On Tue, Aug 15, 2017 at 4:20 AM, Gervase Markham via
dev-security-policy wrote:
> On 06/07/17 16:56, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
>> Relevant to this group, id-kp-serverAuth (and perhaps id-kp-clientAuth)
>
> So what do we do? There are loads of "name-constrained"
On Thu, Aug 10, 2017 at 2:31 PM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> On 10/08/2017 22:22, Jonathan Rudenberg wrote:
>>
>> RFC 5280 section 7.2 and the associated IDNA RFC requires that
>> Internationalized Domain Names are normalized before encoding
Congratulations on finding something not caught by certlint. It turns
out that cabtlint does zero checks for reserved IPs. Something else
for my TODO list.
On Sat, Aug 12, 2017 at 6:52 PM, Jonathan Rudenberg via
dev-security-policy wrote:
> Baseline
On Thu, Aug 10, 2017 at 1:22 PM, Jonathan Rudenberg via
dev-security-policy wrote:
> RFC 5280 section 7.2 and the associated IDNA RFC requires that
> Internationalized Domain Names are normalized before encoding to punycode.
>
> Let’s Encrypt appears to
On Sun, Aug 13, 2017 at 5:59 PM, Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 11, 2017 at 06:32:11PM +0200, Kurt Roeckx via dev-security-policy
> wrote:
>> On Fri, Aug 11, 2017 at 11:48:50AM -0400, Ryan Sleevi via
>> dev-security-policy wrote:
Richard,
I can only guess what Ryan is talking about as the report wasn't sent
to this group, but it is possible that the system described could not
meet the Baseline Requirements, as the BRs do require certain system
designs. For example, two requirements are:
"Require that each individual in
Steve,
I think this level of public detail is very helpful when it comes to
understanding the proposal.
On Thu, Jul 20, 2017 at 8:00 AM, Steve Medin via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> 1) December 1, 2017 is the earliest credible date that any RFP
>
In reviewing the Mozilla CA policy, I noticed one bug that is probably
my fault. It says:
"name constraints which do not allow Subject Alternative Names (SANs)
of any of the following types: dNSName, iPAddress, SRVName,
rfc822Name"
SRVName is not yet allowed by the CA/Browser Forum Baseline
he review period now, it'll be
> passed by the time the Mozilla policy is updated.
>
> -Original Message-
> From: dev-security-policy
> [mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+jeremy.rowley=digicert.com@lists.mozilla
> .org] On Behalf Of Peter Bowen via dev-security-policy
>
> On Jul 5, 2017, at 4:23 AM, Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy
> <dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
>
> On 03/07/17 17:44, Peter Bowen wrote:
>> We still need to get the policy changed, even with the ballot. As
>> written right now, all
The point of certlint was to help identify issues. While I appreciate
it getting broad usage, I don't think pushing for revocation of every
certificate that trips any of the Error level checks is productive.
This reminds of me of people trawling a database of known
vulnerabilities then reporting
On Mon, Aug 7, 2017 at 12:53 AM, Franck Leroy via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> Hello
>
> I checked only one but I think they are all the same.
>
> The integer value of the serial number is 20 octets, but when encoded into
> DER a starting 00 may be
(inserted missed word; off to get coffee now)
On Mon, Aug 7, 2017 at 7:54 AM, Peter Bowen <pzbo...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 7, 2017 at 12:53 AM, Franck Leroy via dev-security-policy
> <dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
>> Hello
>>
>> I check
On Fri, Aug 18, 2017 at 8:47 AM, Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 18, 2017 at 11:02 AM, Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy <
> dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
>
>> Sometimes, CAs apply for inclusion with new, clean
> On May 16, 2017, at 7:42 AM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy
> wrote:
>
> On 13/05/2017 00:48, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
>>
>> And in the original message, what was requested was
>> "If Mozilla is interested in doing a substantial public service, this
>>
On Tue, May 16, 2017 at 10:04 AM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy
<dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> On 16/05/2017 18:10, Peter Bowen wrote:
>>
>> On Tue, May 16, 2017 at 9:00 AM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy
>> <dev-security-policy@lists.mo
On Tue, May 16, 2017 at 10:52 AM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy
<dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> On 16/05/2017 19:36, Peter Bowen wrote:
>>
>> My experience is that Mozilla is very open to taking patches and will
>> help contributors get things i
On Tue, May 16, 2017 at 9:00 AM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> Your post above is the first response actually saying what is wrong
> with the Microsoft format and the first post saying all the
> restrictions are actually in the certdata.txt
> On May 12, 2017, at 3:48 PM, Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
> wrote:
>
> On Fri, May 12, 2017 at 6:02 PM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy <
> dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
>>
>> This SubThread (going back to Kurt Roeckx's post
On Thu, Jun 8, 2017 at 7:09 PM, Jonathan Rudenberg via
dev-security-policy wrote:
>
>> On Jun 8, 2017, at 20:43, Ben Wilson via dev-security-policy
>> wrote:
>>
>> I don't believe that disclosure of root certificates
On Thu, Jun 8, 2017 at 7:02 PM, Matthew Hardeman via
dev-security-policy wrote:
> On Thursday, June 8, 2017 at 7:44:08 PM UTC-5, Ben Wilson wrote:
>> I don't believe that disclosure of root certificates is the responsibility
>> of a CA that has
On Wed, Jun 21, 2017 at 7:15 AM, Gervase Markham via
dev-security-policy wrote:
> On 21/06/17 13:13, Doug Beattie wrote:
>>> Do they have audits of any sort?
>>
>> There had not been any audit requirements for EKU technically
>> constrained CAs, so no, there
On Mon, Jun 19, 2017 at 12:14 PM, Kathleen Wilson via
dev-security-policy wrote:
> I just filed https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1374381 about an
> audit statement that I received for SwissSign. I have copied the bug
> description below,
On Fri, Jun 23, 2017 at 6:17 AM, Rob Stradling via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> On 23/06/17 14:10, Kurt Roeckx via dev-security-policy wrote:
>>
>> On 2017-06-23 14:59, Rob Stradling wrote:
>>>
>>> Reasons:
>>>- Some are only trusted by the old Adobe CDS
On Fri, May 19, 2017 at 6:47 AM, Gervase Markham via
dev-security-policy wrote:
> We need to have a discussion about the appropriate scope for:
>
> 1) the applicability of Mozilla's root policy
> 2) required disclosure in the CCADB
>
> The two questions are
On Mon, May 22, 2017 at 1:02 PM, Matthew Hardeman via
dev-security-policy <dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> On Monday, May 22, 2017 at 2:43:14 PM UTC-5, Peter Bowen wrote:
>
>>
>> I would say that any CA-certificate signed by a CA that does not
On Mon, May 22, 2017 at 12:21 PM, Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> Consider, on one extreme, if every of the Top 1 sites used TCSCs to
> issue their leaves. A policy, such as deprecating SHA-1, would be
> substantially harder, as now there's
On Mon, May 22, 2017 at 9:33 AM, Gervase Markham via
dev-security-policy wrote:
> On 19/05/17 21:04, Kathleen Wilson wrote:
>> - What validity periods should be allowed for SSL certs being issued
>> in the old PKI (until the new PKI is ready)?
>
> Symantec
On Fri, May 19, 2017 at 7:25 AM, Gervase Markham via
dev-security-policy wrote:
> On 15/05/17 21:06, Michael Casadevall wrote:
>
>>> Are there any RA's left for Symantec?
>>
>> TBH, I'm not sure. I think Gervase asked for clarification on this
>> point, but
On Thu, Jun 1, 2017 at 5:49 AM, Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 1, 2017 at 4:35 AM, Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy <
> dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
>
>> On 31/05/17 18:02, Matthew Hardeman wrote:
>> >
On Fri, Jun 2, 2017 at 4:27 AM, Ryan Sleevi <r...@sleevi.com> wrote:
>
>
> On Thu, Jun 1, 2017 at 10:19 PM, Peter Bowen via dev-security-policy
> <dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
>>
>> On Thu, Jun 1, 2017 at 5:49 AM, Ryan Sleevi via dev-securi
On Fri, Jun 2, 2017 at 8:50 AM, Gervase Markham via
dev-security-policy wrote:
> On 02/06/17 12:24, Kurt Roeckx wrote:
>> Should that be "all certificates" instead of "all SSL certificates"?
>
> No; the Baseline Requirements apply only to SSL certificates.
On Fri, Jun 2, 2017 at 8:12 AM, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 2, 2017 at 10:09 AM Jakob Bohm wrote:
>
>> On 02/06/2017 15:54, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
>> > On Fri, Jun 2, 2017 at 9:33 AM, Peter Bowen wrote:
>> >
>> >> Yes, my concern is that thi
On Thu, Jun 8, 2017 at 9:38 AM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy
wrote:
>
> As the linked proposal was worded (I am not on Blink mailing lists), it
> seemed obvious that the original timeline was:
>
> Later: Once the new roots are generally accepted,
On Fri, Jun 9, 2017 at 9:11 AM, Matthew Hardeman via
dev-security-policy wrote:
> For these self-signed roots which have a certificate subject and key which
> match to a different certificate which is in a trusted path (like an
> intermediate to a trusted
On Fri, May 5, 2017 at 9:02 AM, Gervase Markham via
dev-security-policy wrote:
> On 04/05/17 21:58, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
>
> I asked Symantec what fields CrossCert had control over. Their answer is
> here on page 3:
>
On Fri, May 5, 2017 at 9:18 AM, Gervase Markham <g...@mozilla.org> wrote:
> On 05/05/17 17:09, Peter Bowen wrote:
>> We know that the RAs could use different certificate profiles, as
>> certificates they approved had varying issuers, and "Issuer DN" has
>> the
On Fri, May 5, 2017 at 11:44 AM, Dimitris Zacharopoulos via
dev-security-policy wrote:
>
> Looking at https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/issues/69
>
> do you have a proposed language that takes all comments into account? From
> what I understand, the
(Resending as the attached file was too large)
On Fri, May 5, 2017 at 10:46 AM, Peter Bowen <pzbo...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 20, 2017 at 3:01 AM, Gervase Markham via
> dev-security-policy <dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
>> On 15/04/17 17:05, Peter
On Fri, May 5, 2017 at 11:58 AM, Dimitris Zacharopoulos via
dev-security-policy <dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
>
>
> On 5/5/2017 9:49 μμ, Peter Bowen via dev-security-policy wrote:
>>
>> On Fri, May 5, 2017 at 11:44 AM, Dimitris Zacharopoulos via
On Fri, May 5, 2017 at 2:21 PM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy
<dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> On 05/05/2017 22:45, Dimitris Zacharopoulos wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 5/5/2017 10:58 μμ, Peter Bowen wrote:
>>>
>>
>> I don't
On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 10:52 AM, Kathleen Wilson via
dev-security-policy wrote:
> All,
>
> I think it is time for us to change the domains that we are using for the
> CCADB as follows.
>
> Change the links for...
>
> 1) CAs to login to the CCADB
> from
>
On Tue, Sep 19, 2017 at 8:39 PM, Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy
wrote:
>
> The current end-state plan for root cross-signing is provided at
> https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1401384. The diagrams there show
> all of the existing sub CAs
On Thu, Sep 21, 2017 at 7:17 PM, Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> I think we can divide the discussion into two parts, similar to the
> previous mail: How to effectively transition Symantec customers with
> minimum disruption, whether acting as
On Fri, Sep 22, 2017 at 6:22 AM, Nick Lamb via dev-security-policy
<dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> On Friday, 22 September 2017 05:01:03 UTC+1, Peter Bowen wrote:
>> I realize this is somewhat more complex than what you, Ryan, or Jeremy
>> proposed, but it th
On Wed, Sep 20, 2017 at 12:37 AM, Martin Rublik via
dev-security-policy wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 19, 2017 at 5:22 PM, Alex Gaynor via dev-security-policy <
> dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
>
>>
On Tue, Sep 12, 2017 at 5:59 AM, Dmitry Belyavsky via
dev-security-policy wrote:
> Here is the new version of the draft updated according to the discussion on
> mozilla-dev-security list.
Given that RFC 5914 already defines a TrustAnchorList and
On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 10:32 AM, Gervase Markham via
dev-security-policy wrote:
> As per previous discussions and
> https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Symantec_Issues, a consensus proposal[0] was
> reached among multiple browser makers for a graduated distrust of
On Fri, Sep 8, 2017 at 12:24 PM, Andrew Ayer via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> The BRs state:
>
> "Effective as of 8 September 2017, section 4.2 of a CA's Certificate
> Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement (section 4.1 for CAs
> still conforming to
On Sat, Sep 9, 2017 at 3:57 AM, Jonathan Rudenberg
<jonat...@titanous.com> wrote:
>
>> On Sep 9, 2017, at 06:19, Peter Bowen via dev-security-policy
>> <dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
>>
>> In all three of these cases, the "domain's zon
On Sat, Sep 9, 2017 at 11:50 AM, Andrew Ayer <a...@andrewayer.name> wrote:
> On Sat, 9 Sep 2017 08:49:01 -0700
> Peter Bowen via dev-security-policy
> <dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
>
>> On Sat, Sep 9, 2017 at 3:57 AM, Jonathan Rudenberg
&g
On Sat, Sep 9, 2017 at 1:50 PM, Andrew Ayer wrote:
>
> drill is buggy and insecure. Obviously, such implementations can
> be found. Note that drill is just a "debugging/query" tool, not a
> resolver you would actually use in production. You'll find that the
>
On Sat, Sep 9, 2017 at 1:59 PM, Andrew Ayer <a...@andrewayer.name> wrote:
> On Sat, 9 Sep 2017 13:53:52 -0700
> Peter Bowen via dev-security-policy
> <dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
>
>> On Sat, Sep 9, 2017 at 1:50 PM, Andrew Ayer <a...@andrewaye
> Certificate 3 contains a single DNS identifier for
> refused.caatestsuite-dnssec.com
> Attempts to query the CAA record for this DNS name result in a REFUSED DNS
> response. Since there is a DNSSEC validation chain from this zone to the
> ICANN root, CAs are not permitted to treat the lookup
On Sat, Dec 9, 2017 at 11:42 AM, Lewis Resmond via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> I was researching about some older routers by Telekom, and I found out that
> some of them had SSL certificates for their (LAN) configuration interface,
> issued by Verisign
I don't think that is true. Remember for OV/IV/EV certificates, the
Subscriber is the natural person or Legal Entity identified in the
certificate Subject. If the Subscriber is using the certificate on a
CDN, it is probably better to have the CDN generate the key rather
than the Subscriber. The
On Tue, Oct 17, 2017 at 2:06 AM, Gervase Markham <g...@mozilla.org> wrote:
> On 16/10/17 20:22, Peter Bowen wrote:
>> Will the new managed CAs, which will operated by DigiCert under
>> CP/CPS/Audit independent from the current Symantec ones, also be
>> inc
On Mon, Dec 25, 2017 at 7:10 AM, Adrian R. via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> since it's a webserver running on the local machine and is using that
> certificate key/pair, i think that someone more capable than me can easily
> extract the key from it.
>
>
On Tue, Jan 16, 2018 at 3:45 PM, Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> I would like to open a discussion about the criteria by which Mozilla
> decides which CAs we should allow to apply for inclusion in our root store.
>
> Section 2.1 of Mozilla’s
On Sat, Jan 20, 2018 at 8:31 AM, James Burton via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> Approximate date of retirement of RSA-2048?
This is a very broad question, as you don't specify the usage. If you
look at the US National Institute of Standards and Technology's
> On Jan 19, 2018, at 7:22 AM, Doug Beattie via dev-security-policy
> wrote:
>
> Many CA’s haven’t complied with the Mozilla requirement to list the methods
> they use (including Google btw), so it’s hard to tell which CAs are using
> method 10. Of
On Wed, Jan 17, 2018 at 11:49 AM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> 4. Selected company CAs for a handful of too-bit-to-ignore companies
> that refuse to use a true public CA. This would currently probably
> be Microsoft, Amazon and Google.
On Fri, Feb 16, 2018 at 3:34 AM, Kevin Chadwick via
dev-security-policy wrote:
>
> On that subject I think the chromium reported plan to label sites as
> insecure should perhaps be revised to page insecured or something more
> accurate?
Given this group
On Thu, Dec 28, 2017 at 10:24 PM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> After looking at some real certificates both in the browser and on crt.sh, I
> have some followup questions on certificate serial numbers:
>
> 4. If the answers are yes, no, yes,
On Wed, Jul 25, 2018 at 2:08 PM Joanna Fox via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> On Friday, July 20, 2018 at 9:39:04 PM UTC-7, Peter Bowen wrote:
> > > *Total of 17 certificates issued in 2018 were revoked due to invalid
> > >
On Fri, Jul 20, 2018 at 6:39 PM Daymion Reynolds via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> The certificates were identified by analyzing results from both zlint and
> certlint. We also verified all lint findings against current and past BRs.
> We discovered
On Sun, Jul 8, 2018 at 2:34 PM Kurt Roeckx wrote:
> On Sun, Jul 08, 2018 at 04:41:27PM -0400, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
> >
> > Is that because you believe it forbidden by spec, or simply unwise?
>
> It's because nobody implements the spec. Those the claim some
> support for it are just broken. I have
In reviewing a recent CA application, the question came up of what is
allowed in a certificate in data encoded as "TeletexString" (which is
also sometimes called T61String).
Specifically, certlint will report an error if a TeletexString
contains any characters not in the "Teletex Primary Set of
On Wed, Feb 28, 2018 at 9:37 AM, Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> Once we were alerted, the team kicked
> off a debate that I wanted to bring to the CAB Forum. Basically, our
> position is that resellers do not constitute subscribers under the
On Wed, Feb 28, 2018 at 11:29 AM, Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 28, 2018 at 12:13 PM, timx84039--- via dev-security-policy
> wrote:
>
>>
>> Regarding to our investigation they were only
On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 7:19 AM, Kai Engert via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> On 13.03.2018 14:59, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
>> the blog post says, the subCAs controlled by Apple and Google are the
>> ONLY exceptions.
>>
>> However, the Mozilla Firefox
On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 7:55 AM, Kai Engert via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> On 13.03.2018 15:35, Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy wrote:
>>
>>> Are the DigiCert transition CAs, which are part of the exclusion list,
>>> and which you say are used for
On Mon, Apr 2, 2018 at 5:15 PM, Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 2, 2018 at 4:36 PM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy <
> dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
>
>>
>> While Entrust happens to do this, as a relying party, I
As far as I know, this has nothing to do with Mozilla policy.
On Mon, Apr 9, 2018 at 10:28 PM westmail24--- via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> If Mozilla develops an open product, then why are some discussions
> unavailable to users even for reading? (I'm
t for CCADB disclosure?
>
> On Fri, Mar 23, 2018 at 6:18 PM, Peter Bowen <pzbo...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> On Fri, Mar 23, 2018 at 11:34 AM, Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
>> <dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
>> > Recently I've received a fe
On Fri, Mar 23, 2018 at 11:34 AM, Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> Recently I've received a few questions about audit requirements for
> subordinate CAs newly issued from roots in our program. Mozilla policy
> section 5.3.2 requires these to be
Richard,
Unfortunately Gerv is no longer with us, so he cannot respond to this
accusation. Having been involved in many discussions on m.d.s.p and with
Gerv directly, I am very sure Gerv deeply owned the decisions on StartCom
and WoSign. It was by no means Ryan telling Gerv or Mozilla what to
On Thu, Dec 27, 2018 at 12:12 PM Wayne Thayer wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 26, 2018 at 2:42 PM Peter Bowen via dev-security-policy <
> dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
>
>> In the discussion of how to handle certain certificates that no longer
>> meet
&
On Thu, Dec 27, 2018 at 8:34 AM Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 27, 2018 at 11:12 AM Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy <
> dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
>
> > Yes, you are consistently mischaracterizing everything
On Thu, Dec 27, 2018 at 12:53 PM thomas.gh.horn--- via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
>
> As to why these certificates have to be revoked, you should see this the
> other way round: as a very generous service of the community to you and
> your customers!
>
>
On Thu, Dec 27, 2018 at 9:04 AM Nick Lamb via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> On Thu, 27 Dec 2018 15:30:01 +0100
> Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy
> wrote:
>
> > The problem here is that the prohibition lies in a complex legal
> > reading of multiple
On Thu, Dec 27, 2018 at 8:43 PM Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> So absent a bad CA, I wonder where there is a rule that subscribers
> should be ready to quickly replace certificates due to actions far
> outside their own control.
Consider
In the discussion of how to handle certain certificates that no longer meet
CA/Browser Forum baseline requirements, Wayne asked for the "Reason that
publicly-trusted certificates are in use" by the customers. This seems to
imply that Mozilla has an opinion that the default should not be to use
On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 6:52 PM Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> Ballot 202 failed. I’m not sure how it’s relevant other than to indicate
> there was definite disagreement about whether underscores were permitted or
> not. As previously
On Fri, Mar 22, 2019 at 11:51 AM Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> I've been asked if the section 5.1.1 restrictions on SHA-1 issuance apply
> to timestamping CAs. Specifically, does Mozilla policy apply to the
> issuance of a SHA-1 CA
On Thu, Mar 7, 2019 at 12:09 AM Benjamin Gabriel via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> A fair and transparent public discussion requires full disclosure of each
> participant's motivations and ultimate agenda. Whether in CABForum, or
>
On Fri, Mar 8, 2019 at 7:55 PM Matthew Hardeman via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 8, 2019 at 9:49 PM Ryan Sleevi wrote:
>
> > I consider that only a single CA has represented any ambiguity as being
> > their explanation as to why the
On Thu, Mar 14, 2019 at 4:33 AM Rob Stradling via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> On 14/03/2019 01:09, Peter Gutmann via dev-security-policy wrote:
>
> > I'd already asked previously whether any CA wanted to indicate publicly
> that
> > they were compliant
On Mon, Mar 11, 2019 at 10:00 AM Daymion Reynolds via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> Glad you agree 64bit serial numbers can have no fixed bits, as a fixed bit
> in a 64 bit serial number would result in less than 64 bits of entropy. If
> you are going to
On Thu, Mar 7, 2019 at 11:45 AM Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> Currently the Mozilla root program contains a large number of roots that
> are apparently single-nation CA programs serving their local community
> almost exclusively, including by
On Fri, Jan 25, 2019 at 10:40 AM Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> I mean, it's using an ACE label. That's where Ballot 202 would have
> clarified and required more explicit validation of the ACE labels to
> address the SHOULD NOT from
On Thu, Jan 24, 2019 at 4:17 AM Buschart, Rufus via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> Hello
>
> > -Ursprüngliche Nachricht-
> > Von: Hanno Böck
> > Gesendet: Donnerstag, 24. Januar 2019 12:36
> >
> > On Thu, 24 Jan 2019 11:14:11 + Buschart, Rufus
On Thu, Jan 24, 2019 at 7:36 AM Kurt Roeckx via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> On 2019-01-24 15:41, Rob Stradling wrote:
> >
> > Here's an example cert containing the A-label in the SAN:dNSName and the
> > U-label in the CN. (It was issued by Sectigo, known
I support this, as long as Policy CAs meet the same operations standards
and have the same issuance restrictions as root CAs. This would result in
no real change to policy, as I assume roots not directly included in the
Mozilla root store were already considered “roots” for this part of the
On Wed, Aug 14, 2019 at 10:16 AM Jakob Bohm wrote:
> On 14/08/2019 18:18, Peter Bowen wrote:
> > On thing I've found really useful in working on user experience is to
> > discuss things using problem & solution statements that show the before
> and
> > after. For
On Tue, Aug 13, 2019 at 4:24 AM Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> A policy of switching from positive to negative indicators of security
> differences is no justification to switch to NO indication. And it
> certainly doesn't help user
On Fri, Aug 30, 2019 at 10:22 AM Kirk Hall via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> I'll just reiterate my point and then drop the subject. EV certificate
> subject information is used by anti-phishing services and browser phishing
> filters, and it would be a
On Thu, Aug 29, 2019 at 10:38 AM Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 29, 2019 at 1:15 PM Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy <
> dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
>
> > Thanks for posting this Curt. We investigated and
(forking this to a new subject)
On Thu, Aug 29, 2019 at 5:54 PM Kirk Hall via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> What the heck does it mean when sometimes you say you are posting "in a
> personal capacity" and sometimes you don't? To me, it always appears that
On Thu, Aug 22, 2019 at 1:44 PM kirkhalloregon--- via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> Some have responded there is no research saying EV sites have
> significantly less phishing (and are therefore safer) than DV sites – Tim
> has listed two studies that say
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