Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

> On Jan 9, 2017, at 8:35 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > CG: I agree that this definitely tends to make nominalism self-refuting > which I see as a problem rather than a strength. > > A problem for nominalism or for realism? Is

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Jon S., list, I don't have a quote handy, but Peirce said specifically that the pragmatic maxim is for clarifying not qualities of feeling, but conceptions. I suppose that that could include conceptions of qualities of feeling, but not the qualities of feeling themselves. A mechanical

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Jacob, List: Unless I am misunderstanding you, I disagree--I think that according to Peirce, a general as a continuum is infinite; in fact, it contains *potential *individuals exceeding *all *multitude. I have been advocating the existence/reality distinction on the List for a while now, much to

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Ben, List: BU: This rule-style of formulation reflects a major difference between Peirce's generals and Peirce's qualities of feeling which are generals when reflected on but are not rules and are not formulated as rules. I am not convinced that there is a significant difference here, at least

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Clark, List: CG: I agree that this definitely tends to make nominalism self-refuting which I see as a problem rather than a strength. A problem for nominalism or for realism? Is it legitimate for a nominalist to deny that holding everything real to be singular is self-contradictory, on the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Dear list: Why not consider instead: “What do you make to be the meaning of "George Washington"?” Or “a statue of a soldier on some village monument, in his overcoat and with his musket…” For if the names are of “a *type*, or *form*, to which objects, both those that are externally

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

> On Jan 9, 2017, at 4:44 PM, jacob longshore wrote: > > Yes, I think you're right about that. Peirce's definitions of "generals" are > framed in terms of parts of a whole (and thereforefinite), whereas > "universal" would apply to an infinite number of possible

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Jon S., list, _/Universum/_ in the sense of the whole world goes back at least to Cicero in the 1st Century B.C. http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0059%3Aentry%3Duniversus You wrote, Note also Peirce's stance that universal propositions do not assert

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

> On Jan 7, 2017, at 6:52 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > With reference to individuals, I shall only remark that there are certain > general terms whose objects can only be in one place at one time, and these > are called individuals. They are generals that is, not

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

They're Chiasson's quotes (with at least one rephrashing by her) of Peirce from a passage in: Peirce, Charles S. (1905 April), "What Pragmatism Is", /The Monist/ , v. XV, n. 2, pp. 161–181 https://books.google.com/books?id=j6oLIAAJ=PA161-IA22 . Oxford PDF

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

> On Jan 9, 2017, at 2:25 PM, Clark Goble wrote: > Here metaphysics seems important if only to show what hidden premises > undergird our thinking. It’s also possible that he might mean approaching > metaphysics in a somewhat transcendental approach akin to Kant’s various >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

> On Jan 9, 2017, at 1:58 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > > I always liked his use of "general" since the word "universal" unqualified in > English seems to mean true of absolutely everything, and that's certainly not > what Aristotle meant by the Greek word traditionally

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Ben: Of course, "universal" as employed by the scholastics came from Latin, probably by combining "unum" (one) and "versus" (turned), thus meaning something like "turned into one." Presumably the current connotation, "true of absolutely everything," was a later linguistic development within

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

List, Jerry R.,: I am curious about the origin of the quotes: > ‘almost every proposition of ontological metaphysics is meaningless > gibberish’ > ‘made up of words that define each other with no conception being reached.’ > Or else, claimed Peirce, > ‘the conception that is reached is

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Jon S., list, You may well be right. "General" was one of the words of which Peirce was in charge in the Century Dictionary - http://web.archive.org/web/20120324152427/http://www.pep.uqam.ca/listsofwords.pep?l=G but the definition that appears in the Century Dictionary -

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy and Pragmaticism

Stephen, List: Thanks for the reminder. Was there something specific that prompted you to post it at this time? Do you think that some of us are guilty of failing to maintain that distinction in some of our own posts? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Ben, List: Yes, I have obviously made some progress since I first posed the question to Gary. The more I read about all of this, the more I am inclined to think that Peirce's preference for "general" over "universal" does indeed simply reflect his position that no law or habit is absolutely

[PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy and Pragmaticism

The following is from the valuable CP an online PDF that contains eight sections of the voluminous writings of Charles Sanders Peirce. In these very words you will find the germ of a philosophy that I found more than helpful for us all as we face the future. First the Pragmatic Maxim: 'The exact

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Sorry, I forgot to adjust the email message subject line. Repaired here. - Best, Ben Jon S., Gary R., Jon A., list, As promised in my previous message, here is the first off-list response that I made to Jon S.'s messages in this thread to peirce-l: Jon S., You've out-researched me! I'm not

Re: OFFLIST Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Jon S., Gary R., Jon A., list, As promised in my previous message, here is the first off-list response that I made to Jon S.'s messages in this thread to peirce-l: Jon S., You've out-researched me! I'm not sure what to say on-list at this point. I found some backup for some of your claims.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

List, Jon S., Gary R., Gary R., Jon S., and I began discussing the subject of this thread a few days ago off-list, and we've agreed that the off-list parts should be brought on-list. Below is the part that preceded the thread's appearance at peirce-l. Next, I'll send the peirce-l thread plus