> I think what I've been hearing from Jim Bound and others
> that they would rather
> not have these specialized features that FMIPv6 is
> specifying as general purpose
> for any IPv6 router, because they want to move forward with
> their IPv6
> (including base MIPv6 which works w
On Tue, 29 Oct 2002, Richard Draves wrote:
> > The latter is how I read it must be implemented -- and
> > reading Microsoft's implementation and the reason they're
> > using SL *strongly* suggests they
> > also have read it that way. There are very probably many others.
>
> No, I think you're
Pekka,
I'm trying to understand this comment.
> > >.. thus making the argument about the ease of use pretty
> much irrelevant
> > >IMO ..
> >
> > Exactly.
> >
> > It makes any argument that site-local filters are more "secure"
> > than global filters pretty much irrelevant, to
On Wed, 30 Oct 2002, Hesham Soliman (EAB) wrote:
> > > >.. thus making the argument about the ease of use pretty
> > much irrelevant
> > > >IMO ..
> > >
> > > Exactly.
> > >
> > > It makes any argument that site-local filters are more "secure"
> > > than global filters pretty muc
Regarding the ipv6InterfaceTable in the new RFC2011 draft, it looks like
there is a typo in the names of the Reachable and Retransmit time MIB
object names. Shoud the names be ipv6Interface...Time or
ipv6Inteface...Time? Thanks,
Kristine Adamson
IBM Communications Server for MVS: TCP/IP Devel
Hesham,
I wasn't proposing that they be coupled. I see the two as complimentary.
jak
- Original Message -
From: "Hesham Soliman (EAB)" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "'James Kempf'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; "Bound, Jim" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
"Thomas Narten" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: <[EMAI
So, one of the items that Margaret suggested was some text in
the node requirements doc or the scoped addr arch that states
that nodes default to being in one site.
However, there has been some mention that people would prefer
different behavior in routers. That is, the stated desire
was that, by
> This suggestion leads to the model where hosts with multiple
> interfaces will assume that all its interfaces are in the
> same site (e.g. have the same site-local zone id) unless
> explicitly configured to have multiple sites. While routers
> will default to having a unique site-local zone id f
> Margaret Wasserman wrote:
> If you can compromise the edge router and change its
> configuration, you can get either intra-site global
> or site-local traffic to be forwarded outside of the
> site.
Oh really? Maybe you can explain us how you would do that?
Let's see, by announcing FE80::/10 or
> ... How do you reconfigure a router to forward
> site-local traffic to the outside?
create a tunnel.
- Bill
IETF IPng Working Group Mailing List
IPng Home Page: http
Would you please check your sarcasm at the door?
Presumably, if this is a router that can be used either internally or at
the edge of a network, it can be configured so that all of its interfaces
are part of the same site (so that it forwards site-locals) or that some of
its interfaces are not
> > ... How do you reconfigure a router to forward
> > site-local traffic to the outside?
>
> create a tunnel.
=> I guess you would give the same answer
for link-locals and many other cases.
So, if you have a tunnel, secure it.
We've had the exacrt same problems with
MIPv6. These are no
> > create a tunnel.
>
> => I guess you would give the same answer
> for link-locals and many other cases.
link-locals are there for autoconfiguration, not security.
> So, if you have a tunnel, secure it.
answer is non-responsive. we were discussing unauthorized
router modifications.
site
Thank you!
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:owner-ipng@;sunroof.eng.sun.com] On Behalf Of Tim Hartrick
> Sent: Tuesday, October 29, 2002 4:41 PM
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: RE: Limiting the Use of Site-Local
>
>
>
>
> All,
>
> I gener
The whole discussion about lack of definition of site boundary is bogus,
and causing a large waste of energy. We don't tell people how to bound
areas in OSPF, yet we are expected to spell out the universal definition
of a site. To a first order, the concepts are exactly the same, how much
informati
At 03:23 PM 10/30/02, Michel Py wrote:
> Margaret Wasserman wrote:
> If you can compromise the edge router and change its
> configuration, you can get either intra-site global
> or site-local traffic to be forwarded outside of the
> site.
Oh really? Maybe you can explain us how you would do that?
> > => I guess you would give the same answer
> > for link-locals and many other cases.
>
> link-locals are there for autoconfiguration, not security.
=> You said that if you want forward site-locals beyond
a site then create a tunnel and I said:
I guess you would give the same a
>> ... How do you reconfigure a router to forward
>> site-local traffic to the outside?
> Bill Sommerfeld wrote:
> create a tunnel.
Good idea. Trouble is, the tunneling protocol is blocked by the
firewall. What's your next move?
(You don't expect to find a router that is connected to a secure ne
An organization should probably start with the assumption that a site
boundary is exactly congruent with an OSPF area, but they may choose to
restrict it further, or expand it when it makes sense for their network.
In any case, the site boundary should never be larger than the IGP
scope, so if w
I didn't say anything about site-locals and security
and I didn't ask what link-locals are for. I said
that you can create a tunnel to take link-locals
beyond a link, so the problem is not specific to
site-locals.
Actually, I think that there are some important differences
between link-locals
> If the answer is "protocol X", I just need to find a
> way to tunnel IP datagrams inside protocol X. I've
> seen worked examples using DNS, http, ssh, smtp,
Back to my original post: do you have the IOS image that can create http
tunnels on a Cisco 12000?
Michel.
Margaret,
> >I didn't say anything about site-locals and security
> >and I didn't ask what link-locals are for. I said
> >that you can create a tunnel to take link-locals
> >beyond a link, so the problem is not specific to
> >site-locals.
>
> Actually, I think that there are some i
> My take is that the two possible router configs for site locals is
>
> 1. All interfaces are in the same site
> 2. All interfaces are in unique sites
>
> Margaret's proposal that the default behavior is a node's
> interfaces are in 1 site results in case 1. For a router, a
> sa
> Good idea. Trouble is, the tunneling protocol is blocked by the
> firewall. What's your next move?
what *does* the firewall allow through? if the answer is "nothing",
we've reduced this to the "no external connectivity case" and you can
save a bunch of money by simply removing the firewall and
Hi Hesham,
=> I hereby declare to the ML that I completely
agree that link-locals and site-locals are different :)
:-)
Sorry if my note seemed condescending or something... I
didn't mean it that way.
The point was: using tunnelling to evade scope boundaries.
This can be done in a zillion w
At 04:33 PM 10/30/02, Richard Draves wrote:
> My take is that the two possible router configs for site locals is
>
> 1. All interfaces are in the same site
> 2. All interfaces are in unique sites
>
> Margaret's proposal that the default behavior is a node's
> interfaces are in 1 site
> :-)
>
> Sorry if my note seemed condescending or something... I
> didn't mean it that way.
=> oh no I didn't interpret it that way, I just wanted to
make sure that we talk about the same thing.
> >The point was: using tunnelling to evade scope boundaries.
> >This can be done in a
> A router might (and probably should) be hard-coded not to
> forward link-local packets, as there is no reason to ever
> forward them.
>
> However, a router that might ever need have multiple
> interfaces in a single site can't be hard-coded not to
> forward site-locals. Whether or not they w
> Back to my original post: do you have the IOS image that can create http
> tunnels on a Cisco 12000?
Why should I believe that a sufficiently determined adversary couldn't
somehow obtain a bootleg copy of IOS source?
- Bill
---
> I like the idea the hosts default to all interfaces in one site,
=> I think this will be a problem for mobile hosts. Using
ND alone you can't know if both interfaces are in the
same site.
Hesham
IETF IPng Working Group
Actually, a router can forward link-locals between interfaces on the
same link. In particular, a router can forward a packet with link-local
dest and/or source back out the interface from which it arrived (and
presumably generate a Redirect too).
Good point.
If you are implementing link-loca
> Why should I believe that a sufficiently determined
> adversary couldn't somehow obtain a bootleg copy of
> IOS source?
So tell me which of the following setups is the most secure:
a) The one that requires, in order to be hacked, to get a bootleg copy
of the IOS source, all the tools needed to
"sasson, shuki" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
|Hi all, indeed scoping is a pain... specifically since it is not carried as
|a part of the address.
|In any case we should give an escape path out of this ambiguity to a "known"
|world.
|Meaning if a node is configured with a global addresses the global
> Some of these complexities don't apply to link-local addresses, because
> no one expects to put them in the DNS,
This is tunnel vision. The only reason that no one expects
them in the DNS is that we havn't added support for them
in the DNS.
I think LL (and SL)
Margaret Wasserman wrote:
> ...
> I've had an action item for a while to summarize the thread
> that led to this conclusion to the IPv6 list, but I haven't
> gotten to it yet. I'll do so soon.
I appreciate that work loads make a summary effort challenging, but in
this particular case it would se
Dan Lanciani wrote:
> ...
> The thing that bothers me about this discussion is that it is
> starting to sound as if site-local addressing (and all the
> endless debate about scope and address selection rules) was
> just another sham like transparent renumbering. Until a few
> days ago site-loca
> So, one of the items that Margaret suggested was some text in
> the node requirements doc or the scoped addr arch that states
> that nodes default to being in one site.
>
> However, there has been some mention that people would prefer
> different behavior in routers. That is, the stated desire
>
Margaret Wasserman wrote:
> I think it depends what you mean by "filtering a prefix"...
>
> If you use a global prefix to number a private site, you
> wouldn't necessarily advertise that prefix in global routing
> tables.
Yes you would, because that private site is most likely part of a larger
I've heard this argument that site-local addresses somehow make the
site border router filtering problem easier, and I don't get it. As
far as I can tell, they don't help at all, and in fact just make the
problem a little worse. I have to filter all the kinds of addresess
that shouldn't be crossi
Tony and Tim,
I agree with Tim about the flow. But I strongly support Margarets idea
to limit them today to not be part of domain where global addresses
exist as Margaret has clearly articulated.
Support for that is not a minority and not rehash but putting some
controls on an architectural part
On Tue, Oct 29, 2002 at 07:08:55PM +0100, Hesham Soliman (EAB) wrote:
>
> Optimistic DAD needs to be analysed carefully to make sure
> that the failure cases are rare and do not justify killing
> optimistic DAD. I think this analysus is ongoing.
Yep. it's ongoing! No-one seems to have come up w
I would also ask all those who want to kill SLs turn your support to
Margaret to put the controls on. My input to you is you cannot win this
battle. But if we support Margarets idea with consenus then at least
for now we can control them. And I don't like the idea for IPv6
deployment reasons mes
Margaret,
> Margaret Wasserman wrote:
> Let me turn the question around... You have posited
> that the use of site-local address is somehow more
> "secure" than using a private global address range
> that is filtered in the router. Why? What attacks
> would work in the latter case that wouldn't
> This is tunnel vision. The only reason that no one expects
> them in the DNS is that we havn't added support for them
> in the DNS.
>
> well, that and the minor consideration that current DNS architecture
> assumes that names are global and that queries return consiste
At Thu, 31 Oct 2002 09:20:54 +1100, Mark Andrews wrote:
>
> This is tunnel vision. The only reason that no one expects
> them in the DNS is that we havn't added support for them
> in the DNS.
>
> I think LL (and SL) should be in the DNS. Doing this actually
> simpl
Jim,
The fundamental difference is the assumption about what is a reasonable
network topology. It is absolutely wrong to turn off SL just because a
global exists, because neighboring nodes on a single wire may have local
policy to be globally visible or not. Insisting that SL gets turned off
becau
Mark.Andrews wrote in response to Keith:
> ... Your responses to this and previous
> mail make me think that you are not actually paying attention
> to what is being sent. Rather you are locked in a crusade
> to kill SL and are ignoring anything which will actually
> addres
> At Thu, 31 Oct 2002 09:20:54 +1100, Mark Andrews wrote:
> >
> > This is tunnel vision. The only reason that no one expects
> > them in the DNS is that we havn't added support for them
> > in the DNS.
> >
> > I think LL (and SL) should be in the DNS. Doing this actually
> >
A point was brought up on the list that in order to make FastRA defined in
draft-mkahlil-fastra-01.txt work, the MAX_RTR_SOLICITATION_DELAY on the host
must be set to zero and this would cause RS congestion if an access point failed
or a group of mobile nodes moved at once.
While this could be tru
At Thu, 31 Oct 2002 10:59:45 +1100, Mark Andrews wrote:
>
> I'm talking about 1 name with multiple addresses being
> returned in multiple scopes. I'm taking about having
> getaddrinfo() then filter out the inappropriate addresses
> using local knowledge and setting sin6_sc
> > => Are you saying that site-local traffic would start
> > leaking outside the site and routed globally?
> > As in transient ISPs will just forward it?
>
> Of course the ISP's will forward them -- they (probably)
> haven't been
> configured to be part of any sites
=> Forwar
>> Mark.Andrews wrote in response to Keith:
>> ... Your responses to this and previous
>> mail make me think that you are not actually paying
>> attention to what is being sent. Rather you are
>> locked in a crusade to kill SL and are ignoring
>> anything which will actually address the problems
>
I don't understand this. In your proposal, every site will be filtering
a different global prefix. Routers in the internet backbone will not be
filtering any global prefix. Where is the comparable defense in the
depth?
I think it depends what you mean by "filtering a prefix"...
If you use a g
> > when a site renumbers the routers are going to have to be updated
> > anyway. of course we need a solution for this problem. but
> > having site locals won't change the need to reconfigure
> > routers when renumbering.
>
> You haven't contested my point that the security based on site-locals
> At Thu, 31 Oct 2002 10:59:45 +1100, Mark Andrews wrote:
> >
> > I'm talking about 1 name with multiple addresses being
> > returned in multiple scopes. I'm taking about having
> > getaddrinfo() then filter out the inappropriate addresses
> > using local knowledge and setting si
What Ole said.
IETF IPng Working Group Mailing List
IPng Home Page: http://playground.sun.com/ipng
FTP archive: ftp://playground.sun.com/pub/ipng
Direct all administrative requests to [EMA
Dan,
>> Michel Py wrote:
>> Now, explain me how you design that network (the plane)
>> with deprecating site-locals when global addresses are
>> present. Modern plane designs are multiple redundant
>> networks that carry data for almost all of the plane's
>> devices.
> Dan Lanciani wrote:
> Presu
For the record, my opinion follows Ole's comments.
Brian
Rob Austein wrote:
What Ole said.
IETF IPng Working Group Mailing List
IPng Home Page: http://playground.sun.com/ipng
FTP archive:
I wonder what Steeve Deering would have said about this? Sounds like a
Monica strike to me.
What is a Monica strike?
I am pretty sure that Steve would have told us, again, that relative
addressing is an important part of any addressing scheme and that
we need to have some sort of relative add
> What is a Monica strike?
A Monica strike is what Bill Clinton did a while ago: Make a lot of
noise launching a bunch of cruise missiles at Saddam to try to get the
people's attention away from the fact that he had a young lady under his
desk.
Michel.
--
Tony,
That is a reasonable approach and one that I could live
with. It allows SLs to exist and control is based on tools
that are in wide use today.
Brian
Tony Hain wrote:
The whole discussion about lack of definition of site boundary is bogus,
and causing a large waste of energy. We don't
Okay, so I am confused how it applies here.
I'd be very surprised to learn that I have a young lady under
my desk...
Margaret
At 09:32 PM 10/30/02, Michel Py wrote:
> What is a Monica strike?
A Monica strike is what Bill Clinton did a while ago: Make a lot of
noise launching a bunch of cruis
In any case, the site boundary should never be larger than the IGP
scope, so if we are going to talk about defaults, rather than assuming
every interface is in a different site, why not assume every EGP/IGP
boundary identifies a different site? If we can get past that, maybe we
can start talking
Would "provider independent local addressing" be a better name for site
local addressing if Tony's model is the most commonly followed ?
I would find that a more descriptive name, as it doesn't suggest that I
have to artificially place a boundary on the addressing due to physical
geography.
Mark.
> Margaret Wasserman writes:
>
>>>In any case, the site boundary should never be larger
>>>than the IGP scope, so if we are going to talk about
>>>defaults, rather than assuming every interface is in a
>>>different site, why not assume every EGP/IGP boundary
>>>identifies a different site? If we c
>> Michel Py wrote:
>> A Monica strike is what Bill Clinton did a while ago:
>> Make a lot of noise launching a bunch of cruise
>> missiles at Saddam to try to get the people's
>> attention away from the fact that he had a young
>> lady under his desk.
> Margaret Wasserman
> Okay, so I am confused
At Wed, 30 Oct 2002 19:46:22 -0800, Michel Py wrote:
>
> There's been a lot of noise here lately, without real reasons, and it
> has not produced much results either.
You can call a concrete proposal to eliminate a chunk of unnecessary
router complexity "noise" if you like, but I'll have to disag
Margaret,
> Margaret Wasserman wrote:
> You have made a statement that the use of IPv6
> site-local addresses (as opposed to globally
> unique addresses) will increase the security
> of a private network. And, I still don't
> understand the basis for that claim.
Semantics: I would have said "glo
Tony,
What I want is a simple draft that says site-locals will not be
forwarded out of the site?
Brian Haberman et als work had that wordage but the other parts are far
from consensus.
What we could do is have Brian reduce to one draft working with Ole a
statement that this will not happen. We ne
Mark,
> > Please think about this for a minute. It's bad enough for
> > applications that are driven by a human who can type or click or
> > whatever from a list of possible scopes, but what do you do for
> > programs like MTAs? If you're longing for a return to the days of
> > fee!fie%foe@f
002 10:59:45 +1100, Mark Andrews wrote:
> >
> > I'm talking about 1 name with multiple addresses being
> > returned in multiple scopes. I'm taking about having
> > getaddrinfo() then filter out the inappropriate addresses
> > using local knowledge and setting sin6_scope_id.
>
> V
Silly me too. I thought valuing differences was part of our jaundra in
the IETF and I am on the right side of things too. Oh well I learn
everyday.
/jim
[Have you ever seen the rain coming down on a sunny day]
> -Original Message-
> From: Margaret Wasserman [mailto:mrw@;windriver.com]
Michel,
> > What is a Monica strike?
>
> A Monica strike is what Bill Clinton did a while ago: Make a
> lot of noise launching a bunch of cruise missiles at Saddam
> to try to get the people's attention away from the fact that
> he had a young lady under his desk.
If your at this upcoming IET
On Tue, 29 Oct 2002, Keith Moore wrote:
> > Counter to what one might believe from reading my comments above, I don't
> > like the architectural mess that has occured as a consequence of the use
> > private addresses in IPv4. The difference between me and the anti-site-
> > local camp is that I do
On Tue, 29 Oct 2002, Margaret Wasserman wrote:
> At 04:57 PM 10/29/02, Hesham Soliman (EAB) wrote:
>
> > > or to put it another way, why do you have so much faith in
> > > filters of SL addresses and so little faith in filters of prefixes?
> > >
> >
> >=> Because they're not configured, they
> You can't hardcode site-local address filtering in every router,
> or you won't be able to communicate inside a site.
>
> So the router will need to be configured, somehow, to block
> site-local addresses from being forwarded from one interface
> to another. And that configuration isn't any mo
On Wed, 30 Oct 2002, Margaret Wasserman wrote:
> > > You can't hardcode site-local address filtering in every router,
> > > or you won't be able to communicate inside a site.
> > >
> > > So the router will need to be configured, somehow, to block
> > > site-local addresses from being forwarded from
> What are others' opinions on this issue?
I'm actually thinking that the most desirable default behavior
for routers is one that discourages use of SLs unless they're
explicitly configured. So I am inclined to believe that a
router (or a multi-interface host when acting as a router) should
by
> or to put it another way, why do you have so much faith in
> filters of SL addresses and so little faith in filters of prefixes?
Your "so much faith" and "so little faith" are exaggerating my position.
But I do think that site-local addresses will offer better security in
practice than filterin
> Your "so much faith" and "so little faith" are exaggerating my position.
> But I do think that site-local addresses will offer better security in
> practice than filtering a global prefix. Why is that?
>
> First, the security of the site-local addresses rests on proper
> configuration of the sit
>> A router might (and probably should) be hard-coded not to
>> forward link-local packets, as there is no reason to ever
>> forward them.
>>
>> However, a router that might ever need have multiple
>> interfaces in a single site can't be hard-coded not to
>> forward site-locals. Whether or not
> > > ... How do you reconfigure a router to forward
> > > site-local traffic to the outside?
> >
> > create a tunnel.
>
> => I guess you would give the same answer
> for link-locals and many other cases.
> So, if you have a tunnel, secure it.
> We've had the exacrt same problems with
> MI
> when a site renumbers the routers are going to have to be updated
> anyway. of course we need a solution for this problem. but
> having site locals won't change the need to reconfigure
> routers when renumbering.
You haven't contested my point that the security based on site-locals
will not
On Thu, 2002-10-31 at 09:20, Margaret Wasserman wrote:
>
> >
> >I don't understand this. In your proposal, every site will be filtering
> >a different global prefix. Routers in the internet backbone will not be
> >filtering any global prefix. Where is the comparable defense in the
> >depth?
>
> I
This is tunnel vision. The only reason that no one expects
them in the DNS is that we havn't added support for them
in the DNS.
well, that and the minor consideration that current DNS architecture
assumes that names are global and that queries return consistent results
e
> you don't have to have the source to IOS in order to
> figure out a way to get a router to tunnel the traffic
> to a compromised, programmable host of your choosing.
> just build the attack into a mail virus. then all you
> need is one client inside the firewall running outlook
> express...
You'
> > Why should I believe that a sufficiently determined
> > adversary couldn't somehow obtain a bootleg copy of
> > IOS source?
>
> So tell me which of the following setups is the most secure:
>
> a) The one that requires, in order to be hacked, to get a bootleg copy
> of the IOS source, all the
> > you don't have to have the source to IOS in order to
> > figure out a way to get a router to tunnel the traffic
> > to a compromised, programmable host of your choosing.
> > just build the attack into a mail virus. then all you
> > need is one client inside the firewall running outlook
> > expr
Mark Smith wrote:
> ...
> On a related topic, if I was to stuff up my site local
> filters at the edge of my site, would my network then become
> part of my ISPs site local network ?
You would both have to make an error to get the two IGPs tied together.
> In the proposed
> site-local models
> Please don't interpret the ranting of a few as representing anything
> close to consensus of a very large WG.
yes, please don't.
it's very clear that we don't have consensus to use SLs except on an
isolated network.
attempts by a few individuals to legitimize SLs in the face of
considerable
On a related topic, if I was to stuff up my site local filters at the
edge of my site, would my network then become part of my ISPs site local
network ? In the proposed site-local models, are sites adjacent, or are
they separated by segments that only have a global address assignments
(eg the BG
Michel,
You have made a statement that the use of IPv6 site-local
addresses (as opposed to globally-unique addresses) will
increase the security of a private network. And, I still
don't understand the basis for that claim.
Could you please answer the following question that I
posted earlier?
>>> A router might (and probably should) be hard-coded not to
>>> forward link-local packets, as there is no reason to ever
>>> forward them.
>>>
>>> However, a router that might ever need have multiple
>>> interfaces in a single site can't be hard-coded not to
>>> forward site-locals. Whether
Thanks Tony, Margaret.
On Thu, 2002-10-31 at 10:19, Margaret Wasserman wrote:
>
> >
> >On a related topic, if I was to stuff up my site local filters at the
> >edge of my site, would my network then become part of my ISPs site local
> >network ? In the proposed site-local models, are sites adjace
> > This is tunnel vision. The only reason that no one expects
> > them in the DNS is that we havn't added support for them
> > in the DNS.
> >
> > well, that and the minor consideration that current DNS architecture
> > assumes that names are global and that queries return
> I would also ask all those who want to kill SLs turn your support to
> Margaret to put the controls on.
Yes, this is the position I support.
Even I do not expect to kill SLs in the sense that we would reallocate
those addresses for other purposes, forbid using them under all
conditions, expect
> That summarizes it well.
and it appears to me that you are trying to attack me personally
rather than actually make credible arguments in favor of using SL.
IETF IPng Working Group Mailing List
IPng Home Page:
I'm talking about 1 name with multiple addresses being
returned in multiple scopes. I'm taking about having
getaddrinfo() then filter out the inappropriate addresses
using local knowledge and setting sin6_scope_id.
This deals with 99.9% of address lookup.
N
> The fundamental difference is the assumption about what is a reasonable
> network topology. It is absolutely wrong to turn off SL just because a
> global exists, because neighboring nodes on a single wire may have local
> policy to be globally visible or not.
it is absolutely wrong to expect ap
Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino wrote:
could you comment on routing code? (RIPng, OSPFv3) i still think
it's way too tough to support multi-sited node.
Not that the chairs have finalized the agenda, but I am planning
on presenting what it took me to get a site-border router coded
and running. If
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