Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

[Jerry LR Chandler]

> On May 21, 2019, at 1:27 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> GR
>> I truly doubt that Jon needs your "help," while insulting and
>> hubristic comments such as saying that if he refuses to accept your
>> "help" that he has "nothing but a puffy cloud of words" is, in my
>> opinion, below any serious scholar's dignity.
> 
> When it comes to logic, I treat Jon as a student.  He's not happy
> when I say that, so I haven't said that recently.  Instead, I stated
> the most appropriate analogy for his style of reasoning:  "puffy
> clouds of words".   If that's considered insulting, I'll just give
> him a "gentleman's C".

List:

The following is merely my opinion of the on-going comments of John Sowa that I 
find grossly misleading interpretations of CSP’s writings.

First, in my opinion, the special forms of logic that CSP created are rooted in 
CSP’s knowledge of chemistry as it developed in the period of 1850-1910.  The 
notion of spots and his attempt to relate these to chemical roots and 
propositions and graph theory are highly speculative 

Sowa's attempts to relate CSP’s logic to the of continuous functions, first 
order predicate logic and 
the CSP’s graphs is, at best, mystical, at worst, I will comment out of 
politeness…

Secondly, it is clear, in my opinion,  from history of John’s posts that his 
philosophy of mathematics is at a very primitive level, and at odds with CSP’s 
philosophy of mathematics.. In my opinion, all readers of this list serve 
should very very carefully evaluate all of John’s mathematical claims. Beware.  
Enough said.

Thirdly, I have stopped responding to Sowa’s posts because, in my analysis, 
Sowa’s views are remote from the bedrock of CSP’s writings.  As I understand 
his views, first order predicate logic is the ultimate test of CSP’s logical 
forms.  But, first order predicate logic is very remote from logic of chemistry 
and the bedrock of CSP’s graph theory. The logic of the table of elements 
associates several physical attributes (indices) and hence the propositions of 
chemical logic can not be antecedents of predicate logics. The grammar of 
chemical sentences requires both copula and predicates.  Enough said.

Finally, I would compliment Jon Alan Schmidt for his intellectual integrity, 
persistent consistency  careful linguistic analyses.  While I occasionally 
disagree with Jon’s interpretations, his views are meaningful to me. 

In closing, if I may be so bold, a question for John Sowa.

Would you consider becoming a student of Jon Alan Schmidt?
It is rare opportunity for you to cast away the imprisoning chains of predicate 
logic.  
It is also an opportunity to probe the illations between scientific thought and 
semiotics.
>From my reading of your book on Knowledge Representation, both opportunities 
>are possible approaches to improving your work on artificial intelligence.

Cheers

Jerry






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Re: Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric, was, [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

GF:  I took this claim of yours to be based on a confusion of acquaintance
with knowledge, overlooking Peirce’s frequent distinction between the two
and his stipulation that acquaintance can only come from collateral
experience, or collateral observation, and cannot be given by signs.


Let me quote again the passage with which you began this exchange, since I
gather that you are taking it as a basis for positing a *sharp *distinction
between acquaintance and knowledge.

CSP:  The Sign can only represent the Object and tell about it. It cannot
furnish acquaintance with or recognition of that Object; for that is what
is meant in this volume by the Object of a Sign; namely, that with which it
presupposes an acquaintance in order to convey some further information
concerning it. No doubt there will be readers who will say they cannot
comprehend this. They think a Sign need not relate to anything otherwise
known, and can make neither head nor tail of the statement that every Sign
must relate to such an Object. But if there be anything that conveys
information and yet has absolutely no relation nor reference to anything
with which the person to whom it conveys the information has, when he
comprehends that information, the slightest acquaintance, direct or
indirect--and a very strange sort of information that would be--the vehicle
of that sort of information is not, in this volume, called a Sign. (CP
2.231; 1910)


Two key words are missing here--"knowledge" and "collateral."  First,
Peirce was contrasting acquaintance with *information*, rather than
knowledge; in fact, I have not yet been able to find *any *passage where
Peirce *explicitly *distinguished acquaintance and knowledge.  Since you
called it his "frequent distinction," could you please provide some
citations?  What are your (or his) *definitions *of acquaintance and
knowledge in this context?  Second, Peirce did not explicitly equate
acquaintance with what he elsewhere called Collateral
Experience/Observation.  However, he did distinguish two different *kinds *of
acquaintance--direct and indirect--without explaining what their
differences might be.

I agree that acquaintance with the *Object *of a Sign comes from Collateral
Experience/Observation, because (as you noted) that is *precisely *the
requirement that Peirce specified elsewhere for *identifying *the Objects
of a Proposition as denoted by the Semes that serve as its *subjects*.
What remains unclear to me is the warrant for thinking that such
acquaintance cannot be given by Signs *at all*, implying that it must
always be *direct*.  What do you suppose that Peirce meant by
*indirect *acquaintance,
if not acquaintance mediated entirely by *previous *Signs?  How else could
he claim that "long study of the works of Aristotle may make him an
acquaintance" (CP 6.502; c. 1906)?  How else can you and I now be
acquainted with Peirce, such that the man himself is the Object of that
proper name when we utter or interpret Propositions about him?

There is also a specific kind of acquaintance that Peirce explicitly *denied
*to be collateral *at all*--"acquaintance with the system of signs,"
because it is "the prerequisite for getting any idea signified by the sign"
(CP 8.179, EP 2:494; 1909).  If "God" is indeed "*the *definable proper
name," then might it not also be *the *exception to the rule that
acquaintance with the Object of a Sign requires Collateral
Experience/Observation?  Just a thought.

GF:  Yes; we are not in the same situation re knowledge of God as we are re
knowledge of existent beings (such as Peirce) who have left observable
traces of their presence in the Universe.


I guess we disagree on whether God has left such traces; I see His
"fingerprints" all over the Universe, and I also consider certain writings
to be revelations from God Himself.  Perhaps this is where *faith *comes
into play, another theological rather than philosophical issue.

GF:  No, I think we can acquire knowledge of nonexistent things such as
real generals, if they are embodied or manifested in observable tokens of
Types. But as far as I can tell, for both you and Peirce, God the Creator
is the name of an individual, an agent or agency, a person with a proper
name, and not a general.


On the contrary, Peirce explicitly stated that "whatever exists is
individual, since existence (not reality) and individuality are essentially
the same thing" (CP 3.613; 1901); and also that "a person is only a
particular kind of general idea" (CP 6.270; 1892).  Accordingly, if God is
a real person Who does not exist, then He is not an *individual*, but a
real *general*.

GF:  As Peirce says, we need some index to direct our attention to a
subject before we can assign attributes to it and thus have any knowledge
of it.


Again, what was the index that first directed our attention to a man who
lived and died before we were born, Charles Sanders Peirce, when we knew
absolutely nothing at all about him?  Was it not a Sign,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Jon S, List,


My aim was to raise questions about one premiss in the argument. In the 
versions I've seen, it was a general assertion about the object being separate 
from the sign.


JonS response:  "Peirce's emphasis on the non-immanence of the latter rules out 
the possibility that the entire Universe as a Sign is a part of another Sign."


This claim seems separate from the premiss I was calling into question. My own 
interests are primarily in the semiotic theory. Given these interests, I was 
focusing on the assertion about objects being separate from their signs 
considered as a result of Peirce's semiotic inquiries.


As a methodological matter, it would seem odd to support claims about the 
relations between signs and objects in a speculative grammar with assertions 
about the real nature of the universe or about the non-immanent character of 
God. Perhaps I am misunderstanding the gist of your response.


JD:  In this case, it is the crucifix and not the pen that is serving as the 
object of the proposition. How is that object also functioning as a sign (of 
itself)?

JonS: I have acknowledged repeatedly that anything is a Sign of itself in a 
trivial sense, but it is not in the relation of representing unless it stands 
for something other than itself.


The example of the crucifix doesn't look a trivial sense of a sign also being 
its object in a trivial sense. Your comments on each of these examples don't 
seem to provide much guidance for understanding the larger point Peirce is 
making.  Here is that point again:


i)  Now the Sign and the Explanation together make up another Sign, and since 
the explanation will be a Sign, it will probably require an additional 
explanation, which taken together with the already enlarged Sign will make up a 
still larger Sign;
ii) and proceeding in the same way, we shall, or should, ultimately reach a 
Sign of itself, containing its own explanation and those of all its significant 
parts; and according to this explanation each such part has some other part as 
its Object.


Two things stand out to me. First, the claim that the sign and the explanation 
make up another sign is iterated, endlessly. Second, the relation of a whole to 
its part--and the parts of those parts, etc.-appears to be important for the 
sake understanding the point he is making.


It might help to consider some further examples involving relations between 
objects and signs. I suggest that we consider Peirce's example of patterns of 
inference by abduction, deduction and induction in the example of the beans in 
the bag. If this example of the beans in the bag seems forced as an 
illustration of how the forms of inference function as parts of a larger cycle 
of inquiry, then consider a simplified case like sampling colored beans from an 
urn with replacement.


Yours,


Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Tuesday, May 21, 2019 5:15:11 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

Jeff, List:

CSP:  But in order that anything should be a Sign, it must "represent," as we 
say, something else, called its Object, although the condition that a Sign must 
be other than its Object is perhaps arbitrary, since, if we insist upon it we 
must at least make an exception in the case of a Sign that is a part of a Sign. 
(CP 2.230; 1910)

I am having trouble seeing the relevance of this quote for either the 
continuity of semeiosis or the ongoing discussion of my Semeiotic Argumentation 
for the Reality of God, since Peirce's emphasis on the non-immanence of the 
latter rules out the possibility that the entire Universe as a Sign is a part 
of another Sign.

JD:  In this case, it is the crucifix and not the pen that is serving as the 
object of the proposition. How is that object also functioning as a sign (of 
itself)?

I have acknowledged repeatedly that anything is a Sign of itself in a trivial 
sense, but it is not in the relation of representing unless it stands for 
something other than itself.

JD:  This example suggests that the relations that are represented as holding 
between subjects in a proposition are, themselves, also the objects of the 
proposition.

I disagree with this analysis.  "Cain," "Abel," and "killing" are the subjects 
of the Proposition, which therefore denote its Objects (or "one complex 
Object").  The relation between them corresponds to the continuous predicate, 
"_ stands in the relation of _ to _," which therefore signifies the 
Proposition's Interpretant.  In fact, this is precisely the example that Peirce 
gave elsewhere of a sentence in which the continuous predicate is expressed 
entirely by syntax.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jeff, List:

CSP:  But in order that anything should be a Sign, it must "represent," as
we say, something else, called its *Object*, although the condition that a
Sign must be other than its Object is perhaps arbitrary, since, if we
insist upon it we must at least make an exception in the case of a Sign
that is a part of a Sign. (CP 2.230; 1910)


I am having trouble seeing the relevance of this quote for either the
continuity of semeiosis or the ongoing discussion of my Semeiotic
Argumentation for the Reality of God, since Peirce's emphasis on the
non-immanence of the latter rules out the possibility that the entire
Universe as a Sign is a part of another Sign.

JD:  In this case, it is the crucifix and not the pen that is serving as
the object of the proposition. How is that object also functioning as a
sign (of itself)?


I have acknowledged repeatedly that anything is a Sign of itself in a *trivial
*sense, but it is not in the relation of *representing *unless it stands
for something *other than* itself.

JD:  This example suggests that the relations that are represented as
holding between subjects in a proposition are, themselves, also the objects
of the proposition.


I disagree with this analysis.  "Cain," "Abel," and "killing" are the
subjects of the Proposition, which therefore denote its Objects (or "one
complex Object").  The relation between them corresponds to the continuous
predicate, "_ stands in the relation of _ to _," which
therefore signifies the Proposition's Interpretant.  In fact, this is
precisely the example that Peirce gave elsewhere of a sentence in which the
continuous predicate is expressed entirely by *syntax*.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 10:58 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Jon S, Gary F, John S, Edwina, Gary R, List
>
> I'd like to raise some questions about the assertion that every sign has
> an object that is separate, in some sense, from that sign. The basis of the
> claim that the object must be *separate* from the sign, I am supposing,
> is that the object *determines* the sign. As a matter of principle, an
> object cannot be the kind of thing that determines a sign if that object is
> not separate from the sign.
>
> This assertion seems, at least to me, to be clearest in the case
> of the actual objects that determine indexical sinsigns--where the objects
> and signs stand in the relation of agent and patient. This type of relation
> is classified as a dynamical dyadic relation that is formally ordered. For
> this type of sign, the object, as agent, cannot determine the indexical
> sinsign, as patient, if the two are identical. Diversity is requisite for
> the relation to hold.
>
> If we can all agree on this much, then what shall we say about the case of
> a sign that is part of a sign? In order to anchor the discussion of this
> question about Peirce's semiotics in a text, l'd like to focus our
> attention on the following clarification that is offered in "Meaning" from
> 1910:  "But in order that anything should be a Sign, it must "represent,"
> as we say, something else, called its *Object, *although the condition
> that a Sign must be other than its Object is perhaps arbitrary, since, if
> we insist upon it we must at least make an exception in the case of a
> Sign that is a part of a Sign."
>
> Here is the larger paragraph from which this sentence has been abstracted:
>
> SIGNS AND THEIR OBJECTS
>
> The word Sign will be used to denote an Object perceptible, or only 
> imaginable,
> or even unimaginable in one sense--for the word "*fast*," which is a Sign, is
> not imaginable, since it is not *this word itself *that can be set down
> on paper or pronounced, but only *an instance *of it, and since it is the
> very same word when it is written as it is when it is pronounced, but is
> one word when it means "rapidly" and quite another when it means
> "immovable," and a third when it refers to abstinence. But in order that
> anything should be a Sign, it must "represent," as we say, something else,
> called its *Object, *although the condition that a Sign must be other
> than its Object is perhaps arbitrary, since, if we insist upon it we must
> at least make an exception in the case of a Sign that is a part of a
> Sign. Thus nothing prevents the actor who acts a character in an
> historical drama from carrying as a theatrical "property" the very relic that
> that article is supposed merely to represent, such as the crucifix that
> Bulwer's Richelieu holds up with such effect in his defiance. On a map of
> an island laid down upon the soil of that island there must, under all
> ordinary circumstances, be some position, some point, marked or not, that
> represents *qua *place on the map, the very same point *qua *place on the
> island. A sign may have more th

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }1]
JAS- This is what I was responding to: You wrote:
 "As with any logical or mathematical "proof"--i.e., any deductive
argumentation--the conclusion is only as strong as the premisses.  If
one premiss is false, then the conclusion is false, or at least
unwarranted on the basis of  that premiss; but anyone who affirms all
of the premisses is rationally required to affirm the conclusion, as
well."

You said nothing about the form of the argument; you based your
assertion only on the premises and clearly stated that if one accepts
the premises as true, then, one is 'rationally required to affirm the
conclusion'.

I merely showed you some examples where the premises were all true -
but one couldn't consider the conclusion as true. Once I had done that
- you then introduced the requirement for 'logical form'.

2] My interest in this thread is to reject the idea of an external
metaphysical agency for the Universe [aka God] and to focus instead
on the self-generating and self-organizing properties of the semiosic
process. .As outlined, for example, in Peirce's description of the
emergence of the Universe [1.412]

Edwina
 On Tue 21/05/19  6:37 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 ET:  My understanding of science is that its axioms are based on
objective empirical evidence; repeatable observations; quantitative
measurements and fallibility.
 Then your definition of "science" is narrower than Peirce's.
  ET:  Your comments referred only to the premises being true - and
you declared that if the premises are true then the conclusion must
be true. I simply showed you some examples which invalidated your
assertion.
 No, for (at least) the third time, the requirement is that the
premisses are true and the form of argumentation is valid.  Your
examples met the first criterion, but not the second.  My Semeiotic
Argumentation meets both. 
 ET:  I consider it reductionism - and therefore, have every right to
my opinion. You may reject it, but I don't really think that you have
the right to tell me to stop having this opinion.
 The double standard appears again.  What precludes someone from
making exactly the same statement, but substituting "unPeircean" for
"reductionism"?  What makes some such opinions acceptable, and others
out of bounds?  Who gets to decide where that line is drawn--i.e.,
whose  opinion about this is authoritative?
 ET:   I'm not going to get into any discussion of God or creation of
the Universe etc.
 In that case, given its subject line, why are you participating in
this thread at all?
 Regards,
 Jon S. 
 On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 3:16 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
  Please see my responses below
 On Tue 21/05/19  3:12 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
[2] sent:
 Edwina, List:
 1] ET:  I don't think that these discussions on religion and logic
have anything to do with bridging the chasm between religion and
science. They have no scientific content whatsoever.
 JAS] Peirce held that both Logic as Semeiotic and Metaphysics are
sciences, so their content is scientific  content; but not religion. 
Of course, the line between Metaphysics and religion is not sharp,
especially when the topic of discussion is the Reality of God.
 EDWINA My understanding of science is that its axioms are based on
objective empirical evidence; repeatable observations; quantitative
measurements and fallibility. I don't think that any of these
criteria apply to any of the discussions we've had.
 2] ET:  Furthermore, because an argument's single premises are true,
in the sense that they can be abstracted from a text's content and set
up as, in themselves, true--and the format of their syllogistic
placement is valid, this does not make the content of this argument
true. It merely sets up a valid argument. 
 JAS: Again, if the premisses are true and the form of the
argumentation is valid, then the conclusion is necessarily true;
i.e., the argumentation as a whole is sound.  This is the most basic
logical leading principle of all deductive syllogisms.  We can
certainly disagree on whether each of the premisses is true, but
someone who endorses  all of them is rationally required to endorse
the conclusion, as well.
 EDWINA Your comments referred only to the premises being true - and
you declared that if the premises are true then the conclusion must
be true. I simply showed you some examples which invalidated your
assertion. 
  3] ET:  I, for example, question the soundness and truth of JAS's
insistence that takes Peirce's statement that 'the Universe is
perfused with signs' and then, matches it up with Peirce's concept
that multiple signs can be 'merged' to be considered ONE sign - to
conclude that the Universe is A single Sign.
 JAS: Peirce's  theorem was not that multiple Signs can be merged to
be considered one Sign; it is that multiple Signs that are connected
constitute one Sign.  Co

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET:  My understanding of science is that its axioms are based on objective
empirical evidence; repeatable observations; quantitative measurements and
fallibility.


Then your definition of "science" is narrower than Peirce's.

ET:  Your comments referred only to the premises being true - and you
declared that if the premises are true then the conclusion must be true. I
simply showed you some examples which invalidated your assertion.


No, for (at least) the third time, the requirement is that the premisses
are true *and *the form of argumentation is valid.  Your examples met the
first criterion, but not the second.  My Semeiotic Argumentation meets both.

ET:  I consider it reductionism - and therefore, have every right to my
opinion. You may reject it, but I don't really think that you have the
right to tell me to stop having this opinion.


The double standard appears again.  What precludes someone from making
exactly the same statement, but substituting "unPeircean" for
"reductionism"?  What makes some such opinions acceptable, and others out
of bounds?  Who gets to decide where that line is drawn--i.e., whose *opinion
*about this is authoritative?

ET:   I'm not going to get into any discussion of God or creation of the
Universe etc.


In that case, given its subject line, why are you participating in this
thread at all?

Regards,

Jon S.

On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 3:16 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Please see my responses below
>
> On Tue 21/05/19 3:12 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> 1] ET:  I don't think that these discussions on religion and logic have
> anything to do with bridging the chasm between religion and science. They
> have no scientific content whatsoever.
>
> JAS] Peirce held that both Logic as Semeiotic and Metaphysics are sciences,
> so their content is scientific content; but not religion.  Of course, the
> line between Metaphysics and religion is not sharp, especially when the
> topic of discussion is the Reality of God.
>
> EDWINA My understanding of science is that its axioms are based on
> objective empirical evidence; repeatable observations; quantitative
> measurements and fallibility. I don't think that any of these criteria
> apply to any of the discussions we've had.
>
> 2] ET:  Furthermore, because an argument's single premises are true, in
> the sense that they can be abstracted from a text's content and set up as,
> in themselves, true--and the format of their syllogistic placement is
> valid, this does not make the content of this argument true. It merely sets
> up a valid argument.
>
> JAS: Again, if the premisses are true and the form of the argumentation
> is valid, then the conclusion is necessarily true; i.e., the
> argumentation as a whole is sound.  This is the most basic logical
> leading principle of all deductive syllogisms.  We can certainly disagree
> on whether each of the premisses is true, but someone who endorses all of
> them is rationally required to endorse the conclusion, as well.
>
> EDWINA Your comments referred only to the premises being true - and you
> declared that if the premises are true then the conclusion must be true. I
> simply showed you some examples which invalidated your assertion.
>
> 3] ET:  I, for example, question the soundness and truth of JAS's
> insistence that takes Peirce's statement that 'the Universe is perfused
> with signs' and then, matches it up with Peirce's concept that multiple
> signs can be 'merged' to be considered ONE sign - to conclude that the
> Universe is A single Sign.
>
> JAS: Peirce's theorem was not that multiple Signs can be merged to be
> considered one Sign; it is that multiple Signs that are connected
> constitute one Sign.  Consequently, according to Peirce, if the entire
> Universe consists of connected Signs, then the Universe is one Sign; and
> as I keep pointing out, he explicitly affirmed not only that "the
> Universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol ... that Universe being
> precisely an argument" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193-194; 1903), but also that "the
> entire body of all thought is a sign, supposing all thought to be more or
> less connected" (R 1476:36[5-1/2]; c. 1904).
>
> EDWINA I'm not going to get into diversions of semantics - ie between
> 'merged' and 'connected'. The point is, that the Representamen is a
> mediative function - an ACTION - and I ackknowledge that the Universe is
> one vast ACTION of semiosis, but the nature of the representamen, as a
> system of LAWS - is not homogeneous. That is, the laws of organization of
> matter are NOT identical - ie the laws which produce a tree are quite
> different from the laws that produce a giraffe. So, to my interpretation,
> 'the universe is a vast mediative function-of-the-production-of-laws. But
> these laws are not identical.
>
> 4] ET:   I question such reductionism, for that denies the actual
> complexity of the Universe and indeed, the functionality of semiosis ...
>
> JAS:I h

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, List:

JFS:  I endorse Edwina's caveats.  Her examples are among the "puffy
clouds" that create ambiguities in any reasoning stated in ordinary
language.


Do you likewise endorse all of Edwina's attributions of positions to Peirce
that he did not explicitly state?  If not, why have you not said so?  In
what sense are her own (or anyone else's) posts any less pervaded by "puffy
clouds" than you claim mine to be?  Do you automatically dismiss the claims
of anyone who does not first demonstrate their mastery of EGs to your
satisfaction, or do you reserve that treatment only for those with whom you
happen to disagree?

JFS:  When it comes to logic, I treat Jon as a student.  He's not happy
when I say that, so I haven't said that recently.  Instead, I stated the
most appropriate analogy for his style of reasoning:  "puffy clouds of
words".   If that's considered insulting, I'll just give him a "gentleman's
C".


What would be your response if I stated, "When it comes to Peirce's
Semeiotic and Metaphysics, I treat John Sowa as a student" and then offered
you a "gentleman's C" for your performance so far?  Let me be clear--I
would never *actually *be so disrespectful, in this or any other context.
I cannot now and never will be able to match your credentials, but my
impression is that the List is supposed to be a forum where *anyone *can
share thoughts related to Peirce, and ideally receive *constructive *feedback.
In other words, we are all *equals *here, so there is no basis for *anyone *to
make an appeal to their own authority; instead, if someone thinks that I
(or anyone else) is saying something incorrect or unsupported in Peirce's
writings, then the proper response is to *make a better argument*.

I have been told off-List that I tend to come across as very forceful and
sure of myself.  What I am usually doing is trying out a hypothesis, making
the strongest case for it that I can, seeing what (if any) objections
arise, and then figuring out whether and how I can address them.  When no
one on-List manages to *persuade *me that I am on the wrong track, it in no
way entails that I am *unwilling *to change my mind; in fact, when I
*do *realize
that I have made a mistake, I will usually *admit *it and be *grateful *for
the correction--for example, when I recently experimented with
Propositional Graphs, but ultimately abandoned them in favor of sticking
with EGs.  As I have said before, *I am here to learn*, not to make
dogmatic pronouncements that I expect everyone else to accept without
critical evaluation.

JFS:  It's not acceptable to attribute any position to Peirce that he did
not explicitly state ...


In general, I agree, although I think that we are not doing anything
untoward when we draw *reasonable *inferences from those explicit
statements, even if Peirce never wrote down that exact arrangement of words
himself.  If we were *strictly precluded* from doing this, then there would
not be a vast secondary literature derived from what he *did *write down;
and what on earth would we ever discuss on the List?  Besides, did he
ever *explicitly
state* that the presentation of EGs in his 22 June 1911 letter to Mr.
Kehler (NEM 3:168-169; 1911 June 22) was "his final preferred version," as
you have repeatedly claimed?  You once reported
 that he
did so in his 6 Dec 1911 letter to Risteen, but the actual text itself
contains no such assertion, as I pointed out
 at the
time.  For that matter, did Peirce *ever* describe *anything* that he wrote
as "his final preferred version"?

JFS:  ... for example, the assumption that anything could or even must
exist outside his three universes.


But that is *not *an example of what you deem unacceptable.  First, the
claim is not that anything *exists *outside the three Universes--according
to Peirce, nothing *exists* outside the *second *Universe of
Actuality/Existents--but that there is a *Reality *outside the three
Universes.  Second, and more to the point, Peirce *did *explicitly describe
God as "in my belief Really creator of all three Universes of Experience"
(CP 6.452, EP 2:434; 1908) and "a Being *not *immanent in the Universes of
Matter, Mind, and Ideas, but the Sole Creator of every content of them
without exception" (R 843:15; 1908).

JFS:  For the first homework assignment, the students were supposed to
translate 10 English sentences to first-order logic.  None of the sentences
had any syntactic or semantic ambiguities.  There were about 30 students in
the class, but only one student got all 10 sentences correct.


I freely admit that I am probably not adept enough with any of the
*notations* for first-order logic (including EGs) to translate English
sentences of significant complexity, but if you send me those ten, I am
willing to take a stab at it.

JFS:  I doubt that Jon could correctly translate the relevant quotations
from P

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric, was, [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Gary Richmond]

Jeff, List,

I'm sorry that it's taken a little while to get back to you, Jeff, but it's
been a busy, weird time on the list since some here would seem to have
forgotten that for Peirce logic as semeiotic is the third of the normative
sciences which takes some of its most fundamental principles from the other
two normative sciences, especially ethics.

nd | A Suggested Classification of the Sciences | MS [R] 1339:12
Reasoning is self-controlled thought; and thus Logic is directly dependent
upon Ethics, or the science of self-control, in general.


The first normative science is, of course, pure Esthetics (which has little
in common with aesthetics as that term is employed in, for example, the
fine arts). In Peirce's tentative and self-admittedly incomplete (really,
hardly begun) inquiry into a scientific esthetics, he arrives at the *summum
bonum* for science as "the reasonable in itself."

The second normative science is *pure Ethics* which Peirce much less
tentatively suggests is for science--and so, for scientists--pursuing a
course of self-controlled conduct in keeping with the *summum bunum* just
mentioned.


1904 | A Brief Intellectual Autobiography by Charles Sanders Peirce | Peirce,
1983, p. 71; MS [R] L107:20

Ethics studies in the controllable phenomenon the act and process of
controlling it. This study is the very heart of normative science, and
emphasizes more strongly than the others that dichotomy which is the
constitutive characteristic of normative science. For it is the study of
the controlled and the uncontrolled as they appear in effort and resistance.


…conduct. . .  action so far as it seeks one ultimate result as desirable
and shun[s] another [as] undesirable. nd | Fragments [R] | MS [R] 839


I think to be a good logician in Peirce's sense is to be grounded in sound
esthetics and ethics such that eventually the lack of an estheticak and
ethical grounding will reveal itself.

1. In any event, getting to that wonderful passage from Emerson's "The
Poet" you provided, since all the triads he offered "stand respectively for
the love of truth, for the love of good, and for the love of beauty," I
thought I'd start with a categorial trikon of these three as perhaps most
closely aligned with Peirce's categories. While you suggested, I think,
that the order Emerson gave them appear to be "first, second and third in a
number of different cultural traditions," as I see it at the moment these
three appear to be Peirce's 3ns, 2ns, and 1ns in *that* order. So: truth,
good, beauty:

1ns beauty
|> 3ns truth
2ns goodness

That seems roughly right for the practical sciences we might build on
Peirce's triad of the theoretical normative sciences.

1ns pure Esthetics
|> 3ns Logic as Semeiotic
2ns pur Ethics

In any case, starting with Emerson's truth, goodness, beauty, mutatis
mutandis, we get:

1ns sayer (in Emerson's sense)
|> 3ns knower
2ns doer

This too seems reasonably aligned with Peirce's three types of men, as I
recall. For Peirce:

1ns the artist (also, recall Peirce's comment to the effect that religion
is poesis completed)
|> 3ns the scientist
2ns the practical (e.g. business) man

Emerson's cause, operation, and effect doesn't seem to conform to Peirce's
categories:

1ns effect
|> 3ns cause
2ns operation

"Effect" categorially for Peirce would more likely be an example of 2ns,
and 'cause' 1ns (as in his ordering of biological evolution following the
vector (order or path) of process from 1ns through 3ns to 1ns. So for Peirce

1st: 1ns cause (chance sporting leading to. . .)
|> 2nd: 3ns operation (new patterns of habit-formation resulting in. . .)
3rd: 2ns effect (say, some structural change in an organism)

But perhaps Emerson's order more closely represents his "theological" triad:

1ns Spirit
|> 3ns Father
2ns Son

Well, for me it remains unclear which Person of the Holy Trinity to put
where, so I'll leave it at that for now.

I certainly can't make much of the next triad, probably because I have
some, but not many associations for each of these Greek Gods. Perhaps a
classicist could help here.

1ns Neptune
|> 3ns Jove
2ns Pluto

2. But let's start over and give these triads the order you suggested.

1ns truth
|> 3ns beauty
2ns goodness

1ns knower
|> 3ns sayer (in Emerson's sense)
2ns doer

1ns cause
|> 3ns effect
2ns operation

1ns Father
|> 3ns Spirit
2ns Son

1ns Jove
|> 3ns Neptune
2ns Pluto

Well, I don't know what to make of that ordering, except it doesn't seem to
be Peirce's in those triads I'm familiar with (while I haven a clued
regarding Jove, Pluto, and Neptune :-)

However, the following remarks by Emerson have, I think, some significant
Peircean--and, perhaps, universal--resonance.

Emerson: For the Universe has three children, born at one time, which
reappear under different names in every system of thought. . . These three
are equal. Each is that which he is, essentially, so that he cannot be
surmounted or analyzed, and each of these three has the power of the others
laten

Re: Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

[Edwina Taborsky]

  BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }My
comments below
 On Tue 21/05/19  3:27 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, Helmut, List:
 1] ET:  Science requires empirical evidence ...
 JAS: The truth of this statement depends on how we define
"empirical."  In the popular sense, only the Special Sciences require
empirical evidence.  According to Peirce, philosophy--including both
Logic as Semeiotic and Metaphysics--requires empirical evidence,
defined as  experiential evidence of the kind that is common to
anyone and everyone; and even Mathematics requires empirical
evidence, in the sense that it depends upon observation.  That is why
he classified all of these fields as sciences.
 EDWINA I refer only to the sciences that require objective empirical
evidence. I don't think that a pragmatic life can be lived without
such objectivity. 
 2]ET:  Logic can only show us that our beliefs are logical but can't
provide any proof of their pragmatic reality. 
 Deductive logic shows us what Propositions follow necessarily from
other Propositions.  In that sense, it reveals what else we must
believe in accordance with what we already believe; i.e., it only
provides "proof" of other pragmatic realities that are entailed by
what we already have ascertained to be pragmatic realities.
 EDWINA So? Again - without objective evidence, then our logical
analyses are irrelevant.
 3] ET:  My understanding of the sign/representamen is that it is A
PROCESS OF MEDIATION, an ACTION  and is not a 'thing' in itself.
 JAS: There is no need to shout.  Indeed, "a sign is not a real
thing" (EP 2:303; 1904); however, Peirce generally used "thought" or
"semeiosis" for the process, and "Sign" or "Representamen" for each
constituent of the process.  On the other hand, an Argument is a Sign
that is  also a continuous "inferential process," which we describe
using definite Propositions as if they were the constituent Signs of
that process.  That is why I reject the charge of
"reductionism"--saying that the Universe (or any other Argument) is a
Sign says nothing whatsoever about its complexity, except that is more
complex than a Proposition, which in turn is more complex than a Seme.
 EDWINA I'm not shouting but emphasizing. My computer doesn't do
italics or underlining very well - it somehow forgets how to shut
itself off from such methods. My focus is on the action [ACTION] of
the Repesentamen - and I think that we forget it is is an action.
 4] ET:  As such a process of mediation, the sign/representamen only
functions within a semiosic triad of relations, made up of the R-O;
the R-R; and the R-I.
 JAS: Absolutely not; this treats the one triadic relation between
the Sign, Object, and Interpretant as if it were composed of three
dyadic relations.  If anything merits the label of "reductionism,"
this is it.  A Sign can be classified  in accordance with its own
nature (Qualisign/Sinsign/Legisign or Tone/Token/Type), that of its
relation to its Dynamic Object (Icon/Index/Symbol), and that of its
relation to its Final Interpretant (Rheme/Dicisign/Argument or
Seme/Pheme/Delome); these result in the ten classes of Peirce's 1903
taxonomy.  However, a Sign does not consist of these three relations;
I consider such a notion to reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of
Peirce's entire Speculative Grammar.
 EDWINA And I disagree. The triad is not reducible to dyads. I don't
say that the Representamen CONSISTS of these three relations. I say
that the Representamen, as a mediative process, engages in these
three relations.  See 8.335, where Peirce discusses 'In respect to
their relations to their Dynamic Objects, ….
 5] ET:  Therefore - reductionism, which, despite JAS's objection to
the term, is the only one I can come up with that describes the
concept that 'all signs are one' ...
 JAS: So you acknowledge my objection to the term, but persist in
continuing to use it anyway.  That seems rather hypocritical for
someone who routinely accuses me of calling her "unPeircean," even
though I have conscientiously  avoided using that word myself.  If I
claimed to be unable to come up with any other term to describe your
views, would that be justification for me to start using it now?  Of
course not.
 EDWINA There is no comparison between accusing someone of outlining
a semiosis that has nothing to do with Peirce [aka unPeircean whether
or not you use the term] - and my opinion that your outline of Peirce
is a reductionist one. I can't describe your reduction of 'plethora
of signs' to 'one sign' in any other way than 'reductionist'. 
 6] ET:  In addition, I object to the 'backwards reasoning' as I see
it, where you proceed from a conclusion to a premise. If we conclude
that all signs/representamens must refer to objects external from
themselves [and this is a debatable conclusion] - can we actually say
that this 'proves' that the Universe, as a sign/representamen actually
has an Object-external-to-itself? I don't think

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

[Edwina Taborsky]

  BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Please see my responses below
 On Tue 21/05/19  3:12 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 1] ET:  I don't think that these discussions on religion and logic
have anything to do with bridging the chasm between religion and
science. They have no scientific content whatsoever.
 JAS] Peirce held that both Logic as Semeiotic and Metaphysics are
sciences, so their content is scientific  content; but not religion. 
Of course, the line between Metaphysics and religion is not sharp,
especially when the topic of discussion is the Reality of God.
 EDWINA My understanding of science is that its axioms are based on
objective empirical evidence; repeatable observations; quantitative
measurements and fallibility. I don't think that any of these
criteria apply to any of the discussions we've had.
 2] ET:  Furthermore, because an argument's single premises are true,
in the sense that they can be abstracted from a text's content and set
up as, in themselves, true--and the format of their syllogistic
placement is valid, this does not make the content of this argument
true. It merely sets up a valid argument. 
 JAS: Again, if the premisses are true and the form of the
argumentation is valid, then the conclusion is necessarily true;
i.e., the argumentation as a whole is sound.  This is the most basic
logical leading principle of all deductive syllogisms.  We can
certainly disagree on whether each of the premisses is true, but
someone who endorses all of them is rationally required to endorse
the conclusion, as well.
 EDWINA Your comments referred only to the premises being true - and
you declared that if the premises are true then the conclusion must
be true. I simply showed you some examples which invalidated your
assertion. 
  3] ET:  I, for example, question the soundness and truth of JAS's
insistence that takes Peirce's statement that 'the Universe is
perfused with signs' and then, matches it up with Peirce's concept
that multiple signs can be 'merged' to be considered ONE sign - to
conclude that the Universe is A single Sign.
 JAS: Peirce's  theorem was not that multiple Signs can be merged to
be considered one Sign; it is that multiple Signs that are connected
constitute one Sign.  Consequently, according to Peirce, if the
entire Universe consists of connected Signs, then the Universe is one
Sign; and as I keep pointing out, he explicitly affirmed not only that
"the Universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol ... that
Universe being precisely an argument" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193-194; 1903),
but also that "the entire body of all thought is a sign, supposing all
thought to be more or less connected" (R 1476:36[5-1/2]; c. 1904).
 EDWINA I'm not going to get into diversions of semantics - ie
between 'merged' and 'connected'. The point is, that the
Representamen is a mediative function - an ACTION - and I
ackknowledge that the Universe is one vast ACTION of semiosis, but
the nature of the representamen, as a system of LAWS - is not
homogeneous. That is, the laws of organization of matter are NOT
identical - ie the laws which produce a tree are quite different from
the laws that produce a giraffe. So, to my interpretation, 'the
universe is a vast mediative function-of-the-production-of-laws. But
these laws are not identical.
  4] ET:   I question such reductionism, for that denies the actual
complexity of the Universe and indeed, the functionality of semiosis
...
 JAS:I have asked you before, and now ask you again, to stop calling
it "reductionism."  If the entire Universe is indeed a
Sign--specifically, an Argument, a continuous "inferential process"
of semeiosis--that indicates  nothing whatsoever about its
complexity.  On the contrary, it reveals just how vast and complex a
Sign can be, rather than implying that the Universe is any simpler
than we otherwise would have suspected.
 EDWINA I consider it reductionism - and therefore, have every right
to my opinion. You may reject it, but I don't really think that you
have the right to tell me to stop having this opinion. I consider
that semeiosis, i.e., the fact that the Representamen has the ability
to transform input data from an external Object [or Objects] and, via
its generative habits/laws...produce something quite unique as an
Interpretant - I consider that this freedom enables complexity. 
 5] ET:  I also question the soundness of JAS's insistence that a
sign requires an external object - for my reading of Peirce is that,
indeed, the semiosic function requires 'dialogue' which does set up a
'this' and a 'not this' which interact. 
 JAS: I thought we agreed that every Sign is determined by an
external Object.  However, the Sign and its Object do not interact,
since that would imply both of them acting on each other; by
contrast, Peirce explicitly affirmed that while the Object acts on
the Sign, the Sign has no effect on its Object.
 CSP:  For the purpose of this inquiry a 

Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

[Helmut Raulien]

 
 

Supplement: I put an "other" in my second paragraph. Individual signs cannot communicate using quantum entanglement. But perhaps the universe can use quantum entanglement for communication in itself, so may have an event horizon as big as itself..




Edwina, list,

 

I agree. I too think, that a sign is an action, an event, and is therefore limited by its event horizon. Though a part of any sign is due to universal laws, but that does not connect all signs to one (not completely, because only a part of the sign is due to universal laws like efficient causation, other parts follow limitedly ranged laws, habits, needs, volitions, etc.).

 

To your last paragraph about backwards reasoning: I also think, that it is not justified to conclude from subsystems and usual signs to the universe, because the universe is the biggest possible system, and has, other that any other system, no supersystem, and no event horizon bigger than itself. This makes it unique: Even if every other sign would have an object external to it, and if the universe was a sign, then a conclusion that the universe would have an external object too, would still be not justified.

 

On the other hand it is possible to assume, that a part of any sign has the universe as event horizon, e.g. by divine interaction or communication by quantum entanglement. I think, Peirce has assumed so, when he wrote, that he does not entertain a doubt, that what is present to one mind, is present to all minds. But again, this only would apply to a (quite small) part of the sign, I think.

 

Helmut

 

21. Mai 2019 um 20:16 Uhr

"Edwina Taborsky" 
wrote:


Helmut

Science requires empirical evidence - and discussions about 'God' rarely provide that. Logic can only show us that our beliefs are logical but can't provide any proof of their pragmatic reality.

I consider that a major problem in discussion  of 'the sign' is the view, almost, that it is a 'thing', a discrete entity. My understanding of the sign/representamen is that it is A PROCESS OF MEDIATION, an ACTION  and is not a 'thing' in itself. As such a process of mediation, the sign/representamen only functions within a semiosic triad of relations, made up of the R-O; the R-R; and the R-I.

Therefore, one has to examine the functioning nature of this mediative action- which never 'exists' or functions on its own. My understanding of it is that the sign/representamen operates by developing habits of organization or laws which enable matter to develop as morphological forms.

Therefore - reductionism, which, despite JAS's objection to the term, is the only one I can come up with that describes the concept that 'all signs are one'seems to me to ignore these laws or habits. These laws and habits are real and not only real but existent [we can scientifically examine the laws of chemistry, physics, biology] - can or should they be ignored?

And are all these laws reducible? Can a biological entity, eg, a swan, be reduced to a pile of chemicals? My view is that these normative rules of formation are relatively stable and scientifically, I don't see how we can ignore them such that we can conclude that ALL mediation is actually using the same law.

In addition, I object to the 'backwards reasoning' as I see it, where you proceed from a conclusion to a premise. If we conclude that all signs/representamens must refer to objects external from themselves [and this is a debatable conclusion] - can we actually say that this 'proves' that the Universe, as a sign/representamen actually has an Object-external-to-itself? I don't think we can do this that easily.

Edwina

 



 

On Tue 21/05/19 11:18 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:




Edwina, All,

 

I think there is (and will be) a premiss missing: Scale-invariance / connectedness / noncontingency. A forest consisting of different (nonconnected) trees is not a tree, it is not scale-invariant. But there may be a forest in which the trees are connected by their roots, which make them one plant, so you can say that this forest is one tree. Now to the question whether the universe is one sign: Do all signs have a connectibility towards each other, or are they separated, made contingent, by event-horizons due to the limitations by light-velocity and other speed/space limits? Or are there nonlocal and nontemporal ways of connections between signs, such as divine interactions? Is the universe scale-invariant or not? Does religion as reconnection in reality (whatever that is)  provide such a scale-invariance, or is religion a collusion (shared illusion)? Nobody knows, but everybody is free to guess, or "believe" (whatever that is). I think it is ok. to assume that these things (justified religion, connectedness...) may exist. I mean, though it is unscientific to take unproven things for premiss, it is unscientific too to claim for premiss that something cannot exist because it is not proved.

 

Helmut

 

 21. Mai 2019 um 14:48 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear John, list,



I have heard that we, the general public, have contempt for experts.



If by that, it is meant that we do not have high regard for arguments “that
take more than one step”, I tend to agree..



Well, more than three steps, in general;

for abstrusity tends to count against experts.



On the other hand, experts are not experts in all matters.

And especially on matters relating to things political.

For if there are such experts, then show them to me.



And this question of God is of the utmost political matter.



So then, do me a favor and extend to me your offer to JAS.

Show me what EGs can do on the matter of this question of God.



In what way is God the Sign or the Object, according to EGs?



In what way is the word “God,” so “capitalized” *the* definable proper
name, signifying *Ens necessarium*; in my belief Really creator of all
three Universes of Experience, according to EGs?



For I am of the persuasion that I count myself among the careless cavillers
who might say, “what, then, precisely, is your neglected argument?”



With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 1:27 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Edwina and Gary R,
>
> I endorse Edwina's caveats.  Her examples are among the "puffy clouds"
> that create ambiguities in any reasoning stated in ordinary language.
> After half a century of using and inventing symbolic logics, Peirce
> could keep the distinctions clear in his own mind, but any excerpt
> from his writings could easily be ambiguous when taken out of context.
>
> That's why formal logic is essential to clarify any reasoning that
> relates quotations from different MSS.
>
> GR
> > I truly doubt that Jon needs your "help," while insulting and
> > hubristic comments such as saying that if he refuses to accept your
> > "help" that he has "nothing but a puffy cloud of words" is, in my
> > opinion, below any serious scholar's dignity.
>
> When it comes to logic, I treat Jon as a student.  He's not happy
> when I say that, so I haven't said that recently.  Instead, I stated
> the most appropriate analogy for his style of reasoning:  "puffy
> clouds of words".   If that's considered insulting, I'll just give
> him a "gentleman's C".
>
> Ambiguities are the primary reason why words, by themselves, can
> be misleading.  Even in Peirce's technical vocabulary, there are
> ambiguities in the words 'subject' (grammatical or logical) and
> 'universe' (the universe of discourse on the sheet of assertion
> or one of the three modalities -- possible, actual, necessary).
>
> The sheet of assertion, as a piece of paper, is in the universe
> of actuality.  But the universe of discourse represented by the
> EGs on that paper is an abstraction in the universe of possibilities.
> No matter where God may be, any statement about God that is written
> on that paper exists in actuality, and its universe of discourse
> is in the universe of possibility.
>
> Those distinctions provide enough universe-like combinations to
> support any talk about God or anything else.  Another realm for
> God is both semeiotically unnecessary and anti=Peircean.
>
> I admit that Jon has done good work in studying Peirce and relating
> passages from various MSS.  But when he draws inferences that go
> beyond anything Peirce said, there is usually a good reason why
> Peirce did not make those inferences.  It's important to ask why.
>
> It's not acceptable to attribute any position to Peirce that
> he did not explicitly state -- for example, the assumption that
> anything could or even must exist outside his three universes.
>
> Since Gary questioned my qualifications to grade Jon's claims,
> I'll summarize a few points.  I spent 30 years in R & D at IBM,
> where I used math & logic for projects in AI, computational
> linguistics, and parsers and inference engines.  I published
> papers and books and taught courses at IBM and elsewhere.
>
> In 1987, for example, I taught a graduate course at Stanford in the
> Computer Science Dept., which also had many students in linguistics.
> The only prerequisite was "knowledge of first-order logic and natural
> language syntax".  For the course description and student evaluations:
> http://jfsowa.com/pubs/su309a.pdf .  Note that my rating was higher
> than the average for the CS department in nearly all categories.
>
> For the first homework assignment, the students were supposed to
> translate 10 English sentences to first-order logic.  None of the
> sentences had any syntactic or semantic ambiguities.  There were
> about 30 students in the class, but only one student got all 10
> sentences correct.  He was a post-doc, who had just finished his
> PhD in linguistics and was just auditing the course.
>
> For more recent work, see the 73-page article on "Reasoning with
> diagrams and images", which was published in 2018 in the Journal
> of Applied Logics, vol. 5:5, pp. 987-1059 of
> http://www.collegepublications.co.uk/downloads/ifcolog00025.pdf
>
> Re helping Jon to tran

Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

[Helmut Raulien]

Edwina, list,

 

I agree. I too think, that a sign is an action, an event, and is therefore limited by its event horizon. Though a part of any sign is due to universal laws, but that does not connect all signs to one (not completely, because only a part of the sign is due to universal laws like efficient causation, other parts follow limitedly ranged laws, habits, needs, volitions, etc.).

 

To your last paragraph about backwards reasoning: I also think, that it is not justified to conclude from subsystems and usual signs to the universe, because the universe is the biggest possible system, and has, other that any other system, no supersystem, and no event horizon bigger than itself. This makes it unique: Even if every sign would have an object external to it, and if the universe was a sign, then a conclusion that the universe would have an external object too, would still be not justified.

 

On the other hand it is possible to assume, that a part of any sign has the universe as event horizon, e.g. by divine interaction or communication by quantum entanglement. I think, Peirce has assumed so, when he wrote, that he does not entertain a doubt, that what is present to one mind, is present to all minds. But again, this only would apply to a (quite small) part of the sign, I think.

 

Helmut

 

21. Mai 2019 um 20:16 Uhr

"Edwina Taborsky" 
wrote:


Helmut

Science requires empirical evidence - and discussions about 'God' rarely provide that. Logic can only show us that our beliefs are logical but can't provide any proof of their pragmatic reality.

I consider that a major problem in discussion  of 'the sign' is the view, almost, that it is a 'thing', a discrete entity. My understanding of the sign/representamen is that it is A PROCESS OF MEDIATION, an ACTION  and is not a 'thing' in itself. As such a process of mediation, the sign/representamen only functions within a semiosic triad of relations, made up of the R-O; the R-R; and the R-I.

Therefore, one has to examine the functioning nature of this mediative action- which never 'exists' or functions on its own. My understanding of it is that the sign/representamen operates by developing habits of organization or laws which enable matter to develop as morphological forms.

Therefore - reductionism, which, despite JAS's objection to the term, is the only one I can come up with that describes the concept that 'all signs are one'seems to me to ignore these laws or habits. These laws and habits are real and not only real but existent [we can scientifically examine the laws of chemistry, physics, biology] - can or should they be ignored?

And are all these laws reducible? Can a biological entity, eg, a swan, be reduced to a pile of chemicals? My view is that these normative rules of formation are relatively stable and scientifically, I don't see how we can ignore them such that we can conclude that ALL mediation is actually using the same law.

In addition, I object to the 'backwards reasoning' as I see it, where you proceed from a conclusion to a premise. If we conclude that all signs/representamens must refer to objects external from themselves [and this is a debatable conclusion] - can we actually say that this 'proves' that the Universe, as a sign/representamen actually has an Object-external-to-itself? I don't think we can do this that easily.

Edwina

 



 

On Tue 21/05/19 11:18 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:




Edwina, All,

 

I think there is (and will be) a premiss missing: Scale-invariance / connectedness / noncontingency. A forest consisting of different (nonconnected) trees is not a tree, it is not scale-invariant. But there may be a forest in which the trees are connected by their roots, which make them one plant, so you can say that this forest is one tree. Now to the question whether the universe is one sign: Do all signs have a connectibility towards each other, or are they separated, made contingent, by event-horizons due to the limitations by light-velocity and other speed/space limits? Or are there nonlocal and nontemporal ways of connections between signs, such as divine interactions? Is the universe scale-invariant or not? Does religion as reconnection in reality (whatever that is)  provide such a scale-invariance, or is religion a collusion (shared illusion)? Nobody knows, but everybody is free to guess, or "believe" (whatever that is). I think it is ok. to assume that these things (justified religion, connectedness...) may exist. I mean, though it is unscientific to take unproven things for premiss, it is unscientific too to claim for premiss that something cannot exist because it is not proved.

 

Helmut

 

 21. Mai 2019 um 14:48 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky" Gary R, list


I think we have to be very cautious here. I don't think that these discussions on religion and logic have anything to do with bridging the chasm between religion and science. They have no scientific content whatsoever.

Furthermore, because an a

Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, Helmut, List:

ET:  Science requires empirical evidence ...


The truth of this statement depends on how we define "empirical."  In the
popular sense, only the Special Sciences require empirical evidence.
According to Peirce, philosophy--including both Logic as Semeiotic and
Metaphysics--requires empirical evidence, defined as *experiential *evidence
of the kind that is common to anyone and everyone; and even Mathematics
requires empirical evidence, in the sense that it depends upon *observation*.
That is why he classified *all *of these fields as *sciences*.

ET:  Logic can only show us that our beliefs are logical but can't provide
any proof of their pragmatic reality.


Deductive logic shows us what Propositions follow necessarily from other
Propositions.  In that sense, it reveals what *else *we must believe in
accordance with what we *already *believe; i.e., it only provides "proof"
of *other *pragmatic realities that are entailed by what we *already *have
ascertained to be pragmatic realities.

ET:  My understanding of the sign/representamen is that it is A PROCESS OF
MEDIATION, an ACTION  and is not a 'thing' in itself.


There is no need to shout.  Indeed, "a sign is not a real thing" (EP 2:303;
1904); however, Peirce generally used "thought" or "semeiosis" for the
*process*, and "Sign" or "Representamen" for each *constituent *of the
process.  On the other hand, an Argument is a Sign that is *also *a
continuous "inferential process," which we *describe *using definite
Propositions *as if* they were the constituent Signs of that process.  That
is why I reject the charge of "reductionism"--saying that the Universe (or
any other Argument) is a Sign says *nothing whatsoever* about its
complexity, except that is *more *complex than a Proposition, which in turn
is *more *complex than a Seme.

ET:  As such a process of mediation, the sign/representamen only functions
within a semiosic triad of relations, made up of the R-O; the R-R; and the
R-I.


Absolutely not; this treats the *one triadic* relation between the Sign,
Object, and Interpretant as if it were composed of *three dyadic*
relations.  If anything merits the label of "reductionism," this is it.  A
Sign can be *classified *in accordance with its own nature
(Qualisign/Sinsign/Legisign or Tone/Token/Type), that of its relation to
its Dynamic Object (Icon/Index/Symbol), and that of its relation to its
Final Interpretant (Rheme/Dicisign/Argument or Seme/Pheme/Delome); these
result in the ten classes of Peirce's 1903 taxonomy.  However, a Sign does
not *consist *of these three relations; I consider such a notion to reflect
a fundamental misunderstanding of Peirce's entire Speculative Grammar.

ET:  Therefore - reductionism, which, despite JAS's objection to the term,
is the only one I can come up with that describes the concept that 'all
signs are one' ...


So you acknowledge my objection to the term, but persist in continuing to
use it anyway.  That seems rather hypocritical for someone who routinely
accuses me of calling her "unPeircean," even though I have conscientiously
*avoided *using that word myself.  If I claimed to be unable to come up
with any other term to describe your views, would that be justification for
me to start using it now?  Of course not.

ET:  In addition, I object to the 'backwards reasoning' as I see it, where
you proceed from a conclusion to a premise. If we conclude that all
signs/representamens must refer to objects external from themselves [and
this is a debatable conclusion] - can we actually say that this 'proves'
that the Universe, as a sign/representamen actually has an
Object-external-to-itself? I don't think we can do this that easily.


There is nothing "backwards" about reasoning from true premisses to a
necessary conclusion; that is the nature of deductive argumentations in
general, and syllogisms in particular.  In this summary, you conveniently
left out the minor premiss, that the entire Universe is a Sign.  *Denying *that
premiss warrants denying the conclusion; but *given *that additional
premiss, if every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself, then
it *necessarily *follows that the Universe is determined by an Object other
than itself.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 1:16 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Helmut
>
> Science requires empirical evidence - and discussions about 'God'
> rarely provide that. Logic can only show us that our beliefs are logical
> but can't provide any proof of their pragmatic reality.
>
> I consider that a major problem in discussion  of 'the sign' is the view,
> almost, that it is a 'thing', a discrete entity. My understanding of the
> sign/representamen is that it is A PROCESS OF MEDIATION, an ACTION  and is
> not a 'thing' in itself. As such a process of mediation, the
> sign/representamen only fu

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET:  I don't think that these discussions on religion and logic have
anything to do with bridging the chasm between religion and science. They
have no scientific content whatsoever.


Peirce held that both Logic as Semeiotic and Metaphysics are *sciences*, so
their content is *scientific *content; but not religion.  Of course, the
line between Metaphysics and religion is not sharp, especially when the
topic of discussion is the Reality of God.

ET:  Furthermore, because an argument's single premises are true, in the
sense that they can be abstracted from a text's content and set up as, in
themselves, true--and the format of their syllogistic placement is valid,
this does not make the content of this argument true. It merely sets up a
valid argument.


Again, if the premisses are true and the *form *of the argumentation is
valid, then the conclusion is *necessarily *true; i.e., the argumentation
as a whole is *sound*.  This is the most basic logical leading principle of
all deductive syllogisms.  We can certainly disagree on whether each of the
premisses is true, but someone who endorses *all *of them is *rationally
required* to endorse the conclusion, as well.

ET:  I, for example, question the soundness and truth of JAS's insistence
that takes Peirce's statement that 'the Universe is perfused with signs'
and then, matches it up with Peirce's concept that multiple signs can be
'merged' to be considered ONE sign - to conclude that the Universe is A
single Sign.


Peirce's *theorem *was not that multiple Signs *can be* merged to *be
considered* one Sign; it is that multiple Signs that *are *connected
*constitute *one Sign.  Consequently, according to Peirce, if the entire
Universe *consists *of connected Signs, then the Universe is *one *Sign;
and as I keep pointing out, he *explicitly *affirmed not only that "the
Universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol ... that Universe being
precisely an argument" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193-194; 1903), but also that "the
entire body of all thought is a sign, supposing all thought to be more or
less connected" (R 1476:36[5-1/2]; c. 1904).

ET:   I question such reductionism, for that denies the actual complexity
of the Universe and indeed, the functionality of semiosis ...


I have asked you before, and now ask you again, to stop calling it
"reductionism."  If the entire Universe is indeed a Sign--specifically, an
Argument, a continuous "inferential process" of semeiosis--that
indicates *nothing
whatsoever* about its complexity.  On the contrary, it reveals just how
vast and complex a Sign can be, rather than implying that the Universe is
any simpler than we otherwise would have suspected.

ET:  I also question the soundness of JAS's insistence that a sign requires
an external object - for my reading of Peirce is that, indeed, the semiosic
function requires 'dialogue' which does set up a 'this' and a 'not this'
which interact.


I thought we agreed that every Sign is determined by an external Object.
However, the Sign and its Object do not *interact*, since that would
imply *both
*of them acting on *each other*; by contrast, Peirce *explicitly *affirmed
that while the Object acts on the Sign, the Sign has *no effect *on its
Object.

CSP:  For the purpose of this inquiry a Sign may be defined as a Medium for
the communication of a Form ... As a *medium*, the Sign is essentially in a
triadic relation, to its Object which determines it, and to its
Interpretant which it determines. In its relation to the Object, the Sign
is *passive*; that is to say, its correspondence to the Object is brought
about by an effect upon the Sign, the Object remaining unaffected. (EP
2:544n22; 1906)


The Sign *does *have an effect on its *Interpretant*; in fact, it fulfills
the function of a Sign precisely to the degree that it has the *same *effect
on the Interpretant as the Object *itself *would have had in the right
conditions.

CSP:  On the other hand, in its relation to the Interpretant the Sign is
*active*, determining the Interpretant without being itself thereby
affected ... in respect to the Form communicated, the Sign produces upon
the Interpretant an effect similar to that which the Object itself would
under favorable circumstances. (EP 2:544n22; 1906)

CSP:  A sign, on the other hand, just in so far as it fulfills the function
of a sign, and none other, perfectly conforms to the definition of a medium
of communication. It is determined by the object, but in no other respect
than goes to enable it to act upon the interpreting quasi-mind; and the
more perfectly it fulfills its function as a sign, the less effect it has
upon that quasi-mind other than that of determining it as if the object
itself had acted upon it. (EP 2:391; 1906)


This is not at all a "linear" or "mechanical" process consisting of
sequential *dyadic *relations, but rather a *mediative *process consisting
of an irreducible *triadic *relation.

CSP:  I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mod

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

[John F Sowa]

Edwina and Gary R,

I endorse Edwina's caveats.  Her examples are among the "puffy clouds"
that create ambiguities in any reasoning stated in ordinary language.
After half a century of using and inventing symbolic logics, Peirce
could keep the distinctions clear in his own mind, but any excerpt
from his writings could easily be ambiguous when taken out of context.

That's why formal logic is essential to clarify any reasoning that
relates quotations from different MSS.

GR

I truly doubt that Jon needs your "help," while insulting and
hubristic comments such as saying that if he refuses to accept your
"help" that he has "nothing but a puffy cloud of words" is, in my
opinion, below any serious scholar's dignity.


When it comes to logic, I treat Jon as a student.  He's not happy
when I say that, so I haven't said that recently.  Instead, I stated
the most appropriate analogy for his style of reasoning:  "puffy
clouds of words".   If that's considered insulting, I'll just give
him a "gentleman's C".

Ambiguities are the primary reason why words, by themselves, can
be misleading.  Even in Peirce's technical vocabulary, there are
ambiguities in the words 'subject' (grammatical or logical) and
'universe' (the universe of discourse on the sheet of assertion
or one of the three modalities -- possible, actual, necessary).

The sheet of assertion, as a piece of paper, is in the universe
of actuality.  But the universe of discourse represented by the
EGs on that paper is an abstraction in the universe of possibilities.
No matter where God may be, any statement about God that is written
on that paper exists in actuality, and its universe of discourse
is in the universe of possibility.

Those distinctions provide enough universe-like combinations to
support any talk about God or anything else.  Another realm for
God is both semeiotically unnecessary and anti=Peircean.

I admit that Jon has done good work in studying Peirce and relating
passages from various MSS.  But when he draws inferences that go
beyond anything Peirce said, there is usually a good reason why
Peirce did not make those inferences.  It's important to ask why.

It's not acceptable to attribute any position to Peirce that
he did not explicitly state -- for example, the assumption that
anything could or even must exist outside his three universes.

Since Gary questioned my qualifications to grade Jon's claims,
I'll summarize a few points.  I spent 30 years in R & D at IBM,
where I used math & logic for projects in AI, computational
linguistics, and parsers and inference engines.  I published
papers and books and taught courses at IBM and elsewhere.

In 1987, for example, I taught a graduate course at Stanford in the
Computer Science Dept., which also had many students in linguistics.
The only prerequisite was "knowledge of first-order logic and natural
language syntax".  For the course description and student evaluations:
http://jfsowa.com/pubs/su309a.pdf .  Note that my rating was higher
than the average for the CS department in nearly all categories.

For the first homework assignment, the students were supposed to
translate 10 English sentences to first-order logic.  None of the
sentences had any syntactic or semantic ambiguities.  There were
about 30 students in the class, but only one student got all 10
sentences correct.  He was a post-doc, who had just finished his
PhD in linguistics and was just auditing the course.

For more recent work, see the 73-page article on "Reasoning with
diagrams and images", which was published in 2018 in the Journal
of Applied Logics, vol. 5:5, pp. 987-1059 of
http://www.collegepublications.co.uk/downloads/ifcolog00025.pdf

Re helping Jon to translate Peirce's statements to EGs:  I meant
that offer in all sincerity.  I doubt that Jon could correctly
translate the relevant quotations from Peirce to EGs or any other
version of symbolic logic.  Note that Stanford graduate students
in computer science or linguistics couldn't do that.

In any case, I would be pleasantly surprised if Jon could translate
the relevant quotations by Peirce to EGs.  If he can't do that, I
would automatically dismiss any of his claims about any arguments
that take more than one step.

John

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Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Helmut

Science requires empirical evidence - and discussions about 'God'
rarely provide that. Logic can only show us that our beliefs are
logical but can't provide any proof of their pragmatic reality.

I consider that a major problem in discussion  of 'the sign' is the
view, almost, that it is a 'thing', a discrete entity. My
understanding of the sign/representamen is that it is A PROCESS OF
MEDIATION, an ACTION  and is not a 'thing' in itself. As such a
process of mediation, the sign/representamen only functions within a
semiosic triad of relations, made up of the R-O; the R-R; and the
R-I.

Therefore, one has to examine the functioning nature of this
mediative action- which never 'exists' or functions on its own. My
understanding of it is that the sign/representamen operates by
developing habits of organization or laws which enable matter to
develop as morphological forms. 

Therefore - reductionism, which, despite JAS's objection to the
term, is the only one I can come up with that describes the concept
that 'all signs are one'seems to me to ignore these laws or
habits. These laws and habits are real and not only real but existent
[we can scientifically examine the laws of chemistry, physics,
biology] - can or should they be ignored?

And are all these laws reducible? Can a biological entity, eg, a
swan, be reduced to a pile of chemicals? My view is that these
normative rules of formation are relatively stable and
scientifically, I don't see how we can ignore them such that we can
conclude that ALL mediation is actually using the same law.

In addition, I object to the 'backwards reasoning' as I see it,
where you proceed from a conclusion to a premise. If we conclude that
all signs/representamens must refer to objects external from
themselves [and this is a debatable conclusion] - can we actually say
that this 'proves' that the Universe, as a sign/representamen actually
has an Object-external-to-itself? I don't think we can do this that
easily. 

Edwina
 On Tue 21/05/19 11:18 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
  Edwina, All,   I think there is (and will be) a premiss missing:
Scale-invariance / connectedness / noncontingency. A forest
consisting of different (nonconnected) trees is not a tree, it is not
scale-invariant. But there may be a forest in which the trees are
connected by their roots, which make them one plant, so you can say
that this forest is one tree. Now to the question whether the
universe is one sign: Do all signs have a connectibility towards each
other, or are they separated, made contingent, by event-horizons due
to the limitations by light-velocity and other speed/space limits? Or
are there nonlocal and nontemporal ways of connections between signs,
such as divine interactions? Is the universe scale-invariant or not?
Does religion as reconnection in reality (whatever that is)  provide
such a scale-invariance, or is religion a collusion (shared
illusion)? Nobody knows, but everybody is free to guess, or "believe"
(whatever that is). I think it is ok. to assume that these things
(justified religion, connectedness...) may exist. I mean, though it
is unscientific to take unproven things for premiss, it is
unscientific too to claim for premiss that something cannot exist
because it is not proved.   Helmut 21. Mai 2019 um 14:48 Uhr
 Von: "Edwina Taborsky" Gary R, list  

I think we have to be very cautious here. I don't think that these
discussions on religion and logic have anything to do with bridging
the chasm between religion and science. They have no scientific
content whatsoever. 

Furthermore, because an argument's single premises are true, in the
sense that they can be abstracted from a text's content and set up
as, in themselves, true -- and the format of their syllogistic
placement is valid, this does not make the content of this argument
true. It merely sets up a valid argument. 

I, for example, question the soundness and truth of JAS's insistence
that takes Peirce's statement that 'the Universe is perfused with
signs' and then, matches it up with Peirce's concept that multiple
signs can be 'merged' to be considered ONE sign - to conclude that
the Universe is A single Sign.  I question such reductionism, for
that denies the actual complexity of the Universe and indeed, the
functionality of semiosis - which includes, among its other functions
- the ability and necessity to 'make matter complex' rather than
simple. We can intellectually reduce a complexity to singularity but
can we make this an existential simplicity? 

I also question the soundness of JAS's insistence that a sign
requires an external object - for my reading of Peirce is that,
indeed, the semiosic function requires 'dialogue' which does set up a
'this' and a 'not this' which interact. BUT, this external object is
only that when it becomes an integral part of the semiosic
interactionand become

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

[Helmut Raulien]

Edwina, All,

 

I think there is (and will be) a premiss missing: Scale-invariance / connectedness / noncontingency. A forest consisting of different (nonconnected) trees is not a tree, it is not scale-invariant. But there may be a forest in which the trees are connected by their roots, which make them one plant, so you can say that this forest is one tree. Now to the question whether the universe is one sign: Do all signs have a connectibility towards each other, or are they separated, made contingent, by event-horizons due to the limitations by light-velocity and other speed/space limits? Or are there nonlocal and nontemporal ways of connections between signs, such as divine interactions? Is the universe scale-invariant or not? Does religion as reconnection in reality (whatever that is)  provide such a scale-invariance, or is religion a collusion (shared illusion)? Nobody knows, but everybody is free to guess, or "believe" (whatever that is). I think it is ok. to assume that these things (justified religion, connectedness...) may exist. I mean, though it is unscientific to take unproven things for premiss, it is unscientific too to claim for premiss that something cannot exist because it is not proved.

 

Helmut

 

 21. Mai 2019 um 14:48 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky" Gary R, list


I think we have to be very cautious here. I don't think that these discussions on religion and logic have anything to do with bridging the chasm between religion and science. They have no scientific content whatsoever.

Furthermore, because an argument's single premises are true, in the sense that they can be abstracted from a text's content and set up as, in themselves, true -- and the format of their syllogistic placement is valid, this does not make the content of this argument true. It merely sets up a valid argument.

I, for example, question the soundness and truth of JAS's insistence that takes Peirce's statement that 'the Universe is perfused with signs' and then, matches it up with Peirce's concept that multiple signs can be 'merged' to be considered ONE sign - to conclude that the Universe is A single Sign.  I question such reductionism, for that denies the actual complexity of the Universe and indeed, the functionality of semiosis - which includes, among its other functions - the ability and necessity to 'make matter complex' rather than simple. We can intellectually reduce a complexity to singularity but can we make this an existential simplicity?

I also question the soundness of JAS's insistence that a sign requires an external object - for my reading of Peirce is that, indeed, the semiosic function requires 'dialogue' which does set up a 'this' and a 'not this' which interact. BUT, this external object is only that when it becomes an integral part of the semiosic interactionand becomes an Immediate Object.  Therefore - does this externality, God, have any reality before being part of the Universe as its Immediate Object? If it is forever outside the realm of immanent semiosic interaction - does it have any reality?

And - as Jeff D has pointed out, a so-called external Object is not necessarily morphologically external to the semiosic Triad.

Therefore, I think that we have to be very cautious about these discussions.

Edwina



 

On Tue 21/05/19 12:31 AM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:









John, Jon, List

 

John quoted Jon, then wrote:

 






Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:





> If each of my premisses is true, and the form of my argumentation





> is valid --which it unquestionably is, as demonstrated below --





> then the conclusion must also be true; i.e., my argumentation





> is sound.





 





JS: That is the most anti-Peircean dogma imaginable.  Peirce would





never state or accept any such claim.






 

Nonsense. To begin with, Jon is claiming nothing more than what a deductive syllogism can. There is nothing anti-Peircean and dogmatic about it whatsoever. And you should really stop name-calling ("anti-Peircean" and "dogmatic"). It's intellectually unbecoming. 

 

Here's a version of the syllogism Jon offers:












 












Semeiotic Argumentation for the Reality of God.
















	
	
		Every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself [that is a basic principle of Peircean semeiotic, GR]
		The entire Universe is a Sign [Jon has offered textual evidence that Peirce claimed this, GR]
		The entire Universe is determined by an Object other than itself [this necessarily follows, call that Object what you will; (It indeed "necessarily follows" in a deductive syllogism; and this Object Peirce (and Jon) call God, GR].
	
	




John wrote:

 






JS: First, your premises are your interpretations of Peirce's writings





taken from different contexts where he was focusing on different





topics.  






 

GR:  Peirce offers us semeiotic tools to tackle all sorts of topics: Here's one: Peirce presented arguments for the Reality of God. Jon's Semei

RE: Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric, was, [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[gnox]

Jon, I think we’re getting closer to the heart of the matter, which is (and
has been) the nature of knowledge. I think Jeff’s most recent post showing
the complexity of the object-sign relation also contributes greatly to this
discussion, but in this post I’ll just insert some answers to your
questions, along with some other comments, trying to further clarify the
issue.

Gary f.

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt  
Sent: 20-May-19 12:09



JAS: Thank you for further clarifying your objection.  Initially it was
that God is completely separated from His creation, and thus absent from the
Universes of Experience.

GF: Yes, that was what you appeared to be claiming with your stipulation
that the Object must be external to the Sign which is the Universe. But you
amended that by saying that God is not completely separate from the
Universe, so then came the next step:

JAS:  When I disputed this, it was that our acquaintance with God must be
entirely mediated by Signs. 

GF: That was your counter-claim to my claim that acquaintance with an
Object is a prerequisite for knowledge of it, which is indeed mediated by
signs (i.e. propositions). I took this claim of yours to be based on a
confusion of acquaintance with knowledge, overlooking Peirce’s frequent
distinction between the two and his stipulation that acquaintance can only
come from collateral experience, or collateral observation, and cannot be
given by signs. As he put it, “the proper way in logic is to take as the
subject whatever there is of which sufficient knowledge cannot be conveyed
in the proposition itself, but collateral experience on the part of its
interpreter is requisite” (NEM 3:885, 1908). 

JAS: Since I pointed out that we are in the same situation with respect to
anyone who lived or anything that happened before we were born, you noted
that those people and events existed, but God did not and does not--as
Peirce himself explicitly affirmed, which is why he specifically argued for
the Reality of God instead.

GF: Yes; we are not in the same situation re knowledge of God as we are re
knowledge of existent beings (such as Peirce) who have left observable
traces of their presence in the Universe.

JAS: Please do not misinterpret this as an accusation of moving the
goalposts; I am simply explaining the progression of my own understanding of
your position during the course of our exchange so far.  Am I correct that
the non-existence of God is what you find problematic for our ability to
acquire knowledge of Him?  

GF: No, I think we can acquire knowledge of nonexistent things such as real
generals, if they are embodied or manifested in observable tokens of Types.
But as far as I can tell, for both you and Peirce, God the Creator is the
name of an individual, an agent or agency, a person with a proper name, and
not a general. I have said that this Person has not left observable traces
of His presence in the Universe, and you haven’t disputed that. As Peirce
says, we need some index to direct our attention to a subject before we can
assign attributes to it and thus have any knowledge of it. (Certainty is not
the issue here, as all positive knowledge is fallible, though quite distinct
from belief.)

If so, then one possible response from me would be to invoke the Christian
doctrine of the Incarnation; however, I will respect your preference not to
delve any further into theology at this point.  Instead, I will stick to
relevant Peircean concepts and texts.

GF: Thanks for that, and in return, I’ll spare you an account of how
Muslims and Bahá'ís get around the problem of knowing the unknowable. 😊

JAS: In thinking about all of this over the last couple of days, I noticed
the same thing that you did about the first sentence of "A Neglected
Argument" (CP 6.452, EP 2:434; 1908)--Peirce considered "God" to be "the
definable proper name" (emphasis in original), implying that it is the only
such case; and he then specified what it signifies, not what it denotes.  In
other words, the Immediate Interpretant of "God" (so capitalized) is "Ens
necessarium, in my [Peirce's] belief Really creator of all three Universes
of Experience"; and my current understanding of Speculative Grammar is that
the Immediate Object of "God" is whatever it possibly could denote in
English accordingly.

GF: OK. But notice that I am not questioning the reality of God the
Creator. I don’t take that to be a universally instinctive belief or
hypothesis as Peirce does, but I don’t question his honesty in declaring it
to be his belief. What I question is whether that belief has the
pragmaticistic meaning that he says it does, despite its object being
“infinitely incomprehensible.”

What you seem to be questioning is how we can know that "God" actually does
denote something as its Dynamic Object—

GF: No, I’m willing to assume that that proper name does denote something.
What I question is how we can know anything about that Entity defined as Ens
necessarium. (Of course a definition does not count

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Gary R, list

I think we have to be very cautious here. I don't think that these
discussions on religion and logic have anything to do with bridging
the chasm between religion and science. They have no scientific
content whatsoever. 

Furthermore, because an argument's single premises are true, in the
sense that they can be abstracted from a text's content and set up
as, in themselves, true -- and the format of their syllogistic
placement is valid, this does not make the content of this argument
true. It merely sets up a valid argument. 

I, for example, question the soundness and truth of JAS's insistence
that takes Peirce's statement that 'the Universe is perfused with
signs' and then, matches it up with Peirce's concept that multiple
signs can be 'merged' to be considered ONE sign - to conclude that
the Universe is A single Sign.  I question such reductionism, for
that denies the actual complexity of the Universe and indeed, the
functionality of semiosis - which includes, among its other functions
- the ability and necessity to 'make matter complex' rather than
simple. We can intellectually reduce a complexity to singularity but
can we make this an existential simplicity?

I also question the soundness of JAS's insistence that a sign
requires an external object - for my reading of Peirce is that,
indeed, the semiosic function requires 'dialogue' which does set up a
'this' and a 'not this' which interact. BUT, this external object is
only that when it becomes an integral part of the semiosic
interactionand becomes an Immediate Object.  Therefore - does
this externality, God, have any reality before being part of the
Universe as its Immediate Object? If it is forever outside the realm
of immanent semiosic interaction - does it have any reality?

And - as Jeff D has pointed out, a so-called external Object is not
necessarily morphologically external to the semiosic Triad.

Therefore, I think that we have to be very cautious about these
discussions. 

Edwina
 On Tue 21/05/19 12:31 AM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
 John, Jon, List
 John quoted Jon, then wrote:
  Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:> If each of my premisses is true, and the
form of my argumentation> is valid --which it unquestionably is, as
demonstrated below -- > then the conclusion must also be true; i.e.,
my argumentation> is sound.
  JS: That is the most anti-Peircean dogma imaginable.  Peirce
wouldnever state or accept any such claim.
 Nonsense. To begin with, Jon is claiming nothing more than what a
deductive syllogism can. There is nothing anti-Peircean and dogmatic
about it whatsoever. And you should really stop name-calling
("anti-Peircean" and "dogmatic"). It's intellectually unbecoming.  
 Here's a version of the syllogism Jon offers:
 Semeiotic Argumentation for the Reality of God. 
*Every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself [that is
a basic principle of Peircean semeiotic, GR]
* The entire Universe is a Sign [Jon has offered textual evidence
that Peirce claimed this, GR]
*The entire Universe is determined by an Object other than itself
[this necessarily follows, call that Object what you will; (It indeed
"necessarily follows" in a deductive syllogism; and this Object
Peirce (and Jon) call God, GR].
John wrote:
  JS: First, your premises are your interpretations of Peirce's
writingstaken from different contexts where he was focusing on
differenttopics.   
 GR:  Peirce offers us semeiotic tools to tackle all sorts of topics:
Here's one: Peirce presented arguments for the Reality of God. Jon's
Semeiotic Argumentation for the Reality of God merely follows
Peirce's strong suggestion as offered in A Neglected Argument for the
Reality of God  (and elsewhere) in the context of certain basic
semeiotic principles.  
 John wrote:
JS: As Peirce himself said, symbols grow.  Formal logic is a
fossilized version of language.  That is its greatest strength and
its greatestweakness.  Fossils are precise only because they stopped
growing.
 GR: Who has denied this? What in Jon's argumentation denies this?
And whose thinking is fossilized here? Jon offers a way to think
further about what Peirce adumbrated in "A Neglected Argument."
Personally, I am very interested in efforts to help bridge the chasm
between religion and science, and it seems to me that Jon's efforts
tend toward that desideratum. 
JS: Second, Peirce devoted his life to studying, inventing, and
usingthe most advanced logics of his day -- which are still at the
forefront of research in the 21st c.  He would not accept
anyreasoning stated in ordinary language as "unquestionably"
precise,valid, and sound -- not even his own.
  We should all feel free to use Peirce's advanced logic in whatever
ways seems productive to each inquirer. Peirce himself reasoned "in
ordinary language"--thousands and thousands of pages of this
disc