date:20150203

 A vetrean of the Second World War, known only by his initials
W.J., suffered from a severe case of epilepsy. Worse, medication could not
stop his frequent and incapacitating seizures. There was, however, another
option: he could undergo a radical and newly conceived brain surgery. The
surgery would sever his *corpus callosum*, the tight bundle of neural
wiring that links the two hemispheres of one's brain. It was thought that
his seizures originated in one side of his brain and spread to impair the
other side. Severing the link would confine the seizure and prevent it from
impairing his entire brain. In 1961 W.J. elected to undergo this surgery
and by all accounts it was a succeess. His debilitating seizures were
eradicated. Yet, there were unanticipated side effects.

W.J. emerged from the surgery with his language and reasoning
abilities intact. But post-operative testing by Michael Gazzaniga, then a
graduate student under the neuroscientist Roger Sperry, revealed certain
deficits. Prior to the operation, Gazzaniga flashed images of various
objects in either the right or left area of W.J.'s visual field. Before the
operation, W.J. had no difficulty in identifying the objects regardless of
where in his visual field the image was presented. After the operation,
however, when an object was displayed to W.J.'s left visual field, he was
unable to say what he saw. When asked, he reported not seeing anything. It
seemed as though W.J. was blind in his left eye, but things were not so
simple.

After W.J. reported not seen anything, Gazzaniga asked him to
point out what he had just seen from a collection of objects. His hand
correctly pointed out the correct object. It seemed that part of W.J.'s
brain, a part that could not communicate verbally, possed the knowledge of
what was flashed on the left side. It had seen the object. These
experiments helped prove that visual stimuli received by one's left eye is
processed by the right hemisphere, and visual stimuli from the right eye is
processed by the left hemisphere. At the time it was known that each
hemisphere controlls muscles on the opposite side of the body, but a
similar reversal with visual processing was not known.

Later it was found that for most right-handed men the language
center of the brain is found predominently in the left hemisphere.
Left-handed men, and women, are more likely to have language capacities in
both hemispheres. This fact, together with the previous disoveries
regarding the reversal of motor control and perception fully explains
W.J.'s side effect. When the image was shown to his left eye only his right
hemisphere saw it. Lacking the ability to verbalize a response, the right
hemisphere remains mute when asked what it just saw. Yet the right
hemisphere is able to control the muscles on the left-side of the body.
Therefore his right hemisphere, using his left hand, could point out what
it has just seen. Later experiments by other "split-brain" cases lend
further confirmation to this explanation.

Thirty years after working with W.J., Michael Gazzaniga was
still studying split-brain cases. In one experiment involving a patient
named Joe, Gazzaniga flashed two different images simultaneously. The image
of hammer was shown on the right-hand side of the screen, while the image
of a saw was shown on the left. The exchange between Joe and Gazzaniga went
as follows:



Gazzaniga: "What did you see?"

Joe: "I saw a hammer."

Gazzaniga: "Just close your eyes, and draw with your left hand.
Just let it go."

With his eyes closed, Joe's left hand draws the image of a saw.

Gazzaniga: "That's nice, what's that?"

Joe looks at his drawing and answers "A saw."

Gazzaniga: "What did you see?"

Joe: "A hammer."

Gazzaniga: "What'd you draw that for?"

Joe: "I don't know."



This experiment makes clear that Joe saw both images, but his
experience is fractured. One half of his brain observed the hammer while
the other half observed the saw. It is as though two independent minds are
present in one skull. What was previously a singular consciousness is now
two. Another split-brain patient, Paul, helped demonstrate this.

Paul was unusual in that he possessed verbal capacities in both
his right and left hemispheres. This enabled each of his minds to be
interviewed concerning their thoughts, beliefs, and desires. When asked his
name, both hemispheres answered "Paul." When asked his location, both
answered "Vermont." But when asked what he wanted to be, his right
hemisphere answered "Automobile racer" while his left answered "Draftsman."
These experiments took place during the Watergate scandal, and so Paul's
opinion of President Nixon was queried. His right hemisphere expressed
"dislike" while his left hemisphere expressed "like." One wonders how Paul
would

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

Yep, seems like good empirical support for Dennett's competing modules theory
of the brain.

Brent

On 2/3/2015 8:44 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

A vetrean of the Second World War, known only by his initials W.J.,
suffered from a severe case of epilepsy. Worse, medication could not stop his frequent
and incapacitating seizures. There was, however, another option: he could undergo a
radical and newly conceived brain surgery. The surgery would sever his /corpus
callosum/, the tight bundle of neural wiring that links the two hemispheres of one's
brain. It was thought that his seizures originated in one side of his brain and spread
to impair the other side. Severing the link would confine the seizure and prevent it
from impairing his entire brain. In 1961 W.J. elected to undergo this surgery and by all
accounts it was a succeess. His debilitating seizures were eradicated. Yet, there were
unanticipated side effects.

W.J. emerged from the surgery with his language and reasoning abilities
intact. But post-operative testing by Michael Gazzaniga, then a graduate student under
the neuroscientist Roger Sperry, revealed certain deficits. Prior to the operation,
Gazzaniga flashed images of various objects in either the right or left area of W.J.'s
visual field. Before the operation, W.J. had no difficulty in identifying the objects
regardless of where in his visual field the image was presented. After the operation,
however, when an object was displayed to W.J.'s left visual field, he was unable to say
what he saw. When asked, he reported not seeing anything. It seemed as though W.J. was
blind in his left eye, but things were not so simple.

After W.J. reported not seen anything, Gazzaniga asked him to point out what
he had just seen from a collection of objects. His hand correctly pointed out the
correct object. It seemed that part of W.J.'s brain, a part that could not communicate
verbally, possed the knowledge of what was flashed on the left side. It had seen the
object. These experiments helped prove that visual stimuli received by one's left eye is
processed by the right hemisphere, and visual stimuli from the right eye is processed by
the left hemisphere. At the time it was known that each hemisphere controlls muscles on
the opposite side of the body, but a similar reversal with visual processing was not known.

Later it was found that for most right-handed men the language center of the
brain is found predominently in the left hemisphere. Left-handed men, and women, are
more likely to have language capacities in both hemispheres. This fact, together with
the previous disoveries regarding the reversal of motor control and perception fully
explains W.J.'s side effect. When the image was shown to his left eye only his right
hemisphere saw it. Lacking the ability to verbalize a response, the right hemisphere
remains mute when asked what it just saw. Yet the right hemisphere is able to control
the muscles on the left-side of the body. Therefore his right hemisphere, using his left
hand, could point out what it has just seen. Later experiments by other "split-brain"
cases lend further confirmation to this explanation.

Thirty years after working with W.J., Michael Gazzaniga was still studying
split-brain cases. In one experiment involving a patient named Joe, Gazzaniga flashed
two different images simultaneously. The image of hammer was shown on the right-hand
side of the screen, while the image of a saw was shown on the left. The exchange between
Joe and Gazzaniga went as follows:

Gazzaniga: "What did you see?"

Joe: "I saw a hammer."

Gazzaniga: "Just close your eyes, and draw with your left hand. Just let it go."

With his eyes closed, Joe's left hand draws the image of a saw.

Gazzaniga: "That's nice, what's that?"

Joe looks at his drawing and answers "A saw."

Gazzaniga: "What did you see?"

Joe: "A hammer."

Gazzaniga: "What'd you draw that for?"

Joe: "I don't know."

This experiment makes clear that Joe saw both images, but his experience is
fractured. One half of his brain observed the hammer while the other half observed the
saw. It is as though two independent minds are present in one skull. What was previously
a singular consciousness is now two. Another split-brain patient, Paul, helped
demonstrate this.

Paul was unusual in that he possessed verbal capacities in both his right
and left hemispheres. This enabled each of his minds to be interviewed concerning their
thoughts, beliefs, and desires. When asked his name, both hemispheres answered "Paul."
When asked his location, both answered "Vermont." But when asked what he wanted to be,
his right hemisphere answered "Automobile racer" while his left answered "Draftsman."
These experiments took place during the Watergate scandal, and so Paul's opinion of
Presiden

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 meekerdb  wrote:

   >> If consciousness was just a lucky accident Evolution would ensure
>> that it didn't exist for long.
>
>
> > Only if it cost something to maintain consciousness
>

Not so. Mutations happen all the time and nearly all of them are harmful.
In most animals If a mutation happens that renders it blind that will be a
severe handicap and the animal will not live long enough to pass that
mutated gene onto the next generation; but if it happens in a cave creature
it's no handicap at all and so it will get into the next generation, the
end result is that cave creatures are not only blind they don't even have
eyes, and yet they survive just fine. In the same way if consciousness
wasn't a byproduct of intelligence and instead was just something tacked on
that didn't effect behavior (and of course renders the Turing Test
ineffective) then a creature with a mutation that stopped the consciousness
mechanism from working would survive just as well as one without the
mutation. Pretty soon nobody would be conscious, but I know for a fact that
at least one is. So either Darwin was wrong or consciousness is a byproduct
of intelligence. I don't think Darwin was wrong.

>> So carbon atoms are conscious but silicon atoms are not. Well... I can't
>> prove that's wrong but I really think it is.
>
>
> > If you think atoms are conscious you're more mystic than Bruno.
>

You're the one who was talking about a special connection between carbon
and consciousness not me.

  John K Clark

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Re: Why is there something rather than nothing? From quantum theory to dialectics?

2015-02-03 Thread Platonist Guitar Cowboy

On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 6:54 AM, Samiya Illias 
wrote:

>
>
> On Mon, Feb 2, 2015 at 10:56 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> On 02 Feb 2015, at 06:37, Samiya Illias wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 02-Feb-2015, at 6:12 am, LizR  wrote:
>>
>> On 2 February 2015 at 00:15, Samiya Illias 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sun, Feb 1, 2015 at 1:01 PM, LizR  wrote:
>>>
 There is a difference between advancing a theory in a spirit of
 agnosticism and being convinced you know the truth and that everyone else
 is wrong.

>>>
>>> Hmm...
>>> Someday, I hope and pray, when you're blessed with faith, perhaps you'll
>>> understand me.
>>>
>>
>>
>> As other observed that's close to the worst authority argument. By
>> "worst" I don't make a moral judgment, but it is worst in the sense that it
>> is not just invalid, but it makes the honest people automatically doubting
>> your message.
>>
>
> I am not presenting an argument above. I'm just saying that this is
> something to do with feeling/experiencing/qualia?
>

Feelings, woo-o-o feeling it,
woo-o-o, feeling again in my arms
Feelings

Feelings, nothing more than feelings
Trying to forget my feelings of love
Teardrops rolling down on my face
Trying to forget my feelings of love


> so I cannot explain it nor do I expect anyone who doesn't to understand
> it. I know its not valid. That is why I hope Someday...
>

I hope someday, that if something is not valid, you don't pretend as if it
were valid...


>
>>
>>
>>> And vice versa, if you are blessed with faith in reason.
>>
>>
>> Thanks! :)
>>
>>
>> Reason is the best tool, if not the only tool (at some level)
>>
>
> I agree. Reason is a tool, and perhaps the best tool, which is to be used
> to approach reality.
>

Depends. Sometimes certain feelings, fanatic types, their books taken
literally etc. get in the way.


>
>
>
>> to survive the unreasonable (arithmetical)  reality, and to maximize
>> partial relative control.
>>
>> Unfortunately "reason" gives the ability to lie and manipulate the others
>> at different levels.
>>
>
> Both reason and religion have been abused over and over again
>

Sometimes in the name of Feelings, woo-o-o feeling it, woo-o-o, feeling
again in my arms... Feelings. PGC

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Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 2/3/2015 10:00 AM, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

>> If consciousness was just a lucky accident Evolution would ensure 
that it
didn't exist for long. 

> Only if it cost something to maintain consciousness

Not so. Mutations happen all the time and nearly all of them are harmful. In most 
animals If a mutation happens that renders it blind that will be a severe handicap and 
the animal will not live long enough to pass that mutated gene onto the next generation; 
but if it happens in a cave creature it's no handicap at all and so it will get into the 
next generation, the end result is that cave creatures are not only blind they don't 
even have eyes, and yet they survive just fine.

But it is biologically costly to make and maintain eyes.

In the same way if consciousness wasn't a byproduct of intelligence and instead was just 
something tacked on that didn't effect behavior (and of course renders the Turing Test 
ineffective) then a creature with a mutation that stopped the consciousness mechanism 
from working would survive just as well as one without the mutation.

But maybe it was "tacked" on to integrate information processing from different 
independent modules, e.g. vision, language, touch,... which in different developmental 
path, say AI, might have been organized in a hierarchy or unified from the start.  The 
latter might even be more efficient, but evolution can't go back and start over, it can 
only take small steps of improvement.

Pretty soon nobody would be conscious, but I know for a fact that at least one is. So 
either Darwin was wrong or consciousness is a byproduct of intelligence. I don't think 
Darwin was wrong.

>> So carbon atoms are conscious but silicon atoms are not. Well... I 
can't prove that's wrong but I really
think it is.

> If you think atoms are conscious you're more mystic than Bruno.

You're the one who was talking about a special connection between carbon and 
consciousness not me.

I said carbon based life-forms, not carbon atoms.  I'm sure we both agree that 
intelligence and consciousness come from the organization of atoms.

Brent

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Re: Why is there something rather than nothing? From quantum theory to dialectics?



On 03 Feb 2015, at 06:54, Samiya Illias wrote:




On Mon, Feb 2, 2015 at 10:56 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 02 Feb 2015, at 06:37, Samiya Illias wrote:




On 02-Feb-2015, at 6:12 am, LizR  wrote:

On 2 February 2015 at 00:15, Samiya Illias  
 wrote:



On Sun, Feb 1, 2015 at 1:01 PM, LizR  wrote:
There is a difference between advancing a theory in a spirit of  
agnosticism and being convinced you know the truth and that  
everyone else is wrong.


Hmm...
Someday, I hope and pray, when you're blessed with faith, perhaps  
you'll understand me.



As other observed that's close to the worst authority argument. By  
"worst" I don't make a moral judgment, but it is worst in the sense  
that it is not just invalid, but it makes the honest people  
automatically doubting your message.


I am not presenting an argument above. I'm just saying that this is  
something to do with feeling/experiencing/qualia? so I cannot  
explain it nor do I expect anyone who doesn't to understand it. I  
know its not valid. That is why I hope Someday...


Note that it *can* be valid as a personal thought, tough. But when you  
make it public, it is patronizing per-authority argument. Well, I  
don't know, but that what is the universal machine thinks for herself.










And vice versa, if you are blessed with faith in reason.


Thanks! :)


Reason is the best tool, if not the only tool (at some level)

I agree. Reason is a tool, and perhaps the best tool, which is to be  
used to approach reality.


Assuming there is one common to all of us.



to survive the unreasonable (arithmetical)  reality, and to maximize  
partial relative control.


Unfortunately "reason" gives the ability to lie and manipulate the  
others at different levels.


Both reason and religion have been abused over and over again


Yes, like drugs (medication). It is in he human nature, but I think we  
do progress, and can still progress.








Then reason shows that arithmetic is already full of life, indeed  
full of an infinity of universal machines competing to provide your  
infinitely many relatively consistent continuations.


Incompleteness imposes, at least formally, a soul (a first person),  
an observer (a first person plural), a "god" (an independent simple  
but deep truth) to any machine believing in the RA axioms together  
with enough induction axioms. I know you believe in them.


The lexicon is
p   truthGod
[]p  provable Intelligible  (modal logic, G and G*)
[]p & p  the soul (modal logic, S4Grz)
[]p & <>t  intelligible matter(with p sigma_1) (modal logic, Z1,  
Z1*)

[]p & sensible matter (with p sigma_1) (modal logic, X1, X1*)

You need to study some math,

I have been wanting to but it seems such an uphill task. Yet, its a  
mountain I would like to climb :)


7 + 0 = 7. You are OK with this?  Tell me.

Are you OK with the generalisation? For all numbers n, n + 0 = n.   
Right?






to see that this give eight quite different view the universal  
machines develop on themselves.


Reminds me of this verse [http://quran.com/69/17 ]:
And the angels are at its edges. And there will bear the Throne of  
your Lord above them, that Day, eight [of them].


It is like that: The four first (plotinian) hypostases live  
harmonically in the arithmetical heaven:



  God

Terrestrial Intelligible   Divine Intelligible

   Universal Soul



But then the Universal Soul falls, and you get the (four) matters, and  
the "bastard calculus":



Intelligible terrestrial matter   Intelligible Divine  
matter


Sensible terrestrial matter  Sensible Divine matter



Here divine means mainly what is true about the machine/number and not  
justifiable by the numbers.








It provides a universal person, with a soul, consistent extensions,  
beliefs, and some proximity (or not) to God (which is the "ultimate"  
semantic that the machine cannot entirely figure out by herself  
(hence the faith).


Interesting!



All universal machine looking inward discover an inexhaustible  
reality, with absolute and relative aspects.


Babbage discovered the universal machine, (and understood its  
universality).  The universal machine, the mathematical concept, will  
be (re)discovered and made more precise by a bunch of mathematical  
logicians, like Turing, Post, Church, Kleene.


You are using such a universal system right now, even plausibly two of  
them: your brain and your computer. They are a key concept in computer  
science. They suffer a big prize for their universality, as it makes  
them possible to crash, be lied, be lost, be deluded. They can know  
that they are universal, and so they can know the consequences.


The religion which recognizes the universal machine and her classical  
theology might be the one which will spread easily in the galaxy in  
the forthcoming millenaries. (Independently of being t

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

I agree with John. If consciousness had no third-person observable effects,
it would be an epiphenomenon. And then there is no way to explain why we're
even having this discussion about consciousness.

If we build computers that discuss and question their own consciousness and
qualia I'd consider that proof enough that they are. The bigger question,
is what machines might be conscious yet unable to talk about, reflect upon,
or signal to us that they are in fact conscious? This requires a theory of
consciousness.

Jason

On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 1:07 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 2/3/2015 10:00 AM, John Clark wrote:
>
>
> On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 meekerdb  wrote:
>
>  >> If consciousness was just a lucky accident Evolution would
>>> ensure that it didn't exist for long.
>>
>>
>> > Only if it cost something to maintain consciousness
>>
>
>  Not so. Mutations happen all the time and nearly all of them are
> harmful. In most animals If a mutation happens that renders it blind that
> will be a severe handicap and the animal will not live long enough to pass
> that mutated gene onto the next generation; but if it happens in a cave
> creature it's no handicap at all and so it will get into the next
> generation, the end result is that cave creatures are not only blind they
> don't even have eyes, and yet they survive just fine.
>
>
> But it is biologically costly to make and maintain eyes.
>
>   In the same way if consciousness wasn't a byproduct of intelligence and
> instead was just something tacked on that didn't effect behavior (and of
> course renders the Turing Test ineffective) then a creature with a mutation
> that stopped the consciousness mechanism from working would survive just as
> well as one without the mutation.
>
>
> But maybe it was "tacked" on to integrate information processing from
> different independent modules, e.g. vision, language, touch,... which in
> different developmental path, say AI, might have been organized in a
> hierarchy or unified from the start.  The latter might even be more
> efficient, but evolution can't go back and start over, it can only take
> small steps of improvement.
>
>   Pretty soon nobody would be conscious, but I know for a fact that at
> least one is. So either Darwin was wrong or consciousness is a byproduct of
> intelligence. I don't think Darwin was wrong.
>
>  >> So carbon atoms are conscious but silicon atoms are not. Well... I
>>> can't prove that's wrong but I really think it is.
>>
>>
>> > If you think atoms are conscious you're more mystic than Bruno.
>>
>
>  You're the one who was talking about a special connection between carbon
> and consciousness not me.
>
>
> I said carbon based life-forms, not carbon atoms.  I'm sure we both agree
> that intelligence and consciousness come from the organization of atoms.
>
> Brent
>
> --
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Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 03 Feb 2015, at 05:26, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Feb 2, 2015 at 3:50 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

> I believe you're wrong to assume intelligence=>consciousness.   
That may be an accident

If consciousness was just a lucky accident Evolution would ensure  
that it didn't exist for long. Conscious does not effect behavior  
(that's why the Turing Test doesn't work)

If conscious does not effect behavior, unconsciousness too! I know  
what I will say to the cops if they catch me sleeping when I drive my  
car. "Come on Lieutenant, I always make my nap when driving home! We  
don't need consciousness for that".

We don't need consciousness to follow the plan A. But we need it to be  
aware of the plan B, and retrieve it quickly in case of urgence.

Consciousness is an unconscious act of faith: the belief there is a  
ground below your feet, and a sum up of a spectrum of possibilities  
(once I stand up, I can fall).

Once conscious, machine efficaciousness/competence speed exponentially  
(but with the possible abuses and a corresponding level of "stupidity").

Bruno

so it doesn't enhance survival, so from Evolution's point of view it  
would be as useless as eyes are for cave animals, and it would  
disappear in a dozen generations or so due to genetic drift just as  
the eyes of cave animals did.

> of how carbon-based life developed intelligence.

So carbon atoms are conscious but silicon atoms are not. Well... I  
can't prove that's wrong but I really think it is.

  John K Clark

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think



On 03 Feb 2015, at 06:41, Jason Resch wrote:

What are your thoughts on split brains which develop two  
independently conscious minds?


I can take this idea seriously. Some experiences are convincing, but I  
need to see more of them.





We're they always two minds, or do they become such when they can't  
communicate?


That is a difficult question. It might be a question of choice,  
perhaps, depending on what you are willing to identify yourself to.


It is more than communication, it is integration/association, with  
sharing of large data. The corpus callosum is a *big* wire.


I do think the left brain might specialize on the []p, and the right  
brain on []p & p, if not p.


Bruno





Jason

On Monday, February 2, 2015, meekerdb  wrote:
> On 2/2/2015 8:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> You can no more assume those other parts of your brain are  
unconscious than you can assume other beings lack consciousness. You  
might even have solved it consciously but are amnesiac about it.

>
> Poincare's unconscious was pretty smart, it could prove theorems  
his consciousness couldn't.  So JKC would say that proves his  
unconscious was conscious.  I think that's what Bruno calls []f.

>
> I infer (not assume) other beings are conscious because they are  
very similar to me and act like I act when I'm conscious.  Pieces of  
brain don't look much like me and they don't act like me.

>
> Brent
>
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Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 2/3/2015 11:13 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
I agree with John. If consciousness had no third-person observable effects, it would be
an epiphenomenon. And then there is no way to explain why we're even having this
discussion about consciousness.

I'm not arguing that it has no observable effects. JKC says it's necessary for
intelligence. I'm arguing that might have been necessary for for the evolution of
intelligence starting from say fish. But that doesn't entail that is necessary for any
intelligent system.

If we build computers that discuss and question their own consciousness and qualia I'd
consider that proof enough that they are.

But is that the standard of intelligence? JKC argues intelligence=>consciousness. What
if they discuss and question their own consciousness, but say stupid things about it?

The bigger question, is what machines might be conscious yet unable to talk about,
reflect upon, or signal to us that they are in fact conscious? This requires a theory of
consciousness.

Exactly. That is my concern. Suppose we build an autonomous Mars Rover to do research.
We give it learning ability, so it must reflect on its experience and act intelligently.
Have we made a conscious being? Contrary to Bruno, I think there are kinds and degrees of
consciousness - just as there are kinds and degrees of intelligence.

Brent

Jason

On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 1:07 PM, meekerdb > wrote:

On 2/3/2015 10:00 AM, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>
wrote:

>> If consciousness was just a lucky accident Evolution would
ensure that it
didn't exist for long.

> Only if it cost something to maintain consciousness

Not so. Mutations happen all the time and nearly all of them are harmful.
In most
animals If a mutation happens that renders it blind that will be a severe
handicap
and the animal will not live long enough to pass that mutated gene onto the
next
generation; but if it happens in a cave creature it's no handicap at all
and so it
will get into the next generation, the end result is that cave creatures
are not
only blind they don't even have eyes, and yet they survive just fine.

But it is biologically costly to make and maintain eyes.

In the same way if consciousness wasn't a byproduct of intelligence and
instead was
just something tacked on that didn't effect behavior (and of course renders
the
Turing Test ineffective) then a creature with a mutation that stopped the
consciousness mechanism from working would survive just as well as one
without the
mutation.

But maybe it was "tacked" on to integrate information processing from
different
independent modules, e.g. vision, language, touch,... which in different
developmental path, say AI, might have been organized in a hierarchy or
unified from
the start. The latter might even be more efficient, but evolution can't go
back and
start over, it can only take small steps of improvement.

Pretty soon nobody would be conscious, but I know for a fact that at least
one is.
So either Darwin was wrong or consciousness is a byproduct of intelligence.
I don't
think Darwin was wrong.

>> So carbon atoms are conscious but silicon atoms are not. Well...
I can't
prove that's wrong but I really think it is.

> If you think atoms are conscious you're more mystic than Bruno.

You're the one who was talking about a special connection between carbon and
consciousness not me.

I said carbon based life-forms, not carbon atoms. I'm sure we both agree
that
intelligence and consciousness come from the organization of atoms.

Brent
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Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 03 Feb 2015, at 07:01, meekerdb wrote:

I think "conscious" is ambiguous.  From what I've read the two  
halves of the split brain are not both conscious in the sense of  
having an internal narrative; only one half is verbal.

The "[]p" half.

Both halves are conscious in the sense of processing information and  
influencing action - as my dog is conscious and Bruno's jumping  
spider are conscious.

OK. But non verbal consciousness is quite important, and much more  
primitive, it is the p which becomes []p.

Note that child with one one half brain develops normally. The  
remaining half brain build again an opposition between []p and []p & p.

On adults, this operation is much more debilitating I think, and the  
pole []p / p can make years to take form, if ever. The subject can  
become hemi-negligent (but I am not sure).

Bruno

Brent

On 2/2/2015 9:41 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
What are your thoughts on split brains which develop two  
independently conscious minds?

We're they always two minds, or do they become such when they can't  
communicate?

Jason

On Monday, February 2, 2015, meekerdb  wrote:
> On 2/2/2015 8:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> You can no more assume those other parts of your brain are  
unconscious than you can assume other beings lack consciousness.  
You might even have solved it consciously but are amnesiac about it.

>
> Poincare's unconscious was pretty smart, it could prove theorems  
his consciousness couldn't.  So JKC would say that proves his  
unconscious was conscious.  I think that's what Bruno calls []f.

>
> I infer (not assume) other beings are conscious because they are  
very similar to me and act like I act when I'm conscious.  Pieces  
of brain don't look much like me and they don't act like me.

>
> Brent
>
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Re: NUMERALS



On 03 Feb 2015, at 00:36, John Mikes wrote:


FRIENDS - MAINLY BRUNO

(it all came out from the French numbers).
any thoughts why some numerals have specific names, others use  
composites?
Example: (Fr:) onze, ...seize yet dixset etc. German elf, zwoelf yet  
dreizehen...
same in English, Hungarian has composites above 10, Russian Italian  
etc.

similarly. I don't know about Semitic (Arabic?), or Oriental  numbers.

My 'pegs' idea shows the origin of the Roman numerals as 4 ""  
being the maximum
tolerable, why 5, 10 were invented with a different design, even 9  
shows contempt.


I believe  - 2 - is the original counting base (eyes, hands, etc.)  
based on the more primitive Hungarian identification of a 1-eyed  
person as half-eyed, and 1 foot lost makes you

'half footed' etc.
Any idea about the 'dozen'? 12 half tones make an octave, yet more  
primitive folks had

pentatonic music (5).
All that goes before the articulate speach evolution - I think.



Well, I have books on this, it is a vast field. 6, 12, 24, 60, 36 and  
360 are related to the sun and the time Earth go around the sum. They  
are used as base for numbers, or congruence of numbers (that is rest  
of division by natural numbers, like with the clock where either 13 =  
1, or 25 = 1)


5 and 10 are related with the hand's digits, as we count on our  
fingers since always.


Note that the arithmetical formula does not depend on the choice of  
the base used to represent the numbers. x+y = y+x for all numbers, in  
all bases.



The chinese have an interesting way to multiply the numbers, with wood  
sticks, and which exploits positional digits, but works on any base.


https://www.youtube.com/watch?gl=BE&v=Iy0_YNN-H_I

Note that for 0 you need an invisible stick! But it works.

Bruno









John M

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Re: NUMERALS

2015-02-03 Thread LizR

On 3 February 2015 at 13:09, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> LizR wrote:
>
>> I think English, French, German all start composite numbers around 13?
>> (Maybe a Christian influence?)
>> I'm not sure you can deduce base 2 from "half-eyed" etc. And I imagine 5
>> was given a different design because it makes a full hand, so to speak.
>> I imagine types of music that evolved would require some analysis of how
>> it can be made, primitively? I guess everyone recognises that notes an
>> octave apart sound "similar" (unfortunately we can't check if that's also
>> true for colours - yet). Hm.
>>
>
>
> Maybe because base 12 is more sensible than base 10? The Babylonians, who
> had something to do with our numeral system, worked in base 60. Which is
> why we have 360 degrees in a circle, etc.
>
> That's a damn good point. So the fact that the teens start after 12 is a
sort of tacit admission that base 12 is more convenient (as I suppose are
things like eggs coming in dozens - not to mention "six of one, half a
dozen of the other" "six of the best" etc). Maybe the authors of the
Christian story took that on board, rather than vice versa.

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Re: NUMERALS

2015-02-03 Thread LizR

On 4 February 2015 at 08:59, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> Note that for 0 you need an invisible stick! But it works.
>
> I always carry one of those, to fend off Pookas.

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Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On Wednesday, February 4, 2015, Jason Resch  wrote:

> I agree with John. If consciousness had no third-person observable
> effects, it would be an epiphenomenon. And then there is no way to explain
> why we're even having this discussion about consciousness.
>

On the contrary, if consciousness were an epiphenomenon that would explain
why it evolved: it is a necessary side effect of intelligent behaviour, and
was not developed as a separate, useless add-on.


> If we build computers that discuss and question their own consciousness
> and qualia I'd consider that proof enough that they are. The bigger
> question, is what machines might be conscious yet unable to talk about,
> reflect upon, or signal to us that they are in fact conscious? This
> requires a theory of consciousness.
>
> Jason
>
> On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 1:07 PM, meekerdb  > wrote:
>
>>  On 2/3/2015 10:00 AM, John Clark wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 meekerdb > > wrote:
>>
>>  >> If consciousness was just a lucky accident Evolution would
 ensure that it didn't exist for long.
>>>
>>>
>>> > Only if it cost something to maintain consciousness
>>>
>>
>>  Not so. Mutations happen all the time and nearly all of them are
>> harmful. In most animals If a mutation happens that renders it blind that
>> will be a severe handicap and the animal will not live long enough to pass
>> that mutated gene onto the next generation; but if it happens in a cave
>> creature it's no handicap at all and so it will get into the next
>> generation, the end result is that cave creatures are not only blind they
>> don't even have eyes, and yet they survive just fine.
>>
>>
>> But it is biologically costly to make and maintain eyes.
>>
>>   In the same way if consciousness wasn't a byproduct of intelligence
>> and instead was just something tacked on that didn't effect behavior (and
>> of course renders the Turing Test ineffective) then a creature with a
>> mutation that stopped the consciousness mechanism from working would
>> survive just as well as one without the mutation.
>>
>>
>> But maybe it was "tacked" on to integrate information processing from
>> different independent modules, e.g. vision, language, touch,... which in
>> different developmental path, say AI, might have been organized in a
>> hierarchy or unified from the start.  The latter might even be more
>> efficient, but evolution can't go back and start over, it can only take
>> small steps of improvement.
>>
>>   Pretty soon nobody would be conscious, but I know for a fact that at
>> least one is. So either Darwin was wrong or consciousness is a byproduct of
>> intelligence. I don't think Darwin was wrong.
>>
>>  >> So carbon atoms are conscious but silicon atoms are not. Well... I
 can't prove that's wrong but I really think it is.
>>>
>>>
>>> > If you think atoms are conscious you're more mystic than Bruno.
>>>
>>
>>  You're the one who was talking about a special connection between
>> carbon and consciousness not me.
>>
>>
>> I said carbon based life-forms, not carbon atoms.  I'm sure we both agree
>> that intelligence and consciousness come from the organization of atoms.
>>
>> Brent
>>
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Re: Free Speech is not Free unless it is allowed for every point of view

2015-02-03 Thread PGC



On Tuesday, February 3, 2015 at 12:02:02 PM UTC+1, spudb...@aol.com wrote:
>
> Good. 
>
>  Yes, they are willing tools of the corporations and thus, almost all 
> politicians who get funded have their masters, and that is no question. 
> Having said that there are solutions, as long as we don't define a solution 
> as making excuses for the aggressor. My expectation is that the policies 
> employed by the current egoist, will end in big troubles for those who do 
> want western freedoms. I am paranoid that the dude might be waiting for a 
> grande attack, so he can employ a dictatorship-to protect us, and our 
> "freedom." Why not? In the US we sell votes for a free Trac phone. 
>

When you bet and sell fear, of course you need the grand attack for the 
"later told you so". How could anybody live without it?

Having the courage to stand with this fear makes us not paranoid... That's 
just liberal propaganda. 

Not paranoid: It makes us right. Always. PGC

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Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

2015-02-03 Thread David Nyman

On 3 February 2015 at 20:36, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:

On the contrary, if consciousness were an epiphenomenon that would explain
> why it evolved: it is a necessary side effect of intelligent behaviour,
> and was not developed as a separate, useless add-on.
>

I still have no idea what you mean by an epiphenomenon in this context, or
how you deal with Jason's point that any references to 'consciousness' in
the discussion would then be a mystery. The canonical examples of
epiphenomena are such things as the whistle of a steam engine. But such
things are only 'epi' in the sense that they are peripheral to the primary
function of the 'phenomenon' in question (e.g. the steam engine). It
doesn't imply that they are 'immaterial' or in some separate ontological
category: the whistle, of course, consists of standardly 'material'
atmospheric pressure and rarefaction. Consequently, as per usual in these
supposed analogies, this peculiar sort of 'epiphenomenon' seems to be
exclusively invoked in the case of consciousness.

David

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Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 1:40 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 2/3/2015 11:13 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>  I agree with John. If consciousness had no third-person observable
> effects, it would be an epiphenomenon. And then there is no way to explain
> why we're even having this discussion about consciousness.
>
>
> I'm not arguing that it has no observable effects.  JKC says it's
> necessary for intelligence.
>

Perhaps it is impossible to avoid for human-level intelligence (and
probably lower levels of intelligence as well) I don't know but it is at
least plausible.


> I'm arguing that might have been necessary for for the evolution of
> intelligence starting from say fish.   But that doesn't entail that is
> necessary for any intelligent system.
>
>
>  If we build computers that discuss and question their own consciousness
> and qualia I'd consider that proof enough that they are.
>
>
> But is that the standard of intelligence?  JKC argues
> intelligence=>consciousness.  What if they discuss and question their own
> consciousness, but say stupid things about it?
>
>
Then the "intelligence bar" for consciousness is low or perhaps unrelated
to intelligence. I think you can have consciousness without intelligence,
but it is more dubious whether you could have human-level intelligence
without consciousness.


>  The bigger question, is what machines might be conscious yet unable to
> talk about, reflect upon, or signal to us that they are in fact conscious?
> This requires a theory of consciousness.
>
>
> Exactly.  That is my concern.  Suppose we build an autonomous Mars Rover
> to do research.  We give it learning ability, so it must reflect on its
> experience and act intelligently.  Have we made a conscious being?
> Contrary to Bruno, I think there are kinds and degrees of consciousness -
> just as there are kinds and degrees of intelligence.
>

Well the question "is something conscious?" is binary, like "is something
alive?". However there is a great spectrum of possible living entities, and
a massive gulf that separates the simplest life forms from the most complex
life forms. I think the same is true of consciousness. The mars rover might
be conscious, but its consciousness might be as simple as a bacterium's
biology is compared to a human's.

Jason



>
> Brent
>
>
>
> Jason
>
> On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 1:07 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>>  On 2/3/2015 10:00 AM, John Clark wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 meekerdb  wrote:
>>
>>  >> If consciousness was just a lucky accident Evolution would
 ensure that it didn't exist for long.
>>>
>>>
>>> > Only if it cost something to maintain consciousness
>>>
>>
>>  Not so. Mutations happen all the time and nearly all of them are
>> harmful. In most animals If a mutation happens that renders it blind that
>> will be a severe handicap and the animal will not live long enough to pass
>> that mutated gene onto the next generation; but if it happens in a cave
>> creature it's no handicap at all and so it will get into the next
>> generation, the end result is that cave creatures are not only blind they
>> don't even have eyes, and yet they survive just fine.
>>
>>
>>  But it is biologically costly to make and maintain eyes.
>>
>>   In the same way if consciousness wasn't a byproduct of intelligence
>> and instead was just something tacked on that didn't effect behavior (and
>> of course renders the Turing Test ineffective) then a creature with a
>> mutation that stopped the consciousness mechanism from working would
>> survive just as well as one without the mutation.
>>
>>
>>  But maybe it was "tacked" on to integrate information processing from
>> different independent modules, e.g. vision, language, touch,... which in
>> different developmental path, say AI, might have been organized in a
>> hierarchy or unified from the start.  The latter might even be more
>> efficient, but evolution can't go back and start over, it can only take
>> small steps of improvement.
>>
>>   Pretty soon nobody would be conscious, but I know for a fact that at
>> least one is. So either Darwin was wrong or consciousness is a byproduct of
>> intelligence. I don't think Darwin was wrong.
>>
>>  >> So carbon atoms are conscious but silicon atoms are not. Well... I
 can't prove that's wrong but I really think it is.
>>>
>>>
>>> > If you think atoms are conscious you're more mystic than Bruno.
>>>
>>
>>  You're the one who was talking about a special connection between
>> carbon and consciousness not me.
>>
>>
>>  I said carbon based life-forms, not carbon atoms.  I'm sure we both
>> agree that intelligence and consciousness come from the organization of
>> atoms.
>>
>> Brent
>>   --
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Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 2:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

>
>
> On Wednesday, February 4, 2015, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>> I agree with John. If consciousness had no third-person observable
>> effects, it would be an epiphenomenon. And then there is no way to explain
>> why we're even having this discussion about consciousness.
>>
>
> On the contrary, if consciousness were an epiphenomenon that would explain
> why it evolved: it is a necessary side effect of intelligent behaviour,
> and was not developed as a separate, useless add-on.
>
>

If consciousness is a side-effect that has no other effects, then where is
the information coming from when a person articulates something about their
conscious experience? If consciousness itself has no effects at all, then
how did the theory of epiphenomenalism come to be shared beyond the
conscious mind that first conceived of it? Wouldn't such a theory
necessarily be private and unsharable if consciousness has no effects?

Jason

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Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 4 February 2015 at 09:26, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>
> On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 2:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, February 4, 2015, Jason Resch  wrote:
>>>
>>> I agree with John. If consciousness had no third-person observable
>>> effects, it would be an epiphenomenon. And then there is no way to explain
>>> why we're even having this discussion about consciousness.
>>
>>
>> On the contrary, if consciousness were an epiphenomenon that would explain
>> why it evolved: it is a necessary side effect of intelligent behaviour, and
>> was not developed as a separate, useless add-on.
>>
>
>
> If consciousness is a side-effect that has no other effects, then where is
> the information coming from when a person articulates something about their
> conscious experience? If consciousness itself has no effects at all, then
> how did the theory of epiphenomenalism come to be shared beyond the
> conscious mind that first conceived of it? Wouldn't such a theory
> necessarily be private and unsharable if consciousness has no effects?

My position is that if physics is causally closed, then ipso facto
consciousness is epiphenomenal. Otherwise, you would be able to devise
a test to determine if a given system is conscious.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 4 February 2015 at 08:23, David Nyman  wrote:
> On 3 February 2015 at 20:36, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
>
>> On the contrary, if consciousness were an epiphenomenon that would explain
>> why it evolved: it is a necessary side effect of intelligent behaviour, and
>> was not developed as a separate, useless add-on.
>
>
> I still have no idea what you mean by an epiphenomenon in this context, or
> how you deal with Jason's point that any references to 'consciousness' in
> the discussion would then be a mystery. The canonical examples of
> epiphenomena are such things as the whistle of a steam engine. But such
> things are only 'epi' in the sense that they are peripheral to the primary
> function of the 'phenomenon' in question (e.g. the steam engine). It doesn't
> imply that they are 'immaterial' or in some separate ontological category:
> the whistle, of course, consists of standardly 'material' atmospheric
> pressure and rarefaction. Consequently, as per usual in these supposed
> analogies, this peculiar sort of 'epiphenomenon' seems to be exclusively
> invoked in the case of consciousness.

An epiphenomenon is a necessary side-effect of the primary phenomenon.
The epiphenomenon has no separate causal efficacy of its own; if it
did, then we could devise a test for consciousness. This, by the way,
does not imply that consciousness does not exist or is unimportant.

The parallel examples I would give are emergent phenomena such as the
economy. You might say this is not the same thing because it is
somehow obvious that the economy is "just" the behaviour of its
component parts while this is not obvious for the brain and mind. This
may be a valid point, but what is its significance, in the end?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 4:55 PM, Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On 4 February 2015 at 09:26, Jason Resch  wrote:
> >
> >
> > On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 2:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou 
> > wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On Wednesday, February 4, 2015, Jason Resch 
> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> I agree with John. If consciousness had no third-person observable
> >>> effects, it would be an epiphenomenon. And then there is no way to
> explain
> >>> why we're even having this discussion about consciousness.
> >>
> >>
> >> On the contrary, if consciousness were an epiphenomenon that would
> explain
> >> why it evolved: it is a necessary side effect of intelligent behaviour,
> and
> >> was not developed as a separate, useless add-on.
> >>
> >
> >
> > If consciousness is a side-effect that has no other effects, then where
> is
> > the information coming from when a person articulates something about
> their
> > conscious experience? If consciousness itself has no effects at all, then
> > how did the theory of epiphenomenalism come to be shared beyond the
> > conscious mind that first conceived of it? Wouldn't such a theory
> > necessarily be private and unsharable if consciousness has no effects?
>
> My position is that if physics is causally closed, then ipso facto
> consciousness is epiphenomenal. Otherwise, you would be able to devise
> a test to determine if a given system is conscious.
>

Why do you presume such a test is not possible?

Jason

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Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 4 February 2015 at 10:13, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>
> On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 4:55 PM, Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>>
>> On 4 February 2015 at 09:26, Jason Resch  wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> > On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 2:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou 
>> > wrote:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> On Wednesday, February 4, 2015, Jason Resch 
>> >> wrote:
>> >>>
>> >>> I agree with John. If consciousness had no third-person observable
>> >>> effects, it would be an epiphenomenon. And then there is no way to
>> >>> explain
>> >>> why we're even having this discussion about consciousness.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> On the contrary, if consciousness were an epiphenomenon that would
>> >> explain
>> >> why it evolved: it is a necessary side effect of intelligent behaviour,
>> >> and
>> >> was not developed as a separate, useless add-on.
>> >>
>> >
>> >
>> > If consciousness is a side-effect that has no other effects, then where
>> > is
>> > the information coming from when a person articulates something about
>> > their
>> > conscious experience? If consciousness itself has no effects at all,
>> > then
>> > how did the theory of epiphenomenalism come to be shared beyond the
>> > conscious mind that first conceived of it? Wouldn't such a theory
>> > necessarily be private and unsharable if consciousness has no effects?
>>
>> My position is that if physics is causally closed, then ipso facto
>> consciousness is epiphenomenal. Otherwise, you would be able to devise
>> a test to determine if a given system is conscious.
>
>
> Why do you presume such a test is not possible?
>
> Jason

Could you suggest one? We could test other people, animals, computers,
thermostats...


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 5:28 PM, Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On 4 February 2015 at 10:13, Jason Resch  wrote:
> >
> >
> > On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 4:55 PM, Stathis Papaioannou 
> > wrote:
> >>
> >> On 4 February 2015 at 09:26, Jason Resch  wrote:
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 2:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <
> stath...@gmail.com>
> >> > wrote:
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >> On Wednesday, February 4, 2015, Jason Resch 
> >> >> wrote:
> >> >>>
> >> >>> I agree with John. If consciousness had no third-person observable
> >> >>> effects, it would be an epiphenomenon. And then there is no way to
> >> >>> explain
> >> >>> why we're even having this discussion about consciousness.
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >> On the contrary, if consciousness were an epiphenomenon that would
> >> >> explain
> >> >> why it evolved: it is a necessary side effect of intelligent
> behaviour,
> >> >> and
> >> >> was not developed as a separate, useless add-on.
> >> >>
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > If consciousness is a side-effect that has no other effects, then
> where
> >> > is
> >> > the information coming from when a person articulates something about
> >> > their
> >> > conscious experience? If consciousness itself has no effects at all,
> >> > then
> >> > how did the theory of epiphenomenalism come to be shared beyond the
> >> > conscious mind that first conceived of it? Wouldn't such a theory
> >> > necessarily be private and unsharable if consciousness has no effects?
> >>
> >> My position is that if physics is causally closed, then ipso facto
> >> consciousness is epiphenomenal. Otherwise, you would be able to devise
> >> a test to determine if a given system is conscious.
> >
> >
> > Why do you presume such a test is not possible?
> >
> > Jason
>
> Could you suggest one? We could test other people, animals, computers,
> thermostats...
>

I don't know of one but I don't take that to mean no such test can exist,
especially when that assumption leads to things I find less plausible than
consciousness tests, such as epiphenomenalism.

I do follow what your reasoning that (no possible test for consciousness)
-> (epiphenominalism), but I use that reasoning to take the position that (*not
*epiphenominalism) -> (*not *no possible test for consciousness). Hence
there should be a test for consciousness under the assumption that
epiphenomenalism is false. (Which it seems to be because we can talk about
consciousness, also thought experiments like dancing/fading qualia lend
further support to consciousness being detectible and having detectible
influences on behavior, see: http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html ).

Jason

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Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 4 February 2015 at 10:40, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>
> On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 5:28 PM, Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>>
>> On 4 February 2015 at 10:13, Jason Resch  wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> > On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 4:55 PM, Stathis Papaioannou 
>> > wrote:
>> >>
>> >> On 4 February 2015 at 09:26, Jason Resch  wrote:
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 2:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
>> >> > 
>> >> > wrote:
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >> On Wednesday, February 4, 2015, Jason Resch 
>> >> >> wrote:
>> >> >>>
>> >> >>> I agree with John. If consciousness had no third-person observable
>> >> >>> effects, it would be an epiphenomenon. And then there is no way to
>> >> >>> explain
>> >> >>> why we're even having this discussion about consciousness.
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >> On the contrary, if consciousness were an epiphenomenon that would
>> >> >> explain
>> >> >> why it evolved: it is a necessary side effect of intelligent
>> >> >> behaviour,
>> >> >> and
>> >> >> was not developed as a separate, useless add-on.
>> >> >>
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > If consciousness is a side-effect that has no other effects, then
>> >> > where
>> >> > is
>> >> > the information coming from when a person articulates something about
>> >> > their
>> >> > conscious experience? If consciousness itself has no effects at all,
>> >> > then
>> >> > how did the theory of epiphenomenalism come to be shared beyond the
>> >> > conscious mind that first conceived of it? Wouldn't such a theory
>> >> > necessarily be private and unsharable if consciousness has no
>> >> > effects?
>> >>
>> >> My position is that if physics is causally closed, then ipso facto
>> >> consciousness is epiphenomenal. Otherwise, you would be able to devise
>> >> a test to determine if a given system is conscious.
>> >
>> >
>> > Why do you presume such a test is not possible?
>> >
>> > Jason
>>
>> Could you suggest one? We could test other people, animals, computers,
>> thermostats...
>
>
> I don't know of one but I don't take that to mean no such test can exist,
> especially when that assumption leads to things I find less plausible than
> consciousness tests, such as epiphenomenalism.

What could such a test even look like?

> I do follow what your reasoning that (no possible test for consciousness) ->
> (epiphenominalism), but I use that reasoning to take the position that (not
> epiphenominalism) -> (not no possible test for consciousness). Hence there
> should be a test for consciousness under the assumption that
> epiphenomenalism is false. (Which it seems to be because we can talk about
> consciousness, also thought experiments like dancing/fading qualia lend
> further support to consciousness being detectible and having detectible
> influences on behavior, see: http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html ).

I don't see that those thought experiments claim to make consciousness
detectable. What they show is that IF an entity is conscious THEN its
consciousness will be preserved if a functionally equivalent
substitution is made in the entity. This is consistent with
epiphenomenalism - the consciousness emerges necessarily from the
right sort of behaviour. If it were not so, then in theory you could
make a component that was functionally equivalent, but lacked
consciousness (or lacked a consciousness-enabling property), which
would allow the creation of partial zombies, which I believe are
absurd.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Is it my imagination, or is it getting hot in here?

2015-02-03 Thread LizR

2014 was the hottest year on record (Bloomberg)
http://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2014-hottest-year-on-record/

"Vast methane plumes escaping from the seafloor" discovered in Siberian
Arctic Sea (Daily Kos)
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2014/07/28/1317252/--Vast-methane-plumes-escaping-from-the-seafloor-discovered-in-Siberian-Arctic-Sea#


Five Reasons We Need a New Global Agreement on Climate Change by 2015
(Switchboard NRDC)
http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/jschmidt/five_reasons_we_need_a_new_glo.html


10 Signs the stars are aligning for a climate deal in Paris (The Guardian)
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jan/21/10-signs-stars-are-aligning-for-climate-deal-paris


The Arctic Ice “Death Spiral” (Slate)
http://www.slate.com/blogs/bad_astronomy/2013/05/28/arctic_sea_ice_global_warming_is_melting_more_ice_every_year.html

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Re: NUMERALS

On 2/3/2015 12:32 PM, LizR wrote:
On 3 February 2015 at 13:09, Bruce Kellett > wrote:

LizR wrote:

I think English, French, German all start composite numbers around 13?
(Maybe a
Christian influence?)
I'm not sure you can deduce base 2 from "half-eyed" etc. And I imagine
5 was
given a different design because it makes a full hand, so to speak.
I imagine types of music that evolved would require some analysis of
how it can
be made, primitively? I guess everyone recognises that notes an octave
apart
sound "similar" (unfortunately we can't check if that's also true for
colours -
yet). Hm.

Maybe because base 12 is more sensible than base 10? The Babylonians, who
had
something to do with our numeral system, worked in base 60. Which is why we
have 360
degrees in a circle, etc.

That's a damn good point. So the fact that the teens start after 12 is a sort of tacit
admission that base 12 is more convenient (as I suppose are things like eggs coming in
dozens - not to mention "six of one, half a dozen of the other" "six of the best" etc).
Maybe the authors of the Christian story took that on board, rather than vice versa.

Numbers like 6, 12, 24, 36, 60, 360 were favored because they have lots of divisors. This
was convenient for commerce and other practical applications.

Brent

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Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 6:14 PM, Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On 4 February 2015 at 10:40, Jason Resch  wrote:
> >
> >
> > On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 5:28 PM, Stathis Papaioannou 
> > wrote:
> >>
> >> On 4 February 2015 at 10:13, Jason Resch  wrote:
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 4:55 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <
> stath...@gmail.com>
> >> > wrote:
> >> >>
> >> >> On 4 February 2015 at 09:26, Jason Resch 
> wrote:
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> > On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 2:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
> >> >> > 
> >> >> > wrote:
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> On Wednesday, February 4, 2015, Jason Resch  >
> >> >> >> wrote:
> >> >> >>>
> >> >> >>> I agree with John. If consciousness had no third-person
> observable
> >> >> >>> effects, it would be an epiphenomenon. And then there is no way
> to
> >> >> >>> explain
> >> >> >>> why we're even having this discussion about consciousness.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> On the contrary, if consciousness were an epiphenomenon that would
> >> >> >> explain
> >> >> >> why it evolved: it is a necessary side effect of intelligent
> >> >> >> behaviour,
> >> >> >> and
> >> >> >> was not developed as a separate, useless add-on.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> > If consciousness is a side-effect that has no other effects, then
> >> >> > where
> >> >> > is
> >> >> > the information coming from when a person articulates something
> about
> >> >> > their
> >> >> > conscious experience? If consciousness itself has no effects at
> all,
> >> >> > then
> >> >> > how did the theory of epiphenomenalism come to be shared beyond the
> >> >> > conscious mind that first conceived of it? Wouldn't such a theory
> >> >> > necessarily be private and unsharable if consciousness has no
> >> >> > effects?
> >> >>
> >> >> My position is that if physics is causally closed, then ipso facto
> >> >> consciousness is epiphenomenal. Otherwise, you would be able to
> devise
> >> >> a test to determine if a given system is conscious.
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > Why do you presume such a test is not possible?
> >> >
> >> > Jason
> >>
> >> Could you suggest one? We could test other people, animals, computers,
> >> thermostats...
> >
> >
> > I don't know of one but I don't take that to mean no such test can exist,
> > especially when that assumption leads to things I find less plausible
> than
> > consciousness tests, such as epiphenomenalism.
>
> What could such a test even look like?
>

Determining whether the brain or CPU of the supposedly conscious entity was
performing computations or processing information in a manner consistent
with those processes that according to some theory are conscious.

Here's an example: do you think information theory can be used to prove a
certain thing is not consciouss in certain ways? E.g., if some quale
contains at least 2 GB of information in it, then any process too simple to
have 2 GB worth of information could not manifest that particular quale?
After all, you don't worry that the bacteria that die when you wash your
hands have human or God-like consciousness? It seems then information
theory provides at least some tools to measure (or at least bound) possible
conscious states of systems.


>
> > I do follow what your reasoning that (no possible test for
> consciousness) ->
> > (epiphenominalism), but I use that reasoning to take the position that
> (not
> > epiphenominalism) -> (not no possible test for consciousness). Hence
> there
> > should be a test for consciousness under the assumption that
> > epiphenomenalism is false. (Which it seems to be because we can talk
> about
> > consciousness, also thought experiments like dancing/fading qualia lend
> > further support to consciousness being detectible and having detectible
> > influences on behavior, see: http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html ).
>
> I don't see that those thought experiments claim to make consciousness
> detectable. What they show is that IF an entity is conscious THEN its
> consciousness will be preserved if a functionally equivalent
> substitution is made in the entity. This is consistent with
> epiphenomenalism - the consciousness emerges necessarily from the
> right sort of behaviour.


But if epiphenonalism is true, you could never know whether consciousness
emerged or not (even if the right sort of behavior was present). The theory
offers no motivations for accepting it, other than to hide the problem of
explaining consciousness under the rug where it may be conveniently
forgotten.


> If it were not so, then in theory you could
> make a component that was functionally equivalent, but lacked
> consciousness (or lacked a consciousness-enabling property), which
> would allow the creation of partial zombies, which I believe are
> absurd.
>

Epiphenominalism implies full zombies are plausable. If full zombies are
plausible, then why wouldn't partial zombies be plausible?

If on the other hand, you think zombies (full or partial) are absurd, and
ascribe to a theory where conscio

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

2015-02-03 Thread David Nyman

On 3 February 2015 at 23:11, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:

An epiphenomenon is a necessary side-effect of the primary phenomenon.
> The epiphenomenon has no separate causal efficacy of its own; if it
> did, then we could devise a test for consciousness. This, by the way,
> does not imply that consciousness does not exist or is unimportant.
>
> The parallel examples I would give are emergent phenomena such as the
> economy. You might say this is not the same thing because it is
> somehow obvious that the economy is "just" the behaviour of its
> component parts while this is not obvious for the brain and mind. This
> may be a valid point, but what is its significance, in the end?
>

Well, you still haven't addressed the reference issue (you didn't the last
time I asked you either). On the face of it, your position would appear to
be that there is no such reference; i.e. that everything is indeed 'just'
the behaviour of its component parts, whatever we suppose those to be.  But
if so, what are we talking about? Indeed, in what sense are we even talking
at all?

In this regard, your analogy to the economy is indeed inapt, because it
begs the very question at issue. Notions such as the economy are, after
all, 'emergent' only under some interpretation. Absent such interpretation
(which is the very point in question) there would be (as you acknowledge)
no need to invoke such notions in any reductive account. As to your
rhetorical enquiry, it seems to me to be a way of trivialising further
questioning by insinuating that it is, in some unspecified sense,
'insignificant'. IMO, such a proposal is not even wrong. It just tells us
not to ask.

As far as I understand Bruno's thesis, it might at first glance appear to
share a superficial resemblance to what you seem to mean by
epiphenomenalism. Consciousness is not a 'thing' but a species of analytic
or constitutive truth associated with a reductive computational ontology as
a consequence of the simultaneous emulation, or 'entanglement', of specific
third and first-person epistemological logics. Consciousness, as truth, is
to that degree an epistemological emergent 'supervening' on computation.
But the difference is in the much greater explanatory potential implicit in
these assumptions. The paradox of reference becomes resolvable through an
explicit epistemology: i.e. the triangulation of parallel sets of referents
in the cross-hairs of computation, belief and truth. Similarly, questions
of' 'causal ordering', at least in principle, become addressable in terms
characteristic of each of these regimes (e.g. the relation between
computational redundancy and FPI).

ISTM that alternative schemas, of whatever character, must likewise possess
explanatory resources that hold some potential for resolving fundamental
relations of epistemology and ontology, rather than ignoring, distorting,
or trivialising what doesn't fit.

David

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Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think


On 2/3/2015 2:21 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 1:40 PM, meekerdb > wrote:


On 2/3/2015 11:13 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

I agree with John. If consciousness had no third-person observable effects, 
it
would be an epiphenomenon. And then there is no way to explain why we're 
even
having this discussion about consciousness.


I'm not arguing that it has no observable effects.  JKC says it's necessary 
for
intelligence.


Perhaps it is impossible to avoid for human-level intelligence (and probably lower 
levels of intelligence as well) I don't know but it is at least plausible.


I'm arguing that might have been necessary for for the evolution of 
intelligence
starting from say fish.   But that doesn't entail that is necessary for any
intelligent system.



If we build computers that discuss and question their own consciousness and 
qualia
I'd consider that proof enough that they are.


But is that the standard of intelligence?  JKC argues intelligence=>consciousness. 
What if they discuss and question their own consciousness, but say stupid things

about it?


Then the "intelligence bar" for consciousness is low or perhaps unrelated to 
intelligence. I think you can have consciousness without intelligence, but it is more 
dubious whether you could have human-level intelligence without consciousness.



The bigger question, is what machines might be conscious yet unable to talk 
about,
reflect upon, or signal to us that they are in fact conscious? This 
requires a
theory of consciousness.


Exactly.  That is my concern.  Suppose we build an autonomous Mars Rover to 
do
research.  We give it learning ability, so it must reflect on its 
experience and act
intelligently.  Have we made a conscious being? Contrary to Bruno, I think 
there are
kinds and degrees of consciousness - just as there are kinds and degrees of
intelligence.


Well the question "is something conscious?" is binary, like "is something alive?". 
However there is a great spectrum of possible living entities, and a massive gulf that 
separates the simplest life forms from the most complex life forms. I think the same is 
true of consciousness. The mars rover might be conscious, but its consciousness might be 
as simple as a bacterium's biology is compared to a human's.


That seems inconsistent with being "binary", like "being alive". First, being alive isn't 
"binary".  Are viruses alive?  Prions? Cigarettes?  Secondly, why shouldn't there be 
degrees of consciousness all the way from "My thermostat is aware of the temperature." to 
"Bruno's aware of the unprovable truths of arithmetic."  Why should we count them as 
"binary"?  Maybe there are beings whose brains implement hypercomputation; wouldn't you 
expect them to have qualitatively different consciousness, e.g. being aware of all 
consequences of any finite axiom set.


Brent

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Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think


On 2/3/2015 2:26 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 2:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou > wrote:




On Wednesday, February 4, 2015, Jason Resch mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>> wrote:

I agree with John. If consciousness had no third-person observable 
effects, it
would be an epiphenomenon. And then there is no way to explain why 
we're even
having this discussion about consciousness.


On the contrary, if consciousness were an epiphenomenon that would explain 
why it
evolved: it is a necessary side effect of intelligent behaviour, and was not
developed as a separate, useless add-on.


If consciousness is a side-effect that has no other effects, then where is the 
information coming from when a person articulates something about their conscious 
experience? If consciousness itself has no effects at all, then how did the theory of 
epiphenomenalism come to be shared beyond the conscious mind that first conceived of it? 
Wouldn't such a theory necessarily be private and unsharable if consciousness has no 
effects?


As I understand it, being an epiphenomenon means one can give a causal account of the 
phenomenon without mentioning it.  But the epiphenomenon necessarily accompanies the 
phenomenon.  In the case of consciousness it's essentially denying the possibility of a 
philosophical zombie.


Brent


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Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 2:07 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

>> Mutations happen all the time and nearly all of them are harmful. In
>> most animals If a mutation happens that renders it blind that will be a
>> severe handicap and the animal will not live long enough to pass that
>> mutated gene onto the next generation; but if it happens in a cave creature
>> it's no handicap at all and so it will get into the next generation, the
>> end result is that cave creatures are not only blind they don't even have
>> eyes, and yet they survive just fine.
>
>
> > But it is biologically costly to make and maintain eyes.
>

Even if the cost was zero they would not keep those eyes for long because
there would no evolutionary pressure to do so. So random mutation would
ensure that they didn't..

Biologists even use something like this to estimate how long ago 2 species
had a common ancestor. Mutations happen at a known statistical rate and
some of the DNA in the gnome doesn't code for genes or regulate genes or do
anything except duplicate itself, so they look at this non-coding DNA in
the 2 species and see how different it is, the bigger the difference the
older the common ancestor must have been. This won't work for the parts of
DNA that code for genes because it changes much more slowly than the
non-coding DNA does and the changes that do happen don't occur at a
constant rate,  lots of other thing besides the mutation rate come into
play.

And are you suggesting that this consciousness mechanism at work in
biological brains operates on zero energy and no tissue needs to be made
for it and thus
the consciousness mechanism has zero biological cost?

> But maybe it [consciousness] was "tacked" on to integrate information
> processing from different independent modules, e.g. vision, language,
> touch,... which in different developmental path, say AI, might have been
> organized in a hierarchy or unified from the start.  The latter might even
> be more efficient, but evolution can't go back and start over, it can only
> take small steps of improvement.

Maybe I'm wrong but to me that all seems pretty contrived and intended to
show that humans are superior, but it doesn't work because if true humans
are doomed to be intellectually inferior to computers because their brain
is organized in a fundamentally inferior way. And it gives credence to what
I said before, it's not important if humans believe computers are
conscious, the important thing is if computers think humans are conscious.

  John K Clark

>
>
>   In the same way if consciousness wasn't a byproduct of intelligence and
> instead was just something tacked on that didn't effect behavior (and of
> course renders the Turing Test ineffective) then a creature with a mutation
> that stopped the consciousness mechanism from working would survive just as
> well as one without the mutation.
>
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Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 2:25 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> We don't need consciousness to follow the plan A. But we need it to be
> aware of the plan B, and retrieve it quickly in case of urgence.
>

OK, so consciousness does effect behavior and the Turing Test works.

 > Consciousness is an unconscious [!] act of faith:

And X is not X.

 John K Clark

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Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 2:40 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

.

>  >> If we build computers that discuss and question their own
>> consciousness and qualia I'd consider that proof enough that they are.
>
>
> > But is that the standard of intelligence?  JKC argues
> intelligence=>consciousness.  What if they discuss and question their own
> consciousness, but say stupid things about it?
>

Ah,...I've been on this list for a long time and I know one thing for sure,
if stupid remarks about consciousness were proof of non-consciousness then
human beings are not conscious.

 John K Clark

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Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 2:40 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

> > I'm arguing that might have been necessary for for the evolution of
> intelligence starting from say fish.   But that doesn't entail that is
> necessary for any intelligent system.
>

And maybe men need consciousness to behave intelligently but women do not,
so men are conscious beings but women, although just as intelligent as men,
are no more conscious than a rock. Do you have any evidence that your
theory is more likely to be true than mine?

  John K Clark

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Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 2/3/2015 6:43 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 2:07 PM, meekerdb > wrote:

>> Mutations happen all the time and nearly all of them are harmful. In
most animals If a mutation happens that
renders it blind that will be a severe handicap and the animal will not
live
long enough to pass that mutated gene onto the next generation; but if
it
happens in a cave creature it's no handicap at all and so it will get
into the
next generation, the end result is that cave creatures are not only
blind they
don't even have eyes, and yet they survive just fine.

> But it is biologically costly to make and maintain eyes.

Even if the cost was zero they would not keep those eyes for long because there would no
evolutionary pressure to do so. So random mutation would ensure that they didn't..

Biologists even use something like this to estimate how long ago 2 species had a common
ancestor. Mutations happen at a known statistical rate and some of the DNA in the gnome
doesn't code for genes or regulate genes or do anything except duplicate itself, so they
look at this non-coding DNA in the 2 species and see how different it is, the bigger the
difference the older the common ancestor must have been. This won't work for the parts
of DNA that code for genes because it changes much more slowly than the non-coding DNA
does and the changes that do happen don't occur at a constant rate, lots of other thing
besides the mutation rate come into play.

But according to your theory all that junk DNA should be eliminated. It has no behavioral
effect and so "evolution can't see it" as someone is fond of writing.

And are you suggesting that this consciousness mechanism at work in biological brains
operates on zero energy and no tissue needs to be made for it and thus

the consciousness mechanism has zero biological cost?

No, not in biological brains on this planet. I'm suggesting that brains which developed
differently, such as being designed by AI engineers, might not need the same mechanism to
be intelligent.

What I think most likely is that /*our*/ consciousness is implemented by some mechanism
that is creating a summary narrative of what is experienced and this provides an advantage
because it can be reviewed (remembered) to provide experiential learning. Creation of the
narrative both compresses the data and tags it for recall. And it does incur some
biological cost.

> But maybe it [consciousness] was "tacked" on to integrate information
processing
from different independent modules, e.g. vision, language, touch,... which
in
different developmental path, say AI, might have been organized in a
hierarchy or
unified from the start. The latter might even be more efficient, but
evolution
can't go back and start over, it can only take small steps of improvement.

Maybe I'm wrong but to me that all seems pretty contrived and intended to show that
humans are superior, but it doesn't work because if true humans are doomed to be
intellectually inferior to computers because their brain is organized in a fundamentally
inferior way. And it gives credence to what I said before, it's not important if humans
believe computers are conscious, the important thing is if computers think humans are
conscious.

Yes, I agree with that. I never intended to show humans are superior. They are already
inferior by many measures.

Brent

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Re: NUMERALS

On Mon, Feb 2, 2015  Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> Maybe because base 12 is more sensible than base 10? The Babylonians, who
> had something to do with our numeral system, worked in base 60. Which is
> why we have 360 degrees in a circle, etc.

I think if we used base 8 computers might have been developed much sooner
than they were. Charles Babbage tried to make a computer 150 years ago but
it used base 10 and was a mechanical nightmare, and with all those
complicated gears and cogs his machine never operated for long without
breaking down. If.he  used base 2 it would have been far more reliable but
to be practical he would have needed to convert the input from base 10 to
base 2 and output from base 2 to base 10, and that's tricky. But converting
from base 2 to base 8 is far easier.

It would be easier to teach children the multiplication table too.

 John K Clark

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Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think


On 2/3/2015 7:20 PM, John Clark wrote:



On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 2:40 PM, meekerdb > wrote:


> I'm arguing that might have been necessary for for the evolution of 
intelligence
starting from say fish.   But that doesn't entail that is necessary for any
intelligent system.


And maybe men need consciousness to behave intelligently but women do not, so men are 
conscious beings but women, although just as intelligent as men, are no more conscious 
than a rock. Do you have any evidence that your theory is more likely to be true than mine?


Men and women have the same evolutionary history going back to fish.

Brent

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Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 10:53 PM, meekerdb  wrote:


> But according to your theory all that junk DNA should be eliminated.  It
> has no behavioral effect and so "evolution can't see it" as someone is fond
> of writing.
>

But the unit that Evolution works on is not the species or even the
individual it is the gene; and animal bodies are just the robots that genes
use to get duplicated. Some genes make for good bodies and so get
duplicated that way, but some genes are parasitic and do nothing for the
body they occupy, they take advantage of other genes good works. Parasitic
genes are far less stable than genes that actually make things. The real
struggle for existence is between genes not animals.

 John K Clark





>
>
>
>  And are you suggesting that this consciousness mechanism at work in
> biological brains operates on zero energy and no tissue needs to be made
> for it and thus
> the consciousness mechanism has zero biological cost?
>
>
> No, not in biological brains on this planet.  I'm suggesting that brains
> which developed differently, such as being designed by AI engineers, might
> not need the same mechanism to be intelligent.
>
> What I think most likely is that *our* consciousness is implemented by
> some mechanism that is creating a summary narrative of what is experienced
> and this provides an advantage because it can be reviewed (remembered) to
> provide experiential learning.  Creation of the narrative both compresses
> the data and tags it for recall.  And it does incur some biological cost.
>
>
> > But maybe it [consciousness] was "tacked" on to integrate information
>> processing from different independent modules, e.g. vision, language,
>> touch,... which in different developmental path, say AI, might have been
>> organized in a hierarchy or unified from the start.  The latter might even
>> be more efficient, but evolution can't go back and start over, it can only
>> take small steps of improvement.
>
>
>  Maybe I'm wrong but to me that all seems pretty contrived and intended
> to show that humans are superior, but it doesn't work because if true
> humans are doomed to be intellectually inferior to computers because their
> brain is organized in a fundamentally inferior way. And it gives credence
> to what I said before, it's not important if humans believe computers are
> conscious, the important thing is if computers think humans are conscious.
>
>
> Yes, I agree with that.  I never intended to show humans are superior.
> They are already inferior by many measures.
>
> Brent
>
> --
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Re: Why is there something rather than nothing? From quantum theory to dialectics?

2015-02-03 Thread Samiya Illias



> On 04-Feb-2015, at 12:01 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> 
> 
>> On 03 Feb 2015, at 06:54, Samiya Illias wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> On Mon, Feb 2, 2015 at 10:56 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>> 
 On 02 Feb 2015, at 06:37, Samiya Illias wrote:
 
 
 
> On 02-Feb-2015, at 6:12 am, LizR  wrote:
> 
>> On 2 February 2015 at 00:15, Samiya Illias  
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>>> On Sun, Feb 1, 2015 at 1:01 PM, LizR  wrote:
>>> There is a difference between advancing a theory in a spirit of 
>>> agnosticism and being convinced you know the truth and that everyone 
>>> else is wrong. 
>> 
>> Hmm... 
>> Someday, I hope and pray, when you're blessed with faith, perhaps you'll 
>> understand me. 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> As other observed that's close to the worst authority argument. By "worst" 
>>> I don't make a moral judgment, but it is worst in the sense that it is not 
>>> just invalid, but it makes the honest people automatically doubting your 
>>> message. 
>> 
>> I am not presenting an argument above. I'm just saying that this is 
>> something to do with feeling/experiencing/qualia? so I cannot explain it nor 
>> do I expect anyone who doesn't to understand it. I know its not valid. That 
>> is why I hope Someday... 
> 
> Note that it *can* be valid as a personal thought, tough. But when you make 
> it public, it is patronizing per-authority argument. Well, I don't know, but 
> that what is the universal machine thinks for herself.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>>> 
>>> 
> And vice versa, if you are blessed with faith in reason. 
 
 Thanks! :) 
>>> 
>>> Reason is the best tool, if not the only tool (at some level)
>> 
>> I agree. Reason is a tool, and perhaps the best tool, which is to be used to 
>> approach reality. 
> 
> Assuming there is one common to all of us.
> 
>>   
>>> to survive the unreasonable (arithmetical)  reality, and to maximize 
>>> partial relative control.
>>> 
>>> Unfortunately "reason" gives the ability to lie and manipulate the others 
>>> at different levels. 
>> 
>> Both reason and religion have been abused over and over again  
> 
> Yes, like drugs (medication). It is in he human nature, but I think we do 
> progress, and can still progress.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>>  
>>> 
>>> Then reason shows that arithmetic is already full of life, indeed full of 
>>> an infinity of universal machines competing to provide your infinitely many 
>>> relatively consistent continuations.
>>> 
>>> Incompleteness imposes, at least formally, a soul (a first person), an 
>>> observer (a first person plural), a "god" (an independent simple but deep 
>>> truth) to any machine believing in the RA axioms together with enough 
>>> induction axioms. I know you believe in them.
>>> 
>>> The lexicon is 
>>> p   truthGod 
>>> []p  provable Intelligible  (modal logic, G and G*)
>>> []p & p  the soul (modal logic, S4Grz)
>>> []p & <>t  intelligible matter(with p sigma_1) (modal logic, Z1, Z1*)
>>> []p & sensible matter (with p sigma_1) (modal logic, X1, X1*)
>>> 
>>> You need to study some math,
>> 
>> I have been wanting to but it seems such an uphill task. Yet, its a mountain 
>> I would like to climb :) 
> 
> 7 + 0 = 7. You are OK with this?  Tell me. 

OK 
> 
> Are you OK with the generalisation? For all numbers n, n + 0 = n.  Right? 

Right :) 
You suggest I begin with Set Theory? 

Samiya 
> 
> 
> 
>>  
>>> to see that this give eight quite different view the universal machines 
>>> develop on themselves.
>> 
>> Reminds me of this verse [http://quran.com/69/17 ]: 
>> And the angels are at its edges. And there will bear the Throne of your Lord 
>> above them, that Day, eight [of them].  
> 
> It is like that: The four first (plotinian) hypostases live harmonically in 
> the arithmetical heaven:
> 
> 
>   God
> 
> Terrestrial Intelligible   Divine Intelligible
> 
>Universal Soul
> 
> 
> 
> But then the Universal Soul falls, and you get the (four) matters, and the 
> "bastard calculus":
> 
> 
> Intelligible terrestrial matter   Intelligible Divine matter
> 
> Sensible terrestrial matter  Sensible Divine matter
> 
> 
> 
> Here divine means mainly what is true about the machine/number and not 
> justifiable by the numbers.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>>> It provides a universal person, with a soul, consistent extensions, 
>>> beliefs, and some proximity (or not) to God (which is the "ultimate" 
>>> semantic that the machine cannot entirely figure out by herself (hence the 
>>> faith). 
>> 
>> Interesting! 
> 
> All universal machine looking inward discover an inexhaustible reality, with 
> absolute and relative aspects.
> 
> Babbage discovered the universal machine, (and understood its universality).  
> The universal machine, the mathematical concept, will be (re)discovered and 
> made more precise by a bunch of mathematical logicians, like Turing, Po

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 4 February 2015 at 12:18, Jason Resch  wrote:

>> What could such a test even look like?
>
>
> Determining whether the brain or CPU of the supposedly conscious entity was
> performing computations or processing information in a manner consistent
> with those processes that according to some theory are conscious.
>
> Here's an example: do you think information theory can be used to prove a
> certain thing is not consciouss in certain ways? E.g., if some quale
> contains at least 2 GB of information in it, then any process too simple to
> have 2 GB worth of information could not manifest that particular quale?
> After all, you don't worry that the bacteria that die when you wash your
> hands have human or God-like consciousness? It seems then information theory
> provides at least some tools to measure (or at least bound) possible
> conscious states of systems.

Those criteria are suggestive, but they don't prove the presence of
consciousness. It is like saying that the problem of other minds is
proved by the fact that other brains are similar to mine, and if I'm
conscious, they probably are too. It is suggestive, but it is not
proof.

>> > I do follow what your reasoning that (no possible test for
>> > consciousness) ->
>> > (epiphenominalism), but I use that reasoning to take the position that
>> > (not
>> > epiphenominalism) -> (not no possible test for consciousness). Hence
>> > there
>> > should be a test for consciousness under the assumption that
>> > epiphenomenalism is false. (Which it seems to be because we can talk
>> > about
>> > consciousness, also thought experiments like dancing/fading qualia lend
>> > further support to consciousness being detectible and having detectible
>> > influences on behavior, see: http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html ).
>>
>> I don't see that those thought experiments claim to make consciousness
>> detectable. What they show is that IF an entity is conscious THEN its
>> consciousness will be preserved if a functionally equivalent
>> substitution is made in the entity. This is consistent with
>> epiphenomenalism - the consciousness emerges necessarily from the
>> right sort of behaviour.
>
>
> But if epiphenonalism is true, you could never know whether consciousness
> emerged or not (even if the right sort of behavior was present). The theory
> offers no motivations for accepting it, other than to hide the problem of
> explaining consciousness under the rug where it may be conveniently
> forgotten.

If I have epiphenomenal consciousness, then others with similar brains
and behaviour probably also have epiphenomenal consciousness.

>> If it were not so, then in theory you could
>> make a component that was functionally equivalent, but lacked
>> consciousness (or lacked a consciousness-enabling property), which
>> would allow the creation of partial zombies, which I believe are
>> absurd.
>
>
> Epiphenominalism implies full zombies are plausable. If full zombies are
> plausible, then why wouldn't partial zombies be plausible?

Epiphenomenalism implies that full zombies are impossible.

> If on the other hand, you think zombies (full or partial) are absurd, and
> ascribe to a theory where consciousnes always results given the right sorts
> of behavior (under some theory), then can't detection of those right sorts
> of behavior be used as a test of consciousness? Surely, we must always doubt
> the theory under which we are operating, and we can no more prove other
> beings are conscious than we can prove the outside world is real, but if,
> (say under theory X) that we can prove that a process that implements a
> certain set of computations Y conscious of certain things Z, then under
> theory X and computationalism, any other process that implements the
> computations Y will be conscious of Z.

Yes, except I would leave out the requirement that we prove that
computations Y are conscious of Z, because I don't thiunk it's
possible to prove. Instead, I would say that *given* that computations
Y are conscious of Z.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 4 February 2015 at 12:59, meekerdb  wrote:

> As I understand it, being an epiphenomenon means one can give a causal
> account of the phenomenon without mentioning it.  But the epiphenomenon
> necessarily accompanies the phenomenon.  In the case of consciousness it's
> essentially denying the possibility of a philosophical zombie.

Yes, that's how I would put it.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 7:52 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 2/3/2015 2:21 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 1:40 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>>  On 2/3/2015 11:13 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>  I agree with John. If consciousness had no third-person observable
>> effects, it would be an epiphenomenon. And then there is no way to explain
>> why we're even having this discussion about consciousness.
>>
>>
>>  I'm not arguing that it has no observable effects.  JKC says it's
>> necessary for intelligence.
>>
>
>  Perhaps it is impossible to avoid for human-level intelligence (and
> probably lower levels of intelligence as well) I don't know but it is at
> least plausible.
>
>
>>  I'm arguing that might have been necessary for for the evolution of
>> intelligence starting from say fish.   But that doesn't entail that is
>> necessary for any intelligent system.
>>
>>
>>  If we build computers that discuss and question their own consciousness
>> and qualia I'd consider that proof enough that they are.
>>
>>
>>  But is that the standard of intelligence?  JKC argues
>> intelligence=>consciousness.  What if they discuss and question their own
>> consciousness, but say stupid things about it?
>>
>>
>  Then the "intelligence bar" for consciousness is low or perhaps
> unrelated to intelligence. I think you can have consciousness without
> intelligence, but it is more dubious whether you could have human-level
> intelligence without consciousness.
>
>
>>  The bigger question, is what machines might be conscious yet unable to
>> talk about, reflect upon, or signal to us that they are in fact conscious?
>> This requires a theory of consciousness.
>>
>>
>>  Exactly.  That is my concern.  Suppose we build an autonomous Mars Rover
>> to do research.  We give it learning ability, so it must reflect on its
>> experience and act intelligently.  Have we made a conscious being?
>> Contrary to Bruno, I think there are kinds and degrees of consciousness -
>> just as there are kinds and degrees of intelligence.
>>
>
>  Well the question "is something conscious?" is binary, like "is
> something alive?". However there is a great spectrum of possible living
> entities, and a massive gulf that separates the simplest life forms from
> the most complex life forms. I think the same is true of consciousness. The
> mars rover might be conscious, but its consciousness might be as simple as
> a bacterium's biology is compared to a human's.
>
>
> That seems inconsistent with being "binary", like "being alive".  First,
> being alive isn't "binary".  Are viruses alive?  Prions?  Cigarettes?
>

Any of those things are either alive or they aren't (according to some
theory of liveness).



> Secondly, why shouldn't there be degrees of consciousness all the way from
> "My thermostat is aware of the temperature." to "Bruno's aware of the
> unprovable truths of arithmetic."
>

Living things can take many forms, and vary vastly in complexity, and I
think the same is true of consciousness: it may take many forms and vary
significantly in complexity. Is a bacterium comparable to a blue whale? No,
but they're still alive. A bacterium isn't less alive than a blue whale
just because its less intricate or smaller.


>   Why should we count them as "binary"?  Maybe there are beings whose
> brains implement hypercomputation; wouldn't you expect them to have
> qualitatively different consciousness, e.g. being aware of all consequences
> of any finite axiom set.
>
>
They do have different consciousnesses. But that doesn't make lesser
consciousness "unconsciouss" or "not consciouss".

Jason

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Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 7:59 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 2/3/2015 2:26 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 2:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, February 4, 2015, Jason Resch  wrote:
>>
>>>  I agree with John. If consciousness had no third-person observable
>>> effects, it would be an epiphenomenon. And then there is no way to explain
>>> why we're even having this discussion about consciousness.
>>>
>>
>>  On the contrary, if consciousness were an epiphenomenon that would
>> explain why it evolved: it is a necessary side effect of intelligent
>> behaviour, and was not developed as a separate, useless add-on.
>>
>>
>
>  If consciousness is a side-effect that has no other effects, then where
> is the information coming from when a person articulates something about
> their conscious experience? If consciousness itself has no effects at all,
> then how did the theory of epiphenomenalism come to be shared beyond the
> conscious mind that first conceived of it? Wouldn't such a theory
> necessarily be private and unsharable if consciousness has no effects?
>
>
> As I understand it, being an epiphenomenon means one can give a causal
> account of the phenomenon without mentioning it.  But the epiphenomenon
> necessarily accompanies the phenomenon.  In the case of consciousness it's
> essentially denying the possibility of a philosophical zombie.
>
>
>
Epiphenominalism is a form of dualism, like Descarte's interaction, except
without the interaction. In epiphenominalism the causal linkage between the
physical and mental worlds is strictly one way. Stathis gives an accurate
definition when he said:

"An epiphenomenon is a necessary side-effect of the primary phenomenon.
The epiphenomenon has no separate causal efficacy of its own; if it
did, then we could devise a test for consciousness. This, by the way,
does not imply that consciousness does not exist or is unimportant."

If epiphenominalism is possible, then that it implies zombies are possible.
All they would require is cutting the causal link from the physical world
to the mental world.

This interview shows a good debate about epiphenominalism:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ss0aCWpNzSM&t=37m

Jason

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Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 11:10 PM, Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On 4 February 2015 at 12:18, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> >> What could such a test even look like?
> >
> >
> > Determining whether the brain or CPU of the supposedly conscious entity
> was
> > performing computations or processing information in a manner consistent
> > with those processes that according to some theory are conscious.
> >
> > Here's an example: do you think information theory can be used to prove a
> > certain thing is not consciouss in certain ways? E.g., if some quale
> > contains at least 2 GB of information in it, then any process too simple
> to
> > have 2 GB worth of information could not manifest that particular quale?
> > After all, you don't worry that the bacteria that die when you wash your
> > hands have human or God-like consciousness? It seems then information
> theory
> > provides at least some tools to measure (or at least bound) possible
> > conscious states of systems.
>
> Those criteria are suggestive, but they don't prove the presence of
> consciousness. It is like saying that the problem of other minds is
> proved by the fact that other brains are similar to mine, and if I'm
> conscious, they probably are too. It is suggestive, but it is not
> proof.
>

There are never any proofs in the sciences, just accumulations of evidence.
I don't propose a consciousness test here on this list, but I at least show
there may be a path to a test of of an upper bound on consciousness, if the
size of the informational state can be measured (and people seem more
readily accepting of the fact that information storage and carrying
capacity can be objectively measured and studied). Proving something is
conscious seems trickier than proving something is not conscious, but a
similar sort of coherent information processing capacity type of
measurement might be possible (as proposed by Tononi
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Integrated_information_theory ).



>
> >> > I do follow what your reasoning that (no possible test for
> >> > consciousness) ->
> >> > (epiphenominalism), but I use that reasoning to take the position that
> >> > (not
> >> > epiphenominalism) -> (not no possible test for consciousness). Hence
> >> > there
> >> > should be a test for consciousness under the assumption that
> >> > epiphenomenalism is false. (Which it seems to be because we can talk
> >> > about
> >> > consciousness, also thought experiments like dancing/fading qualia
> lend
> >> > further support to consciousness being detectible and having
> detectible
> >> > influences on behavior, see: http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html ).
> >>
> >> I don't see that those thought experiments claim to make consciousness
> >> detectable. What they show is that IF an entity is conscious THEN its
> >> consciousness will be preserved if a functionally equivalent
> >> substitution is made in the entity. This is consistent with
> >> epiphenomenalism - the consciousness emerges necessarily from the
> >> right sort of behaviour.
> >
> >
> > But if epiphenonalism is true, you could never know whether consciousness
> > emerged or not (even if the right sort of behavior was present). The
> theory
> > offers no motivations for accepting it, other than to hide the problem of
> > explaining consciousness under the rug where it may be conveniently
> > forgotten.
>
> If I have epiphenomenal consciousness, then others with similar brains
> and behaviour probably also have epiphenomenal consciousness.
>

But for all you know, you are the lone person on Earth that has the right
gene that enables you to be conscious. Since consciousness is not
detectable (according to epiphenominalism), there would be no way to tell
which gene of yours conferred this ability.


>
> >> If it were not so, then in theory you could
> >> make a component that was functionally equivalent, but lacked
> >> consciousness (or lacked a consciousness-enabling property), which
> >> would allow the creation of partial zombies, which I believe are
> >> absurd.
> >
> >
> > Epiphenominalism implies full zombies are plausable. If full zombies are
> > plausible, then why wouldn't partial zombies be plausible?
>
> Epiphenomenalism implies that full zombies are impossible.
>

Maybe if you define them to be impossible, but they remain logically
possible since there's no physical causal need for consciousness to exist
or not, it can be dispensed with entirely without altering the course of
physics.


> > If on the other hand, you think zombies (full or partial) are absurd, and
> > ascribe to a theory where consciousnes always results given the right
> sorts
> > of behavior (under some theory), then can't detection of those right
> sorts
> > of behavior be used as a test of consciousness? Surely, we must always
> doubt
> > the theory under which we are operating, and we can no more prove other
> > beings are conscious than we can prove the outside world is real, but if,
> > (say under theory X) that we can prove that a proces

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 11:11 PM, Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On 4 February 2015 at 12:59, meekerdb  wrote:
>
> > As I understand it, being an epiphenomenon means one can give a causal
> > account of the phenomenon without mentioning it.  But the epiphenomenon
> > necessarily accompanies the phenomenon.  In the case of consciousness
> it's
> > essentially denying the possibility of a philosophical zombie.
>
> Yes, that's how I would put it.
>
>
>
What Brent describes sounds more like emergence to me than epiphenominalism.

See how epiphenominalism is decribed here:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epiphenomenalism and
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epiphenomenalism/

Perhaps all of our disagreement comes down to operating under different
definitions?

Jason

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Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think


On 2/3/2015 9:12 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



Well the question "is something conscious?" is binary, like "is something 
alive?".
However there is a great spectrum of possible living entities, and a 
massive gulf
that separates the simplest life forms from the most complex life forms. I 
think
the same is true of consciousness. The mars rover might be conscious, but 
its
consciousness might be as simple as a bacterium's biology is compared to a 
human's.


That seems inconsistent with being "binary", like "being alive".  First, 
being alive
isn't "binary".  Are viruses alive?  Prions?  Cigarettes?


Any of those things are either alive or they aren't (according to some theory 
of liveness).


So you simply define "alive" to be all or nothing by invoking some "theory of liveness" - 
however arbitrarily you have to draw the line.  Not a very defensible position.


Brent

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Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think


On 2/3/2015 9:22 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
If epiphenominalism is possible, then that it implies zombies are possible. All they 
would require is cutting the causal link from the physical world to the mental world.


But the definition of epiphenominalism includes that it /*necessarily */accompanies the 
phenomenon.  So zombies are impossible.


Brent

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Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

2015-02-03 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2015-02-04 7:43 GMT+01:00 meekerdb :

>  On 2/3/2015 9:12 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>Well the question "is something conscious?" is binary, like "is
>> something alive?". However there is a great spectrum of possible living
>> entities, and a massive gulf that separates the simplest life forms from
>> the most complex life forms. I think the same is true of consciousness. The
>> mars rover might be conscious, but its consciousness might be as simple as
>> a bacterium's biology is compared to a human's.
>>
>>
>>  That seems inconsistent with being "binary", like "being alive".  First,
>> being alive isn't "binary".  Are viruses alive?  Prions?  Cigarettes?
>>
>
>  Any of those things are either alive or they aren't (according to some
> theory of liveness).
>
>
> So you simply define "alive" to be all or nothing by invoking some "theory
> of liveness" - however arbitrarily you have to draw the line.  Not a very
> defensible position.
>
>
But wherever is the line... there is a line between dead or alive, if there
wasn't, then everything is alive... emptying the alive concept... same
thing for consciousness.

Quentin


> Brent
>
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Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think