Re: [elixir-core:11542] Support using brackets to access an index of a list

> Personally, I don't see the harm in supporting it. If someone's going to abuse it, they'll abuse Enum.at() The harm isn't for people who doing it intentionally, the harm is for people who are doing it unintentionally. Index based array access is so common in certain languages that it's one

Re: MRSP 2.9: Survey Results - August 2023 CA Communication and Survey

All, The period for submitting survey responses has now concluded, and the results are in the sheet linked below (in my previous email). I will now summarize the comments and post them here. Thanks, Ben On Fri, Sep 8, 2023 at 2:12 PM Ben Wilson wrote: > All, > > While survey

Blog Post About Mozilla Root Store Policy Version 2.9

All, Recently, I posted on the Mozilla Security Blog a brief overview of updates to the Mozilla Root Store Policy (v 2.9). See https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2023/09/13/version-2-9-of-the-mozilla-root-store-policy/ Ben -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google

Mozilla Blog Post About Root Store Policy Version 2.9

All, Recently, I posted on the Mozilla Security Blog a brief overview of updates to the Mozilla Root Store Policy (v 2.9). See https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2023/09/13/version-2-9-of-the-mozilla-root-store-policy/ Ben -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google

[cabf_validation] Draft Minutes of Validation Subcommittee - Sept. 7, 2023

*Validation Subcommittee Meeting of September 7, 2023* *Notewell: * Read by Corey Bonnell *Attendance: * Aaron Gable - ISRG, Aaron Poulsen - Amazon Trust Services, Andrea Holland - VikingCloud, Aneta Wojtczak - Microsoft, Antonis Eleftheriadis - HARICA, Ben Wilson - Mozilla, Bhat Abhishek

MRSP 2.9: Survey Results - August 2023 CA Communication and Survey

All, While survey responses are not due until Sept. 15th, here are the results we've received thus far. https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1xJ6VRs2R0tw3-QHoIRzIIO8MWWoqNs576KOxPKYsp3w/edit?usp=sharing Thanks, Ben -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google

Fwd: Public Discussion of CommScope CA Inclusion Request

Forwarding to the list because this message did not appear to post. -- Forwarded message - From: So, Nicol Date: Wed, Aug 30, 2023 at 6:10 PM Subject: RE: Public Discussion of CommScope CA Inclusion Request To: CCADB Public Cc: Ben Wilson On Monday, August 28, 2023 at 5:49 PM

[Servercert-wg] Proposed Revision of SCWG Charter

ations” made in the ballot. > It would also make transparent who wants to suspend whom for what reasons… > > > > Kind regards > Roman > > > > *From:* Ben Wilson > *Sent:* Dienstag, 25. Juli 2023 17:40 > *To:* Roman Fischer > *Cc:* CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG

Re: MRSP 2.9: Draft CA Communication and Survey

Communication and Survey, then please contact me directly, and I will provide you with the link. Thanks, Ben On Fri, Aug 18, 2023 at 4:20 PM Ben Wilson wrote: > All, > Below for your review and comment is a draft CA Communication and Survey > to be sent next week via the CCADB to all CA

Public Discussion of CommScope CA Inclusion Request

All, This email commences a six-week public discussion of CommScope’s request to include the following four (4) certificates as publicly trusted root certificates in one or more CCADB Root Store Member’s program. This discussion period is scheduled to close on October 10, 2023. The purpose of

MRSP 2.9: Draft CA Communication and Survey

All, Below for your review and comment is a draft CA Communication and Survey to be sent next week via the CCADB to all CA operators in Mozilla's root store. Thanks, Ben Mozilla CA Operator Survey - Respond By September 15, 2023Section 1: The purpose of this communication and survey is to ensure

Re: MRSP 2.9: S/MIME BRs and Audits

in the subjectAltName. Please provide any questions or comments. Otherwise, I'll assume that discussion of this matter can be closed. Thanks, Ben On Wed, Jul 19, 2023 at 3:06 PM Ben Wilson wrote: > All, > > For comment and discussion, here is some draft language for replacement i

Re: MRSP 2.9: Issues 261, 263 and 267, Miscellaneous Clarifications and Corrections

All, I don't believe we received any comments or questions, and the proposed changes have been made to the draft version of MRSP v.2.9. Therefore, I will assume that discussion of these issues can now be closed. Thanks, Ben On Thu, Jul 13, 2023 at 2:23 PM Ben Wilson wrote: > All, > > T

Re: MRSP 2.9: Issue #250: Clarify MRSP 5.3.2 to expressly include revoked CA certificates

-Mozilla/pkipolicy/commit/b8f6e16aaf16324bcdca7653e6b8e3f2d25070c7 . Unless there are additional comments, I am assuming that discussion on this topic is now closed. Thanks, Ben On Wed, Jul 5, 2023 at 1:28 PM Ben Wilson wrote: > All, > > This email opens up discussion of our

Re: MRSP 2.9: Issue #239: Audit Statement Content

can now be closed. Here is a reference to the currently proposed language: https://github.com/BenWilson-Mozilla/pkipolicy/commit/117054ecf1eff757cfebe40d7c952ce1e3fca920 . Thanks, Ben On Thu, Jun 29, 2023 at 8:44 AM Ben Wilson wrote: > Hi Pedro, > If the CA has two sites, one primary a

Re: MRSP 2.9: Issue #254: Harmonize CRL Reason Codes with CA/B Forum Revocation Reasons

#End_Entity_TLS_Certificate_CRLRevocation_Reasons Unless I hear otherwise, I will assume that this closes discussions on this Issue #254. Ben On Thu, Jun 22, 2023 at 11:04 AM Ben Wilson wrote: > All, > > This email opens up discussion of our proposed resolution of GitHub Issue > #254 <https://github.com/mozilla/pkipo

TrustAsia CA Root Inclusion Request

All, Public discussion concluded yesterday, August 16th, on the CCADB Public List, for TrustAsia's root inclusion request. See https://groups.google.com/a/ccadb.org/g/public/c/KHaSShYA-eY/m/D7J6ycgZAgAJ This is notice that I am recommending approval of TrustAsia's request to include the

Re: Public Discussion of TrustAsia CA Inclusion Request

ndependently managed Root Store community forums (i.e., MDSP). [1] https://groups.google.com/a/ccadb.org/g/public/c/KHaSShYA-eY/m/toe8FHpnAwAJ Thank you, Ben Wilson, on behalf of the CCADB Steering Committee On Wed, Aug 9, 2023 at 8:13 AM Ben Wilson wrote: > Greetings, > This

Re: [Servercert-wg] SC-XXX: Modify Subscriber Agreement and Terms of Use

in order to enable collapsing their use of “Terms > of Use” into the concept of the “Subscriber Agreement”. Is that an accurate > description of the intent of this draft? Are there any other goals or > outcomes being aimed at with these changes? > > Thanks! > -Clint > > On

[Servercert-wg] SC-XXX: Modify Subscriber Agreement and Terms of Use

Hi, Dustin Hollenback and I are looking for another endorser for a proposed ballot - see https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/a0360b61e73476959220dc328e3b68d0224fa0b3..663695b8319c0cd32e0060bb9304ecd32e3737a1 It would remove the concept of a separate "Terms of Use" and replace it with

Re: Questions about mozilla applied constraints

r if needed. Please let us know if we can provide further clarification. Thanks, Ben Wilson Mozilla Root Program On Tue, Aug 8, 2023 at 2:42 PM Daniel McCarney wrote: > Hi folks, > > The "IncludedCACertificateReportPEMCSV" > <https://ccadb-public.secure.force.com/mozilla

Re: MRSP 2.9: Final Review of MRSP 2.9

ozilla/pkipolicy/blob/2.9/rootstore/policy.md Thanks, Ben On Thu, Jul 27, 2023 at 9:50 AM Ben Wilson wrote: > All, > > Here is a link to a GitHub comparison that shows all changes proposed to > the MRSP for version 2.9: > https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/compare/e8a3f55ea7565bc72e9

Re: Public Discussion of TrustAsia CA Inclusion Request

Greetings, This is just a reminder that public discussion closes on this a week from today. Thanks, Ben On Wed, Jul 5, 2023 at 1:44 PM Ben Wilson wrote: > All, > > This email commences a six-week public discussion of TrustAsia’s request > to include the following certificates

Re: [Smcwg-public] Validation of Information for Name-Constrained SubCAs

s of Section > 3.2.2.1, *or has been authorized by the domain registrant to act on the > registrant’s behalf in line with the verification practices of Section > 3.2.2.3." > > > > Best, Stephen > > > > > > *From:* Smcwg-public *On Behalf Of *Ben > Wilson

[Smcwg-public] Validation of Information for Name-Constrained SubCAs

Does anyone recall offhand why section 7.1.5 doesn't also refer to section 3.2.2.1? Section 7.1.5 says, "The CA SHALL confirm that the Applicant has registered the FQDN contained in the rfc822Name or has authorized by the domain registrant to act on the registrant’s behalf in line with the

Re: MRSP 2.9: S/MIME BRs Transition Timeline

Greetings again, This has been posted on our CA wiki page of transition instructions related to CA implementation of the S/MIME BRs - https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/Transition_SMIME_BRs#Audit_Migration_Plan. Thanks, Ben On Fri, Jun 16, 2023 at 10:36 AM Ben Wilson wrote: > Greetings, >

Re: [Smcwg-public] FW: MRSP 2.9: S/MIME BRs Transition Timeline

> FYI, for thoroughness: MDSP announcement re S/MIME BR. > > Regards, Stephen > > > > > > > > *From:* dev-security-pol...@mozilla.org *On > Behalf Of *Ben Wilson > *Sent:* Friday, June 16, 2023 1:37 PM > *To:* dev-secur...@mozilla.org > *Subject:* MRSP 2.

[Smcwg-public] Scope of S/MIME BRs and No EKU in an S/MIME Certificate

All, For TLS Certificates, I think it was discovered that they would still work if there was no EKU in them (or maybe that was just the chaining down from Intermediate CA certificates). Anyway, I have commented in a discussion on the Mozilla Dev-Security-Policy list

Re: MRSP 2.9: S/MIME BRs and Audits

pe id-on-SmtpUTF8Mailbox in the subjectAltName (i.e. an "email certificate")? Thanks, Ben On Wed, Jul 19, 2023 at 3:06 PM Ben Wilson wrote: > All, > > For comment and discussion, here is some draft language for replacement in > MRSP > section 1.1 Scope > <

Re: MRSP 2.9: Issue #123: Annual Compliance Self-Assessment

days to send the self-assessment, based on the end > date of the audit... I don't see then why you add the SHOULD to do it at > the same time. > > Maybe I missed something... > > El jueves, 27 de julio de 2023 a las 17:26:35 UTC+2, Ben Wilson escribió: > >> Thanks, Bru

MRSP 2.9: Final Review of MRSP 2.9

All, Here is a link to a GitHub comparison that shows all changes proposed to the MRSP for version 2.9: https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/compare/e8a3f55ea7565bc72e9f9e9ab3e57c993fb0812d..342c5ab3172e3be4eca1b6e2bba6a61900e1c4f8 Alternatively, you can review the unmarked draft version 2.9

Re: MRSP 2.9: Issue #123: Annual Compliance Self-Assessment

wrote: > Looks good. There might be an issue with the version of the > self-assessment template as I don't think the CAs know when it will be > updated. Is there a schedule or is this random? > > On Thursday, July 27, 2023 at 11:01:17 AM UTC-4 Ben Wilson wrote: > >> Thank

Re: MRSP 2.9: Issue #123: Annual Compliance Self-Assessment

ds a self-assessment for a root inclusion > request. So, in many cases the first self-assessment is already done. > > On Thursday, July 27, 2023 at 10:40:56 AM UTC-4 Ben Wilson wrote: > >> Thanks, Bruce. If we took that approach, then the language in MRSP >> section 3.4 m

Re: MRSP 2.9: Issue #123: Annual Compliance Self-Assessment

cord's “BR Audit Period End Date” for the > preceding audit period. CA owners should submit the self assessment to the > CCADB at the same time as uploading audit reports.” * > > Perhaps a CCADB policy could be proposed to address this requirement > consistently. > > Thanks, B

Re: MRSP 2.9: Issues #252 and #266 - Incident Reporting

n > > -Original Message- > From: dev-security-policy@mozilla.org > On Behalf Of Matt Palmer > Sent: Mittwoch, 12. Juli 2023 08:03 > To: dev-security-policy@mozilla.org > Subject: Re: MRSP 2.9: Issues #252 and #266 - Incident Reporting > > On Tue, Jul 11, 2

Re: MRSP 2.9: Issue #123: Annual Compliance Self-Assessment

And, for section 3.3 (CPs and CPSes), I am thinking that the same change should be made from 365 to 366 days, and that item 4 would read, "all CPs, CPSes, and combined CP/CPSes MUST be reviewed and updated as necessary at least once every 366 days." Ben On Wed, Jul 26, 2023 at 3:35 PM

Re: MRSP 2.9: Issue #123: Annual Compliance Self-Assessment

self-assessment >> at least every 365 days, then each year it will be earlier to provide some >> insurance time to meet the requirement. Is there any way we can provide the >> requirement to stop this progression? Something like "on an annual basis, >> but not more longer

Re: MRSP 2.9: Issue#232: Root CA Lifecycles

However, I think "forever > forbidden" is unnecessarily harsh! > > So I suggest changing "MUST" to "SHOULD". > > -- > *From:* dev-security-policy@mozilla.org > on behalf of Ben Wilson > *Sent:* 26 July 2023 16:42 > *T

MRSP 2.9: Issue#232: Root CA Lifecycles

All, We previously announced this change in policy over a year ago, and will be finalizing it in Version 2.9 of the Mozilla Root Store Policy (MRSP). Please review this addition, and let us know if you have any final comments. - Begin MRSP Revision - *7.4 Root CA Lifecycles* For a root

Re: [Servercert-wg] Participation Proposal for Revised SCWG Charter

actor in. It’s one end of the > extreme spectrum. There might be over-active participants that overwhelm > the group by pushing their own agenda… If we have minimum participation > requirements, then we maybe should also have maximum participation rules? >  > > > > Rgds > Roman &

Re: [Servercert-wg] Participation Proposal for Revised SCWG Charter

etrics? > > > > I’m very worried we’ll end up doing a lot of management and tracking work, > without actually solving the problem. > > > > -Tim > > > > *From:* Ben Wilson > *Sent:* Monday, July 24, 2023 10:21 AM > *To:* Ben Wilson ; CA/B Forum Server Certificate

Re: [Servercert-wg] Participation Proposal for Revised SCWG Charter

. At this point, I'm going to re-draft a proposal for a revision to the Server Certificate WG Charter and present it on the public list (because an eventual revision of the Charter will have to take place at the Forum level). Thanks, Ben On Thu, Jul 13, 2023 at 9:45 AM Ben Wilson via Servercert-wg

Re: MRSP 2.9: S/MIME BRs and Audits

rtificates that are all in scope, such end entity certificates having either: - an Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension that contains one or more of these KeyPurposeIds: anyExtendedKeyUsage, id-kp-serverAuth, id-kp-emailProtection; or - no EKU extension. Thoughts? Ben On Wed, Jul 19, 2023 at 1

Updated Version of CCADB Policy to v. 1.2.3

All, The CCADB policy has been updated to Version 1.2.3 . This minor version increment represents a change to Section 5.1.2 (“Webtrust”) because WebTrust now has a seal file for Qualified Audits that is integrated with the CCADB. It is recommended that if a CA

[Smcwg-public] Mozilla Wiki Page for S/MIME BR Transition Issues

All, I have created a wiki page (https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/Transition_SMIME_BRs) to address miscellaneous issues that might arise for CAs in their transition toward compliance with the CA/Browser Forum’s Baseline Requirements for S/MIME Certificates (S/MIME BRs). (The wiki page is for items

S/MIME BR Transition Wiki Page

All, I have created a wiki page (https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/Transition_SMIME_BRs) to address miscellaneous issues that might arise for CAs in their transition toward compliance with the CA/Browser Forum’s Baseline Requirements for S/MIME Certificates (S/MIME BRs). (The wiki page is for items

Re: MRSP 2.9: S/MIME BRs and Audits

in the working group and > intentionally out-scoping them from the SBRs to avoid unintended adverse > effects, so wonder how to interpret the proposed update to the MRSP. > > > > Kind regards, > > > > Christophe > > > > *From:* dev-security-policy@

MRSP 2.9: Issues 261, 263 and 267, Miscellaneous Clarifications and Corrections

All, This email announces discussion of three more GitHub issues that we would like to address in Version 2.9 of the Mozilla Root Store Policy (MRSP). *#261 - Merge 5 and 5.1 in Section 2.1* Currently, item 5.1 in section 2.1 of the MRSP has a

Re: [Servercert-wg] Participation Proposal for Revised SCWG Charter

let it run in the > background to “earn the credits”. > > > > Also, what would happen after the 90 day suspension? Would the > organization be removed as a CA/B member? > > > > Rgds > Roman > > > > *From:* Servercert-wg *On Behalf Of *Ben > Wilson via S

Re: [cabfpub] Voting begins for Ballot Forum-18 v3 - Update CA/B Forum Bylaws to version 2.5

authority of the signer during >membership applications. >11. Updated the Chartered Working Group template. >12. Added some language to the Code of Conduct. >13. Publishing private conversations without express permission is > considered a violation of the Code of Cond

Re: Review of e-Tugra's Inclusion in Mozilla’s Root Store

oot store, and go through Mozilla’s full root inclusion process <https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/Application_Process>. Thanks, Ben and Kathleen On Mon, Jun 5, 2023 at 11:36 AM Ben Wilson wrote: > Dear Mozilla Community, > > This email relates to the e-Tugra breach that was d

MRSP 2.9: Issues #252 and #266 - Incident Reporting

All, We are proposing to revise Mozilla Root Store Policy (MRSP) Section 2.4 (Incidents) to address GitHub Issue # 252 and Issue # 266 . *Issue #252

Public Discussion of TrustAsia CA Inclusion Request

ID=21793782-d73e-4eac-b320-7307bc3e898f> Risk-vs-Value Justification: - https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=9323860 Thank you, Ben Wilson, on behalf of the CCADB Steering Committee -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "CCADB Public&q

MRSP 2.9: Issue #250: Clarify MRSP 5.3.2 to expressly include revoked CA certificates

All, This email opens up discussion of our proposed resolution of GitHub Issue #250 . Currently, MRSP section 5.3.2 (Intermediate CA Certificates must be publicly disclosed and audited) requires that all types of intermediate CAs capable of

Re: MRSP 2.9: Issue #239: Audit Statement Content

pecify the locations that "were not > audited". > What does this mean? > Thanks! > Pedro > > El martes, 27 de junio de 2023 a las 17:37:44 UTC+2, Ben Wilson escribió: > >> All, >> >> Section 5.1 of the CCADB Policy >> https://www.ccadb.org/poli

MRSP 2.9: Issue #239: Audit Statement Content

All, Section 5.1 of the CCADB Policy https://www.ccadb.org/policy#51-audit-statement-content now specifies required audit letter content very similar to what is currently in section 3.1.4 of the Mozilla Root Store Policy (MRSP). And so it has been proposed that much of the current language in

[elixir-core:11426] Re: [Proposal] Syntax sugar for Maps construction and pattern matching

Hi, This has been proposed before. Someone came up with https://github.com/meyercm/shorter_maps which accomplishes this as a macro. It might be worth a discussion again at this point but it is worth noting that this is a proposal that has been on this list before, and so it would likely be

MRSP 2.9: Issue #123: Annual Compliance Self-Assessment

All, Historically, Mozilla has required that CAs perform an annual Self-Assessment of their compliance with the CA/Browser Forum's TLS Baseline Requirements and Mozilla's Root Store Policy (MRSP). See https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/Compliance_Self-Assessment. While there has not been any

MRSP 2.9: Issue #254: Harmonize CRL Reason Codes with CA/B Forum Revocation Reasons

All, This email opens up discussion of our proposed resolution of GitHub Issue #254 , “Harmonize CRL Reason Codes with CA/B Forum Revocation Reasons”. We would like to reduce text in Mozilla’s Root Store Policy that is now part of the CA/B Forum

Re: Policy 2.9: Candidate Issues to Address in MRSP v. 2.9

All, I plan to proceed with this list. I've already started discussion on Issue #258 - adoption of the S/MIME Baseline Requirements. I'll be posting the other issues for discussion here on dev-security-policy soon. Thanks, Ben On Wed, May 31, 2023 at 9:25 PM Ben Wilson wrote: >

LAWtrust CA Inclusion Request

All, Public discussion concluded last Friday, June 16, on the CCADB Public List, for LAWtrust's root inclusion request. https://groups.google.com/a/ccadb.org/g/public/c/gk8vbpg5WHo/m/EObfkeUwBQAJ This is notice that I am recommending approval of LAWtrust's request to include the following root

Re: Public Discussion of LAWtrust CA Inclusion Request

munity forums (i.e., MDSP). Thanks, Ben [1] https://groups.google.com/a/ccadb.org/g/public/c/gk8vbpg5WHo/m/T <https://groups.google.com/a/ccadb.org/g/public/c/gk8vbpg5WHo/m/ToThdPaCBQAJ> On Tue, Jun 13, 2023 at 3:14 PM Ben Wilson wrote: > All, > This is just a reminder that the public

MRSP 2.9: S/MIME BRs Transition Timeline

Greetings, Our proposal for a migration plan towards having Certification Authorities (CAs) follow the CA/Browser Forum’s Baseline Requirements for S/MIME Certificates (S/MIME BRs) is as follows, keeping in mind that the Effective Date for version 1.0.0 of the S/MIME BRs is September 1, 2023, and

MRSP 2.9: S/MIME BRs and Audits

All, This email opens up discussion of our proposed resolution of GitHub Issue #258 (SMIME Baseline Requirements). We plan to add requirements to version 2.9 of the Mozilla Root Store Policy

Sectigo CA Inclusion Request

All, Public discussion concluded last Friday, June 9, on the CCADB Public List. https://groups.google.com/a/ccadb.org/g/public/c/1sKKdixUyFs/m/Nb3uWA0aBAAJ This is notice that I am recommending approval of Sectigo's request to include the following four (4) root CA certificates: -

Re: Public Discussion of LAWtrust CA Inclusion Request

All, This is just a reminder that the public discussion period on this root inclusion request (S/MIME) ends this Friday, June 16th. Ben On Fri, May 5, 2023 at 2:40 PM Ben Wilson wrote: > All, > > This email commences a six-week public discussion of LAWtrust’s request to > include t

Review of e-Tugra's Inclusion in Mozilla’s Root Store

Dear Mozilla Community, This email relates to the e-Tugra breach that was described in a blog post by Ian Carroll and subsequent discussions here and in CCADB Public

Policy 2.9: Candidate Issues to Address in MRSP v. 2.9

841af0686676f0435769db8c641d7d17dfb3..444d1cfd4d54edafaa9581e71572280a7bb483a8 Thanks, Ben Wilson Mozilla Root Store -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "dev-security-policy@mozilla.org" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop

CA/Browser Forum S/MIME Baseline Requirements

All, The CA/Browser Forum (CABF) has created a set of Baseline Requirements for publicly trusted S/MIME digital certificates (S/MIME BRs), with an effective date of September 1, 2023. The S/MIME BRs (https://cabforum.org/smime-br/) are the result of several years of work by the CA/Browser

Re: [elixir-core:11420] Re: [Proposal] Pretty print diff when matching on context fails in ExUnit

nction clause errors. :) If someone > wants to explore this path, please go ahead! > > On Sun, May 28, 2023 at 5:13 PM Ben Wilson wrote: > >> Agreed. Can the formatter get invoked on output like that I wonder? >> >> On Friday, May 26, 2023 at 3:32:02 AM UTC-4 ifu

[elixir-core:11417] Re: [Proposal] Pretty print diff when matching on context fails in ExUnit

Agreed. Can the formatter get invoked on output like that I wonder? On Friday, May 26, 2023 at 3:32:02 AM UTC-4 ifu...@gmail.com wrote: > Consider the following code: > > setup do > %{a: 1} > end > > test "test", %{b: b} do > IO.inspect(b) > end > > if we run the test, then it fails with the

Re: [elixir-core:11396] Proposal: Add ~URI sigil

Question: Would this sigil support interpolation? Is that too clever? ~URI"https://#{path}?#{query_params}; - Ben On Thursday, May 18, 2023 at 1:37:37 AM UTC-4 christ...@gmail.com wrote: > I dislike +1 posts, but I feel very strongly about this—it'd be amazing to > have. > > I want booting an

[cabfpub] Ballot FORUM-0XX: Modify Charter of Server Certificate Working Group

1.2 and changes the criteria for voting membership of both Certificate Issuers and Certificate Consumers in the SCWG. The following motion has been proposed by Ben Wilson of Mozilla and endorsed by __ of __ and _ of _. *Motion Begins* MODIFY the Charter of the Server Certificate

Public Discussion of LAWtrust CA Inclusion Request

All, This email commences a six-week public discussion of LAWtrust’s request to include the following CA certificate as a publicly trusted root certificate in one or more CCADB Root Store Member’s program. This discussion period is scheduled to close on June 16, 2023. The purpose of this public

Root Inclusion Request of SSL.com

All, We recently concluded a six-week public discussion of SSL.com's request (Bugzilla #1799533 and #1799703 ) to include four root CA certificates. See

Re: ATOS Trustcenter's Root Inclusion Request

s://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1782092#c16 [2] https://pki.atos.net/Download/Atos_TrustedRoot_CPS_RootCA_v2.7.3.pdf On Sat, Apr 1, 2023 at 8:28 PM Ben Wilson wrote: > All, > > We recently conducted a six-week public discussion on the request from > ATOS Trustcenter for inclusion

Re: Public Discussion of SSL.com CA Inclusion Request

based on > Ben's remarks. > > Regards, > Leo > -- > *From:* 'Chris Clements' via CCADB Public > *Sent:* Tuesday, April 25, 2023 8:07 AM > *To:* Thomas Zermeno > *Cc:* CCADB Public ; Ben Wilson > *Subject:* Re: Public Discussion of SS

Re: Public Discussion of SSL.com CA Inclusion Request

All, I have just completed a CP/CPS review of SSL.com's CP/CPS v. 1.16 and attached it to Bugzilla Bug #1799533 (https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/ show_bug.cgi?id=1799533). See https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=9327554 (Excel Spreadsheet). I would like SSL.com to read through my

ATOS Trustcenter's Root Inclusion Request

All, We recently conducted a six-week public discussion on the request from ATOS Trustcenter for inclusion of its four root certificates. See https://groups.google.com/a/ccadb.org/g/public/c/v5yFBHjuBRo/m/PDTc_JT8AAAJ I have just completed a CPS review and attached it to Bug #1782092 in

Re: Public Discussion re: Beijing CA (BJCA)

n 3.x, the reports mention 2.x. I'd like the same version as > the one mentioned specifically in the reports. > > On Mon, Mar 13, 2023 at 8:39 PM Ben Wilson wrote: > >> Kurt, >> Here is the link to the software download that BJCA provided: >> http://

Re: Public Discussion re: Beijing CA (BJCA)

Kurt, Here is the link to the software download that BJCA provided: http://download.bjca.org.cn/download/yzt/BJCAClientV3.8.101.0052.exe Ben On Mon, Mar 13, 2023 at 8:24 PM 'Kurt Seifried' via dev-security-policy@mozilla.org wrote: > > > On Mon, Mar 13, 2023 at 2:35 PM Kathleen Wilson > wrote:

Re: Digest for public@ccadb.org - 1 update in 1 topic

lic/topics> >> >>- Empty JSON Array of Partitioned CRLs >><#m_-1168315536955637031_m_6205175037828154458_group_thread_0> - 1 >>Update >> >> Empty JSON Array of Partitioned CRLs >> <http://groups.google.com/a/ccadb.org/group/public/t/e3b3a

Empty JSON Array of Partitioned CRLs

All, The CCADB currently has a field titled, "JSON Array of Partitioned CRLs". We have previously instructed CAs that when there is no CRL, they should put an empty JSON array in this field, "[]". A problem has arisen when this field is populated via API. When this notation for an empty array is

Re: [elixir-core:11303] Multi-letter (uppercase) sigils

I'm generally +1 on this, but I am a tiny bit confused about the proposed change to interpolation. Does this propose a change to interpolation for all sigils, single or multi letter? If so, what is the deprecation plan for the current interpolation syntaxx? On Sunday, March 5, 2023 at 2:21:47 

Re: Public Discussion of SERPRO's CA Inclusion Request

discussion in April. Thanks, Ben On Thu, Dec 15, 2022 at 10:53 AM Kurt Seifried wrote: > I assume this resets the 6 week clock for dicussions? Or do they get to > call timeouts and run the clock out? > > On Thu, Dec 15, 2022 at 10:36 AM Ben Wilson wrote: > >> All, >> &g

Re: Announcing CRL Watch to Monitor CRL Problems

Thanks for doing this, Andrew. It is very helpful. Sincerely yours, Ben On Mon, Feb 20, 2023 at 6:48 AM Andrew Ayer wrote: > Now that several root programs require disclosure of CRLs in the CCADB, > I've begun regularly crawling disclosed CRLs to look for problems. > > The list of identified

Re: Public Discussion re: Beijing CA (BJCA)

gt; Certification Management System are issued following the roles of >>>>>> operations in the trusted-role list. All members of the operation team >>>>>> are >>>>>> full-time employees working for the company. >>>>>> >>>>&g

Re: CA Communication re: Mozilla Root Store Policy (MRSP) Version 2.8.1

so we know which to > prioritize looking at? > > On Mon, Feb 6, 2023 at 12:34 PM Ben Wilson wrote: > >> Yes - that is correct. >> >> On Fri, Feb 3, 2023 at 9:56 PM Kurt Seifried wrote: >> >>> Is there an up-to-date list of all the applicants? Is this BZ

Re: CA Communication re: Mozilla Root Store Policy (MRSP) Version 2.8.1

rver%20Software=Other_status=UNCONFIRMED_status=NEW_status=ASSIGNED_status=REOPENED_status=RESOLVED_status=VERIFIED_format=advanced=Importance=---=CA%20Program=CA%20Certificate%20Root%20Program > > > > On Fri, Feb 3, 2023 at 2:15 PM Ben Wilson wrote: > >> Al

CA Communication re: Mozilla Root Store Policy (MRSP) Version 2.8.1

All, I just emailed CA operators that are in, or applying for inclusion in, the Mozilla root store. See https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/Communications#February_2023_CA_Communication The email highlights the recent changes in the Mozilla Root Store Policy and advises them of the Feb. 15th effective

Re: Public Discussion re: Beijing CA (BJCA)

;> >>>> 7. In order to maintain compliance, BJCA has built up ISO 27001 ISMS as >>>> the foundation of its management and got certified. BJCA conducts regular >>>> internal audits and risk assessments following its ISMS management system >>>> requ

Re: Public Discussion re: Beijing CA (BJCA)

I have added BJCA's email addresses, including "washe...@gmail.com", to the list with posting privileges. Hopefully this will enable some responses. Thanks, Ben On Thu, Jan 26, 2023 at 9:00 AM Ben Wilson wrote: > From BJCA - > Hi Ben, > When we reply to the forum through ou

Re: Public Discussion re: Beijing CA (BJCA)

: can you please explain how your company is >> structured to prevent subversion of the root certificate authority? E.g. >> technical measures can be circumvented trivially if the people running them >> are told to do so (and if they don't they can be replaced with people that &

Re: Proposed Updates to MRSP to Address Root CA Life Cycles

; Roman > > > > *From:* Jeremy Rowley > *Sent:* Dienstag, 18. Oktober 2022 22:24 > *To:* Ben Wilson ; dev-security-policy@mozilla.org > *Cc:* Roman Fischer > *Subject:* RE: Proposed Updates to MRSP to Address Root CA Life Cycles > > > > Thanks Ben! This so

Re: [cabfpub] Final Minutes for CA/Browser Forum Teleconference - January 5, 2023

orum Meeting: January 5, 2023* > > *Attendance (in alphabetical order):* > > Aaron Gable (ISRG), Aaron Poulsen (Amazon Trust Services), Adam Jones > (Microsoft), Andrea Holland (VikingCloud), Atsushi Inaba (GlobalSign), Ben > Wilson (Mozilla), Bruce Morton (Entrust), Chris Clements (Go

Re: MRSP Policy v. 2.8.1 Finalization

be February 15, 2023? Thanks, Ben On Fri, Jan 20, 2023 at 12:57 PM Ben Wilson wrote: > Hi Kurt, > As we work on enhancements to the Mozilla Root Store Policy, those changes > or suggestions get logged in GitHub as issues. > https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/issues They can g

Public Discussion re: Beijing CA (BJCA)

All, We recently concluded a six-week public discussion on the CCADB Public list for the root inclusion request of Beijing CA (BJCA), https://groups.google.com/a/ccadb.org/g/public/c/o9lbCbr92Ug/m/lPkqrHF1DQAJ. This email is to announce a continued 3-week discussion of BJCA’s inclusion

Re: spammers on MDSP

All, Unfortunately, our list has caught the attention of spammers. In the last 10 days or so, we have received too many requests to join the list that are not legitimate. We have decided to reject any request to join this list that is not accompanied by a reason for joining. Membership requests

Re: MRSP Policy v. 2.8.1 Finalization

e additional steps to prove > they are acting on behalf of the CA they claim to be. > > Also the (wiki page? I can't find the link right now) of the list of > people and who they represent (if any) for the mailing list, is that > something the CA's should be filling out? > >

Re: Policy 2.8.1: MRSP Issue #256: Requirement that Partitioned CRLs include an Issuing Distribution Point extension

PM Ben Wilson wrote: > For review, see > https://github.com/BenWilson-Mozilla/pkipolicy/commit/de5e462f4ac16bd1e33c470a149061927b805e99 > . > > On Sun, Dec 4, 2022 at 11:21 PM Corey Bonnell > wrote: > >> I like this solution. It establishes the CCADB-specific re

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