Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 13 Feb 2015, at 19:52, David Nyman wrote: On 13 February 2015 at 15:04, Bruno Marchal wrote: The problem of terms like "epiphenomenalism" (and some other ...ism) is that they are defined implicitly only in the Aristotelian picture. They *can* acquire different meanings in the platonici

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 14 February 2015 at 18:27, meekerdb wrote: > On 2/13/2015 10:05 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> You mean a conscious being cannot have a zombie equivalent, i.e. a being >> that behaves the same but is not conscious. In other words the >> philosophical zombie is impossible: if a being is con

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 2/13/2015 10:05 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Saturday, February 14, 2015, meekerdb > wrote: On 2/12/2015 10:23 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Friday, February 13, 2015, meekerdb > wrote: On 2/11/2015 10:39 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wro

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On Saturday, February 14, 2015, meekerdb wrote: > On 2/12/2015 10:23 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On Friday, February 13, 2015, meekerdb > wrote: > >> On 2/11/2015 10:39 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >>> On 12 February 2015 at 16:16, meekerdb wrote: >>> On 2/11/2015 7:20 PM,

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 2/12/2015 10:23 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Friday, February 13, 2015, meekerdb > wrote: On 2/11/2015 10:39 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 12 February 2015 at 16:16, meekerdb wrote: On 2/11/2015 7:20 PM, Stathis Papaioannou w

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On Saturday, February 14, 2015, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 12 Feb 2015, at 13:20, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > On 12 February 2015 at 18:14, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> Which means that consciousness tests are in theory possible, and > non-conscious zombies that exhibit those certain behav

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 13 February 2015 at 15:04, Bruno Marchal wrote: The problem of terms like "epiphenomenalism" (and some other ...ism) is > that they are defined implicitly only in the Aristotelian picture. They > *can* acquire different meanings in the platonician picture. Yes, I agree. In a previous discuss

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 12 Feb 2015, at 13:20, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 12 February 2015 at 18:14, Jason Resch wrote: Which means that consciousness tests are in theory possible, and non-conscious zombies that exhibit those certain behaviors are prohibited. No, as per my answer to Brent. The logic ab

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On Friday, February 13, 2015, meekerdb wrote: > On 2/11/2015 10:39 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > >> On 12 February 2015 at 16:16, meekerdb wrote: >> >>> On 2/11/2015 7:20 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> If zombies are impossible then what can be shown is that IF a certain >> being

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On Thu, Feb 12, 2015 at 9:54 PM, meekerdb wrote: > On 2/12/2015 9:15 AM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Thu, Feb 12, 2015 at 6:20 AM, Stathis Papaioannou > wrote: > >> On 12 February 2015 at 18:14, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> > Which means that consciousness tests are in theory possible, and >>

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 2/12/2015 9:15 AM, Jason Resch wrote: On Thu, Feb 12, 2015 at 6:20 AM, Stathis Papaioannou > wrote: On 12 February 2015 at 18:14, Jason Resch mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>> wrote: >> > Which means that consciousness tests are in theory possible, and >

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 2/11/2015 10:39 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 12 February 2015 at 16:16, meekerdb wrote: On 2/11/2015 7:20 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: If zombies are impossible then what can be shown is that IF a certain being is conscious THEN it is impossible to make a zombie equivalent. But this

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On Thu, Feb 12, 2015 at 6:20 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > On 12 February 2015 at 18:14, Jason Resch wrote: > > >> > Which means that consciousness tests are in theory possible, and > >> > non-conscious zombies that exhibit those certain behaviors are > >> > prohibited. > >> > >> No, as per m

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 12 February 2015 at 18:14, Jason Resch wrote: >> > Which means that consciousness tests are in theory possible, and >> > non-conscious zombies that exhibit those certain behaviors are >> > prohibited. >> >> No, as per my answer to Brent. > > > The logic above alone does not tell us what the te

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On Thu, Feb 12, 2015 at 12:44 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > On 12 February 2015 at 17:19, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > > > On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 9:20 PM, Stathis Papaioannou > > > wrote: > >> > >> On 12 February 2015 at 13:44, Jason Resch wrote: > >> > >> >> > So your saying the presence (o

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 12 February 2015 at 17:19, Jason Resch wrote: > > > On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 9:20 PM, Stathis Papaioannou > wrote: >> >> On 12 February 2015 at 13:44, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> > So your saying the presence (or absence) of consciousness does result >> >> > in >> >> > physicaly detectable dif

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 12 February 2015 at 16:16, meekerdb wrote: > On 2/11/2015 7:20 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: If zombies are impossible then what can be shown is that IF a certain being is conscious THEN it is impossible to make a zombie equivalent. But this cannot be used to show that consciou

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 9:20 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > On 12 February 2015 at 13:44, Jason Resch wrote: > > >> > So your saying the presence (or absence) of consciousness does result > in > >> > physicaly detectable differences in behavior? This is counter to the > >> > belief > >> > of e

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 2/11/2015 7:20 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 12 February 2015 at 13:44, Jason Resch wrote: So your saying the presence (or absence) of consciousness does result in physicaly detectable differences in behavior? This is counter to the belief of epiphenominalism, where consciousness is tak

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 12 February 2015 at 13:44, Jason Resch wrote: >> > So your saying the presence (or absence) of consciousness does result in >> > physicaly detectable differences in behavior? This is counter to the >> > belief >> > of epiphenominalism, where consciousness is take-it-or-leave-it without >> > re

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 3:45 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > On 12 February 2015 at 02:56, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > > > On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 5:37 AM, Stathis Papaioannou > > > wrote: > >> > >> On 11 February 2015 at 19:03, Jason Resch wrote: > >> > >> >> [Brent Meeker] If consciousness

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 3:05 PM, LizR wrote: > Surely the unconscious part of the mind is a "partial zombie" ? > > (For example I have an inexplicable craving for chocolate which originates > somewhere in my subconscious. So my conscious thoughts are ruled by a > zombie which is partial to chocol

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 12 February 2015 at 08:05, LizR wrote: > Surely the unconscious part of the mind is a "partial zombie" ? > > (For example I have an inexplicable craving for chocolate which originates > somewhere in my subconscious. So my conscious thoughts are ruled by a zombie > which is partial to chocolate.

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 12 February 2015 at 02:56, Jason Resch wrote: > > > On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 5:37 AM, Stathis Papaioannou > wrote: >> >> On 11 February 2015 at 19:03, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> [Brent Meeker] If consciousness were unnecessary it would not be an >> >> epiphenomenon, i.e. >> >> something that

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

Surely the unconscious part of the mind is a "partial zombie" ? (For example I have an inexplicable craving for chocolate which originates somewhere in my subconscious. So my conscious thoughts are ruled by a zombie which is partial to chocolate.) -- You received this message because you are sub

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 5:37 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > On 11 February 2015 at 19:03, Jason Resch wrote: > > >> [Brent Meeker] If consciousness were unnecessary it would not be an > epiphenomenon, i.e. > >> something that NECESSARILY accompanies the phenomena of thoughts. Is > heat > >>

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 11 February 2015 at 19:03, Jason Resch wrote: >> [Brent Meeker] If consciousness were unnecessary it would not be an >> epiphenomenon, i.e. >> something that NECESSARILY accompanies the phenomena of thoughts. Is heat >> necessary to random molecular motion? > > > As I and others have pointe

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 1:43 AM, meekerdb wrote: > On 2/10/2015 10:38 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 12:23 AM, meekerdb wrote: > >> On 2/10/2015 10:11 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> >> On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 12:03 AM, meekerdb wrote: >> >>> On 2/10/2015 9:40 PM, J

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 2/10/2015 10:38 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 12:23 AM, meekerdb > wrote: On 2/10/2015 10:11 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 12:03 AM, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: On 2/10/2015 9:40 PM, Jason

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 12:23 AM, meekerdb wrote: > On 2/10/2015 10:11 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 12:03 AM, meekerdb wrote: > >> On 2/10/2015 9:40 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 8:35 PM, meekerdb wrote: >> >>> On 2/10/2015 5:29 PM, Liz

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 2/10/2015 10:11 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 12:03 AM, meekerdb > wrote: On 2/10/2015 9:40 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 8:35 PM, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: On 2/10/2015 5:29 PM, LizR wro

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 12:03 AM, meekerdb wrote: > On 2/10/2015 9:40 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 8:35 PM, meekerdb wrote: > >> On 2/10/2015 5:29 PM, LizR wrote: >> >> On 5 February 2015 at 09:19, meekerdb wrote: >> >>> On 2/4/2015 11:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 2/10/2015 9:40 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 8:35 PM, meekerdb > wrote: On 2/10/2015 5:29 PM, LizR wrote: On 5 February 2015 at 09:19, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: On 2/4/2015 11:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 8:35 PM, meekerdb wrote: > On 2/10/2015 5:29 PM, LizR wrote: > > On 5 February 2015 at 09:19, meekerdb wrote: > >> On 2/4/2015 11:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> On 03 Feb 2015, at 20:13, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> I agree with John. If consciousness had no third-pers

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 2/10/2015 5:29 PM, LizR wrote: On 5 February 2015 at 09:19, meekerdb > wrote: On 2/4/2015 11:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Feb 2015, at 20:13, Jason Resch wrote: I agree with John. If consciousness had no third-person observable effects, it

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 5 February 2015 at 09:19, meekerdb wrote: > On 2/4/2015 11:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 03 Feb 2015, at 20:13, Jason Resch wrote: > > I agree with John. If consciousness had no third-person observable > effects, it would be an epiphenomenon. And then there is no way to explain > why we

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 07 Feb 2015, at 00:36, PGC wrote: On Friday, February 6, 2015 at 7:27:25 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Feb 2015, at 19:30, meekerdb wrote: On 2/5/2015 6:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Feb 2015, at 21:19, meekerdb wrote: On 2/4/2015 11:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Feb

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On Friday, February 6, 2015 at 7:27:25 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 05 Feb 2015, at 19:30, meekerdb wrote: > > On 2/5/2015 6:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 04 Feb 2015, at 21:19, meekerdb wrote: > > On 2/4/2015 11:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 03 Feb 2015, at 20:13, J

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 05 Feb 2015, at 19:30, meekerdb wrote: On 2/5/2015 6:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Feb 2015, at 21:19, meekerdb wrote: On 2/4/2015 11:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Feb 2015, at 20:13, Jason Resch wrote: I agree with John. If consciousness had no third-person observable effect

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 05 Feb 2015, at 19:25, meekerdb wrote: On 2/5/2015 6:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: ... To simplify, you can consider a competence as an ability to follow a program P_i or to compute the corresponding partial or total function phi_i. Learning can then be described as the inverse: finding

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 6 February 2015 at 04:20, meekerdb wrote: > On 2/5/2015 5:57 PM, David Nyman wrote: > > On 6 February 2015 at 01:01, meekerdb wrote: > > You seem intent on defining terms in order to dimiss them. For example, >> why is taking "mental" to be re-description of the physical >> "elimininativi

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 2/5/2015 5:57 PM, David Nyman wrote: On 6 February 2015 at 01:01, meekerdb > wrote: You seem intent on defining terms in order to dimiss them. For example, why is taking "mental" to be re-description of the physical "elimininativism"? Does it elimi

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 6 February 2015 at 01:01, meekerdb wrote: You seem intent on defining terms in order to dimiss them. For example, > why is taking "mental" to be re-description of the physical > "elimininativism"? Does it eliminate the physical or the mental - or > neither. If I describe heat as the average

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 2/5/2015 4:41 PM, David Nyman wrote: On 5 February 2015 at 21:42, meekerdb > wrote: This looks like dualism in name only to me. The "mental" is just a different model of the same process modeled physically. Just as thermodynamics is different model

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 5 February 2015 at 21:42, meekerdb wrote: This looks like dualism in name only to me. The "mental" is just a > different model of the same process modeled physically. Just as > thermodynamics is different model for statistical mechanics. But you're not describing epiphenomenalism here. AFA

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

In all dualist models the mental cannot be explained in terms of the physical, and the physical cannot be explained in terms of the mental. When you say they are different models of the same process, you are defining the situation in a monist sense: you accept there is only one nature and the ment

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 2/5/2015 12:52 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Thu, Feb 5, 2015 at 8:54 AM, David Nyman > wrote: On 5 February 2015 at 13:35, Stathis Papaioannou mailto:stath...@gmail.com>> wrote: On 4 February 2015 at 12:49, David Nyman mailto:da...@davidnyman.com>

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On Thu, Feb 5, 2015 at 8:54 AM, David Nyman wrote: > On 5 February 2015 at 13:35, Stathis Papaioannou > wrote: > > On 4 February 2015 at 12:49, David Nyman wrote: >> > On 3 February 2015 at 23:11, Stathis Papaioannou >> wrote: >> > >> >> An epiphenomenon is a necessary side-effect of the prima

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 05 Feb 2015, at 15:54, David Nyman wrote: On 5 February 2015 at 13:35, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 4 February 2015 at 12:49, David Nyman wrote: > On 3 February 2015 at 23:11, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > >> An epiphenomenon is a necessary side-effect of the primary phenomenon. >>

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 2/5/2015 6:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Feb 2015, at 21:19, meekerdb wrote: On 2/4/2015 11:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Feb 2015, at 20:13, Jason Resch wrote: I agree with John. If consciousness had no third-person observable effects, it would be an epiphenomenon. And then ther

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

2015-02-05 19:25 GMT+01:00 meekerdb : > On 2/5/2015 6:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> ... >> >> To simplify, you can consider a competence as an ability to follow a >> program P_i or to compute the corresponding partial or total function phi_i. >> Learning can then be described as the inverse:

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 2/5/2015 6:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: ... To simplify, you can consider a competence as an ability to follow a program P_i or to compute the corresponding partial or total function phi_i. Learning can then be described as the inverse: finding i (or j ...) when you are presented with a sam

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 05 Feb 2015, at 14:35, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 4 February 2015 at 12:49, David Nyman wrote: On 3 February 2015 at 23:11, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: An epiphenomenon is a necessary side-effect of the primary phenomenon. The epiphenomenon has no separate causal efficacy of its o

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 4 February 2015 at 19:47, meekerdb wrote: On 2/4/2015 9:02 AM, David Nyman wrote: > > > On 4 February 2015 at 05:11, Stathis Papaioannou > wrote: > >> > As I understand it, being an epiphenomenon means one can give a causal >> > account of the phenomenon without mentioning it. But the epiph

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 5 February 2015 at 13:35, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 4 February 2015 at 12:49, David Nyman wrote: > > On 3 February 2015 at 23:11, Stathis Papaioannou > wrote: > > > >> An epiphenomenon is a necessary side-effect of the primary phenomenon. > >> The epiphenomenon has no separate causal eff

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 04 Feb 2015, at 21:19, meekerdb wrote: On 2/4/2015 11:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Feb 2015, at 20:13, Jason Resch wrote: I agree with John. If consciousness had no third-person observable effects, it would be an epiphenomenon. And then there is no way to explain why we're even ha

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 04 Feb 2015, at 21:08, meekerdb wrote: On 2/4/2015 11:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Feb 2015, at 20:40, meekerdb wrote: On 2/3/2015 11:13 AM, Jason Resch wrote: I agree with John. If consciousness had no third-person observable effects, it would be an epiphenomenon. And then there

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 4 February 2015 at 12:49, David Nyman wrote: > On 3 February 2015 at 23:11, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > >> An epiphenomenon is a necessary side-effect of the primary phenomenon. >> The epiphenomenon has no separate causal efficacy of its own; if it >> did, then we could devise a test for cons

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 04 Feb 2015, at 21:07, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2015-02-04 21:03 GMT+01:00 meekerdb : On 2/4/2015 11:37 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2015-02-04 20:00 GMT+01:00 meekerdb : On 2/4/2015 1:09 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: So I agree completely that there are levels of consciousness, as there lev

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 04 Feb 2015, at 03:52, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 2:25 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > We don't need consciousness to follow the plan A. But we need it to be aware of the plan B, and retrieve it quickly in case of urgence. OK, so consciousness does effect behavior Yes.

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 2/4/2015 11:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Feb 2015, at 20:13, Jason Resch wrote: I agree with John. If consciousness had no third-person observable effects, it would be an epiphenomenon. And then there is no way to explain why we're even having this discussion about consciousness. So

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 04 Feb 2015, at 03:43, John Clark wrote: Maybe I'm wrong but to me that all seems pretty contrived and intended to show that humans are superior, but it doesn't work because if true humans are doomed to be intellectually inferior to computers because their brain is organized in a fundam

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 04 Feb 2015, at 02:52, meekerdb wrote: On 2/3/2015 2:21 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 1:40 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 2/3/2015 11:13 AM, Jason Resch wrote: I agree with John. If consciousness had no third-person observable effects, it would be an epiphenomenon. And then

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 2/4/2015 11:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Feb 2015, at 20:40, meekerdb wrote: On 2/3/2015 11:13 AM, Jason Resch wrote: I agree with John. If consciousness had no third-person observable effects, it would be an epiphenomenon. And then there is no way to explain why we're even having thi

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

2015-02-04 21:03 GMT+01:00 meekerdb : > On 2/4/2015 11:37 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > > 2015-02-04 20:00 GMT+01:00 meekerdb : > >> On 2/4/2015 1:09 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >> So I agree completely that there are levels of consciousness, as there >> level of carness, but there is a lev

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 2/4/2015 11:37 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2015-02-04 20:00 GMT+01:00 meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>: On 2/4/2015 1:09 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: So I agree completely that there are levels of consciousness, as there level of carness, but there is a level (whatever it i

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 04 Feb 2015, at 02:49, David Nyman wrote: On 3 February 2015 at 23:11, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: An epiphenomenon is a necessary side-effect of the primary phenomenon. The epiphenomenon has no separate causal efficacy of its own; if it did, then we could devise a test for consciousness.

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 2/4/2015 9:02 AM, David Nyman wrote: On 4 February 2015 at 05:11, Stathis Papaioannou > wrote: > As I understand it, being an epiphenomenon means one can give a causal > account of the phenomenon without mentioning it. But the epiphenomenon > necessari

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 03 Feb 2015, at 20:40, meekerdb wrote: On 2/3/2015 11:13 AM, Jason Resch wrote: I agree with John. If consciousness had no third-person observable effects, it would be an epiphenomenon. And then there is no way to explain why we're even having this discussion about consciousness. I'm n

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

2015-02-04 20:00 GMT+01:00 meekerdb : > On 2/4/2015 1:09 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > So I agree completely that there are levels of consciousness, as there > level of carness, but there is a level (whatever it is) which when you're > below it, there is no more consciousness... like when it's 0

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 03 Feb 2015, at 20:13, Jason Resch wrote: I agree with John. If consciousness had no third-person observable effects, it would be an epiphenomenon. And then there is no way to explain why we're even having this discussion about consciousness. So we all agree on this. If we build comp

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 2/4/2015 1:09 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: So I agree completely that there are levels of consciousness, as there level of carness, but there is a level (whatever it is) which when you're below it, there is no more consciousness... like when it's 0 it's 0, it's no more positive, whatever word p

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 4 February 2015 at 05:11, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > As I understand it, being an epiphenomenon means one can give a causal > > account of the phenomenon without mentioning it. But the epiphenomenon > > necessarily accompanies the phenomenon. In the case of consciousness > it's > > essen

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On Wednesday, February 4, 2015, meekerdb wrote: > On 2/4/2015 12:14 AM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > On Wednesday, February 4, 2015, meekerdb wrote: >> On 2/3/2015 9:22 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> If epiphenominalism is possible, then that it implies zombies are possible. All they would require is c

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On Wednesday, February 4, 2015, meekerdb wrote: > On 2/3/2015 11:57 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > On Wednesday, February 4, 2015, meekerdb wrote: >> On 2/3/2015 9:12 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>> >>> Well the question "is something conscious?" is binary, like "is something alive?". However there is a

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

2015-02-04 9:58 GMT+01:00 Quentin Anciaux : > > > 2015-02-04 9:10 GMT+01:00 meekerdb : > >> On 2/3/2015 11:46 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >> >> >> 2015-02-04 7:43 GMT+01:00 meekerdb : >> >>> On 2/3/2015 9:12 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>> >>>Well the question "is something conscious?" is binar

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

2015-02-04 9:10 GMT+01:00 meekerdb : > On 2/3/2015 11:46 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > > 2015-02-04 7:43 GMT+01:00 meekerdb : > >> On 2/3/2015 9:12 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >>Well the question "is something conscious?" is binary, like "is >>> something alive?". However there is a great s

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 2/4/2015 12:14 AM, Jason Resch wrote: On Wednesday, February 4, 2015, meekerdb > wrote: > On 2/3/2015 9:22 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > If epiphenominalism is possible, then that it implies zombies are possible. All they would require is cutting the causal link f

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 2/3/2015 11:57 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Wednesday, February 4, 2015, meekerdb > wrote: > On 2/3/2015 9:12 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> Well the question "is something conscious?" is binary, like "is something alive?". However there is a great spectrum of possi

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On Wednesday, February 4, 2015, meekerdb wrote: > On 2/3/2015 9:22 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > If epiphenominalism is possible, then that it implies zombies are possible. All they would require is cutting the causal link from the physical world to the mental world. > > But the definition of epiphen

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 2/3/2015 11:46 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2015-02-04 7:43 GMT+01:00 meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>: On 2/3/2015 9:12 PM, Jason Resch wrote: Well the question "is something conscious?" is binary, like "is something alive?". However there is a great spectrum of

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On Wednesday, February 4, 2015, meekerdb wrote: > On 2/3/2015 9:12 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> Well the question "is something conscious?" is binary, like "is something alive?". However there is a great spectrum of possible living entities, and a massive gulf that separates the simplest life form

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

2015-02-04 7:43 GMT+01:00 meekerdb : > On 2/3/2015 9:12 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > >Well the question "is something conscious?" is binary, like "is >> something alive?". However there is a great spectrum of possible living >> entities, and a massive gulf that separates the simplest life forms f

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 2/3/2015 9:22 PM, Jason Resch wrote: If epiphenominalism is possible, then that it implies zombies are possible. All they would require is cutting the causal link from the physical world to the mental world. But the definition of epiphenominalism includes that it /*necessarily */accompanies

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 2/3/2015 9:12 PM, Jason Resch wrote: Well the question "is something conscious?" is binary, like "is something alive?". However there is a great spectrum of possible living entities, and a massive gulf that separates the simplest life forms from the most complex life forms. I

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 11:11 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > On 4 February 2015 at 12:59, meekerdb wrote: > > > As I understand it, being an epiphenomenon means one can give a causal > > account of the phenomenon without mentioning it. But the epiphenomenon > > necessarily accompanies the phen

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 11:10 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > On 4 February 2015 at 12:18, Jason Resch wrote: > > >> What could such a test even look like? > > > > > > Determining whether the brain or CPU of the supposedly conscious entity > was > > performing computations or processing informat

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 7:59 PM, meekerdb wrote: > On 2/3/2015 2:26 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 2:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou > wrote: > >> >> >> On Wednesday, February 4, 2015, Jason Resch wrote: >> >>> I agree with John. If consciousness had no third-person observabl

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 7:52 PM, meekerdb wrote: > On 2/3/2015 2:21 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 1:40 PM, meekerdb wrote: > >> On 2/3/2015 11:13 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> I agree with John. If consciousness had no third-person observable >> effects, it would be an e

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 4 February 2015 at 12:59, meekerdb wrote: > As I understand it, being an epiphenomenon means one can give a causal > account of the phenomenon without mentioning it. But the epiphenomenon > necessarily accompanies the phenomenon. In the case of consciousness it's > essentially denying the po

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 4 February 2015 at 12:18, Jason Resch wrote: >> What could such a test even look like? > > > Determining whether the brain or CPU of the supposedly conscious entity was > performing computations or processing information in a manner consistent > with those processes that according to some theo

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 10:53 PM, meekerdb wrote: > But according to your theory all that junk DNA should be eliminated. It > has no behavioral effect and so "evolution can't see it" as someone is fond > of writing. > But the unit that Evolution works on is not the species or even the individua

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 2/3/2015 7:20 PM, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 2:40 PM, meekerdb > wrote: > I'm arguing that might have been necessary for for the evolution of intelligence starting from say fish. But that doesn't entail that is necessary for any int

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 2/3/2015 6:43 PM, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 2:07 PM, meekerdb > wrote: >> Mutations happen all the time and nearly all of them are harmful. In most animals If a mutation happens that renders it blind that will be a severe handicap a

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 2:40 PM, meekerdb wrote: > > I'm arguing that might have been necessary for for the evolution of > intelligence starting from say fish. But that doesn't entail that is > necessary for any intelligent system. > And maybe men need consciousness to behave intelligently but

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 2:40 PM, meekerdb wrote: . > >> If we build computers that discuss and question their own >> consciousness and qualia I'd consider that proof enough that they are. > > > > But is that the standard of intelligence? JKC argues > intelligence=>consciousness. What if they d

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 2:25 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > We don't need consciousness to follow the plan A. But we need it to be > aware of the plan B, and retrieve it quickly in case of urgence. > OK, so consciousness does effect behavior and the Turing Test works. > Consciousness is an unconsci

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 2:07 PM, meekerdb wrote: >> Mutations happen all the time and nearly all of them are harmful. In >> most animals If a mutation happens that renders it blind that will be a >> severe handicap and the animal will not live long enough to pass that >> mutated gene onto the next

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 2/3/2015 2:26 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 2:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou > wrote: On Wednesday, February 4, 2015, Jason Resch mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>> wrote: I agree with John. If consciousness had no third-person observable e

Re: What over 170 people think about machines that think

On 2/3/2015 2:21 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 1:40 PM, meekerdb > wrote: On 2/3/2015 11:13 AM, Jason Resch wrote: I agree with John. If consciousness had no third-person observable effects, it would be an epiphenomenon. And then ther

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