Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Friday, May 16, 2014 3:20:24 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 15 May 2014, at 22:22, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, May 15, 2014 2:19:01 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 15 May 2014, at 14:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 6:34:55 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 14 May 2014, at 03:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> I'm showing that authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, and that 
> the failure of logic to detect the significance of authenticity can be 
> empirically demonstrated, but that neither authenticity or the failure of 
> logic to detect it can be detected within logic. At least Godel shows 
> logic's incompleteness, but that is just the beginning. What logic doesn't 
> know about what logic doesn't know I think dwarfs all of arithmetic truth.
>
>
> Gödel has shown the completeness of first order logic, and this means that 
> what we prove in a theory written in such logic,  will be true in all 
> interpretation of the theory, and what is true in all interpretations, will 
> be provable in the theory.
>
> Then Gödel proved the incompleteness of *all* theories about numbers and 
> machines, with respect to a standard notion of truth. 
>
> This means that the truth about number and machines are above what 
> machines can prove, and thus what human can prove, locally, if we assume 
> computationalism.
>
>
> But computationalism is a theory about numbers and machines, so we cannot 
> truthfully assume it. 
>
>
>
> no. It is a theory about your consciousness, and its relation with 
> possible brains.
>

But a brain is just a type of machine under comp, and the relations are 
just number relations.
 

> It becomes a theory about numbers, but that is the result of a non trivial 
> reasoning, and the acceptation of the classical theory of knowledge.
>

I can't imagine why the classical theory of knowledge should be acceptable 
as a way to model consciousness.
 

>
>
>
>
> Does Wiles solution to Fermat's last theorem prove that humans can use 
> non-computational methods, in light of the negative solution to Hilbert's 
> 10th problem?
>
>
> No. 
>
>
> Why not? I doubt I'll understand your answer but I might be able to get 
> someone else to explain why he thinks you're wrong.
>
>
> Well, you can invite him to make his point. 
>

I've only spoken with him a couple times, but I would if it comes up in the 
future.
 

> The problem is that somehow, in some sense, humans can use non 
> computational rules, like heuristics and metaheuristic, which are non 
> algorithm. But that is also a big chapter in AI, and machines can also use 
> heuristic without problem, and it change nothing about the truth or falsity 
> of comp. In fact the first person "[]p & p" is also a non algorithmic 
> entity. So, use à-la Penrose Gödelian argument are usually confusion 
> between []p and []p & p, or []p in G and []p in G*.
>

I think that it is nothing other than a semantic misdirection to take 
non-computational first person properties as being associated with 
computation. If non-computational properties serve an important function in 
consciousness, then comp is false. If our first person experience is 
non-computational then comp is false, since the production of 
non-computational effects by computation does not imply consciousness, nor 
does it even imply independence from consciousness to accomplish that 
production.


>
>
>  
>
>
>
>
> Penrose thinks that it does:
>
> "The inescapable conclusion seems to be: Mathematicians are not using a 
> knowably sound calculation procedure in order to ascertain mathematical 
> truth. We deduce that mathematical understanding – the means whereby 
> mathematicians arrive at their conclusions with respect to mathematical 
> truth – cannot be reduced to blind calculation!"
>
>
> Good. That's when Penrose is correct. No machines at all can use a 
> knowably sound procedure to ascertain a mathematical truth. 
> By adding "knowably" Penrose corrected an earlier statement. But then he 
> does not realize that now, his argument is in favor of mechanism, because 
> it attribute to humans, what computer science already attributes to machine.
>
>
> If computer science attributes it to machines (and I would say that it is 
> only some computer scientists who do so) 
>
>
> because some are not aware of the difference between []p & p and  []p. 
>

I am aware that the difference is assumed in comp rather than explained by 
comp. You admit that at some level, basic functions of logic are taken as 
axioms. I reject all possibility of axioms in the absence of sense.
 

>
>
>
>
> then it cannot use a knowably sound procedure to do that, therefore it is 
> a belief rather than a correct attribution. 
>
>
> Yes. you even need an act of faith. I never defend the "truth" of comp. It 
> is a belief like everywhere in science when we apply it to a reality.
>

I don't think that the understanding that awareness is ontologically 
necessary is a

Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, May 15, 2014 6:06:00 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote:
>
> On 16 May 2014 08:22, Craig Weinberg >wrote:
>
>> On Thursday, May 15, 2014 2:19:01 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> On 15 May 2014, at 14:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 6:34:55 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 On 14 May 2014, at 03:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:

 I'm showing that authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, and that 
 the failure of logic to detect the significance of authenticity can be 
 empirically demonstrated, but that neither authenticity or the failure of 
 logic to detect it can be detected within logic. At least Godel shows 
 logic's incompleteness, but that is just the beginning. What logic doesn't 
 know about what logic doesn't know I think dwarfs all of arithmetic truth.


 Gödel has shown the completeness of first order logic, and this means 
 that what we prove in a theory written in such logic,  will be true in all 
 interpretation of the theory, and what is true in all interpretations, 
 will 
 be provable in the theory.

 Then Gödel proved the incompleteness of *all* theories about numbers 
 and machines, with respect to a standard notion of truth. 

 This means that the truth about number and machines are above what 
 machines can prove, and thus what human can prove, locally, if we assume 
 computationalism.

>>>
>> But computationalism is a theory about numbers and machines, so we cannot 
>> truthfully assume it.
>>
>> I believe it's an assumption, and all we can do is bet on (or against) 
> it. If we make that assumption, the UDA shows the consequences.
>

I don't personally know that UDA shows the consequences, but I trust 
Bruno's expertise that UDA at least shows the possible consequences.
 

>
> The assumption is a fairly standard one for scientists working in the 
> materialist paradigm, I believe. Unless they use continua or infinities at 
> some point, it seems quite plausible that at some level reality could be TE.
>

Yes, it's a popular assumption. Those don't always last forever.

Craig

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Re: Video of VCR

[Bruno Marchal]

On 15 May 2014, at 22:22, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Thursday, May 15, 2014 2:19:01 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 15 May 2014, at 14:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 6:34:55 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 14 May 2014, at 03:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:

I'm showing that authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, and  
that the failure of logic to detect the significance of  
authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, but that neither  
authenticity or the failure of logic to detect it can be detected  
within logic. At least Godel shows logic's incompleteness, but  
that is just the beginning. What logic doesn't know about what  
logic doesn't know I think dwarfs all of arithmetic truth.


Gödel has shown the completeness of first order logic, and this  
means that what we prove in a theory written in such logic,  will  
be true in all interpretation of the theory, and what is true in  
all interpretations, will be provable in the theory.


Then Gödel proved the incompleteness of *all* theories about  
numbers and machines, with respect to a standard notion of truth.


This means that the truth about number and machines are above what  
machines can prove, and thus what human can prove, locally, if we  
assume computationalism.



But computationalism is a theory about numbers and machines, so we  
cannot truthfully assume it.



no. It is a theory about your consciousness, and its relation with  
possible brains. It becomes a theory about numbers, but that is the  
result of a non trivial reasoning, and the acceptation of the  
classical theory of knowledge.






Does Wiles solution to Fermat's last theorem prove that humans can  
use non-computational methods, in light of the negative solution to  
Hilbert's 10th problem?


No.

Why not? I doubt I'll understand your answer but I might be able to  
get someone else to explain why he thinks you're wrong.


Well, you can invite him to make his point. The problem is that  
somehow, in some sense, humans can use non computational rules, like  
heuristics and metaheuristic, which are non algorithm. But that is  
also a big chapter in AI, and machines can also use heuristic without  
problem, and it change nothing about the truth or falsity of comp. In  
fact the first person "[]p & p" is also a non algorithmic entity. So,  
use à-la Penrose Gödelian argument are usually confusion between []p  
and []p & p, or []p in G and []p in G*.










Penrose thinks that it does:

"The inescapable conclusion seems to be: Mathematicians are not  
using a knowably sound calculation procedure in order to ascertain  
mathematical truth. We deduce that mathematical understanding - the  
means whereby mathematicians arrive at their conclusions with  
respect to mathematical truth - cannot be reduced to blind  
calculation!"


Good. That's when Penrose is correct. No machines at all can use a  
knowably sound procedure to ascertain a mathematical truth.
By adding "knowably" Penrose corrected an earlier statement. But  
then he does not realize that now, his argument is in favor of  
mechanism, because it attribute to humans, what computer science  
already attributes to machine.


If computer science attributes it to machines (and I would say that  
it is only some computer scientists who do so)


because some are not aware of the difference between []p & p and  []p.




then it cannot use a knowably sound procedure to do that, therefore  
it is a belief rather than a correct attribution.


Yes. you even need an act of faith. I never defend the "truth" of  
comp. It is a belief like everywhere in science when we apply it to a  
reality.







If we allow mechanism to be true by faith, I don't see how any  
argument within mechanism can be used to prove that mechanism cannot  
be disproved.


The point is that mechanism can be disproved.










The arguments against Penrose seem to me pure unscientific bigotry:

"Theorems of the Gödel and Turing kind are not at odds with the  
computationalist vision, but with a kind of grandiose self- 
confidence that human thought has some kind of magical quality  
which resists rational description. The picture of the human mind  
sketched by the computationalist thesis accepts the limitations  
placed on us by Gödel, and predicts that human abilities are  
limited by computational restrictions of the kind that Penrose and  
others find so unacceptable." - Geoffrey LaForte


Well, if you have evidence that we don't have those limitations,  
please give them.


That's what I'm giving. I saw someone's exhibit at the consciousness  
convention a few weeks ago which included a musical translation of  
Wiles proof - a proof which he says would not be possible for a  
computer to produce, given the negative answer of Hilbert's 10th  
problem.


Those are not related.





Are you able to solve and decide all diophantine equations?

I can't, but Wiles proves that humanity as a whole might.


But all mac

Re: Video of VCR

[LizR]

On 16 May 2014 08:22, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

> On Thursday, May 15, 2014 2:19:01 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> On 15 May 2014, at 14:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>> On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 6:34:55 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> On 14 May 2014, at 03:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>> I'm showing that authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, and that
>>> the failure of logic to detect the significance of authenticity can be
>>> empirically demonstrated, but that neither authenticity or the failure of
>>> logic to detect it can be detected within logic. At least Godel shows
>>> logic's incompleteness, but that is just the beginning. What logic doesn't
>>> know about what logic doesn't know I think dwarfs all of arithmetic truth.
>>>
>>>
>>> Gödel has shown the completeness of first order logic, and this means
>>> that what we prove in a theory written in such logic,  will be true in all
>>> interpretation of the theory, and what is true in all interpretations, will
>>> be provable in the theory.
>>>
>>> Then Gödel proved the incompleteness of *all* theories about numbers and
>>> machines, with respect to a standard notion of truth.
>>>
>>> This means that the truth about number and machines are above what
>>> machines can prove, and thus what human can prove, locally, if we assume
>>> computationalism.
>>>
>>
> But computationalism is a theory about numbers and machines, so we cannot
> truthfully assume it.
>
> I believe it's an assumption, and all we can do is bet on (or against) it.
If we make that assumption, the UDA shows the consequences.

The assumption is a fairly standard one for scientists working in the
materialist paradigm, I believe. Unless they use continua or infinities at
some point, it seems quite plausible that at some level reality could be TE.

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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, May 15, 2014 2:19:01 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 15 May 2014, at 14:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 6:34:55 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 14 May 2014, at 03:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>> I'm showing that authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, and that 
>> the failure of logic to detect the significance of authenticity can be 
>> empirically demonstrated, but that neither authenticity or the failure of 
>> logic to detect it can be detected within logic. At least Godel shows 
>> logic's incompleteness, but that is just the beginning. What logic doesn't 
>> know about what logic doesn't know I think dwarfs all of arithmetic truth.
>>
>>
>> Gödel has shown the completeness of first order logic, and this means 
>> that what we prove in a theory written in such logic,  will be true in all 
>> interpretation of the theory, and what is true in all interpretations, will 
>> be provable in the theory.
>>
>> Then Gödel proved the incompleteness of *all* theories about numbers and 
>> machines, with respect to a standard notion of truth. 
>>
>> This means that the truth about number and machines are above what 
>> machines can prove, and thus what human can prove, locally, if we assume 
>> computationalism.
>>
>
But computationalism is a theory about numbers and machines, so we cannot 
truthfully assume it. 

>
> Does Wiles solution to Fermat's last theorem prove that humans can use 
> non-computational methods, in light of the negative solution to Hilbert's 
> 10th problem?
>
>
> No. 
>

Why not? I doubt I'll understand your answer but I might be able to get 
someone else to explain why he thinks you're wrong.
 

>
>
>
> Penrose thinks that it does:
>
> "The inescapable conclusion seems to be: Mathematicians are not using a 
> knowably sound calculation procedure in order to ascertain mathematical 
> truth. We deduce that mathematical understanding – the means whereby 
> mathematicians arrive at their conclusions with respect to mathematical 
> truth – cannot be reduced to blind calculation!"
>
>
> Good. That's when Penrose is correct. No machines at all can use a 
> knowably sound procedure to ascertain a mathematical truth. 
> By adding "knowably" Penrose corrected an earlier statement. But then he 
> does not realize that now, his argument is in favor of mechanism, because 
> it attribute to humans, what computer science already attributes to machine.
>

If computer science attributes it to machines (and I would say that it is 
only some computer scientists who do so) then it cannot use a knowably 
sound procedure to do that, therefore it is a belief rather than a correct 
attribution. 

If we allow mechanism to be true by faith, I don't see how any argument 
within mechanism can be used to prove that mechanism cannot be disproved.


>
>
>
>
> The arguments against Penrose seem to me pure unscientific bigotry:
>
> "Theorems of the Gödel and Turing kind are not at odds with the 
> computationalist vision, but with a kind of grandiose self-confidence that 
> human thought has some kind of magical quality which resists rational 
> description. The picture of the human mind sketched by the computationalist 
> thesis accepts the limitations placed on us by Gödel, and predicts that 
> human abilities are limited by computational restrictions of the kind that 
> Penrose and others find so unacceptable." - Geoffrey LaForte
>
>
> Well, if you have evidence that we don't have those limitations, please 
> give them.
>

That's what I'm giving. I saw someone's exhibit at the consciousness 
convention a few weeks ago which included a musical translation of Wiles 
proof - a proof which he says would not be possible for a computer to 
produce, given the negative answer of Hilbert's 10th problem.
 

> Are you able to solve and decide all diophantine equations?
>

I can't, but Wiles proves that humanity as a whole might.
 

>
>
>
>
>
> He seems to be saying "I don't like it when people imagine that being 
> human can ever be an advantage over being a machine. Machines must be equal 
> or superior to humans because of the thesis that I like."
>
>
>
> Being a machine is an advantage, for reproduction and use of information 
> redundancies. Instead of terraforming the neighborhoods we can adapt 
> ourselves in much more ways. We have more clothes, and ultimately we know 
> where they come from, and where we return.
>

You're saying that we are identical to machines on one hand but that if we 
are machines we will be able to be and do things that we could not do now. 
That says to me that you are 1) intuiting properties of non-machines that 
are not discoverable by math, and 2) attributing those properties to us 
because it is natural to assume that humans are not machines.


>
>
>  
>
>>
>> Universal machine are always unsatisfied, and are born to evolve. There 
>> is a transfinite of path possible.
>>
>
> But there are a lot of humans who seem quite satisf

Re: Video of VCR

[Bruno Marchal]

On 15 May 2014, at 14:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 6:34:55 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 14 May 2014, at 03:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:

I'm showing that authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, and  
that the failure of logic to detect the significance of  
authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, but that neither  
authenticity or the failure of logic to detect it can be detected  
within logic. At least Godel shows logic's incompleteness, but that  
is just the beginning. What logic doesn't know about what logic  
doesn't know I think dwarfs all of arithmetic truth.


Gödel has shown the completeness of first order logic, and this  
means that what we prove in a theory written in such logic,  will be  
true in all interpretation of the theory, and what is true in all  
interpretations, will be provable in the theory.


Then Gödel proved the incompleteness of *all* theories about numbers  
and machines, with respect to a standard notion of truth.


This means that the truth about number and machines are above what  
machines can prove, and thus what human can prove, locally, if we  
assume computationalism.


Does Wiles solution to Fermat's last theorem prove that humans can  
use non-computational methods, in light of the negative solution to  
Hilbert's 10th problem?


No.




Penrose thinks that it does:

"The inescapable conclusion seems to be: Mathematicians are not  
using a knowably sound calculation procedure in order to ascertain  
mathematical truth. We deduce that mathematical understanding - the  
means whereby mathematicians arrive at their conclusions with  
respect to mathematical truth - cannot be reduced to blind  
calculation!"


Good. That's when Penrose is correct. No machines at all can use a  
knowably sound procedure to ascertain a mathematical truth.
By adding "knowably" Penrose corrected an earlier statement. But then  
he does not realize that now, his argument is in favor of mechanism,  
because it attribute to humans, what computer science already  
attributes to machine.







The arguments against Penrose seem to me pure unscientific bigotry:

"Theorems of the Gödel and Turing kind are not at odds with the  
computationalist vision, but with a kind of grandiose self- 
confidence that human thought has some kind of magical quality which  
resists rational description. The picture of the human mind sketched  
by the computationalist thesis accepts the limitations placed on us  
by Gödel, and predicts that human abilities are limited by  
computational restrictions of the kind that Penrose and others find  
so unacceptable." - Geoffrey LaForte


Well, if you have evidence that we don't have those limitations,  
please give them. Are you able to solve and decide all diophantine  
equations?







He seems to be saying "I don't like it when people imagine that  
being human can ever be an advantage over being a machine. Machines  
must be equal or superior to humans because of the thesis that I  
like."



Being a machine is an advantage, for reproduction and use of  
information redundancies. Instead of terraforming the neighborhoods we  
can adapt ourselves in much more ways. We have more clothes, and  
ultimately we know where they come from, and where we return.







Universal machine are always unsatisfied, and are born to evolve.  
There is a transfinite of path possible.


But there are a lot of humans who seem quite satisfied. They  
actively resist dissatisfaction and protect their beliefs, true or  
not.


Good for them. I guess they don't look inward or are not interested in  
the search of truth.








And Gôdel completeness is what machine discover themselves quickly,  
they can justify it rationally.


Yet some of what they justify is not merely justified within their  
own experience or belief, but veridically in intersubjective  
experience over many lifetimes.


That too, from passing from the arithmetical []p (and []p & <>p) to  
the non arithmetical []p & p (and []p & <>p & p), with p sigma_1.


I almost only translated what you said in arithmetical terms, and it  
works very well, as this entials your insitence that sense is not  
formalizable in arithmetic. (It also refute your statement that this  
fact refutes comp).


Bruno






Craig


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 6:34:55 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 14 May 2014, at 03:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> I'm showing that authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, and that 
> the failure of logic to detect the significance of authenticity can be 
> empirically demonstrated, but that neither authenticity or the failure of 
> logic to detect it can be detected within logic. At least Godel shows 
> logic's incompleteness, but that is just the beginning. What logic doesn't 
> know about what logic doesn't know I think dwarfs all of arithmetic truth.
>
>
> Gödel has shown the completeness of first order logic, and this means that 
> what we prove in a theory written in such logic,  will be true in all 
> interpretation of the theory, and what is true in all interpretations, will 
> be provable in the theory.
>
> Then Gödel proved the incompleteness of *all* theories about numbers and 
> machines, with respect to a standard notion of truth. 
>
> This means that the truth about number and machines are above what 
> machines can prove, and thus what human can prove, locally, if we assume 
> computationalism.
>

Does Wiles solution to Fermat's last theorem prove that humans can use 
non-computational methods, in light of the negative solution to Hilbert's 
10th problem?

Penrose thinks that it does:

"The inescapable conclusion seems to be: Mathematicians are not using a 
knowably sound calculation procedure in order to ascertain mathematical 
truth. We deduce that mathematical understanding – the means whereby 
mathematicians arrive at their conclusions with respect to mathematical 
truth – cannot be reduced to blind calculation!"

The arguments against Penrose seem to me pure unscientific bigotry:

"Theorems of the Gödel and Turing kind are not at odds with the 
computationalist vision, but with a kind of grandiose self-confidence that 
human thought has some kind of magical quality which resists rational 
description. The picture of the human mind sketched by the computationalist 
thesis accepts the limitations placed on us by Gödel, and predicts that 
human abilities are limited by computational restrictions of the kind that 
Penrose and others find so unacceptable." - Geoffrey LaForte

He seems to be saying "I don't like it when people imagine that being human 
can ever be an advantage over being a machine. Machines must be equal or 
superior to humans because of the thesis that I like."
 

>
> Universal machine are always unsatisfied, and are born to evolve. There is 
> a transfinite of path possible.
>

But there are a lot of humans who seem quite satisfied. They actively 
resist dissatisfaction and protect their beliefs, true or not.
 

>
> And Gôdel completeness is what machine discover themselves quickly, they 
> can justify it rationally.
>

Yet some of what they justify is not merely justified within their own 
experience or belief, but veridically in intersubjective experience over 
many lifetimes.

Craig
 

>
> Bruno
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

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Re: Video of VCR

[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 May 2014, at 03:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:

I'm showing that authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, and  
that the failure of logic to detect the significance of authenticity  
can be empirically demonstrated, but that neither authenticity or  
the failure of logic to detect it can be detected within logic. At  
least Godel shows logic's incompleteness, but that is just the  
beginning. What logic doesn't know about what logic doesn't know I  
think dwarfs all of arithmetic truth.


Gödel has shown the completeness of first order logic, and this means  
that what we prove in a theory written in such logic,  will be true in  
all interpretation of the theory, and what is true in all  
interpretations, will be provable in the theory.


Then Gödel proved the incompleteness of *all* theories about numbers  
and machines, with respect to a standard notion of truth.


This means that the truth about number and machines are above what  
machines can prove, and thus what human can prove, locally, if we  
assume computationalism.


Universal machine are always unsatisfied, and are born to evolve.  
There is a transfinite of path possible.


And Gôdel completeness is what machine discover themselves quickly,  
they can justify it rationally.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, May 13, 2014 7:56:53 PM UTC-4, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 12:12 AM, Craig Weinberg 
> 
> > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, May 13, 2014 9:43:16 AM UTC-4, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, May 13, 2014 at 4:14 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, May 12, 2014 1:50:45 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 12 May 2014, at 03:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>> We don't know that. It could be the case that all detections used by the 
>>> abstraction of the universal machine are done by the sensory substrate in 
>>> which the machine-program is instantiated. The machine is only an automated 
>>> map as far as I can tell. To make it more than that, the computations must 
>>> take place within sensory-motive-time<>space-energy-mass.
>>>
>>>
>>> I will wait for you to prove this statement.
>>>
>>>
>>> I think my example of the violin being unable to play the song about how 
>>> piano music sounds might work. I would not be surprised if it could be 
>>> formalized into a proof, except that you would need to invent new formal 
>>> symbols for qualia (or use mine). If authenticity is allowed as an axiom, 
>>> then it can be proved. If it is denied, then it is begging the question to 
>>> try to prove authenticity within a formal system in which authenticity is 
>>> specifically disallowed.
>>>
>>>
>>> Denying your premiss is as simple as referring to the differing 
>>> frequency range, envelope, timbre, spectrum of any two instruments; and 
>>> therefore different tonal characteristics and limits (different musical 
>>> colors or effects on listeners). 
>>>
>>> All you are "proving" is that, from some relative pov, musical blue is 
>>> not the same as musical red. 
>>>
>>
>> No, I'm saying that the blue pov can't play red like the red pov can play 
>> red. It's about how music can be used to refer to the aesthetic identity of 
>> the musician, and how that reference can only be authentic in the actual 
>> instance of the musician or musical instrument that plays it. A piano 
>> concerto that is called 'the piano concerto that celebrates the particular 
>> pianist playing this concerto' cannot be played by a violinist or a violin 
>> without comprimising the authenticity of the performance.
>>  
>>
>>>
>>> Doesn't say a thing about reality or proving "machine is automated map". 
>>> Unless Craig uses his personalized language and symbols to make things mean 
>>> whatever he wants; then indeed, Craig could "prove" this kind of thing to 
>>> himself, I guess. PGC
>>>
>>
>> No, I'm using regular old English language, and regular logic, albeit 
>> logic that requires seeing authenticity as being a real and significant 
>> influence in nature. Anyone who was looking at my argument with an 
>> unbiased, scientific attitude would have to go beyond the hand waving 
>> objections of 'personal language', blah blah blah. I guess PGC could prove 
>> his objections exempt from reasoned examination to himself though, using 
>> his Craig straw-idiot.
>>
>
> But I agree. As stated, no two instruments are identical, no two musicians 
> are identical, no two povs on their combination are identical. 
>

Then how could instruments and musicians be reduced to identical arithmetic 
units? As far as I can tell, a yes for irreducible differences is a no to 
computationalism.
 

>
> The authenticity would be preserved given some comp background, simply 
> because no two differing programs, environments, numbers etc. are identical.
>

But you could make a program that emulates the identical environments, 
programs, numbers, etc. That's what Church-Turing means if extended to the 
Absolute. That is computationalism.
 

>
> So yes, on authenticity; but that is exactly why regardless of MSR, comp, 
> some physical universe, I don't see what you show or prove beyond what 
> seems like tautology. 
>

I'm showing that authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, and that the 
failure of logic to detect the significance of authenticity can be 
empirically demonstrated, but that neither authenticity or the failure of 
logic to detect it can be detected within logic. At least Godel shows 
logic's incompleteness, but that is just the beginning. What logic doesn't 
know about what logic doesn't know I think dwarfs all of arithmetic truth.

Craig

 

> PGC
>  
>
>>
>> Craig
>>
>>  
>>>
>>>  
>>> > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
>> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com .
>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com
>> .
>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>>
>
>

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T

Re: Video of VCR

[Platonist Guitar Cowboy]

On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 12:12 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

>
>
> On Tuesday, May 13, 2014 9:43:16 AM UTC-4, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, May 13, 2014 at 4:14 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, May 12, 2014 1:50:45 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 12 May 2014, at 03:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>> We don't know that. It could be the case that all detections used by the
>> abstraction of the universal machine are done by the sensory substrate in
>> which the machine-program is instantiated. The machine is only an automated
>> map as far as I can tell. To make it more than that, the computations must
>> take place within sensory-motive-time<>space-energy-mass.
>>
>>
>> I will wait for you to prove this statement.
>>
>>
>> I think my example of the violin being unable to play the song about how
>> piano music sounds might work. I would not be surprised if it could be
>> formalized into a proof, except that you would need to invent new formal
>> symbols for qualia (or use mine). If authenticity is allowed as an axiom,
>> then it can be proved. If it is denied, then it is begging the question to
>> try to prove authenticity within a formal system in which authenticity is
>> specifically disallowed.
>>
>>
>> Denying your premiss is as simple as referring to the differing frequency
>> range, envelope, timbre, spectrum of any two instruments; and therefore
>> different tonal characteristics and limits (different musical colors or
>> effects on listeners).
>>
>> All you are "proving" is that, from some relative pov, musical blue is
>> not the same as musical red.
>>
>
> No, I'm saying that the blue pov can't play red like the red pov can play
> red. It's about how music can be used to refer to the aesthetic identity of
> the musician, and how that reference can only be authentic in the actual
> instance of the musician or musical instrument that plays it. A piano
> concerto that is called 'the piano concerto that celebrates the particular
> pianist playing this concerto' cannot be played by a violinist or a violin
> without comprimising the authenticity of the performance.
>
>
>>
>> Doesn't say a thing about reality or proving "machine is automated map".
>> Unless Craig uses his personalized language and symbols to make things mean
>> whatever he wants; then indeed, Craig could "prove" this kind of thing to
>> himself, I guess. PGC
>>
>
> No, I'm using regular old English language, and regular logic, albeit
> logic that requires seeing authenticity as being a real and significant
> influence in nature. Anyone who was looking at my argument with an
> unbiased, scientific attitude would have to go beyond the hand waving
> objections of 'personal language', blah blah blah. I guess PGC could prove
> his objections exempt from reasoned examination to himself though, using
> his Craig straw-idiot.
>

But I agree. As stated, no two instruments are identical, no two musicians
are identical, no two povs on their combination are identical.

The authenticity would be preserved given some comp background, simply
because no two differing programs, environments, numbers etc. are identical.

So yes, on authenticity; but that is exactly why regardless of MSR, comp,
some physical universe, I don't see what you show or prove beyond what
seems like tautology. PGC


>
> Craig
>
>
>>
>>
>>  To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>

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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, May 13, 2014 9:43:16 AM UTC-4, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On Tue, May 13, 2014 at 4:14 AM, Craig Weinberg 
> 
> > wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, May 12, 2014 1:50:45 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 12 May 2014, at 03:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> We don't know that. It could be the case that all detections used by the 
> abstraction of the universal machine are done by the sensory substrate in 
> which the machine-program is instantiated. The machine is only an automated 
> map as far as I can tell. To make it more than that, the computations must 
> take place within sensory-motive-time<>space-energy-mass.
>
>
> I will wait for you to prove this statement.
>
>
> I think my example of the violin being unable to play the song about how 
> piano music sounds might work. I would not be surprised if it could be 
> formalized into a proof, except that you would need to invent new formal 
> symbols for qualia (or use mine). If authenticity is allowed as an axiom, 
> then it can be proved. If it is denied, then it is begging the question to 
> try to prove authenticity within a formal system in which authenticity is 
> specifically disallowed.
>
>
> Denying your premiss is as simple as referring to the differing frequency 
> range, envelope, timbre, spectrum of any two instruments; and therefore 
> different tonal characteristics and limits (different musical colors or 
> effects on listeners). 
>
> All you are "proving" is that, from some relative pov, musical blue is not 
> the same as musical red. 
>

No, I'm saying that the blue pov can't play red like the red pov can play 
red. It's about how music can be used to refer to the aesthetic identity of 
the musician, and how that reference can only be authentic in the actual 
instance of the musician or musical instrument that plays it. A piano 
concerto that is called 'the piano concerto that celebrates the particular 
pianist playing this concerto' cannot be played by a violinist or a violin 
without comprimising the authenticity of the performance.
 

>
> Doesn't say a thing about reality or proving "machine is automated map". 
> Unless Craig uses his personalized language and symbols to make things mean 
> whatever he wants; then indeed, Craig could "prove" this kind of thing to 
> himself, I guess. PGC
>

No, I'm using regular old English language, and regular logic, albeit logic 
that requires seeing authenticity as being a real and significant influence 
in nature. Anyone who was looking at my argument with an unbiased, 
scientific attitude would have to go beyond the hand waving objections of 
'personal language', blah blah blah. I guess PGC could prove his objections 
exempt from reasoned examination to himself though, using his Craig 
straw-idiot.

Craig


>
>  
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Video of VCR

[Platonist Guitar Cowboy]

On Tue, May 13, 2014 at 4:14 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, May 12, 2014 1:50:45 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 12 May 2014, at 03:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>> We don't know that. It could be the case that all detections used by the
>> abstraction of the universal machine are done by the sensory substrate in
>> which the machine-program is instantiated. The machine is only an automated
>> map as far as I can tell. To make it more than that, the computations must
>> take place within sensory-motive-time<>space-energy-mass.
>>
>>
>> I will wait for you to prove this statement.
>>
>
> I think my example of the violin being unable to play the song about how
> piano music sounds might work. I would not be surprised if it could be
> formalized into a proof, except that you would need to invent new formal
> symbols for qualia (or use mine). If authenticity is allowed as an axiom,
> then it can be proved. If it is denied, then it is begging the question to
> try to prove authenticity within a formal system in which authenticity is
> specifically disallowed.
>

Denying your premiss is as simple as referring to the differing frequency
range, envelope, timbre, spectrum of any two instruments; and therefore
different tonal characteristics and limits (different musical colors or
effects on listeners).

All you are "proving" is that, from some relative pov, musical blue is not
the same as musical red.

Doesn't say a thing about reality or proving "machine is automated map".
Unless Craig uses his personalized language and symbols to make things mean
whatever he wants; then indeed, Craig could "prove" this kind of thing to
himself, I guess. PGC




>
>
>>
>>
>> Nor with 0, s(0), s(s(0)), yes logic is not enough.
>>>
>>> I guess you mean that logic + elementary arithmetic is not enough. But
>>> that's is tautological in your non-comp theory.
>>>
>>
>> It's not a theory that I'm imposing though, its an observation. As sure
>> as I can be that 5-2=3, I can also be sure that no quantitative function
>> can generate qualia by itself.
>>
>>
>> Yes, but as observation the machine already say so. And you are right, we
>> agree on this, but when you disqualify the machine, you confuse her []p
>> with her []p & p. You confuse her body clothe with its possible relation
>> with truth.
>>
>
> I don't think the machine has a []p or a []p & p. They are all just steps
> in an Escher staircase, leading to anywhere or nowhere, but never somewhere.
>
> Craig
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
>>  --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
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>

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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, May 12, 2014 1:50:45 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 12 May 2014, at 03:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> We don't know that. It could be the case that all detections used by the 
> abstraction of the universal machine are done by the sensory substrate in 
> which the machine-program is instantiated. The machine is only an automated 
> map as far as I can tell. To make it more than that, the computations must 
> take place within sensory-motive-time<>space-energy-mass.
>
>
> I will wait for you to prove this statement.
>

I think my example of the violin being unable to play the song about how 
piano music sounds might work. I would not be surprised if it could be 
formalized into a proof, except that you would need to invent new formal 
symbols for qualia (or use mine). If authenticity is allowed as an axiom, 
then it can be proved. If it is denied, then it is begging the question to 
try to prove authenticity within a formal system in which authenticity is 
specifically disallowed.
 

>
>
> Nor with 0, s(0), s(s(0)), yes logic is not enough.
>>
>> I guess you mean that logic + elementary arithmetic is not enough. But 
>> that's is tautological in your non-comp theory.
>>
>
> It's not a theory that I'm imposing though, its an observation. As sure as 
> I can be that 5-2=3, I can also be sure that no quantitative function can 
> generate qualia by itself.
>
>
> Yes, but as observation the machine already say so. And you are right, we 
> agree on this, but when you disqualify the machine, you confuse her []p 
> with her []p & p. You confuse her body clothe with its possible relation 
> with truth.
>

I don't think the machine has a []p or a []p & p. They are all just steps 
in an Escher staircase, leading to anywhere or nowhere, but never somewhere.

Craig
 

>
>
>
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

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Re: Video of VCR

[Bruno Marchal]

On 12 May 2014, at 03:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:

We don't know that. It could be the case that all detections used by  
the abstraction of the universal machine are done by the sensory  
substrate in which the machine-program is instantiated. The machine  
is only an automated map as far as I can tell. To make it more than  
that, the computations must take place within sensory-motive- 
time<>space-energy-mass.


I will wait for you to prove this statement.



Nor with 0, s(0), s(s(0)), yes logic is not enough.

I guess you mean that logic + elementary arithmetic is not enough.  
But that's is tautological in your non-comp theory.


It's not a theory that I'm imposing though, its an observation. As  
sure as I can be that 5-2=3, I can also be sure that no quantitative  
function can generate qualia by itself.


Yes, but as observation the machine already say so. And you are right,  
we agree on this, but when you disqualify the machine, you confuse her  
[]p with her []p & p. You confuse her body clothe with its possible  
relation with truth.






Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, May 8, 2014 9:56:44 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 07 May 2014, at 21:55, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, May 6, 2014 8:53:54 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 05 May 2014, at 21:38, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, May 5, 2014 10:26:27 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Then you can study how to define sequence in that theory. 
>
>
> Only because you have an a priori expectation of sequence which can be 
> inferred. Otherwise nothing is defined and you have only unrelated 
> statements. You need sense to draw them together and match your intuition.
>
>
> No. Logic is the art of making derivation without sense. 
>
>
> There is no art without sense. 
>
>
> Then substitute "art" by "mean". 
>
>
> If that were true and logic is a means of deriving (deriving what if not 
> sense?) 
>
>
>
> Deriving sentence, syntactically. 
>
>
Doesn't sentence have to make sense?
 

>
>
> without sense, then computation would not need/want to develop sense.
>
>
>
> ?
>

Because it is getting along fine without it.
 

>
>
>
>
>
> I would say that logic seeks to derive sensible information using minimal 
> sense, but it all still goes back ultimately to sensed interactions.
>
>
> ?
>

All logic is a kind of sense, but sense is not a kind of logic.
 

>
>
>
>  
>
>
>
>
> If logic could be accomplished without sense then it would be impossible 
> to make an error in logic. 
>
>
> That does not follow. Logic don't use sense, but the machine or the theory 
> can use it at another level. 
>
>
> Where are other levels coming from? 
>
>
> Interaction with other machine, introspection, etc.
>

Why would interactions entail a separate, fallible kind of logic?
 

>
>
>
>
> Why would they by able to make errors?
>
>
> For many reason. Some are deep like the incompleteness phenomenon, which 
> makes consistent that the consistent machine asserts consistent but false 
> proposition like "I am inconsistent", and others are superficial, like a 
> programs badly implemented in arithmetic (the UD emulates all programs, 
> including programs with bugs, and asserting false propositions).
> In fact, it has been shown that some machines can get genuine new 
> computational power by believing false irrefutable sentences. 
>

It's not clear that there can be any difference between true and false 
without sense, especially if we are saying that the UD plows ahead 
regardless of incoherence. Saying "I am inconsistent" would not be an 
error, it would simply be yet another inevitable thing that will be said 
eventually. If the UD cannot tell the difference between programs that make 
sense and programs that don't, then why would any program generated by the 
UD be any more sensitive?
 

>
>
>
>
>
>  
>
> The physical lwas does not make error, nut an altimeter in a plane can be 
> wrong when referring to the plane altitude.
>
>
> You're smuggling in reality to prop up the theory. Of course real 
> technology can make 'mistakes', because in reality logic is not primordial 
> - sense is. If an ideal machine produced an ideal simulation of an 
> altimeter, I see no reason to allow that there could be any such thing as 
> error.
>
>
> Ideal machine can prove the existence of non ideal machines in arithmetic.
>

How do you know that the ideal machine that proves the existence of 
non-ideal machines is really ideal? What makes ideal machines fall into 
non-ideal states?


>
>
>
>
>  
>
>
>
>
> There would be no need to formalize logic because it would be inescapable 
> in every state of consciousness. 
>
>
> It is still needed when you communicate to others.
>
>
> Again, that's in reality. Sure, we need to formalize logic...because it 
> doesn't entirely permeate reality. Logic must be discerned and developed 
> through sense experience.
>
>
> I don't know what is sense. 
>

It is participatory aesthetic phenomena. Sensory-motive participation. 
Nested presence and representation.
 

> It looks like a gap of the god. It seems to explain everything.
>

Sure, that's the whole idea: to explain everything. Computationalism tries 
to do the same thing only with computation instead of sense.
 

> You have not yet explain how to derive arithmetic from your sense theory, 
> still less anything which could help us to make sense of your notion of 
> "primordial sense".
>

Arithmetic is derived from insensitivity or reduction of sense. 
Representation is a function of inter-qualitative distance. It is profound 
because all qualia share the same distance, which can be expressed most 
precisely as arithmetic, but the qualia itself is not contained within or 
projected through arithmetic.

Primordial sense is the boundaryless container of containment - but 
specifically it is sensory-motive presence. Arithmetic, as well as all 
forms and functions, including space, time, subjectivity, etc are all 
containers which divide the primordial sense into novel palettes of local 
sense experience. It could seem contradictory to say tha

Re: Video of VCR

[Bruno Marchal]

On 07 May 2014, at 21:55, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Tuesday, May 6, 2014 8:53:54 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 05 May 2014, at 21:38, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Monday, May 5, 2014 10:26:27 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Then you can study how to define sequence in that theory.

Only because you have an a priori expectation of sequence which can  
be inferred. Otherwise nothing is defined and you have only  
unrelated statements. You need sense to draw them together and match  
your intuition.


No. Logic is the art of making derivation without sense.

There is no art without sense.

Then substitute "art" by "mean".

If that were true and logic is a means of deriving (deriving what if  
not sense?)



Deriving sentence, syntactically.




without sense, then computation would not need/want to develop sense.



?






I would say that logic seeks to derive sensible information using  
minimal sense, but it all still goes back ultimately to sensed  
interactions.


?








If logic could be accomplished without sense then it would be  
impossible to make an error in logic.


That does not follow. Logic don't use sense, but the machine or the  
theory can use it at another level.


Where are other levels coming from?


Interaction with other machine, introspection, etc.





Why would they by able to make errors?


For many reason. Some are deep like the incompleteness phenomenon,  
which makes consistent that the consistent machine asserts consistent  
but false proposition like "I am inconsistent", and others are  
superficial, like a programs badly implemented in arithmetic (the UD  
emulates all programs, including programs with bugs, and asserting  
false propositions).
In fact, it has been shown that some machines can get genuine new  
computational power by believing false irrefutable sentences.








The physical lwas does not make error, nut an altimeter in a plane  
can be wrong when referring to the plane altitude.


You're smuggling in reality to prop up the theory. Of course real  
technology can make 'mistakes', because in reality logic is not  
primordial - sense is. If an ideal machine produced an ideal  
simulation of an altimeter, I see no reason to allow that there  
could be any such thing as error.


Ideal machine can prove the existence of non ideal machines in  
arithmetic.











There would be no need to formalize logic because it would be  
inescapable in every state of consciousness.


It is still needed when you communicate to others.

Again, that's in reality. Sure, we need to formalize logic...because  
it doesn't entirely permeate reality. Logic must be discerned and  
developed through sense experience.


I don't know what is sense. It looks like a gap of the god. It seems  
to explain everything. You have not yet explain how to derive  
arithmetic from your sense theory, still less anything which could  
help us to make sense of your notion of "primordial sense".










That isn't what we see though. In fact, logic is very tenuous and  
requires a particularly sober intellect which is focused on modeling  
concepts in an impersonal sense.


That is even why so many people think that a machine which can  
reason is just doing syntactical manipulation without understanding,  
and at the low level, that's correct.
A derivation, in a formal theory, is valid or non valid,  
independently of any of its possible interpretation (all those terms  
are well defined).


Syntactical manipulation is still sense, it just has relatively  
limited aesthetic qualities.


You are not trying to understand.

I'm trying to explain so that you (or others) might understand. What  
you are saying is that low level mechanism is derived automatically  
but that does not prevent high level mechanism from developing  
interpretations.


OK. (Roughly speaking).




What I am saying is that these considerations are irrelevant to what  
awareness is about -


Why. people agreed that awareness should obey a formula like []A -> [] 
[]A  (for introspective belief: if I believe A then I believe that I  
believe A).




which is nothing to do with complexity or interpretation or self- 
reference but with presence itself.


This is prose. You cannot pretend that my sun-in-law is a zombie with  
prose. You make a strong statement, but you don't argue for it: you  
just repeat in different way axioms equivalent to that effect. This is  
not arguing, and then you attack the very idea of argumentation and  
logic, making it impossible for me and you to progress on this.







I am explaining why aesthetic experience cannot originate from any  
sort of mechanism,


OK. But I showed to you that once that statement is made precise, we  
can show that machines already argue like that. That gives a counter- 
example. You don't admit this, because you reject precision and logic,  
but then you can argue for anything, and we don't progress.
It is the whole of science which makes problem to you. Not  

Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, May 6, 2014 8:53:54 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 05 May 2014, at 21:38, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, May 5, 2014 10:26:27 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Then you can study how to define sequence in that theory. 
>
>
> Only because you have an a priori expectation of sequence which can be 
> inferred. Otherwise nothing is defined and you have only unrelated 
> statements. You need sense to draw them together and match your intuition.
>
>
> No. Logic is the art of making derivation without sense. 
>
>
> There is no art without sense. 
>
>
> Then substitute "art" by "mean". 
>

If that were true and logic is a means of deriving (deriving what if not 
sense?) without sense, then computation would not need/want to develop 
sense.

I would say that logic seeks to derive sensible information using minimal 
sense, but it all still goes back ultimately to sensed interactions.
 

>
>
>
> If logic could be accomplished without sense then it would be impossible 
> to make an error in logic. 
>
>
> That does not follow. Logic don't use sense, but the machine or the theory 
> can use it at another level. 
>

Where are other levels coming from? Why would they by able to make errors?
 

> The physical lwas does not make error, nut an altimeter in a plane can be 
> wrong when referring to the plane altitude.
>

You're smuggling in reality to prop up the theory. Of course real 
technology can make 'mistakes', because in reality logic is not primordial 
- sense is. If an ideal machine produced an ideal simulation of an 
altimeter, I see no reason to allow that there could be any such thing as 
error.
 

>
>
>
> There would be no need to formalize logic because it would be inescapable 
> in every state of consciousness. 
>
>
> It is still needed when you communicate to others.
>

Again, that's in reality. Sure, we need to formalize logic...because it 
doesn't entirely permeate reality. Logic must be discerned and developed 
through sense experience.
 

>
>
>
>
> That isn't what we see though. In fact, logic is very tenuous and requires 
> a particularly sober intellect which is focused on modeling concepts in an 
> impersonal sense.
>  
>
> That is even why so many people think that a machine which can reason is 
> just doing syntactical manipulation without understanding, and at the low 
> level, that's correct.
> A derivation, in a formal theory, is valid or non valid, independently of 
> any of its possible interpretation (all those terms are well defined).
>
>
> Syntactical manipulation is still sense, it just has relatively limited 
> aesthetic qualities.
>
>
> You are not trying to understand.
>

I'm trying to explain so that you (or others) might understand. What you 
are saying is that low level mechanism is derived automatically but that 
does not prevent high level mechanism from developing interpretations. What 
I am saying is that these considerations are irrelevant to what awareness 
is about - which is nothing to do with complexity or interpretation or 
self-reference but with presence itself. I am explaining why aesthetic 
experience cannot originate from any sort of mechanism, and why all 
mechanisms rely on more primitive sensory and motivational contexts.
 
>
>
>
>
>  
>
>
>
>
>  
>
> Gödel is the fist who did that. He invented the "Gödel beta function", 
> based on a generalization of a famous chinese "lemma", about set of modular 
> equations in arithmetic.
>
> Eventually (not easy exercice) you can define from the axiom and the chine 
> lemma a representation of the exponential function, and with its you can 
> define a sequence in arithmetic by using the unique factorization of the 
> natural numbers.
>
>
> But "eventually" means that you must follow a sequence of steps to do your 
> defining. You smuggle the expectation for sequence in from the start.
>
>
> Hmm, ... I will not insist here, as this will be the object to the next 
> post in the math thread. 
>
>
>
>
>  
>
>
> It is not the existence of arithmetic, it is the existence of 0, s(0), 
> etc. + the basic relation that you can derive from the axioms.
>
>
> "Derive" requires sequence and sense.
>
>
> Not at all.
>
> Does that mean that dead people would be good at deriving relations from 
> axioms? 
>
> Apparently ... in your theory. You are the one saying that my sun in law 
> is a zombie, death as far as his consciousness is concerned.
>
>
Yes, the sun in law is a doll, but there is still low level sense going on 
to keep the simulation going. 

>
>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> It is the same capacity to reason which tells me that 5-3=2 which tells 
>> me that sequence can exist without arithmetic but arithmetic cannot exist 
>> without sequence.
>>
>>
>> It is a bit imprecise. I can define sequence in *any* turing complete 
>> language, and they are all equivalent for computationalism.
>> You can define a notion of sequence as primitive, instead of numbers, 
>> yes. That is the case for 

Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, May 5, 2014 9:12:45 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote:
>
> On 3 May 2014 09:39, Craig Weinberg >wrote:
>
>> On Thursday, May 1, 2014 9:07:13 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>>
> Do you believe that mathematical truths are true independent of mind?
>>>
>> I'm not sure what mind is. I understand that nothing can exist 
>> independently of sensory experience, including mathematical truths. 
>>
>
> That seems to be a "no". So if things don't exist independently of sensory 
> experience, where do they come from when we first observe them? Did the 
> planet Uranus not exist before William Herschell observed it?
>

Yes, Uranus existed before Herschel - Uranus existed before any biological 
phenomenon was present on Earth, but that does not mean that the universe 
is devoid of sensory experience before that. It does not mean that matter 
is something other than a sensory experience. We use a light bulb to create 
light locally, but that does not mean that light is produced only by bulbs 
or that all light is reducible to the activity of light bulbs.

The view of Pansensitivity that I have is completely indifferent to biology 
or human existence. It's indifferent to all possible forms and functions 
also. The idea is that beneath every 'p' there must first be an a priori 
aesthetic (sensory) context and an a priori motive to alter that context. 
The consequence of the sense>motive>sense^2 relation is minimally necessary 
for any number, logical proposition, statement, 'thing', etc. Before 
anything can be said to 'exist' there must first be a capacity to 1) 
discern a difference between existence and non-existence, 2) make such a 
difference, and 3) *appreciate* having made the difference. I consider 
these three aspects to be different from each other in one sense and parts 
of the same primordial/irreducible identity in another.

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Re: Video of VCR

[Bruno Marchal]

On 05 May 2014, at 21:38, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Monday, May 5, 2014 10:26:27 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Then you can study how to define sequence in that theory.

Only because you have an a priori expectation of sequence which can  
be inferred. Otherwise nothing is defined and you have only  
unrelated statements. You need sense to draw them together and match  
your intuition.


No. Logic is the art of making derivation without sense.

There is no art without sense.


Then substitute "art" by "mean".



If logic could be accomplished without sense then it would be  
impossible to make an error in logic.


That does not follow. Logic don't use sense, but the machine or the  
theory can use it at another level. The physical lwas does not make  
error, nut an altimeter in a plane can be wrong when referring to the  
plane altitude.




There would be no need to formalize logic because it would be  
inescapable in every state of consciousness.


It is still needed when you communicate to others.




That isn't what we see though. In fact, logic is very tenuous and  
requires a particularly sober intellect which is focused on modeling  
concepts in an impersonal sense.


That is even why so many people think that a machine which can  
reason is just doing syntactical manipulation without understanding,  
and at the low level, that's correct.
A derivation, in a formal theory, is valid or non valid,  
independently of any of its possible interpretation (all those terms  
are well defined).


Syntactical manipulation is still sense, it just has relatively  
limited aesthetic qualities.


You are not trying to understand.









Gödel is the fist who did that. He invented the "Gödel beta  
function", based on a generalization of a famous chinese "lemma",  
about set of modular equations in arithmetic.


Eventually (not easy exercice) you can define from the axiom and the  
chine lemma a representation of the exponential function, and with  
its you can define a sequence in arithmetic by using the unique  
factorization of the natural numbers.


But "eventually" means that you must follow a sequence of steps to  
do your defining. You smuggle the expectation for sequence in from  
the start.


Hmm, ... I will not insist here, as this will be the object to the  
next post in the math thread.







It is not the existence of arithmetic, it is the existence of 0,  
s(0), etc. + the basic relation that you can derive from the axioms.


"Derive" requires sequence and sense.

Not at all.

Does that mean that dead people would be good at deriving relations  
from axioms?


Apparently ... in your theory. You are the one saying that my sun in  
law is a zombie, death as far as his consciousness is concerned.
















It is the same capacity to reason which tells me that 5-3=2 which  
tells me that sequence can exist without arithmetic but arithmetic  
cannot exist without sequence.


It is a bit imprecise. I can define sequence in *any* turing  
complete language, and they are all equivalent for computationalism.
You can define a notion of sequence as primitive, instead of  
numbers, yes. That is the case for LISP, somehow, which is close to  
combinators and lambda calculus.


Yo have never provide any theory, so I can't figure what you talk  
about.


The theory is that logic and arithmetic are particular continuations  
of sense, not the other way around.


Sense is a vague term. Not two human being understand it in the same  
way. It is a bit like God. Important notion, but hardly usable in  
theories.


If theories can't use sense, and sense is important, then surely it  
is the theories that should change.


No. It is like "god". We can talk about it without referring to it to  
assert a proposition, when we want make a rational communication,  
which was what we were talking about. Of course in daily life, we  
don't do rational communication all of the time. You change the  
subject, and confuse level of discourse. []p does not refer to sense,  
but []p & p does, for example.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Video of VCR

[LizR]

On 3 May 2014 09:39, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

> On Thursday, May 1, 2014 9:07:13 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
Do you believe that mathematical truths are true independent of mind?
>>
> I'm not sure what mind is. I understand that nothing can exist
> independently of sensory experience, including mathematical truths.
>

That seems to be a "no". So if things don't exist independently of sensory
experience, where do they come from when we first observe them? Did the
planet Uranus not exist before William Herschell observed it?

-- 
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To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, May 5, 2014 10:26:27 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 05 May 2014, at 14:27, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, May 3, 2014 3:53:48 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 02 May 2014, at 23:58, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, May 2, 2014 11:15:40 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 01 May 2014, at 20:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, April 18, 2014 3:23:13 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 16 Apr 2014, at 20:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> What generates Platonia?
>
>
>
> Nothing generates Platonia, although addition and multiplication can 
> generate the comp-relevant part of platonia, that is the UD or equivalent.
>
> Elementary arithmetic cannot be justified by anything less complex (in 
> Turing or logical sense). It is the minimum that we have to assume to start.
>
>
> Saying that elementary arithmetic is the minimum that we have to start 
> doesn't make sense to me. Elementary arithmetic depends on many less 
> complex expectations of sequence, identity, position, motivation, etc. I 
> keep repeating this but I don't think that you are willing to consider it 
> scientifically.
>
>
> To define, is a reasonable precise sense, "expectations", "sequence", 
> "identity", "position", or "motivation" (which I doubt is a simple notion) 
> you need arithmetic.
>
>
> How can arithmetic exist without sequence and then define sequence? 
>
>
> If you agree on logic and
>
> 0 ≠ s(x)
> s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
> x+0 = x
> x+s(y) = s(x+y)
> x*0=0
> x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
>
> Then you can study how to define sequence in that theory. 
>
>
> Only because you have an a priori expectation of sequence which can be 
> inferred. Otherwise nothing is defined and you have only unrelated 
> statements. You need sense to draw them together and match your intuition.
>
>
> No. Logic is the art of making derivation without sense. 
>

There is no art without sense. If logic could be accomplished without sense 
then it would be impossible to make an error in logic. There would be no 
need to formalize logic because it would be inescapable in every state of 
consciousness. That isn't what we see though. In fact, logic is very 
tenuous and requires a particularly sober intellect which is focused on 
modeling concepts in an impersonal sense.
 

> That is even why so many people think that a machine which can reason is 
> just doing syntactical manipulation without understanding, and at the low 
> level, that's correct.
> A derivation, in a formal theory, is valid or non valid, independently of 
> any of its possible interpretation (all those terms are well defined).
>

Syntactical manipulation is still sense, it just has relatively limited 
aesthetic qualities.
 

>
>
>
>  
>
> Gödel is the fist who did that. He invented the "Gödel beta function", 
> based on a generalization of a famous chinese "lemma", about set of modular 
> equations in arithmetic.
>
> Eventually (not easy exercice) you can define from the axiom and the chine 
> lemma a representation of the exponential function, and with its you can 
> define a sequence in arithmetic by using the unique factorization of the 
> natural numbers.
>
>
> But "eventually" means that you must follow a sequence of steps to do your 
> defining. You smuggle the expectation for sequence in from the start.
>
>
> Hmm, ... I will not insist here, as this will be the object to the next 
> post in the math thread. 
>
>
>
>
>  
>
>
> It is not the existence of arithmetic, it is the existence of 0, s(0), 
> etc. + the basic relation that you can derive from the axioms.
>
>
> "Derive" requires sequence and sense.
>
>
> Not at all.
>

Does that mean that dead people would be good at deriving relations from 
axioms? 
 

>
>
>
>  
>
>
>
>
>
>
> It is the same capacity to reason which tells me that 5-3=2 which tells me 
> that sequence can exist without arithmetic but arithmetic cannot exist 
> without sequence.
>
>
> It is a bit imprecise. I can define sequence in *any* turing complete 
> language, and they are all equivalent for computationalism.
> You can define a notion of sequence as primitive, instead of numbers, yes. 
> That is the case for LISP, somehow, which is close to combinators and 
> lambda calculus.
>
> Yo have never provide any theory, so I can't figure what you talk about.
>
>
> The theory is that logic and arithmetic are particular continuations of 
> sense, not the other way around. 
>
>
> Sense is a vague term. Not two human being understand it in the same way. 
> It is a bit like God. Important notion, but hardly usable in theories. 
>

If theories can't use sense, and sense is important, then surely it is the 
theories that should change.
 

>
>
>
> Before arithmetic can exist, there must exist a sense of expectation for 
> counting. Counting includes a sense of recursive steps as well as sequence, 
> comparison, memory, change, digits, etc. It cannot be primitive as it is a 
> manipulation of attention.
>
>
>
> Not at all. More in the 

Re: Video of VCR

[Bruno Marchal]

On 05 May 2014, at 14:27, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Saturday, May 3, 2014 3:53:48 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 02 May 2014, at 23:58, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Friday, May 2, 2014 11:15:40 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 01 May 2014, at 20:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Friday, April 18, 2014 3:23:13 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Apr 2014, at 20:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:


What generates Platonia?




Nothing generates Platonia, although addition and multiplication  
can generate the comp-relevant part of platonia, that is the UD or  
equivalent.


Elementary arithmetic cannot be justified by anything less complex  
(in Turing or logical sense). It is the minimum that we have to  
assume to start.


Saying that elementary arithmetic is the minimum that we have to  
start doesn't make sense to me. Elementary arithmetic depends on  
many less complex expectations of sequence, identity, position,  
motivation, etc. I keep repeating this but I don't think that you  
are willing to consider it scientifically.


To define, is a reasonable precise sense, "expectations",  
"sequence", "identity", "position", or "motivation" (which I doubt  
is a simple notion) you need arithmetic.


How can arithmetic exist without sequence and then define sequence?


If you agree on logic and

0 ≠ s(x)
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)
x*0=0
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x

Then you can study how to define sequence in that theory.

Only because you have an a priori expectation of sequence which can  
be inferred. Otherwise nothing is defined and you have only  
unrelated statements. You need sense to draw them together and match  
your intuition.


No. Logic is the art of making derivation without sense. That is even  
why so many people think that a machine which can reason is just doing  
syntactical manipulation without understanding, and at the low level,  
that's correct.
A derivation, in a formal theory, is valid or non valid, independently  
of any of its possible interpretation (all those terms are well  
defined).






Gödel is the fist who did that. He invented the "Gödel beta  
function", based on a generalization of a famous chinese "lemma",  
about set of modular equations in arithmetic.


Eventually (not easy exercice) you can define from the axiom and the  
chine lemma a representation of the exponential function, and with  
its you can define a sequence in arithmetic by using the unique  
factorization of the natural numbers.


But "eventually" means that you must follow a sequence of steps to  
do your defining. You smuggle the expectation for sequence in from  
the start.


Hmm, ... I will not insist here, as this will be the object to the  
next post in the math thread.








It is not the existence of arithmetic, it is the existence of 0,  
s(0), etc. + the basic relation that you can derive from the axioms.


"Derive" requires sequence and sense.


Not at all.










It is the same capacity to reason which tells me that 5-3=2 which  
tells me that sequence can exist without arithmetic but arithmetic  
cannot exist without sequence.


It is a bit imprecise. I can define sequence in *any* turing  
complete language, and they are all equivalent for computationalism.
You can define a notion of sequence as primitive, instead of  
numbers, yes. That is the case for LISP, somehow, which is close to  
combinators and lambda calculus.


Yo have never provide any theory, so I can't figure what you talk  
about.


The theory is that logic and arithmetic are particular continuations  
of sense, not the other way around.


Sense is a vague term. Not two human being understand it in the same  
way. It is a bit like God. Important notion, but hardly usable in  
theories.




Before arithmetic can exist, there must exist a sense of expectation  
for counting. Counting includes a sense of recursive steps as well  
as sequence, comparison, memory, change, digits, etc. It cannot be  
primitive as it is a manipulation of attention.



Not at all. More in the math thread, but you might need to reread all  
posts.













It is, I think, your unwillingness to study a bit of math and logic  
which prevents you from seeing this.


Just the opposite. It is your unwillingness to question the  
supremacy of math and logic which prevents you from even seeing  
that there is something to question.


On the contrary I did ask people to question anything I say, which  
is of the type verifiable. That's how science work.
Then it is not a question of supremacy. Only a good lamp to search  
the key.


There are other lamps...other keys.


Yes, that's the point.

Bruno




Craig


I stop when you attribute to me the contrary on point On which I  
insist a lot.


Bruno





You get a lot about the numbers with few axioms written in first  
order language.


I don't see why any axioms would be possible. Where do they come  
from? Who is writing them?


I doubt you can define "expectation of sequence" in such a sim

Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Saturday, May 3, 2014 3:53:48 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 02 May 2014, at 23:58, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, May 2, 2014 11:15:40 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 01 May 2014, at 20:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, April 18, 2014 3:23:13 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 16 Apr 2014, at 20:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>> What generates Platonia?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Nothing generates Platonia, although addition and multiplication can 
>>> generate the comp-relevant part of platonia, that is the UD or equivalent.
>>>
>>> Elementary arithmetic cannot be justified by anything less complex (in 
>>> Turing or logical sense). It is the minimum that we have to assume to start.
>>>
>>
>> Saying that elementary arithmetic is the minimum that we have to start 
>> doesn't make sense to me. Elementary arithmetic depends on many less 
>> complex expectations of sequence, identity, position, motivation, etc. I 
>> keep repeating this but I don't think that you are willing to consider it 
>> scientifically.
>>
>>
>> To define, is a reasonable precise sense, "expectations", "sequence", 
>> "identity", "position", or "motivation" (which I doubt is a simple notion) 
>> you need arithmetic.
>>
>
> How can arithmetic exist without sequence and then define sequence? 
>
>
> If you agree on logic and
>
> 0 ≠ s(x)
> s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
> x+0 = x
> x+s(y) = s(x+y)
> x*0=0
> x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
>
> Then you can study how to define sequence in that theory. 
>

Only because you have an a priori expectation of sequence which can be 
inferred. Otherwise nothing is defined and you have only unrelated 
statements. You need sense to draw them together and match your intuition.
 

> Gödel is the fist who did that. He invented the "Gödel beta function", 
> based on a generalization of a famous chinese "lemma", about set of modular 
> equations in arithmetic.
>
> Eventually (not easy exercice) you can define from the axiom and the chine 
> lemma a representation of the exponential function, and with its you can 
> define a sequence in arithmetic by using the unique factorization of the 
> natural numbers.
>

But "eventually" means that you must follow a sequence of steps to do your 
defining. You smuggle the expectation for sequence in from the start.
 

>
> It is not the existence of arithmetic, it is the existence of 0, s(0), 
> etc. + the basic relation that you can derive from the axioms.
>

"Derive" requires sequence and sense.
 

>
>
>
>
>
> It is the same capacity to reason which tells me that 5-3=2 which tells me 
> that sequence can exist without arithmetic but arithmetic cannot exist 
> without sequence.
>
>
> It is a bit imprecise. I can define sequence in *any* turing complete 
> language, and they are all equivalent for computationalism.
> You can define a notion of sequence as primitive, instead of numbers, yes. 
> That is the case for LISP, somehow, which is close to combinators and 
> lambda calculus.
>
> Yo have never provide any theory, so I can't figure what you talk about.
>

The theory is that logic and arithmetic are particular continuations of 
sense, not the other way around. Before arithmetic can exist, there must 
exist a sense of expectation for counting. Counting includes a sense of 
recursive steps as well as sequence, comparison, memory, change, digits, 
etc. It cannot be primitive as it is a manipulation of attention.
 

>
>
>
>
>
>> It is, I think, your unwillingness to study a bit of math and logic which 
>> prevents you from seeing this. 
>>
>
> Just the opposite. It is your unwillingness to question the supremacy of 
> math and logic which prevents you from even seeing that there is something 
> to question.
>
>
> On the contrary I did ask people to question anything I say, which is of 
> the type verifiable. That's how science work.
> Then it is not a question of supremacy. Only a good lamp to search the key.
>

There are other lamps...other keys.

Craig
 

>
> I stop when you attribute to me the contrary on point On which I insist a 
> lot.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>  
>
>> You get a lot about the numbers with few axioms written in first order 
>> language.
>>
>
> I don't see why any axioms would be possible. Where do they come from? Who 
> is writing them?
>  
>
>> I doubt you can define "expectation of sequence" in such a simple way.
>>
>
> How can you doubt it? 
>  
>
>> How will you define "sequence" without mentioning some function from N 
>> (the set of natural numbers) to some set?
>>
>
> With rhythmic patterns and pointing - the way that everyone learns to 
> count. A horse can understand sequence without a formal definition derived 
> from set theory. What you are saying sounds to me like 'you cannot make an 
> apple unless you ask an apple pie how to do it'.
>  
>
>>
>> Again, I remind you that "simple" means "simple in the 3p sharable 
>> sense", not "simple" in the 1p personal experiential sense.
>>
>
> Why is that not an arbitrary bias? If I

Re: Video of VCR

[Bruno Marchal]

On 02 May 2014, at 23:58, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Friday, May 2, 2014 11:15:40 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 01 May 2014, at 20:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Friday, April 18, 2014 3:23:13 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Apr 2014, at 20:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:


What generates Platonia?




Nothing generates Platonia, although addition and multiplication  
can generate the comp-relevant part of platonia, that is the UD or  
equivalent.


Elementary arithmetic cannot be justified by anything less complex  
(in Turing or logical sense). It is the minimum that we have to  
assume to start.


Saying that elementary arithmetic is the minimum that we have to  
start doesn't make sense to me. Elementary arithmetic depends on  
many less complex expectations of sequence, identity, position,  
motivation, etc. I keep repeating this but I don't think that you  
are willing to consider it scientifically.


To define, is a reasonable precise sense, "expectations",  
"sequence", "identity", "position", or "motivation" (which I doubt  
is a simple notion) you need arithmetic.


How can arithmetic exist without sequence and then define sequence?


If you agree on logic and

0 ≠ s(x)
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)
x*0=0
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x

Then you can study how to define sequence in that theory. Gödel is the  
fist who did that. He invented the "Gödel beta function", based on a  
generalization of a famous chinese "lemma", about set of modular  
equations in arithmetic.


Eventually (not easy exercice) you can define from the axiom and the  
chine lemma a representation of the exponential function, and with its  
you can define a sequence in arithmetic by using the unique  
factorization of the natural numbers.


It is not the existence of arithmetic, it is the existence of 0, s(0),  
etc. + the basic relation that you can derive from the axioms.






It is the same capacity to reason which tells me that 5-3=2 which  
tells me that sequence can exist without arithmetic but arithmetic  
cannot exist without sequence.


It is a bit imprecise. I can define sequence in *any* turing complete  
language, and they are all equivalent for computationalism.
You can define a notion of sequence as primitive, instead of numbers,  
yes. That is the case for LISP, somehow, which is close to combinators  
and lambda calculus.


Yo have never provide any theory, so I can't figure what you talk about.






It is, I think, your unwillingness to study a bit of math and logic  
which prevents you from seeing this.


Just the opposite. It is your unwillingness to question the  
supremacy of math and logic which prevents you from even seeing that  
there is something to question.


On the contrary I did ask people to question anything I say, which is  
of the type verifiable. That's how science work.
Then it is not a question of supremacy. Only a good lamp to search the  
key.


I stop when you attribute to me the contrary on point On which I  
insist a lot.


Bruno





You get a lot about the numbers with few axioms written in first  
order language.


I don't see why any axioms would be possible. Where do they come  
from? Who is writing them?


I doubt you can define "expectation of sequence" in such a simple way.

How can you doubt it?

How will you define "sequence" without mentioning some function from  
N (the set of natural numbers) to some set?


With rhythmic patterns and pointing - the way that everyone learns  
to count. A horse can understand sequence without a formal  
definition derived from set theory. What you are saying sounds to me  
like 'you cannot make an apple unless you ask an apple pie how to do  
it'.



Again, I remind you that "simple" means "simple in the 3p sharable  
sense", not "simple" in the 1p personal experiential sense.


Why is that not an arbitrary bias? If I don't allow the possibility  
of 3p without 1p, then simplicity can only be 1p.


All scientists agree on the arithmetic axioms,

If that's true, its an argument from authority, and it could be the  
reason why all scientists fail to solve the hard problem. (which is  
exactly my argument).


and I have to almost lie to myself to fake me into doubting them.

I can't remember what it was like before I learned arithmetic, but I  
can still understand that we all live for years without those  
notions. There is at least one culture today that has no arithmetic.


 Something like "expectation" might already have a different meaning  
for spiders, for different humans, etc.


Either way, it is undeniably more primitive than arithmetic in my  
view.


Craig


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Friday, May 2, 2014 11:15:40 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 01 May 2014, at 20:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, April 18, 2014 3:23:13 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 16 Apr 2014, at 20:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>> What generates Platonia?
>>
>>
>>
>> Nothing generates Platonia, although addition and multiplication can 
>> generate the comp-relevant part of platonia, that is the UD or equivalent.
>>
>> Elementary arithmetic cannot be justified by anything less complex (in 
>> Turing or logical sense). It is the minimum that we have to assume to start.
>>
>
> Saying that elementary arithmetic is the minimum that we have to start 
> doesn't make sense to me. Elementary arithmetic depends on many less 
> complex expectations of sequence, identity, position, motivation, etc. I 
> keep repeating this but I don't think that you are willing to consider it 
> scientifically.
>
>
> To define, is a reasonable precise sense, "expectations", "sequence", 
> "identity", "position", or "motivation" (which I doubt is a simple notion) 
> you need arithmetic.
>

How can arithmetic exist without sequence and then define sequence? It is 
the same capacity to reason which tells me that 5-3=2 which tells me that 
sequence can exist without arithmetic but arithmetic cannot exist without 
sequence.


> It is, I think, your unwillingness to study a bit of math and logic which 
> prevents you from seeing this. 
>

Just the opposite. It is your unwillingness to question the supremacy of 
math and logic which prevents you from even seeing that there is something 
to question.
 

> You get a lot about the numbers with few axioms written in first order 
> language.
>

I don't see why any axioms would be possible. Where do they come from? Who 
is writing them?
 

> I doubt you can define "expectation of sequence" in such a simple way.
>

How can you doubt it? 
 

> How will you define "sequence" without mentioning some function from N 
> (the set of natural numbers) to some set?
>

With rhythmic patterns and pointing - the way that everyone learns to 
count. A horse can understand sequence without a formal definition derived 
from set theory. What you are saying sounds to me like 'you cannot make an 
apple unless you ask an apple pie how to do it'.
 

>
> Again, I remind you that "simple" means "simple in the 3p sharable sense", 
> not "simple" in the 1p personal experiential sense.
>

Why is that not an arbitrary bias? If I don't allow the possibility of 3p 
without 1p, then simplicity can only be 1p.
 

> All scientists agree on the arithmetic axioms, 
>

If that's true, its an argument from authority, and it could be the reason 
why all scientists fail to solve the hard problem. (which is exactly my 
argument).
 

> and I have to almost lie to myself to fake me into doubting them. 
>

I can't remember what it was like before I learned arithmetic, but I can 
still understand that we all live for years without those notions. There is 
at least one culture today that has no arithmetic.
 

>  Something like "expectation" might already have a different meaning for 
> spiders, for different humans, etc.
>

Either way, it is undeniably more primitive than arithmetic in my view. 

Craig


> Bruno
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, May 1, 2014 9:07:13 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On 2 May 2014 04:42, Craig Weinberg >wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, April 18, 2014 3:23:13 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 16 Apr 2014, at 20:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>> What generates Platonia?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Nothing generates Platonia, although addition and multiplication can 
>>> generate the comp-relevant part of platonia, that is the UD or equivalent.
>>>
>>> Elementary arithmetic cannot be justified by anything less complex (in 
>>> Turing or logical sense). It is the minimum that we have to assume to start.
>>>
>>
>> Saying that elementary arithmetic is the minimum that we have to start 
>> doesn't make sense to me. Elementary arithmetic depends on many less 
>> complex expectations of sequence, identity, position, motivation, etc. I 
>> keep repeating this but I don't think that you are willing to consider it 
>> scientifically.
>>
>
> Do you believe that mathematical truths are true independent of mind?
>

I'm not sure what mind is. I understand that nothing can exist 
independently of sensory experience, including mathematical truths.
 

>  
>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou 
>

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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, May 1, 2014 7:21:19 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:
>
> I say that human beings (first-person) experience reality only in terms of 
> words, 
>

You think that we were born with words?

 

> many words with some measure of meaning and some without any meaning at 
> all. Even the physics you mentioned are conveyed to the public as words, 
> and the math that is conveyed between physicists is expressed in words, 
> including Robinson's 1,2,3... arithmetic. You see some words, particularly 
> mathematical and physical terms, have special properties that are in some 
> measure truthful...Richard Ruquist 20140501
>
>
> On Thu, May 1, 2014 at 2:42 PM, Craig Weinberg 
> 
> > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, April 18, 2014 3:23:13 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 16 Apr 2014, at 20:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>> What generates Platonia?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Nothing generates Platonia, although addition and multiplication can 
>>> generate the comp-relevant part of platonia, that is the UD or equivalent.
>>>
>>> Elementary arithmetic cannot be justified by anything less complex (in 
>>> Turing or logical sense). It is the minimum that we have to assume to start.
>>>
>>
>> Saying that elementary arithmetic is the minimum that we have to start 
>> doesn't make sense to me. Elementary arithmetic depends on many less 
>> complex expectations of sequence, identity, position, motivation, etc. I 
>> keep repeating this but I don't think that you are willing to consider it 
>> scientifically.
>>
>> Craig
>>  
>>
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  -- 
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
>> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com .
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>> .
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>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>>
>
>

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Re: Video of VCR

[Bruno Marchal]

On 01 May 2014, at 20:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Friday, April 18, 2014 3:23:13 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Apr 2014, at 20:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:


What generates Platonia?




Nothing generates Platonia, although addition and multiplication can  
generate the comp-relevant part of platonia, that is the UD or  
equivalent.


Elementary arithmetic cannot be justified by anything less complex  
(in Turing or logical sense). It is the minimum that we have to  
assume to start.


Saying that elementary arithmetic is the minimum that we have to  
start doesn't make sense to me. Elementary arithmetic depends on  
many less complex expectations of sequence, identity, position,  
motivation, etc. I keep repeating this but I don't think that you  
are willing to consider it scientifically.


To define, is a reasonable precise sense, "expectations", "sequence",  
"identity", "position", or "motivation" (which I doubt is a simple  
notion) you need arithmetic.


It is, I think, your unwillingness to study a bit of math and logic  
which prevents you from seeing this. You get a lot about the numbers  
with few axioms written in first order language. I doubt you can  
define "expectation of sequence" in such a simple way. How will you  
define "sequence" without mentioning some function from N (the set of  
natural numbers) to some set?


Again, I remind you that "simple" means "simple in the 3p sharable  
sense", not "simple" in the 1p personal experiential sense. All  
scientists agree on the arithmetic axioms, and I have to almost lie to  
myself to fake me into doubting them.  Something like "expectation"  
might already have a different meaning for spiders, for different  
humans, etc.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Video of VCR

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 2 May 2014 04:42, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>
>
> On Friday, April 18, 2014 3:23:13 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 16 Apr 2014, at 20:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>> What generates Platonia?
>>
>>
>>
>> Nothing generates Platonia, although addition and multiplication can
>> generate the comp-relevant part of platonia, that is the UD or equivalent.
>>
>> Elementary arithmetic cannot be justified by anything less complex (in
>> Turing or logical sense). It is the minimum that we have to assume to start.
>>
>
> Saying that elementary arithmetic is the minimum that we have to start
> doesn't make sense to me. Elementary arithmetic depends on many less
> complex expectations of sequence, identity, position, motivation, etc. I
> keep repeating this but I don't think that you are willing to consider it
> scientifically.
>

Do you believe that mathematical truths are true independent of mind?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Video of VCR

[Richard Ruquist]

I say that human beings (first-person) experience reality only in terms of
words, many words with some measure of meaning and some without any meaning
at all. Even the physics you mentioned are conveyed to the public as words,
and the math that is conveyed between physicists is expressed in words,
including Robinson's 1,2,3... arithmetic. You see some words, particularly
mathematical and physical terms, have special properties that are in some
measure truthful...Richard Ruquist 20140501


On Thu, May 1, 2014 at 2:42 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

>
>
> On Friday, April 18, 2014 3:23:13 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 16 Apr 2014, at 20:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>> What generates Platonia?
>>
>>
>>
>> Nothing generates Platonia, although addition and multiplication can
>> generate the comp-relevant part of platonia, that is the UD or equivalent.
>>
>> Elementary arithmetic cannot be justified by anything less complex (in
>> Turing or logical sense). It is the minimum that we have to assume to start.
>>
>
> Saying that elementary arithmetic is the minimum that we have to start
> doesn't make sense to me. Elementary arithmetic depends on many less
> complex expectations of sequence, identity, position, motivation, etc. I
> keep repeating this but I don't think that you are willing to consider it
> scientifically.
>
> Craig
>
>
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
>>  --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Friday, April 18, 2014 3:23:13 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 16 Apr 2014, at 20:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> What generates Platonia?
>
>
>
> Nothing generates Platonia, although addition and multiplication can 
> generate the comp-relevant part of platonia, that is the UD or equivalent.
>
> Elementary arithmetic cannot be justified by anything less complex (in 
> Turing or logical sense). It is the minimum that we have to assume to start.
>

Saying that elementary arithmetic is the minimum that we have to start 
doesn't make sense to me. Elementary arithmetic depends on many less 
complex expectations of sequence, identity, position, motivation, etc. I 
keep repeating this but I don't think that you are willing to consider it 
scientifically.

Craig
 

>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

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Re: Video of VCR

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Apr 2014, at 20:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:


What generates Platonia?




Nothing generates Platonia, although addition and multiplication can  
generate the comp-relevant part of platonia, that is the UD or  
equivalent.


Elementary arithmetic cannot be justified by anything less complex (in  
Turing or logical sense). It is the minimum that we have to assume to  
start.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, April 16, 2014 4:46:52 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 15 Apr 2014, at 21:11, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> It seems like I just gave a perfectly legitimate, clear, and common 
>> sense challenge, to which your response has no relation. You're talking 
>> about remote and obscure technologies, but I'm using a simple example from 
>> ordinary human experience.
>>
>>
>>
>> To talk with me you are using that very technology. It is hardly remote, 
>> and I guess you find it obscure because you don't study it.
>>
>
> I'm using a lot of genetic and neurochemical technology also, but I would 
> still find the suggestion that I should study microbiology in order to 
> understand how to be myself to be a dodge.
>
>
>
> By definition of comp, you are not a dodge when you get an artificial 
> brain, or an artificial kidney, heart, whatever, unless you are copied at 
> some inadequate level.
>

Yes, but that's because comp cannot conceive of a brain as being different 
from a kidney, heart, etc, but in reality, of course, the difference 
between a person's brain and anything else in the universe is of the 
highest possible significance, while the difference between kidneys, hearts 
etc is irrelevant except with respect to function. If we put on the 
blinders of comp, we fail to see that consciousness entails personal 
presence above all other functions, and that presence is not a function or 
configuration of numbers at all.
 

>
>
>
>
> You keep saying that, and I keep explaining that I do know exactly what 
> you mean, but that in fact I have no confusion at all between the 
> difference between saying 'comp should be ruled out' and 'comp is not 
> proved'. I know the difference and I still say comp should be ruled out, 
> and for good reason. The reason is not one that is understandable to your 
> sun in law though, just as the shadow of water doesn't understand why it is 
> not water.
>
>
>
> I will skip the irrelevant metaphors too.
>

Too, bad, they are probably the only way that we can understand the reality 
of nature.
 

>
>
>
>
>
>
> If you start from comp, there is no possibility of refuting it. That is 
> the nature of computation - consistency, and consistency to the point of 
> absurdity, error, and catastrophe. 
>
>
>
> To refute X, you have to start from X and get a contrdiction, 
>

I am starting from X. As soon as we come to aesthetic experience, we get a 
contradiction.
 

> without adding anything to X. 
> If not, you are just advertizing another theory.
>

 I think my argument is pretty straightforward. If computation can exist 
without consciousness, then there is no room in computationalism for 
consciousness. All computations can be performed unconsciously, if any can 
be.


>
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> I think that we can pretty well figure it out by the differences between 
>> automatic systems and human resources. Machines make perfect slaves, humans 
>> make terrible slaves.
>>
>>
>> OK, so you agree that we can enslave my sun-in-law. Nice! 
>>
>
> Sure. What good is a machine that is not a slave?
>
>
> Well, thanks for the warning. 
>

Numbers are not creative, they are recursive.


Universal number are complete with respect of recursiveness, and this is 
arguably creative,


Creative how?

 and that is why Emil Post used the term  "creative" to describe them. They 
> can refute all normative theories that we can do about them. So 
> recursiveness or recursive enumerability suggests creativity.


We don't know that recursiveness suggests creativity, or if it does, that 
may be only in response to the creativity of our inquiry.
 

> What you say is not more than: "machine are not clever, they are machine". 
>> It is only your same begging of the question.
>>
>
Machines are clever, but they have no understanding, no presence...not 
because they are machines, but because machines are maps with no territory.
 

>
>> I conclude from this, and after this long exchange that you have just no 
>> argument.
>>
>
I have the same conclusion about your argument.

Craig 
 
 

>
> Bruno
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, April 16, 2014 4:46:52 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 15 Apr 2014, at 21:11, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, April 15, 2014 1:21:41 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 14 Apr 2014, at 21:47, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, April 13, 2014 12:44:37 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> 
>
>
> That my sun in law might not be a zombie/doll. Comp assumes that the   
> brain is Turing emulable at some level of description. 
>
>
> What does the brain being Turing emulable mean in this context other than 
> that "consciousness is generated by computation"? 
>
>
> "consciousness is generated by computation" is misleading, especially in 
> the Aristotelian era. 
> How will people understand that consciousness generates the appearance of 
> matter, without any matter, if they visualize consciousness as a brain 
> product. 
> I don't even say that the brain is Turing emulable, comp only asks for a 
> level of description of the brain so that I would genuinely survive or 
> experience if a simulation of my brain (which by itself might be a non 
> Turing emulable object) at that level.
>
>
> We're not talking about what people will understand though, we're talking 
> about the basic claim of comp. The brain is only involved because you bring 
> it in to allow Church-Turing to build Frankensun.
>  
>
>
>
>
>
> If sun in law is not a doll, and if he has a brain that is being emulated 
> by a Turing machine, then that means that the computation of the machine is 
> generating his consciousness.
>
>
> Not really. You reason in the aristotelian picture, where brain are real 
> object, etc. The classical comp picture is a priori very different, you 
> have a 3p ocean of computations in arithmetic, and a consciousness 
> particularization process made in play by natural coherence conditions 
> among some infinite sets of computations. 
>
>
> I make no claims at all on the objectivity of brains, I only am reading 
> back to you what your position seems to be to me. If you introduce the 
> brain's presumed partial Turing emulability into the discussion, then I 
> presume you do so to argue that emulability supports the sufficiency of 
> computation to  generate consciousness. 
>
>
> It does not generate consciousness, which exists in Platonia. The brain 
> only make that consciousness relatively manifestable.
>

What generates Platonia?
 

>
>
>
>
> The ability of computation to generate consciousness is the sole aspect of 
> computationalism/digital functionalism that I disagree with (and all of the 
> consequences of it). If you are not saying that comp generates 
> consciousness, then I'm not sure what you have been arguing all this time.
>
>
>
> I don't argue that my sun-in-law is conscious. I argue only that your 
> argument that he is not conscious is not valid, nor even existing. It is 
> based on your assumption that formal things cannot yield informal things, 
> which is provably false for machine.
>

I do not assume that formal things cannot yield informal things, I assume 
that informal things take on a formal appearance from a distance, which 
means that a copy of a formal thing can only copy a superficial part of the 
total informal (as the total informal is ultimately 'prime' as well as 
'primeness').
 

>
>
>
>
> Ah! So if my sun in law get his original carbon back, he would be 
> conscious again? And even retrospectively so, as you agree his behavior 
> remains invariant.
>
>
> It has nothing to do with carbon. If his original brain is dead, there is 
> no going back.
>
>
> Repeating statements does not prove them. Of course with comp there are 
> infinitely many going back possible.
>

Another area where comp refers to a theoretical universe in which nobody 
actually lives.
 
... 
Craig

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Re: Video of VCR

[Bruno Marchal]

On 15 Apr 2014, at 19:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:


Numbers are not creative, they are recursive.


Universal number are complete with respect of recursiveness, and this  
is arguably creative, and that is why Emil Post used the term   
"creative" to describe them. They can refute all normative theories  
that we can do about them. So recursiveness or recursive enumerability  
suggests creativity.


What you say is not more than: "machine are not clever, they are  
machine". It is only your same begging of the question.


I conclude from this, and after this long exchange that you have just  
no argument.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Video of VCR

[Bruno Marchal]

On 15 Apr 2014, at 21:11, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Tuesday, April 15, 2014 1:21:41 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 14 Apr 2014, at 21:47, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Sunday, April 13, 2014 12:44:37 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:


That my sun in law might not be a zombie/doll. Comp assumes that the
brain is Turing emulable at some level of description.

What does the brain being Turing emulable mean in this context  
other than that "consciousness is generated by computation"?


"consciousness is generated by computation" is misleading,  
especially in the Aristotelian era.
How will people understand that consciousness generates the  
appearance of matter, without any matter, if they visualize  
consciousness as a brain product.
I don't even say that the brain is Turing emulable, comp only asks  
for a level of description of the brain so that I would genuinely  
survive or experience if a simulation of my brain (which by itself  
might be a non Turing emulable object) at that level.


We're not talking about what people will understand though, we're  
talking about the basic claim of comp. The brain is only involved  
because you bring it in to allow Church-Turing to build Frankensun.






If sun in law is not a doll, and if he has a brain that is being  
emulated by a Turing machine, then that means that the computation  
of the machine is generating his consciousness.


Not really. You reason in the aristotelian picture, where brain are  
real object, etc. The classical comp picture is a priori very  
different, you have a 3p ocean of computations in arithmetic, and a  
consciousness particularization process made in play by natural  
coherence conditions among some infinite sets of computations.



I make no claims at all on the objectivity of brains, I only am  
reading back to you what your position seems to be to me. If you  
introduce the brain's presumed partial Turing emulability into the  
discussion, then I presume you do so to argue that emulability  
supports the sufficiency of computation to  generate  
consciousness.


It does not generate consciousness, which exists in Platonia. The  
brain only make that consciousness relatively manifestable.





The ability of computation to generate consciousness is the sole  
aspect of computationalism/digital functionalism that I disagree  
with (and all of the consequences of it). If you are not saying that  
comp generates consciousness, then I'm not sure what you have been  
arguing all this time.



I don't argue that my sun-in-law is conscious. I argue only that your  
argument that he is not conscious is not valid, nor even existing. It  
is based on your assumption that formal things cannot yield informal  
things, which is provably false for machine.






Ah! So if my sun in law get his original carbon back, he would be  
conscious again? And even retrospectively so, as you agree his  
behavior remains invariant.


It has nothing to do with carbon. If his original brain is dead,  
there is no going back.


Repeating statements does not prove them. Of course with comp there  
are infinitely many going back possible.














It seems like I just gave a perfectly legitimate, clear, and common  
sense challenge, to which your response has no relation. You're  
talking about remote and obscure technologies, but I'm using a  
simple example from ordinary human experience.



To talk with me you are using that very technology. It is hardly  
remote, and I guess you find it obscure because you don't study it.


I'm using a lot of genetic and neurochemical technology also, but I  
would still find the suggestion that I should study microbiology in  
order to understand how to be myself to be a dodge.



By definition of comp, you are not a dodge when you get an artificial  
brain, or an artificial kidney, heart, whatever, unless you are copied  
at some inadequate level.






You keep saying that, and I keep explaining that I do know exactly  
what you mean, but that in fact I have no confusion at all between  
the difference between saying 'comp should be ruled out' and 'comp  
is not proved'. I know the difference and I still say comp should be  
ruled out, and for good reason. The reason is not one that is  
understandable to your sun in law though, just as the shadow of  
water doesn't understand why it is not water.



I will skip the irrelevant metaphors too.







If you start from comp, there is no possibility of refuting it. That  
is the nature of computation - consistency, and consistency to the  
point of absurdity, error, and catastrophe.



To refute X, you have to start from X and get a contrdiction, without  
adding anything to X.

If not, you are just advertizing another theory.













I think that we can pretty well figure it out by the differences  
between automatic systems and human resources. Machines make  
perfect slaves, humans make terrible slaves.


OK, so you agree that we can enslave my sun-in

Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, April 15, 2014 1:21:41 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 14 Apr 2014, at 21:47, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, April 13, 2014 12:44:37 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> 
>
>
>> That my sun in law might not be a zombie/doll. Comp assumes that the   
>> brain is Turing emulable at some level of description. 
>>
>
> What does the brain being Turing emulable mean in this context other than 
> that "consciousness is generated by computation"? 
>
>
> "consciousness is generated by computation" is misleading, especially in 
> the Aristotelian era. 
> How will people understand that consciousness generates the appearance of 
> matter, without any matter, if they visualize consciousness as a brain 
> product. 
> I don't even say that the brain is Turing emulable, comp only asks for a 
> level of description of the brain so that I would genuinely survive or 
> experience if a simulation of my brain (which by itself might be a non 
> Turing emulable object) at that level.
>

We're not talking about what people will understand though, we're talking 
about the basic claim of comp. The brain is only involved because you bring 
it in to allow Church-Turing to build Frankensun.
 

>
>
>
>
> If sun in law is not a doll, and if he has a brain that is being emulated 
> by a Turing machine, then that means that the computation of the machine is 
> generating his consciousness.
>
>
> Not really. You reason in the aristotelian picture, where brain are real 
> object, etc. The classical comp picture is a priori very different, you 
> have a 3p ocean of computations in arithmetic, and a consciousness 
> particularization process made in play by natural coherence conditions 
> among some infinite sets of computations. 
>
>
I make no claims at all on the objectivity of brains, I only am reading 
back to you what your position seems to be to me. If you introduce the 
brain's presumed partial Turing emulability into the discussion, then I 
presume you do so to argue that emulability supports the sufficiency of 
computation to  generate consciousness. The ability of computation to 
generate consciousness is the sole aspect of computationalism/digital 
functionalism that I disagree with (and all of the consequences of it). If 
you are not saying that comp generates consciousness, then I'm not sure 
what you have been arguing all this time.
 

>
>
>
>
> In my work, comp is an assumption, but usually comp is seen as a   
>> consequence of other theories, and is usually an implicit theory of   
>> all materialist (and that is a problem for them, as UDA shows that   
>> comp does not marry well with materialism). 
>>
>> By materialism, as usual I mean the weak sense: the doctrine which   
>> asserts the primitive existence of matter (or time, space, energy, ...). 
>>
>> UDA assumes consciousness as subject matter of the inquiry, and   
>> assumes that it is invariant for digital functional substitution done   
>> at some level, and it explains from that assumption that both   
>> consciousness and matter emerges from arithmetic. 
>
>
> If you assume rather than prove digital functional substitution for 
> consciousness, then how can the conclusion that consciousness emerges from 
> arithmetic be something other than tautology?
>
>
> Because it implies very strong constraints on the physical reality. My 
> point is that comp is testable. 
> Comp makes theology an experimental science.
>
> In science, we never prove anything. We collect evidence and try theories.
>

You're the one who keeps demanding proof of the unprovable from me. I don't 
ask for proof, only sense.
 

>  
>
>
>  
>
>> Then AUDA (the   
>> arithmetical UDA) shows, by applying an idea of Theaetetus on Gödel's   
>> predicate of probability,  how to make the derivation, and derives the   
>> propositional physics, (the logic of the observable) making comp +   
>> Theaetetus is testable. 
>>
>
> It doesn't surprise me very much, as I would expect that formal, 
> linguistically based interactions could be automated to an impressive 
> degree.
>
>
> That is the computational metaphor, and it is another topic. Comp implies 
> that such metaphor is always wrong both for mind and matter, independently 
> of being useful.
>

Well, comp would have to imply that or else admit that it was a false 
theory.
 

>
>
>
>
> It has nothing to do with qualia though. The presence of aesthetic 
> phenomena, including intention and care, has no place in AUDA as far as I 
> can tell, which would run monotonously regardless of the consequences.
>
>
> X1*. You just don't study, 
>

How can I justify what seems to produce nothing of interest to me. A chef 
might be curious to see how plastic fruit is made, but he need not be 
interested in it professionally.

 

> I will pass also the commentary which just show that you have not study, 
> probably because you believe that if qualia are informal a theory about 
> them has to be informal. 
>

To the contrary, I am 

Re: Video of VCR

[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Apr 2014, at 21:47, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Sunday, April 13, 2014 12:44:37 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:


That my sun in law might not be a zombie/doll. Comp assumes that the
brain is Turing emulable at some level of description.

What does the brain being Turing emulable mean in this context other  
than that "consciousness is generated by computation"?


"consciousness is generated by computation" is misleading, especially  
in the Aristotelian era.
How will people understand that consciousness generates the appearance  
of matter, without any matter, if they visualize consciousness as a  
brain product.
I don't even say that the brain is Turing emulable, comp only asks for  
a level of description of the brain so that I would genuinely survive  
or experience if a simulation of my brain (which by itself might be a  
non Turing emulable object) at that level.





If sun in law is not a doll, and if he has a brain that is being  
emulated by a Turing machine, then that means that the computation  
of the machine is generating his consciousness.


Not really. You reason in the aristotelian picture, where brain are  
real object, etc. The classical comp picture is a priori very  
different, you have a 3p ocean of computations in arithmetic, and a  
consciousness particularization process made in play by natural  
coherence conditions among some infinite sets of computations.







In my work, comp is an assumption, but usually comp is seen as a
consequence of other theories, and is usually an implicit theory of
all materialist (and that is a problem for them, as UDA shows that
comp does not marry well with materialism).

By materialism, as usual I mean the weak sense: the doctrine which
asserts the primitive existence of matter (or time, space,  
energy, ...).


UDA assumes consciousness as subject matter of the inquiry, and
assumes that it is invariant for digital functional substitution done
at some level, and it explains from that assumption that both
consciousness and matter emerges from arithmetic.

If you assume rather than prove digital functional substitution for  
consciousness, then how can the conclusion that consciousness  
emerges from arithmetic be something other than tautology?


Because it implies very strong constraints on the physical reality. My  
point is that comp is testable.

Comp makes theology an experimental science.

In science, we never prove anything. We collect evidence and try  
theories.





Then AUDA (the
arithmetical UDA) shows, by applying an idea of Theaetetus on Gödel's
predicate of probability,  how to make the derivation, and derives the
propositional physics, (the logic of the observable) making comp +
Theaetetus is testable.

It doesn't surprise me very much, as I would expect that formal,  
linguistically based interactions could be automated to an  
impressive degree.


That is the computational metaphor, and it is another topic. Comp  
implies that such metaphor is always wrong both for mind and matter,  
independently of being useful.





It has nothing to do with qualia though. The presence of aesthetic  
phenomena, including intention and care, has no place in AUDA as far  
as I can tell, which would run monotonously regardless of the  
consequences.


X1*. You just don't study, I will pass also the commentary which just  
show that you have not study, probably because you believe that if  
qualia are informal a theory about them has to be informal. But that  
is wrong. As much as we can make a crisp theory on fuzzy set, the "&  
p" arithmetical hypostases provides forma logics concerning informal,  
intuitive and non definable objects.













hich is irrelevant as far as actually authenticating sentience.

?
If comp is true, we will never ever know it.
We can test it only if it is false, by finding a physical phenomenon
which violates the comp consequences in physics.

We could know if comp is true by having someone be uploaded to a new  
brain and then uploaded back into their old brain.



Ah! So if my sun in law get his original carbon back, he would be  
conscious again? And even retrospectively so, as you agree his  
behavior remains invariant.








It seems like I just gave a perfectly legitimate, clear, and common  
sense challenge, to which your response has no relation. You're  
talking about remote and obscure technologies, but I'm using a  
simple example from ordinary human experience.



To talk with me you are using that very technology. It is hardly  
remote, and I guess you find it obscure because you don't study it.








But *you*, on the contrary, pretends to have a general argument, not
based on your theory,  that comp has to be false, or that my sun-law
has to be a doll. But I have not yet seen it. In each case you refer
implicitly or explicitly to your theory.

I just gave you the argument. Since a computer voice can say 'baby'  
without feeling like it has lips or a voicebox or lungs, then we  
should pres

Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Sunday, April 13, 2014 2:26:21 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> Craig illustrates well that consciousness is in the true part, not in the 
> representation, but you need both to have a local particular person, 
> relatively to some universal number or system.
>

I agree that a local person needs representation to localize their 
experience, but that does not mean that universal numbers are not also 
representations for conditioning the primordial (sensory) presence. Numbers 
are not creative, they are recursive. Numbers can extend the creativity of 
an existing substrate to the extent that the substrate is intrinsically 
creative.

Craig
 

>
> Now this made him into a trivial step zero stopper, and I can be tired of 
> the accumulation of word play, and the begging questions. 
>
> I appreciate the intervention. 
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Sun, Apr 13, 2014 at 7:22 PM, Bruno Marchal 
> > wrote:
>
>
> On 13 Apr 2014, at 00:46, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> Can sense not be allowed to represent itself in your court of argument?
>
>
>
> That is a very good idea. 
>
> That is quite close to what happens with the definition by Theatetus of 
> (rational) knowledge by saying that is a (rational) belief (finitely 3p 
> describable) which is also true (something not definable in general, but 
> well known in many situations). That truth might not be computable (like in 
> self-multiplication), nor definable (like in Peano Arithmetic or by Löbian 
> machines), and that is why we use the truth (p) to represent itself, in the 
> definition of know(p) by []p & p.
>
> That describes a knower (it obeys S4), and explains the existence of the 
> fixed point, the locus where the beliefs are incorrigible, and correctly 
> so, from that necessarily existing point of view.  It explains the 
> existence of proposition which will be trivially true from the first person 
> perspective, yet impossible to communicate rationally to another machine.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> ...

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Re: Video of VCR

[Platonist Guitar Cowboy]

On Sun, Apr 13, 2014 at 8:26 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 13 Apr 2014, at 19:43, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
>
> If you guys want to argue to infinity these similar points (all really
> particular too at both end, of course), than sure: my apologies. I just
> took Bruno by his word of "I'll just say if I see an argument or not." and
> felt that was better than to have this thread keep ballooning with nobody
> else in the discussion or seeming to follow anymore. But if that was not a
> genuine point, fine. I stand corrected. PGC
>
>
> On the contrary, and I wish I could have read your comment before
> answering Craig. I might have avoiding answering it but I have that sort of
> weakness in believing he might see some point. It is also hard to not
> answer false attribution.
>

Ok, it's undecidable whether he ever will see the points or the fallacies.
But one can mistake some appearance of progress with fresh syntax of the
day. I don't think his position changed or moved one iota in past two years
regarding just the possibility of subject/step 0. The latest posts prove
this again and again.


>
> Craig is quite correct compared to the first person associated to the
> machine by the []p & p definition, and it reminds me that comp is, and has
> to be, counter-intuitive.
>
> It is a mini Brouwer-Hilbert debate, with Brouwer played by Craig, and the
> 1p of the machine (S4Grz, []p & p), and Hilbert (me, or the []p of the
> machines.
>

That is a fine way to see it, but I doubt Brouwer would confuse his own
intuitive notions with problems/resolutions to "true generation of
consciousness" and concepts of that sort.


>
> The logical appearance of the person is
>
> Truth  -> person -> machine/theories/ideas
>
> or put it differently:
>
> p  ->  []p & p  -> []p (& p?)
>
> Craig illustrates well that consciousness is in the true part, not in the
> representation, but you need both to have a local particular person,
> relatively to some universal number or system.
>

He never acknowledged that he lacks a frame in some third person sense, or
limits for the primitives to his explanations. So he could continue forever
trivially, S4Grzetting you to the end of time with fancy color explosion of
syntax/semantics after you state some limit of machine or some flaw in
reasoning.


>
> Now this made him into a trivial step zero stopper, and I can be tired of
> the accumulation of word play, and the begging questions.
>
> I appreciate the intervention.
>

I see how that it's a tricky question, but I wouldn't be surprised if you
just turned around and walked away from these games that are not even that
funny; well, except for Craig = Brouwer and you = Hilbert []p (I'm not so
sure Brouwer would be ok with Craig; much less Hilbert with you!) kind of
stuff. PGC


>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Sun, Apr 13, 2014 at 7:22 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> On 13 Apr 2014, at 00:46, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>> Can sense not be allowed to represent itself in your court of argument?
>>
>>
>>
>> That is a very good idea.
>>
>> That is quite close to what happens with the definition by Theatetus of
>> (rational) knowledge by saying that is a (rational) belief (finitely 3p
>> describable) which is also true (something not definable in general, but
>> well known in many situations). That truth might not be computable (like in
>> self-multiplication), nor definable (like in Peano Arithmetic or by Löbian
>> machines), and that is why we use the truth (p) to represent itself, in the
>> definition of know(p) by []p & p.
>>
>> That describes a knower (it obeys S4), and explains the existence of the
>> fixed point, the locus where the beliefs are incorrigible, and correctly
>> so, from that necessarily existing point of view.  It explains the
>> existence of proposition which will be trivially true from the first person
>> perspective, yet impossible to communicate rationally to another machine.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
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>>
>
>
> --
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>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>  --
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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

continued

On Sunday, April 13, 2014 12:44:37 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 13 Apr 2014, at 00:28, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
>
>
>
>
> > and say that it is computation which is more likely derived from   
> > awareness rather than the other way around, and therefore   
> > computation in and of itself cannot necessarily contain/generate/ 
> > produce/lead to awareness/sense/ 
> > 
> > 
> > Do you agree with 0+1=1? 
> > Do you agree with 0+2=2? 
> > 
> > Yes, but so what? 
>
> So perhaps you agree that is true for any number n, and so you agree   
> on Ax (0 + x = x). And what comp says, is that with few axioms more,   
> of that type, we can extract a compelling theory which explains matter   
> and consciousness in a testable way. 
>

What is the testable way of explaining consciousness?
 

>
>
>
>
> > I agree with "B" and "P" are associated with lips, or that blue +   
> > red = purple. I believe in the extraordinary consistency of   
> > mathematics, but I do not think that sets it apart from sense or   
> > gives it the power to make sense experiences on its own. 
>
> You argue, like me and the machine, that comp is not provable, if   
> true. ~[]comp. We agree on this since the beginning, but you still   
> talk like if I was pretending the contrary. 
> It is your confusion between ~[]comp (we cannot prove comp) and your   
> string statement []~comp (I know that your sun in law is a zombie). 
> It is the second one that I challenge you to prove. 
>

Proof may not be the proper expectation. By Occam's razor we can see that 
the computer need not feel that it has lips in order to make a 'B' sound 
come out of a speaker. The speaker functions as mouth, lips, lungs, and 
voicebox but it has no connection to those things or their experiences. The 
sun in law is designed from the outside in to mimic external behaviors. Why 
would internal experiences match our expectations? Why should there be any 
internal experiences on that level at all?
 

>
>
> > 
> > If arithmetic truth is conscious, then comp is circular. 
> > 
> > Proof? Note that I was saying that it does not make much sense to   
> > say that the arithmetical truth is conscious, although I cannot   
> > exclude it. Open problem say. But comp is not circular as you   
> > illustrate by not attributing consciousness to my sun in law. 
> > 
> > I don't see where there is room for doubt. If you say A contains X   
> > then saying that 'X is contained by A' is a tautology. Nothing is   
> > explained, you have just moved dualism down to the level where   
> > arithmetic arbitrary contains unexplained non-arithmetic qualities.   
> > I understand that in the math you are talking about, you see   
> > indications that such non-arithmetic qualities must be present, and   
> > I don't doubt that numbers present a kind of negative rendition of   
> > those qualities by their absence, but I don't think that ultimately   
> > amounts to a support for comp. 
>
>
> But for the millionth time; I am NOT arguing that comp is true or   
> supported. You defend again ~[]comp, which is a theorem in comp. Since   
> the start I repeat and repeat again that you are CORRECT on this point. 
>
> All what I say, is that you cannot deduce validly []~comp from   
> ~[]comp. From your non seeing something you cannot pretend the non   
> existence of something. 
>

and I repeat that I agree you are correct in saying that it cannot be 
proved logically, but I am saying that nothing about consciousness is 
logical to begin with, so the expectation of that kind of deduction working 
for consciousness is not valid. There is no argument for why I can move my 
fingers just by moving them, but it is nonetheless as true as any truth can 
possibly be.
 

>
>
>
> > > You are saying that the assumptions of comp cannot be challenged 
> > 
> > I have never said that. You symmetrize again. 
> > 
> > By aligning the defense of comp 
> > 
> > 
> > I do not defend comp. You are defending non-comp. But I have not yet   
> > seen an argument. 
> > 
> > The argument is that the map is not the territory. 
>
> The map is not always the territory, but the map can be plunged in the   
> territory, 


I think only metaphorically
 

> and there will be a fixed point, that is a point of the map   
> whose position will be equal to the position of the location it refers   
> too. 
> Something similar happens with universal number transfiormation, there   
> are fixed point, some syntactical-like (reproduction), some semantical   
> (self-reference). 
>

I think self-reference can appear figuratively, as when a doll talks about 
itself. I don't reduce sophisticated AI to a doll talking to itself, since 
interactivity adds an order of magnitude more depth, but the principle is 
the same. We can be fooled by the doll, but the doll can't fool itself into 
thinking it is alive.
 

>
>
>
>
> > B and P sound can be reproduced electronically without reproducing   
> > any feeling of lips and speaking beh

Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Sunday, April 13, 2014 12:44:37 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 13 Apr 2014, at 00:28, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
>
> > 
> > 
> > On Saturday, April 12, 2014 2:24:03 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> > 
> > On 11 Apr 2014, at 20:30, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > On Friday, April 11, 2014 12:16:47 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> > 
> > On 10 Apr 2014, at 20:09, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
> > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > On Thursday, April 10, 2014 6:42:08 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> > > Craig, 
> > > 
> > > I have already commented that type of non-argument. Once we get 
> > > closer to a refutation of your attempt to show that your argument 
> > > against comp is not valid, you vindicate being illogical, 
> > > 
> > > I don't vindicate being illogical, I vindicate being more logical 
> > > about factoring in the limitations of logic in modeling the deeper 
> > > aspects of nature and consciousness. Logically we must not presume 
> > > to rely on logic alone to argue the nature of awareness, from which 
> > > logic seems to arise. 
> > > 
> > > so I am not sure that repeating my argument can help. 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > I will just sum up: 
> > > 
> > > 1) You keep talking like if the situation was symmetrical. You 
> > > defending ~comp, and me defending comp. But that is not the case. I 
> > > am nowhere defending the idea that comp is true. I am agnostic on 
> > > this. 
> > > 
> > > I think that you are pseudo-agnostic on it, and have admitted as 
> > > much on occasion, but that's ok with me either way. 
> > > 
> > > I am not convince by your argument against comp, that's all. That is 
> > > the confusion between ~[]comp and []~comp. 
> > > 
> > > Part of my argument though is that being convinced is not a 
> > > realistic expectation of any argument about consciousness. My 
> > > argument is that it can only ever be about how much sense it makes 
> > > relatively speaking, and that the comp argument unfairly rules out 
> > > immeasurable aesthetic qualities from the start. 
> > 
> > 
> > It does not. *you* rule it out. You make less sense. 
> > 
> > If it doesn't rule it out, then comp is circular. 
> > 
> > Proof? 
> > 
> > Reasoning. Comp has to begin without consciousness to explain   
> > anything. If comp begins with consciousness then you are saying that   
> > consciousness creates itself...which is fine, but it doesn't need   
> > computation then. 
>
> You will not convince me that my sun in law *has to be* a zombie or a   
> doll with argument like that, which mocks completely what I have done. 
>

That rebuttal doesn't convince me that I should doubt my reasoning. It 
sounds like you're just saying that my argument offends you.
 

>
>
>
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > For the statement that comp makes "consciousness is generated by   
> > computation" 
> > 
> > Comp does not say "consciousness is generated by computation". I   
> > have insisted on this many times. 
> > 
> > "In philosophy, a computational theory of mind names a view that the   
> > human mind or the human brain (or both) is an information processing   
> > system and that thinking is a form of computing. " - 
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computational_theory_of_mind 
> > 
> > The Wikipedia definition agrees with me. If you are not saying that   
> > consciousness is a form of computation or product of computation,   
> > then it seems to me you have made comp too weak of an assertion.   
> > What do you say that comp asserts? 
>
> That my sun in law might not be a zombie/doll. Comp assumes that the   
> brain is Turing emulable at some level of description. 
>

What does the brain being Turing emulable mean in this context other than 
that "consciousness is generated by computation"? If sun in law is not a 
doll, and if he has a brain that is being emulated by a Turing machine, 
then that means that the computation of the machine is generating his 
consciousness.

In my work, comp is an assumption, but usually comp is seen as a   
> consequence of other theories, and is usually an implicit theory of   
> all materialist (and that is a problem for them, as UDA shows that   
> comp does not marry well with materialism). 
>
> By materialism, as usual I mean the weak sense: the doctrine which   
> asserts the primitive existence of matter (or time, space, energy, ...). 
>
> UDA assumes consciousness as subject matter of the inquiry, and   
> assumes that it is invariant for digital functional substitution done   
> at some level, and it explains from that assumption that both   
> consciousness and matter emerges from arithmetic. 


If you assume rather than prove digital functional substitution for 
consciousness, then how can the conclusion that consciousness emerges from 
arithmetic be something other than tautology?
 

> Then AUDA (the   
> arithmetical UDA) shows, by applying an idea of Theaetetus on Gödel's   
> predicate of probability,  how to make the derivation, and derives the   
> propositional physic

Re: Video of VCR

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Apr 2014, at 19:43, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:

If you guys want to argue to infinity these similar points (all  
really particular too at both end, of course), than sure: my  
apologies. I just took Bruno by his word of "I'll just say if I see  
an argument or not." and felt that was better than to have this  
thread keep ballooning with nobody else in the discussion or seeming  
to follow anymore. But if that was not a genuine point, fine. I  
stand corrected. PGC


On the contrary, and I wish I could have read your comment before  
answering Craig. I might have avoiding answering it but I have that  
sort of weakness in believing he might see some point. It is also hard  
to not answer false attribution.


Craig is quite correct compared to the first person associated to the  
machine by the []p & p definition, and it reminds me that comp is, and  
has to be, counter-intuitive.


It is a mini Brouwer-Hilbert debate, with Brouwer played by Craig, and  
the 1p of the machine (S4Grz, []p & p), and Hilbert (me, or the []p of  
the machines.


The logical appearance of the person is

Truth  -> person -> machine/theories/ideas

or put it differently:

p  ->  []p & p  -> []p (& p?)

Craig illustrates well that consciousness is in the true part, not in  
the representation, but you need both to have a local particular  
person, relatively to some universal number or system.


Now this made him into a trivial step zero stopper, and I can be tired  
of the accumulation of word play, and the begging questions.


I appreciate the intervention.

Bruno







On Sun, Apr 13, 2014 at 7:22 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 13 Apr 2014, at 00:46, Craig Weinberg wrote:

Can sense not be allowed to represent itself in your court of  
argument?



That is a very good idea.

That is quite close to what happens with the definition by Theatetus  
of (rational) knowledge by saying that is a (rational) belief  
(finitely 3p describable) which is also true (something not  
definable in general, but well known in many situations). That truth  
might not be computable (like in self-multiplication), nor definable  
(like in Peano Arithmetic or by Löbian machines), and that is why we  
use the truth (p) to represent itself, in the definition of know(p)  
by []p & p.


That describes a knower (it obeys S4), and explains the existence of  
the fixed point, the locus where the beliefs are incorrigible, and  
correctly so, from that necessarily existing point of view.  It  
explains the existence of proposition which will be trivially true  
from the first person perspective, yet impossible to communicate  
rationally to another machine.


Bruno






http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: Video of VCR

[Platonist Guitar Cowboy]

If you guys want to argue to infinity these similar points (all really
particular too at both end, of course), than sure: my apologies. I just
took Bruno by his word of "I'll just say if I see an argument or not." and
felt that was better than to have this thread keep ballooning with nobody
else in the discussion or seeming to follow anymore. But if that was not a
genuine point, fine. I stand corrected. PGC


On Sun, Apr 13, 2014 at 7:22 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 13 Apr 2014, at 00:46, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> Can sense not be allowed to represent itself in your court of argument?
>
>
>
> That is a very good idea.
>
> That is quite close to what happens with the definition by Theatetus of
> (rational) knowledge by saying that is a (rational) belief (finitely 3p
> describable) which is also true (something not definable in general, but
> well known in many situations). That truth might not be computable (like in
> self-multiplication), nor definable (like in Peano Arithmetic or by Löbian
> machines), and that is why we use the truth (p) to represent itself, in the
> definition of know(p) by []p & p.
>
> That describes a knower (it obeys S4), and explains the existence of the
> fixed point, the locus where the beliefs are incorrigible, and correctly
> so, from that necessarily existing point of view.  It explains the
> existence of proposition which will be trivially true from the first person
> perspective, yet impossible to communicate rationally to another machine.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>  --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
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>

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Re: Video of VCR

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Apr 2014, at 00:46, Craig Weinberg wrote:

Can sense not be allowed to represent itself in your court of  
argument?



That is a very good idea.

That is quite close to what happens with the definition by Theatetus  
of (rational) knowledge by saying that is a (rational) belief  
(finitely 3p describable) which is also true (something not definable  
in general, but well known in many situations). That truth might not  
be computable (like in self-multiplication), nor definable (like in  
Peano Arithmetic or by Löbian machines), and that is why we use the  
truth (p) to represent itself, in the definition of know(p) by []p & p.


That describes a knower (it obeys S4), and explains the existence of  
the fixed point, the locus where the beliefs are incorrigible, and  
correctly so, from that necessarily existing point of view.  It  
explains the existence of proposition which will be trivially true  
from the first person perspective, yet impossible to communicate  
rationally to another machine.


Bruno






http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Video of VCR

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Apr 2014, at 00:28, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Saturday, April 12, 2014 2:24:03 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 11 Apr 2014, at 20:30, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Friday, April 11, 2014 12:16:47 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 10 Apr 2014, at 20:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:

>
>
> On Thursday, April 10, 2014 6:42:08 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Craig,
>
> I have already commented that type of non-argument. Once we get
> closer to a refutation of your attempt to show that your argument
> against comp is not valid, you vindicate being illogical,
>
> I don't vindicate being illogical, I vindicate being more logical
> about factoring in the limitations of logic in modeling the deeper
> aspects of nature and consciousness. Logically we must not presume
> to rely on logic alone to argue the nature of awareness, from which
> logic seems to arise.
>
> so I am not sure that repeating my argument can help.
>
>
> I will just sum up:
>
> 1) You keep talking like if the situation was symmetrical. You
> defending ~comp, and me defending comp. But that is not the case. I
> am nowhere defending the idea that comp is true. I am agnostic on
> this.
>
> I think that you are pseudo-agnostic on it, and have admitted as
> much on occasion, but that's ok with me either way.
>
> I am not convince by your argument against comp, that's all. That is
> the confusion between ~[]comp and []~comp.
>
> Part of my argument though is that being convinced is not a
> realistic expectation of any argument about consciousness. My
> argument is that it can only ever be about how much sense it makes
> relatively speaking, and that the comp argument unfairly rules out
> immeasurable aesthetic qualities from the start.


It does not. *you* rule it out. You make less sense.

If it doesn't rule it out, then comp is circular.

Proof?

Reasoning. Comp has to begin without consciousness to explain  
anything. If comp begins with consciousness then you are saying that  
consciousness creates itself...which is fine, but it doesn't need  
computation then.


You will not convince me that my sun in law *has to be* a zombie or a  
doll with argument like that, which mocks completely what I have done.










For the statement that comp makes "consciousness is generated by  
computation"


Comp does not say "consciousness is generated by computation". I  
have insisted on this many times.


"In philosophy, a computational theory of mind names a view that the  
human mind or the human brain (or both) is an information processing  
system and that thinking is a form of computing. " - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computational_theory_of_mind


The Wikipedia definition agrees with me. If you are not saying that  
consciousness is a form of computation or product of computation,  
then it seems to me you have made comp too weak of an assertion.  
What do you say that comp asserts?


That my sun in law might not be a zombie/doll. Comp assumes that the  
brain is Turing emulable at some level of description.
In my work, comp is an assumption, but usually comp is seen as a  
consequence of other theories, and is usually an implicit theory of  
all materialist (and that is a problem for them, as UDA shows that  
comp does not marry well with materialism).


By materialism, as usual I mean the weak sense: the doctrine which  
asserts the primitive existence of matter (or time, space, energy, ...).


UDA assumes consciousness as subject matter of the inquiry, and  
assumes that it is invariant for digital functional substitution done  
at some level, and it explains from that assumption that both  
consciousness and matter emerges from arithmetic. Then AUDA (the  
arithmetical UDA) shows, by applying an idea of Theaetetus on Gödel's  
predicate of probability,  how to make the derivation, and derives the  
propositional physics, (the logic of the observable) making comp +  
Theaetetus is testable.











we have to assume first that comp is not already consciousness itself,


Comp is a theory. There are no reason to say comp is consciousness,  
no more than to say that F=GmM/r^2 has some mass. category error.


Comp is a theory, but it is a theory that computation is what  
produces consciousness.



Not at all. I always says that a machine can instantiate  
consciousness, or make a first person able to manifest its  
consciousness, but avoid an expression like computation of brain  
produces consciousness. Those expression confuses implicitlky the  
machine []p and the non-machine (except in God's eye) []p & p.




Like in the hunting of the snark, you want the sentence first, and  
the trial after. Well, that is still better than the NDAA, which  
evacuates the trial completely ...


The trial can only be started if we have sufficient technology to  
trade brains and trade back. As far as I can tell, all other testing  
would rely only on measuring whether the imposter can fool a judge -  
which is irrelevant as far as actually authenticating s

Re: Video of VCR

[Platonist Guitar Cowboy]

On Sun, Apr 13, 2014 at 4:17 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

>
>
> On Sunday, April 13, 2014 9:32:19 AM UTC-4, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Apr 13, 2014 at 12:46 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, April 12, 2014 2:24:03 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> We know that we cannot make our legs stand by arguing with them or
>> proving that standing can occur, we must exercise direct sensory-motive
>> participation and move our legs by ourselves.
>>
>>
>> and
>> just assume this if you want, but your phenomenology does not need
>> this. Comp mighty be false, but you need far better argument,
>>
>>
>> You demand that the subtlest, most delicate truth in the universe kneel
>> down to the vending machine of comp and bash it open with a brick. That's
>> not the way that it works. The machine gets nothing from me. Not a single
>> coin. I know that it has nothing without our patronage, and gives nothing
>> back but its own mindless rules, empty images, plastic music, and rude
>> interventions.
>>
>>
>> and for
>> this much more humility and study the worlds of many others and the
>> training in "scientific" argumentation.
>>
>>
>> There is little humility in comp. I see it as an ideology which feigns
>> politeness but actually buries consciousness alive.
>>
>>
>> Rhetoric.
>>
>> You can answer this, but in my reply, I will just say if I see or not an
>> argument.
>>
>>
>> Can sense not be allowed to represent itself in your court of argument?
>>
>>
>> How about: can't you see this isn't going anywhere? Bruno is repeating
>> himself, while you enjoy, as the only one here, your own rhetoric
>> variations, repeating the same content and biases over and over in
>> linguistic strings, with only minor differences in use of metaphor and
>> empty, albeit sometimes amusing expressions and figures of speech, that
>> don't constitute a serious argument or proposal of ontology framing your
>> ideas on "sense".
>>
>
> Being the only one here doesn't bother me (even if it did, there are
> others not on this list who understand my ideas), and I don't care that
> what I'm saying doesn't fulfill your expectations of 'going anywhere'.  As
> long as others can see the conversations, they can judge who is putting
> together a new idea of consciousness, physics, and information, and who is
> resisting it based on bias. The conversation is a commercial for the ideas
> being discussed even if one side does not recapitulate to the other.
>
>
>> Your zeal in seeking validation from Bruno by presenting yourself "as his
>> equal confronting him", mirrors perhaps the doubt you have concerning your
>> own thoughts, which is good indication of your intention to seek and test,
>> because why else would you seek this validation?
>>
>
> I'm not seeking validation, I'm seeking an awakening to a new idea -
> either for Bruno or someone else.
>
>
>>
>> Then again, we are all each other's equals, so why force this with
>> monster discussions of details of details, when we know the outcome:
>>
>
> Discussing the details yields new examples, new connections, etc.
>
>
>> you will not consider comp as possibility or example and improvise
>> linguistic tricks for the problems that come up in the edifice of your work
>> on logical and mathematical levels, by putting aesthetics on a pedestal,
>> which is also unconvincing as of today.
>>
>
> If you put logical and mathematical levels on a pedestal, then the
> aesthetic is undervalued proportionately. Your bias is exactly what my view
> predicts.
>
>
>>
>> Instead of taking the problems, criticisms arising here as some personal
>> thing, take what you can learn or leave it; your work needs to overcome its
>> limits and problems, and you won't get it done by forcing anybody here,
>> including Bruno, to spoon feed you.
>>
>
> How am I forcing Bruno to do anything, much less spoon feed me?
>

Simple: by abusing cordiality, professionalism, distance, and politeness
that you would never reciprocate because people here other than yours
truly, especially Bruno, take your ideas at face value; even when you
trample views that are not your own as "nonsense", instead of taking more
distanced, professional perspective.

Take it easy, man... because nobody has or should have infinite credit and
you will increasingly look like spam/nuisance if you keep it up; and people
will increasingly switch off or ignore you; quite contrary to your
intentions of awakening new ideas.

Especially if you continue this obvious falsity of dismissing possible
worldviews outright with linguistic play of unconvincing arguments and
evidence. The fact that you need to state "my ideas are appreciated
elsewhere" reflects a defensiveness, rather than an awakening.


> I'm not looking for input from Bruno,
>

Then stop addressing him in this fashion, perhaps?


> I'm looking to explain why comp ultimately fails and how it can be
> inverted to find a new solution that makes more sense.
>

This, even if you suc

Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Sunday, April 13, 2014 9:32:19 AM UTC-4, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On Sun, Apr 13, 2014 at 12:46 AM, Craig Weinberg 
> 
> > wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, April 12, 2014 2:24:03 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>
> We know that we cannot make our legs stand by arguing with them or proving 
> that standing can occur, we must exercise direct sensory-motive 
> participation and move our legs by ourselves.
>  
>
> and   
> just assume this if you want, but your phenomenology does not need   
> this. Comp mighty be false, but you need far better argument, 
>
>
> You demand that the subtlest, most delicate truth in the universe kneel 
> down to the vending machine of comp and bash it open with a brick. That's 
> not the way that it works. The machine gets nothing from me. Not a single 
> coin. I know that it has nothing without our patronage, and gives nothing 
> back but its own mindless rules, empty images, plastic music, and rude 
> interventions.
>  
>
> and for   
> this much more humility and study the worlds of many others and the   
> training in "scientific" argumentation. 
>
>
> There is little humility in comp. I see it as an ideology which feigns 
> politeness but actually buries consciousness alive.
>
>
> Rhetoric.
>
> You can answer this, but in my reply, I will just say if I see or not an 
> argument.
>
>
> Can sense not be allowed to represent itself in your court of argument?
>
>
> How about: can't you see this isn't going anywhere? Bruno is repeating 
> himself, while you enjoy, as the only one here, your own rhetoric 
> variations, repeating the same content and biases over and over in 
> linguistic strings, with only minor differences in use of metaphor and 
> empty, albeit sometimes amusing expressions and figures of speech, that 
> don't constitute a serious argument or proposal of ontology framing your 
> ideas on "sense".
>

Being the only one here doesn't bother me (even if it did, there are others 
not on this list who understand my ideas), and I don't care that what I'm 
saying doesn't fulfill your expectations of 'going anywhere'.  As long as 
others can see the conversations, they can judge who is putting together a 
new idea of consciousness, physics, and information, and who is resisting 
it based on bias. The conversation is a commercial for the ideas being 
discussed even if one side does not recapitulate to the other.


> Your zeal in seeking validation from Bruno by presenting yourself "as his 
> equal confronting him", mirrors perhaps the doubt you have concerning your 
> own thoughts, which is good indication of your intention to seek and test, 
> because why else would you seek this validation? 
>

I'm not seeking validation, I'm seeking an awakening to a new idea - either 
for Bruno or someone else.
 

>
> Then again, we are all each other's equals, so why force this with monster 
> discussions of details of details, when we know the outcome:
>

Discussing the details yields new examples, new connections, etc.
 

> you will not consider comp as possibility or example and improvise 
> linguistic tricks for the problems that come up in the edifice of your work 
> on logical and mathematical levels, by putting aesthetics on a pedestal, 
> which is also unconvincing as of today. 
>

If you put logical and mathematical levels on a pedestal, then the 
aesthetic is undervalued proportionately. Your bias is exactly what my view 
predicts.
 

>
> Instead of taking the problems, criticisms arising here as some personal 
> thing, take what you can learn or leave it; your work needs to overcome its 
> limits and problems, and you won't get it done by forcing anybody here, 
> including Bruno, to spoon feed you. 
>

How am I forcing Bruno to do anything, much less spoon feed me? I'm not 
looking for input from Bruno, I'm looking to explain why comp ultimately 
fails and how it can be inverted to find a new solution that makes more 
sense. 
 

>  
> Craig
>  
> 
> ...

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Re: Video of VCR

[Platonist Guitar Cowboy]

On Sun, Apr 13, 2014 at 12:46 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

>
>
> On Saturday, April 12, 2014 2:24:03 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>>
>> We know that we cannot make our legs stand by arguing with them or
>> proving that standing can occur, we must exercise direct sensory-motive
>> participation and move our legs by ourselves.
>>
>>
>>> and
>>> just assume this if you want, but your phenomenology does not need
>>> this. Comp mighty be false, but you need far better argument,
>>
>>
>> You demand that the subtlest, most delicate truth in the universe kneel
>> down to the vending machine of comp and bash it open with a brick. That's
>> not the way that it works. The machine gets nothing from me. Not a single
>> coin. I know that it has nothing without our patronage, and gives nothing
>> back but its own mindless rules, empty images, plastic music, and rude
>> interventions.
>>
>>
>>> and for
>>> this much more humility and study the worlds of many others and the
>>> training in "scientific" argumentation.
>>>
>>
>> There is little humility in comp. I see it as an ideology which feigns
>> politeness but actually buries consciousness alive.
>>
>>
>> Rhetoric.
>>
>> You can answer this, but in my reply, I will just say if I see or not an
>> argument.
>>
>
> Can sense not be allowed to represent itself in your court of argument?
>

How about: can't you see this isn't going anywhere? Bruno is repeating
himself, while you enjoy, as the only one here, your own rhetoric
variations, repeating the same content and biases over and over in
linguistic strings, with only minor differences in use of metaphor and
empty, albeit sometimes amusing expressions and figures of speech, that
don't constitute a serious argument or proposal of ontology framing your
ideas on "sense".

Your zeal in seeking validation from Bruno by presenting yourself "as his
equal confronting him", mirrors perhaps the doubt you have concerning your
own thoughts, which is good indication of your intention to seek and test,
because why else would you seek this validation?

Then again, we are all each other's equals, so why force this with monster
discussions of details of details, when we know the outcome: you will not
consider comp as possibility or example and improvise linguistic tricks for
the problems that come up in the edifice of your work on logical and
mathematical levels, by putting aesthetics on a pedestal, which is also
unconvincing as of today.

Instead of taking the problems, criticisms arising here as some personal
thing, take what you can learn or leave it; your work needs to overcome its
limits and problems, and you won't get it done by forcing anybody here,
including Bruno, to spoon feed you.

>
> Craig
>
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>> Craig
>>
>>
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> --
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>>
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>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>>
>>
>>  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
>>  --
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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Saturday, April 12, 2014 2:24:03 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Apr 2014, at 20:30, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
> His mind is reverse engineered from mind-like circuits that again 
> represent nothing else. The mind *is* the circuit. For a natural person, 
> the mind is a vehicle for personal attention - a glove of cognitive 
> transformations. I don't insult your sun-in-law lightly or out of 
> prejudice, I only explain why he is likely only a shadow of human 
> intelligence cast in mechanical clothing.
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>> > Perceptual relativity creates mind-like and body-like qualities to   
>> > represent distance between categories of experience. 
>>
>> Well, nice, but that is already what the machine does, and it makes   
>> this testable. 
>>
>
> I don't think that the machine creates any qualities or appreciates them, 
> it only quantifies some common aspects of theoretical/generic experience.
>
>
> I know you don't think, but that is not an argument. 
>

The assertion that the machine does create such qualities and appreciation 
is not an argument either. The question is which seems more plausible given 
everything that we can understand.
 

>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>> > 
>> > 6) Stathis' point: what in the brain/body would be responsible for   
>> > its non Turing emulability. 
>> > 
>> > The same thing that is responsible for consciousness. In my view, it   
>> > is backward to begin from a brain and say why won't a copy of this   
>> > be conscious. Instead we must begin with a life experience and ask   
>> > why we would assume it can be reduced to the functions of an object.   
>> > It is only if we buy into our 1p sense of realism for 3p objects   
>> > completely that we could make that assumption. 
>>
>> You avoid the question. 
>>
>
> I don't see how. You are assuming that the brain produces consciousness 
>
>
>
> Not at all. Please study comp and its consequence. 
>

This isn't about the consequence of comp, its about the attempt to force a 
validation of comp by bringing the Church-Turing and the brain into it.


>
>
> whereas my view is that the brain is a representation of human qualities 
> of consciousness from the 3p body view. 
>
>
> As any physical object. That is a comp consequence.
>

Yes, but then how can you use that view of the brain to justify comp? We 
agree that the brain, even assuming it is Turing emulable, is only a 
footprint of the total consciousness, so why would emulating a footprint 
lead to the foot? It's the same thing over and over again. I say the map is 
not the territory and you say that makes me a racist against maps.
 

>
>
>
> The 3p view may or may not be Turing emulable, as it is influenced by 
> phenomena which is ~p immeasurable.
>
>
> The phsyical 3p viex is not Turing emulable indeed. Again, that is a 
> consequence of comp.
>

That's why I say that your " 6) Stathis' point: what in the brain/body 
would be responsible for   
> its non Turing emulability." is invalid because it presumes that the 
possibility of the brain being Turing emulable would validate comp. If the 
footprint is a machine, then the foot must be also...I assert that it does 
not follow logically.


>
>
>
>>
>>
>> > 
>> > Saying that my sun-in-law is a zombie/doll is based on your non- 
>> > comp, it is not an argument for non-comp. Begging question again. 
>> > 
>> > My non-comp leads to the conclusion that comp cannot be defeated by   
>> > argument, 
>>
>> But I proved it can. It is the main whole point. Comp can be defeated   
>> by reason, and by experiments. You have still not study it. 
>>
>
> No, I'm saying that is false falsifiability in this case. We cannot trust 
> the square theory to judge its own completeness, as it will find that 
> indeed it seems to be square. This is what Godel is all about. 
>
>
> You make to big jumps.
>

I still make it to the other side.
 

>
>
>
>
>
> All I am doing is adapting it to consciousness so that the whole of 
> arithmetic truth and logic constitutes a kind of formal system which cannot 
> contain awareness itself.
>
>
>>
>>
>> > so it is circular to demand that it must be. Feeling cannot be   
>> > proved, but that does not mean it is not more real than logic or   
>> > theory. Feeling doesn't have to be correct in its content, but the   
>> > fact of feeling is the only undeniable fact. 
>>
>> yes. That's eaxctly what the machine says. Should I conclude that you   
>> are a machine from this? 
>> No, but I can conclude that this is not an argument. 
>>
>>
> You would be concluding that based on preference for the modes of thought 
> that you prefer though.
>
>
>>
>> > 
>> > 7) your critics of logic is self-defeating, and unanswerable. 
>> > 
>> > If logic could be defeated with logic, then Godel would be wrong. 
>>
>> OK, but that's a reason more to not criticize the use of logic in   
>> argument. 
>>
>
> Logic is fine in arguments, until you get to elements and axioms. Then we 
> have only sense to go on...which is anot

Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Saturday, April 12, 2014 2:24:03 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Apr 2014, at 20:30, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, April 11, 2014 12:16:47 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 10 Apr 2014, at 20:09, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
>
> > 
> > 
> > On Thursday, April 10, 2014 6:42:08 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> > Craig, 
> > 
> > I have already commented that type of non-argument. Once we get   
> > closer to a refutation of your attempt to show that your argument   
> > against comp is not valid, you vindicate being illogical, 
> > 
> > I don't vindicate being illogical, I vindicate being more logical   
> > about factoring in the limitations of logic in modeling the deeper   
> > aspects of nature and consciousness. Logically we must not presume   
> > to rely on logic alone to argue the nature of awareness, from which   
> > logic seems to arise. 
> > 
> > so I am not sure that repeating my argument can help. 
> > 
> > 
> > I will just sum up: 
> > 
> > 1) You keep talking like if the situation was symmetrical. You   
> > defending ~comp, and me defending comp. But that is not the case. I   
> > am nowhere defending the idea that comp is true. I am agnostic on   
> > this. 
> > 
> > I think that you are pseudo-agnostic on it, and have admitted as   
> > much on occasion, but that's ok with me either way. 
> > 
> > I am not convince by your argument against comp, that's all. That is   
> > the confusion between ~[]comp and []~comp. 
> > 
> > Part of my argument though is that being convinced is not a   
> > realistic expectation of any argument about consciousness. My   
> > argument is that it can only ever be about how much sense it makes   
> > relatively speaking, and that the comp argument unfairly rules out   
> > immeasurable aesthetic qualities from the start. 
>
>
> It does not. *you* rule it out. You make less sense. 
>
>
> If it doesn't rule it out, then comp is circular. 
>
>
> Proof?
>

Reasoning. Comp has to begin without consciousness to explain anything. If 
comp begins with consciousness then you are saying that consciousness 
creates itself...which is fine, but it doesn't need computation then.
 

>
>
>
>
> For the statement that comp makes "consciousness is generated by 
> computation" 
>
>
> Comp does not say "consciousness is generated by computation". I have 
> insisted on this many times.
>

"In philosophy, a computational theory of mind names a view that the human 
mind or the human brain (or both) is an information processing system and 
that thinking is a form of computing. " - 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computational_theory_of_mind

The Wikipedia definition agrees with me. If you are not saying that 
consciousness is a form of computation or product of computation, then it 
seems to me you have made comp too weak of an assertion. What do you say 
that comp asserts?


>
>
>
> we have to assume first that comp is not already consciousness itself, 
>
>
>
> Comp is a theory. There are no reason to say comp is consciousness, no 
> more than to say that F=GmM/r^2 has some mass. category error.
>

Comp is a theory, but it is a theory that computation is what produces 
consciousness.
 

>
>
> I read below, and I do not see argument. Only rhetorical tricks, including 
> attribution of many things I have never said.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> otherwise we aren't saying anything.
>  
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > My argument predicts the bias of comp in predicting the bias of non- 
> > comp, so in that aspect we are symmetric. 
>
>
> Not at all, because I don't conclude in either comp or not-comp from   
> that. You do an error in logic. That's all. 
>
>
> The "error" in logic is necessary to locate consciousness. Your calling it 
> an error *is* the conclusion that makes comp seem possible.
>  
>
>
>
>
>
> > 
> > 2) you confuse truth and first person sense, all the time. 
> > 
> > I'm not confused, I'm flat out denying that truth can ever be   
> > anything other than sense, 
>
> Then truth = sense, as I said.
>
>
> It isn't though. Blue isn't truth or non-truth. Truth is a quality of 
> cognitive experience, but cognitive experience is not generated by truth.
>
>  
>
> But is is a cosmic or universal form of   
> sense, and you have to related it to the brain and flesh in some ways,   
> even making them delusion. 
>
>
> I'm not relating it to the brain or flesh at all. You have to stop 
> thinking of sense as implying physical matter. I compare logically that 
> 1+1=2 either makes sense because there is an unconscious property of truth 
> which we can detect consciously, or that 1+1=2 makes sense because it 
> re-acquaints us with a quality of coherence that we are compelled to 
> accept. I think if it was the former, then it would be impossible to ever 
> get a math problem wrong, and people would come out of the womb doing 
> calculus instead of sucking their thumb. The latter makes more sense to me, 
> because it does not take concepts like "1" and "=" for granted, but sees 
> 

Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Friday, April 11, 2014 12:16:47 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 10 Apr 2014, at 20:09, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
>
> > 
> > 
> > On Thursday, April 10, 2014 6:42:08 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> > Craig, 
> > 
> > I have already commented that type of non-argument. Once we get   
> > closer to a refutation of your attempt to show that your argument   
> > against comp is not valid, you vindicate being illogical, 
> > 
> > I don't vindicate being illogical, I vindicate being more logical   
> > about factoring in the limitations of logic in modeling the deeper   
> > aspects of nature and consciousness. Logically we must not presume   
> > to rely on logic alone to argue the nature of awareness, from which   
> > logic seems to arise. 
> > 
> > so I am not sure that repeating my argument can help. 
> > 
> > 
> > I will just sum up: 
> > 
> > 1) You keep talking like if the situation was symmetrical. You   
> > defending ~comp, and me defending comp. But that is not the case. I   
> > am nowhere defending the idea that comp is true. I am agnostic on   
> > this. 
> > 
> > I think that you are pseudo-agnostic on it, and have admitted as   
> > much on occasion, but that's ok with me either way. 
> > 
> > I am not convince by your argument against comp, that's all. That is   
> > the confusion between ~[]comp and []~comp. 
> > 
> > Part of my argument though is that being convinced is not a   
> > realistic expectation of any argument about consciousness. My   
> > argument is that it can only ever be about how much sense it makes   
> > relatively speaking, and that the comp argument unfairly rules out   
> > immeasurable aesthetic qualities from the start. 
>
>
> It does not. *you* rule it out. You make less sense. 
>

If it doesn't rule it out, then comp is circular. For the statement that 
comp makes "consciousness is generated by computation" we have to assume 
first that comp is not already consciousness itself, otherwise we aren't 
saying anything.
 

>
>
>
>
>
> > My argument predicts the bias of comp in predicting the bias of non- 
> > comp, so in that aspect we are symmetric. 
>
>
> Not at all, because I don't conclude in either comp or not-comp from   
> that. You do an error in logic. That's all. 
>

The "error" in logic is necessary to locate consciousness. Your calling it 
an error *is* the conclusion that makes comp seem possible.
 

>
>
>
>
> > 
> > 2) you confuse truth and first person sense, all the time. 
> > 
> > I'm not confused, I'm flat out denying that truth can ever be   
> > anything other than sense, 
>
> Then truth = sense, as I said.


It isn't though. Blue isn't truth or non-truth. Truth is a quality of 
cognitive experience, but cognitive experience is not generated by truth.

 

> But is is a cosmic or universal form of   
> sense, and you have to related it to the brain and flesh in some ways,   
> even making them delusion. 
>

I'm not relating it to the brain or flesh at all. You have to stop thinking 
of sense as implying physical matter. I compare logically that 1+1=2 either 
makes sense because there is an unconscious property of truth which we can 
detect consciously, or that 1+1=2 makes sense because it re-acquaints us 
with a quality of coherence that we are compelled to accept. I think if it 
was the former, then it would be impossible to ever get a math problem 
wrong, and people would come out of the womb doing calculus instead of 
sucking their thumb. The latter makes more sense to me, because it does not 
take concepts like "1" and "=" for granted, but sees them as generalized 
stereotypes which are common in certain kinds of perception (especially 
visual and tactile).
 

>
>
>
>
> > and I'm denying that sense has to be first person. It's an explicit   
> > part of my conjecture. 
>
> truth = first person is just an open problem in comp theology. 
>

Not sure what you mean by that, or how it relates.
 

>
>
>
>
> > 
> > I can be OK with this, for some theory which assumes non-comp, but   
> > not for an argument, which should be independent of any theory,   
> > against ~comp. If you use your theory to refute comp, you beg the   
> > question. 
> > 
> > By constraining the terms of the argument to disallow aesthetic   
> > sense to transcend logical truth, 
>
> There is no logical truth. It is always arithmetical truth. 
>

Either way my point is the same. You are only allowing arguments that begin 
with a truth that is square when my argument requires that we admit that 
the square is sitting in a larger circle.
 

>
>
>
>
> > you beg the question. We are symmetric here too. 
>
> No, I make assumption, where you are the one pretending having a proof   
> those assumption is inconsistent. 
>

I'm saying proof is likely impossible and irrelevant. It's about what makes 
more sense.
 

>
> I am OK with both ~[]comp and ~[]~comp. 
>
> You are the one saying that comp is false. 
> I am not the one saying that ~comp is false. 
>

If ~comp is true, then com

Re: Video of VCR

[Bruno Marchal]

On 10 Apr 2014, at 20:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Thursday, April 10, 2014 6:42:08 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Craig,

I have already commented that type of non-argument. Once we get  
closer to a refutation of your attempt to show that your argument  
against comp is not valid, you vindicate being illogical,


I don't vindicate being illogical, I vindicate being more logical  
about factoring in the limitations of logic in modeling the deeper  
aspects of nature and consciousness. Logically we must not presume  
to rely on logic alone to argue the nature of awareness, from which  
logic seems to arise.


so I am not sure that repeating my argument can help.


I will just sum up:

1) You keep talking like if the situation was symmetrical. You  
defending ~comp, and me defending comp. But that is not the case. I  
am nowhere defending the idea that comp is true. I am agnostic on  
this.


I think that you are pseudo-agnostic on it, and have admitted as  
much on occasion, but that's ok with me either way.


I am not convince by your argument against comp, that's all. That is  
the confusion between ~[]comp and []~comp.


Part of my argument though is that being convinced is not a  
realistic expectation of any argument about consciousness. My  
argument is that it can only ever be about how much sense it makes  
relatively speaking, and that the comp argument unfairly rules out  
immeasurable aesthetic qualities from the start.



It does not. *you* rule it out. You make less sense.





My argument predicts the bias of comp in predicting the bias of non- 
comp, so in that aspect we are symmetric.



Not at all, because I don't conclude in either comp or not-comp from  
that. You do an error in logic. That's all.







2) you confuse truth and first person sense, all the time.

I'm not confused, I'm flat out denying that truth can ever be  
anything other than sense,


Then truth = sense, as I said. But is is a cosmic or universal form of  
sense, and you have to related it to the brain and flesh in some ways,  
even making them delusion.





and I'm denying that sense has to be first person. It's an explicit  
part of my conjecture.


truth = first person is just an open problem in comp theology.






I can be OK with this, for some theory which assumes non-comp, but  
not for an argument, which should be independent of any theory,  
against ~comp. If you use your theory to refute comp, you beg the  
question.


By constraining the terms of the argument to disallow aesthetic  
sense to transcend logical truth,


There is no logical truth. It is always arithmetical truth.





you beg the question. We are symmetric here too.


No, I make assumption, where you are the one pretending having a proof  
those assumption is inconsistent.


I am OK with both ~[]comp and ~[]~comp.

You are the one saying that comp is false.
I am not the one saying that ~comp is false.

You seem to have difficulties here. With respect to comp I am  
agnostic, and you are "atheist". You pretend to know that my sun in  
law is a doll.






3) You confuse levels in theories. You seem to infer that a theory  
can only talk about syntax and formal objects, because a theory is  
itself a formal object, but that is a confusion between a theory,  
and what the theory is about.


No, you're projecting that confusion on me because my results  
disagree with yours.


The results as such does not disagree, given that your theory is close  
to the machine first person phenomenology.

I just patiently try to make you understand a mistake, that's all.




I understand that the number 4 or the expression x are not intended  
to relate literally to the figures 4 or x, and I understand that  
your view of arithmetic assumes a correspondence to Platonic entities.


It does not. You need only to agree that  0+x = x, etc.



My view though is that no such entities can arise from anything  
other than the capacity to detect, feel, compare, control, etc.


To just define "capacity", "detect", "compare" ... you need to assume  
things like 0+x=x.






To give arithmetic entities experiential potentials makes comp beg  
the question from the start. How is arithmetic truth not conscious  
from the start, in order to produce machines that find themselves to  
be conscious?


Arithmetical truth can be said conscious, except that it is not a  
person, and it is more the container and limiter of the consciousness  
differentiating flux of of the universal numbers.






4) You take "sense" for granted, and you object to elementary  
arithmetic. Again, why not, in your theory, but again, that beg the  
question as an argument refuting comp. Here I can only suggest you  
to study a bit more computer science and logic.


We can just turn that around and say you take "arithmetic" for  
granted, and you object to elementary sense.


But all scientist take arithmetic for granted, nine take sense for  
granted in the 3p sense of scientific theories (but 

Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, April 10, 2014 6:42:08 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Craig, 
>
> I have already commented that type of non-argument. Once we get closer to 
> a refutation of your attempt to show that your argument against comp is not 
> valid, you vindicate being illogical, 
>

I don't vindicate being illogical, I vindicate being more logical about 
factoring in the limitations of logic in modeling the deeper aspects of 
nature and consciousness. Logically we must not presume to rely on logic 
alone to argue the nature of awareness, from which logic seems to arise.
 

> so I am not sure that repeating my argument can help.
>
>
> I will just sum up:
>
> 1) You keep talking like if the situation was symmetrical. You defending 
> ~comp, and me defending comp. But that is not the case. I am nowhere 
> defending the idea that comp is true. I am agnostic on this.
>

I think that you are pseudo-agnostic on it, and have admitted as much on 
occasion, but that's ok with me either way.
 

> I am not convince by your argument against comp, that's all. That is the 
> confusion between ~[]comp and []~comp.
>

Part of my argument though is that being convinced is not a realistic 
expectation of any argument about consciousness. My argument is that it can 
only ever be about how much sense it makes relatively speaking, and that 
the comp argument unfairly rules out immeasurable aesthetic qualities from 
the start. My argument predicts the bias of comp in predicting the bias of 
non-comp, so in that aspect we are symmetric.
 

> 2) you confuse truth and first person sense, all the time.
>

I'm not confused, I'm flat out denying that truth can ever be anything 
other than sense, and I'm denying that sense has to be first person. It's 
an explicit part of my conjecture.
 

> I can be OK with this, for some theory which assumes non-comp, but not for 
> an argument, which should be independent of any theory, against ~comp. If 
> you use your theory to refute comp, you beg the question.
>

By constraining the terms of the argument to disallow aesthetic sense to 
transcend logical truth, you beg the question. We are symmetric here too.
 

> 3) You confuse levels in theories. You seem to infer that a theory can 
> only talk about syntax and formal objects, because a theory is itself a 
> formal object, but that is a confusion between a theory, and what the 
> theory is about.
>

No, you're projecting that confusion on me because my results disagree with 
yours. I understand that the number 4 or the expression x are not intended 
to relate literally to the figures 4 or x, and I understand that your view 
of arithmetic assumes a correspondence to Platonic entities. My view though 
is that no such entities can arise from anything other than the capacity to 
detect, feel, compare, control, etc. To give arithmetic entities 
experiential potentials makes comp beg the question from the start. How is 
arithmetic truth not conscious from the start, in order to produce machines 
that find themselves to be conscious?
 

> 4) You take "sense" for granted, and you object to elementary arithmetic. 
> Again, why not, in your theory, but again, that beg the question as an 
> argument refuting comp. Here I can only suggest you to study a bit more 
> computer science and logic.
>

We can just turn that around and say you take "arithmetic" for granted, and 
you object to elementary sense. You are saying that the assumptions of comp 
cannot be challenged unless we first agree not to challenge the assumptions 
of comp with new assumptions. 
 

> 5) Your assumption are unclear. It is still not clear if you assume or not 
> a physical reality,
>

I assume sensory-motive interaction. Physicality and realism are a set of 
qualities which potentially arise through modulations of 
sensitive/insensitive interaction.

or how are handled the subject's references to the physical Cf David Nyman. 
> It is not clear how you address the mind/body problem.
>

I address it by putting the entire universe in the gap between mind and 
body. Perceptual relativity creates mind-like and body-like qualities to 
represent distance between categories of experience.
 

> 6) Stathis' point: what in the brain/body would be responsible for its non 
> Turing emulability.
>

The same thing that is responsible for consciousness. In my view, it is 
backward to begin from a brain and say why won't a copy of this be 
conscious. Instead we must begin with a life experience and ask why we 
would assume it can be reduced to the functions of an object. It is only if 
we buy into our 1p sense of realism for 3p objects completely that we could 
make that assumption.
 

> Saying that my sun-in-law is a zombie/doll is based on your non-comp, it 
> is not an argument for non-comp. Begging question again.
>

My non-comp leads to the conclusion that comp cannot be defeated by 
argument, so it is circular to demand that it must be. Feeling cannot be 
proved, but that does not mean it is not 

Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, April 9, 2014 5:42:18 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 07 Apr 2014, at 22:01, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> Another part 2
>
> On Sunday, April 6, 2014 1:13:09 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 05 Apr 2014, at 19:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>  
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  
>>>
>>> I keep explaining that arithmetic seen from inside escapes somehow the 
>>> mathematics accessible to the machine. 
>>>
>>>
>>> No need to keep explaining, I understood from the beginning. I'm 
>>> suggesting that the 'somehow' is due to the machine actually being a 
>>> reduced set of qualia. Arithmetic is a machine run by sense.
>>>
>>>
>>> No problem with such suggestion, but a suggestion is not a refutation.
>>>
>>>
>>> A refutation may not be possible because comp is too autistic. It 
>>> refuses to accept any arguments that are not defined in purely logical 
>>> terms. Insensitivity defines sensitivity in a trivial way.
>>>
>>>
>>> False. It accepts any valid argument. You did not present one. 
>>>
>>
>> You're just affirming what I said. Why do you assume that the truth must 
>> be a valid argument? 
>>
>>
>> Truth is not a valid argument. It is not an argument to begin with. It is 
>> a valuation of a statement. A semantics. 
>>
>
> It doesn't have to be a statement. Truth is a quality of congruence across 
> sensory experiences.
>
>
> For the 1p.
>

Anything beyond 1p is begging the question. We can't know if truth extends 
beyond the nested collective 1p.

 

> Of course, by denying any independent 3p, you just deny that science has 
> any ability to handle such question, but comp, even if wrong, provides the 
> counter-example. You deny it from your theory, but that is trivial and beg 
> the question.
>

There may indeed be advantages to studying theories that are wrong rather 
than studying realities that might be impossible to model theoretically, 
but that doesn't deny science from stretching to fit the new reality.
 

>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>> Some truths are experiential and aesthetic. 
>>
>>
>> You confuse p and []p & p.
>>
>
> No, I deny "& p" altogether.
>
>
>
> Then you can prove that 0=1. The " & p" has to be added, the machines 
> already "know" this. 
>

I can suggest that 'prove', '0', '=', and '1' are all sensible conditions 
which can be expanded or contracted to suit the intended context. 0 can be 
'almost 1' in some context, or it can be the opposite of 1 in another 
context, or it can be an irreducible part of a continuum in another context.
 

>
>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>> They appear before logic and cognition.
>>
>>
>> At which level, in what sense of "before"? I need a theory to make sense 
>> of such terms.
>>
>
> In the sense of there being a possibility of sense without logic but not 
> logic without sense.
>
>
> In your theory. That begs the question. You can't use your theory in this 
> discussion.
>

The only thing that I'm interested in discussing is my theory. It's my 
theory that makes comp invalid, why would you try to censor it?

 

>
>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>>> You just tell us that you know that, but that is not an argument. 
>>>
>>
>> I don't say I know it, I say that it makes more sense.
>>
>>
>> That is a progress. It makes more sense to machine too. But "more sense" 
>> is not an argument, especially in this context.
>>
>
> More sense is better than an argument. Arguments are limited to logic.
>
>
> Logic is applied in argument, about anything. Again, if you need to be 
> illogical as this point, you make my point.
>

Logic cannot be applied to aesthetic experience. It is false that it can be 
applied to anything and it is false that pointing this out makes my point 
illogical.
 

>
>
>  
>
>>
>> How do you know that a machine that can't feel (like a voice mail 
>> machine) knows that it can't feel? 
>>
>>
>>
>> I know nothing (publicly communicable). I just tell you what I assume, 
>> and what I derive from the assumption. 
>>
>> But I thought you were saying that you have an argument showing that step 
>> 0 (comp) is invalid at the start.
>>
>
> Comp is invalid at the start because it loses nothing when we assume that 
> all function can be reduced to logic and hidden logic.
>
> Computation works as a map of maps, and need have no territory that is 
> presented aesthetically, either theoretically or empirically. The jump from 
> map to territory is reverse engineered from the very expectations of our 
> own awareness, making comp more likely to be a figment of circular 
> reasoning. 
>
>
> Confusion between []~comp and ~[]comp. It would be circular if I was 
> defending the truth of comp, but I am just showing that your argument beg 
> the question.
>

Even if my argument seems to beg the question from a 3p logical 
perspective, it doesn't matter because the argument assumes from the start 
that 3p logic is not necessary or sufficient to address consciousness.
 

>
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>> Why would a more sophisticated machine be any differen

Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, April 9, 2014 4:58:40 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 07 Apr 2014, at 21:33, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, April 6, 2014 1:13:09 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 05 Apr 2014, at 19:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> I'm not saying that I know it, I'm saying that it makes more sense.
>>
>>
>> But then why are we discussing? 
>>
>
> To make more sense of everything.
>  
>
>> Then, as I said, comp makes no sense from the 1p, which in comp is the 
>> sense-maker, which makes your point logically in favor of comp.
>>
>
> If 1p is the sense maker, and comp makes no sense from the 1p, then comp 
> makes no sense.
>
>
> For the 1p. You will tell me that is all what count in your theory, but 
> that is what is debated, and you beg the question again.
>

You are the one who is saying that sense making is limited to 1p. How is 
that begging the question to ask you to clarify your contradiction that 
comp makes sense beyond 1p, but that sense making is limited to 1p at the 
same time.
 

>
>
>
>> I am just saying that the non comp feeling is normal with comp, 
>>
>
> Yes, I have no problem with the idea that some analysis of machine 
> function would point outside of computation.
>
>
> ... some analysis of machine function made by the machine.
>

Sure. In my view, machines reflect a particular range of sensible 
relations, so that they do indeed tap into what I would call a 
'meta-theroetical' library, but that library is a generic reflection that 
can be used to impersonate sense, but not experience it.
 

>
>
>
>> Very plausibly. That part can be related to Tarski or Gödel limitation 
>> theorem, although very often the arguments are not valid, but sometimes it 
>> is.
>>
>
> Some things may be true but not arguable, so that an invalid argument can 
> still point us to a valid truth - i.e. a metaphor.
>
>
> You confuse false and non-valid. Non-valid does not entail false, but it 
> remains non valid, and thus is not an argument, even if you were correct in 
> the conclusion. You might guess this, because that type of argument can 
> prove everything.
>

What we are used to thinking of as valid or non-valid has to more deeply 
considered when it comes to consciousness. We cannot argue with the method 
that we use to move our fingers or taste coffee. 
 

>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>> If I said that I have a theory that horses pull carts rather than the 
>> other way around, does its lack of argumentative value make it less true?
>>
>>
>> Lack of justfication can make it less plausible, compared to a theory 
>> with more justification. That is a very contextual questions, depending on 
>> many things.
>>
>>
> You're interested in what makes a good theory, but I'm interested in 
> understanding consciousness.
>
>
>
> I am interested in consciousness too, and ask for a good theory, not one 
> which makes it into a primitive falling from the sky.
>

If its primitive, it doesn't fall from the sky, the sky falls from it.
 

>
>
>> The decision to say "yes" to the doctor.
>>
>>
>> What would a UM say to the doctor?
>>
>>
>> The 1-I will say no, and the 3-I might say yes. The UM will live a 
>> conflict, and only its education might help to decide, in one or the other 
>> direction. 
>>
>
> That sounds like it is the 1-I doing the deciding...which makes me wonder 
> what is 3-I there to do?
>
>
>
> Your body, or your Gödel number, that is a description at the right 
> substitution level. It is the []p, for the case of the ideally correct 
> machine, as opposed to the 1p Theaetetus' []p & p, which obeys a quite 
> different logic.
>

It sounds like the 3-I is just an address.
 

>
>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>> The machine's decision to add a self-consistency axiom and become another 
>> machine.
>> The direct introspection of the machine, when she feels what is out of 
>> any possible justification.
>> That is formalized by the the annuli Z* \ Z, X* \ X, etc.
>>
>> Yes, mathematical logic provides tools to meta-formalizes some non 
>> formalizable, by the machine, predicate which are still applying on the 
>> machine.
>>
>>
>> Whether it is formal or meta-formal, it's still logic. 
>>
>>
>> Not really. Logic is applied, but is not the subject of the inquiry. As 
>> you said above, arithmetic is not entirely logical.
>>
>
> It depends. If the method of inquiry is logical and the response is 
> logical, there is no reason to expect that there is anything beyond logic 
> in between, even if it is not the logic that we are expecting.  
>
>
> But the point is that "logical" does not mean anything per se. The 3p and 
> the 1p have different and opposed logics.
>

Logical means representation by cognitive functions rather than aesthetic 
contents. If you wanted, for instance, to make a cell phone that 
auto-rotates its screen, you have to use some hardware; an acceleration 
sensor or mercury switch. Such a sensor has no substitution level as no 
logical instructions can locate the actual ph

Re: Video of VCR

[Bruno Marchal]

On 07 Apr 2014, at 22:01, Craig Weinberg wrote:


Another part 2

On Sunday, April 6, 2014 1:13:09 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 05 Apr 2014, at 19:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:











I keep explaining that arithmetic seen from inside escapes somehow  
the mathematics accessible to the machine.


No need to keep explaining, I understood from the beginning. I'm  
suggesting that the 'somehow' is due to the machine actually being  
a reduced set of qualia. Arithmetic is a machine run by sense.


No problem with such suggestion, but a suggestion is not a  
refutation.


A refutation may not be possible because comp is too autistic. It  
refuses to accept any arguments that are not defined in purely  
logical terms. Insensitivity defines sensitivity in a trivial way.


False. It accepts any valid argument. You did not present one.

You're just affirming what I said. Why do you assume that the truth  
must be a valid argument?


Truth is not a valid argument. It is not an argument to begin with.  
It is a valuation of a statement. A semantics.


It doesn't have to be a statement. Truth is a quality of congruence  
across sensory experiences.


For the 1p. Of course, by denying any independent 3p, you just deny  
that science has any ability to handle such question, but comp, even  
if wrong, provides the counter-example. You deny it from your theory,  
but that is trivial and beg the question.










Some truths are experiential and aesthetic.


You confuse p and []p & p.

No, I deny "& p" altogether.



Then you can prove that 0=1. The " & p" has to be added, the machines  
already "know" this.











They appear before logic and cognition.


At which level, in what sense of "before"? I need a theory to make  
sense of such terms.


In the sense of there being a possibility of sense without logic but  
not logic without sense.


In your theory. That begs the question. You can't use your theory in  
this discussion.














You just tell us that you know that, but that is not an argument.

I don't say I know it, I say that it makes more sense.


That is a progress. It makes more sense to machine too. But "more  
sense" is not an argument, especially in this context.


More sense is better than an argument. Arguments are limited to logic.


Logic is applied in argument, about anything. Again, if you need to be  
illogical as this point, you make my point.







How do you know that a machine that can't feel (like a voice mail  
machine) knows that it can't feel?



I know nothing (publicly communicable). I just tell you what I  
assume, and what I derive from the assumption.


But I thought you were saying that you have an argument showing that  
step 0 (comp) is invalid at the start.


Comp is invalid at the start because it loses nothing when we assume  
that all function can be reduced to logic and hidden logic.
Computation works as a map of maps, and need have no territory that  
is presented aesthetically, either theoretically or empirically. The  
jump from map to territory is reverse engineered from the very  
expectations of our own awareness, making comp more likely to be a  
figment of circular reasoning.


Confusion between []~comp and ~[]comp. It would be circular if I was  
defending the truth of comp, but I am just showing that your argument  
beg the question.









Why would a more sophisticated machine be any different in that  
regard?


A voice mail machine does not seem to implement a universal machine  
believing in some induction principles, like PA, ZF.


We don't know that the voice mail machine lacks PA and ZF induction  
principles,



This is ridiculous.



any more that I know that machines can't be zombies. Even if that  
were true though, I see no reason to presume that the extra  
functionality added through PA or ZF need result in any aesthetic  
phenomena flying around.


The point is that you argue for the contrary, but don't present an  
argument independent of your non-comp assumption, making it circular.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Video of VCR

[Bruno Marchal]

On 07 Apr 2014, at 21:33, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Sunday, April 6, 2014 1:13:09 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 05 Apr 2014, at 19:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:



I'm not saying that I know it, I'm saying that it makes more sense.

But then why are we discussing?

To make more sense of everything.

Then, as I said, comp makes no sense from the 1p, which in comp is  
the sense-maker, which makes your point logically in favor of comp.


If 1p is the sense maker, and comp makes no sense from the 1p, then  
comp makes no sense.


For the 1p. You will tell me that is all what count in your theory,  
but that is what is debated, and you beg the question again.





I am just saying that the non comp feeling is normal with comp,

Yes, I have no problem with the idea that some analysis of machine  
function would point outside of computation.


... some analysis of machine function made by the machine.




Very plausibly. That part can be related to Tarski or Gödel  
limitation theorem, although very often the arguments are not valid,  
but sometimes it is.


Some things may be true but not arguable, so that an invalid  
argument can still point us to a valid truth - i.e. a metaphor.


You confuse false and non-valid. Non-valid does not entail false, but  
it remains non valid, and thus is not an argument, even if you were  
correct in the conclusion. You might guess this, because that type of  
argument can prove everything.









If I said that I have a theory that horses pull carts rather than  
the other way around, does its lack of argumentative value make it  
less true?


Lack of justfication can make it less plausible, compared to a  
theory with more justification. That is a very contextual questions,  
depending on many things.



You're interested in what makes a good theory, but I'm interested in  
understanding consciousness.



I am interested in consciousness too, and ask for a good theory, not  
one which makes it into a primitive falling from the sky.




The decision to say "yes" to the doctor.

What would a UM say to the doctor?

The 1-I will say no, and the 3-I might say yes. The UM will live a  
conflict, and only its education might help to decide, in one or the  
other direction.


That sounds like it is the 1-I doing the deciding...which makes me  
wonder what is 3-I there to do?



Your body, or your Gödel number, that is a description at the right  
substitution level. It is the []p, for the case of the ideally correct  
machine, as opposed to the 1p Theaetetus' []p & p, which obeys a quite  
different logic.











The machine's decision to add a self-consistency axiom and become  
another machine.
The direct introspection of the machine, when she feels what is out  
of any possible justification.

That is formalized by the the annuli Z* \ Z, X* \ X, etc.

Yes, mathematical logic provides tools to meta-formalizes some non  
formalizable, by the machine, predicate which are still applying on  
the machine.


Whether it is formal or meta-formal, it's still logic.

Not really. Logic is applied, but is not the subject of the inquiry.  
As you said above, arithmetic is not entirely logical.


It depends. If the method of inquiry is logical and the response is  
logical, there is no reason to expect that there is anything beyond  
logic in between, even if it is not the logic that we are expecting.


But the point is that "logical" does not mean anything per se. The 3p  
and the 1p have different and opposed logics.








It remains a view of consciousness that lacks aesthetic presence

That is the statement I am quite skeptical about, and that you  
should justify, at least the day you pretend that comp is false (not  
today).


I justify it with all of the examples you keep ignoring -  
blindsight, synesthesia, the separation of i/o devices from CPUs,  
the map-territory distinction, the conflict between generic/ 
universal systems and proprietary histories, the model of  
information as a reduction of qualia, the lack of need for geometry  
in binary systems, etc. I don't see anything that positively  
supports qualia arising from computation, other than the pathetic  
fallacy.


You don't have to see that. The counter-example shows you invalid.  
That's all. You confuse again []~comp, which you defend, and ~[]comp,  
on which we both agree, as comp -> ~[]comp.














and is limited to programmatic states of figuring and configuring.

It concerns both the 1p, and its relation with some 3p. You are the  
one conflating them, but that beg the question of why we should  
conflate them.


Not sure what you mean or how it relates.



All your argument shows that the 3p machine cannot think, and I agree  
with them. A body, or a description or a number cannot think indeed,  
only a (first) person can. But comp does not say that a machine can  
think, only that it can manifest the thinking of a person. With comp,  
my body and brain are just natural machine that we get at bi

Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

Another part 2

On Sunday, April 6, 2014 1:13:09 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 05 Apr 2014, at 19:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>> I keep explaining that arithmetic seen from inside escapes somehow the 
>> mathematics accessible to the machine. 
>>
>>
>> No need to keep explaining, I understood from the beginning. I'm 
>> suggesting that the 'somehow' is due to the machine actually being a 
>> reduced set of qualia. Arithmetic is a machine run by sense.
>>
>>
>> No problem with such suggestion, but a suggestion is not a refutation.
>>
>>
>> A refutation may not be possible because comp is too autistic. It refuses 
>> to accept any arguments that are not defined in purely logical terms. 
>> Insensitivity defines sensitivity in a trivial way.
>>
>>
>> False. It accepts any valid argument. You did not present one. 
>>
>
> You're just affirming what I said. Why do you assume that the truth must 
> be a valid argument? 
>
>
> Truth is not a valid argument. It is not an argument to begin with. It is 
> a valuation of a statement. A semantics. 
>

It doesn't have to be a statement. Truth is a quality of congruence across 
sensory experiences.
 

>
>
>
> Some truths are experiential and aesthetic. 
>
>
> You confuse p and []p & p.
>

No, I deny "& p" altogether.
 

>
>
>
> They appear before logic and cognition.
>
>
> At which level, in what sense of "before"? I need a theory to make sense 
> of such terms.
>

In the sense of there being a possibility of sense without logic but not 
logic without sense.
 

>
>
>
>
>
>  
>
>> You just tell us that you know that, but that is not an argument. 
>>
>
> I don't say I know it, I say that it makes more sense.
>
>
> That is a progress. It makes more sense to machine too. But "more sense" 
> is not an argument, especially in this context.
>

More sense is better than an argument. Arguments are limited to logic.
 

>
>
>
>
>  
>
>> Nor do you present a theory, in the usual informal sense used by 
>> scientists, which you criticize as having inadequate tools, but then you 
>> put yourself out of the dialog.
>>
>
> Yes, the dialog is the problem. You have to take off the sunglasses to see 
> all of the light.
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>> and it seems that changing the logic to refute comp, is like trying to 
>> rotate the solar system to be in front of your computer (it is simpler to 
>> rotate yourself).
>>
>>
>> I'm not changing the logic, I'm denying that it is relevant. 
>>
>>
>> This is worst than "don't ask". It is: "let us be irrational". 
>>
>>
>> Let us be rational in understanding the trans-rational, but do not limit 
>> ourselves to the rationality of strict logic.
>>
>>
>>
>> = "give me some amount of illogicalness so that I can keep up my 
>> prejudice against machine";
>>
>>
>> "Let me disallow all but strictly logical terms so I can keep up my 
>> prejudice against consciousness".
>>
>>
>>
>> UDA is informal, and I hope valid. AUDA uses mathematical logic and 
>> theoretical computer science, which uses are of course invited when you 
>> assume computationalism.
>>
>> It seems again like if you do have a prejudice against my sun in law, and 
>> other possible machines, ability to manifest personal consciousness.
>>
>
> It's not a prejudice, it's an understanding. Consciousness need not be 
> manifested by anything, let alone machines. Consciousness is manifestation 
> itself.
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Consciousness is what we are looking for and consciousness is required 
>> before logic.
>>
>>
>> Like the far away galaxies are required before the telescope, but that 
>> does not make the telescope irrelevant to detect the galaxies.
>>
>>
>> No, but the galaxies are not defined by what a telescope detects. An 
>> array of telescopes cannot create a galaxy.
>>
>>
>> Nor can logic create consciousness, but still be useful to reason about 
>> consciousness. You make my point, again.
>>
>>
>> It be useful to reason about consciousness to a point, but it doesn't go 
>> all the way, 
>>
>>
>> Hmm... OK. Incompleteness valid this.
>>
>
> :)
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>> and it doesn't know why it can't go all the way. Surely incompleteness 
>> validates this.
>>
>>
>>
>> No. the machine can be aware of its own incompleteness and understand why 
>> it doesn't go all the way, but also why this makes the possible "outside" 
>> productive and very rich.
>>
>
> How do you know that a machine that can't feel (like a voice mail machine) 
> knows that it can't feel? 
>
>
>
> I know nothing (publicly communicable). I just tell you what I assume, and 
> what I derive from the assumption. 
>
> But I thought you were saying that you have an argument showing that step 
> 0 (comp) is invalid at the start.
>

Comp is invalid at the start because it loses nothing when we assume that 
all function can be reduced to logic and hidden logic. Computation works as 
a map of maps, and need

Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Sunday, April 6, 2014 1:13:09 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 05 Apr 2014, at 19:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, April 4, 2014 2:07:47 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 04 Apr 2014, at 03:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, April 3, 2014 2:34:06 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> I'm not confusing them, I'm saying that []~comp is not untrue
>
>
> this means you say []~comp is true.
>
>
> Yes.
>
>
>
> Nice. 
>
>
>  
>
>
> Or that you confuse, like you did already "truth" and knowledge, but in 
> that case you keep saying that you know []~comp, yet your argument above 
> was only for ~[]comp, on which I already agree, as it is a consequence of 
> comp.
>
>
> I'm not saying that I know it, I'm saying that it makes more sense.
>
>
> But then why are we discussing? 
>

To make more sense of everything.
 

> Then, as I said, comp makes no sense from the 1p, which in comp is the 
> sense-maker, which makes your point logically in favor of comp.
>

If 1p is the sense maker, and comp makes no sense from the 1p, then comp 
makes no sense.


>
>  
>
>
>
>
> just because it is outside of logic. When you arbitrarily begin from the 
> 3p perspective, you can only see the flatland version of 1p intuition. You 
> would have to consider the possibility that numbers can come from this kind 
> of intuition and not the other way around. If you put your fingers in your 
> ears, and only listen to formalism, then you can only hear what formalism 
> has to say about intuition, which is... not much.
>
>
> Why?
>
>
> Because of the incompleteness of all formal systems.
>
>
> But this is based on arithmetic.
>

Ah, you are confusing the arithmetic with the sensible conditions that the 
arithmetic is pointing to. 


>
>
> comp implies that ~comp has the benefits of the doubt. I told you this 
> many times. 
> As I just repeated above, this does not refute comp.
>
>
> What does it mean to give it the benefit of the doubt but then deny it?
>
>
>
> You are the only one who deny a theory here.
>
>
> By saying that ~comp is only what seems true from the machine's 1p 
> perspective, you are denying ~comp can be more true than comp.
>
>
> I am just saying that the non comp feeling is normal with comp, 
>

Yes, I have no problem with the idea that some analysis of machine function 
would point outside of computation.
 

> and cannot be used to refute logically comp. 
>

Why not? Aren't you just jumping to a conclusion like 'since there are 
drive through  restaurants, it means that we cannot assume that cars are 
not hungry'.
 

> I am not denying non-comp. Not at all.
>
>
>
>
>
>  
>
>
> I never said that comp is true, or that comp is false. I say only that 
> comp leads to a Plato/aristotle reversal, to be short.
>
>
> We agree on this from the start, but what I am saying is that Plato also 
> can be reversed on the lower level, so that the ideal/arithmetic is 
> generated statistically by aesthetics.
>
>
>
> Derive 1 = 1 in your theory. Show me the theory first.
>

In my theory, 1 = 1 is reflects a particular set of mathematical 
expectations. I don't make any claims on the contents of arithmetic, only 
on the nature of what arithmetic derives from.

 

>
>
>
>  
>
>
> But *you* say that comp is false, and that is why we ask you an argument. 
> The argument has to be understandable, and not of the type "let us abandon 
> logic and ...", which is like "God told me ...", and has zero argumentative 
> value.
>
>
> We don't have to abandon logic, but we have to understand that the source 
> of logic is not necessarily going to be logical. This is what most people 
> get from Godel. 
>
>
> We knew this already. The choice of theories are not 100% logical. We 
> don't need Gödel for this.
>

even better
 

>
>
>
> The truth does not require argumentation value. 
>
>
> Very plausibly. That part can be related to Tarski or Gödel limitation 
> theorem, although very often the arguments are not valid, but sometimes it 
> is.
>

Some things may be true but not arguable, so that an invalid argument can 
still point us to a valid truth - i.e. a metaphor.
 

>
>
>
> If I said that I have a theory that horses pull carts rather than the 
> other way around, does its lack of argumentative value make it less true?
>
>
> Lack of justfication can make it less plausible, compared to a theory with 
> more justification. That is a very contextual questions, depending on many 
> things.
>
>
You're interested in what makes a good theory, but I'm interested in 
understanding consciousness.
 

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>  
>
>
> Comp is Gödelian. It behaves like "consistency" (~[]f, <>t), which entails 
> the consistency of its negation: <>t -> <>[]f.
>
>
> Not sure what you mean. Maybe if you wrote it out without symbols.
>
>
> If I am consistent then it is consistent that I am not consistent.   (I = 
> the 3p notion of self).
>
>
> How is "I" a 3p notion of self?
>
>
> It is not. Only here.
>

(raise eyebrow)
 

>  
>
I was just sa

Re: Video of VCR

[Bruno Marchal]

On 05 Apr 2014, at 19:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Friday, April 4, 2014 2:07:47 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 04 Apr 2014, at 03:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:











Logic is just required to be able to argue with others, and you do  
use it, it seems to me, except that you seem to decide  
opportunistically to not apply it to "refute" comp.


Comp can't be refuted logically.


Sorry, but the whole point is that it might be. It can be refuted  
logically, arithmetically, and empirically.


It's a mirage. It seems like it could be refuted, but the built in  
bias of logic overlooks the stacked deck. Just as emotions and ego  
have their biases that warp our thinking, so too does logical  
thinking have an agenda which undersignifies its competition.



You are so wrong here that I have to pause. You talk in a way which  
empties the dialog of any sense. You tell me in advance you need to  
be illogical to refute my agnosticism in the matter.


You don't have to be 'illogical', you just have to transcend strict  
logic...break the fourth wall...use some of that courage you were  
talking about. All that I am saying is that incompleteness supports  
the limits of logic, so that we cannot presume to hold sense to that  
standard if my view is true.


Incompleteness does not supports the limit of logics, but the limits  
of theories and machines. Then it shows how theories and machines can  
access to those limitations and how they can transcend them in some  
local sense, and exploit them to nuance their view on themselves.
Ideally correct and simple machines do have already a rich and complex  
"theology", including a "physics". We have to listen to them, before  
judging them, I think. (Here I gave the programs).







How could that conversation have sense? I put my hypotheses on the  
table, but here you put a gun on the table.


Haha, yes, that's the thing, sense is tyrannical and violent. It  
acts like it is following laws but it cheats and then blames  
something else. At least I'm telling you it's a gun, you've  
convinced yourself that your gun is just a polite hypothesis.


Confusion between ~[]comp and []~comp.

I don't pretend that my assumption are true. And sometimes you do,  
forgetting that you have put ~comp in your assumption, and so that you  
beg the question when using your theory to "refute" comp.


In your last post, it seemed to me you progress on it, but the  
progress seem fragile here.








The choice is between logic, which is basically the most common part  
of common sense, and war or violence.


It's precisely because logic is the most common part of common sense  
that it cannot parse the germ of sense,



You are right, it cannot. But from this it does not follow that  
machines, which are not purely logical, as they have a non trivial  
arithmetical (non logical) components, cannot parse the germ of sense.


You still believe that arithmetic comes from logic?




which is absolutely unprecedented. Identity is not just uncommon,  
but the opposite - unrepeatable, proprietary, anti-mechnical. There  
is no choice at all. There is the illusion of logic and the reality  
of having to carve some kind of genuine sanity out of this thing,  
moment by moment. If we wait for logic to give us permission, we  
lose the moment.


I can relate, but you don't provide an argument why machines or number  
cannot relate too.


You keep thinking in term of simple logic, or simple non universal  
machine, but then you miss the key notion which makes computationalism  
consistent with know facts, including the experience of consciousness.  
That does not prove comp, but that disprove your type of argument  
against comp.








Your theory is "don't ask", but I realize also "don't argue".

Asking and arguing is great, but you can't get away from the fact  
that it doesn't make sense for the one who asks and argues to be a  
logical machine. It is comp which ultimately makes asking and  
arguing irrelevant, but it does so like a vampire - obligating us to  
invite us in..be fair to the imposter and let him take your brain.


Comp insists that you have the right to say "no" to the doctor. But  
your type of philosophy would entail a segregation among people with  
and without prostheses.


Tell me, can my sun-in-law vote?







That might be correct, and provable in your non-comp theory, but  
that is not an argument against comp.

(And this is no more an argument in favor of comp of course).

It is an argument against comp in my non-comp theory.


That is trivial then.



If it comes down to choosing between the certainty of life and  
awareness as you know it and taking a gamble on logic and  
computation, do you say yes to the farmer? If we aren't being faced  
with death with a mad doctor as our only hope, would we gamble with  
our lives? Would a machine say yes to the farmer?



It will not be like that. It will be more like 2060 working artificial  
hippocampus, 2090 artif

Re: Video of VCR

[Bruno Marchal]

On 05 Apr 2014, at 19:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Friday, April 4, 2014 2:07:47 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 04 Apr 2014, at 03:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Thursday, April 3, 2014 2:34:06 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

I'm not confusing them, I'm saying that []~comp is not untrue

this means you say []~comp is true.

Yes.



Nice.





Or that you confuse, like you did already "truth" and knowledge, but  
in that case you keep saying that you know []~comp, yet your  
argument above was only for ~[]comp, on which I already agree, as it  
is a consequence of comp.


I'm not saying that I know it, I'm saying that it makes more sense.


But then why are we discussing?
Then, as I said, comp makes no sense from the 1p, which in comp is the  
sense-maker, which makes your point logically in favor of comp.








just because it is outside of logic. When you arbitrarily begin from  
the 3p perspective, you can only see the flatland version of 1p  
intuition. You would have to consider the possibility that numbers  
can come from this kind of intuition and not the other way around.  
If you put your fingers in your ears, and only listen to formalism,  
then you can only hear what formalism has to say about intuition,  
which is... not much.


Why?

Because of the incompleteness of all formal systems.


But this is based on arithmetic.




comp implies that ~comp has the benefits of the doubt. I told you  
this many times.

As I just repeated above, this does not refute comp.

What does it mean to give it the benefit of the doubt but then deny  
it?



You are the only one who deny a theory here.

By saying that ~comp is only what seems true from the machine's 1p  
perspective, you are denying ~comp can be more true than comp.


I am just saying that the non comp feeling is normal with comp, and  
cannot be used to refute logically comp. I am not denying non-comp.  
Not at all.









I never said that comp is true, or that comp is false. I say only  
that comp leads to a Plato/aristotle reversal, to be short.


We agree on this from the start, but what I am saying is that Plato  
also can be reversed on the lower level, so that the ideal/ 
arithmetic is generated statistically by aesthetics.



Derive 1 = 1 in your theory. Show me the theory first.






But *you* say that comp is false, and that is why we ask you an  
argument. The argument has to be understandable, and not of the type  
"let us abandon logic and ...", which is like "God told me ...", and  
has zero argumentative value.


We don't have to abandon logic, but we have to understand that the  
source of logic is not necessarily going to be logical. This is what  
most people get from Godel.


We knew this already. The choice of theories are not 100% logical. We  
don't need Gödel for this.





The truth does not require argumentation value.


Very plausibly. That part can be related to Tarski or Gödel limitation  
theorem, although very often the arguments are not valid, but  
sometimes it is.




If I said that I have a theory that horses pull carts rather than  
the other way around, does its lack of argumentative value make it  
less true?


Lack of justfication can make it less plausible, compared to a theory  
with more justification. That is a very contextual questions,  
depending on many things.












Comp is Gödelian. It behaves like "consistency" (~[]f, <>t), which  
entails the consistency of its negation: <>t -> <>[]f.


Not sure what you mean. Maybe if you wrote it out without symbols.

If I am consistent then it is consistent that I am not consistent.
(I = the 3p notion of self).


How is "I" a 3p notion of self?


It is not. Only here. I was just saying that I was using "I" in the 3p  
sense of the self. In that case, the "I" is given by the body or the  
code of the entity saying "I" (by definition).










The decision to say "yes" to the doctor.

What would a UM say to the doctor?


The 1-I will say no, and the 3-I might say yes. The UM will live a  
conflict, and only its education might help to decide, in one or the  
other direction.






The machine's decision to add a self-consistency axiom and become  
another machine.
The direct introspection of the machine, when she feels what is out  
of any possible justification.

That is formalized by the the annuli Z* \ Z, X* \ X, etc.

Yes, mathematical logic provides tools to meta-formalizes some non  
formalizable, by the machine, predicate which are still applying on  
the machine.


Whether it is formal or meta-formal, it's still logic.


Not really. Logic is applied, but is not the subject of the inquiry.  
As you said above, arithmetic is not entirely logical.





It remains a view of consciousness that lacks aesthetic presence


That is the statement I am quite skeptical about, and that you should  
justify, at least the day you pretend that comp is false (not today).







and is limited to programmatic states of figuring and configuring.

Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Friday, April 4, 2014 2:07:47 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 04 Apr 2014, at 03:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>>>
>>> Logic is just required to be able to argue with others, and you do use 
>>> it, it seems to me, except that you seem to decide opportunistically to not 
>>> apply it to "refute" comp.
>>>
>>
>> Comp can't be refuted logically. 
>>
>>
>> Sorry, but the whole point is that it might be. It can be refuted 
>> logically, arithmetically, and empirically.
>>
>
> It's a mirage. It seems like it could be refuted, but the built in bias of 
> logic overlooks the stacked deck. Just as emotions and ego have their 
> biases that warp our thinking, so too does logical thinking have an agenda 
> which undersignifies its competition.
>
>
>
> You are so wrong here that I have to pause. You talk in a way which 
> empties the dialog of any sense. You tell me in advance you need to be 
> illogical to refute my agnosticism in the matter. 
>

You don't have to be 'illogical', you just have to transcend strict 
logic...break the fourth wall...use some of that courage you were talking 
about. All that I am saying is that incompleteness supports the limits of 
logic, so that we cannot presume to hold sense to that standard if my view 
is true. 
 

>
> How could that conversation have sense? I put my hypotheses on the table, 
> but here you put a gun on the table.
>

Haha, yes, that's the thing, sense is tyrannical and violent. It acts like 
it is following laws but it cheats and then blames something else. At least 
I'm telling you it's a gun, you've convinced yourself that your gun is just 
a polite hypothesis.


> The choice is between logic, which is basically the most common part of 
> common sense, and war or violence.
>

It's precisely because logic is the most common part of common sense that 
it cannot parse the germ of sense, which is absolutely unprecedented. 
Identity is not just uncommon, but the opposite - unrepeatable, 
proprietary, anti-mechnical. There is no choice at all. There is the 
illusion of logic and the reality of having to carve some kind of genuine 
sanity out of this thing, moment by moment. If we wait for logic to give us 
permission, we lose the moment.
 

>
> Your theory is "don't ask", but I realize also "don't argue". 
>

Asking and arguing is great, but you can't get away from the fact that it 
doesn't make sense for the one who asks and argues to be a logical machine. 
It is comp which ultimately makes asking and arguing irrelevant, but it 
does so like a vampire - obligating us to invite us in..be fair to the 
imposter and let him take your brain. 
 

>
> That might be correct, and provable in your non-comp theory, but that is 
> not an argument against comp.
> (And this is no more an argument in favor of comp of course).
>

It is an argument against comp in my non-comp theory. If it comes down to 
choosing between the certainty of life and awareness as you know it and 
taking a gamble on logic and computation, do you say yes to the farmer? If 
we aren't being faced with death with a mad doctor as our only hope, would 
we gamble with our lives? Would a machine say yes to the farmer?
 

>
>
>
>
>
>>> Randomness comes up in comp predictions?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Yes. At step seven, as the UD will notably dovetail on all normal 
>>> differentiation, on a continuum. The iterated WM self-duplication is a part 
>>> of UD*.
>>>
>>
>> What becomes random, and why?
>>
>>
>>
>> Are you OK with step 3 of the UDA?
>>
>
> I don't think so. Teleportation?
>
>
>
> No, the FPI. The fact that you cannot predict, in your personal diary, 
> what you will write tomorrow, when you will be copied and sent at two 
> different places simultaneously (or not).
>

Nothing like that is going to happen. There aren't going to be any copies 
of me.
 

>
>
>
>
> Sociopaths and actors refute comp. Blindsight refutes comp. Keyboard 
> passwords refute comp. Sports refute comp. etc.
>
>
> You do have a problem with logic.
>

Maybe I do, because I don't see how that follows. When I list examples, you 
change the subject every time.
 

>
>
>
>
>
>  
>
>> I am just saying that you have not prove that comp is false. Telling me 
>> that I have not proved comp will not do the work, as comp implies that no 
>> such proof can ever exist.
>>
>
> It's not a matter of proof, because proof has nothing to do with 
> consciousness. It is a matter of what makes more sense overall.
>
>
>
> That is wishful thinking. It is your right. I have no problem with 
> non-comp, but I do have problem with people using any theory pretending to 
> refute something, and actually unable to do it.
>

I'm refuting the metatheory that comp's refutability is related to its 
truth. I'm suggesting that specifically, comp is a theoretical construct 
which brilliantly reduces a theory of consciousness to simple elements, but 
that this is actually not related directly to consciousness, just as the 
shadow of a swimming p

Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Friday, April 4, 2014 2:07:47 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 04 Apr 2014, at 03:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, April 3, 2014 2:34:06 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 02 Apr 2014, at 21:34, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, April 2, 2014 1:00:54 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 01 Apr 2014, at 21:55, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> I believe you, but all of the laws and creativity can still only occur in 
> the context of a sense making experience.
>
>
> Did I ever said the contrary?
>
>
> Yes, you are saying that multiplication and addition laws prefigure sense 
> making and sense experience.
>
>
> It makes the minimal sense *you* need to understand what we talk about. 
> That sense has already been studied and has itself some mathematical 
> representation. 
> Then, once you have the numbers, and the laws of + and *, you can prove 
> the existence of the universal numbers and their computations. The 
> universal numbers are the sense discovering machine. 
>
>
> It doesn't matter how minimal the sense is by our standards. In that frame 
> of reference, before we exist, it is much sense as there could ever be. If 
> there is sense to make + and *, then numbers can only act as conduit to 
> shape that sense, not to create it. You're interested in understanding 
> numbers, but I'm only interested in understanding the sense that makes 
> everything (including, but not limited to numbers).
>
>
> You ignore the discovery that numbers can understand and make sense of 
> many things, with reasonable and understandable definitions (with some 
> work).
>
>
> Just as we depend our eyes to make sense of our retinal cells sense, so to 
> do numbers act as lenses and filters to capture sense for us. That does not 
> mean that what sense is made through numbers belong to numbers.
>
>
>
> Of course. Comp might be false. ~comp, we agree on this since the start. 
> But it does not add anything to your []~comp. You persist to confuse 
> ~[]comp and []~comp.
>
>
> I'm not confusing them, I'm saying that []~comp is not untrue
>
>
> this means you say []~comp is true.
>

Yes.
 

>
> Or that you confuse, like you did already "truth" and knowledge, but in 
> that case you keep saying that you know []~comp, yet your argument above 
> was only for ~[]comp, on which I already agree, as it is a consequence of 
> comp.
>

I'm not saying that I know it, I'm saying that it makes more sense.
 

>
>
>
> just because it is outside of logic. When you arbitrarily begin from the 
> 3p perspective, you can only see the flatland version of 1p intuition. You 
> would have to consider the possibility that numbers can come from this kind 
> of intuition and not the other way around. If you put your fingers in your 
> ears, and only listen to formalism, then you can only hear what formalism 
> has to say about intuition, which is... not much.
>
>
> Why?
>

Because of the incompleteness of all formal systems.
 

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>  
>
>  
>
>
>
>
>
>  
>
>
>
>
>
>
>  
>
>
> All that can still make sense in the theory according to which sense is a 
> gift by Santa Klaus.
>
> And this is not an argument against your theory, nor against the existence 
> of Santa Klaus.
>
> Concerning your theory, I find it uninteresting because it abandons my 
> entire field of inquiry: making sense of sense.
>
>
> I don't think abandoned as much as frees it from trying to do the 
> impossible. I see mathematics as being even more useful when we know that 
> it is safe from gaining autonomous intent.
>
>
>
> Comp implies that Arithmetic is not free of autonomous intent, trivially. 
> But computer science provides many realities capable of justifying or 
> defining autonomous intent. 
>
>
> I was talking about the theory of comp being over-extended to try to 
> explain qualia and awareness.
>
>
>
> It helps to formulate the problems, and provides way to test indirect 
> predictions. 
>
> But again you are pursuing the confusion between ~[]comp and []~comp.
>
>
> There's no confusion. If comp cannot justify actual qualia, but ~comp can, 
> then we should give ~comp the benefit of the doubt.
>
>
>
> comp implies that ~comp has the benefits of the doubt. I told you this 
> many times. 
> As I just repeated above, this does not refute comp.
>
>
> What does it mean to give it the benefit of the doubt but then deny it?
>
>
>
> You are the only one who deny a theory here.
>

By saying that ~comp is only what seems true from the machine's 1p 
perspective, you are denying ~comp can be more true than comp.
 

>
> I never said that comp is true, or that comp is false. I say only that 
> comp leads to a Plato/aristotle reversal, to be short.
>

We agree on this from the start, but what I am saying is that Plato also 
can be reversed on the lower level, so that the ideal/arithmetic is 
generated statistically by aesthetics.
 

>
> But *you* say that comp is false, and that is why we ask you an argument. 
> The argument has to be under

Re: Video of VCR

[Bruno Marchal]

On 04 Apr 2014, at 03:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Thursday, April 3, 2014 2:34:06 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 02 Apr 2014, at 21:34, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Wednesday, April 2, 2014 1:00:54 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 01 Apr 2014, at 21:55, Craig Weinberg wrote:

I believe you, but all of the laws and creativity can still only  
occur in the context of a sense making experience.


Did I ever said the contrary?

Yes, you are saying that multiplication and addition laws prefigure  
sense making and sense experience.


It makes the minimal sense *you* need to understand what we talk  
about. That sense has already been studied and has itself some  
mathematical representation.
Then, once you have the numbers, and the laws of + and *, you can  
prove the existence of the universal numbers and their  
computations. The universal numbers are the sense discovering  
machine.


It doesn't matter how minimal the sense is by our standards. In  
that frame of reference, before we exist, it is much sense as there  
could ever be. If there is sense to make + and *, then numbers can  
only act as conduit to shape that sense, not to create it. You're  
interested in understanding numbers, but I'm only interested in  
understanding the sense that makes everything (including, but not  
limited to numbers).


You ignore the discovery that numbers can understand and make sense  
of many things, with reasonable and understandable definitions  
(with some work).


Just as we depend our eyes to make sense of our retinal cells  
sense, so to do numbers act as lenses and filters to capture sense  
for us. That does not mean that what sense is made through numbers  
belong to numbers.



Of course. Comp might be false. ~comp, we agree on this since the  
start. But it does not add anything to your []~comp. You persist to  
confuse ~[]comp and []~comp.


I'm not confusing them, I'm saying that []~comp is not untrue


this means you say []~comp is true.

Or that you confuse, like you did already "truth" and knowledge, but  
in that case you keep saying that you know []~comp, yet your argument  
above was only for ~[]comp, on which I already agree, as it is a  
consequence of comp.




just because it is outside of logic. When you arbitrarily begin from  
the 3p perspective, you can only see the flatland version of 1p  
intuition. You would have to consider the possibility that numbers  
can come from this kind of intuition and not the other way around.  
If you put your fingers in your ears, and only listen to formalism,  
then you can only hear what formalism has to say about intuition,  
which is... not much.


Why?

























All that can still make sense in the theory according to which  
sense is a gift by Santa Klaus.


And this is not an argument against your theory, nor against the  
existence of Santa Klaus.


Concerning your theory, I find it uninteresting because it abandons  
my entire field of inquiry: making sense of sense.


I don't think abandoned as much as frees it from trying to do the  
impossible. I see mathematics as being even more useful when we  
know that it is safe from gaining autonomous intent.



Comp implies that Arithmetic is not free of autonomous intent,  
trivially. But computer science provides many realities capable of  
justifying or defining autonomous intent.


I was talking about the theory of comp being over-extended to try  
to explain qualia and awareness.



It helps to formulate the problems, and provides way to test  
indirect predictions.


But again you are pursuing the confusion between ~[]comp and []~comp.

There's no confusion. If comp cannot justify actual qualia, but  
~comp can, then we should give ~comp the benefit of the doubt.



comp implies that ~comp has the benefits of the doubt. I told you  
this many times.

As I just repeated above, this does not refute comp.

What does it mean to give it the benefit of the doubt but then deny  
it?



You are the only one who deny a theory here.

I never said that comp is true, or that comp is false. I say only that  
comp leads to a Plato/aristotle reversal, to be short.


But *you* say that comp is false, and that is why we ask you an  
argument. The argument has to be understandable, and not of the type  
"let us abandon logic and ...", which is like "God told me ...", and  
has zero argumentative value.







Comp is Gödelian. It behaves like "consistency" (~[]f, <>t), which  
entails the consistency of its negation: <>t -> <>[]f.


Not sure what you mean. Maybe if you wrote it out without symbols.


If I am consistent then it is consistent that I am not consistent.
(I = the 3p notion of self).





























But in logic and computer science, we do have theories relating  
formula/theories/machine and some mathematical notion senses  
(models, interpretation, valuation) usually infinite or transfinite.


But I have never said that you are wrong with your theory. Only  
th

Re: Video of VCR

[Bruno Marchal]

On 02 Apr 2014, at 21:34, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Wednesday, April 2, 2014 1:00:54 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 01 Apr 2014, at 21:55, Craig Weinberg wrote:

I believe you, but all of the laws and creativity can still only  
occur in the context of a sense making experience.


Did I ever said the contrary?

Yes, you are saying that multiplication and addition laws prefigure  
sense making and sense experience.


It makes the minimal sense *you* need to understand what we talk  
about. That sense has already been studied and has itself some  
mathematical representation.
Then, once you have the numbers, and the laws of + and *, you can  
prove the existence of the universal numbers and their computations.  
The universal numbers are the sense discovering machine.


It doesn't matter how minimal the sense is by our standards. In that  
frame of reference, before we exist, it is much sense as there could  
ever be. If there is sense to make + and *, then numbers can only  
act as conduit to shape that sense, not to create it. You're  
interested in understanding numbers, but I'm only interested in  
understanding the sense that makes everything (including, but not  
limited to numbers).


You ignore the discovery that numbers can understand and make sense  
of many things, with reasonable and understandable definitions (with  
some work).


Just as we depend our eyes to make sense of our retinal cells sense,  
so to do numbers act as lenses and filters to capture sense for us.  
That does not mean that what sense is made through numbers belong to  
numbers.



Of course. Comp might be false. ~comp, we agree on this since the  
start. But it does not add anything to your []~comp. You persist to  
confuse ~[]comp and []~comp.




















All that can still make sense in the theory according to which sense  
is a gift by Santa Klaus.


And this is not an argument against your theory, nor against the  
existence of Santa Klaus.


Concerning your theory, I find it uninteresting because it abandons  
my entire field of inquiry: making sense of sense.


I don't think abandoned as much as frees it from trying to do the  
impossible. I see mathematics as being even more useful when we know  
that it is safe from gaining autonomous intent.



Comp implies that Arithmetic is not free of autonomous intent,  
trivially. But computer science provides many realities capable of  
justifying or defining autonomous intent.


I was talking about the theory of comp being over-extended to try to  
explain qualia and awareness.



It helps to formulate the problems, and provides way to test  
indirect predictions.


But again you are pursuing the confusion between ~[]comp and []~comp.

There's no confusion. If comp cannot justify actual qualia, but  
~comp can, then we should give ~comp the benefit of the doubt.



comp implies that ~comp has the benefits of the doubt. I told you this  
many times.

As I just repeated above, this does not refute comp.

Comp is Gödelian. It behaves like "consistency" (~[]f, <>t), which  
entails the consistency of its negation: <>t -> <>[]f.

























But in logic and computer science, we do have theories relating  
formula/theories/machine and some mathematical notion senses  
(models, interpretation, valuation) usually infinite or transfinite.


But I have never said that you are wrong with your theory. Only that  
the use of your theory to refute computationalism is not valid.


Not valid by what epistemology though?

Yes, that is your problem. You seem unaware of the most simple  
universal standard, which are basically either classical logic, or  
another logic, but then made explicit.


It's not that I'm not aware, it's that I think it doesn't work for  
consciousness unless you beg the question by assuming that  
consciousness comes from logic.



Then you become non sensical, at least for the others. Somehow you  
confess you have to abandon logic to make my sun in law into a zombie.


You make my point.

You make my point also. Your view assumes that we must judge  
consciousness by the standard of logic,


I never said that, on the contrary.



even though we know from the start that our access to logic depends  
on consciousness. Your sun in law is animated doll, and you must  
amputate my circle of sense to the digital square in order to make  
him seem human.


On the contrary. I justify why the machine has no "amputation of  
sense" to do.

















It begs the question if you use the logic that gives rise to comp to  
refute a conjecture that explicitly questions logic as primordial.



If you refute comp with a non standard logic, you have to make it  
explicit.


I do make it explicit. In the matter of 1p awareness, I refute all  
possible logic with the deeper reality of sense.


Good 1p intuition, but the machine already knows that, and they can  
know that this cannot been used to justify that they are  
(necessarily unknown for them) m

Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, April 2, 2014 1:00:54 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 01 Apr 2014, at 21:55, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> I believe you, but all of the laws and creativity can still only occur in 
> the context of a sense making experience.
>
>
> Did I ever said the contrary?
>
>
> Yes, you are saying that multiplication and addition laws prefigure sense 
> making and sense experience.
>
>
> It makes the minimal sense *you* need to understand what we talk about. 
> That sense has already been studied and has itself some mathematical 
> representation. 
> Then, once you have the numbers, and the laws of + and *, you can prove 
> the existence of the universal numbers and their computations. The 
> universal numbers are the sense discovering machine. 
>
>
> It doesn't matter how minimal the sense is by our standards. In that frame 
> of reference, before we exist, it is much sense as there could ever be. If 
> there is sense to make + and *, then numbers can only act as conduit to 
> shape that sense, not to create it. You're interested in understanding 
> numbers, but I'm only interested in understanding the sense that makes 
> everything (including, but not limited to numbers).
>
>
> You ignore the discovery that numbers can understand and make sense of 
> many things, with reasonable and understandable definitions (with some 
> work).
>

Just as we depend our eyes to make sense of our retinal cells sense, so to 
do numbers act as lenses and filters to capture sense for us. That does not 
mean that what sense is made through numbers belong to numbers.
 

>  
>

>
>
>
>  
>
>
>
>
>
>
>  
>
>
> All that can still make sense in the theory according to which sense is a 
> gift by Santa Klaus.
>
> And this is not an argument against your theory, nor against the existence 
> of Santa Klaus.
>
> Concerning your theory, I find it uninteresting because it abandons my 
> entire field of inquiry: making sense of sense.
>
>
> I don't think abandoned as much as frees it from trying to do the 
> impossible. I see mathematics as being even more useful when we know that 
> it is safe from gaining autonomous intent.
>
>
>
> Comp implies that Arithmetic is not free of autonomous intent, trivially. 
> But computer science provides many realities capable of justifying or 
> defining autonomous intent. 
>
>
> I was talking about the theory of comp being over-extended to try to 
> explain qualia and awareness.
>
>
>
> It helps to formulate the problems, and provides way to test indirect 
> predictions. 
>
> But again you are pursuing the confusion between ~[]comp and []~comp.
>

There's no confusion. If comp cannot justify actual qualia, but ~comp can, 
then we should give ~comp the benefit of the doubt.


>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>  
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>  
>
> But in logic and computer science, we do have theories relating 
> formula/theories/machine and some mathematical notion senses (models, 
> interpretation, valuation) usually infinite or transfinite. 
>
> But I have never said that you are wrong with your theory. Only that the 
> use of your theory to refute computationalism is not valid. 
>
>
> Not valid by what epistemology though? 
>
>
> Yes, that is your problem. You seem unaware of the most simple universal 
> standard, which are basically either classical logic, or another logic, but 
> then made explicit.
>
>
> It's not that I'm not aware, it's that I think it doesn't work for 
> consciousness unless you beg the question by assuming that consciousness 
> comes from logic.
>
>
>
> Then you become non sensical, at least for the others. Somehow you confess 
> you have to abandon logic to make my sun in law into a zombie.
>
> You make my point.
>

You make my point also. Your view assumes that we must judge consciousness 
by the standard of logic, even though we know from the start that our 
access to logic depends on consciousness. Your sun in law is animated doll, 
and you must amputate my circle of sense to the digital square in order to 
make him seem human.
 

>
>
>
>
>
>  
>
>
>
>
>
>
> It begs the question if you use the logic that gives rise to comp to 
> refute a conjecture that explicitly questions logic as primordial.
>
>
>
> If you refute comp with a non standard logic, you have to make it 
> explicit. 
>
>
> I do make it explicit. In the matter of 1p awareness, I refute all 
> possible logic with the deeper reality of sense.
>
>
> Good 1p intuition, but the machine already knows that, and they can know 
> that this cannot been used to justify that they are (necessarily unknown 
> for them) machines/numbers.
>
>
Isn't that an argument from authority, where the authority is how you 
interpret hypothetical machines states of mind? Saying that machines know 
that my view is wrong does not help. I can say that kangaroos know that 
your view is wrong.



>
>
>  
>
> But you will have to motivate the use of that logic, 
>
>
> Why would I have to motivate the use of sense if I don't have to motivate 
> the use of standa

Re: Video of VCR

[Bruno Marchal]

On 01 Apr 2014, at 22:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:

Logic obeys its own incorrigibility also. Logic cannot be doubted  
logically.


I would say that it is the contrary.

Logic + numbers leads to doubts and science only make the doubt  
greater, augmenting the possibilities, and freedom degrees.


<>t  ->  <>[]f

The machine already says it at the (local) 3p-self level:   if "3-I"  
is consistent, then it is consistent that "3-I" is inconsistent.


'---That does not apply to me!' echoes the 1-p.

Yeah, life is not easy at the very start, in the arithmetical reality.  
Well, perhaps it would be more easy then there would be less fun?
There could be an eternal non ending conflict between security and  
liberty, in the 3p/1p arithmetical reality. The 1p and 3p realities/ 
persons never agree/fit completely, even in the ideal correct case of  
simple solitary(Löbian) machines.
For the 3p, self-consistency is not self-attributable and is  
doubtable, for the 1p it is trivial.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Video of VCR

[Bruno Marchal]

On 01 Apr 2014, at 21:55, Craig Weinberg wrote:

I believe you, but all of the laws and creativity can still only  
occur in the context of a sense making experience.


Did I ever said the contrary?

Yes, you are saying that multiplication and addition laws prefigure  
sense making and sense experience.


It makes the minimal sense *you* need to understand what we talk  
about. That sense has already been studied and has itself some  
mathematical representation.
Then, once you have the numbers, and the laws of + and *, you can  
prove the existence of the universal numbers and their computations.  
The universal numbers are the sense discovering machine.


It doesn't matter how minimal the sense is by our standards. In that  
frame of reference, before we exist, it is much sense as there could  
ever be. If there is sense to make + and *, then numbers can only  
act as conduit to shape that sense, not to create it. You're  
interested in understanding numbers, but I'm only interested in  
understanding the sense that makes everything (including, but not  
limited to numbers).


You ignore the discovery that numbers can understand and make sense of  
many things, with reasonable and understandable definitions (with some  
work).














All that can still make sense in the theory according to which sense  
is a gift by Santa Klaus.


And this is not an argument against your theory, nor against the  
existence of Santa Klaus.


Concerning your theory, I find it uninteresting because it abandons  
my entire field of inquiry: making sense of sense.


I don't think abandoned as much as frees it from trying to do the  
impossible. I see mathematics as being even more useful when we know  
that it is safe from gaining autonomous intent.



Comp implies that Arithmetic is not free of autonomous intent,  
trivially. But computer science provides many realities capable of  
justifying or defining autonomous intent.


I was talking about the theory of comp being over-extended to try to  
explain qualia and awareness.



It helps to formulate the problems, and provides way to test indirect  
predictions.


But again you are pursuing the confusion between ~[]comp and []~comp.



















But in logic and computer science, we do have theories relating  
formula/theories/machine and some mathematical notion senses  
(models, interpretation, valuation) usually infinite or transfinite.


But I have never said that you are wrong with your theory. Only that  
the use of your theory to refute computationalism is not valid.


Not valid by what epistemology though?

Yes, that is your problem. You seem unaware of the most simple  
universal standard, which are basically either classical logic, or  
another logic, but then made explicit.


It's not that I'm not aware, it's that I think it doesn't work for  
consciousness unless you beg the question by assuming that  
consciousness comes from logic.



Then you become non sensical, at least for the others. Somehow you  
confess you have to abandon logic to make my sun in law into a zombie.


You make my point.












It begs the question if you use the logic that gives rise to comp to  
refute a conjecture that explicitly questions logic as primordial.



If you refute comp with a non standard logic, you have to make it  
explicit.


I do make it explicit. In the matter of 1p awareness, I refute all  
possible logic with the deeper reality of sense.


Good 1p intuition, but the machine already knows that, and they can  
know that this cannot been used to justify that they are (necessarily  
unknown for them) machines/numbers.







But you will have to motivate the use of that logic,

Why would I have to motivate the use of sense if I don't have to  
motivate the use of standard logic? All I have to do is stop  
presuming that math can make color and then begin to understand why.


But comp explains why. I keep explaining that arithmetic seen from  
inside escapes somehow the mathematics accessible to the machine.






and it seems that changing the logic to refute comp, is like trying  
to rotate the solar system to be in front of your computer (it is  
simpler to rotate yourself).


I'm not changing the logic, I'm denying that it is relevant.


This is worst than "don't ask". It is: "let us be irrational".




Consciousness is what we are looking for and consciousness is  
required before logic.


Like the far away galaxies are required before the telescope, but that  
does not make the telescope irrelevant to detect the galaxies.


Logic is just required to be able to argue with others, and you do use  
it, it seems to me, except that you seem to decide opportunistically  
to not apply it to "refute" comp.


You really do make my point. I did a reductio ad absurdum of your  
proposition. My chance! You defend the absurdum.


What could I ever add to that?



















Now, instead of the numbers, I could have taken many other things,  
which are jus

Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, March 25, 2014 9:19:35 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote:
>
> On 25 March 2014 02:59, Craig Weinberg  >wrote:
>
>>
>> If you are living, you already understand what living is.
>>
>
> Are you telling me a potato plant - which is undeniably alive - 
> understands what living is? If so, this seems to either elevate potatoes to 
> conscious beings, or else to reduce the meaning of "understand" to 
> something trivial.
>

I would not imagine that there is any understanding of life as a potato, 
but there is probably an understanding of water, temperature, probably soil 
density...not in those terms obviously, but there is an experience going 
on. A plants life might be more comparable with the life of a single 
emotion. A blooming flower looks like a feeling. The whole life of that 
flower may, in some sense, 'be' that feeling. Not a feeling that belongs to 
the thing that we see as a flower, but a feeling in general. Just as the 
gold qualities of gold don't belong to any piece of gold in particular, 
most experiences in the universe may not be localized in the same way that 
a freaked out hominid's mind is.

Craig 

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Re: Video of VCR

[LizR]

On 25 March 2014 02:59, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>
> If you are living, you already understand what living is.
>

Are you telling me a potato plant - which is undeniably alive - understands
what living is? If so, this seems to either elevate potatoes to conscious
beings, or else to reduce the meaning of "understand" to something trivial.

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Re: Video of VCR

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Mar 2014, at 19:38, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Sunday, March 23, 2014 4:49:48 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 22 Mar 2014, at 19:35, Craig Weinberg wrote:


Continued...

On Saturday, March 22, 2014 4:54:41 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 21 Mar 2014, at 19:43, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Friday, March 21, 2014 4:44:20 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 21 Mar 2014, at 02:28, Craig Weinberg wrote:


I don't think logic can study reality, only truncated maps of maps  
of reality.



Whatever is reality, it might not depend on what you think it is,  
or is not.


Of course, but it might not depend on logic or computation either.



It depends on the theory we assume.

You don't see the double standard there?




You, again, talk like if our point was symmetrical. It is not.

I do not say that non-comp is wrong.

You *do* say that comp is wrong.

You can assume non-comp, and make your theory and prediction.

You might even use your theory to find a valid argument against comp,  
but it has not to rely on the non-comp assumption, or you beg the  
question.


Note that the Löb formula (the main axiom of G, in which all points of  
view are defined in arithmetic, or in arithmetical terms) is a form of  
"begging the question", and might be seen as a form of placebo, which  
makes my sympathy for your "consciousness has to beg the question".  
But of course, that rings like a confirmation of comp. Note that this  
has to be taken with some grain of salt, but it is clear that the Löb  
theorem shows that machines can prove by a curious technic of begging  
the question. Indeed if PA proves []p -> p, for some proposition p,  
then PA will always prove p.  PA obeys to the Löb rule:


([]p -> p)
  p



([]p -> p)


  p

PA knows that, as PA can prove []([]p -> p) -> []p.  (Löb's formula,  
the main axiom of G and G*).












I do. That's why I insist that comp asks for a non trivial leap of  
faith, and we are warned that comp might be refuted. Without the  
empirical evidences for the quantum and MWI, I am not sure I would  
dare to defend the study of comp. It *is* socking and counter- 
intuitive.


It's not shocking at all to me. For me it's old news.

Not to me, and I don't take anything for granted. I assume comp,  
and this includes elementary arithmetic, enough to explain  
Church's thesis.


I don't take arithmetic for granted.


Then you have no tools to assert non-comp.

Why not? I assert sense. Computation need not even exist in  
theory. Computation arises intentionally as an organizational  
feature - just as it does on Earth: to keep track of things and  
events.


Question begging.

If an explanation falls out of the hypothesis, why is it question  
begging?


Because it does not justify at all why comp has to be wrong. It  
justifies only that comp might be wrong, and is unbelievable, but  
this is already derivable from comp.


The fact that there may be no way to justify that comp has to be  
wrong does not mean that comp is in fact not wrong.


But we have never disagree on that.



The fact that it is unbelievable is not as persuasive as the  
numerous specific examples where our expectations from comp do not  
match,


You never mention one without either begging the question, or  
confusing some points of view.






and indeed are counter-factual.




















What is shocking and counter-intuitive is that the nature of  
consciousness is such that there is a very good reason why  
consciousness is forever incompatible with empirical evidence.


Again, you talk like Brouwer, the founder of intuitionism (and a  
solipsist!), also a great guy in topology. Well, the easiest way  
to attribute a person to a machine (theaetetus) provides S4Grz,  
(the logic of []p & p) which talks like Brouwer too, and identify  
somehow truth and knowledge, and makes consciousness out of any 3p  
description.


Truth and knowledge, []p & p...these things are meaningless to me.  
All I care about is what cares. Truth and knowledge care for  
nothing.


I was beginning to suspect this. But then why still argue?

Because consciousness is what cares.



Truth or knowledge of consciousness only can make sense of this.

Consciousness includes knowledge of itself by definition.


No, that self-consciousness.

That would be knowledge of the self. You don't need to know that you  
are 'you' to know that there is an experience 'here'.


Yes. That is why there is awareness/consciousness and self-awareness/ 
self-consciousness.


In the first both the 1-I and 3-I are implicit, and in the second, it  
is explicit, the machine "sees" it.


Currently, I think consciousness appears at the Sigma_1 complete, or  
Turing universal, level. Self-consciousness appears at the Löbian level.

I would say.

It is the difference between RA and PA.

The main difference is that although each time RA proves p, RA will  
soon or later proves []p, yet RA will fail to notice or justify that  
fact,, RA will not

Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Sunday, March 23, 2014 4:49:48 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 22 Mar 2014, at 19:35, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> Continued...
>
> On Saturday, March 22, 2014 4:54:41 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 21 Mar 2014, at 19:43, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, March 21, 2014 4:44:20 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 21 Mar 2014, at 02:28, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
>>>
>> I don't think logic can study reality, only truncated maps of maps of 
>>> reality.
>>>
>>
>>
>> Whatever is reality, it might not depend on what you think it is, or is 
>> not.
>>
>
> Of course, but it might not depend on logic or computation either.
>
>
>
> It depends on the theory we assume. 
>

You don't see the double standard there?
 

>
>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>> I do. That's why I insist that comp asks for a non trivial leap of faith, 
>>> and we are warned that comp might be refuted. Without the empirical 
>>> evidences for the quantum and MWI, I am not sure I would dare to defend the 
>>> study of comp. It *is* socking and counter-intuitive.
>>>
>>>
>>> It's not shocking at all to me. For me it's old news. 
>>>
>>>
>>> Not to me, and I don't take anything for granted. I assume comp, and 
>>> this includes elementary arithmetic, enough to explain Church's thesis.
>>>
>>>
>>> I don't take arithmetic for granted.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Then you have no tools to assert non-comp. 
>>>
>>
>> Why not? I assert sense. Computation need not even exist in theory. 
>> Computation arises intentionally as an organizational feature - just as it 
>> does on Earth: to keep track of things and events.
>>
>>
>> Question begging.
>>
>
> If an explanation falls out of the hypothesis, why is it question begging?
>
>
> Because it does not justify at all why comp has to be wrong. It justifies 
> only that comp might be wrong, and is unbelievable, but this is already 
> derivable from comp.
>

The fact that there may be no way to justify that comp has to be wrong does 
not mean that comp is in fact not wrong. The fact that it is unbelievable 
is not as persuasive as the numerous specific examples where our 
expectations from comp do not match, and indeed are counter-factual.
 

>
>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> What is shocking and counter-intuitive is that the nature of 
>>> consciousness is such that there is a very good reason why consciousness is 
>>> forever incompatible with empirical evidence.
>>>
>>>
>>> Again, you talk like Brouwer, the founder of intuitionism (and a 
>>> solipsist!), also a great guy in topology. Well, the easiest way to 
>>> attribute a person to a machine (theaetetus) provides S4Grz, (the logic of 
>>> []p & p) which talks like Brouwer too, and identify somehow truth and 
>>> knowledge, and makes consciousness out of any 3p description.
>>>
>>>
>>> Truth and knowledge, []p & p...these things are meaningless to me. All I 
>>> care about is what cares. Truth and knowledge care for nothing.
>>>
>>>
>>> I was beginning to suspect this. But then why still argue?
>>>
>>
>> Because consciousness is what cares.
>>
>>
>>
>> Truth or knowledge of consciousness only can make sense of this.
>>
>
> Consciousness includes knowledge of itself by definition.
>
>
> No, that self-consciousness. 
>

That would be knowledge of the self. You don't need to know that you are 
'you' to know that there is an experience 'here'.
 

>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  
>>>
>>>
>>> And you are right on this, again. It *is* a theorem of comp. 
>>>
>>> I hope you try to follow the modal thread, as it will help you to put 
>>> sense on that last sentence. But there is some amount of work to do, and 
>>> you have to be willing to change your mode of arguing, going from your []p 
>>> & p to the usual "scientific and 3p" []p. 
>>>
>>>
>>> I think that it's you who should try paddling away from the shallow 
>>> waters of modal logic and truth and surf the big waves of  sense.
>>>
>>>
>>> Why do you judge something shallow, and at the same time confess not 
>>> studying this. It makes you look rather foolish, and wipe o
>>>
>>
>> I'm not trying to be an expert in sailing to China from Italy. I'm trying 
>> to show whoever is interested that there is another continent or two in the 
>> way.
>>
>>
>> The other continents has been found, and you don't need to invoke sense 
>> other than at the metalevel. If not, what you do is the persisting hulman 
>> error to invoke God in science. It cannot work.It makes science into 
>> pseudo-religion.
>>
>
> It has nothing to do with God or religion for me. 
>
>
> I said that your use of sense is like the use of god, in the gap-god type 
> of explanation. You use "sense" to forbid the study of some theory. You 
> justify "don't ask" by invoking a private feature.
>

I don't forbid the study of anything. I applaud AI research, including 
Strong AI Singularity variety. I'm not one of those who sees interviews 
with Kurzweil or Moravec (who I met once, btw)

Re: Video of VCR

[Bruno Marchal]

On 22 Mar 2014, at 19:35, Craig Weinberg wrote:


Continued...

On Saturday, March 22, 2014 4:54:41 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 21 Mar 2014, at 19:43, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Friday, March 21, 2014 4:44:20 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 21 Mar 2014, at 02:28, Craig Weinberg wrote:


I don't think logic can study reality, only truncated maps of maps  
of reality.



Whatever is reality, it might not depend on what you think it is, or  
is not.


Of course, but it might not depend on logic or computation either.



It depends on the theory we assume.








I do. That's why I insist that comp asks for a non trivial leap of  
faith, and we are warned that comp might be refuted. Without the  
empirical evidences for the quantum and MWI, I am not sure I would  
dare to defend the study of comp. It *is* socking and counter- 
intuitive.


It's not shocking at all to me. For me it's old news.

Not to me, and I don't take anything for granted. I assume comp,  
and this includes elementary arithmetic, enough to explain Church's  
thesis.


I don't take arithmetic for granted.


Then you have no tools to assert non-comp.

Why not? I assert sense. Computation need not even exist in theory.  
Computation arises intentionally as an organizational feature -  
just as it does on Earth: to keep track of things and events.


Question begging.

If an explanation falls out of the hypothesis, why is it question  
begging?


Because it does not justify at all why comp has to be wrong. It  
justifies only that comp might be wrong, and is unbelievable, but this  
is already derivable from comp.




















What is shocking and counter-intuitive is that the nature of  
consciousness is such that there is a very good reason why  
consciousness is forever incompatible with empirical evidence.


Again, you talk like Brouwer, the founder of intuitionism (and a  
solipsist!), also a great guy in topology. Well, the easiest way to  
attribute a person to a machine (theaetetus) provides S4Grz, (the  
logic of []p & p) which talks like Brouwer too, and identify  
somehow truth and knowledge, and makes consciousness out of any 3p  
description.


Truth and knowledge, []p & p...these things are meaningless to me.  
All I care about is what cares. Truth and knowledge care for nothing.


I was beginning to suspect this. But then why still argue?

Because consciousness is what cares.



Truth or knowledge of consciousness only can make sense of this.

Consciousness includes knowledge of itself by definition.


No, that self-consciousness.















And you are right on this, again. It *is* a theorem of comp.

I hope you try to follow the modal thread, as it will help you to  
put sense on that last sentence. But there is some amount of work  
to do, and you have to be willing to change your mode of arguing,  
going from your []p & p to the usual "scientific and 3p" []p.


I think that it's you who should try paddling away from the shallow  
waters of modal logic and truth and surf the big waves of  sense.


Why do you judge something shallow, and at the same time confess  
not studying this. It makes you look rather foolish, and wipe o


I'm not trying to be an expert in sailing to China from Italy. I'm  
trying to show whoever is interested that there is another  
continent or two in the way.


The other continents has been found, and you don't need to invoke  
sense other than at the metalevel. If not, what you do is the  
persisting hulman error to invoke God in science. It cannot work.It  
makes science into pseudo-religion.


It has nothing to do with God or religion for me.


I said that your use of sense is like the use of god, in the gap-god  
type of explanation. You use "sense" to forbid the study of some  
theory. You justify "don't ask" by invoking a private feature.




It's about grounding physics and mathematics in aesthetic sense.  
This does help explain ideas of God and religion, but that is  
completely optional. I find your fear and prejudice toward this  
possibility interesting.



I am open to the possibility, so you are wrong. But I wait for  
evidences or justification, but the way you proceed confirms it is  
only a prejudice, which unfortunately makes you not studying the  
domain. So you are just stucking yourself in some (negative) personal  
opinion. That is hardly convincing. Sorry.
You introduce many relevant differences and nuances, but apply them  
only to humans, and forget them despite I try to explain that machines  
already do these distinctions. But you don't listen to them invoking  
that you have already made your opinion, so ... well, you build your  
own mental prison.


Bruno






Craig



Bruno







Craig
...

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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

Continued...

On Saturday, March 22, 2014 4:54:41 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 21 Mar 2014, at 19:43, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, March 21, 2014 4:44:20 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 21 Mar 2014, at 02:28, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
>>
> I don't think logic can study reality, only truncated maps of maps of 
>> reality.
>>
>
>
> Whatever is reality, it might not depend on what you think it is, or is 
> not.
>

Of course, but it might not depend on logic or computation either.
 

>
>
> I do. That's why I insist that comp asks for a non trivial leap of faith, 
>> and we are warned that comp might be refuted. Without the empirical 
>> evidences for the quantum and MWI, I am not sure I would dare to defend the 
>> study of comp. It *is* socking and counter-intuitive.
>>
>>
>> It's not shocking at all to me. For me it's old news. 
>>
>>
>> Not to me, and I don't take anything for granted. I assume comp, and this 
>> includes elementary arithmetic, enough to explain Church's thesis.
>>
>>
>> I don't take arithmetic for granted.
>>
>>
>>
>> Then you have no tools to assert non-comp. 
>>
>
> Why not? I assert sense. Computation need not even exist in theory. 
> Computation arises intentionally as an organizational feature - just as it 
> does on Earth: to keep track of things and events.
>
>
> Question begging.
>

If an explanation falls out of the hypothesis, why is it question begging?
 

>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> What is shocking and counter-intuitive is that the nature of 
>> consciousness is such that there is a very good reason why consciousness is 
>> forever incompatible with empirical evidence.
>>
>>
>> Again, you talk like Brouwer, the founder of intuitionism (and a 
>> solipsist!), also a great guy in topology. Well, the easiest way to 
>> attribute a person to a machine (theaetetus) provides S4Grz, (the logic of 
>> []p & p) which talks like Brouwer too, and identify somehow truth and 
>> knowledge, and makes consciousness out of any 3p description.
>>
>>
>> Truth and knowledge, []p & p...these things are meaningless to me. All I 
>> care about is what cares. Truth and knowledge care for nothing.
>>
>>
>> I was beginning to suspect this. But then why still argue?
>>
>
> Because consciousness is what cares.
>
>
>
> Truth or knowledge of consciousness only can make sense of this.
>

Consciousness includes knowledge of itself by definition.
 

>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>>
>> And you are right on this, again. It *is* a theorem of comp. 
>>
>> I hope you try to follow the modal thread, as it will help you to put 
>> sense on that last sentence. But there is some amount of work to do, and 
>> you have to be willing to change your mode of arguing, going from your []p 
>> & p to the usual "scientific and 3p" []p. 
>>
>>
>> I think that it's you who should try paddling away from the shallow 
>> waters of modal logic and truth and surf the big waves of  sense.
>>
>>
>> Why do you judge something shallow, and at the same time confess not 
>> studying this. It makes you look rather foolish, and wipe o
>>
>
> I'm not trying to be an expert in sailing to China from Italy. I'm trying 
> to show whoever is interested that there is another continent or two in the 
> way.
>
>
> The other continents has been found, and you don't need to invoke sense 
> other than at the metalevel. If not, what you do is the persisting hulman 
> error to invoke God in science. It cannot work.It makes science into 
> pseudo-religion.
>

It has nothing to do with God or religion for me. It's about grounding 
physics and mathematics in aesthetic sense. This does help explain ideas of 
God and religion, but that is completely optional. I find your fear and 
prejudice toward this possibility interesting.


Craig

 

>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Craig 
>
>> ...
>
>
> -- 
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> "Everything List" group.
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> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com .
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>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

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Re: Video of VCR

[Bruno Marchal]

On 19 Mar 2014, at 18:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Wednesday, March 19, 2014 5:02:15 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 17 Mar 2014, at 22:28, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Monday, March 17, 2014 2:18:58 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 17 Mar 2014, at 17:50, Craig Weinberg wrote:

I'm mirroring back to you what my impression is of what you say to  
me. I say it is obvious that machines are impersonal, cold,  
mechanical, and that it is obvious that sophisticated technology  
can be developed that will make them seem less mechanical without  
actually feeling anything. Your response has been that I'm only  
looking at machines that exist now, not the more advanced  
versions. I see no significant between the two arguments, except  
that mine is facetious. You say that there is no reason why  
certain kinds of computations could not produce consciousness, and  
I say there is no reason why certain kinds of configurations of  
mirrors or cameras couldn't produce computation.



You go from a mirror to a configuration of mirror. I discussed that  
case.


I am comparing the argument against zombies in comp with your  
argument against the VCR. I see a double standard in comp which is  
very left wing in presuming equality with living creatures,


?
The "argument against zombies" presume equality for equal behavior.  
Your "theory" single out the living.


I don't single out the living, I discern between directly  
experienced histories and generic information.


A chance!  (comp too)



Our histories just so happen to follow the  
biological>zoological>anthropological branch, but I would not expect  
any kind of proprietary experience to be possible to emulate with  
generic information.



My fault, perhaps. I suppose people to get well the 1p and 3p person  
notion, at step 2 of the UDA already. Then I indulge myself in  
shortening, like saying that a machine can think (be conscious), where  
I always mean it in the sense of comp: that is the bet, or act of  
faith, in a level of description of my"body" so that a digital  
emulation would preserve my first person experience, with the normal  
"probabilities" conserved.


But the "proprietary experience" is NOT "generic information". (except  
perhaps in some "God's eyes", but not hereby).


That would be a confusion between []p and []p & p.

UDA illustrates the difference in some intuitive way, and just  
arithmetic justify how correct machine *already* knows the difference,  
once they have the introspective ability []A -> [][]A, like PA, ZF,  
and many other "theories/machines/numbers".








but very right wing in presuming lower status for phenomena in  
which computation is not apparent.


Behavior is not apparent.

Why not?



For a 3p unknown creature, we have to be cautious in denying first- 
personality and consciousness, but by default we can stay trivially  
agnostic.
If we can suspect computations indeed somewhere, like a mobile for  
example, then why not enlarge the opening to such an attribution,  
indeed.








Because you believe that comp associate consciousness to machine/ 
bodies, or to behavior, despite I have explained many times this is  
not what comp does. Consciousness is an attribute of a person,  
which own a body (well, infinitely many bodies).


Then the explanatory gap is moved from mind/brain to person/ 
computation, with no improvement on bridging it.


On the contrary, computation handles both the first and third person  
reference and this by using only the existing standard definition  
(of knowledge, etc.). It lead to a mathematical theory of qualia,  
and of quanta, 100% precise and this testable, and indeed partially  
tested. You make affirmation just showing that you are not studying  
neither the posts nor the papers.


The gap is still there.



But with comp it acquires 8 mathematical descriptions, some explicit  
in terms of the Z* \  Z, X* \  X, inheritated from the Gödel-Solovay   
"gap" G* \ G.


The gap vanishes only in the outer God's point of view (Arithmetical  
truth), and curiously enough, in the first person point of view (the  
inner God, the soul).


Your "sense" fits well the machine's soul (S4Grz, []p & p, the inner  
God, the soul).






Math offers no first person theory of computation,


I offer you a counter-example on a plate.

More precisely, a theory of the soul (and matter) based on  
computations (motivated by the computationalist assumption).


You just ignore it, or refute it with straw man argument, or begging  
the question.






nor third person theory of qualia,



For qualia, you get them in X1* \ X1.




it only correlates the *idea* of first and third person perspectives  
(devoid of aesthetic content)


No, you are wrong here: it is not devoid of the "aesthetic content",  
unless the theory is shown wrong, but the basic theory of knowledge  
used is independent of comp, and it applies to many arithmetical non- 
machine entities (like PI_1 complete set, which are like

Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, March 19, 2014 5:02:15 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 17 Mar 2014, at 22:28, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, March 17, 2014 2:18:58 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 17 Mar 2014, at 17:50, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>> I'm mirroring back to you what my impression is of what you say to me. I 
>> say it is obvious that machines are impersonal, cold, mechanical, and that 
>> it is obvious that sophisticated technology can be developed that will make 
>> them seem less mechanical without actually feeling anything. Your response 
>> has been that I'm only looking at machines that exist now, not the more 
>> advanced versions. I see no significant between the two arguments, except 
>> that mine is facetious. You say that there is no reason why certain kinds 
>> of computations could not produce consciousness, and I say there is no 
>> reason why certain kinds of configurations of mirrors or cameras couldn't 
>> produce computation.
>>
>>
>>
>> You go from a mirror to a configuration of mirror. I discussed that case. 
>>
>
> I am comparing the argument against zombies in comp with your argument 
> against the VCR. I see a double standard in comp which is very left wing in 
> presuming equality with living creatures, 
>
>
> ?
> The "argument against zombies" presume equality for equal behavior. Your 
> "theory" single out the living. 
>

I don't single out the living, I discern between directly experienced 
histories and generic information. Our histories just so happen to follow 
the biological>zoological>anthropological branch, but I would not expect 
any kind of proprietary experience to be possible to emulate with generic 
information.


>
> but very right wing in presuming lower status for phenomena in which 
> computation is not apparent.
>
>
> Behavior is not apparent. 
>

Why not?
 

>
>
> Because you believe that comp associate consciousness to machine/bodies, 
>> or to behavior, despite I have explained many times this is not what comp 
>> does. Consciousness is an attribute of a person, which own a body (well, 
>> infinitely many bodies).
>>
>
> Then the explanatory gap is moved from mind/brain to person/computation, 
> with no improvement on bridging it.
>
>
> On the contrary, computation handles both the first and third person 
> reference and this by using only the existing standard definition (of 
> knowledge, etc.). It lead to a mathematical theory of qualia, and of 
> quanta, 100% precise and this testable, and indeed partially tested. You 
> make affirmation just showing that you are not studying neither the posts 
> nor the papers.
>

The gap is still there. Math offers no first person theory of computation, 
nor third person theory of qualia, it only correlates the *idea* of first 
and third person perspectives (devoid of aesthetic content) with the idea 
of knowledge (again, semantically flattened into maps).


> Then by assuming "sense", sorry, but that does just not make sense to me, 
>> unless you mean God,
>>
>
> God has to make sense too.
>
> That is a reason more to not invoke "sense" in a scientific explanation. 
> You just make your case worst.
>

Science is tradition within sense. Sense is the reality. 
 

>
>
> Your "theory" seems to be only an opinion that another theory is foolish.
>>
>
> Not at all. My attack on CTM is only part of MSR because MSR seeks to pick 
> up where CTM leaves off. The theory is about the relation of sense, 
> information, and physics, and about the spectrum of sense, not just about 
> pointing out the mistake of comp.
>
>
> But you did not succeed in showing where CTM leaves of. You just beg the 
> question, or play with words.
>

CTM leaves off in failing to account for the presence of aesthetic 
qualities. It provides for no presence, no motivation, no proprietary 
novelty, etc. It takes sense for granted and mistakes its own shadow for 
the truth.
 

>
> You seem unable to doubt, as I have shown the remarkable coherence, with 
>> respect to comp, of your phenomenology, with the one made by the first 
>> person associated naturally to the machine, by applying the oldest 
>> definition of knowledge to machines, and it works thanks to a remarkable, 
>> and non obvious double phenomena: incompleteness and machine's 
>> understanding of incompleteness.
>>
>
> This is one of your points that I find the most flawed, and I have 
> explained why many times. If we are both machines under comp, how can you 
> say that my view is consistent with the stereotypical machine views if your 
> view is not? 
>
>
> By the tension between []p and []p & p. It explains why the "comp truth" 
> is counter-intuitive fpr the machine.
>

If we have opposite intuitions, and we are both machines, how can you claim 
that comp would be counter-intuitive to one of us and not the other?
 

>
>
>
>
> You would have to be placing yourself above me arbitrarily 
>
>
> No, I have just to assume comp.
>

But if comp is counter-intuitive to me, then it 

Re: Video of VCR

[Bruno Marchal]

On 17 Mar 2014, at 22:28, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Monday, March 17, 2014 2:18:58 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 17 Mar 2014, at 17:50, Craig Weinberg wrote:

I'm mirroring back to you what my impression is of what you say to  
me. I say it is obvious that machines are impersonal, cold,  
mechanical, and that it is obvious that sophisticated technology  
can be developed that will make them seem less mechanical without  
actually feeling anything. Your response has been that I'm only  
looking at machines that exist now, not the more advanced versions.  
I see no significant between the two arguments, except that mine is  
facetious. You say that there is no reason why certain kinds of  
computations could not produce consciousness, and I say there is no  
reason why certain kinds of configurations of mirrors or cameras  
couldn't produce computation.



You go from a mirror to a configuration of mirror. I discussed that  
case.


I am comparing the argument against zombies in comp with your  
argument against the VCR. I see a double standard in comp which is  
very left wing in presuming equality with living creatures,


?
The "argument against zombies" presume equality for equal behavior.  
Your "theory" single out the living.



but very right wing in presuming lower status for phenomena in which  
computation is not apparent.


Behavior is not apparent.


Because you believe that comp associate consciousness to machine/ 
bodies, or to behavior, despite I have explained many times this is  
not what comp does. Consciousness is an attribute of a person, which  
own a body (well, infinitely many bodies).


Then the explanatory gap is moved from mind/brain to person/ 
computation, with no improvement on bridging it.


On the contrary, computation handles both the first and third person  
reference and this by using only the existing standard definition (of  
knowledge, etc.). It lead to a mathematical theory of qualia, and of  
quanta, 100% precise and this testable, and indeed partially tested.  
You make affirmation just showing that you are not studying neither  
the posts nor the papers.


Then by assuming "sense", sorry, but that does just not make sense to  
me, unless you mean God,


God has to make sense too.

That is a reason more to not invoke "sense" in a scientific  
explanation. You just make your case worst.



Your "theory" seems to be only an opinion that another theory is  
foolish.


Not at all. My attack on CTM is only part of MSR because MSR seeks  
to pick up where CTM leaves off. The theory is about the relation of  
sense, information, and physics, and about the spectrum of sense,  
not just about pointing out the mistake of comp.


But you did not succeed in showing where CTM leaves of. You just beg  
the question, or play with words.


You seem unable to doubt, as I have shown the remarkable coherence,  
with respect to comp, of your phenomenology, with the one made by  
the first person associated naturally to the machine, by applying  
the oldest definition of knowledge to machines, and it works thanks  
to a remarkable, and non obvious double phenomena: incompleteness  
and machine's understanding of incompleteness.


This is one of your points that I find the most flawed, and I have  
explained why many times. If we are both machines under comp, how  
can you say that my view is consistent with the stereotypical  
machine views if your view is not?


By the tension between []p and []p & p. It explains why the "comp  
truth" is counter-intuitive fpr the machine.






You would have to be placing yourself above me arbitrarily


No, I have just to assume comp.



and escaping your own 1p machine nature somehow.


Yes, we have to that, but that is the case when we attribute 1p to  
others. Comp explains why the machine is wrong about comp, from the 1p  
view. And the machine can understand, and find by itself, that  
explanation.





Why doesn't Bruno machine succumb to incompleteness and his  
understanding of incompleteness?



I do. That's why I insist that comp asks for a non trivial leap of  
faith, and we are warned that comp might be refuted. Without the  
empirical evidences for the quantum and MWI, I am not sure I would  
dare to defend the study of comp. It *is* socking and counter-intuitive.


Bruno





Craig


Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, March 17, 2014 2:18:58 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 17 Mar 2014, at 17:50, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> I'm mirroring back to you what my impression is of what you say to me. I 
> say it is obvious that machines are impersonal, cold, mechanical, and that 
> it is obvious that sophisticated technology can be developed that will make 
> them seem less mechanical without actually feeling anything. Your response 
> has been that I'm only looking at machines that exist now, not the more 
> advanced versions. I see no significant between the two arguments, except 
> that mine is facetious. You say that there is no reason why certain kinds 
> of computations could not produce consciousness, and I say there is no 
> reason why certain kinds of configurations of mirrors or cameras couldn't 
> produce computation.
>
>
>
> You go from a mirror to a configuration of mirror. I discussed that case. 
>

I am comparing the argument against zombies in comp with your argument 
against the VCR. I see a double standard in comp which is very left wing in 
presuming equality with living creatures, but very right wing in presuming 
lower status for phenomena in which computation is not apparent.

Craig


> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, March 17, 2014 2:31:32 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 17 Mar 2014, at 18:11, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> I don't think it needs to be an experience to compute though. In real life 
> it does need to be an experience, because I think that it is the experience 
> which underlies all computation and arithmetic rather than the other way 
> around. In the hypothetical universe of comp though, I see no place for 
> 'experience' at all. Computations within comp need not be felt or seen, 
> only stored and processed.
>
>
>
> Because you believe that comp associate consciousness to machine/bodies, 
> or to behavior, despite I have explained many times this is not what comp 
> does. Consciousness is an attribute of a person, which own a body (well, 
> infinitely many bodies).
>

Then the explanatory gap is moved from mind/brain to person/computation, 
with no improvement on bridging it.
 

>
> Then by assuming "sense", sorry, but that does just not make sense to me, 
> unless you mean God, 
>

God has to make sense too.
 

> but then you are not doing a theory, and if your god does not allow my sun 
> in law to play genuinely his role in the spectacle, I am not sure I can 
> discuss this anymore.
>

His genuine role is not in the spectacle, it is in the intangible 
processing of meaningless data.
 

>
> Your "theory" seems to be only an opinion that another theory is foolish.
>

Not at all. My attack on CTM is only part of MSR because MSR seeks to pick 
up where CTM leaves off. The theory is about the relation of sense, 
information, and physics, and about the spectrum of sense, not just about 
pointing out the mistake of comp.
 

> You seem unable to doubt, as I have shown the remarkable coherence, with 
> respect to comp, of your phenomenology, with the one made by the first 
> person associated naturally to the machine, by applying the oldest 
> definition of knowledge to machines, and it works thanks to a remarkable, 
> and non obvious double phenomena: incompleteness and machine's 
> understanding of incompleteness.
>

This is one of your points that I find the most flawed, and I have 
explained why many times. If we are both machines under comp, how can you 
say that my view is consistent with the stereotypical machine views if your 
view is not? You would have to be placing yourself above me arbitrarily and 
escaping your own 1p machine nature somehow. Why doesn't Bruno machine 
succumb to incompleteness and his understanding of incompleteness?
 

>
> Anyway, I have not seen any theory, nor valid argument. Sorry.
>

Maybe that's what 1p machines say when they are infected with the comp 
virus ;)
 

>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, March 17, 2014 2:17:01 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 17 Mar 2014, at 17:50, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> If someone said that they were agnostic about God, would I be wrong in 
> thinking that they do *not* assume God's presence or absence? To say that 
> you assume comp and are agnostic about it would seem to be a contradiction.
>
>
> You have a lot of things to learn.
>

That seems like an odd response to what I see as a fairly uncontroversial 
assertion.

Craig
 

>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

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Re: Video of VCR

[Bruno Marchal]

On 17 Mar 2014, at 18:11, Craig Weinberg wrote:

I don't think it needs to be an experience to compute though. In  
real life it does need to be an experience, because I think that it  
is the experience which underlies all computation and arithmetic  
rather than the other way around. In the hypothetical universe of  
comp though, I see no place for 'experience' at all. Computations  
within comp need not be felt or seen, only stored and processed.



Because you believe that comp associate consciousness to machine/ 
bodies, or to behavior, despite I have explained many times this is  
not what comp does. Consciousness is an attribute of a person, which  
own a body (well, infinitely many bodies).


Then by assuming "sense", sorry, but that does just not make sense to  
me, unless you mean God, but then you are not doing a theory, and if  
your god does not allow my sun in law to play genuinely his role in  
the spectacle, I am not sure I can discuss this anymore.


Your "theory" seems to be only an opinion that another theory is  
foolish. You seem unable to doubt, as I have shown the remarkable  
coherence, with respect to comp, of your phenomenology, with the one  
made by the first person associated naturally to the machine, by  
applying the oldest definition of knowledge to machines, and it works  
thanks to a remarkable, and non obvious double phenomena:  
incompleteness and machine's understanding of incompleteness.


Anyway, I have not seen any theory, nor valid argument. Sorry.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Video of VCR

[Bruno Marchal]

On 17 Mar 2014, at 17:50, Craig Weinberg wrote:

I'm mirroring back to you what my impression is of what you say to  
me. I say it is obvious that machines are impersonal, cold,  
mechanical, and that it is obvious that sophisticated technology can  
be developed that will make them seem less mechanical without  
actually feeling anything. Your response has been that I'm only  
looking at machines that exist now, not the more advanced versions.  
I see no significant between the two arguments, except that mine is  
facetious. You say that there is no reason why certain kinds of  
computations could not produce consciousness, and I say there is no  
reason why certain kinds of configurations of mirrors or cameras  
couldn't produce computation.



You go from a mirror to a configuration of mirror. I discussed that  
case.


Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Video of VCR

[Bruno Marchal]

On 17 Mar 2014, at 17:50, Craig Weinberg wrote:

If someone said that they were agnostic about God, would I be wrong  
in thinking that they do *not* assume God's presence or absence? To  
say that you assume comp and are agnostic about it would seem to be  
a contradiction.



You have a lot of things to learn.

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Sunday, March 16, 2014 12:37:39 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 16 Mar 2014, at 14:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, March 16, 2014 3:40:49 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 15 Mar 2014, at 23:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> http://www.jesseengland.net/index.php?/project/vide-uhhh/
>>
>>
>> Have a look at this quick video (or get the idea from this_)
>>
>> Since the VCR can get video feedback of itself, is there any 
>> computational reason why this doesn't count as a degree of self awareness? 
>>
>>
>> The computational reason is that there is no computation at all there. 
>> There is no self-representation, no introspection in the computer science 
>> theoretical sense.
>>
>
> How do you know though? 
>
>
> I don't know. 
>
> I assume it.
>

Then try not assuming it?
 

>
>
>
> This is the same argument that I give for machines, except I am saying 
> that there is no introspection in the sense of aesthetic phenomenal sense. 
>
>
> Where you confuse []p and []p & p.
>
> Before Gödel, it was thought they would obey the same logic, when the 
> machine is correct. But after Gödel, we know that they obey different 
> logic, even when the machine is always correct. 
>
> The aesthetics phenomenal sense comes from the machine keeping its 
> umbilical chord with truth, which is natural for her to do, as it exists, 
> even if relatively.
>

I'm fine with an umbilical cord with truth, but why would there be any 
aesthetic phenomena or sense associated with it? I can see why sense would 
invent truth, but I cannot see why or how truth would invent sense.
 

>
>
>
> Maybe the VCR is just very young compared to the machines that you are 
> used to considering as capable of self-representation - indeed the jumpy 
> screen artifacts correlate perfectly with the events that are impacting the 
> VCR's body. Notice how each operation performed on the 'VCS' (VCR + Camera 
> System) generates a unique vocabulary of responses on the screen. Why not 
> assume that these are intelligent cries which reflect specific mechanical 
> emotions. If we reproduced the experiment on a variety of similar devices, 
> we could probably deduce a mathematical schema - a language through which 
> VCS' talk about themselves and their environment. We could interview them 
> and see whether they follow computationalist expectations for UMs or LUMs.
>
>
> OK, but why would they not. You speculate on some analog machines, and you 
> speculate on an analog theory of mind. That might be more interesting than 
> assuming sense. You would make a theory of sense from a non comp theory of 
> machines. Go for it.
>

I present it only as a counter-example. I don't think that there is any 
sense there on that level. It's an example of how low level continuity 
across microphenomenal coincidence can be misattributed as having high 
level, phenomenal significance.
 

>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>> There is an interesting analogy, as the computational self-reference 
>> leads to similar fixed points, but the analogy stops there. The VCR is like 
>> a mirror, with some dynamical delay similar to a computer self-reference, 
>> but it lacks the computations. Simply.
>>
>
> I think that you would have to be telepathic to say with certainty that it 
> lacks computations, just as I would have to be telepathic to 'know' that a 
> machine is not a p-zombie. 
>
>
> Oh, but if there are computations, I apologize. just show them to me.
>

That's like me saying show me the flavor of strawberry that the machine 
tastes. The whole point is that there is a sub-computational level which 
can't be detected by computation, but which is responsible for computation.
 

> Keep in mind that with comp, a "material object like a mirror" does not 
> really exist, it is a map of your most probable future experience among 
> infinitely many: it is a "wave" of possible computations (arithmetical 
> relations, in our base). It is a common and sharable *experience*.
>

I don't think it needs to be an experience to compute though. In real life 
it does need to be an experience, because I think that it is the experience 
which underlies all computation and arithmetic rather than the other way 
around. In the hypothetical universe of comp though, I see no place for 
'experience' at all. Computations within comp need not be felt or seen, 
only stored and processed.
 

>
>
>
>
> Your argument is that the VCS is a an m-zombie. A mechanical zombie which 
> only seems to respond to its own condition as if it were a machine's 1p.
>
>
> By definition, a zombie acts like you and me. The mirror does not act like 
> you and me.
>

We're talking about the VCS though, not a mirror. As you can see in the 
video, it does indeed act like you and me, squealing and squirming when we 
treat it harshly.
 

>
> My sun in law does. He can discuss with you on consciousness, zombie, 
> mind, brain, philosophy and also gastronomy, he works himself as a chef, 
> actually. He makes money with his nose

Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, March 17, 2014 12:19:23 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 16 Mar 2014, at 19:30, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, March 16, 2014 12:05:50 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 16 Mar 2014, at 13:52, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, March 16, 2014 3:41:30 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 16 Mar 2014, at 05:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, March 15, 2014 7:00:48 PM UTC-4, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

 Craig,

 Hmmm, let me see. If I just take my eye out of its socket and turn it 
 around then I guess by your theory I'd have self awareness?

>>>
>>> It's not my theory, but does computationalism provide a reason why your 
>>> eye looking in the mirror doesn't have self-awareness?
>>>
>>>
>>> The mirror does not compute.
>>>
>>
>> How do you know you're not being racist against mirrors?
>>
>>
>>
>> Did I ever say something bad about mirror?
>>
>
> You're saying they don't compute. 
>
>
> Nice you defend this as a compliment!
>
>
>
>
>
> Just as I say your sun in law doesn't appreciate the flavor of food.
>
>
> The difference is that my sun in law pretend to appreciate food. The 
> mirror does not pretend to compute.
>

Why not? Any computation which can be output optically can be mirrored. 
There could be a Turing test in which any computation seen in a mirror that 
cannot be distinguished from a backward computation on a screen must be 
considered good enough.
 

>
> The expression "a mirror compute" does not make much sense. There is 
> category error here. We can make too much sense of such expression.
>

I don't think it is any more of a category error made by comp in 
attributing feelings to behaviors. Anyways, my example is not a mirror, it 
is a VCR+camera, as seen in the video. In the video, we see the tape 
responding visibly to each intrusion on it's 'computation'. If you had a 
virtual machine that responded in that same way to environmental 
conditions, would you not say that is evidence of computationalism?


>
>
>
>  
>
>> I have no clue they are intensional agent, but if they ask I will oblige. 
>>
>
> If you hold up a sign that says 'I am an intensional agent' in backward 
> letters, you will see that they turn them around so you can see what they 
> are.
>  
>
>> Mirror will also evolves, and the intelligent digital mirror can 
>> anticipate on you, or show you with another cut, or some brain scan.
>>
>> You know that I assume comp, so it should just be obvious to you that 
>> mirror have not the ability of universal computation.
>>
>
> I thought that you are agnostic about comp. 
>
>
> ?
> Yes, that is why I make clear that I assume it. It is my working theory. I 
> am agnostic indeed.
>

If someone said that they were agnostic about God, would I be wrong in 
thinking that they do *not* assume God's presence or absence? To say that 
you assume comp and are agnostic about it would seem to be a contradiction.
 

>
>
>
>
> How do you know that the mirror doesn't have the ability of universal 
> computation though? 
>
>
>
> That expression does not make sense. 
>

Suppose I say that mirrors work because they simulate optical environments, 
and are in fact universal machines...but again, this 'mirror' example is a 
straw man. The example I'm working with is the VCR+camera.
 

>
>
>
>
> Maybe they are just very shy about it? Maybe the mirrors of today are just 
> babies?
>
>
>
> Your analogy flirts with the ridiculous. 
>

I'm mirroring back to you what my impression is of what you say to me. I 
say it is obvious that machines are impersonal, cold, mechanical, and that 
it is obvious that sophisticated technology can be developed that will make 
them seem less mechanical without actually feeling anything. Your response 
has been that I'm only looking at machines that exist now, not the more 
advanced versions. I see no significant between the two arguments, except 
that mine is facetious. You say that there is no reason why certain kinds 
of computations could not produce consciousness, and I say there is no 
reason why certain kinds of configurations of mirrors or cameras couldn't 
produce computation.
 

>
>
>
>
>  
>
>> Even the Dx = F"xx" method alone, seen as a control structure, alone, or 
>> even some generalization of it, are not Turing universal. Consciousness is 
>> the attribute to the first person, it is phenomenal, and there is nothing 
>> in a mirror which a priori invites us to such an attribution. 
>>
>
> The VCR+camera do invite such an attribution though.
>  
>
>> I tend currently to attribute consciousness at the Turing complete level, 
>> and self-consciousness at the Gödel-Löbian one, like when a K4 reasoner 
>> becomes when he visits the Knave Knight Island, or when a universal Turing 
>> machine develops beliefs in enough induction axioms.
>>
>> Now, if your theory attributes consciousness to a mirror, and not to my 
>> sun in law,  it will look even less convincing to me, Craig.
>>

Re: Video of VCR

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Mar 2014, at 19:30, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Sunday, March 16, 2014 12:05:50 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Mar 2014, at 13:52, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Sunday, March 16, 2014 3:41:30 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Mar 2014, at 05:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Saturday, March 15, 2014 7:00:48 PM UTC-4, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
Craig,

Hmmm, let me see. If I just take my eye out of its socket and turn  
it around then I guess by your theory I'd have self awareness?


It's not my theory, but does computationalism provide a reason why  
your eye looking in the mirror doesn't have self-awareness?


The mirror does not compute.

How do you know you're not being racist against mirrors?



Did I ever say something bad about mirror?

You're saying they don't compute.


Nice you defend this as a compliment!






Just as I say your sun in law doesn't appreciate the flavor of food.


The difference is that my sun in law pretend to appreciate food. The  
mirror does not pretend to compute.


The expression "a mirror compute" does not make much sense. There is  
category error here. We can make too much sense of such expression.







I have no clue they are intensional agent, but if they ask I will  
oblige.


If you hold up a sign that says 'I am an intensional agent' in  
backward letters, you will see that they turn them around so you can  
see what they are.


Mirror will also evolves, and the intelligent digital mirror can  
anticipate on you, or show you with another cut, or some brain scan.


You know that I assume comp, so it should just be obvious to you  
that mirror have not the ability of universal computation.


I thought that you are agnostic about comp.


?
Yes, that is why I make clear that I assume it. It is my working  
theory. I am agnostic indeed.





How do you know that the mirror doesn't have the ability of  
universal computation though?



That expression does not make sense.




Maybe they are just very shy about it? Maybe the mirrors of today  
are just babies?



Your analogy flirts with the ridiculous.






Even the Dx = F"xx" method alone, seen as a control structure,  
alone, or even some generalization of it, are not Turing universal.  
Consciousness is the attribute to the first person, it is  
phenomenal, and there is nothing in a mirror which a priori invites  
us to such an attribution.


The VCR+camera do invite such an attribution though.

I tend currently to attribute consciousness at the Turing complete  
level, and self-consciousness at the Gödel-Löbian one, like when a  
K4 reasoner becomes when he visits the Knave Knight Island, or when  
a universal Turing machine develops beliefs in enough induction  
axioms.


Now, if your theory attributes consciousness to a mirror, and not to  
my sun in law,  it will look even less convincing to me, Craig.


I don't attribute consciousness to either one, I present the VCR  
example as a reductio ad absurdum against comp.


Straw man.

Bruno






Craig






Craig


Bruno





Edgar



On Saturday, March 15, 2014 6:09:27 PM UTC-4, Craig Weinberg wrote:


http://www.jesseengland.net/index.php?/project/vide-uhhh/

Have a look at this quick video (or get the idea from this_)

Since the VCR can get video feedback of itself, is there any  
computational reason why this doesn't count as a degree of self  
awareness? Would VCRs which have 'seen themselves' in this way  
have a greater chance of developing that awareness than those  
which have not? If not, what initial conditions would be necessary  
for such an awareness to develop in some machines and how would  
those initial conditions appear?


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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Sunday, March 16, 2014 12:05:50 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 16 Mar 2014, at 13:52, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, March 16, 2014 3:41:30 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 16 Mar 2014, at 05:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, March 15, 2014 7:00:48 PM UTC-4, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>>>
>>> Craig,
>>>
>>> Hmmm, let me see. If I just take my eye out of its socket and turn it 
>>> around then I guess by your theory I'd have self awareness?
>>>
>>
>> It's not my theory, but does computationalism provide a reason why your 
>> eye looking in the mirror doesn't have self-awareness?
>>
>>
>> The mirror does not compute.
>>
>
> How do you know you're not being racist against mirrors?
>
>
>
> Did I ever say something bad about mirror?
>

You're saying they don't compute. Just as I say your sun in law doesn't 
appreciate the flavor of food.
 

> I have no clue they are intensional agent, but if they ask I will oblige. 
>

If you hold up a sign that says 'I am an intensional agent' in backward 
letters, you will see that they turn them around so you can see what they 
are.
 

> Mirror will also evolves, and the intelligent digital mirror can 
> anticipate on you, or show you with another cut, or some brain scan.
>
> You know that I assume comp, so it should just be obvious to you that 
> mirror have not the ability of universal computation.
>

I thought that you are agnostic about comp. How do you know that the mirror 
doesn't have the ability of universal computation though? Maybe they are 
just very shy about it? Maybe the mirrors of today are just babies?
 

> Even the Dx = F"xx" method alone, seen as a control structure, alone, or 
> even some generalization of it, are not Turing universal. Consciousness is 
> the attribute to the first person, it is phenomenal, and there is nothing 
> in a mirror which a priori invites us to such an attribution. 
>

The VCR+camera do invite such an attribution though.
 

> I tend currently to attribute consciousness at the Turing complete level, 
> and self-consciousness at the Gödel-Löbian one, like when a K4 reasoner 
> becomes when he visits the Knave Knight Island, or when a universal Turing 
> machine develops beliefs in enough induction axioms.
>
> Now, if your theory attributes consciousness to a mirror, and not to my 
> sun in law,  it will look even less convincing to me, Craig.
>

I don't attribute consciousness to either one, I present the VCR example as 
a reductio ad absurdum against comp.

Craig
 

>
>
>
>
> Craig
>  
>
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>>>
>>> Edgar
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, March 15, 2014 6:09:27 PM UTC-4, Craig Weinberg wrote:


 
 http://www.jesseengland.net/index.php?/project/vide-uhhh/

 Have a look at this quick video (or get the idea from this_)

 Since the VCR can get video feedback of itself, is there any 
 computational reason why this doesn't count as a degree of self awareness? 
 Would VCRs which have 'seen themselves' in this way have a greater chance 
 of developing that awareness than those which have not? If not, what 
 initial conditions would be necessary for such an awareness to develop in 
 some machines and how would those initial conditions appear?

>>>
>> -- 
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>> "Everything List" group.
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>> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
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>>
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
>>
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>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

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Re: Video of VCR

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Mar 2014, at 14:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Sunday, March 16, 2014 3:40:49 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 15 Mar 2014, at 23:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:
http://www.jesseengland.net/index.php?/project/vide-uhhh/


Have a look at this quick video (or get the idea from this_)

Since the VCR can get video feedback of itself, is there any  
computational reason why this doesn't count as a degree of self  
awareness?


The computational reason is that there is no computation at all  
there. There is no self-representation, no introspection in the  
computer science theoretical sense.


How do you know though?


I don't know.

I assume it.



This is the same argument that I give for machines, except I am  
saying that there is no introspection in the sense of aesthetic  
phenomenal sense.


Where you confuse []p and []p & p.

Before Gödel, it was thought they would obey the same logic, when the  
machine is correct. But after Gödel, we know that they obey different  
logic, even when the machine is always correct.


The aesthetics phenomenal sense comes from the machine keeping its  
umbilical chord with truth, which is natural for her to do, as it  
exists, even if relatively.




Maybe the VCR is just very young compared to the machines that you  
are used to considering as capable of self-representation - indeed  
the jumpy screen artifacts correlate perfectly with the events that  
are impacting the VCR's body. Notice how each operation performed on  
the 'VCS' (VCR + Camera System) generates a unique vocabulary of  
responses on the screen. Why not assume that these are intelligent  
cries which reflect specific mechanical emotions. If we reproduced  
the experiment on a variety of similar devices, we could probably  
deduce a mathematical schema - a language through which VCS' talk  
about themselves and their environment. We could interview them and  
see whether they follow computationalist expectations for UMs or LUMs.


OK, but why would they not. You speculate on some analog machines, and  
you speculate on an analog theory of mind. That might be more  
interesting than assuming sense. You would make a theory of sense from  
a non comp theory of machines. Go for it.







There is an interesting analogy, as the computational self-reference  
leads to similar fixed points, but the analogy stops there. The VCR  
is like a mirror, with some dynamical delay similar to a computer  
self-reference, but it lacks the computations. Simply.


I think that you would have to be telepathic to say with certainty  
that it lacks computations, just as I would have to be telepathic to  
'know' that a machine is not a p-zombie.


Oh, but if there are computations, I apologize. just show them to me.  
Keep in mind that with comp, a "material object like a mirror" does  
not really exist, it is a map of your most probable future experience  
among infinitely many: it is a "wave" of possible computations  
(arithmetical relations, in our base). It is a common and sharable  
*experience*.





Your argument is that the VCS is a an m-zombie. A mechanical zombie  
which only seems to respond to its own condition as if it were a  
machine's 1p.


By definition, a zombie acts like you and me. The mirror does not act  
like you and me.


My sun in law does. He can discuss with you on consciousness, zombie,  
mind, brain, philosophy and also gastronomy, he works himself as a  
chef, actually. He makes money with his nose.


But let me think, when was my last discussion on culinary art with a  
mirror, hmm  ?












Would VCRs which have 'seen themselves' in this way have a greater  
chance of developing that awareness than those which have not?


No.

Not when you have ruled out their right to compute from the start ;)


You can compute with a ruler, a compass, but with a mirror you can do  
only simple symmetries, and dilations. Now, with many mirrors, it is  
different, especially if you can make them transparent and reflecting  
by a switch, then you can made them computing, by placing them in the  
right places.

With quantum semi-mirror you can do quantum computations.








If not, what initial conditions would be necessary for such an  
awareness to develop in some machines and how would those initial  
conditions appear?


The VCR lacks the numbers, the digital information. It lack  
retrievable memories, and well, the whole universality/Löbianity  
stuff.


Maybe its just very quiet about it. Any argument that you have used  
against my objections to computationalism can be used as effectively  
here to your objections to sub-computationalism.



Well, if sub-computationalism is correct, then computationalism is  
correct. It is just that one mirror does not compute much more than  
addition or multiplication, but it can't do both, and lacks the  
ability of a universal machine.


There is a notion, in computer science, of sub-universality, and sub- 
creativity, which is indeed where I think c

Re: Video of VCR

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Mar 2014, at 13:52, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Sunday, March 16, 2014 3:41:30 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Mar 2014, at 05:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Saturday, March 15, 2014 7:00:48 PM UTC-4, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
Craig,

Hmmm, let me see. If I just take my eye out of its socket and turn  
it around then I guess by your theory I'd have self awareness?


It's not my theory, but does computationalism provide a reason why  
your eye looking in the mirror doesn't have self-awareness?


The mirror does not compute.

How do you know you're not being racist against mirrors?



Did I ever say something bad about mirror? I have no clue they are  
intensional agent, but if they ask I will oblige. Mirror will also  
evolves, and the intelligent digital mirror can anticipate on you, or  
show you with another cut, or some brain scan.


You know that I assume comp, so it should just be obvious to you that  
mirror have not the ability of universal computation. Even the Dx =  
F"xx" method alone, seen as a control structure, alone, or even some  
generalization of it, are not Turing universal. Consciousness is the  
attribute to the first person, it is phenomenal, and there is nothing  
in a mirror which a priori invites us to such an attribution.
I tend currently to attribute consciousness at the Turing complete  
level, and self-consciousness at the Gödel-Löbian one, like when a K4  
reasoner becomes when he visits the Knave Knight Island, or when a  
universal Turing machine develops beliefs in enough induction axioms.


Now, if your theory attributes consciousness to a mirror, and not to  
my sun in law,  it will look even less convincing to me, Craig.






Craig


Bruno





Edgar



On Saturday, March 15, 2014 6:09:27 PM UTC-4, Craig Weinberg wrote:


http://www.jesseengland.net/index.php?/project/vide-uhhh/

Have a look at this quick video (or get the idea from this_)

Since the VCR can get video feedback of itself, is there any  
computational reason why this doesn't count as a degree of self  
awareness? Would VCRs which have 'seen themselves' in this way have  
a greater chance of developing that awareness than those which have  
not? If not, what initial conditions would be necessary for such an  
awareness to develop in some machines and how would those initial  
conditions appear?


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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Sunday, March 16, 2014 3:40:49 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 15 Mar 2014, at 23:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> http://www.jesseengland.net/index.php?/project/vide-uhhh/
>
>
> Have a look at this quick video (or get the idea from this_)
>
> Since the VCR can get video feedback of itself, is there any computational 
> reason why this doesn't count as a degree of self awareness? 
>
>
> The computational reason is that there is no computation at all there. 
> There is no self-representation, no introspection in the computer science 
> theoretical sense.
>

How do you know though? This is the same argument that I give for machines, 
except I am saying that there is no introspection in the sense of aesthetic 
phenomenal sense. Maybe the VCR is just very young compared to the machines 
that you are used to considering as capable of self-representation - indeed 
the jumpy screen artifacts correlate perfectly with the events that are 
impacting the VCR's body. Notice how each operation performed on the 'VCS' 
(VCR + Camera System) generates a unique vocabulary of responses on the 
screen. Why not assume that these are intelligent cries which reflect 
specific mechanical emotions. If we reproduced the experiment on a variety 
of similar devices, we could probably deduce a mathematical schema - a 
language through which VCS' talk about themselves and their environment. We 
could interview them and see whether they follow computationalist 
expectations for UMs or LUMs.
 

>
> There is an interesting analogy, as the computational self-reference leads 
> to similar fixed points, but the analogy stops there. The VCR is like a 
> mirror, with some dynamical delay similar to a computer self-reference, but 
> it lacks the computations. Simply.
>

I think that you would have to be telepathic to say with certainty that it 
lacks computations, just as I would have to be telepathic to 'know' that a 
machine is not a p-zombie. Your argument is that the VCS is a an m-zombie. 
A mechanical zombie which only seems to respond to its own condition as if 
it were a machine's 1p.
 

>
>
>
>
> Would VCRs which have 'seen themselves' in this way have a greater chance 
> of developing that awareness than those which have not? 
>
>
> No. 
>

Not when you have ruled out their right to compute from the start ;)
 

>
>
> If not, what initial conditions would be necessary for such an awareness 
> to develop in some machines and how would those initial conditions appear?
>
>
> The VCR lacks the numbers, the digital information. It lack retrievable 
> memories, and well, the whole universality/Löbianity stuff. 
>

Maybe its just very quiet about it. Any argument that you have used against 
my objections to computationalism can be used as effectively here to your 
objections to sub-computationalism.

Craig

 

> The VCR just singles out one aspect of digital machine self-reference, but 
> lacks the main part: the computations itself.
>
> How would those initial conditions appears? You can derive them from the 
> laws of addition + multiplication.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
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>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Sunday, March 16, 2014 7:20:19 AM UTC-4, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>
> Craig,
>
> Depends on what you mean by 'self-awareness'. Do you mean awareness that 
> you are a separate 'thing' in the world with special attributes? Or do you 
> mean the self monitoring awareness of your actual functions as you perform 
> them?
>
> These are two very different meanings of self-awareness.
>

Difference meanings, but the common component is the basic capacity to 
detect that what is doing the detecting is part of what is being detected, 
and that there is an appreciation of intrinsic significance in that 
awareness.

Craig
 

>
> Edgar
>
>
>
> On Sunday, March 16, 2014 12:17:47 AM UTC-4, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, March 15, 2014 7:00:48 PM UTC-4, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>>>
>>> Craig,
>>>
>>> Hmmm, let me see. If I just take my eye out of its socket and turn it 
>>> around then I guess by your theory I'd have self awareness?
>>>
>>
>> It's not my theory, but does computationalism provide a reason why your 
>> eye looking in the mirror doesn't have self-awareness?
>>  
>>
>>>
>>> Edgar
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, March 15, 2014 6:09:27 PM UTC-4, Craig Weinberg wrote:


 
 http://www.jesseengland.net/index.php?/project/vide-uhhh/

 Have a look at this quick video (or get the idea from this_)

 Since the VCR can get video feedback of itself, is there any 
 computational reason why this doesn't count as a degree of self awareness? 
 Would VCRs which have 'seen themselves' in this way have a greater chance 
 of developing that awareness than those which have not? If not, what 
 initial conditions would be necessary for such an awareness to develop in 
 some machines and how would those initial conditions appear?

>>>

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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Sunday, March 16, 2014 3:41:30 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 16 Mar 2014, at 05:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, March 15, 2014 7:00:48 PM UTC-4, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>>
>> Craig,
>>
>> Hmmm, let me see. If I just take my eye out of its socket and turn it 
>> around then I guess by your theory I'd have self awareness?
>>
>
> It's not my theory, but does computationalism provide a reason why your 
> eye looking in the mirror doesn't have self-awareness?
>
>
> The mirror does not compute.
>

How do you know you're not being racist against mirrors?

Craig
 

>
> Bruno
>
>
>  
>
>>
>> Edgar
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, March 15, 2014 6:09:27 PM UTC-4, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> 
>>> http://www.jesseengland.net/index.php?/project/vide-uhhh/
>>>
>>> Have a look at this quick video (or get the idea from this_)
>>>
>>> Since the VCR can get video feedback of itself, is there any 
>>> computational reason why this doesn't count as a degree of self awareness? 
>>> Would VCRs which have 'seen themselves' in this way have a greater chance 
>>> of developing that awareness than those which have not? If not, what 
>>> initial conditions would be necessary for such an awareness to develop in 
>>> some machines and how would those initial conditions appear?
>>>
>>
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>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

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Re: Video of VCR

[Edgar L. Owen]

Craig,

Depends on what you mean by 'self-awareness'. Do you mean awareness that 
you are a separate 'thing' in the world with special attributes? Or do you 
mean the self monitoring awareness of your actual functions as you perform 
them?

These are two very different meanings of self-awareness.

Edgar



On Sunday, March 16, 2014 12:17:47 AM UTC-4, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, March 15, 2014 7:00:48 PM UTC-4, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>>
>> Craig,
>>
>> Hmmm, let me see. If I just take my eye out of its socket and turn it 
>> around then I guess by your theory I'd have self awareness?
>>
>
> It's not my theory, but does computationalism provide a reason why your 
> eye looking in the mirror doesn't have self-awareness?
>  
>
>>
>> Edgar
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, March 15, 2014 6:09:27 PM UTC-4, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> 
>>> http://www.jesseengland.net/index.php?/project/vide-uhhh/
>>>
>>> Have a look at this quick video (or get the idea from this_)
>>>
>>> Since the VCR can get video feedback of itself, is there any 
>>> computational reason why this doesn't count as a degree of self awareness? 
>>> Would VCRs which have 'seen themselves' in this way have a greater chance 
>>> of developing that awareness than those which have not? If not, what 
>>> initial conditions would be necessary for such an awareness to develop in 
>>> some machines and how would those initial conditions appear?
>>>
>>

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Re: Video of VCR

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Mar 2014, at 05:35, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:





On 16 March 2014 09:09, Craig Weinberg  wrote:


http://www.jesseengland.net/index.php?/project/vide-uhhh/

Have a look at this quick video (or get the idea from this_)

Since the VCR can get video feedback of itself, is there any  
computational reason why this doesn't count as a degree of self  
awareness? Would VCRs which have 'seen themselves' in this way have  
a greater chance of developing that awareness than those which have  
not? If not, what initial conditions would be necessary for such an  
awareness to develop in some machines and how would those initial  
conditions appear?


Perhaps seeing itself is not enough:


I don't even think there is any seeing here, as I am sure you did not.  
Even if there is seeing, that would not been enough, but there is no  
seeing here. I mean: no reason to attribute any seeing.



it may have to be able to adjust its behaviour incorporating its own  
image in a feedback loop, or something.


Exactly.



In any case, it makes more sense that self-awareness should develop  
as a result of some such complex behaviour than because the VCR is  
made out of meat.


Sure.


Bruno






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Re: Video of VCR

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Mar 2014, at 05:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Saturday, March 15, 2014 7:00:48 PM UTC-4, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
Craig,

Hmmm, let me see. If I just take my eye out of its socket and turn  
it around then I guess by your theory I'd have self awareness?


It's not my theory, but does computationalism provide a reason why  
your eye looking in the mirror doesn't have self-awareness?


The mirror does not compute.

Bruno





Edgar



On Saturday, March 15, 2014 6:09:27 PM UTC-4, Craig Weinberg wrote:


http://www.jesseengland.net/index.php?/project/vide-uhhh/

Have a look at this quick video (or get the idea from this_)

Since the VCR can get video feedback of itself, is there any  
computational reason why this doesn't count as a degree of self  
awareness? Would VCRs which have 'seen themselves' in this way have  
a greater chance of developing that awareness than those which have  
not? If not, what initial conditions would be necessary for such an  
awareness to develop in some machines and how would those initial  
conditions appear?


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Re: Video of VCR

[Bruno Marchal]

On 15 Mar 2014, at 23:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:


http://www.jesseengland.net/index.php?/project/vide-uhhh/

Have a look at this quick video (or get the idea from this_)

Since the VCR can get video feedback of itself, is there any  
computational reason why this doesn't count as a degree of self  
awareness?


The computational reason is that there is no computation at all there.  
There is no self-representation, no introspection in the computer  
science theoretical sense.


There is an interesting analogy, as the computational self-reference  
leads to similar fixed points, but the analogy stops there. The VCR is  
like a mirror, with some dynamical delay similar to a computer self- 
reference, but it lacks the computations. Simply.





Would VCRs which have 'seen themselves' in this way have a greater  
chance of developing that awareness than those which have not?


No.


If not, what initial conditions would be necessary for such an  
awareness to develop in some machines and how would those initial  
conditions appear?


The VCR lacks the numbers, the digital information. It lack  
retrievable memories, and well, the whole universality/Löbianity  
stuff. The VCR just singles out one aspect of digital machine self- 
reference, but lacks the main part: the computations itself.


How would those initial conditions appears? You can derive them from  
the laws of addition + multiplication.


Bruno







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Re: Video of VCR

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 16 March 2014 09:09, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>
> 
> http://www.jesseengland.net/index.php?/project/vide-uhhh/
>
> Have a look at this quick video (or get the idea from this_)
>
> Since the VCR can get video feedback of itself, is there any computational
> reason why this doesn't count as a degree of self awareness? Would VCRs
> which have 'seen themselves' in this way have a greater chance of
> developing that awareness than those which have not? If not, what initial
> conditions would be necessary for such an awareness to develop in some
> machines and how would those initial conditions appear?
>

Perhaps seeing itself is not enough: it may have to be able to adjust its
behaviour incorporating its own image in a feedback loop, or something. In
any case, it makes more sense that self-awareness should develop as a
result of some such complex behaviour than because the VCR is made out of
meat.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Saturday, March 15, 2014 7:00:48 PM UTC-4, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>
> Craig,
>
> Hmmm, let me see. If I just take my eye out of its socket and turn it 
> around then I guess by your theory I'd have self awareness?
>

It's not my theory, but does computationalism provide a reason why your eye 
looking in the mirror doesn't have self-awareness?
 

>
> Edgar
>
>
>
> On Saturday, March 15, 2014 6:09:27 PM UTC-4, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>> 
>> http://www.jesseengland.net/index.php?/project/vide-uhhh/
>>
>> Have a look at this quick video (or get the idea from this_)
>>
>> Since the VCR can get video feedback of itself, is there any 
>> computational reason why this doesn't count as a degree of self awareness? 
>> Would VCRs which have 'seen themselves' in this way have a greater chance 
>> of developing that awareness than those which have not? If not, what 
>> initial conditions would be necessary for such an awareness to develop in 
>> some machines and how would those initial conditions appear?
>>
>

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Re: Video of VCR

[Edgar L. Owen]

Craig,

Hmmm, let me see. If I just take my eye out of its socket and turn it 
around then I guess by your theory I'd have self awareness?

Edgar



On Saturday, March 15, 2014 6:09:27 PM UTC-4, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
> 
> http://www.jesseengland.net/index.php?/project/vide-uhhh/
>
> Have a look at this quick video (or get the idea from this_)
>
> Since the VCR can get video feedback of itself, is there any computational 
> reason why this doesn't count as a degree of self awareness? Would VCRs 
> which have 'seen themselves' in this way have a greater chance of 
> developing that awareness than those which have not? If not, what initial 
> conditions would be necessary for such an awareness to develop in some 
> machines and how would those initial conditions appear?
>

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