From: Jobst Heitzig [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [EM] Re: Definite Majority Choice, AWP, AM
The following proves that the only immune candidate is the least
approved not strongly defeated candidate, assuming no pairwise defeat or
approval ties:
Let A be that candidate, with approval a.
To prove that
Chris,
I wonder if the following Approval Margins Sort (AMS) is equivalent to
your Approval Margins method:
1. List the alternatives in order of approval with highest approval at the
top of the list.
2. While any adjacent pair of alternatives is out of order pairwise ...
among all such
On Wed, 30 Mar 2005, Forest Simmons wrote:
Chris,
I wonder if the following Approval Margins Sort (AMS) is equivalent to your
Approval Margins method:
1. List the alternatives in order of approval with highest approval at the
top of the list.
2. While any adjacent pair of alternatives is out
Basic Approval Strategies:
1. Given a list L of winning probabilities for the various alternatives,
you should approve an alternative A if and only if it is more likely that
the winner will be worse than A than that it will be better than A.
That's the recommendation when the alternatives are
For those who are not ready to consider randomization, I suggest that you
at least consider the ballot type and its utilization for gathering
the pairwise and approval information (steps 1 through 3, below).
(Ninety percent seriously) I suggest that we start with any good method
that makes
I would just like to point out that median rating is to range voting as
Bucklin is to Borda.
This was noted back in the days when we first considered Majority Choice
Approval (Bucklin based on CR ballots of resolution 3), and were exploring
to see if there might be any fruitful generalization
On Tue, 29 Mar 2005, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Dear Folks!
Under the working title Democratic Fair Choice, I described on our
Wiki a detailed voting procedure composed from ideas by Forest (most)
and me (some):
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Imagine_Democratic_Fair_Choice
I tried to make it more
Approval's weakness is that it is vulnerable to media manipulation.
To counteract this we could look at all of the approval winners under all
possible media manipulations, and then choose by random ballot from these.
Less ambitious, but feasible and adequate:
Choose by random ballot from among
Date: Fri, 25 Mar 2005 09:25:46 +0100
From: Jobst Heitzig [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Andrew: Sincere methodsd
...
The median is a simpler, more accurate, and more robust measure of
social utility than the sum! It has the additional advantage that we
need not assume that utilities possess
Sorry, I was thinking in terms of equilibria that are stable under Rob's
ballot-by-ballot DSV procedure.
On Wed, 23 Mar 2005, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Dear Forest!
You answered to me:
The point is that when all ways to fill in the ballot are admissible
strategies, there is never as group strategy
From: James Green-Armytage [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [EM] I forgot something important...
James wrote...
I forgot to mention something important before I sent my last post, CWO
may be worth fighting for. I wrote:
Here is one possible progression for single winner elections (to
Date: Wed, 23 Mar 2005 18:50:26 +0100
From: Jobst Heitzig [EMAIL PROTECTED]
There is no sincere way to specify utilities.
Prove me wrong and tell me what a sincere utility could possibly be!
How about the probability that the candidate in question would represent
me accurately in his vote on a
On Fri, 25 Mar 2005, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Forest, you wrote:
Sorry, I was thinking in terms of equilibria that are stable under Rob's
ballot-by-ballot DSV procedure.
And:
In Rob's algorithm, once A is in the lead, the ABC voters stop approving
B.
But why should they do so when A wins already?
They
On Sun, 20 Mar 2005, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Dear Russ!
I completely agree with what you wrote!
Just like you, I think that
an ideal election
method must integrate both ordinal and cardinal information, and the
cardinal information should be simple approval (yes/no for each
candidate).
I would even
On Tue, 22 Mar 2005, Monkey Puzzle wrote:
Jobst, could you please clarify below?
On Mon, 21 Mar 2005 16:56:06 -0800 (PST), Forest Simmons wrote:
On Sat, 19 Mar 2005, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
By the way, here's a simple procedural version of the method, to be
used in meetings:
First, options may
On Tue, 22 Mar 2005, James Green-Armytage wrote:
James G-A replying to Forest, on the subject of cardinal-weighted pairwise
(CWP)...
I've delayed bringing this up because I didn't want to dampen your
spirits; I think that Cardinal Pairwise suffers from a bunching up near
the extremes problem
Ted, it looks like most list members prefer ordinal ballots with approval
cutoffs to graded ballots. Perhaps those of us who like graded ballots are
not vocal enough.
I like graded ballots, and I think that (for public proposal) the standard
A,B,C,D,F scale is sufficient, with C as the default
On Mon, 21 Mar 2005, Paul Kislanko wrote:
At the risk of both complicating the discussion and (again) showing some
ignorance, I think the analogies are not quite precise and possibly not as
intuitive as it may seem.
Everybody understands the concept of grades, but in the classroom situation
all
On Sat, 19 Mar 2005, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
...
However, one could make a minor modification which would only seldom be
used: Determine P, and as long as all of P is beaten by a candidate
outside P, add the most approved such candidate to P. I will try to
prove its monotonicity...
That would be nice
On Sun, 20 Mar 2005, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Dear Russ!
I completely agree with what you wrote!
Just like you, I think that
an ideal election
method must integrate both ordinal and cardinal information, and the
cardinal information should be simple approval (yes/no for each
candidate).
I would even
Sorry! I hit the wrong key on that previous message. Please don't
include it in the message digest!
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On Fri, 18 Mar 2005, James Green-Armytage wrote:
James G-A replying to Forest
I should have made it more clear that I wasn't talking exclusively about
100% consensus, though that is the (usually impossible) democratic ideal.
But the greater the consensus, the better.
If no significant consensus is
Jobst, the more I think about it, the more I like your idea (influenced by
Kevin) of requiring full majorities for strong defeat.
I don't think that we lose any of the basic properties, and it solves
Kevin's 49C, 24B, 27AB problem without the additional randomness that I
was beginning to
Date: Thu, 17 Mar 2005 13:14:10 -0800
From: Araucaria Araucana [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [EM] Re: Total Approval Ranked Pairs
Ted wrote:
About the Approval Cutoff Candidate, as both name and concept. In
general I think it is an excellent idea, but I would still suggest
using graded ballots
Here's most of a message I sent to Ted Stern recently, but I'm not sure if
his new email server allowed it past the filter.
I like the idea of Grade ballots and the use of Cardinal Ratings for seeding
the bubble sort.
I'm not sure how much temptation there would be to distort the ratings,
Date: Tue, 15 Mar 2005 21:49:20 -0800
From: Russ Paielli [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [EM] Re: Total Approval Ranked Pairs
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Russ worried that putting in an approval cutoff might be too costly.
The cost is the same as adding one extra candidate, the ACC (Approval
Cutoff
Before I read your post I proposed a Madison Avenue style name of
Majority Fair Chance.
It's not very scientific. Perhaps, Fair Chance Democratic Choice would
be better, though still not taxonomically descriptive.
I don't think it has quite enough randomness in it for the tough examples.
Date: Mon, 14 Mar 2005 22:03:25 -0800
From: Russ Paielli [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] About random election methods
Russ wrote to Andrew:
Andrew,
I think voters will reject any method that isn't deterministic. Barring
actual numerical ties, why should the selection of the winner depend in
On Tue, 15 Mar 2005, Ted Stern wrote:
I don't think
anybody could argue with that.
Bart inoculated me against ever using that sentence :')
Here's my sales pitch (to EM members) for RAV/ARC:
When candidate X beats Y in both approval and by head-to-head choice,
let's say that X strongly beats Y.
A variation on least additional votes:
Let f(A) be the fewest number of additional ballots (by friends of A) that
can turn A into the CW.
Let g(A) be the fewest number of additional ballots (by opponents of A)
that can turn A into the Condorcet Loser.
In other words g(A) is the same as the
On Tue, 15 Mar 2005, James Green-Armytage wrote:
James G-A replying to Forest Simmons, about fundamental Condorcet vs.
approval issues
James opined that the winner should always come from the Smith set
because
otherwise majority rule is violated more than necessary.
However, it seems to me
Here's the original recursive procedure that I gave for Approval Seeded
Bubble Sort:
1. List the candidates in order of approval, from top to bottom.
2. Percolate the bottom candidate as far as possible up the recursively
sorted list of the other candidates.
How's that for concise?
Jobst is
James opined that the winner should always come from the Smith set because
otherwise majority rule is violated more than necessary.
However, it seems to me that majority is just one form of consensus.
Max approval is another form.
Consider (sincere)
52 ABC
48 BCA
Candidate B is the max approval
Dear Ted,
Your TAB method is what I used to call Approval Seeded Bubble Sort.
Then after a year of thinking that it was my invention I came across an
article about the Kemeny Order in which the authors called our bubble
sort process Local Kemenization and suggested using it as a way of
refining
Kevin's Approval Runoff in which low approval candidates are eliminated
until there is a Condorcet Winner, can also be described as follows:
Pick the lowest approval score candidate that beats all of the candidates
with greater approval scores.
Proof of equivalence:
Kevin's winner KW has to
Ted,
Thanks for your thoughtful critique. I have been thinking along similar
lines for different reasons, mainly a desire to achieve IDPA.
Unfortunately, reverse TACC is not monotonic with respect to approval. If
the winner moves up to the top approval slot without also becoming the CW,
she
I agree with Russ that Kevin's Approval Runoff method (eliminate lowest
approval candidates until there is a CW) is a decent public proposal.
It would be interesting to compare that method with what I call TACF,
Total Approval Chain Filling:
Proceeding from the highest approval candidate to
James, your proof is sound, but here's a shorter one based on Kevin's
comment:
Raynaud eliminates candidates one by one until there is only one candidate
left. At some stage the Smith set must have only one candidate A left.
This candidate A is not beaten pairwise by any of the remaining
Most of the proposed Approval/Condorcet Compromises assume that the CW is
more desirable than the Approval Winner when they are not the same
candidate, i.e. the Approval Winner is only to be considered when there is
no CW available.
That seems to me like a kind of one sided approach to
Jobst, I'm worried about a kind of incentive for insincere voting:
Consider
x ABC
y BCA
z CAB
where max{x,y,z} 50%, x+y+z=100%.
If we do random ballot chain climbing, then the respective winning
probabilities for A, B, and C are z, x, and y.
Supporters of A have an incentive (up to a certain
On Mon, 7 Mar 2005, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
...
Perhaps I should make clear again why I propose randomization in the
first place:
...
Methods such as Condorcet Lottery, RBCC, and RBACC accomplish this ...
But the Condorcet Lottery picks the CW with certainty when there is one.
Wouldn't this
My email server was down for a while, but I'm glad to see this message
from Jobst.
I like the TACC option the best, but I would like to suggest the following
variation (which I will call TACC+ if you don't mind):
After finding the (deterministic) TACC winner, create a lottery based on
random
On Wed, 2 Mar 2005, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Dear Forest!
When I understand you right, you propose to just strike out all strongly
covered candidates and then use Random Ballot on the rest, right?
But then there must be some error in your proof of monotonicity, I fear --
look at the following
Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2005 23:37:05 +0100
From: Jobst Heitzig [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [EM] R.B.MacSmith
snip
Anti-strategic properties:
I did not yet test many anti-strategy criteria, but the main
anti-strategic feature is that, due to the above-mentioned
randomization, in every majority which
Let P represent the set of candidates that have a positive probability of
winning, i.e. P is the support of the winning lottery. What if we require
the following?
1. The set P cannot be empty.
2. Any candidate that has more approval than some member of P must also be
a member of P.
3. Any
I consider Mike's recent posting under the above subject heading to be
very thoughtful and a good summary of some of our common interests and
where we are currently in our quest to find methods that are in line with
those interests.
Regarding wv between all possible lotteries (a small part of
Here's an idea to stimulate thought:
Ballots are Cardinal Ratings or Ordinal Rankings. Approval cutoffs are
optional. Some default scheme is used for ballots that do not have
indicated approval cutoffs.
If there is a CW, the winner is chosen by random ballot among all of the
candidates that
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2005 01:46:38 +
From: Gervase Lam [EMAIL PROTECTED]
snip
A
.
ACB . .[4] ABC
Not(B) . . Not(C)
CAB [2].. BAC
C . . B
CBA . .[3] BCA
.
From: Markus Schulze [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] How to break this tie?
Dear Chris,
here is an example to illustrate my reservations
about the uncovered set.
Suppose the defeats are (sorted according to their
strengths in a decreasing order):
D A
A B
B C
C A
C D
B D
The
Gervase proposed changing the quota to more than fifty percent based on
the number of candidates.
Could this give some party an incentive to field dummy candidates just to
drive up the quota?
Forest
From: MIKE OSSIPOFF [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [EM] Approval with 2 ballotings
To: [EMAIL
I'm still intrigued by the idea of electing lotteries for choosing
candidates. Here's an example of where they might come in useful:
Suppose that true preferences are
45 ACB
30 BCA
25 CAB.
Then C is the Condorcet Winner, but the A faction, not liking C all that
much, has an incentive to vote
Dan,
Thanks for your interest.
Sprucing Up is still in a state of evolution. Originally it meant
restricting to the Uncovered Set, then collapsing any beat clones that
might remain, then (recursively) applying the method being spruced up
to the collapsed clone sets until an actual candidate
Suppose the electorate is divided into the following three factions of
equal size:
x A1A2A3BC
x BCA2A3A1
x CA3A1A2B
How should this tie be resolved?
Every candidate is in the Dutta set.
Random Ballot Dutta gives the win to A1, B, or C with probability one
third each.
Spruced up Random Ballot
From: Brian Olson [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] How to break this tie?
On Feb 10, 2005, at 8:06 AM, Forest Simmons wrote:
A1A2A3BC
BCA2A3A1
CA3A1A2B
I don't suppose it would help to know that just about every system I've
implemented answers C, eh?
The A's form a clone set, which collapsed
What is the supposed purpose of pre-election popularity polls today?
Is it just to entertain the voters?
Is it just to satisfy their curiosity?
Is it to help them make decisions about whom to vote for?
If it is the latter, do those who commission and report these polls
realize that they are
Craig's diagnosis:
* the geriatric with the incredible shrinking brain, Mr Forest Simmons. One of
our slowest learners, I guess. Do we have data on his learning speeds ?.
Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2005 23:03:25 -0800
From: Russ Paielli [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] lying to pollsters
Date: Wed, 2 Feb 2005 14:45:57 -0800 (PST)
From: Rob LeGrand [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [EM] Re: simulating an Approval campaign/election
Forest wrote:
Actually, DSV with Strategy A can sometimes converge to a stable
equilibrium even when there is no Condorcet Winner:
4900 C
2400 B
2700 AB
Rob
From: Russ Paielli [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Comparative Effectiveness of Approval and Condorcet
in the case of a three candidate cycle.
snip
Yes, Approval does have some nice properties under the ideal conditions
of DSV, but let me play devil's advocate again and bring up some
From: Rob LeGrand [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [EM] Re: simulating an Approval campaign/election
Russ wrote:
You seem to have confirmed my hypothesis that, in the idealized
case (DSV batch mode), Approval voting almost always converges on
the Cordorcet winner if one exists, but rarely (never?)
Gervase,
Thanks for taking time to explore. And nice text graphics for the clock!
It turns out that as long as you allow only strict rankings, the center of
gravity of the distribution will fall in the the four hour (i.e. 120
degree) sector of the clock face centered on the Borda winner, so
and
voter re-evaluation of his vote. I simply assumed that complete
and perfect polling data is available to every voter. Then I have
each voter re-evaluate his approval/disapproval of his middle
candidate based on Forest Simmons elegant strategy rule (special
case for three candidates only
From: Daniel Bishop [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [EM] Condorcet failure of Approval Voting (was Re: Dave
reply)
MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
...
[Dave] continued:
BUT the voter's actions, such as strategy, have to be based on what
is practical for voters to learn and use (it is too easy for EM
From: Russ Paielli [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Re: simulating an Approval campaign/election
Rob LeGrand honky1998-at-yahoo.com |EMlist| wrote:
You're simulating a DSV (Declared-Strategy Voting) election with
Approval. My current research is on just that topic, though I'm
also interested
That no subject posting was just a slip of the Return key while scrolling
down the EM digest. Sorry for the bother.
Forest
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
From: Russ Paielli [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Rewording Strategy A (BF(1st))
Forest Simmons simmonfo-at-up.edu |EMlist| wrote:
Departing from Strategy A, we offer the following refinement in the same
spirit:
For each candidate C, if you think the winner is more likely to come
from
From: MIKE OSSIPOFF [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [EM] Rewordng strategy A (BF(1st))
The strategy that's been called Strategy A, and which I've been calling
BF(1st) has been worded like this:
The Approval cutoff point goes adjacent to the candidate expected to get the
most votes, toward the side of
Jobst brought up the idea of electing lotteries and letting the
lotteries choose the candidates, instead of electing the candidates
directly.
He found that it had already been proved that there is always a Condorcet
Winner among lotteries provided that you compare lotteries in a certain
way.
Take a clock face and put labels A, B, and C at 12:00, 4:00, and 8:00,
respectively. At 2:00, 6:00, and 10:00 put the labels not(C), not(A), and
not(B), respectively.
Then on the intervals between the hour marks put the labels
ABC (between 12:00 and 1:00),
ABC (between 1:00 and 2:00),
From: Russ Paielli [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [EM] How Approval locks onto the CW in two or three moves
A couple of days ago, Forest Simmons posted an interesting message about
how Approval can elect a third-party candidate within a few election
cycles if that party is truly preferred
From: Ted Stern [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Re: Approval/Condorcet Hybrids
To: Jobst Heitzig [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: election-methods-electorama.com@electorama.com, Ted Stern
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
On 11 Jan 2005 at 14:40 PST, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
But ... your argument that, if W
On Thu, 20 Jan 2005, James Green-Armytage wrote:
Forest,
Interesting stuff; I'll have to look at this for awhile.
Might be good to mention the operative approval strategy at the beginning
of these posts, to avoid confusion. You mentioned a few possible
strategies in your 1/17 e-mail; I'm not quite
In this Grand Compromise voters can choose which kind of ballot they
want. The ballot styles to choose from are ordinal rankings,and a variety
of cardinal ratings style ballots including range ballots, grade ballots
(whether A to F or A to Z), 0 to 10 olympic, 0 to seven psychological,
Yes/No
On Thu, 20 Jan 2005, Paul Kislanko wrote:
Forest Simmons wrote (Thursday, January 20, 2005)
Here's a quick way to find the Condorcet Winner if there is one:
Use Rob LeGrand's ballot by ballot approval idea, but instead
of ballot by
ballot, use voter by voter.
For fairness, either randomize
Daniel Bishop wrote:
Forest Simmons wrote:
Ballots are ordinal rankings or cardinal ratings.
Any candidate with more than average first place rankings or ratings
gets a point. Any candidate with fewer than average last place (or
truncated) rankings or ratings gets a point
From: Anthony Duff [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] approval strategy
My favourite approval strategy to recommend generally is vote for
your strategic plurality candidate and every candidate you like
better. (suggested to me by Marc LeBlanc)
Besides Kevin's suggestion (approve everybody that
It seems to me that it would be perfectly ethical for Russ to post his own
versions of Mike's ideas as long as he identifies them as such.
It is common in the acknowledgements in the forward or preface of a book
for an author to thank many proof readers and others who have made
helpful
Date: Tue, 11 Jan 2005 23:40:47 +0100
From: Jobst Heitzig [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [EM] Re: Approval/Condorcet Hybrids
snip
Forest has made [a plausibility argument] that in public elections
it will be paramountly probable that there is either a CW or a
three-element covering set, that is, a
Date: Sat, 08 Jan 2005 07:42:29 -0800
From: Michael A. Rouse [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [EM] Question/Strategic Approval Voting
Mike wrote:
I've been bouncing back and forth between Range and Approval voting for
the past couple of days, trying to see how each is affected by
strategy.
I
Date: Fri, 07 Jan 2005 15:07:16 -0800
From: Mike [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Deterministic Districting
Mike wrote ...
Well, it's not really deterministic (in the sense that the results are
repeatable), but one could could put the districting maps on the ballot
along with the candidate.
From: Jobst Heitzig [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [EM] Sprucing up vs. Condorcet Lottery vs. immunity: The
twisted prism example
Jobst wrote:
Dear Forest!
Your sprucing up technique is a very nice idea since it can simplify the
tallying of those methods which fulfil beat-clone-proofness and
This looks like another way of doing Spruced Up Random Candidate.
In particular, properties 7 and 8 below correspond to the first two steps
of the Spruce Up process. Because of this, Spruced Up Lottery has to be
equivalent to Lottery. And then properties 5 and 6 finish the
characterization of
ACB
y BCA
z CAB .
From: Forest Simmons [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [EM] Re: lotteries
snip
However, even though it is non-deterministic, and highly manipulation
resistant, it is not totally manipulation free:
(following Bart's critique on non-determinism...)
Suppose that there are three
Date: Tue, 4 Jan 2005 12:06:14 EST
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [EM] Corrected commentary re IRV
To: election-methods-electorama.com@electorama.com
Message-ID: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
The commentary is better suited to its purpose than any that I have ever
In this example, Borda, IRV and Margins go with C, while wv and Bucklin
say B.
Besides this disagreement, there is the problem that if the win is given
to B for this ballot set, then if the 24 faction voters' true preferences
were BAC, they would be sorely tempted to truncate so that B would
Date: Tue, 28 Dec 2004 13:40:07 -0800
From: Ted Stern [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [EM] Re: Sprucing up MMPO and other methods
...
I have a question about the first stage, eliminating covered candidates:
On 21 Dec 2004 at 16:09 PST, Forest Simmons wrote:
1. Eliminate covered candidates until each
From: Forest Simmons [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: election-methods-electorama.com@electorama.com
Subject: non-determinism and PR.
From: Bart Ingles [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] non-deterministic methods
...
Wouldn't a random cycle-breaker provide strong incentive for a sure
loser in a cycle-free
On Tue, 28 Dec 2004, Forest Simmons wrote:
Here are two analogous questions concerning a cycle in which A beats C beats
B beats A:
3000 A
3000 A=B
4000 BC
(1) Suppose that A, B, and C represent parties, and that based on these
ballots, we are supposed to allocate 100 seats in congress
I'm sure that Kevin has given more thought to this example than I have,
but it just occured to me that C cannot win under approval no matter where
the third faction members place their approval cutoffs, whether above,
below, or equal to B. Since C can never win (under approval) the best
As Jobst recently pointed out, non-deterministic methods have not been
adequately studied or promoted, considereing their potential contribution
to fairness and to strategy free voting.
Consider, for example the following cycle of three:
34 ABC
33 BCA
33 CAB
Though most methods would give
From: Kevin Venzke [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Re: sprucing up
Forest,
I certainly think this is an impressive, interesting idea, even if I don't
have a lot of comments on it. But:
--- Forest Simmons [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
In particular, Spruced Up River, Spruced Up Ranked Pairs
Kevin wrote
Sprucing up Bucklin and IRV seem particularly interesting. But I doubt it
is able to do anything helpful with the 49 A, 24 B, 27 CB scenario.
I (mis)read 49 A, 24 BC, 27 CB
In Kevin's example B beats A beats C beats B, so there is no covered
candidate to eliminate nor any beat clone
The last paragraph of my previous message should have said
Remember the symmetric completion and reverse cancellation are not part of the
sprucing up process; they are only an assumption making possible two
dimensional geometrical analysis of spruced up methods that already happen to
satisfy
to misunderstanding. If I have piqued your
interest, and you would like more complete explanations, just let me know,
so I can ask someone with more patience (like Jobst) to provide some
concrete examples, etc. if I don't have time to do it myself.
Cheers!
Forest
From: Forest Simmons [EMAIL
From: Gervase Lam [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] MMPO, Majority, Condorcet failures
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 2004 21:59:38 +1030
From: Chris Benham
Subject: [EM] MMPO, Majority, Condorcet failures
To me the price MMPO (MinMax Pairwise Opposition) pays for strategy
benefits you describe is just far
Kevin Venzke [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote ...
Subject: Re: [EM] Range Voting and Cardinal Ratings Runoff
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Message-ID: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
--- Forest Simmons [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
For this reason Kevin came up with the Runoff Without
Date: Wed, 15 Dec 2004 20:30:19 -0800
From: Brian Olson [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Is range voting the panacea we need?
Straight rating summation is vulnerable to strategic voting. Perhaps in
this study people voted honestly because it obviously didn't matter and
so there was no
On Wed, 15 Dec 2004, Chris Benham wrote:
Forest,
I can't pretend to understand your proposed de-cloning mechanism, and I'm
surprised that you are interested in Copeland
because I thought that one of its main problems is that it usually isn't very
decisive.
Well I came up with de-cloned
It's interesting to me that before I opened my email today I was already
thinking about proposing Banks//WMA.
Now that Chris has brought up this clone problem, maybe I'll hold off.
Some thoughts on other possible ways of de-cloning WMA.
1. Proceed as in my de-cloning of Copeland. (Use an
Recently, in his grand compromise proposal, Jobst suggested k-consistency as
a valuable criterion.
In the multiwinner context,
a method is k-consistent
iff
a candidate set S winning
in each of its k candidate supersets
implies
Jobst's recent postings about complaints and their rebuttals, and short
ranked pairs has led me to the following Approval Condorcet hybrid:
Ballots are ordinal with approval cutoff, equal rankings allowed.
Let U(A) be the set of uncovered candidates that cover the approval winner
A. The member
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