RE: Question About The Statutory Title VII Exception and the Constitutional Ministerial Exception

2010-05-10 Thread Esenberg, Richard
CLS v. Martinez occurred to me too. Although there are the complications of 
public fora analysis, it seems to me that the case may begin a process of 
facing the inevitable conflict presented by efforts to define a perspective 
that is still shared by a significant portion of the population - perhaps even 
a majority - as invidious discrimination. This strikes me as fundamentally 
different from our experience with race and gender. The national (if not, in 
the case of race, southern) consensus led, rather than trailed, the law.

The difficulty of this reconciliation is reflected in the litigating positions 
taken in Martinez. Hastings has retreated from the idea that it can restrict 
the particular point of view expressed by CLS arguing (rather fantastically in 
my view) that it merely wishes to prohibit any student organization from 
excluding anyone from leadership based on point of view. In Hastings' forum, 
cats must live with dogs, Democrats must welcome Republicans, and PrideLaw must 
accept congregants of the Westboro Baptist Church. Even if this works in the 
context of public fora analysis (and I don't think it does), it won't help in 
other contexts.

CLS, on the other hand, says that it has no desire to exclude gays and lesbians 
as long as they are willing to affirm that to act on their sexual orientation 
would be a sin.

To some, this is an odd distinction. When I debated CLS v. Martinez with Shaun 
Martin at the Unviversity of San Diego Law School, he referred to to it as 
saying well, ... I'm not gay gay. CLS, in the views of some, has simply 
recast an exclusion based on status as an exclusion based on belief.

I think Chris' hypothetical raises that issue more starkly than CLS. We can 
imagine that some (although perhaps not many) gays and lesbians might well 
believe that acting on his or her sexual orientation would be wrong and would  
be willing to affirm CLS' statement of belief.

But a woman who accepts Ordinatio Sacerdotalis will not present herself for 
ordination. Viewing the exclusion as an exercise of a right of expressive 
association rather than sex discrimination effectively excludes women from the 
leadership position at issue.

Maybe that's OK for religious organizations even if Smith has put paid to the 
ministerial exception.

But what about the secular world? What about a kinder and gentler version of 
the Little Rascal's He-Man Woman Haters Club, say the Legion for Preservation 
of Motherhood and the Traditional Family formed to advocate for, among other 
things, traditional gender roles. Might it say that it will only hire women who 
sign a statement that says married women should not work outside of the home.

Beyond that, could it take the postion that hiring women (or even admitting 
them to membership meetings in the evening when they should be at home with the 
children) would interfere with their expressive message? As I recall, the Boy 
Scouts' policy was to exclude avowed homosexuals.

I guess its evident that I really don't want to start grading today.

Professor Rick Esenberg
Marquette University Law School
Sensenbrenner Hall 321C
1103 W. Wisconsin Avenue
Milwaukee, WI 53201
(o) 414-288-6908
(m)414-213-3957
(f)  414-288-6975





From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] 
on behalf of Douglas Laycock [layco...@umich.edu]
Sent: Sunday, May 09, 2010 8:42 AM
To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
Subject: Re: Question About The Statutory Title VII Exception and the 
Constitutional Ministerial Exception

This questions were actually posed in Dayton Christian Schools, which went off 
on Younger grounds in the Supreme Court in 1986.  Got a hostile opinion on the 
merits in the Sixth Circuit.

They are also lurking in CLS v. Martinez, argued April 19.  CLS requires a 
statement of faith, which everyone agrees is religious, and it requires a good 
faith effort to live up to Christian morality, which precludes unrepentant 
nonmarital sex.  That's clearly religious for CLS; Hastings claims it is sexual 
orientation discrimination.

Quoting Christopher Lund ed9...@wayne.edu:

 No problem with you missing it, Eugene -- it actually proves we're
 thinking alike.  I agree with everything you said, and I think it
 unlikely the Catholic Church would do this.  (Although note Ordinatio
 Sacerdotalis does end with the line, “We declare that the Church has
 no authority whatsoever to confer priestly ordination on women and
 that this judgment is to be definitively held by all the Church's
 faithful.”).

 In any event, the main issue I’m trying to think about is this.  The
 statutory exception, as written, only gives churches a shield against
 claims of religious discrimination.  But, in practice, it should
 provide protection from any type of discrimination claim -- as long
 as the discrimination is not just a church practice but a core church
 belief.  And this has ex ante effects; by adopting certain doctrines,
 

Re: Factual Clarification re CLS

2010-05-10 Thread David Cruz
I'm not sure my understanding of the CLS policy agrees 100% with Doug's.  
Whether or not you call it a disparate impact, I believe there is what groups 
like Lambda have been litigating as an insurmountable obstacle faced by 
same-sex couples that different-sex couples don't face.  My understanding was 
that the CLS policy excluded people who were not in what CLS considered a 
biblical marriage; that is, I thought CLS didn't care if a same-sex couple was 
civilly married in the few months it was legal in California, for example, but 
instead maintained that a same-sex relationship *couldn't be* a marriage (in 
the biblical sense) and hence same-sex couples could not ever have marital sex 
(regardless of civil law).  Thus, if I'm right, it's possible for straight 
people to be sexually active and members of CLS, but not for gay people.

If, however, Doug or someone can point to evidence that CLS accepts sexual 
activity within a *civil* same-sex marriage, then it would be more complicated 
though not necessarily impossible to conclude that there is no sexual 
orientation discrimination.  But if my understanding is right, I think there is 
sexual orientation discrimination (as I reject the notion that it wouldn't 
discriminate against gay and lesbian people to say, you're as free as straight 
people to marry and have sex with a person of a different sex, and straight 
people are as forbidden as gay and lesbian people to have sex with a person of 
the same sex).

David B. Cruz
Professor of Law
University of Southern California Gould School of Law
Los Angeles, CA 90089-0071
U.S.A.

On May 10, 2010, at 9:53 AM, Douglas Laycock wrote:

CLS's membership policy does not turn on the distinction between sexual 
orientation and sexual conduct.  CLS's rule prohibits any unrepentant sexual 
relationships outside marriage, whether same-sex or opposite-sex.  There is no 
classification based on sexual orientation. There is no disparate impact; there 
no are no doubt many more Hastings students in sexually active opposite-sex 
relationships than in sexually active same-sex relationships.

It is true that the opposite-sex couples could legally get married, and the 
same-sex couples could not, but that has little relevance to the unmarried 
opposite-sex couples, who are unmarried for a reason:  they are finanically or 
emotionally unprepared for marriage, or not yet ready to settle down, or 
commit, or whatever.  Most of the same-sex couples are probably int he same 
situation in addition to being legally unable to marry.  Anyone who is having 
sex and for whatever reason isn't married is excluded by the CLS rule.

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Faith Base Banking

2010-05-10 Thread Paul Finkelman
Are there First Amendment issues here? Or more precisely, should there be bank 
regulations -- or civil rights regulations -- that preclude religious banks? Or 
is this just run-of-the-mill corruption (assuming the indictments lead to 
conviction, and the banks are not innocent).

==


The New York Times

May 7, 2010 



2 
at Faith-Based
Bank Are Indicted Over Bribes 

By ROBBIE BROWN 



ATLANTA
— When government regulators here shut down Integrity Bank at the height
 of the
recession, in August of 
2008,
the bank was seen as just another failed lender that had overvalued the 
real
estate market and collapsed.  

But
a federal indictment unsealed on Friday accused two former vice 
presidents at
the bank of hastening its downfall by selling fraudulent loans to a 
hotel
developer in exchange for bribes.  

The
two executives, Douglas Ballard and Joseph Todd Foster, were charged 
with
conspiracy, insider trading and bank fraud, according to the indictment.
 Mr.
Ballard was also charged with bribery. The developer, Guy Mitchell, who
received $80 million in loans, was charged with conspiracy and bribery. 
 

   

Founded on Christian principles 
in 2000 in an Atlanta suburb,
Integrity used the motto “In God We Trust.” The bank gave customers free
Bibles, and employees prayed together at meetings. Onetime
investors included a Georgia state senator and the former CNN host Lou Dobbs.  

   

But
in announcing the indictment, the United States attorney Sally Quillian 
Yates
said Mr. Ballard and Mr. Foster had not lived up to the bank’s name or 
mission.
 

“A
number of banks have suffered from the plummeting real estate market, 
but this
bank was robbed from the inside,” she said.  

Mr.
Ballard, 40, and Mr. Foster, 42, could not be reached for comment on 
Friday and
will be arraigned at a later date. Mr. Mitchell, 50, pleaded not guilty 
at a
federal courthouse in Atlanta.  

A
lawyer for Mr. Mitchell, Edward Garland, said his client had been a 
law-abiding,
profitable customer for the bank. “The collapse of the economy caused 
the bank
failure, not his activity,” Mr. Garland said.  

Georgia
leads the nation in bank failures, with 38 banks having closed since 
2007,
according to the Federal
Deposit
 Insurance Corporation. The state’s woes have generally been blamed
on underregulation and overinvestment in real estate. But the Integrity 
case is
a different matter.  

“These
indictments are very unusual,” said A. James Elliott, associate dean of Emory 
University 
School of
Law, an expert in banking law.  

From
2004 to 2006, Mr. Mitchell, who lives in Coral Gables, Fla., and has 
developed
hotels, shopping centers and other commercial real estate, received the 
$80
million in loans from Integrity, the indictment says. His holdings 
include the
upscale Casa Madrona Hotel and Spa in Sausalito, Calif., and the Royal 
Palm
Hotel near Miami.  

The
indictment charges that he obtained much of the money under false 
pretenses and
deposited nearly $20 million in a personal checking account, with which 
he
bought luxury items, including a $1.5 million private island in the 
Bahamas.  

The
indictment charges that Mr. Mitchell made few, if any, payments on the 
loans.
Instead, it says, he took additional loans, and his debt ballooned. In 
return
for lenience, Mr. Mitchell paid Mr. Ballard more than $230,000 in 
bribes, the
indictment says. It also accuses the two bank executives of engaging in 
insider
trading by selling Integrity stock.  

“After
passing out $80 million to the developer like it was Monopoly money, 
both
officers dumped their Integrity stock before the failed loans came to 
light,”
Ms. Yates said.  

But
Mr. Garland, the defense lawyer, said Mr. Mitchell was in compliance 
with
banking regulations and merely used a central bank account for both 
personal
and business expenses, adding, “We expect to show that he is completely
innocent.”  

Integrity
reported assets of $1.1 billion when it was sold to a unit of the Regions 
Financial
Corporation in 2008. The bank had been a prominent example of 
faith-based
banking in Georgia, with five locations.  

The
bank’s founder, Steven M. Skow, a Lutheran, said it gave away 10 percent
 of
annual profits to churches and faith-based charities, donating $1.7 
million in
2007. Mr. Skow said it did not discriminate against non-Christians. 
 

“We
weren’t selling religion,” he said. “We just managed the bank on godly
principles, like the golden rule.”  

Mr.
Skow, who left the bank in 2007 and was not implicated in the 
indictment, said
he knew nothing about the activities at the heart of the indictment. He 
said he
had lost $22 million in stock when the bank failed.  

Ms.
Yates, the United States attorney, said the investigation into Integrity
 was
continuing.  




Paul Finkelman

President William McKinley Distinguished Professor of Law

Albany Law School

80 New Scotland Avenue

Albany, NY  12208



518-445-3386 (p)

518-445-3363 (f)




RE: Factual Clarification re CLS

2010-05-10 Thread Esenberg, Richard
Douglas Laycock is certainly correct that CLS' statement of belief also calls 
for heterosexual students to refrain from sex outside of marriage, but I am not 
sure that does much work in resolving the tension between the desire to 
prohibit discrimination based on a status that is tied to at least a desire to 
engage in certain forms of behavior and the assertion of an associational right 
that excludes anyone who acts on that status. Nor does it change the fact that 
CLS most certainly - and quite explicity - draws a distinction between sexual 
orientation and acting on that orientation.

In response to David Cruz' question, CLS would not extend membership to persons 
engaged in sexual activity within a same sex marriage or civil union. Its 
policy is not simply about sex outside of a marriage without regard to sexual 
orientation. CLS would exclude sexually active homosexuals even if, for 
example, Prop 8 was declared unconstitutional or improperly enacted, and those 
couples were married. CLS' statement of belief calls for members to refrain 
from all acts of sexual conduct outside of God’s design for marriage between 
one man and one woman, which acts include fornication, adultery, and homosexual 
conduct.”  So, at the same time that it insists on sex within marriage, it 
makes clear that marriage may not be between persons of the same sex.

CLS certainly believes that its policy creates a distinction between sexual 
orientation and sexual conduct - although I agree that it is not simply that. 
In its letter to its Hastings requesting recognition, CLS quite forthrightly 
said that a person who engages in homosexual conduct or adheres to the 
viewpoint that homosexual conduct is not a sin cannot be a chapter officer or 
member. It also said that a person who has homosexual inclinations ut does not 
engage in or affirm homosexual conduct can be an officer or member.

Now, I don't think its entirely unfair to say that this has a disparate impact 
on gays and lesbians (and, if it is unfair, it is certainly not because there 
are many more heterosexuals than homosexuals.) The policy excludes all sexually 
active homosexuals but only those sexually active heterosexuals who have sex 
outside of marriage.

But I don't see the notion of disparate impact as helpful at all. The question, 
rather, is whether CLS' rights of association entitle it to make that 
distinction or, in the particular context of public fora analysis, whether 
Hastings decision to condition recognition of the group as a student 
organization is viewpoint neutral.

My own view is that CLS - certainly outside the public forum context but, I 
would argue, within it as well - should be permitted to exclude those who do 
not share its views. Pushed to its logical conclusion, this may result in hard 
cases in which the question becomes whether these associational rights can be 
pushed to permit the exclusion not only of those persons who wish to act on a 
status but who adhere to views about that status on which otherwise applicable 
antidiscrimination law is based.

Rick

Professor Rick Esenberg
Marquette University Law School
Sensenbrenner Hall 321C
1103 W. Wisconsin Avenue
Milwaukee, WI 53201
(o) 414-288-6908
(m)414-213-3957
(f)  414-288-6975





From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] 
on behalf of Douglas Laycock [layco...@umich.edu]
Sent: Monday, May 10, 2010 11:53 AM
To: Law  Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Factual Clarification re CLS

CLS's membership policy does not turn on the .  CLS's rule prohibits any 
unrepentant sexual relationships outside marriage, whether same-sex or 
opposite-sex.  There is no classification based on sexual orientation. There is 
no disparate impact; there no are no doubt many more Hastings students in 
sexually active opposite-sex relationships than in sexually active same-sex 
relationships.

It is true that the opposite-sex couples could legally get married, and the 
same-sex couples could not, but that has little relevance to the unmarried 
opposite-sex couples, who are unmarried for a reason:  they are finanically or 
emotionally unprepared for marriage, or not yet ready to settle down, or 
commit, or whatever.  Most of the same-sex couples are probably int he same 
situation in addition to being legally unable to marry.  Anyone who is having 
sex and for whatever reason isn't married is excluded by the CLS rule.

Quoting Esenberg, Richard richard.esenb...@marquette.edu:

 CLS v. Martinez occurred to me too. Although there are the
 complications of public fora analysis, it seems to me that the case
 may begin a process of facing the inevitable conflict presented by
 efforts to define a perspective that is still shared by a significant
 portion of the population - perhaps even a majority - as invidious
 discrimination. This strikes me as fundamentally different from our
 experience with race and gender. The national (if 

RE: Faith Base Banking

2010-05-10 Thread Volokh, Eugene
  I’m not sure I even quite understand the question – what exactly 
constitutes a “religious bank” that would be prohibited, while “secular banks” 
would be permitted?

  Eugene

From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Paul Finkelman
Sent: Monday, May 10, 2010 11:07 AM
To: Law  Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Faith Base Banking

Are there First Amendment issues here? Or more precisely, should there be bank 
regulations -- or civil rights regulations -- that preclude religious banks? Or 
is this just run-of-the-mill corruption (assuming the indictments lead to 
conviction, and the banks are not innocent).

==
The New York Times
May 7, 2010
2 at Faith-Based Bank Are Indicted Over Bribes
By ROBBIE 
BROWNhttp://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/b/robbie_brown/index.html?inline=nyt-per

ATLANTA — When government regulators here shut down Integrity Bank at the 
height of the 
recessionhttp://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/r/recession_and_depression/index.html?inline=nyt-classifier,
 in August of 2008, the bank was seen as just another failed lender that had 
overvalued the real estate market and collapsed.

But a federal indictment unsealed on Friday accused two former vice presidents 
at the bank of hastening its downfall by selling fraudulent loans to a hotel 
developer in exchange for bribes.

The two executives, Douglas Ballard and Joseph Todd Foster, were charged with 
conspiracy, insider trading and bank fraud, according to the indictment. Mr. 
Ballard was also charged with bribery. The developer, Guy Mitchell, who 
received $80 million in loans, was charged with conspiracy and bribery.



Founded on Christian principles in 2000 in an Atlanta suburb, Integrity used 
the motto “In God We Trust.” The bank gave customers free Bibles, and employees 
prayed together at meetings. Onetime investors included a Georgia state senator 
and the former CNN host Lou 
Dobbshttp://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/d/lou_dobbs/index.html?inline=nyt-per.



But in announcing the indictment, the United States attorney Sally Quillian 
Yates said Mr. Ballard and Mr. Foster had not lived up to the bank’s name or 
mission.

“A number of banks have suffered from the plummeting real estate market, but 
this bank was robbed from the inside,” she said.

Mr. Ballard, 40, and Mr. Foster, 42, could not be reached for comment on Friday 
and will be arraigned at a later date. Mr. Mitchell, 50, pleaded not guilty at 
a federal courthouse in Atlanta.

A lawyer for Mr. Mitchell, Edward Garland, said his client had been a 
law-abiding, profitable customer for the bank. “The collapse of the economy 
caused the bank failure, not his activity,” Mr. Garland said.

Georgia leads the nation in bank failures, with 38 banks having closed since 
2007, according to the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporationhttp://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/f/federal_deposit_insurance_corp/index.html?inline=nyt-org.
 The state’s woes have generally been blamed on underregulation and 
overinvestment in real estate. But the Integrity case is a different matter.

“These indictments are very unusual,” said A. James Elliott, associate dean of 
Emory 
Universityhttp://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/e/emory_university/index.html?inline=nyt-org
 School of Law, an expert in banking law.

From 2004 to 2006, Mr. Mitchell, who lives in Coral Gables, Fla., and has 
developed hotels, shopping centers and other commercial real estate, received 
the $80 million in loans from Integrity, the indictment says. His holdings 
include the upscale Casa Madrona Hotel and Spa in Sausalito, Calif., and the 
Royal Palm Hotel near Miami.

The indictment charges that he obtained much of the money under false pretenses 
and deposited nearly $20 million in a personal checking account, with which he 
bought luxury items, including a $1.5 million private island in the Bahamas.

The indictment charges that Mr. Mitchell made few, if any, payments on the 
loans. Instead, it says, he took additional loans, and his debt ballooned. In 
return for lenience, Mr. Mitchell paid Mr. Ballard more than $230,000 in 
bribes, the indictment says. It also accuses the two bank executives of 
engaging in insider trading by selling Integrity stock.

“After passing out $80 million to the developer like it was Monopoly money, 
both officers dumped their Integrity stock before the failed loans came to 
light,” Ms. Yates said.

But Mr. Garland, the defense lawyer, said Mr. Mitchell was in compliance with 
banking regulations and merely used a central bank account for both personal 
and business expenses, adding, “We expect to show that he is completely 
innocent.”

Integrity reported assets of $1.1 billion when it was sold to a unit of the 
Regions Financial 

Re: Faith Base Banking

2010-05-10 Thread hamilton02
Sounds like religious insurance.  They typically argue they should not have to 
abide by regulations and they discriminate on the basis of religion in hiring 
and in choosing customers

As I remember there is a religious exemption for religious insurers in the 
health care law.

Marci
Sent from my Verizon Wireless BlackBerry

-Original Message-
From: Volokh, Eugene vol...@law.ucla.edu
Date: Mon, 10 May 2010 11:13:12 
To: 'Law  Religion issues for Law Academics'religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
Subject: RE: Faith Base Banking

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RE: Factual Clarification re CLS

2010-05-10 Thread Rick Duncan
Interestingly, Hastings takes the position that the policy it is 
enforcing against the CLS is not a sexual orientation policy, but an 
all comers policy, a policy that forbids any group from discriminating
 against any person who wishes to be a member. Under this policy, an 
NAACP student group would have to admit racists as voting members and 
even leaders of the group, and the Young Republicans would have to allow
 democrats to be voting members and leaders.

I think the school 
took this tack to avoid the viewpoint discrimination argument, but may 
have substituted an even greater problem for the one it seeks to avoid.

The
 school may even lose Justice Breyer, who in the oral argument referred 
to the policy as fantastical  and as creating a silly kind of forum in
 which everyone gets together in a nice discussion group and hugs each
 other.

That led Mike McConnell to conclude that the policy does
 not even provide a rational basis for excluding a student group from a 
forum with the stated purpose of creating a diverse marketplace of 
ideas. As Mike put it, the all comers policy does not even slightly 
advance the stated purpose of the forum, and indeed is destructive of 
that purpose by prohibiting groups from having a membership policy based
 upon its organizing principles and beliefs.



Rick Duncan 
Welpton Professor of Law 
University of Nebraska College of Law 
Lincoln, NE 68583-0902


And against the constitution I have never raised a storm,It's the scoundrels 
who've corrupted it that I want to reform --Dick Gaughan (from the song, 
Thomas Muir of Huntershill)



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RE: Factual Clarification re CLS

2010-05-10 Thread Scarberry, Mark
The all comers policy may not be viewpoint discriminatory, but it is in,
at least in potential, viewpoint annihilatory. That makes it nonsensical
for a forum explicitly designed to encourage a diversity of viewpoints.

 

Mark Scarberry

Pepperdine

 

From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Rick Duncan
Sent: Monday, May 10, 2010 11:47 AM
To: Law  Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Factual Clarification re CLS

 

Interestingly, Hastings takes the position that the policy it is
enforcing against the CLS is not a sexual orientation policy, but an
all comers policy, a policy that forbids any group from discriminating
against any person who wishes to be a member. Under this policy, an
NAACP student group would have to admit racists as voting members and
even leaders of the group, and the Young Republicans would have to allow
democrats to be voting members and leaders.

I think the school took this tack to avoid the viewpoint discrimination
argument, but may have substituted an even greater problem for the one
it seeks to avoid.

The school may even lose Justice Breyer, who in the oral argument
referred to the policy as fantastical  and as creating a silly kind of
forum in which everyone gets together in a nice discussion group and
hugs each other.

That led Mike McConnell to conclude that the policy does not even
provide a rational basis for excluding a student group from a forum with
the stated purpose of creating a diverse marketplace of ideas. As Mike
put it, the all comers policy does not even slightly advance the stated
purpose of the forum, and indeed is destructive of that purpose by
prohibiting groups from having a membership policy based upon its
organizing principles and beliefs.




Rick Duncan 
Welpton Professor of Law 
University of Nebraska College of Law 
Lincoln, NE 68583-0902



And against the constitution I have never raised a storm,It's the
scoundrels who've corrupted it that I want to reform --Dick Gaughan
(from the song, Thomas Muir of Huntershill)

 

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RE: Factual Clarification re CLS

2010-05-10 Thread Ira (Chip) Lupu
This concern about associations getting taken over by hostile forces is 
completely ungrounded -- it never happens, and for an obvious reason.  These 
kinds of fora are cooperation games -- no group is ever a majority (even the 
Democratic law students at a liberal law school have a relatively small number 
of active members), and every group is vulnerable to takeover.  But takeover 
would invite tit-for-tat counter-takeover.  CLS members could intrude on the 
GLBT group, and vice versa.  Everyone knows this, so all of the incentives are 
lined up in ways that make this extremely unlikely to occur.  (Yes, if the KKK 
had a campus group, enraged others might try to invade and destroy the 
association, but that example is sui generis, just like the Bob Jones case.)

If CLS had not litigated this, and had filed by-laws with Hastings LS that said 
CLS was open to all comers, there is no reason to expect that those who reject 
orthodox Christianity would try to join.  Someone just has to show forbearance 
-- either the school by allowing discrimination based on beliefs (which could 
be a pretext for other kinds of discrimination), or the groups by being open to 
all comers (confident that the process of selecting and joining would bring 
them no hostile members).   In a law school, there is certainly a rational 
basis for coming down on the side of non-exclusivity as a condition of access 
to the forum and its privileges  -- among other things, all-comers increases 
the likelihood of dynamic exchange of views, something a law school may 
legitimately value.  CLS is not a church, and neither is Outlaw, and yet (if 
Hastings prevails) both will wind up with (only) the members sympathetic to 
their respective purposes.

  
Ira C. Lupu
F. Elwood  Eleanor Davis Professor of Law
George Washington University Law School
2000 H St., NW 
Washington, DC 20052
(202)994-7053
My SSRN papers are here:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=181272#reg


 Original message 
Date: Mon, 10 May 2010 11:47:00 -0700 (PDT)
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu (on behalf of Rick Duncan 
nebraskalawp...@yahoo.com)
Subject: RE: Factual Clarification re CLS  
To: Law  Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu

   Interestingly, Hastings takes the position that the  
   policy it is enforcing against the CLS is not a  
   sexual orientation policy, but an all comers   
   policy, a policy that forbids any group from 
   discriminating against any person who wishes to be a 
   member. Under this policy, an NAACP student group
   would have to admit racists as voting members and
   even leaders of the group, and the Young Republicans 
   would have to allow democrats to be voting members   
   and leaders. 

   I think the school took this tack to avoid the   
   viewpoint discrimination argument, but may have  
   substituted an even greater problem for the one it   
   seeks to avoid.  

   The school may even lose Justice Breyer, who in the  
   oral argument referred to the policy as  
   fantastical  and as creating a silly kind of forum 
   in which everyone gets together in a nice   
   discussion group and hugs each other.   

   That led Mike McConnell to conclude that the policy  
   does not even provide a rational basis for excluding 
   a student group from a forum with the stated purpose 
   of creating a diverse marketplace of ideas. As Mike  
   put it, the all comers policy does not even slightly 
   advance the stated purpose of the forum, and indeed  
   is destructive of that purpose by prohibiting groups 
   from having a membership policy based upon its   
   organizing principles and beliefs.   

   Rick Duncan  
   Welpton Professor of Law 
   University of Nebraska College of Law
   Lincoln, NE 68583-0902   

   And against the constitution I have never raised a  
   storm,It's the scoundrels who've corrupted it that I 
   want to reform --Dick Gaughan (from the song,   
   Thomas Muir of Huntershill)  

___
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 Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people 
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RE: Factual Clarification re CLS

2010-05-10 Thread Marc Stern
It is not true that it never happens. I think it was scientology in the
late 70's or early 80's  Scientology tried to take over an anti-cult
group,invokng the Unruh Act. The California courts saw through the
effort.
Marc

-Original Message-
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Ira (Chip) Lupu
Sent: Monday, May 10, 2010 4:41 PM
To: Law  Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Factual Clarification re CLS

This concern about associations getting taken over by hostile forces is
completely ungrounded -- it never happens, and for an obvious reason.
These kinds of fora are cooperation games -- no group is ever a majority
(even the Democratic law students at a liberal law school have a
relatively small number of active members), and every group is
vulnerable to takeover.  But takeover would invite tit-for-tat
counter-takeover.  CLS members could intrude on the GLBT group, and vice
versa.  Everyone knows this, so all of the incentives are lined up in
ways that make this extremely unlikely to occur.  (Yes, if the KKK had a
campus group, enraged others might try to invade and destroy the
association, but that example is sui generis, just like the Bob Jones
case.)

If CLS had not litigated this, and had filed by-laws with Hastings LS
that said CLS was open to all comers, there is no reason to expect that
those who reject orthodox Christianity would try to join.  Someone just
has to show forbearance -- either the school by allowing discrimination
based on beliefs (which could be a pretext for other kinds of
discrimination), or the groups by being open to all comers (confident
that the process of selecting and joining would bring them no hostile
members).   In a law school, there is certainly a rational basis for
coming down on the side of non-exclusivity as a condition of access to
the forum and its privileges  -- among other things, all-comers
increases the likelihood of dynamic exchange of views, something a law
school may legitimately value.  CLS is not a church, and neither is
Outlaw, and yet (if Hastings prevails) both will wind up with (only) the
members sympathetic to their respective purposes.

  
Ira C. Lupu
F. Elwood  Eleanor Davis Professor of Law George Washington University
Law School 2000 H St., NW Washington, DC 20052
(202)994-7053
My SSRN papers are here:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=181272#reg


 Original message 
Date: Mon, 10 May 2010 11:47:00 -0700 (PDT)
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu (on behalf of Rick Duncan
nebraskalawp...@yahoo.com)
Subject: RE: Factual Clarification re CLS  
To: Law  Religion issues for Law Academics
religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu

   Interestingly, Hastings takes the position that the  
   policy it is enforcing against the CLS is not a  
   sexual orientation policy, but an all comers   
   policy, a policy that forbids any group from 
   discriminating against any person who wishes to be a 
   member. Under this policy, an NAACP student group
   would have to admit racists as voting members and
   even leaders of the group, and the Young Republicans 
   would have to allow democrats to be voting members   
   and leaders. 

   I think the school took this tack to avoid the   
   viewpoint discrimination argument, but may have  
   substituted an even greater problem for the one it   
   seeks to avoid.  

   The school may even lose Justice Breyer, who in the  
   oral argument referred to the policy as  
   fantastical  and as creating a silly kind of forum 
   in which everyone gets together in a nice   
   discussion group and hugs each other.   

   That led Mike McConnell to conclude that the policy  
   does not even provide a rational basis for excluding 
   a student group from a forum with the stated purpose 
   of creating a diverse marketplace of ideas. As Mike  
   put it, the all comers policy does not even slightly 
   advance the stated purpose of the forum, and indeed  
   is destructive of that purpose by prohibiting groups 
   from having a membership policy based upon its   
   organizing principles and beliefs.   

   Rick Duncan  
   Welpton Professor of Law 
   University of Nebraska College of Law
   Lincoln, NE 68583-0902   

   And against the constitution I have never raised a  
   storm,It's the scoundrels who've corrupted it that I 
   want to reform --Dick Gaughan (from the song,   
  

RE: Factual Clarification re CLS

2010-05-10 Thread Ira (Chip) Lupu
Did this attempted takeover of the anti-cult group by Scientologists happen in 
a law school, or other educational institution, where the cooperation 
incentives are maximized?  If you are going to offer real examples, more 
details would be helpful.  

In the world of truly private associations (like religious congregations, or 
the Boy Scouts)), the right to exclude is of course a trump against any 
state-imposed policy of mandatory inclusion of all comers.  But that doesn't 
mean that a state university must recognize that right to exclude when it sets 
a policy about access to the forum -- in that context, nondiscrimination among 
groups is the controlling norm.  And all-comers is nondiscriminatory. 

Ira C. Lupu
F. Elwood  Eleanor Davis Professor of Law
George Washington University Law School
2000 H St., NW 
Washington, DC 20052
(202)994-7053
My SSRN papers are here:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=181272#reg


 Original message 
Date: Mon, 10 May 2010 16:49:55 -0400
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu (on behalf of Marc Stern 
mst...@ajcongress.org)
Subject: RE: Factual Clarification re CLS  
To: Law  Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu

It is not true that it never happens. I think it was scientology in the
late 70's or early 80's  Scientology tried to take over an anti-cult
group,invokng the Unruh Act. The California courts saw through the
effort.
Marc

-Original Message-
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Ira (Chip) Lupu
Sent: Monday, May 10, 2010 4:41 PM
To: Law  Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Factual Clarification re CLS

This concern about associations getting taken over by hostile forces is
completely ungrounded -- it never happens, and for an obvious reason.
These kinds of fora are cooperation games -- no group is ever a majority
(even the Democratic law students at a liberal law school have a
relatively small number of active members), and every group is
vulnerable to takeover.  But takeover would invite tit-for-tat
counter-takeover.  CLS members could intrude on the GLBT group, and vice
versa.  Everyone knows this, so all of the incentives are lined up in
ways that make this extremely unlikely to occur.  (Yes, if the KKK had a
campus group, enraged others might try to invade and destroy the
association, but that example is sui generis, just like the Bob Jones
case.)

If CLS had not litigated this, and had filed by-laws with Hastings LS
that said CLS was open to all comers, there is no reason to expect that
those who reject orthodox Christianity would try to join.  Someone just
has to show forbearance -- either the school by allowing discrimination
based on beliefs (which could be a pretext for other kinds of
discrimination), or the groups by being open to all comers (confident
that the process of selecting and joining would bring them no hostile
members).   In a law school, there is certainly a rational basis for
coming down on the side of non-exclusivity as a condition of access to
the forum and its privileges  -- among other things, all-comers
increases the likelihood of dynamic exchange of views, something a law
school may legitimately value.  CLS is not a church, and neither is
Outlaw, and yet (if Hastings prevails) both will wind up with (only) the
members sympathetic to their respective purposes.

  
Ira C. Lupu
F. Elwood  Eleanor Davis Professor of Law George Washington University
Law School 2000 H St., NW Washington, DC 20052
(202)994-7053
My SSRN papers are here:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=181272#reg


 Original message 
Date: Mon, 10 May 2010 11:47:00 -0700 (PDT)
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu (on behalf of Rick Duncan
nebraskalawp...@yahoo.com)
Subject: RE: Factual Clarification re CLS  
To: Law  Religion issues for Law Academics
religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu

   Interestingly, Hastings takes the position that the  
   policy it is enforcing against the CLS is not a  
   sexual orientation policy, but an all comers   
   policy, a policy that forbids any group from 
   discriminating against any person who wishes to be a 
   member. Under this policy, an NAACP student group
   would have to admit racists as voting members and
   even leaders of the group, and the Young Republicans 
   would have to allow democrats to be voting members   
   and leaders. 

   I think the school took this tack to avoid the   
   viewpoint discrimination argument, but may have  
   substituted an even greater problem for the one it   
   seeks to avoid.  

   The school may even lose Justice Breyer, who in the  
   oral argument referred to the policy as  
   fantastical  and as 

Re: Factual Clarification re CLS

2010-05-10 Thread Hamilton02
 
I think Rick misreads Justice Breyer's comments.  He was playing  Michael, 
saying, tongue-in-cheek, that it would be fantastical that there  would be 
this open exchange between opposing views on a law school  campus.  Michael 
was resisting agreeing that such an exchange was  likely or good, and so 
Breyer needed to bring him back to another view  of the universe to get 
Michael to answer the question he wanted  answered.  Careful reading of the 
transcript does not support Rick's  interpretation.
 
 I think a law school has a compelling interest in having an  all-comers 
policy, because it encourages lawyers to see all sides of every  issue, 
regardless of their existing predispositions, which is crucial to  becoming a 
good 
lawyer, no?  
 
In any event, this case is not about whether or not this group can protect  
its associational rights to exclude certain believers and actors.  It is  
about whether a public university law school must provide certain meeting  
rooms and certain bulletin boards and money to a group that insists on  
exclusionary practices among its voting membership and leadership.  There  are 
no 
rules that forbid the group from meeting or holding the beliefs it  holds.  
It is an attempt to move Rosenberger beyond its facts.  I  thought 
Rosenberger was wrongly decided, but cleverly argued.  I think  the Court needs 
to 
draw the line on this foolhardy doctrine before schools  are required to have 
to pay for all worship services, which surely is not  required by the First 
Amendment.  Only Chief Justice Roberts and  Justice Alito made any real 
effort to defend CLS's position, which seems to  me to bode well for Martinez.  
But I would not have thought it possible  that a majority of the Supreme 
Court today would agree that white crosses  are the standard marker for our 
diverse array of soldiers, so as usual, it will  be interesting to see what 
happens.
 
Marci
 
 
In a message dated 5/10/2010 4:41:46 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time,  
icl...@law.gwu.edu writes:

This  concern about associations getting taken over by hostile forces is 
completely  ungrounded -- it never happens, and for an obvious reason.  These 
kinds  of fora are cooperation games -- no group is ever a majority (even 
the  Democratic law students at a liberal law school have a relatively small 
number  of active members), and every group is vulnerable to takeover.  But  
takeover would invite tit-for-tat counter-takeover.  CLS members could  
intrude on the GLBT group, and vice versa.  Everyone knows this, so all  of the 
incentives are lined up in ways that make this extremely unlikely to  occur. 
 (Yes, if the KKK had a campus group, enraged others might try to  invade 
and destroy the association, but that example is sui generis, just  like 
the Bob Jones case.)

If CLS had not litigated this, and had filed  by-laws with Hastings LS that 
said CLS was open to all comers, there is no  reason to expect that those 
who reject orthodox Christianity would try to  join.  Someone just has to 
show forbearance -- either the school by  allowing discrimination based on 
beliefs (which could be a pretext for other  kinds of discrimination), or the 
groups by being open to all comers  (confident that the process of selecting 
and joining would bring them no  hostile members).   In a law school, there 
is certainly a rational  basis for coming down on the side of 
non-exclusivity as a condition of access  to the forum and its privileges  -- 
among other 
things, all-comers  increases the likelihood of dynamic exchange of views, 
something a law school  may legitimately value.  CLS is not a church, and 
neither is Outlaw, and  yet (if Hastings prevails) both will wind up with 
(only) the members  sympathetic to their respective purposes.


Ira C. Lupu
F.  Elwood  Eleanor Davis Professor of Law
George Washington University  Law School
2000 H St., NW 
Washington, DC 20052
(202)994-7053
My  SSRN papers are  here:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=181272#reg


  Original message 
Date: Mon, 10 May 2010 11:47:00 -0700  (PDT)
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu (on behalf of Rick  Duncan 
nebraskalawp...@yahoo.com)
Subject: RE: Factual  Clarification re CLS  
To: Law  Religion issues for Law  Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu

Interestingly, Hastings takes the position that the  
policy it is enforcing against the CLS is not a   
   sexual orientation policy, but an all comers   
   policy, a policy that forbids any  group from 
discriminating against any person who wishes to be a 
member. Under this policy, an NAACP student group 
   would have to admit racists as voting members and   
   even leaders of the group, and the Young  Republicans 
   would have to allow democrats to be voting  members   
   and leaders.
 
   I think the school took this tack to  avoid the   
   viewpoint  discrimination argument, but may have  

Re: Factual Clarification re CLS

2010-05-10 Thread ArtSpitzer
Apparently the Scientologists tried twice; two reported cases seem to fit 
Marc's description:

Hart v. Cult Awareness Network, 13 Cal.App.4th 777, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 705 
(Cal.App. 2 Dist. 1993)

Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752 (9th Cir. 1994)

The cases didn't arise on a college campus.
 
Art Spitzer


In a message dated 5/10/10 4:50:53 PM, mst...@ajcongress.org writes:


 It is not true that it never happens. I think it was scientology in the
 late 70's or early 80's  Scientology tried to take over an anti-cult
 group,invokng the Unruh Act. The California courts saw through the
 effort.
 Marc
 
___
To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see 
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Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private.  
Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can 
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Re: Salazar

2010-05-10 Thread Ira (Chip) Lupu
Marci wrote: I would not have thought it possible that a majority of the 
Supreme Court today would agree that white crosses are the standard marker for 
our diverse array of soldiers.  

Such an agreement did not occur in Salazar. (Of the six Justices who addressed 
the merits, three would have affirmed.) Justices Scalia and Thomas concurred in 
the judgment, on the ground that Mr. Buono lacked standing to seek what Scalia 
called an expansion of the injunction, to cover a display of the cross on land 
that the U.S. sought to transfer to a private party.  Scalia may well have felt 
somewhat trapped by his McCreary County dissent, in which he strongly 
emphasized that the Ten Commandments were a text shared by western monotheists 
-- Jews, Christians, and Muslims.  I also think Scalia may have been 
(appropriately)  chagrined by his exchange in the oral argument in Salazar, 
when the ACLU counsel reminded him that Jewish cemeteries will not display 
crosses on gravestones.  So we don't really know what Justice Scalia would say 
on the merits of government sponsorship of a cross as a war memorial (and 
perhaps he will forever argue that no one has Article III standing to !
 ch!
allenge such a display, so he never has to reach those merits.) 

Ira C. Lupu
F. Elwood  Eleanor Davis Professor of Law
George Washington University Law School
2000 H St., NW 
Washington, DC 20052
(202)994-7053
My SSRN papers are here:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=181272#reg


 Original message 
Date: Mon, 10 May 2010 17:07:15 EDT
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu (on behalf of hamilto...@aol.com)
Subject: Re: Factual Clarification re CLS  
To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu

   I think Rick misreads Justice Breyer's comments.  He
   was playing Michael, saying, tongue-in-cheek, that
   it would be fantastical that there would be this
   open exchange between opposing views on a law school
   campus.  Michael was resisting agreeing that such an
   exchange was likely or good, and so Breyer needed to
   bring him back to another view of the universe to
   get Michael to answer the question he wanted
   answered.  Careful reading of the transcript does
   not support Rick's interpretation.

I think a law school has a compelling interest in
   having an all-comers policy, because it encourages
   lawyers to see all sides of every issue, regardless
   of their existing predispositions, which is crucial
   to becoming a good lawyer, no? 

   In any event, this case is not about whether or not
   this group can protect its associational rights to
   exclude certain believers and actors.  It is about
   whether a public university law school must provide
   certain meeting rooms and certain bulletin boards
   and money to a group that insists on exclusionary
   practices among its voting membership and
   leadership.  There are no rules that forbid the
   group from meeting or holding the beliefs it holds. 
   It is an attempt to move Rosenberger beyond its
   facts.  I thought Rosenberger was wrongly decided,
   but cleverly argued.  I think the Court needs to
   draw the line on this foolhardy doctrine before
   schools are required to have to pay for all worship
   services, which surely is not required by the First
   Amendment.  Only Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
   Alito made any real effort to defend CLS's position,
   which seems to me to bode well for Martinez.  But I
   would not have thought it possible that a majority
   of the Supreme Court today would agree that white
   crosses are the standard marker for our diverse
   array of soldiers, so as usual, it will be
   interesting to see what happens.

   Marci


   In a message dated 5/10/2010 4:41:46 P.M. Eastern
   Daylight Time, icl...@law.gwu.edu writes:

 This concern about associations getting taken over
 by hostile forces is completely ungrounded -- it
 never happens, and for an obvious reason.  These
 kinds of fora are cooperation games -- no group is
 ever a majority (even the Democratic law students
 at a liberal law school have a relatively small
 number of active members), and every group is
 vulnerable to takeover.  But takeover would invite
 tit-for-tat counter-takeover.  CLS members could
 intrude on the GLBT group, and vice versa. 
 Everyone knows this, so all of the incentives are
 lined up in ways that make this extremely unlikely
 to occur.  (Yes, if the KKK had a campus group,
 enraged others might try to invade and destroy
 the association, but that example is sui generis,
 just like the Bob Jones case.)

 If CLS had not litigated this, and had filed
 by-laws with Hastings LS that said CLS was open to
 all comers, there is no reason to expect that
 those who reject orthodox Christianity would try
 to join.  Someone just has to show forbearance --
 either the school by allowing discrimination based
 on 

Re: Factual Clarification re CLS

2010-05-10 Thread ArtSpitzer
Ira Lupu writes:

 In a law school, there is certainly a rational basis for coming down on 
 the side of non-exclusivity as a condition of access to the forum and its 
 privileges -- among other things, all-comers increases the likelihood of 
 dynamic exchange of views, something a law school may legitimately value.  
 CLS 
 is not a church, and neither is Outlaw, and yet (if Hastings prevails) both 
 will wind up with (only) the members sympathetic to their respective 
 purposes.
 
 
But isn't that purpose fully served by requiring that campus groups allow 
all comers to attend meetings and participate in discussions?   Does voting 
membership or eligibility for leadership positions further serve that 
purpose?

And campus groups are not only discussion groups.   Quite often they are 
action groups as well.   For example, a CLS group and an Outlaw group at GWU 
may both want to present testimony at a DC Council hearing on a same-sex 
marriage bill.

Art Spitzer
___
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Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can 
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RE: Factual Clarification re CLS

2010-05-10 Thread Rick Duncan
Perhaps democrats will not attempt to take control of the Young Republicans.

But I think there is a good chance that socially liberal Christians may take 
control of a conservative Christian group that can't protect its doctrinal 
beliefs through its membership policy.

By the way, it is clear that the CLS allows all comers to attend its meetings. 
This case is strictly about who can control an organization's beliefs and 
speech, not about who may attend meetings.

I have read the oral argument transcript several times. And it is clear to me 
that Breyer believes an all comers membership policy is silly and completely 
inconsistent with a marketplace of ideas in which many groups with different 
beliefs debate and express different ideas from very different perspectives.

Rick Duncan

Rick Duncan 
Welpton Professor of Law 
University of Nebraska College of Law 
Lincoln, NE 68583-0902



  ___
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RE: Factual Clarification re CLS

2010-05-10 Thread Esenberg, Richard
Quite apart from Justice Breyer's view of the matter, the all comers policy 
does seem fantastical since it wasn't cited by Hastings until after the matter 
was in suit and recognized student organizations had all sorts of limitations 
on who could become voting members or officers. One even had a racial 
exclusion. All were unrenarked upon by Hastings until this case came along. 
While I understand that the plaintiffs stipulated that that this was in fact at 
least one policy, it does seem like a contrivance (which doesn't mean it can be 
upheld).

It is certainly the case that lawyers ought to learn to see (or, better put, 
understand the arguments on all sides of an issue) but it seems unlikely that 
an all comers policy will serve that end. Either no dissenters will join CLS, 
i.e., the takeover will not happen either due to incentives for cooperation or 
some other reason (in which case the all comers policy serves no real purpose) 
or they will in which case the group's message will be bent to the consensus. 
While that might happen because CLS members will be persuaded to abandon their 
retrograde ways, it seems just as likely - if not more likely - that the 
group's message will be diluted by the inclusion of those who don't share it. 
The end result is not to encourage diversity of viewpoints but to drive the 
range of viewpoints to those held by a consensus of students or, perhaps more 
accurately, a consensus of those students who find the expression of divergent 
points of view to be offensive or discriminatory.

In any event, requiring CLS to accept those with differing points of view as 
voting members (as opposed to permitting them to attend and participate in CLS 
events as is already the case) is hardly the least restrictive alternatives.

Of course, the case goes beyond Rosenberger's facts, but not necessarily its 
rationale. Hastings policy discriminates against creedal groups, i.e., those 
who define themselves by the desire to adhere to and promote some particular 
viewpoint. It is certainly an extension of the law to say that Rosenberger's 
prohibition against restricting participation in a forum to viewpoints about 
temporal matters might also cover restricting participation to those who insist 
on no particular point of view, but I am not sure it is an unreasonable one.

Rick


Professor Rick Esenberg
Marquette University Law School
Sensenbrenner Hall 321C
1103 W. Wisconsin Avenue
Milwaukee, WI 53201
(o) 414-288-6908
(m)414-213-3957
(f)  414-288-6975

From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] 
on behalf of hamilto...@aol.com [hamilto...@aol.com]
Sent: Monday, May 10, 2010 4:07 PM
To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
Subject: Re: Factual Clarification re CLS

I think Rick misreads Justice Breyer's comments.  He was playing Michael, 
saying, tongue-in-cheek, that it would be fantastical that there would be 
this open exchange between opposing views on a law school campus.  Michael was 
resisting agreeing that such an exchange was likely or good, and so Breyer 
needed to bring him back to another view of the universe to get Michael to 
answer the question he wanted answered.  Careful reading of the transcript does 
not support Rick's interpretation.

 I think a law school has a compelling interest in having an all-comers policy, 
because it encourages lawyers to see all sides of every issue, regardless of 
their existing predispositions, which is crucial to becoming a good lawyer, no?

In any event, this case is not about whether or not this group can protect its 
associational rights to exclude certain believers and actors.  It is about 
whether a public university law school must provide certain meeting rooms and 
certain bulletin boards and money to a group that insists on exclusionary 
practices among its voting membership and leadership.  There are no rules that 
forbid the group from meeting or holding the beliefs it holds.  It is an 
attempt to move Rosenberger beyond its facts.  I thought Rosenberger was 
wrongly decided, but cleverly argued.  I think the Court needs to draw the line 
on this foolhardy doctrine before schools are required to have to pay for all 
worship services, which surely is not required by the First Amendment.  Only 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito made any real effort to defend CLS's 
position, which seems to me to bode well for Martinez.  But I would not have 
thought it possible that a majority of the Supreme Court today would !
 agree that white crosses are the standard marker for our diverse array of 
soldiers, so as usual, it will be interesting to see what happens.

Marci


In a message dated 5/10/2010 4:41:46 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, 
icl...@law.gwu.edu writes:
This concern about associations getting taken over by hostile forces is 
completely ungrounded -- it never happens, and for an obvious reason.  These 
kinds of fora are cooperation games -- no group is ever a majority 

Re: Faith Base Banking

2010-05-10 Thread Vance R. Koven
I don't see any particular connection to religion at all here. Everybody
seems to be saying they were in compliance with banking regulations, the
securities laws and anything else they've been charged with violating. If
there is going to be a claim that being a religious bank means they don't
have to abide by whatever lending criteria the law establishes (and if they
were out of compliance, I'd like to know what Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's
excuse was), it would strike me as both a last refuge of a scoundrel issue
and a possible estoppel issue if they didn't make any exemption claims when
obtaining their banking licenses (I don't know what regulations would apply
to the borrower--there are already cases that hold a bank loan is not a
securities transaction to which Rule 10b-5 would apply).

There are, however, religious banks, in the sense of banks that apply
religious law to their products, chiefly Islamic banks that structure
products around the interest prohibition. Of course, Western banks also deal
in such products for clients to whom the religious prohibitions matter.
However, the NYT article doesn't suggest that Integrity was claiming a
Christian loan is one that doesn't need to be repaid.

Vance

On Mon, May 10, 2010 at 2:30 PM, hamilto...@aol.com wrote:

 Sounds like religious insurance.  They typically argue they should not have
 to abide by regulations and they discriminate on the basis of religion in
 hiring and in choosing customers

 As I remember there is a religious exemption for religious insurers in the
 health care law.

 Marci
 Sent from my Verizon Wireless BlackBerry

 -Original Message-
 From: Volokh, Eugene vol...@law.ucla.edu
 Date: Mon, 10 May 2010 11:13:12
 To: 'Law  Religion issues for Law Academics'religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
 Subject: RE: Faith Base Banking

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Vance R. Koven
Boston, MA USA
vrko...@world.std.com
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RE: Factual Clarification re CLS

2010-05-10 Thread Brownstein, Alan
I understand that the facts of CLS v. Martinez case are limited to voting 
membership and eligibility for leadership positions. But if the foundation of 
the CLS claim is that it is being required to sacrifice its freedom of 
association rights to obtain access to a designated public forum, why wouldn't 
those associational freedom rights also extend to deciding to who may attend 
meetings and participate in discussions?

Just asking.

Alan Brownstein
UC Davis School of Law

From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of artspit...@aol.com
Sent: Monday, May 10, 2010 2:42 PM
To: icl...@law.gwu.edu; religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
Subject: Re: Factual Clarification re CLS

Ira Lupu writes:


In a law school, there is certainly a rational basis for coming down on the 
side of non-exclusivity as a condition of access to the forum and its 
privileges -- among other things, all-comers increases the likelihood of 
dynamic exchange of views, something a law school may legitimately value.  CLS 
is not a church, and neither is Outlaw, and yet (if Hastings prevails) both 
will wind up with (only) the members sympathetic to their respective purposes.

But isn't that purpose fully served by requiring that campus groups allow all 
comers to attend meetings and participate in discussions?  Does voting 
membership or eligibility for leadership positions further serve that purpose?

And campus groups are not only discussion groups.  Quite often they are action 
groups as well.  For example, a CLS group and an Outlaw group at GWU may both 
want to present testimony at a DC Council hearing on a same-sex marriage bill.

Art Spitzer

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Re: Factual Clarification re CLS

2010-05-10 Thread ArtSpitzer

In a message dated 5/10/10 6:01:48 PM, aebrownst...@ucdavis.edu writes:

 why wouldn’t those associational freedom rights also extend to deciding 
 to who may attend meetings and participate in discussions?
 
I think the associational claim might well extend to those activities.   
But mightn't the state educational institution be found to have an 
anti-discrimination interest that is compelling as applied to those activities, 
but 
that is not compelling as applied to voting and leadership?

Art Spitzer
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RE: Factual Clarification re CLS

2010-05-10 Thread Ira (Chip) Lupu
I was at the oral argument in CLS v. Hastings.  I think Marci's interpretation 
of Breyer's questions and comments is quite right.  We'll know soon enough, but 
(from his questions, tone, and facial expression -- the latter two don't come 
through in a transcript -- at argument) I will be very surprised if Breyer 
joins an opinion that says an all-comers policy in this context is 
unconstitutional.

If social liberals join a conservative Christian group, and succeed in changing 
the message, conservative Christians can leave and form a new, conservative 
Christian group.  Do list members think the socially liberal Christians will 
just keep hunting down and infiltrating such groups?  This seems  fantastical 
(and slightly paranoid) to me.  I'm still waiting for real-life, on-campus 
examples of such behavior.

To Art Spitzer's question -- I don't know how you can say the purpose of an 
all-comers policy is fully served by allowing dissenters to attend 
meetings, but not vote or hold office.  This is a matter of degree -- the more 
that dissenters can exercise political influence in the group, the more the 
interchange within the group may be open, dynamic, and non-dogmatic.  Those may 
not be purposes that religious congregations may prefer, but the law school can 
have its own, independent purposes for insisting on access to full membership 
for all comers.  (Whether anyone at Hastings LS really thought all of this 
through is another question, but CLS did stipulate that all comers is among 
the relevant policies.)

  
Ira C. Lupu
F. Elwood  Eleanor Davis Professor of Law
George Washington University Law School
2000 H St., NW 
Washington, DC 20052
(202)994-7053
My SSRN papers are here:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=181272#reg


 Original message 
Date: Mon, 10 May 2010 14:45:10 -0700 (PDT)
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu (on behalf of Rick Duncan 
nebraskalawp...@yahoo.com)
Subject: RE: Factual Clarification re CLS  
To: Law  Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu

   Perhaps democrats will not attempt to take control   
   of the Young Republicans.

   But I think there is a good chance that socially 
   liberal Christians may take control of a 
   conservative Christian group that can't protect its  
   doctrinal beliefs through its membership policy. 

   By the way, it is clear that the CLS allows all  
   comers to attend its meetings. This case is strictly 
   about who can control an organization's beliefs and  
   speech, not about who may attend meetings.   

   I have read the oral argument transcript several 
   times. And it is clear to me that Breyer believes an 
   all comers membership policy is silly and completely 
   inconsistent with a marketplace of ideas in which
   many groups with different beliefs debate and
   express different ideas from very different  
   perspectives.

   Rick Duncan  

   Rick Duncan  
   Welpton Professor of Law 
   University of Nebraska College of Law
   Lincoln, NE 68583-0902   

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RE: Factual Clarification re CLS

2010-05-10 Thread Scarberry, Mark
Alan's question is (as always) a fair one. 

 

I'd say that the government's (Hastings Law School's) interest in having
the message promoted by the groups in its forum available to all
students is quite consistent with allowing those groups to have their
own points of view, free from being taken over by a hostile majority.
The claim that a group should be allowed to close its meetings to
non-adherents is thus at least one step beyond* the claim that it
should be able to have standards for those who set its agenda and speak
its message. In other words, because the explicit purpose of the forum
is to promote a diversity of viewpoint among groups for the benefit of
the entire student body, requiring groups to allow any student to hear
the messages put forward by the group helps to advance the purpose of
the forum. I suppose this would be similar to saying that the student
group in Rosenberger would have to allow any student to have a copy of
its magazine, but would not have to allow any student to become an
editor of the magazine. 

 

To the extent that participation in discussion by students who are
non-adherents is consistent with the putting forward of the group's
point of view, I think it also would be  one step beyond for a group
to claim a right to exclude non-adherents from active participation in
discussion, where discussion is part of the activity. But this would be
subject, just as in our classes, to the right of the discussion leader
to guide the discussion and keep the discussion somewhat on point.
Leaders would need to be able to prevent hijacking of Bible studies or
other discussions by those intent not on participating in a cooperative
spirit but rather on disrupting the activity. 

 

Whether an argument could be made for these one step beyond claims is
not something I've considered. But they are distinguishable from the
claim made by the Hastings chapter of CLS.

 

At least that's my initial reaction to Alan's good question.

 

Mark Scarberry

Pepperdine

 

*One Step Beyond was a TV show that ran about the same time that the
original Twilight Zone series was on.

 

From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Brownstein,
Alan
Sent: Monday, May 10, 2010 3:01 PM
To: Law  Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Factual Clarification re CLS

 

I understand that the facts of CLS v. Martinez case are limited to
voting membership and eligibility for leadership positions. But if the
foundation of the CLS claim is that it is being required to sacrifice
its freedom of association rights to obtain access to a designated
public forum, why wouldn't those associational freedom rights also
extend to deciding to who may attend meetings and participate in
discussions? 

 

Just asking.

 

Alan Brownstein

UC Davis School of Law

 

From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of
artspit...@aol.com
Sent: Monday, May 10, 2010 2:42 PM
To: icl...@law.gwu.edu; religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
Subject: Re: Factual Clarification re CLS

 

Ira Lupu writes:



In a law school, there is certainly a rational basis for coming down on
the side of non-exclusivity as a condition of access to the forum and
its privileges -- among other things, all-comers increases the
likelihood of dynamic exchange of views, something a law school may
legitimately value.  CLS is not a church, and neither is Outlaw, and yet
(if Hastings prevails) both will wind up with (only) the members
sympathetic to their respective purposes.


But isn't that purpose fully served by requiring that campus groups
allow all comers to attend meetings and participate in discussions?
Does voting membership or eligibility for leadership positions further
serve that purpose?

And campus groups are not only discussion groups.  Quite often they are
action groups as well.  For example, a CLS group and an Outlaw group at
GWU may both want to present testimony at a DC Council hearing on a
same-sex marriage bill.

Art Spitzer

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RE: Factual Clarification re CLS

2010-05-10 Thread Ira (Chip) Lupu
Rick writes If all groups must allow everyone and anyone to participate in the 
formation of its beliefs, there will be no diversity of ideas in the 
marketplace. Just a lot of watered down, least common denominators of 
expression.  

But this is more fantasy and fear.  Students do and will self-select.  The 
moderate feminists group will not take over the radical feminists group.  The 
Republicans and Democrats will not co-opt each other and form the single 
political group of the mushy middles. Groups can form and reform at will 
(most schools require only a very small number of students to form a new, 
recognized group.)  
What some on the list seem concerned about is a group's right to maintain a 
constant and religiously orthodox message.  Congregations have every right to 
insist on that, and to chose members, leaders, and even attendees at worship or 
lectures accordingly.  But state schools do not have to support a structure 
that protects religiously orthodox messages.  The forum can have many purposes, 
including not only diversity (which Hastings and others will inevitably have), 
but the opportunity for students to join a group and challenge its orthodoxy 
(however infrequently that happens, because of self-selection, exit options, 
and mutual forbearance).  It's that right to join and challenge purpose that 
the all-comers policy may advance.  And that purpose -- quite legitimate in 
this context -- is in perfect tension with the right to exclude that CLS 
advances in this case.

Ira C. Lupu
F. Elwood  Eleanor Davis Professor of Law
George Washington University Law School
2000 H St., NW 
Washington, DC 20052
(202)994-7053
My SSRN papers are here:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=181272#reg


 Original message 
Date: Mon, 10 May 2010 15:28:12 -0700 (PDT)
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu (on behalf of Rick Duncan 
nebraskalawp...@yahoo.com)
Subject: RE: Factual Clarification re CLS  
To: Law  Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu

   Alan asks a great question:  

   I understand that the facts of CLS v. Martinez case 
   are limited to voting membership and eligibility for 
   leadership positions. But if the foundation of the   
   CLS claim is that it is being required to sacrifice  
   its freedom of association rights to obtain access   
   to a designated public forum, why wouldn’t those   
   associational freedom rights also extend to deciding 
   to who may attend meetings and participate in
   discussions? 



   Just asking.

   I think the essence of expressive association is 
   that an expressive group speaks through its leaders, 
   and leaders are elected by voting members.   

   Hastings has created a limited public forum for the  
   express purpose of creating a diverse marketplace of 
   ideas. Even if the all comers policy is viewpoint
   neutral, Hastings reason for excluding a student 
   group from its forum must be reasonable in light of  
   the purpose of the forum. This policy is not 
   reasonable in light of the purpose of the forum; it  
   is destructive of a marketplace of ideas, of a forum 
   in which groups with diverse beliefs come together   
   to debate and express very different views about the 
   good life and what is true, what is good, and what   
   is beautiful.

   If all groups must allow everyone and anyone to  
   participate in the formation of its beliefs, there   
   will be no diversity of ideas in the marketplace.
   Just a lot of watered down, least common 
   denominators of expression.  

   Rick 

   Rick Duncan  
   Welpton Professor of Law 
   University of Nebraska College of Law
   Lincoln, NE 68583-0902   

   And against the constitution I have never raised a  
   storm,It's the scoundrels who've corrupted it that I 
   want to reform --Dick Gaughan (from the song,   
   Thomas Muir of Huntershill)  

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Re: Faith Base Banking

2010-05-10 Thread verizon
I think the bank was claiming something like Hebrew National's we answer to a 
higher authority.
That is, they would be more friendly, transparent, and helpful than other 
banks. Maybe they would keep the borrower from getting a loan that could not be 
repaid.

Alan

Law Office of Alan Leigh Armstrong
18652 Florida St., Suite 225
Huntington Beach CA 92648-6006
714 375 1147 faz 714 782 6007
a...@alanarmstrong.com
Serving the family and small business since 1984





On May 10, 2010, at 2:51 PM, Vance R. Koven wrote:

 I don't see any particular connection to religion at all here. Everybody 
 seems to be saying they were in compliance with banking regulations, the 
 securities laws and anything else they've been charged with violating. If 
 there is going to be a claim that being a religious bank means they don't 
 have to abide by whatever lending criteria the law establishes (and if they 
 were out of compliance, I'd like to know what Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's 
 excuse was), it would strike me as both a last refuge of a scoundrel issue 
 and a possible estoppel issue if they didn't make any exemption claims when 
 obtaining their banking licenses (I don't know what regulations would apply 
 to the borrower--there are already cases that hold a bank loan is not a 
 securities transaction to which Rule 10b-5 would apply).
 
 There are, however, religious banks, in the sense of banks that apply 
 religious law to their products, chiefly Islamic banks that structure 
 products around the interest prohibition. Of course, Western banks also deal 
 in such products for clients to whom the religious prohibitions matter. 
 However, the NYT article doesn't suggest that Integrity was claiming a 
 Christian loan is one that doesn't need to be repaid.
 
 Vance
 
 On Mon, May 10, 2010 at 2:30 PM, hamilto...@aol.com wrote:
 Sounds like religious insurance.  They typically argue they should not have 
 to abide by regulations and they discriminate on the basis of religion in 
 hiring and in choosing customers
 
 As I remember there is a religious exemption for religious insurers in the 
 health care law.
 
 Marci
 Sent from my Verizon Wireless BlackBerry
 
 -Original Message-
 From: Volokh, Eugene vol...@law.ucla.edu
 Date: Mon, 10 May 2010 11:13:12
 To: 'Law  Religion issues for Law Academics'religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
 Subject: RE: Faith Base Banking
 
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 Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as 
 private.  Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; 
 people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) 
 forward the messages to others.
 
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 people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) 
 forward the messages to others.
 
 
 
 -- 
 Vance R. Koven
 Boston, MA USA
 vrko...@world.std.com
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Re: Factual Clarification re CLS

2010-05-10 Thread Lisa A. Runquist


On 5/10/2010 3:14 PM, Ira (Chip) Lupu wrote:

If social liberals join a conservative Christian group, and succeed in changing 
the message, conservative Christians can leave and form a new, conservative 
Christian group.
You do recognize, don't you, that the Christian Legal Society is a 
national religious organization of attorneys and law students?  I do 
think that CLS has a right to maintain control over its membership and 
its name.  To suggest that it is appropriate to allow a student chapter 
to be taken over by people who have different beliefs, and then require 
the original group to form a new entity (which would also then have to 
have a new name) seems at least as fantastical as anything else you 
suggest.  If someone wants a group for these new beliefs, that seems to 
be more appropriate to require them to start the new group.

To Art Spitzer's question -- I don't know how you can say the purpose of an all-comers 
policy is fully served by allowing dissenters to attend meetings, but not vote or hold 
office.  This is a matter of degree -- the more that dissenters can exercise political influence in 
the group, the more the interchange within the group may be open, dynamic, and non-dogmatic.
Political influence?  Firmly held religious beliefs are generally not 
established by who gets the most votes.  And why do you want to insist 
that any student group be non-dogmatic?  Is this another term for 
politically correct?

Those may not be purposes that religious congregations may prefer, but the law 
school can have its own, independent purposes for insisting on access to full 
membership for all comers.
And what might these be?  It seems that this policy will ultimately 
backfire.  What is to be gained by requiring a Latino student group to 
change its documents to allow whites to become voting members?  Why 
should the gay, lesbian, transgender group have to allow individuals who 
do not believe in their lifestyle to be members of their organization?

   (Whether anyone at Hastings LS really thought all of this through is another question, 
but CLS did stipulate that all comers is among the relevant policies.)


Ira C. Lupu
F. Elwood  Eleanor Davis Professor of Law
George Washington University Law School
2000 H St., NW
Washington, DC 20052
(202)994-7053
My SSRN papers are here:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=181272#reg


 Original message 
   

Date: Mon, 10 May 2010 14:45:10 -0700 (PDT)
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu (on behalf of Rick 
Duncannebraskalawp...@yahoo.com)
Subject: RE: Factual Clarification re CLS
To: Law  Religion issues for Law Academicsreligionlaw@lists.ucla.edu

   Perhaps democrats will not attempt to take control
   of the Young Republicans.

   But I think there is a good chance that socially
   liberal Christians may take control of a
   conservative Christian group that can't protect its
   doctrinal beliefs through its membership policy.

   By the way, it is clear that the CLS allows all
   comers to attend its meetings. This case is strictly
   about who can control an organization's beliefs and
   speech, not about who may attend meetings.

   I have read the oral argument transcript several
   times. And it is clear to me that Breyer believes an
   all comers membership policy is silly and completely
   inconsistent with a marketplace of ideas in which
   many groups with different beliefs debate and
   express different ideas from very different
   perspectives.

   Rick Duncan

   Rick Duncan
   Welpton Professor of Law
   University of Nebraska College of Law
   Lincoln, NE 68583-0902

__




--
Lisa A. Runquist
Runquist  Associates
Attorneys at Law
17554 Community Street
Northridge, CA 91325
(818)609-7761
(818)609-7794 (fax)
l...@runquist.com
http://www.runquist.com



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Re: Factual Clarification re CLS

2010-05-10 Thread Lisa A. Runquist
While I agree with Rick's analysis, I would also point out that if the 
organization wants a closed meeting, it does not have to occur on the 
university campus.  It can find a local church, a dorm room, or some 
other similar location.


Lisa

On 5/10/2010 3:28 PM, Rick Duncan wrote:

Alan asks a great question:

I understand that the facts of CLS v. Martinez case are limited to 
voting membership and eligibility for leadership positions. But if the 
foundation of the CLS claim is that it is being required to sacrifice 
its freedom of association rights to obtain access to a designated 
public forum, why wouldn’t those associational freedom rights also 
extend to deciding to who may attend meetings and participate in 
discussions?


Just asking.


I think the essence of expressive association is that an expressive 
group speaks through its leaders, and leaders are elected by voting 
members.


Hastings has created a limited public forum for the express purpose of 
creating a diverse marketplace of ideas. Even if the all comers policy 
is viewpoint neutral, Hastings reason for excluding a student group 
from its forum must be reasonable in light of the purpose of the 
forum. This policy is not reasonable in light of the purpose of the 
forum; it is destructive of a marketplace of ideas, of a forum in 
which groups with diverse beliefs come together to debate and express 
very different views about the good life and what is true, what is 
good, and what is beautiful.


If all groups must allow everyone and anyone to participate in the 
formation of its beliefs, there will be no diversity of ideas in the 
marketplace. Just a lot of watered down, least common denominators of 
expression.


Rick

Rick Duncan
Welpton Professor of Law
University of Nebraska College of Law
Lincoln, NE 68583-0902



--
Lisa A. Runquist
Runquist  Associates
Attorneys at Law
17554 Community Street
Northridge, CA 91325
(818)609-7761
(818)609-7794 (fax)
l...@runquist.com
http://www.runquist.com




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Justice Breyer in Hastings case

2010-05-10 Thread Douglas Laycock
I don't think the transcript will support Marci's take on Justice Breyer.  He 
was clearly making fun of somebody.  It appears from the beginning that 
Hastings was the target. But if if the fun-making is ambiguous, it is clarified 
by the end of the exchange, when he says to Michael, I tend to sympathize with 
your view that it's so hard to believe that they really hold it.  The 
antecedent of it is this policy.  

Don't take my word or Marci's for it; read the transcipt for yourself.  The 
exchange starts at the bottom of page 61 and runs to the top of 63.  Here's the 
link.

http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-1371.pdf

Breyer's problem was not that he thought the all-comers policy made any sense, 
but that it was so unclear what the policy was that maybe they should DIG the 
case.

Douglas Laycock
Yale Kamisar Collegiate Professor of Law
University of Michigan Law School
625 S. State St.
Ann Arbor, MI  48109-1215
  734-647-9713___
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Re: Justice Breyer in Hastings case

2010-05-10 Thread hamilton02
For what it is worth, Doug, I will stick with my reading of the transcript.  It 
is not as though either of us will be writing the opinion(s)
In any event, what is more interesting to me is the attempt by conservative 
Christians to demand university funds and recognition when they can meet 
without it.  Where is the stopping point here?   I was quite serious when I 
said that the reasoning propounded by CLS is one short step away from demanding 
the university pay for all worship services.
And then schools can be required to segregate students in classes or campus 
housing so there is no cross-pollination between believers.  And separate 
cafeterias.  Where does this push to turn the public sphere into the service of 
the private sphere end?  I am sincerely interested in the limiting principle if 
Doug or others can articulate it

Marci

Marci A. Hamilton
Paul R. Verkuil Chair in Public Law
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law
Yeshiva University
Sent from my Verizon Wireless BlackBerry

-Original Message-
From: Douglas Laycock layco...@umich.edu
Date: Mon, 10 May 2010 20:53:23 
To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
Subject: Justice Breyer in Hastings case

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Re: Justice Breyer in Hastings case

2010-05-10 Thread Rick Duncan
Marci, the limiting principle is the public forum doctrine.

CLS is not asking for public funding in a vacuum. They merely want access to 
Hastings' limited public forum for student groups, access that respects their 
right of expressive association.

Hastings is searching for a loophole to overrule the results in Widmar, 
Mergens, Lambs Chapel, and Good News. If all the govt has to do to keep 
churches, religious organizations, and other unpopular groups from having 
access to a public forum is adopt an all comers policy that excludes groups 
which exclude from membership those who reject their beliefs and expressive 
ideas, then Widmar, Lambs Chapel, and Good News are meaningless.

Rick Duncan 
Welpton Professor of Law 
University of Nebraska College of Law 
Lincoln, NE 68583-0902


And against the constitution I have never raised a storm,It's the scoundrels 
who've corrupted it that I want to reform --Dick Gaughan (from the song, 
Thomas Muir of Huntershill)

--- On Mon, 5/10/10, hamilto...@aol.com hamilto...@aol.com wrote:

From: hamilto...@aol.com hamilto...@aol.com
Subject: Re: Justice Breyer in Hastings case
To: Law  Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
Date: Monday, May 10, 2010, 7:31 PM

For what it is worth, Doug, I will stick with my reading of the transcript.  It 
is not as though either of us will be writing the opinion(s)
In any event, what is more interesting to me is the attempt by conservative 
Christians to demand university funds and recognition when they can meet 
without it.  Where is the stopping point here?   I was quite serious when I 
said that the reasoning propounded by CLS is one short step away from demanding 
the university pay for all worship services.
And then schools can be required to segregate students in classes or campus 
housing so there is no cross-pollination between believers.  And separate 
cafeterias.  Where does this push to turn the public sphere into the service of 
the private sphere end?  I am sincerely interested in the limiting principle if 
Doug or others can articulate it

Marci

Marci A. Hamilton
Paul R. Verkuil Chair in Public Law
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law
Yeshiva University
Sent from my Verizon Wireless BlackBerry

-Original Message-
From: Douglas Laycock layco...@umich.edu
Date: Mon, 10 May 2010 20:53:23 
To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
Subject: Justice Breyer in Hastings case

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A real-life on-campus example

2010-05-10 Thread Eric Rassbach
Chip -

One real-life, on-campus example is cited at page 33 n.5 of Petitioner's 
brief -- a Mormon student was not allowed to lead Bible study at the Washburn 
University CLS chapter.  His reaction was to petition (successfully) to get the 
CLS chapter derecognized. It appears from PACER that CLS got re-recognized only 
after filing suit and settling the case.

In a religiously diverse, politically polarized world (witness this list), only 
Polyanna believes that these situations will just work themselves out absent 
the shadow of the law. Maybe folks think that an outcome allowing CLS to 
belief-test leaders and voting members is immoral or otherwise wrong, but they 
shouldn't pretend the conflict doesn't actually exist.

Eric





From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] 
On Behalf Of Ira (Chip) Lupu [icl...@law.gwu.edu]
Sent: Monday, May 10, 2010 6:14 PM
To: Law  Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Factual Clarification re CLS

I was at the oral argument in CLS v. Hastings.  I think Marci's interpretation 
of Breyer's questions and comments is quite right.  We'll know soon enough, but 
(from his questions, tone, and facial expression -- the latter two don't come 
through in a transcript -- at argument) I will be very surprised if Breyer 
joins an opinion that says an all-comers policy in this context is 
unconstitutional.

If social liberals join a conservative Christian group, and succeed in changing 
the message, conservative Christians can leave and form a new, conservative 
Christian group.  Do list members think the socially liberal Christians will 
just keep hunting down and infiltrating such groups?  This seems  fantastical 
(and slightly paranoid) to me.  I'm still waiting for real-life, on-campus 
examples of such behavior.

To Art Spitzer's question -- I don't know how you can say the purpose of an 
all-comers policy is fully served by allowing dissenters to attend 
meetings, but not vote or hold office.  This is a matter of degree -- the more 
that dissenters can exercise political influence in the group, the more the 
interchange within the group may be open, dynamic, and non-dogmatic.  Those may 
not be purposes that religious congregations may prefer, but the law school can 
have its own, independent purposes for insisting on access to full membership 
for all comers.  (Whether anyone at Hastings LS really thought all of this 
through is another question, but CLS did stipulate that all comers is among 
the relevant policies.)


Ira C. Lupu
F. Elwood  Eleanor Davis Professor of Law
George Washington University Law School
2000 H St., NW
Washington, DC 20052
(202)994-7053
My SSRN papers are here:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=181272#reg


 Original message 
Date: Mon, 10 May 2010 14:45:10 -0700 (PDT)
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu (on behalf of Rick Duncan 
nebraskalawp...@yahoo.com)
Subject: RE: Factual Clarification re CLS
To: Law  Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu

   Perhaps democrats will not attempt to take control
   of the Young Republicans.

   But I think there is a good chance that socially
   liberal Christians may take control of a
   conservative Christian group that can't protect its
   doctrinal beliefs through its membership policy.

   By the way, it is clear that the CLS allows all
   comers to attend its meetings. This case is strictly
   about who can control an organization's beliefs and
   speech, not about who may attend meetings.

   I have read the oral argument transcript several
   times. And it is clear to me that Breyer believes an
   all comers membership policy is silly and completely
   inconsistent with a marketplace of ideas in which
   many groups with different beliefs debate and
   express different ideas from very different
   perspectives.

   Rick Duncan

   Rick Duncan
   Welpton Professor of Law
   University of Nebraska College of Law
   Lincoln, NE 68583-0902

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Re: A real-life on-campus example

2010-05-10 Thread Steven Jamar
CLS is not being stopped from association and restricting membership, etc.
CLS can belief-test leaders.  That is not the issue.  The government is not
stopping CLS from meeting, from associating, from adverstising, from doing
anything at all except using government property when CLS fails to comply
with a neutral, secular law/rule of general applicability.

I disagree with the Rosenberger reasoning and result, but it would seem that
that equality principle -- treating CLS just like all the other
organizations (must comply with the neutral, generally applicable rule)
could have some traction here.

Religion and religious organizations are different from other
organizations.  The constitution says we need to treat religion
differently.  Unless we decide that speech and association and equal
treatment principles trump the religion clauses, we need to give them effect
somehow -- both the free exercise and establishment clauses.

Will there be difficult cases?  Surely.

What would be the result if the university made an exception for religious
organizations -- then it is not treating the religious organization
equally.  It is getting special treatment.  And that seems ok.  But what is
being sought here is not a policy based accommodation, but a
constitution-based one.

Steve

On Mon, May 10, 2010 at 10:52 PM, Eric Rassbach erassb...@becketfund.orgwrote:

 Chip -

 One real-life, on-campus example is cited at page 33 n.5 of Petitioner's
 brief -- a Mormon student was not allowed to lead Bible study at the
 Washburn University CLS chapter.  His reaction was to petition
 (successfully) to get the CLS chapter derecognized. It appears from PACER
 that CLS got re-recognized only after filing suit and settling the case.

 In a religiously diverse, politically polarized world (witness this list),
 only Polyanna believes that these situations will just work themselves out
 absent the shadow of the law. Maybe folks think that an outcome allowing CLS
 to belief-test leaders and voting members is immoral or otherwise wrong, but
 they shouldn't pretend the conflict doesn't actually exist.

 Eric


 --
Prof. Steven Jamar
Howard University School of Law
Associate Director, Institute of Intellectual Property and Social Justice
(IIPSJ) Inc.
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