RE: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

] SENT: 18-Feb-18 20:41 TO: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu SUBJECT: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind List: Having received no corrections or objections to my summary of the relevant Peirce quotes, I would like to offer some further comments. In these contexts, at least, Quasi-minds are clearly indispensable

Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

Dear Jerry, you wrote that we have had experiences. I dont remember them so well. In any case, it is not so, that I would see you representing a certain way of thinking I would categorically oppose. I cannot put you into a drawer. But I dont want to put people into drawers anyway. Some things

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

Edwina, List: Our very different readings of Peirce and models of semiosis are manifesting again, so I will leave it at that, with two exceptions. First, Peirce *did not* say that "the whole universe is composed of signs." I assume that you are alluding to this long sentence, which should

[PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }Jon 1] Mind, which is to say, Thirdness, is operative in 6 of the ten sign classes. Of these 6, there are only 3 that also use the Symbolic Relation. Therefore - my view is that only 3 of the ten refer to human

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

Edwina, List: 1. What exactly are you claiming that I deny? I have repeatedly quoted CP 4.551 (crystals and bees), while you are the one who confines Symbols and Arguments to human conceptual semiosis. What I *have *pointed out is that Peirce *did not* treat triadic semoisis as the *only *kind

[PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }Gary R - thanks for a wonderful post as moderator. I don't know how to describe it - but- it was 'reasonable and moderate'. I have two comments: 1] Since Peirce considered that Mind is operative in all of nature,

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

Gary R., List: I honestly did try to pause at a couple of points--after posting the initial list of quotes, and then after posting my own summaries of them--to give others a chance to comment, but my eagerness to put my ideas out there and get feedback on them eventually got the best of me. I

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

Nice response -- here's mine Do not pretend to know my name The words I use are weak and lame They cannot tell from whence they came They don’t pretend to know my name + There is no reason to say more I do not know what this is for There is no why there’s no wherefore Why is there reason

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

Dear Helmut, You said, All that is a reflection in another mirror, a bit further away. Solipsism is assuming an endless series of mirrors behind mirrors. Sounds like hell. Can you show a way out.. I would presume based on our past experiences that you wouldn’t care for me to show you a way

Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

Jerry, when a mirror appears in the field of sight, then the eye can see itself. Its owner may ask him/herself: What is behind that mirror? But the mirror is there, so behind it is also what is behind the eye. But the world too. So it is the (eye-owner´s) world, and the owner of the world, being

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

Dear list, Speaking of the person who sees the vase, who happens to be a Quasi-mind: *5.6 * *The limits of my language** mean the limits of my world.* *5.61* Logic fills the world: the limits of the world are also its limits. We cannot therefore say in logic: This and this

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

Edwina, List: 1. A hypothesis is not intended to be an argument. However, your point about providing multiple terms for the same concept is well-taken. With that in mind, I now see *three *interpretive possibilities for Peirce's statement, "Such perfect sign is a quasi-mind. It is the sheet

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; } Jon - 1. All I can say is that your definitions are circular. You repeat that 'a perfect mind= a quasi-mind= the sheet of assertion of the EG. This, frankly, is not an argument; it is not enlightening; it

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

Edwina, List: 1. We can say two things for sure based on that straightforward pair of sentences by Peirce--first, that a perfect Sign, whatever else it might be, is a Quasi-mind; and second, that the Sheet of Assertion of Existential Graphs is a perfect Sign. We also know, from various other

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; } Jon - 1]You are the one who is 'asserting' Peirce's sentence: " Such perfect sign is a quasi-mind. It is the sheet of assertion of Existential Graphs" (EP 2:545n25). So- you should be the one

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

Edwina, List: 1. Respectfully, I asked you to *make your case* for that position, not simply *reassert *it. I honestly do not see how a Rhematic Indexical Legisign *can *be "the sheet of assertion of Existential Graphs"; please *explain *it to me. 2. What is your *warrant *for taking Peirce's

[PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; } Jon, list 1. I see no reason why a rhematic indexical legisign, with its qualities that fit all of Peirce's stated description of a 'perfect sign' cannot fulfill being a 'sheet of assertion of existential

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 From: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> Sent: Tuesday, February 20, 2018 3:03 PM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind Jeff, List: I agree that Peirce was pre

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

Jeff, List: I agree that Peirce was predominantly discussing "perfect Signs" and "Quasi-minds" within the framework of a normative theory of logic as semeiotic; that "perfect" is related to Entelechy in this context (as I just posted); and that "Quasi-mind" is a generalization of *human *minds,

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

Helmut, List: I agree with Jeff that "perfect" in this context does not have a Platonic meaning, but rather--as I have stated previously--is related to the Aristotelian notion of Entelechy. In fact, here is another passage that *might *provide more clues about what Peirce meant by a "perfect

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

Gary F., List: Thank you for offering this possible counterexample to my hypothesis that all Quasi-minds are perfect Signs. Our exchange, including the off-List portion, exemplifies what I greatly value about the List--it is not supposed to be a place where we simply reiterate our preconceived

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

ght evolve and grow in relatively instinctive and experientially informed ways. --Jeff From: g...@gnusystems.ca <g...@gnusystems.ca> Sent: Tuesday, February 20, 2018 11:53 AM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind Jon A.S., list, In this thread (and an offline exchan

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

List, Quasi and not-quasi, perfect and imperfect, genuine and degenerate: I find it boring, and it reminds me of dogmatism and fundamentalism. By saying that it reminds me, I dont mean it as an offence. Rather like proposing the application of Ockham´s razor: Why don´t you try to find a way to

[PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

list - I think the terms need to be defined, since, apparently, each of us has different definitions of 'sign'; perfect sign' and 'quasi-mind'. Again, my understanding of the Sign is not confined to its function as the Representamen, but to the semiosic process of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

Jon A.S., list, In this thread (and an offline exchange) Jon has been proposing the hypothesis that every quasi-mind (as Peirce uses the term) is a “perfect sign” as Peirce defines that term. He has challenged me to refute this hypothesis by giving an example of a quasi-mind that is not a perfect

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

Dear Gary, list, *As a question of intellectual lineage, the link may be of minor importance, but it becomes significant as soon as one recognizes the degree to which certain crucial passages and themes in Schiller and in Peirce, which have resisted comprehension, are mutually illuminating when

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

Jerry, list, Would you please explain why you posted this to the list, especially in this thread. I cannot see what pertinence it has to the discussion of quasi-minds? Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

Dear list, I wish to share this article, which I take to be topical given our incomplete understanding of Quasi-minds: *We worked in a group of three where one played the part of a scoundrel, the other one was a hero, and the third one kept a neutral position..* *He said he hated the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

List: I found three more potentially relevant quotes in an alternate draft of "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism" (R 193, NEM 4:313-330; 1906). It was a bit of a challenge to ascertain how much of the context I should include in each case, so please let me know off-List if you would like

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

Edwina, List: The only obvious contradiction that I see in your summary is between these two claims. ET: the Quasi-Mind is a bundle of habits capable of habit change by experience [Note: this rules out Firstness in this situation] ET: Form = 1stness Why would my concept of Quasi-mind "rule

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

List: Thanks to Jon for his meaningful scholarship on this term. Whose problem (definition of quasi-mind”) is this? Edwinia’s? Jon’s? or is merely another example of the qualities of CSP’s mental states? Cheers jerry > On Feb 19, 2018, at 12:16 PM, Edwina Taborsky

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; } Jon - just a few of my concerns about your definitions - but - I'm not going to get into another endless debate. I'm sure you'll respond - but - we'll have to leave it with that. You have informed us, in this

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

Jon -- Our interpretations are a frail reed to expect others to embrace. If we have something to add to what we take Peirce to mean, that makes sense. But why argue over taking something he said is quasi aka vague and saying it is meant to be specific. Peirce is not here to demur. Agreeing is a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

Gary F., List: I am obviously attempting to make the term "Quasi-mind" less vague and more definite. My understanding is that *every *perfect Sign is determinable by other Signs; in this context, "perfect" does not mean "complete" or "finished." Where do you see Peirce saying otherwise? On the

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

Edwina, List: I understand your hesitancy, and appreciate your willingness to offer some comments. 1. Not surprisingly, your analysis makes sense within your model of semiosis, in which a "Sign" is an (inter)action; but not within mine, in which a "Sign" is one of three Correlates in a triadic

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

Jon, Yes, that’s what I see as a problem, that you regard “perfect Sign” and “Quasi-mind” as synonyms. “Quasi-mind” is an intentionally vague term, meaning “something of the general nature of a mind” (MS 283). “Perfect Sign,” on the other hand, is a very definite and distinctive kind of sign,

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }list - I have hesitated to get into this thread because I don't want to get into yet another interminable debate over terms - but - I do have a few concerns about the definition of a quasi-mind and of a perfect sign.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

Gary F., List: I agree that "'quasi-mind' is a broader, *more general* term than 'mind,'" and that "a human mind is one kind of quasi-mind, not the other way round." Where do you see me suggesting otherwise? My reading of EP 2:545n25, taken as a whole, is that "perfect Sign" and "Quasi-mind"

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

that such misreadings are possible! Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] Sent: 18-Feb-18 20:41 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind List: Having received no corrections or objections to my summary of the relevant Peirce quotes, I would like to offer

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

List: Having received no corrections or objections to my summary of the relevant Peirce quotes, I would like to offer some further comments. In these contexts, at least, Quasi-minds are clearly indispensable to Sign-action. In fact, there must be at least *two *Quasi-minds (#4-5) involved, such

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

      Supp-supplement: Corrections: - Eukaryotes, not Prokaryotes. - Quasi-utterer, Quasi-interpreter versus utterer, interpreter: I don´t know which would be which, but one would be the individual, and the other the whole classification chain. - Complete individuation: Not possible. Even

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

    Supplement: In the post below you may replace "sign" with "mind" or "piece of mind", depending on which suits where better. I don´t see a necessity to distinguish "mind" from "quasi-mind", so no necessity to say "quasi" at all. I only said "quasi-symbol" to force to distinguish it from the

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

List, I think, that every sign is an argument. Everything that happens aka every sign has a reason, thus contains a "because", which makes it an argument. The quasi-utterer and the quasi-interpreter are each not only the respective individual, but the whole classification chain, such as:

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

List: Still attempting to avoid any interpretive commentary just yet, here is what those quotes tell us about Quasi-minds, in their likely order of composition. - EP 2:389 - Every Sign, or nearly every Sign, is a determination of a Quasi-mind. - EP 2:391 - The Object determines the Sign

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

List: Following Gary R.'s example, before offering any further remarks of my own, I would like to add a few more Peirce quotes about Quasi-minds to the mix. The first three are from "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism" (1906); #2 directly precedes Gary's first selection, and #3 comes

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

I have never in any forum seen more quibbling over terms which either cannot be clarified or need not be clarified. I think this is not great for this forum. I see little here that convinces me that what is truly revolutionary in Peirce -- his convincing attacks on nominalism and dualism, the

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

Edwina, List: Despite the considerable progress that we have made in recent weeks at understanding each other better, we obviously still have some very fundamental differences in our readings of Peirce, models of semiosis, and uses of terminology. What you call a Sign is what I call a

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }Jon - read my first post: I've underlined a key component.. If one considers that Mind is an essential and universal component of all existence and dialogue is equally essential to semiosis, then, I am

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

Edwina, List: I was not trying to start another argument, just clarify the topic of discussion. My reading of those quotes is that what you are calling "utterer," "interpreter," "oneself," "subjects," "Agent," and "community" all correspond to what Peirce meant by "Quasi-mind," rather than the

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

Dear list, I wish to bring attention back to a critical assertion (largely willfully neglected) in which Peirce states “man is a sign”, and in a different place, “this is man”. *It was at this point, for example, that Ladd-Franklin began to lose confidence in him. As Brent points out,

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }Jon, list I'm not going to get into an extensive argument with you, yet again, over terms. I've stated my interpretation - and you aren't dealing with it but are using your own definitions. I

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

Edwina: I suppose it depends on how you define "symbol," but for now we can leave that aside. The third quote that Gary R. posted states, "The quasi-mind is itself a sign, a determinable sign"; and a Sign is not itself an interaction, it is one of three Correlates in a triadic relation.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

Edwina, What you say about symbolic users is exactly my point in How Language Began. In my forthcoming Aeon article on Homo erectus, I note that there are several other species that have learned symbols, but on species of the genus Homo (erectus, Neanderthal, sapiens) have had symbols. Dan

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }Jon, list: A non-symbolic user, to me, is a non-human. I consider that all realms, the physic-chemical, biologic and human conceptual realms, engage in semiosis, but only the human realm uses symbols in this

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

Edwina, List: I will review and comment on the quotes that Gary R. posted at a later time, and also offer my current working definition of "Quasi-mind." For now, I am just seeking clarification of your brief remarks below. 1. What do you mean by "a non-symbolic user"? 2. Are you suggesting

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }Gary R, List: Again, my reading of these sections is that the Quasi-Mind appears in the semiosic action of interaction. If one considers that Mind is an essential and universal component of all

[PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

Edwina, Jon S., list, OK, I'll start the thread by offering the few quotes in *Commens* on Quasi-mind. Again, I won't be able to join in the discussion until sometime next week. Best, Gary R 1906 | Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism | CP 4.551 Thought is not necessarily connected