014 11:41 pm
Subject: Re: Is Consciousness Computable?


Hibbs,
I do not often share your opinion, but in this instance I do. It seems to me 
that Bruno's principal argument for comp is that it predicts MWI. Yet MWI 
itself is not falsifiable or testable.


 And I think MWI fails the measure problem despite the Gleason Theorem. I think 
it is a mistake for Bruno to connect comp to MWI. Comp like string theory is so 
rich in results that I suggest that it could as well predict a single world.


However, I do appreciate Bruno's intellect and humility, a rare combination.
Richard




On Sat, May 17, 2014 at 10:47 PM,   wrote:


On Thursday, May 15, 2014 7:48:26 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 14 May 2014, at 22:44, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:



On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 7:31:17 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 14 May 2014, at 03:29, meekerdb wrote:


  

On 5/13/2014 6:11 PM, LizR wrote:


  

  
On 14 May 2014 11:15, meekerdb wrote:

  

  

On 5/13/2014 4:06 PM, LizR wrote:


  

  
On 14 May 2014 06:29,meekerdb  
   wrote:

  

  
On 5/12/2014 9:40 AM, BrunoMarchal wrote:
  


  

Turing *emulation*  is only meaningful in 
the context  of emulating one part relative 
to  another part that is not emulated,  
i.e. is "real". 

If you say so. We can still listen  
  to the machine, and compare with  
  nature. 
  

When we compare with nature we find that
some things exist and some don't.
  

  
  


Like other worlds don't  exist, or atoms don't exist 
... the question  about what exists hasn't been 
answered yet. Or  indeed the question about what it 
means for  something to exist.

  

  

So is it your view that no matter what comp predicts
it's not falsified because it may be true somewhereelse?
  

  
  


I find it hard to read that into what I  wrote. (Unless "no matter what 
comp predicts" is a slightly  awkward, but potentially rather funny, 
pun?)
  


But anyway, no that isn't my view.  Either comp is true or it isn't, 
which is to say, either  consciousness is Turing emulable at some 
level, or it isn't.  And if it is, either there is some flaw in what 
Bruno derives  from that assumption, or there isn't.

  


But the question is about how to test comp.  Bruno has offered thatwe 
should compare its predictions to observed physics.  My view isthat this 
requires predictions about what happens here and now,where some things 
happen and some don't.  "Predictions" thatsomething happens somewhere in 
the multiverse don't satisfy my ideaof testable.






But comp do prediction right now. At first sight it predicts white noise and 
white rabbits, but then we listen to the machines views on this, and the 
simplest pass from provability to probability (the local erasing of the 
cul-de-sac worlds) gives a quantization of the arithmetical sigma_1 
proposition. A good chance that arithmetic provided some quantum erazing, or 
destructive interference in the observations.


To me, Gleason theorem somehow solve the measur

Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-18 Thread Platonist Guitar Cowboy
On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 5:12 PM, Richard Ruquist  wrote:

> It is easy to prove that "99.9% of scientists believe in MWI" is not true.
> The polls taken at physics meetings indicate that less than 50% have such
> a belief.
> Gotta go.
>

Where do you see Bruno make such a statement?


>
>
> On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 11:07 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy <
> multiplecit...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 4:50 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 5:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>

 On 18 May 2014, at 05:41, Richard Ruquist wrote:

 Hibbs,
 I do not often share your opinion, but in this instance I do. It seems
 to me that Bruno's principal argument for comp is that it predicts MWI.



He said:


>
 The argument says that comp (believed by 99,9% of scientists today)
 entails the MWI. OK.

>>>
Comp entails MWI does not mean majority of scientists believe MWI. So straw
man, Richard. PGC


>
>>> Not OK and not true.
>>>
>>
>> So the majority of scientists don't believe in concept of function or
>> mechanism (that comp aims to make precise and study the consequences of,
>> given its step 0 assumptions)?
>>
>> What do they believe in then, according to you?
>>
>> Prove it, Richard. Yelling "Not ok", is not sufficient. Same for the
>> flaws you claim to have found. PGC
>>
>>
>>>
 But it predicts much more than the MWI. It predicts, with the use of
 the classical definition of knowledge (used by most analytical
 philosopher), the precise possible logic of observability (Z1*, or S4Grz1,
 or X1*). In fact we get different physical realms (probably the physics in
 heaven, earth, and many intermediate realms, ...).

 Yet MWI itself is not falsifiable or testable.


 I disagree. If you assume mechanism, the two-slits experience is enough
 test of the MW or MC(*)for me. I use "world" is the sense of a reality as
 real as what I can observe here and now with quasi-certainty, not in the
 sense of some ontology, as you know "I believe" only in natural numbers,
 and in Einstein reality definition.

>>>
>>> The two-slit experiment does not test MWI because the detectors all
>>> select the same world. All controlled experiments select a single world.
>>>

 (*) MC = Many Computations.



  And I think MWI fails the measure problem despite the Gleason Theorem.
 I think it is a mistake for Bruno to connect comp to MWI. Comp like string
 theory is so rich in results that I suggest that it could as well predict a
 single world.


 I doubt this.




 However, I do appreciate Bruno's intellect and humility,


 Thanks.


 a rare combination.


 I hope it is not. Comp predicts it is not. The more you know, the more
 you are aware of the bigness of what you don't know.

 Bruno




 Richard


 On Sat, May 17, 2014 at 10:47 PM,  wrote:

>
> On Thursday, May 15, 2014 7:48:26 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 14 May 2014, at 22:44, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 7:31:17 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 14 May 2014, at 03:29, meekerdb wrote:
>>>
>>>  On 5/13/2014 6:11 PM, LizR wrote:
>>>
>>>  On 14 May 2014 11:15, meekerdb  wrote:
>>>
   On 5/13/2014 4:06 PM, LizR wrote:

  On 14 May 2014 06:29, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 5/12/2014 9:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Turing **emulation** is only meaningful in the context of
> emulating one part relative to another part that is not emulated, 
> i.e. is
> "real".
>
> If you say so. We can still listen to the machine, and compare
> with nature.
>
>  When we compare with nature we find that some things exist and
> some don't.
>

  Like other worlds don't exist, or atoms don't exist ... the
 question about what exists hasn't been answered yet. Or indeed the 
 question
 about what it means for something to exist.

  So is it your view that no matter what comp predicts it's not
 falsified because it may be true somewhere else?

>>>
>>>  I find it hard to read that into what I wrote. (Unless "no matter
>>> what comp predicts" is a slightly awkward, but potentially rather funny,
>>> pun?)
>>>
>>>  But anyway, no that isn't my view. Either comp is true or it
>>> isn't, which is to say, either consciousness is Turing emulable at some
>>> level, or it isn't. And if it is, either there is some flaw in what 
>>> Bruno
>>> derives from that assumption, or there isn't.
>>>
>>>
>>> But the question is about how to test comp.  Bruno has offere

Re: Moneybot Singularity

2014-05-18 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Thursday, May 15, 2014 5:18:15 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote:
>
> On 16 May 2014 08:29, Craig Weinberg >wrote:
>
>> On Thursday, May 15, 2014 3:55:12 PM UTC-4, JohnM wrote:
>>
>>> Craig:
>>> beautiful reply, appreciate your understanding and explanation.
>>> H O W E V E R : 
>>> if we "MIX" pop culture with more 'thought-of' speculation (language?) 
>>> we get into trouble soon. Popular meanings are ill-defined and many times 
>>> loose. 
>>> I try to verify the exact meanings applies  
>>>
>>
>> Craig, my Kraxlwerk (PC) stole the half-baked text and mailed it away. 
>>> I am thankful: the rest would have been silly, anyway.
>>> John
>>>
>>  
>> Thanks John, 
>>
>> Yeah, I re-posted that one from by blog so it is more pop-friendly than I 
>> probably would have made it for this list. Applying 'singularity' to the 
>> growth of technology is pretty weak, I agree. I guess someone decided it 
>> needed a super-amazing name.
>>
>
> Vernor Vinge.
>
> He called it a technological singularity because it makes the future 
> impossible to predict even in a weak sense. This makes it more like a 
> technological event horizon than a singularity, assuming it occurs (Max 
> Tegmark seems to be both worried and hopeful that it will). A singularity 
> is where something comes to an end, in this case human progress (it ends 
> because it hits the wall of whatever is actually possible, assuming that is 
> finite, or if not it ends because it goes to infinity).
>

Thanks. Yeah, that makes more sense, and I have heard of Vinge, but it 
still seems like a term which as a meaning that is more of a metaphor than 
most people would assume. 

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Free Will Universe Model - James Tagg

2014-05-18 Thread Craig Weinberg
Free Will Universe Model: Non-computability and its relationship to the 
‘hardware’ of our Universe

I saw his poster presentation at the TSC conference in Tucson and thought 
it was pretty impressive. I'm not qualified to comment on the math, but I 
don't see any obvious problems with his general approach:

http://jamestagg.com/2014/04/26/free-will-universe-paper-text-pdf/

Some highlights:


Some Diophantine equations are easily solved
> automatically, for example:
> ∃𝑥, ∃𝑦 𝑥² = 𝑦² , 𝑥 & 𝑦 ∈ ℤ
> Any pair of integers will do, and a computer programmed
> to step through all the possible solutions will find one
> immediately at ‘1,1’. An analytical tool such as Mathematica,
> Mathcad or Maple would also immediately give symbolic
> solutions to this problem therefore these can be solved
> mechanically. But, Hilbert did not ask if ‘some’ equations
> could be solved, he asked if there was a general way to solve
> any Diophantine equation. 
>
> ...
> *Consequence*
> In 1995 Andrew Wiles – who had been secretly working on
> Fermat’s ‘arbitrary equation’ since age eight – announced he
> had found a proof. We now had the answers to both of our
> questions: Fermat’s last theorem is provable (therefore
> obviously decidable) and no algorithm could have found this
> proof. This leads to a question; If no algorithm can have
> found the proof what thought process did Wiles use to answer
> the question: Put another way, Andrew Wiles can not be a
> computer.
>

Also, he is the inventor of the LCD touchscreen, so that gives him some 
credibility as well.

http://www.trustedreviews.com/news/i-never-expected-them-to-take-off-says-inventor-of-the-touchscreen-display
 

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Re: Video of VCR

2014-05-18 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Friday, May 16, 2014 3:20:24 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 15 May 2014, at 22:22, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, May 15, 2014 2:19:01 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 15 May 2014, at 14:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 6:34:55 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 14 May 2014, at 03:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> I'm showing that authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, and that 
> the failure of logic to detect the significance of authenticity can be 
> empirically demonstrated, but that neither authenticity or the failure of 
> logic to detect it can be detected within logic. At least Godel shows 
> logic's incompleteness, but that is just the beginning. What logic doesn't 
> know about what logic doesn't know I think dwarfs all of arithmetic truth.
>
>
> Gödel has shown the completeness of first order logic, and this means that 
> what we prove in a theory written in such logic,  will be true in all 
> interpretation of the theory, and what is true in all interpretations, will 
> be provable in the theory.
>
> Then Gödel proved the incompleteness of *all* theories about numbers and 
> machines, with respect to a standard notion of truth. 
>
> This means that the truth about number and machines are above what 
> machines can prove, and thus what human can prove, locally, if we assume 
> computationalism.
>
>
> But computationalism is a theory about numbers and machines, so we cannot 
> truthfully assume it. 
>
>
>
> no. It is a theory about your consciousness, and its relation with 
> possible brains.
>

But a brain is just a type of machine under comp, and the relations are 
just number relations.
 

> It becomes a theory about numbers, but that is the result of a non trivial 
> reasoning, and the acceptation of the classical theory of knowledge.
>

I can't imagine why the classical theory of knowledge should be acceptable 
as a way to model consciousness.
 

>
>
>
>
> Does Wiles solution to Fermat's last theorem prove that humans can use 
> non-computational methods, in light of the negative solution to Hilbert's 
> 10th problem?
>
>
> No. 
>
>
> Why not? I doubt I'll understand your answer but I might be able to get 
> someone else to explain why he thinks you're wrong.
>
>
> Well, you can invite him to make his point. 
>

I've only spoken with him a couple times, but I would if it comes up in the 
future.
 

> The problem is that somehow, in some sense, humans can use non 
> computational rules, like heuristics and metaheuristic, which are non 
> algorithm. But that is also a big chapter in AI, and machines can also use 
> heuristic without problem, and it change nothing about the truth or falsity 
> of comp. In fact the first person "[]p & p" is also a non algorithmic 
> entity. So, use à-la Penrose Gödelian argument are usually confusion 
> between []p and []p & p, or []p in G and []p in G*.
>

I think that it is nothing other than a semantic misdirection to take 
non-computational first person properties as being associated with 
computation. If non-computational properties serve an important function in 
consciousness, then comp is false. If our first person experience is 
non-computational then comp is false, since the production of 
non-computational effects by computation does not imply consciousness, nor 
does it even imply independence from consciousness to accomplish that 
production.


>
>
>  
>
>
>
>
> Penrose thinks that it does:
>
> "The inescapable conclusion seems to be: Mathematicians are not using a 
> knowably sound calculation procedure in order to ascertain mathematical 
> truth. We deduce that mathematical understanding – the means whereby 
> mathematicians arrive at their conclusions with respect to mathematical 
> truth – cannot be reduced to blind calculation!"
>
>
> Good. That's when Penrose is correct. No machines at all can use a 
> knowably sound procedure to ascertain a mathematical truth. 
> By adding "knowably" Penrose corrected an earlier statement. But then he 
> does not realize that now, his argument is in favor of mechanism, because 
> it attribute to humans, what computer science already attributes to machine.
>
>
> If computer science attributes it to machines (and I would say that it is 
> only some computer scientists who do so) 
>
>
> because some are not aware of the difference between []p & p and  []p. 
>

I am aware that the difference is assumed in comp rather than explained by 
comp. You admit that at some level, basic functions of logic are taken as 
axioms. I reject all possibility of axioms in the absence of sense.
 

>
>
>
>
> then it cannot use a knowably sound procedure to do that, therefore it is 
> a belief rather than a correct attribution. 
>
>
> Yes. you even need an act of faith. I never defend the "truth" of comp. It 
> is a belief like everywhere in science when we apply it to a reality.
>

I don't think that the understanding that awareness is ontologically 
necessary is a

Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-18 Thread Richard Ruquist
It is easy to prove that "99.9% of scientists believe in MWI" is not true.
The polls taken at physics meetings indicate that less than 50% have such a
belief.
Gotta go.


On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 11:07 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy <
multiplecit...@gmail.com> wrote:

>
>
>
> On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 4:50 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 5:37 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On 18 May 2014, at 05:41, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>>>
>>> Hibbs,
>>> I do not often share your opinion, but in this instance I do. It seems
>>> to me that Bruno's principal argument for comp is that it predicts MWI.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The argument says that comp (believed by 99,9% of scientists today)
>>> entails the MWI. OK.
>>>
>>
>> Not OK and not true.
>>
>
> So the majority of scientists don't believe in concept of function or
> mechanism (that comp aims to make precise and study the consequences of,
> given its step 0 assumptions)?
>
> What do they believe in then, according to you?
>
> Prove it, Richard. Yelling "Not ok", is not sufficient. Same for the flaws
> you claim to have found. PGC
>
>
>>
>>> But it predicts much more than the MWI. It predicts, with the use of the
>>> classical definition of knowledge (used by most analytical philosopher),
>>> the precise possible logic of observability (Z1*, or S4Grz1, or X1*). In
>>> fact we get different physical realms (probably the physics in heaven,
>>> earth, and many intermediate realms, ...).
>>>
>>> Yet MWI itself is not falsifiable or testable.
>>>
>>>
>>> I disagree. If you assume mechanism, the two-slits experience is enough
>>> test of the MW or MC(*)for me. I use "world" is the sense of a reality as
>>> real as what I can observe here and now with quasi-certainty, not in the
>>> sense of some ontology, as you know "I believe" only in natural numbers,
>>> and in Einstein reality definition.
>>>
>>
>> The two-slit experiment does not test MWI because the detectors all
>> select the same world. All controlled experiments select a single world.
>>
>>>
>>> (*) MC = Many Computations.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  And I think MWI fails the measure problem despite the Gleason Theorem.
>>> I think it is a mistake for Bruno to connect comp to MWI. Comp like string
>>> theory is so rich in results that I suggest that it could as well predict a
>>> single world.
>>>
>>>
>>> I doubt this.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> However, I do appreciate Bruno's intellect and humility,
>>>
>>>
>>> Thanks.
>>>
>>>
>>> a rare combination.
>>>
>>>
>>> I hope it is not. Comp predicts it is not. The more you know, the more
>>> you are aware of the bigness of what you don't know.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Richard
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sat, May 17, 2014 at 10:47 PM,  wrote:
>>>

 On Thursday, May 15, 2014 7:48:26 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 14 May 2014, at 22:44, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
> On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 7:31:17 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 14 May 2014, at 03:29, meekerdb wrote:
>>
>>  On 5/13/2014 6:11 PM, LizR wrote:
>>
>>  On 14 May 2014 11:15, meekerdb  wrote:
>>
>>>   On 5/13/2014 4:06 PM, LizR wrote:
>>>
>>>  On 14 May 2014 06:29, meekerdb  wrote:
>>>
  On 5/12/2014 9:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 Turing **emulation** is only meaningful in the context of
 emulating one part relative to another part that is not emulated, i.e. 
 is
 "real".

 If you say so. We can still listen to the machine, and compare with
 nature.

  When we compare with nature we find that some things exist and
 some don't.

>>>
>>>  Like other worlds don't exist, or atoms don't exist ... the
>>> question about what exists hasn't been answered yet. Or indeed the 
>>> question
>>> about what it means for something to exist.
>>>
>>>  So is it your view that no matter what comp predicts it's not
>>> falsified because it may be true somewhere else?
>>>
>>
>>  I find it hard to read that into what I wrote. (Unless "no matter
>> what comp predicts" is a slightly awkward, but potentially rather funny,
>> pun?)
>>
>>  But anyway, no that isn't my view. Either comp is true or it isn't,
>> which is to say, either consciousness is Turing emulable at some level, 
>> or
>> it isn't. And if it is, either there is some flaw in what Bruno derives
>> from that assumption, or there isn't.
>>
>>
>> But the question is about how to test comp.  Bruno has offered that
>> we should compare its predictions to observed physics.  My view is that
>> this requires predictions about what happens here and now, where some
>> things happen and some don't.  "Predictions" that something happens
>> somewhere in the multiverse don't satisfy my idea of testable.
>>
>>
>>
>> But comp do prediction right now. At first sigh

Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-18 Thread Platonist Guitar Cowboy
On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 4:50 PM, Richard Ruquist  wrote:

>
>
>
> On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 5:37 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> On 18 May 2014, at 05:41, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>>
>> Hibbs,
>> I do not often share your opinion, but in this instance I do. It seems to
>> me that Bruno's principal argument for comp is that it predicts MWI.
>>
>>
>>
>> The argument says that comp (believed by 99,9% of scientists today)
>> entails the MWI. OK.
>>
>
> Not OK and not true.
>

So the majority of scientists don't believe in concept of function or
mechanism (that comp aims to make precise and study the consequences of,
given its step 0 assumptions)?

What do they believe in then, according to you?

Prove it, Richard. Yelling "Not ok", is not sufficient. Same for the flaws
you claim to have found. PGC


>
>> But it predicts much more than the MWI. It predicts, with the use of the
>> classical definition of knowledge (used by most analytical philosopher),
>> the precise possible logic of observability (Z1*, or S4Grz1, or X1*). In
>> fact we get different physical realms (probably the physics in heaven,
>> earth, and many intermediate realms, ...).
>>
>> Yet MWI itself is not falsifiable or testable.
>>
>>
>> I disagree. If you assume mechanism, the two-slits experience is enough
>> test of the MW or MC(*)for me. I use "world" is the sense of a reality as
>> real as what I can observe here and now with quasi-certainty, not in the
>> sense of some ontology, as you know "I believe" only in natural numbers,
>> and in Einstein reality definition.
>>
>
> The two-slit experiment does not test MWI because the detectors all select
> the same world. All controlled experiments select a single world.
>
>>
>> (*) MC = Many Computations.
>>
>>
>>
>>  And I think MWI fails the measure problem despite the Gleason Theorem. I
>> think it is a mistake for Bruno to connect comp to MWI. Comp like string
>> theory is so rich in results that I suggest that it could as well predict a
>> single world.
>>
>>
>> I doubt this.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> However, I do appreciate Bruno's intellect and humility,
>>
>>
>> Thanks.
>>
>>
>> a rare combination.
>>
>>
>> I hope it is not. Comp predicts it is not. The more you know, the more
>> you are aware of the bigness of what you don't know.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Richard
>>
>>
>> On Sat, May 17, 2014 at 10:47 PM,  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, May 15, 2014 7:48:26 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 14 May 2014, at 22:44, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:


 On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 7:31:17 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 14 May 2014, at 03:29, meekerdb wrote:
>
>  On 5/13/2014 6:11 PM, LizR wrote:
>
>  On 14 May 2014 11:15, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>>   On 5/13/2014 4:06 PM, LizR wrote:
>>
>>  On 14 May 2014 06:29, meekerdb  wrote:
>>
>>>  On 5/12/2014 9:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> Turing **emulation** is only meaningful in the context of emulating
>>> one part relative to another part that is not emulated, i.e. is "real".
>>>
>>> If you say so. We can still listen to the machine, and compare with
>>> nature.
>>>
>>>  When we compare with nature we find that some things exist and some
>>> don't.
>>>
>>
>>  Like other worlds don't exist, or atoms don't exist ... the
>> question about what exists hasn't been answered yet. Or indeed the 
>> question
>> about what it means for something to exist.
>>
>>  So is it your view that no matter what comp predicts it's not
>> falsified because it may be true somewhere else?
>>
>
>  I find it hard to read that into what I wrote. (Unless "no matter
> what comp predicts" is a slightly awkward, but potentially rather funny,
> pun?)
>
>  But anyway, no that isn't my view. Either comp is true or it isn't,
> which is to say, either consciousness is Turing emulable at some level, or
> it isn't. And if it is, either there is some flaw in what Bruno derives
> from that assumption, or there isn't.
>
>
> But the question is about how to test comp.  Bruno has offered that we
> should compare its predictions to observed physics.  My view is that this
> requires predictions about what happens here and now, where some things
> happen and some don't.  "Predictions" that something happens somewhere in
> the multiverse don't satisfy my idea of testable.
>
>
>
> But comp do prediction right now. At first sight it predicts white
> noise and white rabbits, but then we listen to the machines views on this,
> and the simplest pass from provability to probability (the local erasing 
> of
> the cul-de-sac worlds) gives a quantization of the arithmetical sigma_1
> proposition. A good chance that arithmetic provided some quantum erazing,
> or destructive interference in the observations.
>
> To me, Gleason theorem somehow solve the

Re: TRONNIES

2014-05-18 Thread John Clark
On Sat, May 17, 2014 at 3:27 PM, John Ross  wrote

>  I am  a good friend of many brilliant scientist.  Most of them are also
> skeptical of my theory, but none of them has convinced me of any basic
> errors in my theory
>

I am not one bit surprised that none of those brilliant scientist could
convince you that your theory is wrong, the defining characteristic of a
crackpot is the inability to make the slightest change in ones views even
in the face of overwhelming logic. Many, including me, have pointed out
that your model is not stable because it would radiate electromagnetic
waves and so things would spiral inward, and that your model violates the
conservation of mass/energy, and that your model violates the conservation
of momentum, and that your model violates the law of conservation of lepton
number, and that your model explains absolutely nothing that had previously
been unexplained, and that your model can not be used to calculate anything
that had previously been incalculable (actually I have grave doubts your
model can be used to calculate ANYTHING).

All these devastating criticisms have had absolutely positively zero effect
on you;  you don't even attempt to refute them other than to simply say "no
it doesn't". And then just like all good crackpots you ignore logical
argument and just keep on spouting the same old tired stuff.

  John K Clark

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-18 Thread Richard Ruquist
PGC,

If you have not noticed I rarely post here any more.
Richard


On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 9:57 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy <
multiplecit...@gmail.com> wrote:

>
>
>
> On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 5:41 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
>> Hibbs,
>> I do not often share your opinion, but in this instance I do. It seems to
>> me that Bruno's principal argument for comp is that it predicts MWI. Yet
>> MWI itself is not falsifiable or testable.
>>
>>  And I think MWI fails the measure problem despite the Gleason Theorem. I
>> think it is a mistake for Bruno to connect comp to MWI. Comp like string
>> theory is so rich in results that I suggest that it could as well predict a
>> single world.
>>
>> However, I do appreciate Bruno's intellect and humility, a rare
>> combination.
>>
>
> You do?
>
> Then why participate in this tedious, repetitive carousel of personal
> attacks (pointing to flaws without precision, just hand waving that there
> is one and/or attacking Bruno on personal level) of everybody who hasn't
> red the original thesis, the literature they are based on, and the papers
> that build, clarify, or expand on the consequences; while pretending to
> presuppose their content and invalidating them disingenuously?
>
> Everybody here should know by now that these "attacks" don't lead anywhere
> because off topic by nature and that comp makes your head spin in disbelief
> at first recognizing possibilities and implications. That's not an argument
> and neither are personal judgements and attacks of this sort. The real time
> wasters. PGC
>
>
>> Richard
>>
>>
>> On Sat, May 17, 2014 at 10:47 PM,  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, May 15, 2014 7:48:26 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 14 May 2014, at 22:44, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:


 On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 7:31:17 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 14 May 2014, at 03:29, meekerdb wrote:
>
>  On 5/13/2014 6:11 PM, LizR wrote:
>
>  On 14 May 2014 11:15, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>>   On 5/13/2014 4:06 PM, LizR wrote:
>>
>>  On 14 May 2014 06:29, meekerdb  wrote:
>>
>>>  On 5/12/2014 9:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> Turing **emulation** is only meaningful in the context of emulating
>>> one part relative to another part that is not emulated, i.e. is "real".
>>>
>>> If you say so. We can still listen to the machine, and compare with
>>> nature.
>>>
>>>  When we compare with nature we find that some things exist and some
>>> don't.
>>>
>>
>>  Like other worlds don't exist, or atoms don't exist ... the
>> question about what exists hasn't been answered yet. Or indeed the 
>> question
>> about what it means for something to exist.
>>
>>  So is it your view that no matter what comp predicts it's not
>> falsified because it may be true somewhere else?
>>
>
>  I find it hard to read that into what I wrote. (Unless "no matter
> what comp predicts" is a slightly awkward, but potentially rather funny,
> pun?)
>
>  But anyway, no that isn't my view. Either comp is true or it isn't,
> which is to say, either consciousness is Turing emulable at some level, or
> it isn't. And if it is, either there is some flaw in what Bruno derives
> from that assumption, or there isn't.
>
>
> But the question is about how to test comp.  Bruno has offered that we
> should compare its predictions to observed physics.  My view is that this
> requires predictions about what happens here and now, where some things
> happen and some don't.  "Predictions" that something happens somewhere in
> the multiverse don't satisfy my idea of testable.
>
>
>
> But comp do prediction right now. At first sight it predicts white
> noise and white rabbits, but then we listen to the machines views on this,
> and the simplest pass from provability to probability (the local erasing 
> of
> the cul-de-sac worlds) gives a quantization of the arithmetical sigma_1
> proposition. A good chance that arithmetic provided some quantum erazing,
> or destructive interference in the observations.
>
> To me, Gleason theorem somehow solve the measure problem for the
> quantum theory, but we have only some promise that it will be so for comp,
> as it needs to if comp is true.
>
> My point is that if you say yes to the doctor, and believe in peano
> Arithmetic, that concerns you.
>
> It is a problem. We have to find the equivalent of Gleason theorem in
> arithmetic, for the arithmetical quantum logics.
>
> I submit a problem, and I provided a testable part. The quantum
> propositional tautologies.
>
> Bruno
>

  So it looks like it isn't just me that doesn't understand your story
 of testability.

 So may I do a little test here.  Can anyone here, other than Bruno,
 explain this paragraph in

Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-18 Thread Richard Ruquist
On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 5:37 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 18 May 2014, at 05:41, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
> Hibbs,
> I do not often share your opinion, but in this instance I do. It seems to
> me that Bruno's principal argument for comp is that it predicts MWI.
>
>
>
> The argument says that comp (believed by 99,9% of scientists today)
> entails the MWI. OK.
>

Not OK and not true.

>
> But it predicts much more than the MWI. It predicts, with the use of the
> classical definition of knowledge (used by most analytical philosopher),
> the precise possible logic of observability (Z1*, or S4Grz1, or X1*). In
> fact we get different physical realms (probably the physics in heaven,
> earth, and many intermediate realms, ...).
>
> Yet MWI itself is not falsifiable or testable.
>
>
> I disagree. If you assume mechanism, the two-slits experience is enough
> test of the MW or MC(*)for me. I use "world" is the sense of a reality as
> real as what I can observe here and now with quasi-certainty, not in the
> sense of some ontology, as you know "I believe" only in natural numbers,
> and in Einstein reality definition.
>

The two-slit experiment does not test MWI because the detectors all select
the same world. All controlled experiments select a single world.

>
> (*) MC = Many Computations.
>
>
>
>  And I think MWI fails the measure problem despite the Gleason Theorem. I
> think it is a mistake for Bruno to connect comp to MWI. Comp like string
> theory is so rich in results that I suggest that it could as well predict a
> single world.
>
>
> I doubt this.
>
>
>
>
> However, I do appreciate Bruno's intellect and humility,
>
>
> Thanks.
>
>
> a rare combination.
>
>
> I hope it is not. Comp predicts it is not. The more you know, the more you
> are aware of the bigness of what you don't know.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> Richard
>
>
> On Sat, May 17, 2014 at 10:47 PM,  wrote:
>
>>
>> On Thursday, May 15, 2014 7:48:26 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 14 May 2014, at 22:44, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 7:31:17 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 14 May 2014, at 03:29, meekerdb wrote:

  On 5/13/2014 6:11 PM, LizR wrote:

  On 14 May 2014 11:15, meekerdb  wrote:

>   On 5/13/2014 4:06 PM, LizR wrote:
>
>  On 14 May 2014 06:29, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>>  On 5/12/2014 9:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> Turing **emulation** is only meaningful in the context of emulating
>> one part relative to another part that is not emulated, i.e. is "real".
>>
>> If you say so. We can still listen to the machine, and compare with
>> nature.
>>
>>  When we compare with nature we find that some things exist and some
>> don't.
>>
>
>  Like other worlds don't exist, or atoms don't exist ... the question
> about what exists hasn't been answered yet. Or indeed the question about
> what it means for something to exist.
>
>  So is it your view that no matter what comp predicts it's not
> falsified because it may be true somewhere else?
>

  I find it hard to read that into what I wrote. (Unless "no matter
 what comp predicts" is a slightly awkward, but potentially rather funny,
 pun?)

  But anyway, no that isn't my view. Either comp is true or it isn't,
 which is to say, either consciousness is Turing emulable at some level, or
 it isn't. And if it is, either there is some flaw in what Bruno derives
 from that assumption, or there isn't.


 But the question is about how to test comp.  Bruno has offered that we
 should compare its predictions to observed physics.  My view is that this
 requires predictions about what happens here and now, where some things
 happen and some don't.  "Predictions" that something happens somewhere in
 the multiverse don't satisfy my idea of testable.



 But comp do prediction right now. At first sight it predicts white
 noise and white rabbits, but then we listen to the machines views on this,
 and the simplest pass from provability to probability (the local erasing of
 the cul-de-sac worlds) gives a quantization of the arithmetical sigma_1
 proposition. A good chance that arithmetic provided some quantum erazing,
 or destructive interference in the observations.

 To me, Gleason theorem somehow solve the measure problem for the
 quantum theory, but we have only some promise that it will be so for comp,
 as it needs to if comp is true.

 My point is that if you say yes to the doctor, and believe in peano
 Arithmetic, that concerns you.

 It is a problem. We have to find the equivalent of Gleason theorem in
 arithmetic, for the arithmetical quantum logics.

 I submit a problem, and I provided a testable part. The quantum
 propositional tautologies.

 Bruno

>>>
>>>  So it looks like it isn't ju

Re: Video of VCR

2014-05-18 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Thursday, May 15, 2014 6:06:00 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote:
>
> On 16 May 2014 08:22, Craig Weinberg >wrote:
>
>> On Thursday, May 15, 2014 2:19:01 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> On 15 May 2014, at 14:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 6:34:55 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 On 14 May 2014, at 03:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:

 I'm showing that authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, and that 
 the failure of logic to detect the significance of authenticity can be 
 empirically demonstrated, but that neither authenticity or the failure of 
 logic to detect it can be detected within logic. At least Godel shows 
 logic's incompleteness, but that is just the beginning. What logic doesn't 
 know about what logic doesn't know I think dwarfs all of arithmetic truth.


 Gödel has shown the completeness of first order logic, and this means 
 that what we prove in a theory written in such logic,  will be true in all 
 interpretation of the theory, and what is true in all interpretations, 
 will 
 be provable in the theory.

 Then Gödel proved the incompleteness of *all* theories about numbers 
 and machines, with respect to a standard notion of truth. 

 This means that the truth about number and machines are above what 
 machines can prove, and thus what human can prove, locally, if we assume 
 computationalism.

>>>
>> But computationalism is a theory about numbers and machines, so we cannot 
>> truthfully assume it.
>>
>> I believe it's an assumption, and all we can do is bet on (or against) 
> it. If we make that assumption, the UDA shows the consequences.
>

I don't personally know that UDA shows the consequences, but I trust 
Bruno's expertise that UDA at least shows the possible consequences.
 

>
> The assumption is a fairly standard one for scientists working in the 
> materialist paradigm, I believe. Unless they use continua or infinities at 
> some point, it seems quite plausible that at some level reality could be TE.
>

Yes, it's a popular assumption. Those don't always last forever.

Craig

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-18 Thread Platonist Guitar Cowboy
On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 5:41 AM, Richard Ruquist  wrote:

> Hibbs,
> I do not often share your opinion, but in this instance I do. It seems to
> me that Bruno's principal argument for comp is that it predicts MWI. Yet
> MWI itself is not falsifiable or testable.
>
>  And I think MWI fails the measure problem despite the Gleason Theorem. I
> think it is a mistake for Bruno to connect comp to MWI. Comp like string
> theory is so rich in results that I suggest that it could as well predict a
> single world.
>
> However, I do appreciate Bruno's intellect and humility, a rare
> combination.
>

You do?

Then why participate in this tedious, repetitive carousel of personal
attacks (pointing to flaws without precision, just hand waving that there
is one and/or attacking Bruno on personal level) of everybody who hasn't
red the original thesis, the literature they are based on, and the papers
that build, clarify, or expand on the consequences; while pretending to
presuppose their content and invalidating them disingenuously?

Everybody here should know by now that these "attacks" don't lead anywhere
because off topic by nature and that comp makes your head spin in disbelief
at first recognizing possibilities and implications. That's not an argument
and neither are personal judgements and attacks of this sort. The real time
wasters. PGC


> Richard
>
>
> On Sat, May 17, 2014 at 10:47 PM,  wrote:
>
>>
>> On Thursday, May 15, 2014 7:48:26 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 14 May 2014, at 22:44, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 7:31:17 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 14 May 2014, at 03:29, meekerdb wrote:

  On 5/13/2014 6:11 PM, LizR wrote:

  On 14 May 2014 11:15, meekerdb  wrote:

>   On 5/13/2014 4:06 PM, LizR wrote:
>
>  On 14 May 2014 06:29, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>>  On 5/12/2014 9:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> Turing **emulation** is only meaningful in the context of emulating
>> one part relative to another part that is not emulated, i.e. is "real".
>>
>> If you say so. We can still listen to the machine, and compare with
>> nature.
>>
>>  When we compare with nature we find that some things exist and some
>> don't.
>>
>
>  Like other worlds don't exist, or atoms don't exist ... the question
> about what exists hasn't been answered yet. Or indeed the question about
> what it means for something to exist.
>
>  So is it your view that no matter what comp predicts it's not
> falsified because it may be true somewhere else?
>

  I find it hard to read that into what I wrote. (Unless "no matter
 what comp predicts" is a slightly awkward, but potentially rather funny,
 pun?)

  But anyway, no that isn't my view. Either comp is true or it isn't,
 which is to say, either consciousness is Turing emulable at some level, or
 it isn't. And if it is, either there is some flaw in what Bruno derives
 from that assumption, or there isn't.


 But the question is about how to test comp.  Bruno has offered that we
 should compare its predictions to observed physics.  My view is that this
 requires predictions about what happens here and now, where some things
 happen and some don't.  "Predictions" that something happens somewhere in
 the multiverse don't satisfy my idea of testable.



 But comp do prediction right now. At first sight it predicts white
 noise and white rabbits, but then we listen to the machines views on this,
 and the simplest pass from provability to probability (the local erasing of
 the cul-de-sac worlds) gives a quantization of the arithmetical sigma_1
 proposition. A good chance that arithmetic provided some quantum erazing,
 or destructive interference in the observations.

 To me, Gleason theorem somehow solve the measure problem for the
 quantum theory, but we have only some promise that it will be so for comp,
 as it needs to if comp is true.

 My point is that if you say yes to the doctor, and believe in peano
 Arithmetic, that concerns you.

 It is a problem. We have to find the equivalent of Gleason theorem in
 arithmetic, for the arithmetical quantum logics.

 I submit a problem, and I provided a testable part. The quantum
 propositional tautologies.

 Bruno

>>>
>>>  So it looks like it isn't just me that doesn't understand your story of
>>> testability.
>>>
>>> So may I do a little test here.  Can anyone here, other than Bruno,
>>> explain this paragraph in terms of realizable falsiibility and attest to
>>> that?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *"By looking to our neighborhood close enough to see if the physics
>>> match well a sum on infinities of computations. If comp is true, we   will
>>> learn nothing, and can't conclude that comp has been proved, but   if there
>>> is a 

Re: The Evolutionary Tree of Religion

2014-05-18 Thread Bruno Marchal

Hi John,

I frown when I read "ontology" because it means something like the  
science (philosophy???) of the existing everything (improved  
definitions gladly accepted).
I am not sure about such "existing". Maybe we have some ideas what  
we THINK it may be. (in the ballpark of reality?)


IF we assume computationalism, we have a pretty good idea of what  
needs to exist. We need anything capable of defining the partial  
computable functions. Then we have a lot of choice, as for the  
ontology we can chose any Turing universal system. It happens than  
elementary arithmetic is Turing complete, and so we can use just the  
numbers 0, s(0), s(s(0)), ... with (mainly) the addition and  
multiplication law. But as I said often the combinators can be used  
instead, or even the FORTRAN programs, the game-of-life pattern, etc.








Older savants made useful application of terms we cannot really  
fixate. This is part of my agnosticism: to discount the 'oldies' -  
no matter how smart (wise?) they were.


Hmm... We have to disagree on this. Some oldies might be better than  
us, especially when a science (theology) has been stolen by "special  
interest", and has not yet be given back. Plotinus is more modern than  
us, far more.




I start the time for 'oldies' at the present and count them on any  
backwards scale. Even include my own past oeuvre.

Now THAT you may call "wishful thinking".


We have made progresses on the "material", but we are too much dazzled  
by technology to understand that matter might not be what is.  
Progresses are double edged, and sometimes can only make a delusion  
bigger.
That is provably the case if we assume comp, as mechanism and  
materialism are incompatible. I let you chose your favorite poison.


Bruno






John M


On Sat, May 3, 2014 at 4:14 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 03 May 2014, at 16:38, John Mikes wrote:


Bruno (excuse me!) - what is the difference between
 " stable patterns of information, e.g. perception..."
and::(your ontological existence?, 'explained' as):
 "the primitive objects that we agree to assume to solve or  
formulate some problem, and the phenomenological, or  
epistemological existence,"
Ontology is a word. Existence another. So is Information and  
Perception.


I would say "ontology" is a word. But ontology is what exist, and  
that can be a word in some theory but could be a giraffe or a  
dinosaur, or a planet, or a number, in this or that other theory.


The same for "existence", "information" and "perception", those are  
words. But I don't see why information, perception and existence  
would be word.


(Later, in the math thread, I might denote the number 2 by s(s(0)),  
and denote the sequence "s(s(0))" by the number 2^(code of  
s)*5^(code of "("; , which will give a large number  
s(s(s(s(s(s(s(...(0)))...).
 This is necessary to distinguish in arithmetic a number and a code  
for that number.)





 Both definitions are based on ASSUMING.human ways of cognition/ 
mentality.


We can work from the cognitive abilities of machines. Those  
abilities can be defined in elementary arithmetic, or in any  
computer language.





Phenomenological in my vocabulary points to "as we perceive"  
something, the
epistemological points to changes of the same. Within our mental  
capabilities.


All right.



None cuts into anything " R E A L " .


You don't know that.


WE CAN NOT.


You cannot know that too.

What we cannot do, is express that we can. But we can't express that  
we cannot do it either.
We cannot pretend having stumble on some truth, but we might still  
stumble on some truth. Why not?


Bruno








On Thu, May 1, 2014 at 4:17 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 30 Apr 2014, at 21:06, meekerdb wrote:




So what does "existence" mean besides stable patterns of  
information, e.g. perception of the Moon, landing on the Moon,  
tidal effects of the Moon,...


I distinguish the ontological existence, which concerns the  
primitive objects that we agree to assume to solve or formulate  
some problem, and the phenomenological, or epistemological  
existence, which are the appearance that we derive at some higher  
"emergent" level.


With comp we need to assume a simple basic Turing complete theory  
(like Robinson arithmetic, or the SK combinator). And we derive  
from them the emergence of all universal machines, their  
interactions and the resulting first person statistics, which  
should explains the origin and development (in some mathematical  
space) of the law of physics.


















I like when David Mermin said once: "Einstein asked if the moon  
still exist when nobody look at it. Now we know that the moon,  
in that case, definitely not exist".


Well, that was a comp prediction, with the difference that the  
moon doesn't exist even when we look at it.
Only the relative relations between my computational states and  
infinitely many computations exists.


Thus completely eviscerating the meaning of "e

Re: The Evolutionary Tree of Religion

2014-05-18 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 17 May 2014, at 20:47, meekerdb wrote:


On 5/17/2014 10:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Very generaly, we can say that a believer M is agnostic with  
respect to a proposition A if M does not believe A *and* does not  
believe ~A.


If G is for God exists, someone agnostic obeys ~[]G and ~[]~G. He  
does not believe in God and he does not believe in the inexistence  
of God. Either because he is not interested in the question, or  
because he waits for more information, and better precision, or he  
believes may be that it is in God nature than humans can't decide,  
whatever.


There's also the category of "strong agnostic", one who denies that  
a question can possibly be resolved.  And I suppose there is a whole  
range of agnosticism depending on what degree of resolution is meant.


Yes, agnosticism is very large, and is not a philosophical position  
per se, but more a meta-position, like a statement of ignorance. You  
can be officially agnostic, yet harbor few doubts. I am officially  
agnostic on both God and Matter, but I am far more open to a fertile  
notion of God (like Arithmetical truth) than (primitive) Matter (which  
I have no clue what it is, and how it could singularize a conscious  
experience related to observation when we assume computationalism.


I define God by anything transcendental, unnameable, and responsible  
(in a personal or non personal way)  for our spiritual and physical  
existence. In comp, it cannot be "Matter". The material derives from  
the spiritual, like explained in the UDA.


Bruno





Brent

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Re: The Evolutionary Tree of Religion

2014-05-18 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 17 May 2014, at 21:57, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:

Here's a slightly different direction for this topic. Religion  
purportedly answers the why, questions, and science is attributed  
with answering the how, questions. Regarding God, as I guess him/her/ 
it, would be a centralized super intelligence that created the  
Hubble Volume, or likely this, and other galaxies. Atheist, Michael  
Shermer, coined Shermer's Last Law as "Any sufficiently advanced ET  
is indistinguishable from God."


There is something similar in computer science. A machine cannot  
distinguish a non computable set from a set generated by a machine  
more complex than herself.


I would not say that science = how, and religion "why", although there  
is a bit of truth there. I distinguish science and religion only by  
their extension. Religion is more like the truth (that we search) and  
science is more the beliefs (that we share and revise). In the ideal  
case of the correct machine, science is a proper subset of truth, like  
G is a proper subset of G*.





My reaction has been, So? It's not like we all have to obey the  
writings of St Augustine, or Thomas Aquinas, on who or what is God.  
They have a voice, a vote, but not a veto. So maybe God is Krezwell,  
the Alien?


God is more non nameable than that. It is supposed to be responsible  
also for the Alien, and everything material and spiritual. In comp,  
the arithmetical truth plays the role of God, even if the Noùs  
(defined by qG*) is far bigger than God. In comp God is responsible of  
something which overwhelm him/her/it.
That's the price of the comp religion: god is not omniscient nor  
omnipotent.





It's not as if we, mere mortals, have any choice in the matter.


We have the moral choice of being skeptical with any name or  
description of God (of both the outer-god and the inner god). We have  
(and must have ) the choice to say No to the shaman, priest, doctor.





So, knowing this, we might be wiser in  focusing on the How  
questions of the Universe, rather the Why? Maybe we will find the  
why, more profound, after we identify the how's?


Yes, thats science, but we can use reason for both the how and the  
why. You cannot do science, without doing religion. Those saying that  
they do not religion, either are instrumentalist technicians, or they  
are not aware of their religious beliefs.
Fundamental science without religion is pseudo-science and/or pseudo- 
religion.


Bruno







-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Sat, May 17, 2014 1:35 pm
Subject: Re: The Evolutionary Tree of Religion


On 17 May 2014, at 10:10, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

> But it is worth to reflect on the mere idea of "Agnosticism" that
> comes from Kant and his approach to metaphysics. Kant did not  
invented
> it, but it is was the logical consequence of his philosophy and  
almost

> every western agnostic is kantian despite that he does not know this
> fact.
>
> It is very important to follow historically the development of that
> way of thinking to know what this philosophy mean and what more  
things

> besides God (a lot, and very important) you are living without.


Very generaly, we can say that a believer M is agnostic with respect
to a proposition A if M does not believe A *and* does not believe ~A.

If G is for God exists, someone agnostic obeys ~[]G and ~[]~G. He does
not believe in God and he does not believe in the inexistence of God.
Either because he is not interested in the question, or because he
waits for more information, and better precision, or he believes may
be that it is in God nature than humans can't decide, whatever.

Atheists, or at least strong Atheists, are believer, as they tend to
believe or assert the non existence of God (instead of the "I don't
know" of the agnostic).

Many are believing, or taking for granted, in a primitive material
universe, but in science, i think we should be agnostic on this too,
especially in front of the debate on the meaning of QM, and the mind-
body problem.

I understand that agnosticism about space and time can be related to
Kant, but for "god" , "matter", "energy", that seems to me less clear.

Bruno



>
> 2014-05-17 0:06 GMT+02:00, John Mikes :
>> Dear Liz, thanks for your care to reflect upon my text and I
>> apologize for
>> my LATE  REPLY.
>> You ask about my opinion on Tegmark's "math-realism" - well, if it
>> were
>> REALISM
>> indeed, he would not have had to classify it 'mathemaitcal'. I
>> consider it
>> a fine sub chapter to ideas about *realism* what we MAY NOT KNOW at
>> our
>> present level.
>> Smart Einstein etc. may have invented 'analogue' relativity etc.,
>> it does
>> not exclude all those other ways Nature may apply beyond our  
present

>> knowledge.
>> Our ongoing 'scientific thinking' - IS - inherently mathematical,  
so

>> wherever you look you find it in the books.
>> I did not find so far a *natural spot* self-calculating 374  
pieces 

Re: The Evolutionary Tree of Religion

2014-05-18 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 18 May 2014, at 09:59, Alberto G. Corona wrote:


2014-05-17 19:35 GMT+02:00, Bruno Marchal :


Very generally..



Very generally is not enough.


Quoting "Very generally ..." is not enough!





A philosophical standpoint has a
tradition.


I don't do philosophy, in that sense. I study physics in the context  
of the computationalist frame.





We the humans inherit ways of thinking, memeplexes that can
not be  isolated in atomic concepts, neither reduced to fancy
mathematical formulas.


In which theory (or meta-theory, or f-realm, frame).





These set of related ideas include attitudes
about life, an interpretation of the history, and a set of "prophets"
and precursors of his way of thinking. Even if he don´t know his
tradition, he is a consumer of a vulgarized version of the view, which
is a second rate version of the same ideas reduced to the present.


I derive conclusion from an hypothesis. That's all.





That historical holistic way of working of the human mind is why
modern thinkers that follow a the tradition, the one of modernity,
that despises tradition, can not think at the deep level of the
thinkers of the past and falsely think that the ancients were
confusing.

That is not the case.  If anything, the modern thinkers are simple.
and sterile.


Here we agree. In theology, the seriousness peak has standed about  
1500 years ago with neoplatonism, and we have regress since. It might  
be good: we might have to regress sometimes, to concentrate first on  
easy problem and then come back to the serious deeper and more complex  
question.


Bruno




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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-18 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 18 May 2014, at 04:47, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:



On Thursday, May 15, 2014 7:48:26 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 14 May 2014, at 22:44, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:



On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 7:31:17 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 14 May 2014, at 03:29, meekerdb wrote:


On 5/13/2014 6:11 PM, LizR wrote:

On 14 May 2014 11:15, meekerdb  wrote:
On 5/13/2014 4:06 PM, LizR wrote:

On 14 May 2014 06:29, meekerdb  wrote:
On 5/12/2014 9:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Turing *emulation* is only meaningful in the context of  
emulating one part relative to another part that is not  
emulated, i.e. is "real".
If you say so. We can still listen to the machine, and compare  
with nature.
When we compare with nature we find that some things exist and  
some don't.


Like other worlds don't exist, or atoms don't exist ... the  
question about what exists hasn't been answered yet. Or indeed  
the question about what it means for something to exist.
So is it your view that no matter what comp predicts it's not  
falsified because it may be true somewhere else?


I find it hard to read that into what I wrote. (Unless "no matter  
what comp predicts" is a slightly awkward, but potentially rather  
funny, pun?)


But anyway, no that isn't my view. Either comp is true or it  
isn't, which is to say, either consciousness is Turing emulable  
at some level, or it isn't. And if it is, either there is some  
flaw in what Bruno derives from that assumption, or there isn't.


But the question is about how to test comp.  Bruno has offered  
that we should compare its predictions to observed physics.  My  
view is that this requires predictions about what happens here and  
now, where some things happen and some don't.  "Predictions" that  
something happens somewhere in the multiverse don't satisfy my  
idea of testable.



But comp do prediction right now. At first sight it predicts white  
noise and white rabbits, but then we listen to the machines views  
on this, and the simplest pass from provability to probability (the  
local erasing of the cul-de-sac worlds) gives a quantization of the  
arithmetical sigma_1 proposition. A good chance that arithmetic  
provided some quantum erazing, or destructive interference in the  
observations.


To me, Gleason theorem somehow solve the measure problem for the  
quantum theory, but we have only some promise that it will be so  
for comp, as it needs to if comp is true.


My point is that if you say yes to the doctor, and believe in peano  
Arithmetic, that concerns you.


It is a problem. We have to find the equivalent of Gleason theorem  
in arithmetic, for the arithmetical quantum logics.


I submit a problem, and I provided a testable part. The quantum  
propositional tautologies.


Bruno

 So it looks like it isn't just me that doesn't understand your  
story of testability.


So may I do a little test here.  Can anyone here, other than Bruno,  
explain this paragraph in terms of realizable falsiibility and  
attest to that?


"By looking to our neighborhood close enough to see if the physics
match well a sum on infinities of computations. If comp is true, we
will learn nothing, and can't conclude that comp has been proved, but
if there is a difference, then we can know that comp is refuted  
(well,

comp + the classical theory of knowledge)."

How does the end part "well, comp + the classical theory of  
knowledge" change the commitment to falsification?


Good question. I let other answer, but frankly, it is just a matter  
of *studying* the papers.  Note that in some presentation, I take  
the classical theory (or definition) of knowledge granted, but in  
other presentation, I explain and answer your question with some  
detail, and it is the object of the thesis.


More on this, and you can ask the question to me. The point is in  
focus, not the success of my pedagogy on this list.


Bruno

I think you're confused where your theory ends and scientific  
standards, conventions, definitions begin. The arguments and  
explanations you lay out in your theory, may certainly arrive at  
various conclusions for the implications comp has for the world. And  
I'm quite sure within that you offer your explanation for the  
falsifiability of comp.


But you're getting ahead of yourself dramatically Bruno, if you  
think the details of your argument is an influential factor in  
settling the matter of falsifiability. What you profess within your  
theory is irrelevant...on this encapsulating turf.


In fact from memory you've made about 4 arguments at various times.  
In at least one of your papers you offer this...little package of  
philosophical reasoning, which 5 lines and 30 seconds later  
concludes your work is falsifiable so scientific. I mentioned at the  
time the same argument can be formulated for all philosophy...and  
probably religion and everything else. Then you insisted your theory  
is falsifiable because its fundamental position requires huge  
accomplishme

Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

2014-05-18 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 18 May 2014, at 05:41, Richard Ruquist wrote:


Hibbs,
I do not often share your opinion, but in this instance I do. It  
seems to me that Bruno's principal argument for comp is that it  
predicts MWI.



The argument says that comp (believed by 99,9% of scientists today)  
entails the MWI. OK.


But it predicts much more than the MWI. It predicts, with the use of  
the classical definition of knowledge (used by most analytical  
philosopher), the precise possible logic of observability (Z1*, or  
S4Grz1, or X1*). In fact we get different physical realms (probably  
the physics in heaven, earth, and many intermediate realms, ...).



Yet MWI itself is not falsifiable or testable.


I disagree. If you assume mechanism, the two-slits experience is  
enough test of the MW or MC(*)for me. I use "world" is the sense of a  
reality as real as what I can observe here and now with quasi- 
certainty, not in the sense of some ontology, as you know "I believe"  
only in natural numbers, and in Einstein reality definition.


(*) MC = Many Computations.




 And I think MWI fails the measure problem despite the Gleason  
Theorem. I think it is a mistake for Bruno to connect comp to MWI.  
Comp like string theory is so rich in results that I suggest that it  
could as well predict a single world.


I doubt this.





However, I do appreciate Bruno's intellect and humility,


Thanks.



a rare combination.


I hope it is not. Comp predicts it is not. The more you know, the more  
you are aware of the bigness of what you don't know.


Bruno





Richard


On Sat, May 17, 2014 at 10:47 PM,  wrote:

On Thursday, May 15, 2014 7:48:26 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 14 May 2014, at 22:44, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:



On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 7:31:17 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 14 May 2014, at 03:29, meekerdb wrote:


On 5/13/2014 6:11 PM, LizR wrote:

On 14 May 2014 11:15, meekerdb  wrote:
On 5/13/2014 4:06 PM, LizR wrote:

On 14 May 2014 06:29, meekerdb  wrote:
On 5/12/2014 9:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Turing *emulation* is only meaningful in the context of  
emulating one part relative to another part that is not  
emulated, i.e. is "real".
If you say so. We can still listen to the machine, and compare  
with nature.
When we compare with nature we find that some things exist and  
some don't.


Like other worlds don't exist, or atoms don't exist ... the  
question about what exists hasn't been answered yet. Or indeed  
the question about what it means for something to exist.
So is it your view that no matter what comp predicts it's not  
falsified because it may be true somewhere else?


I find it hard to read that into what I wrote. (Unless "no matter  
what comp predicts" is a slightly awkward, but potentially rather  
funny, pun?)


But anyway, no that isn't my view. Either comp is true or it  
isn't, which is to say, either consciousness is Turing emulable  
at some level, or it isn't. And if it is, either there is some  
flaw in what Bruno derives from that assumption, or there isn't.


But the question is about how to test comp.  Bruno has offered  
that we should compare its predictions to observed physics.  My  
view is that this requires predictions about what happens here and  
now, where some things happen and some don't.  "Predictions" that  
something happens somewhere in the multiverse don't satisfy my  
idea of testable.



But comp do prediction right now. At first sight it predicts white  
noise and white rabbits, but then we listen to the machines views  
on this, and the simplest pass from provability to probability (the  
local erasing of the cul-de-sac worlds) gives a quantization of the  
arithmetical sigma_1 proposition. A good chance that arithmetic  
provided some quantum erazing, or destructive interference in the  
observations.


To me, Gleason theorem somehow solve the measure problem for the  
quantum theory, but we have only some promise that it will be so  
for comp, as it needs to if comp is true.


My point is that if you say yes to the doctor, and believe in peano  
Arithmetic, that concerns you.


It is a problem. We have to find the equivalent of Gleason theorem  
in arithmetic, for the arithmetical quantum logics.


I submit a problem, and I provided a testable part. The quantum  
propositional tautologies.


Bruno

 So it looks like it isn't just me that doesn't understand your  
story of testability.


So may I do a little test here.  Can anyone here, other than Bruno,  
explain this paragraph in terms of realizable falsiibility and  
attest to that?


"By looking to our neighborhood close enough to see if the physics
match well a sum on infinities of computations. If comp is true, we
will learn nothing, and can't conclude that comp has been proved, but
if there is a difference, then we can know that comp is refuted  
(well,

comp + the classical theory of knowledge)."

How does the end part "well, comp + the classical theory of  
knowledge" change the commitment to fa

Re: TRONNIES

2014-05-18 Thread ghibbsa

On Saturday, May 17, 2014 8:27:19 PM UTC+1, John Ross wrote:
>
> John Clark,
>
>  
>
> I assure you I am not a crackpot.  I am a graduate Nuclear Engineer, a 
> Patent Attorney and Vice President Intellectual Property of a respected 
> corporation engaged in important scientific research and development.  I 
> am  a good friend of many brilliant scientist.  Most of them are also 
> skeptical of my theory, but none of them has convinced me of any basic 
> errors in my theory, other than it is inconsistent with existing accepted 
> theories.
>
How do you define a crackpot, out of interest? I understand a pretty 
constrained and precise set of characters. I think you come close John, if 
as you say, not in fact being a 'crackpot'? It isn't a derogatory label in 
my view. Most of us are crackpot at one time or another, or regarding one 
interest or another. 
 
 
I think you qualify because you don't seem to know your subject at anything 
approaching 'depth'. And you, don't seem to understand what is critical in 
a theory, and what is 'good to have'. A more elegant, asymmetric 
arrangement, with a simpler family of fundamental particles. This is 'good 
to have'it's definitely where science wants to be...but the standard of 
proof goes up inversely as theories get simpler and more elegant.  
 
The two go together...but far and away the critical 'must have' is the 
standard of what a theory says about the world. If it corrects, or 
supercedes, or generalizes Relativity and QM, and has a mathmatical reality 
and does everything they do, and more. That's a profound development, and 
will quickly find itself elevated to the top table and celebrated round the 
world. But what if it's all that, but involves a more complicated particle 
structure and actually increases the number of loose ends and puzzles or 
whatever? 
 
Would make no difference at all. If it's a better theory that replaces the 
best we have, then it's immaterial if it's more elegant or more complex, 
simpler, or messier. All that would matter would be the fact major 
predictions an d generalizations were opened up in a process that involved 
discovery things are messier and more complex than we previously thought. 
e
John...a situation like that wousld happen all kinds of way. Most 
frequently, there's no change to the longer term trend toward elegance...go 
back 2 or 3 steps and things were far messier...but the discovery is that 
last step just gone saw simplifications that were not grounded in good 
science. The last step over simplified and wrong simplified and that's why 
the right theory here is a more complex and messier. 
 
John, maybe that was youmaybe the last step had a John Ross at the 
helm, and John Ross got it into his head simpler and more symmetrical is 
right for its own sakeeven if the theory doesn't do anything and 
doesn't replace relativity and QMand faces falsification from hard 
science (courtesy John C), and violates major principles in physical law, 
and makes no predictions, and has no unififying equations,hat' and can't 
calculate or solve problems. Even if all that.because it's SIMPLER and 
SYMMETRICAL and John Ross thinks that's the HARD challenge in science...all 
the other stuffis the easy part. So John Ross ignores all the problems 
and inadequeciesbecause he's solved the hard problem of coming up with 
a simpler particle idea and being symmetrical. 
 
Get real John. It's EASY to dream up a simple elegant structure, if it 
don't gotta do anything much. I could have ten for you by sun down.
 

>  
>
 

> I have developed my “Theory of Everything “ through 13 years of hard 
> work.  Like all theories (like the relativity theories and the standard 
> model) my theory may or may not be correct.  It is certainly not generally 
> accepted by the scientific community like relativity and the standard model 
> are.  The scientific  community is not yet even aware of my theory.  Other 
> than my own friends and family, this chat group is the first people to be 
> aware of it.  This group has  asked a lot of good questions all of which I 
> have tried to answer quickly; however, to my knowledge no one in  this 
> group has read my book.  It is available at Amazon.com.  And I have offered 
> to send copies to several of this group who have appeared to be seriously 
> interested in my theory.  I honestly believe  my theory is a great 
> improvement over the standard model and relativity theories.  But I am not 
> absolutely certain of that.  Time will tell.
>
>  
>
> In the meantime, Richard Feynman’s father was on the right track and 
> Richard Feynman’s answer was not a good one.  Richard was correct that the 
> photon was not  in the atom.  The photons that his father was talking about 
> are much too large to fit in an atom.  However, as I have explained several 
> times to this group the energy part of the photon is an entron.  The entron 
> is two tronnies traveling in a circle at pi/2 times the 

Re: The Evolutionary Tree of Religion

2014-05-18 Thread Alberto G. Corona
2014-05-17 19:35 GMT+02:00, Bruno Marchal :
>
> Very generaly..
>

Very generally is not enough. A philosophical standpoint has a
tradition. We the humans inherit ways of thinking, memeplexes that can
not be  isolated in atomic concepts, neither reduced to fancy
mathematical formulas. These set of related ideas include attitudes
about life, an interpretation of the history, and a set of "prophets"
and precursors of his way of thinking. Even if he don´t know his
tradition, he is a consumer of a vulgarized version of the view, which
is a second rate version of the same ideas reduced to the present.

That historical holistic way of working of the human mind is why
modern thinkers that follow a the tradition, the one of modernity,
that despises tradition, can not think at the deep level of the
thinkers of the past and falsely think that the ancients were
confusing.

 That is not the case.  If anything, the modern thinkers are simple.
and sterile.

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