On 5/22/2017 1:40 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
Here is the WayBak link to http://www.existentialgraphs.com/
http://web.archive.org/web/2016021812/http://www.existentialgraphs.com/
Thanks for finding that copy. But some links in that copy are broken.
Starting from the first page, click on
"A Proof
Jay Zeman's web site at the University of Florida is still available
at http://users.clas.ufl.edu/jzeman/
But the link to existentialgraphs.org is broken. His wife forgot
to renew the registration. Fortunately, I downloaded that web site.
I have now posted a copy at http://www.jfsowa.com/exgrap
Jeff and Mike,
Those are important points.
JBD
In a broad sense, Sir William Rowan Hamilton anticipated Einstein's
idea that space and time can be conceived as parts of a four dimensional
continuum. In fact, he used the algebra of quaternions to articulate a
formal framework for conceiving of s
On 5/8/2017 10:40 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
The question then is whether we keep or lose information in passing
from a triadic relation to the collection of its dyadic projections.
Linguists use the term 'obligatory'. For example:
Obligatory: "Mary gave Bill a camera."
Optional: "Mary saw Bill
On 5/1/2017 1:52 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
You said: "Useful exercise: Finding examples from Peirce's writings
that show how he related his categories to phaneroscopy."
But first, would you mind giving an off-the-cuff explanation of
what phaneroscopy is, please?
Peirce's definition (CP 1.284):
Ph
Jon and Jerry,
JA
triadic relations extend across a threshold of complexity, such that
relations of all higher adicities can be analyzed in terms of 1-adic,
2-adic, and 3-adic relations.
No. Peirce never said that. Many logicians have correctly observed
that you can replace any triadic relat
Helmut and Jon,
HR
I think, the problem with bringing together Peirce and conventional
mathematics is, that Peirces monism is one of time / change, and the
conventional mathematical monism is one of space / permanence.
Peirce would not say that.
Charles learned mathematics from his father Ben
On 4/28/2017 10:24 AM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
Great quote!
Thanks Jon, Tom, list!
I agree:
Proust 1.48
I put down the cup and turn to my mind. It is up to my mind to
find the truth. But how? What grave uncertainty, whenever the
mind feels overtaken by itself; when it, the seeker, is also the
Helmut, Jeffrey, Jon A, Clark, list,
HR
Not every triadic relation is categorically thirdness. But which are?
That's a good question. Some basic principles:
1. For each of Peirce's categories, there is a characteristic question:
Firstness: What is it? What kind of mark?
Secondnes
Jon,
That is an extensional definition of a relation:
Following the pattern of the functional case, let the notation
“L ⊆ X × Y” bring to mind a mathematical object specified by
three pieces of data, the set X, the set Y, and a particular
subset of their cartesian product X × Y}. As before we
Jeffrey,
That's a good guideline:
I think it will help to dispel confusion in our discussions on the
list if we spell out the texts and sources that are most on our minds
when we are trying to interpret specific passages. Or, in those cases
when we are giving an "all things considered" reading,
On 4/14/2017 10:41 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
I have to say (one more time) that if we want to understand Peirce’s
terms — especially what he means by a *triadic relation* — we need to
read them *in the context *where Peirce uses them, not lift them out
of their context and drop them into a
On 4/13/2017 3:59 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
In my mind, I am left with an intractable question: Is a Procrustian Bed
essential to understanding the role of the identity relation in CSP’s
theory of logical graphs of relations? Or, is a semantic explanation
possible?
Peirce published his alge
On 4/12/2017 12:33 PM, Clark Goble wrote:
Was the computer science that developed relational databases
engaging with Peirce explicitly? Any good place to get a
primer on that history?
The theory of relational databases was originally developed
by Edgar F. (Ted) Codd at IBM Research in San Jose:
Edwina, Jon A., Clark, list,
The issues of mapping a continuous world to a small finite
vocabulary imply that (1) there is always some residual error
in anything we say about the world, and (2) there is an open-
ended variety of ways of talking about the same phenomena from
different points of vi
On 4/10/2017 11:46 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
The unique role of the chemical elements in the composition of chemical
sentences serve as an excellent model for the logical structures of
other sentences in other symbol systems.
I agree that the system of chemical elements is more tractable
tha
Helmut, Edwina, Jon, list,
Few borders in any realm, animate or inanimate, are clearly defined.
There is a continuum. The inanimate realm has extremes from sharp
boundaries (a crystal) to extremely vague boundaries (the earth's
atmosphere). The borders of living things are an intermediate case.
On 4/8/2017 2:59 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
I would say, that the instantiation of a law is not it´s token,
but the law itself at work.
I agree.
So law is all type, there are no tokens of it in inanimate world
of efficient causation. Is my guess.
For a law of science, the proposition that st
Jon and Edwina,
Jon
I am still trying to figure out how to classify that real aspect/
regularity as a Sign itself, if in fact it is legitimate to treat
reality as consisting entirely of Signs.
Anything that can affect our sense organs is a mark. Those marks
could be interpreted and classified
Edwina, Gary, Clark, list,
ET
I'd say that our primary experience of these natural laws is
indexical, in that we physically connect with the RESULTS of
these laws. Intellectually analyzing them and developing
symbolic constructs - is a secondary step.
I agree with both sentences. And I would
On 4/6/2017 5:51 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
JFS: In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is
a metaphor for aspects of nature that we can only describe.
Again, I am asking about those aspects of nature /themselves/, not our
linguistic or mathematical descriptions of them. What clas
Jon and Edwina,
Jon
What class of Sign is a law of nature? I am not referring to how we
/describe/ a law of nature in human language, an equation, or other
/representation/ of it; I am talking about the law of nature /itself/,
the real general that governs actual occurrences.
Edwina
But a sy
Edwina, Gary, and Jon,
ET
So, rather than saying that a single bacterium 'has' a quasi-mind,
I'd consider that bacterium to be a semiosic materialization of Mind.
The brain is not the same as Mind.
Peirce would certainly agree that the brain is not the same as mind,
and so would I. But when P
On 4/2/2017 11:04 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
I like your terms and yes, Peirce has indeed used all of them.
My question is: What would your definition be of a 'sign'?
You use it often in the chart but it has no definition.
I'm glad that you approve of the choice of terms.
Re definition of sig
On 4/2/2017 4:54 AM, Stephen Jarosek wrote:
imitation is so central that perhaps a case can be made
for a more accurate representation of what we really mean.
I certainly agree.
But I would make a distinction between Peirce's fundamental
terminology and the open-ended variety of terms that can
Edwina, Stephen, list,
I don't disagree with the points you're addressing, but I'm
concerned about the proliferation of terminology.
Formal logic and linguistics (Chomsky, Montague, Kamp, Partee
and their PhD students) have had little success for AI and natural
language understanding. The next
Jon A.S., Clark, list,
I started writing this note several days ago, but I got sidetracked
with other commitments.
My main interest (at the moment) is in the following slides, which
I presented in 2015, and which I am now developing into a longer
article: http://www.jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf
Th
Clark, Jon A.S., and Claudio,
I'm trying to relate Peirce's logic, mathematics, semiotic,
theory of truth, and logic of pragmatism to his insights
into perception, cognition, and purposeful action.
CSP's essential insights: triadic semiotic; icons as the
starting point; symbols growing from ico
Clark and Claudio,
Clark
I think my point about modal realism is more that connection
between universals and particulars. Does he make that connection
with mathematics early on? Again I don’t know. It’s one thing to
speak about the nature of mathematics as possibilities and quite
an other to spe
On 3/25/2017 3:27 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
"I declared myself long ago as one who sees more continuity
of development than radical shift in Peirce's thought over
his lifetime."
That is one reason why I'm not interested that much in the dates of the
writings; my focus is on the content, and I v
On 3/16/2017 11:20 AM, Clark Goble wrote:
The way I usually think about it is that there are many continuous
equations such that the limit as x → ∞ y → 0.
But if we use some language with a finite alphabet and limit
the theories to a finite specification, there are at most
a countable number of
On 3/16/2017 8:44 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
This is the question of “convergence”, a question that mathematicians,
physicists, systems theorists, etc. have investigated in great detail.
As a rule we find that some methods of procedure, of stepping through
a sequence of states, will eventually converg
On 3/10/2017 8:57 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
By contrast, Peirce's realism recognizes that "correspondence,
coherence, consensus, and instrumental reliability are all essential
and constitutive elements of truth--none is any more fundamental than
the others. Moreover, each of these elements of
Jeff and Jerry,
Everything in Peirce's philosophy is related to everything else.
This thread could fan out in all directions, and I have work to do.
So I'll just end my contribution with a couple of short comments
and a copy of the summary from the end of my previous note:
JFS
Summary: What I'
Jerry, Clark, list,
In my response to Jeff B.D., I was defending the claim that board
games are versions of mathematics. But I definitely do *not* restrict
math to board games or to set-theoretic models.
Jerry
Many mathematicians reject set theory as a foundation for mathematics
Yes. Peirce
On 3/8/2017 12:10 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
I'm trying to interpret Peirce's remarks about the importance
of stating the mathematical hypotheses of a system precisely
for the purpose of drawing conclusions with exactitude.
I certainly agree. And the point I was trying to make is that
th
On 3/7/2017 3:19 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
pure mathematics starts from a set of hypotheses of a particular sort,
and it does not seem obvious to me that these games are grounded
on such hypotheses.
More precisely, pure mathematics starts with axioms and definitions.
A hypothesis is a st
Jerry,
We already have a universal foundation for logic. It's called
"Peirce's semiotic".
JLRC
the mathematics of the continuous can not be the same as the
mathematics of the discrete. Nor can the mathematics of the
discrete become the mathematics of the continuous.
They are all subsets of w
On 3/4/2017 4:26 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
I saw Beauty, Goodness, and Truth as the intersecting circles
of a Venn diagram, with the summum bonum the central cell.
Note that Beauty comes first in most versions -- including Peirce's.
All sciences, including the normative sciences, are based on perce
Jeff and Gary,
JBD
I'm wondering if anyone can explain in greater detail what Peirce
is suggesting in this passage in making the comparison between the
atomic weight of oxygen and the continuity of Time
GF
I think the claim is that our experience of time is the prototype
for all conceptions o
Edwina, Stephen, Jon A.S., Jon A., list
ET
I don't find that it's the terms that slow down the use of Peirce in
analysis; I find that it's the concept of a triadic semiosis with that
vital mediation, and the concept of the three modal categories. Both
seem very hard for people to grasp - and so
On 2/8/2017 12:31 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
The three triads of CSP,
qualisign, sinsign, legisign;
icon, index, symbol;
rhema, dicisign, argument,
can be, in my opinion, a “recipe” for realism; that is, the logical
association of antecedent observations (Qualisigns with logical
conseq
On 2/6/2017 9:19 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
I myself tend to view causality as more economic and population-size
driven than ideologically driven.
I agree. In fact, that's a major reason why the Homo saps were
so far ahead of the neanderthals in technology: they had a warmer
climate in Africa
On 2/5/2017 12:38 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
that knowledge is derived from the evidence of the senses, is as old
as Aristotle - who espoused just that [along with the use of reason].
But as a societal force, with its insistence that the individual and
that individual's direct contact with the w
On 2/4/2017 11:10 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
I have been reading up on Peirce's version of scholastic realism and his
opposition to various forms of nominalism. He seems to have consistently
preferred the term “general” to “universal” (e.g., CP 2.367); has anyone
ever tried to figure out why?
The
John C and Edwina,
JC
Nominalism is a weaker hypothesis than Realism, so if something is
consistent with realism, then it is consistent with nominalism. Locke,
for example, distinguished between the nominal essence and the real
essence. The former tells us what we think something is like, while
On 1/29/2017 1:00 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
The distinction between nominal thinking and real thinking is distinct
from the distinction between extensional thinking and intensional
thinking, as one can see from the fact that extreme nominalists do not
admit sets as entities.
Quine was as extreme as
Eric and list,
EC
My initial inclination is to say that everything you pointed to does
seem important, but doesn't seem obviously to hinge on anything I can
easily understand as a difference between nominalists and realists
The simplest explanation I have ever read was by Alonzo Church --
in a
On 1/26/2017 6:13 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
the putative distinction between the semeiotic triad seen /as a single
triadic entity/ /versus/ the triad *as expressing three relations* seems
to me to one worth entertaining in considering what is really a
fundamental aspect of Peircean semeiotics.
I
On 1/25/2017 10:42 PM, John F Sowa wrote:
On 1/25/2017 10:28 PM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:
Sorry for the rant and if I am alone in my reaction...
You're not along in that reaction.
Sorry for the typo. I meant 'alone'.
John
-
PEIRCE-L subscribers:
On 1/25/2017 10:28 PM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:
Sorry for the rant and if I am alone in my reaction...
You're not along in that reaction.
John
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On 1/24/2017 6:33 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Essentially, nominalism denies universals or common attributes have
reality in themselves; it considers them to be mere terms created
by man for these 'commonalities'.
Yes. And one of the worst examples is its treatment of the laws
of science. Rudo
On 1/19/2017 10:19 AM, John F Sowa wrote:
consider the following sentence:
"I think that Tom believes Superman is real, but
Mary knows he's just a character in a story."
This sentence would have four UoDs: (1) the world that includes
Tom, Mary, and me; (2) the UoD of
Jon A. and Clark,
JA
Already by 1870 Peirce ... shifts individuality from a category
of being to a category of description, relative to a particular
discourse situation...
That's an important observation.
CG
I think really what we’re getting at is Peirce’s notion of the
Universe of Discourse
Jerry and Clark,
In mathematics, logic, computer science, physics, engineering...,
precision in measurement, reasoning, and communication is essential.
I am not denying that.
But I also believe that Peirce's point that "symbols grow",
Wittgenstein's language games, and Sue Atkins' remark that
"I
On 1/16/2017 3:32 PM, Clark Goble wrote:
I think one can still manage how symbols grow. That is consider them
bundles of process. The question ends up being what the limits of the
symbol are. Of course that becomes a complex topic too.
I don't believe that it's possible or desirable to put any
Jon A., Edwina, Kirsti, Jon A.S., list,
The issues about universals and essences have been with us for a
couple of millennia, and nobody has a proposed useful definition that
everyone can accept. Peirce developed his semiotic as a foundation
that *avoids* those terms.
JA
I find it more useful
On 1/10/2017 2:21 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Forster's /Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism/.
Re: The favorable review by Nathan Houser and the highly critical
review by T. L. Short.
I believe that both reviewers saw the same issues, and they
represent complementary rather than opposite opini
On 12/31/2016 10:43 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:
Is this list about the philosophy of Peirce any more? - Or does
CSP only serve as a starting point to presenting any kinds of
ideas loosely connected with CSP?
Those are good questions.
I believe that it's important to relate CSP's writings
On 12/29/2016 2:52 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
I wonder why [Luther's] still well regarded.
For the same reason as Russell vs. Peirce: better hype and PR.
John
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On 12/16/2016 4:50 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
I'd like to suggest the recent lecture by Denis Noble
in the British Physiological Society:
http://www.voicesfromoxford.org/video/dance-to-the-tune-of-life-lecture/699
Thanks for the reference. That led me to some of his earlier articles.
The one fr
On 12/13/2016 2:43 PM, Thomas903 wrote:
I wanted to comment on statements made last night about the meaning
of law-theory-hypothesis.
I wasn't attempting to state a definitive analysis of scientific
terminology. I was making the point that logicians use the word
'theory' in a formal sense that
On 12/13/2016 11:15 AM, John Collier wrote:
For some theories, like number theory and set theory, there are
statements that are true but not deducible. I would think they
are entailed by the theory even if not provable, so I would call
them part of the theory.
I agree. I just blame my fingers
On 12/12/2016 1:24 PM, Clark Goble wrote:
I don’t like the term “legitimate” precisely because it’s ambiguous.
However I think good theories are theories that allow us to inquire
about their truthfulness by making somewhat testable predictions.
I agree with both points.
I think that some of th
On 12/12/2016 10:57 AM, Clark Goble wrote:
I think the bigger problem is that most of the big theories (loop
quantum gravity, string theory) don’t really have even “in theory” tests
that are limited by technology. String theory in particular has the
problem that it explains too much.
I would co
On 12/11/2016 7:44 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
if electrical field theory contradicts quantum mechanics and the
uncertainty principle, then it is valid (at most) only in a
classical limit.
Quantum Electrodynamics (QED) is the well developed theory
that unifies quantum mechanics and electrodynamic
On 12/7/2016 1:52 PM, Clark Goble wrote:
I do think there is a different type of bias and type of thinking
for those doing more theoretical work.
No two people have identical interests, preferences, and ways of
thinking. The word 'bias' has a negative connotation that is only
appropriate when
Clark and Jerry,
Every branch of science has four kinds of developers: (1) naturalists,
(2) experimenters, (3) theoreticians, and (4) engineers. They often
disagree, but they need each other. Many of them play two or more
roles at different times. Peirce played all four roles in his various
w
On 11/29/2016 2:57 PM, Clark Goble wrote:
Treating thirdness as something real in the universe independent
of what any particular person thinks about it is key.
That is not a new point. Scientists have always assumed that the
laws of nature are "really real".
Ernst Mach is the positivist who
Kirsti,
We are in violent agreement.
I looked at the slides you provided. With as good as all of them,
was mark 'wrong', wrong, and again wrong.
I have been doing R & D in AI for years, and the point I'm trying
to make is that current AI research is *on the wrong track* .
I presented an earli
Jon A., Jerry, Jeffrey, list
In any notation for logic, we have to distinguish the ontology from
the base logic. Peirce's basic existential graphs (Alpha + Beta)
make minimal assumptions about ontology. They can be mapped to
and from FOL in Peirce-Schröder-Peano algebraic notation.
Peirce's ma
On 11/19/2016 6:14 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
I don't think that democracy 'is human destiny', and I don't
believe that we are moving 'in the direction of goodness'.
I agree. Just look at history.
Greece and Rome had democracies. But both of those democracies were
toppled by tyrants (AKA mon
On 11/15/2016 8:40 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
Differential logic is simply the qualitative analogue of the
differential and integral calculus.
That's an analogy that might inspire an abduction. But abductions
are hypotheses or guesses that may be useful -- or not. In any case,
their acceptance mus
On 11/12/2016 12:55 PM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:
You wrote:
"Different languages have different options for the grammatical forms
that express such relations. The number of options could lead to a
combinatorial explosion, but the practical number is limited by human
memory."
I take your fi
On 11/11/2016 9:36 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
These are raw text copies right now but I'm in the
process of segmenting them for ease of study and
retrieving WayBak links for the discussion pages
that are no longer live on the web.
What do you mean by "segmenting"? Does that mean chopping
them up in
Edwina, Jon A, Jeff, Jerry, Jon AS, Kirsti,
This topic has so many ramifications that it's impossible to say
anything complete and definitive. The observation I considered
important was Bateson's remark about stories as a natural way for
minds or quasi-minds to think, talk, and reason about expe
Edwina, Kirsti, list,
ET
I wish we could get into the analysis of time in more detail.
I came across a short passage by Gregory Bateson that clarifies the
issues. See the attached Bateson79.jpg, which is an excerpt from p. 2
of a book on biosemiotics (see below). Following is the critical poi
On 11/4/2016 12:00 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
JFS: But at the instant of the Big Bang and for some time thereafter,
there were no minds or quasi-minds that could perceive and interpret
that existence. But there was a physical kind of monadic and dyadic
pre-semiosis.
ET: I don't know that anal
On 11/4/2016 8:57 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
my own view that our 'existential cosmos' IS a three category semiosic
universe. That is, my view is that the three categories only emerge
within the existentiality of the matter/mind universe.
Yes. But at the instant of the Big Bang and for some ti
On 11/2/2016 2:01 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
His favorite Gospel was that of John, but did he ever quote its
first chapter? "In the beginning was the Word [logos] ...
Since his father taught him Greek at a very early age, I'm sure
that New Testament Greek was one of the first texts he studied
On 10/29/2016 11:55 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
I think that [Peirce] was a non-traditional Christian--he once
referred to his views as buddheo-Christian
Those two traditions are not necessarily in conflict. Note,
for example, the writings of Thomas Merton. For an overview, see
http://www.americ
On 10/30/2016 10:37 AM, jerry_lr_chand...@me.com wrote:
see:
http://www.pucsp.br/pragmatismo/dowloads/eip_15/15th_imp_shannon_dea_peirce-and_spinozas_pragmaticist_methaphysics.pdf
for a very nice paper on CSP wrt Spinoza.
I agree that it's "a very nice paper". It contains many excerpts
by CS
On 10/22/2016 3:44 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
both explanations are based on belief; I really don't think either
is open to empirical evidence.
Peirce encouraged reasoning by hypothesis (abduction), but he
insisted that the implications of those hypotheses be evaluated
by testing (purposive act
On 10/21/2016 4:16 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
Thanks for summarizing the issue so clearly. This has traditionally
been one of the most difficult points to get across both on this
List and within the wider spheres of Peirce readership.
Thanks for the note of support. For some related issues, see th
On 10/21/2016 2:05 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
The role of efficient causality is extremely perplex in life
and in the chemical sciences.
That is true of all the sciences, especially physics. When I used
the word 'modern', I meant the informal use by Hume. But as early
as the 17th century, p
On 10/21/2016 1:09 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
By "scientific causality," do you mean /efficient/ causality (i.e.,
brute reactions), /final/ causality (i.e., laws of nature), both,
or something else altogether?
Scientific causality is not so constrained as your question suggests.
In discussi
On 10/17/2016 3:15 AM, Dau, Frithjof wrote:
I own www.existential-graph.org (for about two decades now...)
and I would be more than pleased to offer somespace on my site.
That's an excellent idea. It would be important to combine Jay's EG
material and related work on EGs on a site that has a k
On 10/15/2016 9:26 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Since I am rejecting a metaphysical origin [God] as the origin
of the universe, I stick with the Big Bang for now.
I agree with Heraclitus and my namesake, John the Evangelist:
Heraclitus wrote about the logos — translated variously as word,
speech
On 10/13/2016 5:24 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
[Peirce's pragmatic axiom] once accepted, – intelligently accepted,
in the light of the evidence of its truth, – speedily sweeps all
metaphysical rubbish out of one’s house. Each abstraction is either
pronounced to be gibberish or is provided with a plain,
I forgot to include the URL of his web site:
http://users.clas.ufl.edu/jzeman/
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