GSE (UK) Enterprise Security Working Group

Sent on behalf of Jamie Pease, Chairman GSE (UK) Enterprise Security Working Group Chairman. Ladies and Gentlemen, Just to remind you that the next meeting of the GSE Enterprise Security Working Group will take place on Wednesday 27th June in Central London. Full details including the agenda

GSE UK - Enterprise Security Working Group Meeting

> >Email sent on behalf of Jamie Pease > > >Hi Folks, > >I'm pleased to announce that the next meeting of the GSE Enterprise >Security Working Group will take place on Wednesday 27th June. > >Full details including the agenda can be found at >http://www.racf

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

In , on 03/12/2012 at 02:52 PM, Peter Relson said: >The authorized code must be written to prevent such exposures. What does IGX00011 do and what are the safeguards? -- Shmuel (Seymour J.) Metz, SysProg and JOAT ISO position; see We

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

Some of the integrity examples have been tripping a bit over trying to define system integrity in terms of the behavior of authorized programs, when the statement is in terms of what an unauthorized program must not be allowed to do. For the PC FLIH intercept case, the requirement is that a mal

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

On Sun, Mar 11, 2012 at 8:07 AM, John Gilmore wrote: > Since this sort of thing is expected of me, I will note that we find > ourselves between Scylla and Charybdis here. > > Chris Craddock's formulation was open to the exception that Peter > Relson took: there is fetch-protected storage the conte

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

Swans, white and black, have a long history in scholastic and then mathematical logic, figuring too frequently in illustrations of modus ponens: All swans are white. A is a swan. Ergo, A is white. The heavy, unquestioning use of this scheme presumably reflects the fact that northern hemisphere

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

On 3/11/2012 9:07 AM, John Gilmore wrote: There is a long intellectual tradition which has it that the production of just one black swan is an unanswerable refutation of the proposition that all swans are white. I cringe at the word "production" - purportedly (google search came up empty) not

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

Since this sort of thing is expected of me, I will note that we find ourselves between Scylla and Charybdis here. Chris Craddock's formulation was open to the exception that Peter Relson took: there is fetch-protected storage the contents of which its owner is entirely free to make available to ot

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

>this is true, but it is not interesting. (with respect to my pointing out some flaws in the examples) I respectfully disagree. When something is presented as a guideline or even perhaps a "rule of thumb", that is one thing. When something is presented as a rule, that is a different thing. If i

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

In response to Chris Craddock's stricture about the disclosure of the contents of fetch-protected storage Peter Relson wrote This is not necessarily a violation of the IBM statement of integrity. It depends on whose data is being copied. I am allowed to put my own non-sensitive data into fetch-p

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

I apologize in advance to Karl Schmitz if I have a bit of this not quite exact. >Perhaps some Integrity Vulnerability examples will help clarify: > >1)If your authorized program while executing in PSW key 0-7 stores >into an address provided by an unauthorized caller then this is a >violatio

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

On Mar 8, 2012, at 1:15 PM, Ray Overby wrote: > Rob - How about: If your authorized program while executing in PSW Key 0-7 > stores into an address provided by an unauthorized caller (as long as the > store operation uses the execution PSW KEY) then this is a violation of the > IBM statement o

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

In <4f58fe65.7030...@kr-inc.com>, on 03/08/2012 at 12:45 PM, Ray Overby said: >1)If your authorized program while executing in PSW key 0-7 >stores into an address provided by an unauthorized caller then >this is a violation of the IBM statement of integrity. MVCDK -- Shmuel (Seym

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

ua.edu] On Behalf Of Ray Overby Sent: 08 March 2012 19:15 To: IBM-MAIN@bama.ua.edu Subject: Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security! Rob - How about: If your authorized program while executing in PSW Key 0-7 stores into an address provided by an unauthorized caller (as lon

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

e.com -Original Message- From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List [mailto:IBM-MAIN@bama.ua.edu] On Behalf Of Ray Overby Sent: 08 March 2012 18:46 To: IBM-MAIN@bama.ua.edu Subject: Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security! Charles - yes, it is somewhat ambiguous what "violat

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

Of Ray Overby Sent: 08 March 2012 18:46 To: IBM-MAIN@bama.ua.edu Subject: Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security! Charles - yes, it is somewhat ambiguous what "violation of the IBM statement of integrity" means. Perhaps some Integrity Vulnerability examples will

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

rogram could now have the ability to MODESET -The security credentials may have been dynamically elevated (i.e. - I now have RACF privileged attribute which I did not have before) -Some code provided by my program could have been executed in an authorized state (PSW Key 0-7 or Supervisor sta

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

gram FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security! The IBM statement of Integrity or its equivalent is a standard that all authorized programs should conform with. See IBM statement of Integrity <http://www-03.ibm.com/systems/z/os/zos/features/racf/zos_integrity_statemen t.html>. If you

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

it not? Further, there is no industry agreement -- witness this thread -- on what constitutes acceptable APF authorized program conduct. My "the only technique that will work" is someone else's "criminal breach of security." It seems to me the problem here is, from a technological

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

hat will work' [a phrase one poster used] is someone else's 'criminal breach of security.'" Failing that, a formal affirmation of "we do X but we don't do Y." Charles -Original Message- From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List [mailto:IBM-MAIN@bama.ua.ed

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

On 3/8/2012 6:40 AM, Charles Mills wrote: From a non-technology point of view, we need some sort of industry agreement on what is good behavior in an authorized program. I am thinking of something like a standardized set of questions that a vendor could answer and have an officer certify: "Mr./

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

- on what constitutes acceptable APF authorized program conduct. My "the only technique that will work" is someone else's "criminal breach of security." It seems to me the problem here is, from a technological point of view, the "all or nothing" nature of APF authorizat

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

urse they were authorized to be able to install their intercept >I have not seen the vendor code and cannot >comment on what it does or does not do or >how much security checking it does or does >not perform before it does what it does. That was Ed'

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

s magic and they were NOT APF authorized, then we have a lot to talk about here. I have not seen the vendor code and cannot comment on what it does or does not do or how much security checking it does or does not perform before it does what it does. My defense was of the use of the tec

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

In <4f5638d5.6050...@phoenixsoftware.com>, on 03/06/2012 at 08:18 AM, Edward Jaffe said: >Suffice to say that it does. Perhaps; I'd have to examine the code to confirm that. Of course, if I examined the code and found a hole, I wouldn't give the details to anybody but IBM. -- Shmuel (

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

Edward E. Jaffe wrote: The above notwithstanding, I don't think anyone at IBM or elsewhere would recommend this technique for brand new, 21st-century development. and I am very pleased to see that this is his view. My own, slightly different view of "this interface" is in a certain sense admi

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

On 3/6/2012 7:40 AM, Clark Morris wrote: On 5 Mar 2012 23:38:50 -0800, in bit.listserv.ibm-main you wrote: To understand what it does study the two trace entries below (GTF is your friend): SVC CODE 109 ASCB 00F95200 CPU. PSW. 0785 8

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

In <4f55be9e.7000...@phoenixsoftware.com>, on 03/05/2012 at 11:37 PM, Edward Jaffe said: >To understand what it does study the two trace entries below (GTF is >your friend): That doesn't tell me what happens in between. >Of course, I meant the intended caller. Code trumps intention. >Unint

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

On 5 Mar 2012 23:38:50 -0800, in bit.listserv.ibm-main you wrote: >On 3/5/2012 6:06 PM, Shmuel Metz (Seymour J.) wrote: >> In<4f540cf5.3080...@phoenixsoftware.com>, on 03/04/2012 >> at 04:46 PM, Edward Jaffe said: >> >>> Look more closely. >> In the PLM that IBM doesn't publish? >> >> >> Pete

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

On 3/5/2012 6:06 PM, Shmuel Metz (Seymour J.) wrote: In<4f540cf5.3080...@phoenixsoftware.com>, on 03/04/2012 at 04:46 PM, Edward Jaffe said: Look more closely. In the PLM that IBM doesn't publish? Peter? Could you comment on what IGX00011 does? To understand what it does study the two

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

In <4f540cf5.3080...@phoenixsoftware.com>, on 03/04/2012 at 04:46 PM, Edward Jaffe said: >Look more closely. In the PLM that IBM doesn't publish? Peter? Could you comment on what IGX00011 does? >You need to look more closely at IGX00011. Hint: the "secure" >implementation is not just in t

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

In , on 03/05/2012 at 02:19 PM, "Pate, Gene" said: >How you allow code to get into supervisor state is of no consequence >once it is in supervisor state so, unless you have a pristine system >where every load module library on the system is totally locked down >and only the OS libraries suppli

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

In <4f540e03.3070...@phoenixsoftware.com>, on 03/04/2012 at 04:51 PM, Edward Jaffe said: >For the record, I once knew of a developer who claimed to have found >an MVS back door because he wanted to appear cool like a phone >phreaking hacker, but he was full of B.S. I also know someone that >

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

: 03/05/2012 08:30 AM Subject: Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security! Sent by: IBM Mainframe Discussion List I am amazed at the uproar over this. Is there anything that a PCFLIH backdoor can accomplish that any AC=1 module in any APF authorized library cannot?

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

On Mon, 5 Mar 2012 14:19:33 + "Pate, Gene" wrote: :>I am amazed at the uproar over this. Is there anything that a PCFLIH backdoor can accomplish that any AC=1 module in any APF authorized library cannot? No. The question is how is the PC-FLIH among the best choices to do this function. --

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

On 03/05/2012 08:19 AM, Pate, Gene wrote: I am amazed at the uproar over this. Is there anything that a PCFLIH backdoor can accomplish that any AC=1 module in any APF authorized library cannot? Is there anyone else out there that is running any vendor code for which they have not done code revi

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

On Mon, 5 Mar 2012 14:19:33 +, Pate, Gene wrote: >I am amazed at the uproar over this. Is there anything that a PCFLIH backdoor >can accomplish that any AC=1 module in any APF authorized library cannot? >Is there anyone else out there that is running any vendor code for which they >have not

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

>I wrote an SE hardware emulator that would run on Ups, APs, and MPs and while >you got a 15% >performance increase with the hardware upgrade and MVS/SE we >still got around 12% with my >PCFLIH hardware emulator and we were able to >move to MVS/SE 3 years sooner that we could have >had we all ha

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

I am amazed at the uproar over this. Is there anything that a PCFLIH backdoor can accomplish that any AC=1 module in any APF authorized library cannot? Is there anyone else out there that is running any vendor code for which they have not done code reviews that is running AC=1 in any APF authori

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

On 3/4/2012 10:28 AM, Shmuel Metz (Seymour J.) wrote: Speculative? Did you read what he quoted from Bill Fairchild's message? Yes. I read it before he quoted it. We don't even know the person's name or how long ago this happened (if at all). A lot can change in a decade. For the record, I on

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

On 3/4/2012 10:24 AM, Shmuel Metz (Seymour J.) wrote: The presence of SVC IGX00011 on z/OS systems *proves* that so-called "magic" SVCs that "confer authority to their callers," The ESR's do not"confer authority to their callers," but rather invoke narrowly defined functions. The so-called "magi

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

In <4f50f9bf.10...@phoenixsoftware.com>, on 03/02/2012 at 08:47 AM, Edward Jaffe said: >A "magic" PFLIH technique is not substantially different, from an >integrity standpoint, than a "magic" SVC except that the code >gets control for EVERY interrupt ITYM every Program interrupt. >The pre

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

In <4f510ab8.2070...@phoenixsoftware.com>, on 03/02/2012 at 10:00 AM, Edward Jaffe said: >The subject line of this thread started off (in the other list) as >"Program FLIH". Then, you renamed it to, "Program FLIH backdoor - >This is a criminal breach of sec

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

I am sure that you could easily ask VAT Security... since the product offering is all about verifying the ability to subvert any interface to gain authorization. AFAIK VAT has already taken IBM for the trip to discover OS related vulnerabilities. Rob Schramm Senior Systems Consultant Imperium

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

sserts. So that absolutely is why I am concerned. The subject line of this thread started off (in the other list) as "Program FLIH". Then, you renamed it to, "Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!" Having concerns is one thing; making speculative ac

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

At 3/2/2012 10:25 AM, Edward Jaffe wrote: On 3/2/2012 1:29 AM, David Cole wrote: If the PFLIH hook is (as it has been described earlier in these threads) a mechanism by which a non-authorized process can become authorized, then its very existence is a "substantive offense" in and of itself. It

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

On 3/2/2012 1:29 AM, David Cole wrote: If the PFLIH hook is (as it has been described earlier in these threads) a mechanism by which a non-authorized process can become authorized, then its very existence is a "substantive offense" in and of itself. It is not just "a template", it doesn't just

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

David Cole and I are, I think, in substantive agreement about the offensive character of this ISV's scheme. That said, the situation we confront would be much worse if this scheme had been used to do real mischief. It has not, and we can take some small comfort---It is only small comfort--- in th

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

At 3/1/2012 06:46 PM, Skip Robinson wrote: For years we ran a 'channel extender' product call RDS. It worked by front-endng FLIH for I/O interrupts to determine whether the I/O was to or from a supported device as defined to RDS. If not, the I/O was passed along for normal processing. If so, RD

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

John Gilmore wrote: even though, as I believe, the the offender's code itself commits no substantive offense it it is, I think, guilty of the admittedly much subtler offense of providing a template for others, who are bent on mischief, to use. If the PFLIH hook is (as it has been described ea

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

2 01:56 PM Subject:Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security! Sent by:IBM Mainframe Discussion List I don't want to put words in EJ's mouth; but if 'an exposure' were replaced by what I should call 'misuse' what he said is corr

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

I don't want to put words in EJ's mouth; but if 'an exposure' were replaced by what I should call 'misuse' what he said is correct and not even controversial. I think there is an exposure, in the sense that this device lends itself very readily to abuse. I have seen no evidence that it has actual

Re: Program FLIH backdoor - This is a criminal breach of security!

Ed, Let me quote to you what Bill Fairchild posted earlier on this thread: At 2/23/2012 05:42 PM, Bill Fairchild wrote: I found a similar (and maybe the same) vendor hook in 1996, disassembled the code, and discovered that one of its purposes was to put an unauthorized caller into various prot

Security resolutions article posted, and query for education/training tips

Thanks for tips for this, security "resolutions": http://destinationz.org/Mainframe-Solution/Security/12-New-Years-Resolutions-to-Keep-Your-Mainframe.aspx ...and for great/abundant backup tips; that article to post soon. Next article will be on education/training -- mostly general

Check out Symantec Recommends Disabling PcAnywhere and Waiting for Security P

_Symantec Recommends Disabling PcAnywhere and Waiting for Security Patches | PCWorld Business Center_ (http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/248782/symantec_recommends_disabling_pcanywhere_and_waiting_for_security_patc hes.html) I meant to send this earlier but was fighting another

Re: Enable security in ftp client

Thanks Chris and excuse my poor English. We'll search in the Redbooks and if it's necessary we'll post a message to RACF-L or IBMTCP-L. Regards -- For IBM-MAIN subscribe / signoff / archive access instructions, send email to li

Re: Question on scheduling security for TWS ad-hoc jobs

ering. -Original Message- From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List [mailto:IBM-MAIN@bama.ua.edu] On Behalf Of Jousma, David Sent: Wednesday, December 21, 2011 1:30 PM To: IBM-MAIN@bama.ua.edu Subject: Question on scheduling security for TWS ad-hoc jobs I am posting a question for a co-worker

Re: Question on scheduling security for TWS ad-hoc jobs

, David Sent: Wednesday, December 21, 2011 1:30 PM To: IBM-MAIN@bama.ua.edu Subject: Question on scheduling security for TWS ad-hoc jobs I am posting a question for a co-worker. We are looking for some real world feedback on how you may have solved the problem we are trying to solve. We use Tivoli

Re: Question on scheduling security for TWS ad-hoc jobs

List [mailto:IBM-MAIN@bama.ua.edu] On Behalf Of Marco Gianfranco Indaco Sent: Thursday, December 22, 2011 3:49 AM To: IBM-MAIN@bama.ua.edu Subject: Re: Question on scheduling security for TWS ad-hoc jobs Obviously it's all possible. The work depend on what kind of operations are made before s

Re: Enable security in ftp client

of entry for users of the FTP server", you are really interested in two sets of steps back, namely 2.3.4.1.2, "Steps for setting up security for your FTP server". Note that I am answering only on the basis of what I read in the manual, I do not have any actual experience of havi

Re: Enable security in ftp client

Hello: We make a mistake with the ftp type. We want to configure the ftp server security and limit the users access by a RACF resource. We've reviewed the link Steps for setting up security for your FTP server. SIS1 is the system name and TCPIP is the tcpname. FTPD1 is the ftp daemon

Re: Question on scheduling security for TWS ad-hoc jobs

Obviously it's all possible. The work depend on what kind of operations are made before submit and if you want to have full control. I think that the best way is manage all under sw lifecycle and use a smart way to release object(input data or other thing) to prod before start. You can determine st

Re: Enable security in ftp client

c 2011 10:00:51 -0600, Jorge Garcia wrote: >Hello: > > We want to enable a security for ftp client in our production system. We > don't grant access to any user for execute ftp client again our production > system. We've searched a RACF resource for limit the access to ftp

Re: Enable security in ftp client

On Wed, 21 Dec 2011 10:00:51 -0600, Jorge Garcia wrote: > We want to enable a security for ftp client in our production system. We > don't grant access to any user for execute ftp client again our production > system. We've > searched a RACF resource for limit the access

Question on scheduling security for TWS ad-hoc jobs

I am posting a question for a co-worker. We are looking for some real world feedback on how you may have solved the problem we are trying to solve. We use Tivoli workload scheduler on z/OS for about 80% of our standard/supported production batch workload. Operated in typical fashion by producti

Re: Enable security in ftp client

On Wed, 21 Dec 2011 10:41:09 -0600, Chase, John wrote: >> -Original Message- >> From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List On Behalf Of Jorge Garcia >> >> We want to enable a security for ftp client in our production system. We >> don't grant access to

Re: Enable security in ftp client

> -Original Message- > From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List On Behalf Of Jorge Garcia > > Hello: > > We want to enable a security for ftp client in our production system. We don't grant access to any > user for execute ftp client again our production sys

Enable security in ftp client

Hello: We want to enable a security for ftp client in our production system. We don't grant access to any user for execute ftp client again our production system. We've searched a RACF resource for limit the access to ftp client in RACF system programmers guide and RAC

Re: Security Group

> -Original Message- > From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List > [mailto:IBM-MAIN@bama.ua.edu] On Behalf Of Ron Thomas > Sent: Thursday, December 15, 2011 8:40 AM > To: IBM-MAIN@bama.ua.edu > Subject: Security Group > > Hi. > > How to find the securit

Re: Security Group

On Thu, 15 Dec 2011 08:40:08 -0600, Ron Thomas wrote: >Hi. > >How to find the security group my id resides from TSO? > >Regards >Ron If RACF, you should be able to list your own USERID - "TSO LU userid"

Re: Security Group

Thanks John , it worked! I needed to see where my id resides as currently some datasets i lost read access. Regards Ron -- For IBM-MAIN subscribe / signoff / archive access instructions, send email to lists...@bama.ua.edu with t

Re: Security Group

> > How to find the security group my id resides from TSO? > > Regards Ron, RACF, ACF2, or Top Secret Security Product? Or are you asking about SDSF Groups? What are you doing that you need to know the security gro

Re: Security Group

> -Original Message- > From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List On Behalf Of Ron Thomas > > Hi. > > How to find the security group my id resides from TSO? LU and look for DEFAULT-GROUP. ("LU" is the abbrevia

Security Group

Hi. How to find the security group my id resides from TSO? Regards Ron -- For IBM-MAIN subscribe / signoff / archive access instructions, send email to lists...@bama.ua.edu with the message: GET IBM-MAIN INFO Search the

Re: Security Certificate error message at IBMLINK

a.edu Date: 09/27/2011 03:11 PM Subject: Re: Security Certificate error message at IBMLINK Sent by:IBM Mainframe Discussion List The expired cetificate is back. I was gone for a while. :-( Anybody else? Linda - Original Message - From: "Linda Mooney"

Re: Security Certificate error message at IBMLINK

The expired cetificate is back.  I was gone for a while.  :-(  Anybody else? Linda - Original Message - From: "Linda Mooney" To: IBM-MAIN@bama.ua.edu Sent: Tuesday, September 27, 2011 10:29:16 AM Subject: Re: Security Certificate error message at IBMLINK Hi Sam,

Re: Security Certificate error message at IBMLINK

al Message - From: "Sam Knutson" To: IBM-MAIN@bama.ua.edu Sent: Tuesday, September 27, 2011 7:40:09 AM Subject: Re: Security Certificate error message at IBMLINK Advice from the IBMLink feedback apparently they did correct something.   Cleared cache and cookies as instructed and ex

Re: Security Certificate error message at IBMLINK

  Not good. Linda - Original Message - From: "Mike S Ward" To: IBM-MAIN@bama.ua.edu Sent: Tuesday, September 27, 2011 6:59:34 AM Subject: Re: Security Certificate error message at IBMLINK What URL are you using? -Original Message- From: IBM Mainf

Re: Security Certificate error message at IBMLINK

Skip, Sigh macs are even more security concuss and we get a similar message that is hard to ignore. Ed -- For IBM-MAIN subscribe / signoff / archive access instructions, send email to lists...@bama.ua.edu with the message

Re: Security Certificate error message at IBMLINK

S Sent: Tuesday, September 27, 2011 10:00 AM To: IBM-MAIN@bama.ua.edu Subject: Re: Security Certificate error message at IBMLINK What URL are you using? -Original Message- From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List [mailto:IBM-MAIN@bama.ua.edu] On Behalf Of Linda Mooney Sent: Monday, September

Re: Security Certificate error message at IBMLINK

What URL are you using? -Original Message- From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List [mailto:IBM-MAIN@bama.ua.edu] On Behalf Of Linda Mooney Sent: Monday, September 26, 2011 3:48 PM To: IBM-MAIN@bama.ua.edu Subject: Re: Security Certificate error message at IBMLINK Hi Mike, And they&#x

Re: Security Certificate error message at IBMLINK

Yes. It's back to "normal" today. -jc- > -Original Message- > From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List [mailto:IBM-MAIN@bama.ua.edu] On Behalf > Of Linda Mooney > Sent: Monday, September 26, 2011 3:32 PM > To: IBM-MAIN@bama.ua.edu > Subject: Re: Secu

Re: Security Certificate error message at IBMLINK

I also opened a Feedback PMR# 40016,499,000 in IBMLink. I would encourage everyone who is seeing this to put in a Feedback using IBMLink Feedback or SR till this is resolved. This is basic certificate management off the rails. An SSL certificate expired for 3 days is still being served to custo

Re: Security Certificate error message at IBMLINK

On Mon, 26 Sep 2011 21:27:48 -0300 Clark Morris wrote: > Amazing how unreliable IBMLINK, the support function for the 24/7 > mainframe seems to be. Is it hosted on z? Should it be hosted on z? Unfortunately the platform, even a good one, isn't going to resolve inherent frailties like those ment

Re: Security Certificate error message at IBMLINK

row. Thanks, Linda - Original Message - From: "Skip Robinson" To: IBM-MAIN@bama.ua.edu Sent: Monday, September 26, 2011 8:47:06 PM Subject: Re: Security Certificate error message at IBMLINK This bump in the road has not impeded my business, merely added an extra

Re: Security Certificate error message at IBMLINK

gram Co-Manager 626-302-7535 Office 323-715-0595 Mobile jo.skip.robin...@sce.com From: Clark Morris To: IBM-MAIN@bama.ua.edu Date: 09/26/2011 05:28 PM Subject: Re: Security Certificate error message at IBMLINK Sent by:IBM Mainframe Discussion List On 26 Sep 2011 13:

Re: Security Certificate error message at IBMLINK

z? Should it be hosted on z? An interested shareholder wants to know. Clark Morris > >Linda > > >- Original Message - > > >From: "Skip Robinson" >To: IBM-MAIN@bama.ua.edu >Sent: Monday, September 26, 2011 1:50:38 PM >Subject: Re: Security C

Re: Security Certificate error message at IBMLINK

Thanks Skip, I appreciate it.  The just closed my SR for the third time and I'm getting plenty steamed Linda - Original Message - From: "Skip Robinson" To: IBM-MAIN@bama.ua.edu Sent: Monday, September 26, 2011 1:50:38 PM Subject: Re: Security Certificate e

Re: Security Certificate error message at IBMLINK

IBM-MAIN@bama.ua.edu Date: 09/26/2011 01:48 PM Subject: Re: Security Certificate error message at IBMLINK Sent by:IBM Mainframe Discussion List Hi Mike, And they're telling me that it ain't so, that I must be doing something to cause it. They even closed my

Re: Security Certificate error message at IBMLINK

2:46 PM Subject: Re: Security Certificate error message at IBMLINK The digital certificate expiring has been reported to IBM. On Mon, Sep 26, 2011 at 3:32 PM, Linda Mooney wrote: > Yipes! let me try this again.  I don't know what happened. > > Greetings! > > Anybody e

Re: Security Certificate error message at IBMLINK

t; today?  All was well yesterday, but this today - > > The security certificate presented by this website has expired or is > not yet valid. > > Security certificate problems may indicate an attempt to fool you or > intercept any data you send to the server. >   We recommend that y

Re: Security Certificate error message at IBMLINK

Yipes! let me try this again.  I don't know what happened.  Greetings!   Anybody else getting the following message trying to access IBMLINK this today?  All was well yesterday, but this today -   The security certificate presented by this website has expired or is   not yet

Re: Security Certificate error message at IBMLINK

Am I the only one for whom this didn't unencode? On Mon, Sep 26, 2011 at 4:24 PM, Linda Mooney wrote: > Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 > CgpHcmVldGluZ3MhIAoKCgpBbnlib2R5IGVsc2UgZ2V0dGluZyB0aGUgZm9sbG93aW5nIG1lc3Nh > Z2UgdHJ5aW5nIHRvIGFjY2VzcyBJQk1MSU5L

Security Certificate error message at IBMLINK

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Re: Security is fun in the PC world....

: Tuesday, August 23, 2011 1:14 PM To: j...@thethomasresidence.us Subject: Re: Security is fun in the PC world Offlist In <025101cc6133$02b0a860$0811f920$@us>, on 08/22/2011 at 08:21 PM, Jim Thomas said: >Thank you ... but that was a couple of years ago ... >besides .. lawyers are

Re: Security is fun in the PC world....

In <4e539fcf.2020...@gmail.com>, on 08/23/2011 at 08:40 PM, David Crayford said: >Wow! At least UWA could afford a PDP-11 ;-) The CDC was a mainframe, and fairly fast for its day; basically a 6600 without all of the parallelism. A much more powerful machine that the DEC PDP-11. -- Shm

Re: Security is fun in the PC world....

In <025301cc6134$b9c39ca0$2d4ad5e0$@us>, on 08/22/2011 at 08:33 PM, Jim Thomas said: >Don't know about the first HTTP server Mainframe, at CERN as I recall. -- Shmuel (Seymour J.) Metz, SysProg and JOAT ISO position; see We don't ca

Re: Security is fun in the PC world....

On 23/08/2011 4:04 PM, Shane wrote: On Mon, 22 Aug 2011 11:27:08 -0400 "Shmuel Metz (Seymour J.)" wrote: or even computer science back then, There were CS departments in the late 1960's. But they weren't all offering degrees - even into the 70's. I had to do a Science degree majoring in Appli

Re: Security is fun in the PC world....

On Mon, 22 Aug 2011 11:27:08 -0400 "Shmuel Metz (Seymour J.)" wrote: > >or even computer science back then, > > There were CS departments in the late 1960's. But they weren't all offering degrees - even into the 70's. I had to do a Science degree majoring in Applied Mathematics and Computer Scie

Re: Security is fun in the PC world....

mobile) 636-294-1014(res) j...@thethomasresidence.us (Email) -Original Message- From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List [mailto:IBM-MAIN@bama.ua.edu] On Behalf Of Shmuel Metz (Seymour J.) Sent: Monday, August 22, 2011 10:27 AM To: IBM-MAIN@bama.ua.edu Subject: Re: Security is fun in

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