Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:
I fear that the distinction between connotation and denotation is being lost in 
this discussion.
Cheers
Jerry

Sent from my iPhone

> On Mar 17, 2016, at 2:12 PM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
> 
> Thread:http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18467
> JLRC:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18486
> JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18508
> TG:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18511
> JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18512
> 
> Cf:http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/03/15/abduction-deduction-induction-analogy-inquiry-16/
> Cf:http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/03/16/abduction-deduction-induction-analogy-inquiry-17/
> 
> Tom, List,
> 
> Let me dispel any notion that “the interpretant introduces
> the person as part of the object-sign-interpretant structure”.
> We may have left it implicit or unclear in the text, but the
> lower case “i” and the dashed lines in the figure were meant
> to suggest the agency of the interpreter and the circumstance
> that signs and interpretants reside nearer the personal sphere
> than the objects, generally speaking.  I think you know all the
> reasons why primers in semiotics tend to start out talking about
> interpreters and only gradually abstract away to interpretants.
> But I see now that was faulty notation, as it's more usual to
> read a lower case “i” as indicating a member of a local set I.
> Next time I will use a Greek iota for the interpretive agent.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon
> 
> On 3/16/2016 12:57 PM, Tom Gollier wrote:
> > Jon,
> >
> > I think there's a troubling narrowness interpreting
> > this situation as something like:
> >
> > "In this narrative we can identify the characters
> > of the sign relation as follows:  *coolness* is a
> > Sign of the Object *rain*, and the Interpretant
> > is *the thought of the rain’s likelihood*."
> >
> > First of all, how can something that has not yet occurred be
> > the object?  And what of all the other things "coolness" might
> > indicate (be a sign of in that sense)?  And the interpretant
> > introduces the person as part of the object-sign-interpretant
> > structure?
> >
> > Personally, I prefer to see the "sign" as a diagram of the elements
> > and relationships abstracted from this situation, the "object".  And,
> > the interpretant, "rain," is then the inference being made using one
> > of those elements, "coolness", and its relationship to rain.  I think
> > this view would accord well with Peirce's description of a diagram used
> > in problem-solving; it would allow the "rain" to remain virtual rather
> > than actual (along the lines set out by Deleuze); and it also doesn't
> > bring the man into the sign structure itself.  He enters only in his
> > use of it to make the personal inference that he ought to quicken
> > his pace.
> >
> > Tom
> >
> 
> -- 
> 
> academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
> my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
> inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
> oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
> 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry

[Jerry Rhee]

Tom,

Vegas?!  Lucky you.  Weather here in Chicago is cool.  :)

Sure, that'll work.  But ultimately, we're talking about a method to
truth.  For me, what you propose is perfectly fine because it's a matter of
putting words to phenomenon.  Also, when talking semiotic, we should be
talking about signs, of which words are one type.

The important part for me is that we're agreed about
the object (that is observed) = C
the sign = A
the interpretant = B

Best,
Jerry R

On Thu, Mar 17, 2016 at 8:50 PM, Tom Gollier  wrote:

> Jerry,
>
> Why not just a rule of thumb like there's usually a coolness in the air
> before it rains.  (Here in Las Vegas there's a burst of windiness.)  But
> then it's just a straight-forward deduction to get to the rain.
>
> Tom
>
>
>
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>
>
>
>
>
>

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry

[John Collier]

Anything can be  a Peircean object, including how something feels, what is 
felt, and any other category you might want. Peircean objects, as he says, are 
rather like Platonic ideas, but without the Platonism. They are close to what 
analytic philosophy calls the referent.

Weather in Chicago can certainly be a sign, but in the example coolness is a 
sign of rain.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate
University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Tom Gollier [mailto:tgoll...@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, 18 March 2016 3:26 AM
To: Peirce List
Subject: Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry


-- Forwarded message --
From: Tom Gollier <tgoll...@gmail.com<mailto:tgoll...@gmail.com>>
Date: Thu, Mar 17, 2016 at 6:25 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry
To: Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net<mailto:jawb...@att.net>>

Jon,

Thanks for your reply.

If we take "object" in sense of an objective, why isn't "avoiding rain" the 
object?  I really don't see how "rain" gets to be the object in either sense of 
"object".

As for "coolness" being a sign of impending rain, that it is, but only within 
the context of a diagrammatic understanding of the "weather in Chicago".  Other 
signs also function within such a sign/diagram — "cloudiness" for example.  
And, of course, the diagram/sign being employed could vary in complexity from 
something created in terms of temperature gradients, continental air masses, 
and such as that to one consisting of a couple of rules of thumb.

In short, I'm not arguing there is no an object-sign-interpretant where 
"coolness" is the sign, but:

1. I would interpret this as: what is being felt (object), "coolness" (sign), 
and "rain" (interpretant),

2. And, this object-sign-interpretant is just one relationship within the 
diagram/sign, "weather in Chicago," that would, it seems to me, more clearly 
correspond with the situation being described.

Tom


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry

[Edwina Taborsky]

I'm late to this thread and may have missed most of the argument, but it seems 
to me that an abductive argument begins with a hypothesis or general statement. 

So, to state that 'coolness is observed' is a particular statement- and fits in 
with induction.

An abductive argument would, I think, be:

If it is cool, then it will rain.
It is cool now
Therefore it will rain. 

But that original hypothesis [If it's cool, then it will rain] will have been 
developed as a hypothesis from 'surprising factual correlations'.

My apologies if I've missed the point - but I've been away and have missed most 
posts in this thread.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Jerry Rhee 
  To: Tom Gollier 
  Cc: Peirce List 
  Sent: Thursday, March 17, 2016 9:40 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry


  Tom, Jon, list,



  If I may, and making the argument explicit:



  The surprising fact, C (coolness), is observed.

  But if A (rain) were true, C would be a matter of course.

  Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.



  Therefore, it’s likely to rain.



  On Thu, Mar 17, 2016 at 8:26 PM, Tom Gollier <tgoll...@gmail.com> wrote:



-- Forwarded message --
From: Tom Gollier <tgoll...@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, Mar 17, 2016 at 6:25 PM
    Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, 
Inquiry
To: Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net>



Jon,


Thanks for your reply.


If we take "object" in sense of an objective, why isn't "avoiding rain" the 
object?  I really don't see how "rain" gets to be the object in either sense of 
"object".


As for "coolness" being a sign of impending rain, that it is, but only 
within the context of a diagrammatic understanding of the "weather in Chicago". 
 Other signs also function within such a sign/diagram — "cloudiness" for 
example.  And, of course, the diagram/sign being employed could vary in 
complexity from something created in terms of temperature gradients, 
continental air masses, and such as that to one consisting of a couple of rules 
of thumb.


In short, I'm not arguing there is no an object-sign-interpretant where 
"coolness" is the sign, but:


1. I would interpret this as: what is being felt (object), "coolness" 
(sign), and "rain" (interpretant), 


2. And, this object-sign-interpretant is just one relationship within the 
diagram/sign, "weather in Chicago," that would, it seems to me, more clearly 
correspond with the situation being described.


Tom




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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry

[Jerry Rhee]

Tom, Jon, list,



If I may, and making the argument explicit:



The surprising fact, *C (coolness)*, is observed.

But if *A (rain)* were true, *C* would be a matter of course.

Hence, there is reason to suspect that *A* is true.



Therefore, it’s likely to rain.

On Thu, Mar 17, 2016 at 8:26 PM, Tom Gollier <tgoll...@gmail.com> wrote:

>
> -- Forwarded message --
> From: Tom Gollier <tgoll...@gmail.com>
> Date: Thu, Mar 17, 2016 at 6:25 PM
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy,
> Inquiry
> To: Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net>
>
>
> Jon,
>
> Thanks for your reply.
>
> If we take "object" in sense of an objective, why isn't "avoiding rain"
> the object?  I really don't see how "rain" gets to be the object in either
> sense of "object".
>
> As for "coolness" being a sign of impending rain, that it is, but only
> within the context of a diagrammatic understanding of the "weather in
> Chicago".  Other signs also function within such a sign/diagram —
> "cloudiness" for example.  And, of course, the diagram/sign being employed
> could vary in complexity from something created in terms of temperature
> gradients, continental air masses, and such as that to one consisting of a
> couple of rules of thumb.
>
> In short, I'm not arguing there is no an object-sign-interpretant where
> "coolness" is the sign, but:
>
> 1. I would interpret this as: what is being felt (object), "coolness"
> (sign), and "rain" (interpretant),
>
> 2. And, this object-sign-interpretant is just one relationship within the
> diagram/sign, "weather in Chicago," that would, it seems to me, more
> clearly correspond with the situation being described.
>
> Tom
>
>
>
> -
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>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry

[Tom Gollier]

Jerry,

Why not just a rule of thumb like there's usually a coolness in the air
before it rains.  (Here in Las Vegas there's a burst of windiness.)  But
then it's just a straight-forward deduction to get to the rain.

Tom

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Tom:

Perhaps someone here knows more details about these distinctions in the forms 
of logic.  

A few comments about the history of logic may be helpful to some readers. 

The modern names of logics are remote from the “suppositio” of the middle ages.
My understanding is that CSP’s usage of the terms “breadth and comprehension” 
originate from the later  Port Royal logic of French origins (1662).

I seem to recall that connotation and denotation were used by Mills and were 
used in relation to induction and deduction.  

The perplexity of extension and intention usage is entangled with the addition 
of terms (CSP used extension to base his notions of graph theory  as well as 
triadic triads. This form of extension is related to chemical extension (from 
atoms to molecules and from molecules to other molecules)

The term “Intension" is intertwined with consciousness and good/evil, see 
Zalta’s works on Metaphysics and Intentional Logic, which I puzzled over for 
several years.

A reference which clearly and succinctly distinguished the history of logical 
NOTATIONS, terminology and usage is by Michel Malatesta, The Primary Logic 
(1999), Gracewings.  I point this out because the severe tensions separate the 
logics of numbers as mathematical objects from numbers as chemical objects and 
from numbers as physical objects.  The tensions seem to be a consequence of the 
antecedent attributes of electricity in propositional functions. 

I would be pleased if someone can clarify these general statements with 
specific counter-examples. Learning logic by self-study is extremely 
challenging and leads to deep skepticisms about the putative universality of 
logic as a singularity.

Cheers

jerry




> On Mar 17, 2016, at 8:16 PM, Tom Gollier  wrote:
> 
> Jerry,
> 
> Having been brought up on "extension" and "intension," I always assumed 
> "denotation" and "connotation" were more or less synonyms for them.  Thus, I 
> was startled to learn that "denotation" is generally associated with a 
> definition, and thus both terms would be part of the intension.  But living 
> in a culture where "cascading connotations" consistently obscure (via 
> double-speak),  distort (via propaganda), or simply ignore what the terms 
> actually refer to, I shouldn't have  been all that surprised.  Without 
> reference to "objects" — in the sense of "material things that can be seen 
> and touched" [New Oxford American Dictionary] — there can be no question of 
> truth or falsity.
> 
> Tom
> 
> 
> On Thu, Mar 17, 2016 at 5:15 PM, Jerry LR Chandler 
> > wrote:
> List:
> I fear that the distinction between connotation and denotation is being lost 
> in this discussion.
> Cheers
> Jerry
> 
> Sent from my iPhone
> 
> 
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> 
> 
> 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry

[Jerry Rhee]

Hi list,


In a sense, Peircean semiotic is Socratic dialectic taken to its limit (art
of conversation or of friendly dispute in which
justice/truth/goodness/Thirdness is the motivation, which are slave to
First and Second).



There are three minds operating during the inquiry; the utterer,
interpreter and the commens.  The commens is “that mind into which the
minds of utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order that any
communication should take place… It consists of all that is, and must be,
well understood between utterer and interpreter, at the outset, in order
that the sign in question should fulfill its function.”  The interpretant
is what the commens says, which is mediated between first and second.



If you initially make explicit the noetically heterogeneous opinions about
a phenomenon, which are in the respective minds of participants, issues
with denotation and connotation will resolve themselves.



hth,

Jerry Rhee

On Thu, Mar 17, 2016 at 7:15 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> List:
> I fear that the distinction between connotation and denotation is being
> lost in this discussion.
> Cheers
> Jerry
>
> Sent from my iPhone
>
> > On Mar 17, 2016, at 2:12 PM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
> >
> > Thread:http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18467
> > JLRC:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18486
> > JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18508
> > TG:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18511
> > JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18512
> >
> > Cf:
> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/03/15/abduction-deduction-induction-analogy-inquiry-16/
> > Cf:
> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/03/16/abduction-deduction-induction-analogy-inquiry-17/
> >
> > Tom, List,
> >
> > Let me dispel any notion that “the interpretant introduces
> > the person as part of the object-sign-interpretant structure”.
> > We may have left it implicit or unclear in the text, but the
> > lower case “i” and the dashed lines in the figure were meant
> > to suggest the agency of the interpreter and the circumstance
> > that signs and interpretants reside nearer the personal sphere
> > than the objects, generally speaking.  I think you know all the
> > reasons why primers in semiotics tend to start out talking about
> > interpreters and only gradually abstract away to interpretants.
> > But I see now that was faulty notation, as it's more usual to
> > read a lower case “i” as indicating a member of a local set I.
> > Next time I will use a Greek iota for the interpretive agent.
> >
> > Regards,
> >
> > Jon
> >
> > On 3/16/2016 12:57 PM, Tom Gollier wrote:
> > > Jon,
> > >
> > > I think there's a troubling narrowness interpreting
> > > this situation as something like:
> > >
> > > "In this narrative we can identify the characters
> > > of the sign relation as follows:  *coolness* is a
> > > Sign of the Object *rain*, and the Interpretant
> > > is *the thought of the rain’s likelihood*."
> > >
> > > First of all, how can something that has not yet occurred be
> > > the object?  And what of all the other things "coolness" might
> > > indicate (be a sign of in that sense)?  And the interpretant
> > > introduces the person as part of the object-sign-interpretant
> > > structure?
> > >
> > > Personally, I prefer to see the "sign" as a diagram of the elements
> > > and relationships abstracted from this situation, the "object".  And,
> > > the interpretant, "rain," is then the inference being made using one
> > > of those elements, "coolness", and its relationship to rain.  I think
> > > this view would accord well with Peirce's description of a diagram used
> > > in problem-solving; it would allow the "rain" to remain virtual rather
> > > than actual (along the lines set out by Deleuze); and it also doesn't
> > > bring the man into the sign structure itself.  He enters only in his
> > > use of it to make the personal inference that he ought to quicken
> > > his pace.
> > >
> > > Tom
> > >
> >
> > --
> >
> > academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
> > my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
> > inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
> > isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
> > oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
> > facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
> >
> > -
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> >
> >
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry

[Jon Awbrey]

Jerry, List,

A very good question.

Susan Awbrey and I tried our hands at answering the “What Next?”
question in the medium of analyzing Dewey's “Sign of Rain” example:

https://www.academia.edu/1266493/Interpretation_as_Action_The_Risk_of_Inquiry

Relevant excerpt below:



The Pattern and Stages of Inquiry
=

To illustrate the place of the sign relation in inquiry we begin with
Dewey's elegant and simple example of reflective thinking in everyday life:


A man is walking on a warm day.  The sky was clear the last time he observed 
it; but
presently he notes, while occupied primarily with other things, that the air is 
cooler.
It occurs to him that it is probably going to rain;  looking up, he sees a dark 
cloud
between him and the sun, and he then quickens his steps.  What, if anything, in 
such
a situation can be called thought?  Neither the act of walking nor the noting 
of the
cold is a thought.  Walking is one direction of activity; looking and noting 
are other
modes of activity.  The likelihood that it will rain is, however, something 
suggested.
The pedestrian feels the cold; he thinks of clouds and a coming shower.

(Dewey 1991, 6-7).


In this narrative we can identify the characters of the sign relation
as follows: coolness is a Sign of the Object rain, and the Interpretant
is the thought of the rain's likelihood.  In his 1910 description of
reflective thinking Dewey distinguishes two phases, “a state of perplexity,
hesitation, doubt” and “an act of search or investigation” (Dewey 1991, 9),
comprehensive stages which are further refined in his later model of inquiry.
In this example reflection is the act of the interpreter which establishes a
fund of connections between the sensory shock of coolness and the objective
danger of rain, by way of his impression that rain is likely.  But reflection
is more than irresponsible speculation.  In reflection the interpreter acts
to charge or defuse the thought of rain (the probability of rain in thought)
by seeking other signs which this thought implies and evaluating the thought
according to the results of this search.

Figure 2 illustrates Dewey's “Rain” example, tracing the structure and function
of the sign relation as it informs the activity of inquiry, including both the
movements of surprise explanation and intentional action.  The dyadic faces of
the sign relation are labeled with just a few of the loosest terms that apply,
indicating the “significance” of signs for eventual occurrences and the
“correspondence” of ideas with external orientations.  Nothing essential
is meant by these dyadic role distinctions, since it is only in special
or degenerate cases that their shadowy projections can maintain enough
information to determine the original sign relation.

Figure 2.  Signs and Inquiry in Dewey [see attached]

If we follow this example far enough to consider the import of thought
for action, we realize that the subsequent conduct of the interpreter,
progressing up through the natural conclusion of the episode — the
quickening steps, seeking shelter in time to escape the rain — all of
these acts form a series of further interpretants, contingent on the
active causes of the individual, for the originally recognized signs
of rain and for the first impressions of the actual case.  Just as
critical reflection develops the associated and alternative signs
which gather about an idea, pragmatic interpretation explores the
consequential and contrasting actions which give effective and
testable meaning to a person's belief in it.



Regards,

Jon

On 3/9/2016 5:07 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
> John, Clark,  List:
>
> The simple question arises:  If an abductive step is taken by the inquirer,
> then what?
>
> For example, say that a sinsign and its legisigns and qualisigns provide
> the informative extension to generate an index, how does one take this
> abductive object and move through the inferential steps needed to
> generate a valid argument?
>
> Or, from a different logical perspective, what information is needed
> to extend (in the Aristotelian sense of intensional logic) the index
> to the (telelogical?) goal of the inquirer?
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>

--

academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry

[Jerry Rhee]

ides who thought that one or the
> other or both made sense for centuries, let alone decades, and that they
> were in real competition.
>
>
>
> This is why, though I agree with Clark about the positive aspects of the
> Pragmatic Maxim, I think the negative aspect I pointed to is important in
> this sort of context. Very smart people can be deluded about whether what
> they believe actually makes sense. I don’t think this is a normal
> condition, though. We often do have ideas about the world that are both
> coherent and accurate. And we can discover bad ones and dispose of them.
>
>
>
> John Collier
>
> Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate
>
> University of KwaZulu-Natal
>
> http://web.ncf.ca/collier
>
>
>
> *From:* Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* Saturday, 12 March 2016 4:30 AM
>
> *To:* John Collier
> *Cc:* Jerry LR Chandler; Peirce List; Clark Goble
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy,
> Inquiry
>
>
>
> John,
>
> You're saying there is no case where transformative science operates
> through normal science?
>
> If it's simply a matter of coordinating the proper joint problem space and
> convincing experts to see that space (eros), then phi spiral abduction has
> it in spades.  But the truth is in the future.  So, let's wait...  :)
>
> Best,
>
> Jerry Rhee
>
>
>
> On Fri, Mar 11, 2016 at 2:04 AM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote:
>
> Jerry,
>
>
>
> The example I gave (bucket experiment) involved genuine doubt about what
> at least some (e.g., Newton) took to be a real world situation.
>
>
>
> Your example is within normal science (the Kuhnian notion of cumulative
> science under a single interpretative paradigm). I was focussing more on
> cases in which doubt has been raised about the suitability of a paradigm
> for explaining the phenomena. This has been a long standing area of
> interest of mine, and the further concern I raised about abduction arises
> primarily if not always in cases in which a paradigm has fallen into doubt.
> In normal science there are common exemplars and preferred analogies(ways
> of extending a theory to new applications). In this case my concerns would
> not typically arise, except as a practical issue resulting from our limited
> abilities to understand our methods, not more basic logical difficulties.
> So I think we are talking past each other here by focussing on
> significantly different kinds of cases (normal science versus revolutionary
> science). I raised Feyerabend at least in part because he focuses on
> problems for empiricism in the revolutionary case, but also because that is
> the sort of case I see as being especially problematic. In my paper
> “Pragmatic Incommensurabiity (1984)” I argued that the sort of problem that
> Kuhn and Feyerabend raised arise from the lack of an available common
> interpretative framework. In my dissertation I argued that the solution was
> to use the available interpretations of the theories involved to tease out
> discordant implicit presuppositions of the paradigms. As I said, I am still
> working on this problem. I am pretty sure that there is more than just luck
> involved in finding a good resolution. In my dissertation I explained how
> this was done in relativity theory, as an example. I am not yet happy with
> any analysis of this how that I have seen so far. It may be there in
> Peirce, and I am certain that Peircean methods are needed to find a
> solution.
>
>
>
> In any case, I repeat that I would agree that there is no special problem
> of the sort I was worried about that arises in the course of normal science.
>
>
>
> John Collier
>
> Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate
>
> University of KwaZulu-Natal
>
> http://web.ncf.ca/collier
>
>
>
> *From:* Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* Thursday, 10 March 2016 9:15 PM
> *To:* John Collier
> *Cc:* Jerry LR Chandler; Peirce List; Clark Goble
>
>
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy,
> Inquiry
>
>
>
> John,
>
>
>
> To me, we are talking about whether Feyerabend or Peirce can offer a
> definite suggestion on how to proceed if we are frozen with respect to
> advancing on a problem.  To say there’s no systematic way to proceed is
> antithetical to Peirce, who offers abduction, a very definite formalism
> that asks you to be explicit about three things, the icon (C), index (A)
> and symbol (B) and to consider them in relation according to CP 5.189.
> Yes, there are a number of things to consider in order to assess the
> goodness of an explanation, some criteria that you li

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry

[Jerry Rhee]

John,

You're saying there is no case where transformative science operates
through normal science?

If it's simply a matter of coordinating the proper joint problem space and
convincing experts to see that space (eros), then phi spiral abduction has
it in spades.  But the truth is in the future.  So, let's wait...  :)

Best,
Jerry Rhee

On Fri, Mar 11, 2016 at 2:04 AM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote:

> Jerry,
>
>
>
> The example I gave (bucket experiment) involved genuine doubt about what
> at least some (e.g., Newton) took to be a real world situation.
>
>
>
> Your example is within normal science (the Kuhnian notion of cumulative
> science under a single interpretative paradigm). I was focussing more on
> cases in which doubt has been raised about the suitability of a paradigm
> for explaining the phenomena. This has been a long standing area of
> interest of mine, and the further concern I raised about abduction arises
> primarily if not always in cases in which a paradigm has fallen into doubt.
> In normal science there are common exemplars and preferred analogies(ways
> of extending a theory to new applications). In this case my concerns would
> not typically arise, except as a practical issue resulting from our limited
> abilities to understand our methods, not more basic logical difficulties.
> So I think we are talking past each other here by focussing on
> significantly different kinds of cases (normal science versus revolutionary
> science). I raised Feyerabend at least in part because he focuses on
> problems for empiricism in the revolutionary case, but also because that is
> the sort of case I see as being especially problematic. In my paper
> “Pragmatic Incommensurabiity (1984)” I argued that the sort of problem that
> Kuhn and Feyerabend raised arise from the lack of an available common
> interpretative framework. In my dissertation I argued that the solution was
> to use the available interpretations of the theories involved to tease out
> discordant implicit presuppositions of the paradigms. As I said, I am still
> working on this problem. I am pretty sure that there is more than just luck
> involved in finding a good resolution. In my dissertation I explained how
> this was done in relativity theory, as an example. I am not yet happy with
> any analysis of this how that I have seen so far. It may be there in
> Peirce, and I am certain that Peircean methods are needed to find a
> solution.
>
>
>
> In any case, I repeat that I would agree that there is no special problem
> of the sort I was worried about that arises in the course of normal science.
>
>
>
> John Collier
>
> Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate
>
> University of KwaZulu-Natal
>
> http://web.ncf.ca/collier
>
>
>
> *From:* Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* Thursday, 10 March 2016 9:15 PM
> *To:* John Collier
> *Cc:* Jerry LR Chandler; Peirce List; Clark Goble
>
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy,
> Inquiry
>
>
>
> John,
>
>
>
> To me, we are talking about whether Feyerabend or Peirce can offer a
> definite suggestion on how to proceed if we are frozen with respect to
> advancing on a problem.  To say there’s no systematic way to proceed is
> antithetical to Peirce, who offers abduction, a very definite formalism
> that asks you to be explicit about three things, the icon (C), index (A)
> and symbol (B) and to consider them in relation according to CP 5.189.
> Yes, there are a number of things to consider in order to assess the
> goodness of an explanation, some criteria that you list in the last part of
> your post.  But these things are not really assessable by talking strictly
> in abstraction.  The possibilities are simply too numerous.
>
>
>
> But why not take genuine doubt about a real-world phenomenon in a
> real-world situation to test your assertions about quality, index,
> interpretation, practice, effectiveness, goodness, space and time, testing
> of explanation...?  There is such a phenomenon in phi spiral abduction.  It
> is an abductive inference about a regularity that comes in perceptual
> judgment.  There were others with different collateral experience who saw
> the phenomenon but did not see the same icon.  I proposed an alternative
> index, one that implicates optimal stromal collagen organization.  It is a
> definite prediction.  It is testable, etc.…
>
>
>
> Is it a good explanation?  I think so because eros, that is, it is
> suggestive of "effective surprise".  Reasons for eros are many.  These
> reasons go beyond materials and corneal science; justifications that flow
> into philosophy and education.  I trust that good ideas t

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry

[John Collier]

Jerry,

The example I gave (bucket experiment) involved genuine doubt about what at 
least some (e.g., Newton) took to be a real world situation.

Your example is within normal science (the Kuhnian notion of cumulative science 
under a single interpretative paradigm). I was focussing more on cases in which 
doubt has been raised about the suitability of a paradigm for explaining the 
phenomena. This has been a long standing area of interest of mine, and the 
further concern I raised about abduction arises primarily if not always in 
cases in which a paradigm has fallen into doubt. In normal science there are 
common exemplars and preferred analogies(ways of extending a theory to new 
applications). In this case my concerns would not typically arise, except as a 
practical issue resulting from our limited abilities to understand our methods, 
not more basic logical difficulties. So I think we are talking past each other 
here by focussing on significantly different kinds of cases (normal science 
versus revolutionary science). I raised Feyerabend at least in part because he 
focuses on problems for empiricism in the revolutionary case, but also because 
that is the sort of case I see as being especially problematic. In my paper 
“Pragmatic Incommensurabiity (1984)” I argued that the sort of problem that 
Kuhn and Feyerabend raised arise from the lack of an available common 
interpretative framework. In my dissertation I argued that the solution was to 
use the available interpretations of the theories involved to tease out 
discordant implicit presuppositions of the paradigms. As I said, I am still 
working on this problem. I am pretty sure that there is more than just luck 
involved in finding a good resolution. In my dissertation I explained how this 
was done in relativity theory, as an example. I am not yet happy with any 
analysis of this how that I have seen so far. It may be there in Peirce, and I 
am certain that Peircean methods are needed to find a solution.

In any case, I repeat that I would agree that there is no special problem of 
the sort I was worried about that arises in the course of normal science.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate
University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, 10 March 2016 9:15 PM
To: John Collier
Cc: Jerry LR Chandler; Peirce List; Clark Goble
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry

John,

To me, we are talking about whether Feyerabend or Peirce can offer a definite 
suggestion on how to proceed if we are frozen with respect to advancing on a 
problem.  To say there’s no systematic way to proceed is antithetical to 
Peirce, who offers abduction, a very definite formalism that asks you to be 
explicit about three things, the icon (C), index (A) and symbol (B) and to 
consider them in relation according to CP 5.189.  Yes, there are a number of 
things to consider in order to assess the goodness of an explanation, some 
criteria that you list in the last part of your post.  But these things are not 
really assessable by talking strictly in abstraction.  The possibilities are 
simply too numerous.

But why not take genuine doubt about a real-world phenomenon in a real-world 
situation to test your assertions about quality, index, interpretation, 
practice, effectiveness, goodness, space and time, testing of explanation...?  
There is such a phenomenon in phi spiral abduction.  It is an abductive 
inference about a regularity that comes in perceptual judgment.  There were 
others with different collateral experience who saw the phenomenon but did not 
see the same icon.  I proposed an alternative index, one that implicates 
optimal stromal collagen organization.  It is a definite prediction.  It is 
testable, etc.…

Is it a good explanation?  I think so because eros, that is, it is suggestive 
of "effective surprise".  Reasons for eros are many.  These reasons go beyond 
materials and corneal science; justifications that flow into philosophy and 
education.  I trust that good ideas take care of themselves and that there is a 
good chance for consilience here because if not this, which?

Are such justifications allowable for assessing an explanation?  What does 
Newton have to say on the matter?  Who decides if I disagree with his silence?  
Importantly, what if it turns out my idea is true; that it does what I say it 
does.  Is that reason enough to agree that there is a systematic approach to 
creativity and that it is complete in CP 5.189?

Best,
Jerry Rhee

On Thu, Mar 10, 2016 at 10:53 AM, John Collier 
<colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:
Jerry,

That is certainly the main issue that needs to be resolved in full. The 
phenomena to be explained have to be identified by the abductive inference. 
This would be the index part of the proposition.  The qualitative part has to 
be able to all

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry

[John Collier]

Jerry,

That is certainly the main issue that needs to be resolved in full. The 
phenomena to be explained have to be identified by the abductive inference. 
This would be the index part of the proposition.  The qualitative part has to 
be able to allow this identification. Together they must permit an 
interpretation that we have a way to use in pactice. I would say that it is the 
effectiveness of the last that determines how good the abduction is. I suspect 
that the answer involves considering a number of factors.

For example, Newtonian space and time are one way to explain the bucket thought 
experiment. But even in Newton's own time it was observed  (e.g.  by Leibniz) 
that the explanation couldn't be tested (it failed the pragmatic maxim). Mach 
made the problem even more clear.  It was not a good explanation on those 
grounds,  though it was good enough for Newton and for most physicists up to 
Einstein.

John



Sent from my Samsung device


 Original message 
From: Jerry LR Chandler <jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com>
Date: 2016/03/10 00:07 (GMT+02:00)
To: Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Cc: Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com>, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry

John, Clark,  List:


On Mar 9, 2016, at 1:59 AM, John Collier 
<colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:

List,

Another point that is often overlooked in discussions of inference to the best 
explanation, which I agree is not the same as abduction, though I think 
abduction is more restrictive than just inference to any hypothesis from which 
the evidence might be inferred, is that the best explanation need not be a good 
explanation, so we need more than inference to the best explanation to carry 
out inquiry responsibly.

The simple question arises:
If an abductive step is taken by the inquirer, then what?

For example, say that a sinsign and its legisigns and qualisigns provide the 
informative extension to generate an index, how does one take this abductive 
object and move through the inferential steps needed to generate a valid 
argument?

Or, from a different logical perspective, what information is needed to extend 
(in the Aristotelian sense of intensional logic) the index to the 
(telelogical?) goal of the inquirer?

Cheers

Jerry








From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
Sent: Friday, 04 March 2016 12:35 AM
To: Peirce List
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry


On Mar 3, 2016, at 3:25 PM, Jon Awbrey 
<jawb...@att.net<mailto:jawb...@att.net>> wrote:

Let me just say again that abduction is not "inference to the best explanation".
That gloss derives from a later attempt to rationalize Peirce's idea and it has
led to a whole literature of misconception.  Abduction is more like "inference
to any explanation" - or maybe adapting Kant's phrase, "conceiving a concept
that reduces a manifold to a unity".  The most difficult part of its labor
is delivering a term, very often new or unnoticed, that can serve as
a middle term in grasping the structure of an object domain.

I fully agree and many of his quotations make clear it's not inference to the 
best explanation. However we should admit that in some places he sure seems to 
get close to that idea. Even if it doesn't appear to be workable. I'd argue 
that even when he appears to be talking about best explanation he's much more 
after the fact our guesses are so often quite good. (Although I'd have to go 
through all the quotes to be sure that's fair to the texts)



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry

[John Collier]

Jerry,
Although Feyerabend is arguably a pragmatic realist, I think there should be no 
thinking of him as a Peircean. Nonetheless I think that there is some 
convergence on the idea that we can't specify in advance which ideas will be 
successful between Feyerabend and Peirce. I think that rhetorically Feyerabend 
exaggerates this aspect, but other things he says, for example in his 
historical treatment of Galileo in Against Method, treat the justification of 
new ideas in terms that are comprehensible in terms of the old (in this case 
Aristotelean). His rhetoric tends to undermine the continuity. It was directed 
at a specific form of cumulative empiricism, the dominant view at the time.

I wrote my PhD dissertation on the problems with empiricism of that kind, and I 
gave an analysis and proposed solution that is basically Peircean, I think. I 
am still working on the solution part more than three decades later. The 
linguistic creativity paper is part of that project.

John



Sent from my Samsung device


 Original message 
From: Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com>
Date: 2016/03/10 09:40 (GMT+02:00)
To: John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za>
Cc: Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com>, Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry

Hi John,

I agree with your conclusion of the paper (although I did not read the body).  
I was objecting to this portion of your post: "There are no magic rules for 
finding the truth (or "anything goes" as Feyerabend would say in his typically 
provocative manner)."

I think although unsound, and with consideration to its relatedness to context 
and usage, Peirce's abduction can be an extremely helpful prescription for how 
to progress honestly and earnestly in inquiry.  The Feyrabend quote has the 
effect of diminishing the value of this great tool.

Best,
Jerry R

On Thu, Mar 10, 2016 at 1:20 AM, John Collier 
<colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:
I am not at all clear what you are getting at here, Jerry. I thought Jon 
Awbrey's recent remarks 1 and 2 were spot on.

On his reference to 3, creativity, I would follow the approach I give for 
creativity in language, but restricted to the formation of hypotheses, in

  *   Informal Pragmatics and Linguistic 
Creativity<http://web.ncf.ca/collier/papers/Informal%20pragmatics%20and%20Linguistic%20Creativity%20version2.pdf>,
 South African Journal of Philosophy, 2014


John Collier
Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate
University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com<mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com>]
Sent: Wednesday, 09 March 2016 11:02 AM
To: John Collier
Cc: Clark Goble; Peirce List

Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry

Hi all,
It seems paradoxical to me that a Peircean doesn't believe in Peirce's method 
to inferencing truth under uncertainty.

There must be a way out of this dilemma...one, two, three...CP 5.189.
Best,
Jerry R

On Wed, Mar 9, 2016 at 1:59 AM, John Collier 
<colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:
List,

Another point that is often overlooked in discussions of inference to the best 
explanation, which I agree is not the same as abduction, though I think 
abduction is more restrictive than just inference to any hypothesis from which 
the evidence might be inferred, is that the best explanation need not be a good 
explanation, so we need more than inference to the best explanation to carry 
out inquiry responsibly. There are no magic rules for finding the truth (or 
"anything goes" as Feyerabend would say in his typically provocative manner).

John Collier
Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate
University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com<mailto:cl...@lextek.com>]
Sent: Friday, 04 March 2016 12:35 AM
To: Peirce List
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry


On Mar 3, 2016, at 3:25 PM, Jon Awbrey 
<jawb...@att.net<mailto:jawb...@att.net>> wrote:

Let me just say again that abduction is not "inference to the best explanation".
That gloss derives from a later attempt to rationalize Peirce's idea and it has
led to a whole literature of misconception.  Abduction is more like "inference
to any explanation" - or maybe adapting Kant's phrase, "conceiving a concept
that reduces a manifold to a unity".  The most difficult part of its labor
is delivering a term, very often new or unnoticed, that can serve as
a middle term in grasping the structure of an object domain.

I fully agree and many of his quotations make clear it's not inference to the 
best explanation. However we should admit that in some places he sure seems to 
get close to that idea. Even if it doesn't appear to be w

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry

[John Collier]

I am not at all clear what you are getting at here, Jerry. I thought Jon 
Awbrey’s recent remarks 1 and 2 were spot on.

On his reference to 3, creativity, I would follow the approach I give for 
creativity in language, but restricted to the formation of hypotheses, in

  *   Informal Pragmatics and Linguistic 
Creativity<http://web.ncf.ca/collier/papers/Informal%20pragmatics%20and%20Linguistic%20Creativity%20version2.pdf>,
 South African Journal of Philosophy, 2014


John Collier
Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate
University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, 09 March 2016 11:02 AM
To: John Collier
Cc: Clark Goble; Peirce List
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry

Hi all,
It seems paradoxical to me that a Peircean doesn't believe in Peirce's method 
to inferencing truth under uncertainty.

There must be a way out of this dilemma...one, two, three...CP 5.189.
Best,
Jerry R

On Wed, Mar 9, 2016 at 1:59 AM, John Collier 
<colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:
List,

Another point that is often overlooked in discussions of inference to the best 
explanation, which I agree is not the same as abduction, though I think 
abduction is more restrictive than just inference to any hypothesis from which 
the evidence might be inferred, is that the best explanation need not be a good 
explanation, so we need more than inference to the best explanation to carry 
out inquiry responsibly. There are no magic rules for finding the truth (or 
“anything goes” as Feyerabend would say in his typically provocative manner).

John Collier
Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate
University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com<mailto:cl...@lextek.com>]
Sent: Friday, 04 March 2016 12:35 AM
To: Peirce List
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry


On Mar 3, 2016, at 3:25 PM, Jon Awbrey 
<jawb...@att.net<mailto:jawb...@att.net>> wrote:

Let me just say again that abduction is not “inference to the best explanation”.
That gloss derives from a later attempt to rationalize Peirce's idea and it has
led to a whole literature of misconception.  Abduction is more like “inference
to any explanation” — or maybe adapting Kant's phrase, “conceiving a concept
that reduces a manifold to a unity”.  The most difficult part of its labor
is delivering a term, very often new or unnoticed, that can serve as
a middle term in grasping the structure of an object domain.

I fully agree and many of his quotations make clear it’s not inference to the 
best explanation. However we should admit that in some places he sure seems to 
get close to that idea. Even if it doesn’t appear to be workable. I’d argue 
that even when he appears to be talking about best explanation he’s much more 
after the fact our guesses are so often quite good. (Although I’d have to go 
through all the quotes to be sure that’s fair to the texts)




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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry

[Jerry Rhee]

Wrt Jerry C's contribution...

Why *eros* and not *epithumia*?  Wherefore relevance relation?

"My point is not that Strauss is wrong, but that he owes us an account of
how the Socratic path between Scylla and Charybdis can be maintained
without shipwreck." ~ Stanley Rosen.

The question really amounts to "What is CP 5.189; one, two, three" and what
does that entail?

Best,
Jerry Rhee

On Wed, Mar 9, 2016 at 4:07 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> John, Clark,  List:
>
>
> On Mar 9, 2016, at 1:59 AM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote:
>
> List,
>
> Another point that is often overlooked in discussions of inference to the
> best explanation, which I agree is not the same as abduction, though I
> think abduction is more restrictive than just inference to any hypothesis
> from which the evidence might be inferred, is that the best explanation
> need not be a good explanation, so we need more than inference to the best
> explanation to carry out inquiry responsibly.
>
>
> The simple question arises:
> If an abductive step is taken by the inquirer, then what?
>
> For example, say that a sinsign and its legisigns and qualisigns provide
> the informative extension to generate an index, how does one take this
> abductive object and move through the inferential steps needed to generate
> a valid argument?
>
> Or, from a different logical perspective, what information is needed to
> extend (in the Aristotelian sense of intensional logic) the index to the
> (telelogical?) goal of the inquirer?
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com <cl...@lextek.com>]
> *Sent:* Friday, 04 March 2016 12:35 AM
> *To:* Peirce List
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy,
> Inquiry
>
>
>
> On Mar 3, 2016, at 3:25 PM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote:
>
> Let me just say again that abduction is not “inference to the best
> explanation”.
> That gloss derives from a later attempt to rationalize Peirce's idea and
> it has
> led to a whole literature of misconception.  Abduction is more like
> “inference
> to any explanation” — or maybe adapting Kant's phrase, “conceiving a
> concept
> that reduces a manifold to a unity”.  The most difficult part of its labor
> is delivering a term, very often new or unnoticed, that can serve as
> a middle term in grasping the structure of an object domain.
>
>
> I fully agree and many of his quotations make clear it’s not inference to
> the best explanation. However we should admit that in some places he sure
> seems to get close to that idea. Even if it doesn’t appear to be workable.
> I’d argue that even when he appears to be talking about best explanation
> he’s much more after the fact our guesses are so often quite good.
> (Although I’d have to go through all the quotes to be sure that’s fair to
> the texts)
>
>
>
> -
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>
>
>
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>
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>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry

[Jerry LR Chandler]

John, Clark,  List:


> On Mar 9, 2016, at 1:59 AM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote:
> 
> List, <>
>  
> Another point that is often overlooked in discussions of inference to the 
> best explanation, which I agree is not the same as abduction, though I think 
> abduction is more restrictive than just inference to any hypothesis from 
> which the evidence might be inferred, is that the best explanation need not 
> be a good explanation, so we need more than inference to the best explanation 
> to carry out inquiry responsibly. 

The simple question arises:
If an abductive step is taken by the inquirer, then what?

For example, say that a sinsign and its legisigns and qualisigns provide the 
informative extension to generate an index, how does one take this abductive 
object and move through the inferential steps needed to generate a valid 
argument? 

Or, from a different logical perspective, what information is needed to extend 
(in the Aristotelian sense of intensional logic) the index to the 
(telelogical?) goal of the inquirer?

Cheers

Jerry 







>  
> From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com] 
> Sent: Friday, 04 March 2016 12:35 AM
> To: Peirce List
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry
>  
>  
> On Mar 3, 2016, at 3:25 PM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net 
> <mailto:jawb...@att.net>> wrote:
>  
> Let me just say again that abduction is not “inference to the best 
> explanation”.
> That gloss derives from a later attempt to rationalize Peirce's idea and it 
> has
> led to a whole literature of misconception.  Abduction is more like “inference
> to any explanation” — or maybe adapting Kant's phrase, “conceiving a concept
> that reduces a manifold to a unity”.  The most difficult part of its labor
> is delivering a term, very often new or unnoticed, that can serve as
> a middle term in grasping the structure of an object domain.
>  
> I fully agree and many of his quotations make clear it’s not inference to the 
> best explanation. However we should admit that in some places he sure seems 
> to get close to that idea. Even if it doesn’t appear to be workable. I’d 
> argue that even when he appears to be talking about best explanation he’s 
> much more after the fact our guesses are so often quite good. (Although I’d 
> have to go through all the quotes to be sure that’s fair to the texts)
>  
>  
> 
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry

[Jerry Rhee]

Hi all,

It seems paradoxical to me that a Peircean doesn't believe in Peirce's
method to inferencing truth under uncertainty.

There must be a way out of this dilemma...one, two, three...CP 5.189.

Best,
Jerry R

On Wed, Mar 9, 2016 at 1:59 AM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote:

> List,
>
>
>
> Another point that is often overlooked in discussions of inference to the
> best explanation, which I agree is not the same as abduction, though I
> think abduction is more restrictive than just inference to any hypothesis
> from which the evidence might be inferred, is that the best explanation
> need not be a good explanation, so we need more than inference to the best
> explanation to carry out inquiry responsibly. There are no magic rules for
> finding the truth (or “anything goes” as Feyerabend would say in his
> typically provocative manner).
>
>
>
> John Collier
>
> Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate
>
> University of KwaZulu-Natal
>
> http://web.ncf.ca/collier
>
>
>
> *From:* Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
> *Sent:* Friday, 04 March 2016 12:35 AM
> *To:* Peirce List
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy,
> Inquiry
>
>
>
>
>
> On Mar 3, 2016, at 3:25 PM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote:
>
>
>
> Let me just say again that abduction is not “inference to the best
> explanation”.
> That gloss derives from a later attempt to rationalize Peirce's idea and
> it has
> led to a whole literature of misconception.  Abduction is more like
> “inference
> to any explanation” — or maybe adapting Kant's phrase, “conceiving a
> concept
> that reduces a manifold to a unity”.  The most difficult part of its labor
> is delivering a term, very often new or unnoticed, that can serve as
> a middle term in grasping the structure of an object domain.
>
>
>
> I fully agree and many of his quotations make clear it’s not inference to
> the best explanation. However we should admit that in some places he sure
> seems to get close to that idea. Even if it doesn’t appear to be workable.
> I’d argue that even when he appears to be talking about best explanation
> he’s much more after the fact our guesses are so often quite good.
> (Although I’d have to go through all the quotes to be sure that’s fair to
> the texts)
>
>
>
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry

[John Collier]

List,

Another point that is often overlooked in discussions of inference to the best 
explanation, which I agree is not the same as abduction, though I think 
abduction is more restrictive than just inference to any hypothesis from which 
the evidence might be inferred, is that the best explanation need not be a good 
explanation, so we need more than inference to the best explanation to carry 
out inquiry responsibly. There are no magic rules for finding the truth (or 
“anything goes” as Feyerabend would say in his typically provocative manner).

John Collier
Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate
University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
Sent: Friday, 04 March 2016 12:35 AM
To: Peirce List
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry


On Mar 3, 2016, at 3:25 PM, Jon Awbrey 
<jawb...@att.net<mailto:jawb...@att.net>> wrote:

Let me just say again that abduction is not “inference to the best explanation”.
That gloss derives from a later attempt to rationalize Peirce's idea and it has
led to a whole literature of misconception.  Abduction is more like “inference
to any explanation” — or maybe adapting Kant's phrase, “conceiving a concept
that reduces a manifold to a unity”.  The most difficult part of its labor
is delivering a term, very often new or unnoticed, that can serve as
a middle term in grasping the structure of an object domain.

I fully agree and many of his quotations make clear it’s not inference to the 
best explanation. However we should admit that in some places he sure seems to 
get close to that idea. Even if it doesn’t appear to be workable. I’d argue 
that even when he appears to be talking about best explanation he’s much more 
after the fact our guesses are so often quite good. (Although I’d have to go 
through all the quotes to be sure that’s fair to the texts)



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry

[Jerry Rhee]

Hi Jon, list,

Despite your noble efforts to address it, the problem continues to
persist.  It appears it doesn't even matter that you're right.

What would you say is a best strategy for fixing the problem of
communicating Peirce correctly other than what you or anyone else is
doing?  Are they even doing the same as you?

Best,
Jerry


On Fri, Mar 4, 2016 at 2:50 PM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:

> Post : Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, Inquiry : 10
>
> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/03/04/abduction-deduction-induction-analogy-inquiry-10/
> Date : March 4, 2016 at 3:30 pm
>
> Peircers,
>
> Continuing efforts to clarify the distinctive character and
> role of abductive reasoning within the well-formed inquiry.
>
> Re: Beyond Experiment
> http://www.math.columbia.edu/~woit/wordpress/?p=8323
> • Scott Church
> http://www.math.columbia.edu/~woit/wordpress/?p=8323=1#comment-221819
>
> Names are not important of course, except for the purpose of
> communication.  The important thing is for us to distinguish
> hypothesis formation from hypothesis evaluation.  Now, there
> happens to be a long tradition of using the word “abduction”
> to distinguish that former, most incipient stage of inquiry
> and I think it serves communication to preserve that tradition.
>
> Concepts, hypotheses, and theories have to be formed, logically
> speaking, before they can be evaluated.  In complex inquiries
> extending over long periods of time, formation, evaluation, and
> re-formation will of course proceed in cascades of parallel and
> series operations, but the analytic distinction between elements
> and mixtures is still worth its salt.
>
> The role of ab-, de-, in-duction in the cycle of inquiry
> is discussed a bit further in the following article:
>
> • InterSciWiki • Inquiry
> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Inquiry
>
> Resources
> =
>
> • Prospects for Inquiry Driven Systems
>
> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Prospects_for_Inquiry_Driven_Systems
>
> • Introduction to Inquiry Driven Systems
>
> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Introduction_to_Inquiry_Driven_Systems
>
> • Functional Logic : Inquiry and Analogy
>
> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Functional_Logic_:_Inquiry_and_Analogy
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> --
>
> academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
> my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
> inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
> oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
>
>
> -
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry

[Clark Goble]

> On Mar 3, 2016, at 3:25 PM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
> 
> Let me just say again that abduction is not “inference to the best 
> explanation”.
> That gloss derives from a later attempt to rationalize Peirce's idea and it 
> has
> led to a whole literature of misconception.  Abduction is more like “inference
> to any explanation” — or maybe adapting Kant's phrase, “conceiving a concept
> that reduces a manifold to a unity”.  The most difficult part of its labor
> is delivering a term, very often new or unnoticed, that can serve as
> a middle term in grasping the structure of an object domain.

I fully agree and many of his quotations make clear it’s not inference to the 
best explanation. However we should admit that in some places he sure seems to 
get close to that idea. Even if it doesn’t appear to be workable. I’d argue 
that even when he appears to be talking about best explanation he’s much more 
after the fact our guesses are so often quite good. (Although I’d have to go 
through all the quotes to be sure that’s fair to the texts)



-
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry

[Jerry Rhee]

Hi everyone,


To clarify:


"Therefore, I extend logic to embrace all the necessary principles of
semeiotic, and I recognize a logic of icons, and a logic of indices, as
well as a logic of symbols…" (CP 4.9)



“Logic follows Ethics and both follow Aesthetics”



“Why, then, is spirit privileged over appetite as the ally of reason?”
~Jessica Moss



Because phi spiral (C, icon), FEM model (A, index), structural optimization
of corneal stroma (B, symbol).



one, two, three…

esthetics, ethics, logic…

icon, index, symbol…

spiritedness, desire, reason…



“*Although Peirce came to recognize the nature and role of the normative
sciences only late in his career, still he was convinced that his own
account of the hierarchical dependence of logic on ethics and of ethics on
esthetics was a discovery of fundamental importance for a correct
understanding of his system, and one which distinguished his "pragmaticism"
from other less correct interpretations of his own famous maxim.**”*

~ Potter

Best,
Jerry Rhee

On Wed, Mar 2, 2016 at 11:00 PM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:

> Post : Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, Inquiry : 8
>
> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/03/02/abduction-deduction-induction-analogy-inquiry-8/
> Date : March 2, 2016 at 4:32 pm
>
> Peircers,
>
> In Peirce's theory of inquiry none of the three basic types
> of inference is reducible to any mixture of the other two.
> This too, too solid feature of Peirce's paradigm appears
> to be one of the hardest things to represent within the
> frame of dyadic or 2-dimensional paradigms, at least,
> without the proverbial Procrustean distortion and
> truncation.  At any rate, the following comment
> is another one of my tries to get that across.
>
> Re: Peter Woit ( http://www.math.columbia.edu/~woit/ )
> • Beyond Experiment ( http://www.math.columbia.edu/~woit/wordpress/?p=8323
> )
>
> I will limit myself to clearing up popular confusions
> about Peirce's concept of abductive inference.  Analytic
> philosophy swayed many people into thinking that science
> could be reduced to purely deductive reasoning, eliminating
> induction and ignoring abduction, but Peirce was a practicing
> scientist who worked outside that warp.  In his model of the
> inquiry process abduction is at root logically prior to any
> discussion of probabilities, however true it may be that
> all three modes of inference work in tandem to advance
> any moderately complex investigation.
>
> There's more information on the history and function
> of abductive inference in the following article:
>
> * Functional Logic : Inquiry and Analogy
>
> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Functional_Logic_:_Inquiry_and_Analogy
>
> See especially:
>
> * Section 1.2. Types of Reasoning in C.S. Peirce
>
> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Functional_Logic_:_Inquiry_and_Analogy#1.2._Types_of_Reasoning_in_C.S._Peirce
>
>
> * Section 1.4. Aristotle's “Apagogy” : Abductive Reasoning as Problem
> Reduction
>
> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Functional_Logic_:_Inquiry_and_Analogy#1.4._Aristotle.27s_.E2.80.9CApagogy.E2.80.9D_:_Abductive_Reasoning_as_Problem_Reduction
>
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> --
>
> academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
> my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
> inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
> oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, Inquiry

[Jerry Rhee]

oh and btw,

phi spiral abduction is for *everybody*...or at least for *all who
investigate*.

"Only everybody can know the truth."  ~Goethe
"The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who
investigate, is what we mean by the truth. and the object represented in
this opinion is the real." ~Peirce

Best,
Jerry Rhee



On Tue, Mar 1, 2016 at 6:28 PM, Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> wrote:

> :)
>
> Edwina,
> No worries...it's hard to go to something from nothing if one doesn't see
> the connection...even if there is something there, already.
>
> Best,
> Jerry
>
> On Tue, Mar 1, 2016 at 6:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> Jerry - I wouldn't dare analyze this, as the phi spiral abduction is a
>> specific analysis of yours and I haven't been following that thread. My
>> first 'abductive' response would be that the formation of a spiral is a
>> process of habit-formation, i.e., the formation of a hypothesis, a set of
>> rules. But again, I apologize but I haven't been following that thread.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> - Original Message -
>> *From:* Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com>
>> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>> *Cc:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> ; Peirce-L
>> <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
>> *Sent:* Tuesday, March 01, 2016 6:28 PM
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy,
>> Inquiry
>>
>> Hi Edwina,
>>
>> It clarifies.  For instance, what would you say is the 
>> "Object-as-it-is-meant-to-be-understood,
>> i.e., the dynamic object" in phi spiral abduction?
>>
>> Best,
>> Jerry Rhee
>>
>> On Tue, Mar 1, 2016 at 5:24 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> In reply to Gary, the reason I refer to Relation*s *in the plural  -
>>> and there are indeed those people who reject this [eg, John Deely I know!]
>>> - is because each of the three can function in a different modal category.
>>> I don't see how defining the semiosic triad as ONE Relation conveys this
>>> possibility.
>>>
>>> Furthermore, Pierce  himself refers to these relations in their
>>> particularity. For example, 'In respect to their relations to their dynamic
>>> objects" 8.335, Welby Signs and Categories,  where Peirce outlines that
>>> such a relation is defined as 'icon, index, symbol'. Then, he discusses "in
>>> regard to its relation to its signified Interpretant"..and such is defined
>>> as 'rheme, dicent, argument. And, the 'sign in itself' - a qualisign,
>>> sinsign, legisign'.
>>>
>>> Now, the triad itself, he terms 'triadic relation*s*', as in 'genuine
>>> triadic relations can never be built of dyadic relations'..1.346. The
>>> Categories in Detail. He refers here to 'three lines of identity...and
>>> 'triadic relations' 1.347. The Sign [that triad of three relations] is
>>> irreducible. It can't be built, as he says, of dyads. But - there are still
>>> three 'tails', three 'lines of identity', three interactions: that with the
>>> dynamic object; that of the representamen in itself, which means, with its
>>> habits; and that with the 'signified interpretant'.
>>>
>>> As for your quotation, and he writes similarly, in the Welby section,
>>> where "a sign is something by knowing which we know something more [8.332]
>>> and "A sign therefore is an object which is in relation to its object on
>>> the one hand and to an interpretant on the other, in such a way as to bring
>>> the interpretant into a relation to the object, corresponding to its own
>>> relation to the object' [8.332].
>>>
>>> The whole point of this process is to truthfully 'interpret' the object
>>> in itself. That is, not the object-as-it-is-represented (the immediate
>>> object) but the object-in-itself [the dynamic object]. This requires
>>> several Interpretants - including the Final Interpretant which can be
>>> understood as the Object-as-it-is-meant-to-be-understood, i.e., the dynamic
>>> object.  That is, the continuous semiosic process is a process of
>>> truth-gathering and truth-representation. And it can take time - many
>>> semiosic Signs - before one has arrived at that genuine Final Interpretant
>>> which corresponds to that Dynamic Object.
>>>
>>> Does this clarify or muddle?
>>>
>>> Edwina
>>>
>>>
>>> - Original Messa

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, Inquiry

[Jerry Rhee]

:)

Edwina,
No worries...it's hard to go to something from nothing if one doesn't see
the connection...even if there is something there, already.

Best,
Jerry

On Tue, Mar 1, 2016 at 6:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Jerry - I wouldn't dare analyze this, as the phi spiral abduction is a
> specific analysis of yours and I haven't been following that thread. My
> first 'abductive' response would be that the formation of a spiral is a
> process of habit-formation, i.e., the formation of a hypothesis, a set of
> rules. But again, I apologize but I haven't been following that thread.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com>
> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> *Cc:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> ; Peirce-L
> <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Sent:* Tuesday, March 01, 2016 6:28 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy,
> Inquiry
>
> Hi Edwina,
>
> It clarifies.  For instance, what would you say is the 
> "Object-as-it-is-meant-to-be-understood,
> i.e., the dynamic object" in phi spiral abduction?
>
> Best,
> Jerry Rhee
>
> On Tue, Mar 1, 2016 at 5:24 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> In reply to Gary, the reason I refer to Relation*s *in the plural  - and
>> there are indeed those people who reject this [eg, John Deely I know!] - is
>> because each of the three can function in a different modal category. I
>> don't see how defining the semiosic triad as ONE Relation conveys this
>> possibility.
>>
>> Furthermore, Pierce  himself refers to these relations in their
>> particularity. For example, 'In respect to their relations to their dynamic
>> objects" 8.335, Welby Signs and Categories,  where Peirce outlines that
>> such a relation is defined as 'icon, index, symbol'. Then, he discusses "in
>> regard to its relation to its signified Interpretant"..and such is defined
>> as 'rheme, dicent, argument. And, the 'sign in itself' - a qualisign,
>> sinsign, legisign'.
>>
>> Now, the triad itself, he terms 'triadic relation*s*', as in 'genuine
>> triadic relations can never be built of dyadic relations'..1.346. The
>> Categories in Detail. He refers here to 'three lines of identity...and
>> 'triadic relations' 1.347. The Sign [that triad of three relations] is
>> irreducible. It can't be built, as he says, of dyads. But - there are still
>> three 'tails', three 'lines of identity', three interactions: that with the
>> dynamic object; that of the representamen in itself, which means, with its
>> habits; and that with the 'signified interpretant'.
>>
>> As for your quotation, and he writes similarly, in the Welby section,
>> where "a sign is something by knowing which we know something more [8.332]
>> and "A sign therefore is an object which is in relation to its object on
>> the one hand and to an interpretant on the other, in such a way as to bring
>> the interpretant into a relation to the object, corresponding to its own
>> relation to the object' [8.332].
>>
>> The whole point of this process is to truthfully 'interpret' the object
>> in itself. That is, not the object-as-it-is-represented (the immediate
>> object) but the object-in-itself [the dynamic object]. This requires
>> several Interpretants - including the Final Interpretant which can be
>> understood as the Object-as-it-is-meant-to-be-understood, i.e., the dynamic
>> object.  That is, the continuous semiosic process is a process of
>> truth-gathering and truth-representation. And it can take time - many
>> semiosic Signs - before one has arrived at that genuine Final Interpretant
>> which corresponds to that Dynamic Object.
>>
>> Does this clarify or muddle?
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>> - Original Message -
>> *From:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
>> *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
>> *Sent:* Tuesday, March 01, 2016 4:42 PM
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy,
>> Inquiry
>>
>> Edwina, Frances, List,
>>
>> This may possible be, at least in part, something of a linguistic
>> dispute. If one sees the Representamen as 'sign' (one of Peirce's uses of
>> the term), then, one could argue that, say, a rhematic iconic qualisign
>> (sign 1 in the 10-fold sign classification) hasn't any meaning apart from
>> its embodiment in some actual (or potential) semiosis. But this, it seems
>> to me, is only the case in a strictly analytical or formal sens

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, Inquiry

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jerry - I wouldn't dare analyze this, as the phi spiral abduction is a specific 
analysis of yours and I haven't been following that thread. My first 
'abductive' response would be that the formation of a spiral is a process of 
habit-formation, i.e., the formation of a hypothesis, a set of rules. But 
again, I apologize but I haven't been following that thread. 

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Jerry Rhee 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: Gary Richmond ; Peirce-L 
  Sent: Tuesday, March 01, 2016 6:28 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, Inquiry


  Hi Edwina,


  It clarifies.  For instance, what would you say is the 
"Object-as-it-is-meant-to-be-understood, i.e., the dynamic object" in phi 
spiral abduction?


  Best,

  Jerry Rhee



  On Tue, Mar 1, 2016 at 5:24 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

In reply to Gary, the reason I refer to Relations in the plural  - and 
there are indeed those people who reject this [eg, John Deely I know!] - is 
because each of the three can function in a different modal category. I don't 
see how defining the semiosic triad as ONE Relation conveys this possibility. 

Furthermore, Pierce  himself refers to these relations in their 
particularity. For example, 'In respect to their relations to their dynamic 
objects" 8.335, Welby Signs and Categories,  where Peirce outlines that such a 
relation is defined as 'icon, index, symbol'. Then, he discusses "in regard to 
its relation to its signified Interpretant"..and such is defined as 'rheme, 
dicent, argument. And, the 'sign in itself' - a qualisign, sinsign, legisign'. 

Now, the triad itself, he terms 'triadic relations', as in 'genuine triadic 
relations can never be built of dyadic relations'..1.346. The Categories in 
Detail. He refers here to 'three lines of identity...and 'triadic relations' 
1.347. The Sign [that triad of three relations] is irreducible. It can't be 
built, as he says, of dyads. But - there are still three 'tails', three 'lines 
of identity', three interactions: that with the dynamic object; that of the 
representamen in itself, which means, with its habits; and that with the 
'signified interpretant'. 

As for your quotation, and he writes similarly, in the Welby section, where 
"a sign is something by knowing which we know something more [8.332] and "A 
sign therefore is an object which is in relation to its object on the one hand 
and to an interpretant on the other, in such a way as to bring the interpretant 
into a relation to the object, corresponding to its own relation to the object' 
[8.332]. 

The whole point of this process is to truthfully 'interpret' the object in 
itself. That is, not the object-as-it-is-represented (the immediate object) but 
the object-in-itself [the dynamic object]. This requires several Interpretants 
- including the Final Interpretant which can be understood as the 
Object-as-it-is-meant-to-be-understood, i.e., the dynamic object.  That is, the 
continuous semiosic process is a process of truth-gathering and 
truth-representation. And it can take time - many semiosic Signs - before one 
has arrived at that genuine Final Interpretant which corresponds to that 
Dynamic Object.

Does this clarify or muddle?

Edwina

  - Original Message - 
  From: Gary Richmond 
  To: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Tuesday, March 01, 2016 4:42 PM
      Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, 
Inquiry


  Edwina, Frances, List,


  This may possible be, at least in part, something of a linguistic 
dispute. If one sees the Representamen as 'sign' (one of Peirce's uses of the 
term), then, one could argue that, say, a rhematic iconic qualisign (sign 1 in 
the 10-fold sign classification) hasn't any meaning apart from its embodiment 
in some actual (or potential) semiosis. But this, it seems to me, is only the 
case in a strictly analytical or formal sense. 


  If, however,one employs 'sign' to mean the fullness of the triadic 
semiosis (another richer way in which Peirce employs the term), then as soon as 
an actual interpretant is involved, there is 'meaning' in some sense (at least 
in some primitive sense, for example, as even in Peirce's sunflower example 
which Edwina occasionally refers to). 


  I must admit that I still have some trouble with Edwina's requirement 
that a sign be defined as the three relations, "input/mediation/output" because 
that formulation doesn't seem to me to convey an essential characteristic of a 
Peircean sign (taken in the broader sense), namely, that the interpretant shall 
stand in the same relation to the object as the representamen itself stands. 
This again brings up the question of what constitutes a genuine triadic 
relation in Peircean semiotics; or, in a slighly different formulation, is it 
one relation or three? I recall that John Collier 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, Inquiry

[Jerry Rhee]

Hi Edwina,

It clarifies.  For instance, what would you say is the
"Object-as-it-is-meant-to-be-understood,
i.e., the dynamic object" in phi spiral abduction?

Best,
Jerry Rhee

On Tue, Mar 1, 2016 at 5:24 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> In reply to Gary, the reason I refer to Relation*s *in the plural  - and
> there are indeed those people who reject this [eg, John Deely I know!] - is
> because each of the three can function in a different modal category. I
> don't see how defining the semiosic triad as ONE Relation conveys this
> possibility.
>
> Furthermore, Pierce  himself refers to these relations in their
> particularity. For example, 'In respect to their relations to their dynamic
> objects" 8.335, Welby Signs and Categories,  where Peirce outlines that
> such a relation is defined as 'icon, index, symbol'. Then, he discusses "in
> regard to its relation to its signified Interpretant"..and such is defined
> as 'rheme, dicent, argument. And, the 'sign in itself' - a qualisign,
> sinsign, legisign'.
>
> Now, the triad itself, he terms 'triadic relation*s*', as in 'genuine
> triadic relations can never be built of dyadic relations'..1.346. The
> Categories in Detail. He refers here to 'three lines of identity...and
> 'triadic relations' 1.347. The Sign [that triad of three relations] is
> irreducible. It can't be built, as he says, of dyads. But - there are still
> three 'tails', three 'lines of identity', three interactions: that with the
> dynamic object; that of the representamen in itself, which means, with its
> habits; and that with the 'signified interpretant'.
>
> As for your quotation, and he writes similarly, in the Welby section,
> where "a sign is something by knowing which we know something more [8.332]
> and "A sign therefore is an object which is in relation to its object on
> the one hand and to an interpretant on the other, in such a way as to bring
> the interpretant into a relation to the object, corresponding to its own
> relation to the object' [8.332].
>
> The whole point of this process is to truthfully 'interpret' the object in
> itself. That is, not the object-as-it-is-represented (the immediate object)
> but the object-in-itself [the dynamic object]. This requires several
> Interpretants - including the Final Interpretant which can be understood as
> the Object-as-it-is-meant-to-be-understood, i.e., the dynamic object.  That
> is, the continuous semiosic process is a process of truth-gathering and
> truth-representation. And it can take time - many semiosic Signs - before
> one has arrived at that genuine Final Interpretant which corresponds to
> that Dynamic Object.
>
> Does this clarify or muddle?
>
> Edwina
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> *From:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Sent:* Tuesday, March 01, 2016 4:42 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy,
> Inquiry
>
> Edwina, Frances, List,
>
> This may possible be, at least in part, something of a linguistic dispute.
> If one sees the Representamen as 'sign' (one of Peirce's uses of the term),
> then, one could argue that, say, a rhematic iconic qualisign (sign 1 in the
> 10-fold sign classification) hasn't any meaning apart from its embodiment
> in some actual (or potential) semiosis. But this, it seems to me, is only
> the case in a strictly analytical or formal sense.
>
> If, however,one employs 'sign' to mean the fullness of the triadic
> semiosis (another richer way in which Peirce employs the term), then as
> soon as an *actual *interpretant is involved, *there is 'meaning'* in
> some sense (at least in some primitive sense, for example, as even in
> Peirce's sunflower example which Edwina occasionally refers to).
>
> I must admit that I still have some trouble with Edwina's requirement that
> a sign be defined as the *three* relations, "input/mediation/output*" 
> *because that
> formulation doesn't seem to me to convey an essential characteristic of a
> Peircean sign (taken in the broader sense), namely, that the interpretant
> shall stand in the same relation to the object as the representamen itself
> stands. This again brings up the question of what constitutes a *genuine
> triadic relation* in Peircean semiotics; or, in a slighly different
> formulation, is it one relation or three? I recall that John Collier and
> others on this list, including me, have argued that it is *one genuine
> triadic* relation, and that seeing semiosis--especially in consideration
> of its continuity--as three relations (such as input/ mediation/ output)
> suggests a kind of linear and, indeed, dyadic characte

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, Inquiry

[Edwina Taborsky]

In reply to Gary, the reason I refer to Relations in the plural  - and there 
are indeed those people who reject this [eg, John Deely I know!] - is because 
each of the three can function in a different modal category. I don't see how 
defining the semiosic triad as ONE Relation conveys this possibility. 

Furthermore, Pierce  himself refers to these relations in their particularity. 
For example, 'In respect to their relations to their dynamic objects" 8.335, 
Welby Signs and Categories,  where Peirce outlines that such a relation is 
defined as 'icon, index, symbol'. Then, he discusses "in regard to its relation 
to its signified Interpretant"..and such is defined as 'rheme, dicent, 
argument. And, the 'sign in itself' - a qualisign, sinsign, legisign'. 

Now, the triad itself, he terms 'triadic relations', as in 'genuine triadic 
relations can never be built of dyadic relations'..1.346. The Categories in 
Detail. He refers here to 'three lines of identity...and 'triadic relations' 
1.347. The Sign [that triad of three relations] is irreducible. It can't be 
built, as he says, of dyads. But - there are still three 'tails', three 'lines 
of identity', three interactions: that with the dynamic object; that of the 
representamen in itself, which means, with its habits; and that with the 
'signified interpretant'. 

As for your quotation, and he writes similarly, in the Welby section, where "a 
sign is something by knowing which we know something more [8.332] and "A sign 
therefore is an object which is in relation to its object on the one hand and 
to an interpretant on the other, in such a way as to bring the interpretant 
into a relation to the object, corresponding to its own relation to the object' 
[8.332]. 

The whole point of this process is to truthfully 'interpret' the object in 
itself. That is, not the object-as-it-is-represented (the immediate object) but 
the object-in-itself [the dynamic object]. This requires several Interpretants 
- including the Final Interpretant which can be understood as the 
Object-as-it-is-meant-to-be-understood, i.e., the dynamic object.  That is, the 
continuous semiosic process is a process of truth-gathering and 
truth-representation. And it can take time - many semiosic Signs - before one 
has arrived at that genuine Final Interpretant which corresponds to that 
Dynamic Object.

Does this clarify or muddle?

Edwina

  - Original Message - 
  From: Gary Richmond 
  To: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Tuesday, March 01, 2016 4:42 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, Inquiry


  Edwina, Frances, List,


  This may possible be, at least in part, something of a linguistic dispute. If 
one sees the Representamen as 'sign' (one of Peirce's uses of the term), then, 
one could argue that, say, a rhematic iconic qualisign (sign 1 in the 10-fold 
sign classification) hasn't any meaning apart from its embodiment in some 
actual (or potential) semiosis. But this, it seems to me, is only the case in a 
strictly analytical or formal sense. 


  If, however,one employs 'sign' to mean the fullness of the triadic semiosis 
(another richer way in which Peirce employs the term), then as soon as an 
actual interpretant is involved, there is 'meaning' in some sense (at least in 
some primitive sense, for example, as even in Peirce's sunflower example which 
Edwina occasionally refers to). 


  I must admit that I still have some trouble with Edwina's requirement that a 
sign be defined as the three relations, "input/mediation/output" because that 
formulation doesn't seem to me to convey an essential characteristic of a 
Peircean sign (taken in the broader sense), namely, that the interpretant shall 
stand in the same relation to the object as the representamen itself stands. 
This again brings up the question of what constitutes a genuine triadic 
relation in Peircean semiotics; or, in a slighly different formulation, is it 
one relation or three? I recall that John Collier and others on this list, 
including me, have argued that it is one genuine triadic relation, and that 
seeing semiosis--especially in consideration of its continuity--as three 
relations (such as input/ mediation/ output) suggests a kind of linear and, 
indeed, dyadic character. Perhaps I'm just not seeing this clearly enough, so 
I'm simply ask you, Edwina, does your "three relations" model square with 
Peirce's seeming insistence that 
…a sign is something, A, which brings something, B, its interpretant sign 
determined or created by it, into the same sort of correspondence with 
something, C, its object, as that in which itself stands to C. (emphasis added. 
NEM 4:20-1 in the Commens dictionary)



  and if so, how does it?


  I do agree with Edwina that talk of a 'sign vehicle' 'bearing' some 'sign 
object' smacks perhaps of semiology, but perhaps even more so of Morris' 
syntactics (I believe it was Morris who introduced the t

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, Inquiry

[Jerry Rhee]

lisign (sign 1 in the
> 10-fold sign classification) hasn't any meaning apart from its embodiment
> in some actual (or potential) semiosis. But this, it seems to me, is only
> the case in a strictly analytical or formal sense.
>
> If, however,one employs 'sign' to mean the fullness of the triadic
> semiosis (another richer way in which Peirce employs the term), then as
> soon as an *actual *interpretant is involved, *there is 'meaning'* in
> some sense (at least in some primitive sense, for example, as even in
> Peirce's sunflower example which Edwina occasionally refers to).
>
> I must admit that I still have some trouble with Edwina's requirement that
> a sign be defined as the *three* relations, "input/mediation/output*" 
> *because that
> formulation doesn't seem to me to convey an essential characteristic of a
> Peircean sign (taken in the broader sense), namely, that the interpretant
> shall stand in the same relation to the object as the representamen itself
> stands. This again brings up the question of what constitutes a *genuine
> triadic relation* in Peircean semiotics; or, in a slighly different
> formulation, is it one relation or three? I recall that John Collier and
> others on this list, including me, have argued that it is *one genuine
> triadic* relation, and that seeing semiosis--especially in consideration
> of its continuity--as three relations (such as input/ mediation/ output)
> suggests a kind of linear and, indeed, dyadic character. Perhaps I'm just
> not seeing this clearly enough, so I'm simply ask you, Edwina, does your
> "three relations" model square with Peirce's seeming insistence that
>
> …a sign is something, *A*, which brings something, *B*, its *interpretant* 
> sign
> determined or created by it, *into the same sort of correspondence with
> something, C, its object, as that in which itself stands to C*. (emphasis
> added. NEM 4:20-1 in the *Commens* dictionary)
>
>
> and if so, how does it?
>
> I do agree with Edwina that talk of a 'sign vehicle' 'bearing' some 'sign
> object' smacks perhaps of semiology, but perhaps even more so of Morris'
> syntactics (I believe it was Morris who introduced the term "sign vehicle"
> into semiotics).
>
> Best,
>
> Gary
>
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *C 745*
> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
>
> On Tue, Mar 1, 2016 at 2:35 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> Frances - I don't consider your outline as Peircean semiosis but as
>> semiology, where an object is a sign only when it REFERS TO something else.
>> That's dyadic, and views the Sign as simply a kind of metaphor of something
>> else.  That's not, in my view, Peirce.
>>
>> My view is that the object itself, in its own composition, exists as a
>> Sign. It is a triadic process. A Sign is a unit of matter/energy that
>> exists as a Form in interaction with other Forms. There must be a triadic
>> set of Relations: input/mediation/output. Without that triad - it's not a
>> Sign.
>>
>> Nothing exists 'per se' on its own in isolation but is networked with
>> other matter - whether it be one molecule interacting with another
>> molecule, one cell with another cell; one sound with another sound. It is
>> this continuity of Form which enables this continuity of Connections [see
>> Peirce's outline of the development of habits' [1.412 A guess at the
>> riddle].  This is the process of semiosis - that continuous formulation of
>> discrete units formed within a habit, which are in interaction with other
>> discrete units. As formed and networked, [which is not at all similar to
>> referencing] they are therefore 'meaningful'.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>> - Original Message - From: <frances.ke...@sympatico.ca>
>> To: "'Peirce List'" <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
>> Sent: Tuesday, March 01, 2016 1:57 PM
>> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy,
>> Inquiry
>>
>>
>> Frances to Edwina and Listers--- You partly stated in effect recently
>> that a sign "is" meaning, and that if a sign "has" no meaning then it is
>> not a sign, but is say mere noise. This seems wrong to me from a Peircean
>> stance, but perhaps others here can clarify the jargon and with some
>> references. My grasp of the matter is that in semiosis a "sign vehicle"
>> (like say even just noise) is an ordinary object that at least represents
>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, Inquiry

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, Frances, List,

This may possible be, at least in part, something of a linguistic dispute.
If one sees the Representamen as 'sign' (one of Peirce's uses of the term),
then, one could argue that, say, a rhematic iconic qualisign (sign 1 in the
10-fold sign classification) hasn't any meaning apart from its embodiment
in some actual (or potential) semiosis. But this, it seems to me, is only
the case in a strictly analytical or formal sense.

If, however,one employs 'sign' to mean the fullness of the triadic semiosis
(another richer way in which Peirce employs the term), then as soon as
an *actual
*interpretant is involved, *there is 'meaning'* in some sense (at least in
some primitive sense, for example, as even in Peirce's sunflower example
which Edwina occasionally refers to).

I must admit that I still have some trouble with Edwina's requirement that
a sign be defined as the *three* relations, "input/mediation/output*"
*because that
formulation doesn't seem to me to convey an essential characteristic of a
Peircean sign (taken in the broader sense), namely, that the interpretant
shall stand in the same relation to the object as the representamen itself
stands. This again brings up the question of what constitutes a *genuine
triadic relation* in Peircean semiotics; or, in a slighly different
formulation, is it one relation or three? I recall that John Collier and
others on this list, including me, have argued that it is *one genuine
triadic* relation, and that seeing semiosis--especially in consideration of
its continuity--as three relations (such as input/ mediation/ output)
suggests a kind of linear and, indeed, dyadic character. Perhaps I'm just
not seeing this clearly enough, so I'm simply ask you, Edwina, does your
"three relations" model square with Peirce's seeming insistence that

…a sign is something, *A*, which brings something, *B*, its *interpretant* sign
determined or created by it, *into the same sort of correspondence with
something, C, its object, as that in which itself stands to C*. (emphasis
added. NEM 4:20-1 in the *Commens* dictionary)


and if so, how does it?

I do agree with Edwina that talk of a 'sign vehicle' 'bearing' some 'sign
object' smacks perhaps of semiology, but perhaps even more so of Morris'
syntactics (I believe it was Morris who introduced the term "sign vehicle"
into semiotics).

Best,

Gary


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*

On Tue, Mar 1, 2016 at 2:35 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Frances - I don't consider your outline as Peircean semiosis but as
> semiology, where an object is a sign only when it REFERS TO something else.
> That's dyadic, and views the Sign as simply a kind of metaphor of something
> else.  That's not, in my view, Peirce.
>
> My view is that the object itself, in its own composition, exists as a
> Sign. It is a triadic process. A Sign is a unit of matter/energy that
> exists as a Form in interaction with other Forms. There must be a triadic
> set of Relations: input/mediation/output. Without that triad - it's not a
> Sign.
>
> Nothing exists 'per se' on its own in isolation but is networked with
> other matter - whether it be one molecule interacting with another
> molecule, one cell with another cell; one sound with another sound. It is
> this continuity of Form which enables this continuity of Connections [see
> Peirce's outline of the development of habits' [1.412 A guess at the
> riddle].  This is the process of semiosis - that continuous formulation of
> discrete units formed within a habit, which are in interaction with other
> discrete units. As formed and networked, [which is not at all similar to
> referencing] they are therefore 'meaningful'.
>
> Edwina
>
>
> - Original Message - From: <frances.ke...@sympatico.ca>
> To: "'Peirce List'" <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> Sent: Tuesday, March 01, 2016 1:57 PM
> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy,
> Inquiry
>
>
> Frances to Edwina and Listers--- You partly stated in effect recently that
> a sign "is" meaning, and that if a sign "has" no meaning then it is not a
> sign, but is say mere noise. This seems wrong to me from a Peircean stance,
> but perhaps others here can clarify the jargon and with some references. My
> grasp of the matter is that in semiosis a "sign vehicle" (like say even
> just noise) is an ordinary object that at least represents some other
> referred object and to some interpreted effect, and to any kind of signer.
> In other words, the "sign vehicle" must informatively "bear" some "sign
> object" for some

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, Inquiry

[Martin Kettelhut]

One reason to appreciate the Abduction-Deduction-Induction distinction Peirce 
derives from Aristotle is because it puts us in a different reality from the 
one promulgated by Analytic Philosophy.  

Analytic Philosophy supposes a reality of determinate logical atoms; and finds 
it challenging to determine them, given the different modes of being implicated 
by the various kinds of inference we use.  

Whereas for Peirce, the results of real Abductions-Deductions-Inductions are 
real Possibilities-Necessities-Potentialities.  

“A logical atom, then, like a point in space, would involve for its precise 
determination an endless process. We can only say, in a general way, that a 
term, however determinate, may be more determinate still, but not that it can 
be made absolutely determinate." (CP3.93)  

The pragmaticist's reality is a continuum of modes of being, generally, and 
with regard to any given phenomenon.

Martin Kettelhut, PhD
www.listeningisthekey.com
303 747 4449



> On Mar 1, 2016, at 1:35 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
> 
> Frances - I don't consider your outline as Peircean semiosis but as 
> semiology, where an object is a sign only when it REFERS TO something else. 
> That's dyadic, and views the Sign as simply a kind of metaphor of something 
> else.  That's not, in my view, Peirce.
> 
> My view is that the object itself, in its own composition, exists as a Sign. 
> It is a triadic process. A Sign is a unit of matter/energy that exists as a 
> Form in interaction with other Forms. There must be a triadic set of 
> Relations: input/mediation/output. Without that triad - it's not a Sign.
> 
> Nothing exists 'per se' on its own in isolation but is networked with other 
> matter - whether it be one molecule interacting with another molecule, one 
> cell with another cell; one sound with another sound. It is this continuity 
> of Form which enables this continuity of Connections [see Peirce's outline of 
> the development of habits' [1.412 A guess at the riddle].  This is the 
> process of semiosis - that continuous formulation of discrete units formed 
> within a habit, which are in interaction with other discrete units. As formed 
> and networked, [which is not at all similar to referencing] they are 
> therefore 'meaningful'.
> 
> Edwina
> 
> 
> - Original Message - From: <frances.ke...@sympatico.ca>
> To: "'Peirce List'" <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> Sent: Tuesday, March 01, 2016 1:57 PM
> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, Inquiry
> 
> 
> Frances to Edwina and Listers--- You partly stated in effect recently that a 
> sign "is" meaning, and that if a sign "has" no meaning then it is not a sign, 
> but is say mere noise. This seems wrong to me from a Peircean stance, but 
> perhaps others here can clarify the jargon and with some references. My grasp 
> of the matter is that in semiosis a "sign vehicle" (like say even just noise) 
> is an ordinary object that at least represents some other referred object and 
> to some interpreted effect, and to any kind of signer. In other words, the 
> "sign vehicle" must informatively "bear" some "sign object" for some "sign 
> effect" to be a sign overall, but that the "sign vehicle" need not "yield" or 
> "endure" any meaning at all to be such a sign, even if it may or can or will 
> "yield" some meaning to an able signer. Any meaningless sign might therefore 
> be a crude sign or not much of a sign, but it will in any event be a sign to 
> some degree.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> -
>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to 
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>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> 
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
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> 
> 
> 
> 


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, Inquiry

[frances.kelly]

Frances to Edwina and Listers--- 
You partly stated in effect recently that a sign "is" meaning, and that if a 
sign "has" no meaning then it is not a sign, but is say mere noise. This seems 
wrong to me from a Peircean stance, but perhaps others here can clarify the 
jargon and with some references. My grasp of the matter is that in semiosis a 
"sign vehicle" (like say even just noise) is an ordinary object that at least 
represents some other referred object and to some interpreted effect, and to 
any kind of signer. In other words, the "sign vehicle" must informatively 
"bear" some "sign object" for some "sign effect" to be a sign overall, but that 
the "sign vehicle" need not "yield" or "endure" any meaning at all to be such a 
sign, even if it may or can or will "yield" some meaning to an able signer. Any 
meaningless sign might therefore be a crude sign or not much of a sign, but it 
will in any event be a sign to some degree. 



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, Inquiry

[Jerry Rhee]

Hi everyone,



If you read CP 5.189 with logographic necessity (where “every part of the
written speech must be necessary for the whole… (where) nothing is
accidental…where everything is necessary at the place where it occurs”
~Strauss), that is, the form abduction *ought* to take (Peirce), then abduction
is a formal method to transform genuine doubt about a perceptual judgment
(surprise, suspect, matter of course) using triadic relations (C, A, B;
esthetics, ethics, logic).  It is also a recognition and response to
certain expected patterns of political conflict (c.f., first line of
Fixation of Belief and A Guess at the Riddle).  Peirce was, in that sense,
an exoteric writer.



A Sign can be a first, a second or a third.  A meaning is a third for the
utterer or interpreter and not the commens.  So a Sign can be a meaning but
it can also be something other than meaning; especially to new inquirers
entering inquiry.



I consider Inference to the Best Explanation as the concluding part of the
First Stage of Inquiry, not the beginning.   Selecting the best explanation
has to operate in context of relieving a genuine doubt, preceded by problem
framing (abduction) and deduction of different possibilities.  There is
always the possibility that you might be choosing from a bad lot, so one
should be clear about the relevance relation.  Importantly, IBE mitigates
importance of the thumotic component, the spiritedeness that seeks to rein
in the multiplicity into simplicity in an earnest way.  That is, that of
First is so tender you cannot touch it without spoiling it.



Best,

Jerry Rhee

On Tue, Mar 1, 2016 at 11:56 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:

> Post : Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, Inquiry : 7
>
> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/03/01/abduction-deduction-induction-analogy-inquiry-7/
> Date : March 1, 2016 at 12:34 pm
>
> Peircers,
>
> Here's another issue I thought had been cleared up
> a long time ago but I find is still causing confusion,
> the distinction between Peirce's concept of abduction
> and Gilbert Harman's “inference to the best explanation”.
>
> Re: Peter Woit ( http://www.math.columbia.edu/~woit/ )
> • Beyond Experiment ( http://www.math.columbia.edu/~woit/wordpress/?p=8323
> )
>
> The phrase “inference to the best explanation” was coined by
> Gilbert Harman in his attempt to explain abductive inference
> but it conveys the wrong impression to anyone who takes it
> as a substitute for the whole course of inquiry rather than
> just its starting point.  Peirce himself was always very
> clear about this.
>
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> --
>
> academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
> my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
> inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
> oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, Inquiry

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jerry - but a Sign IS meaning. If a sign has no meaning then it isn't a 
sign. It's noise.


With regard to your 'meta-language' doesn't that have some similarity to 
General Terms, which do allow multiple CONTEXT-based meanings?


You note that chemical symbols and propositions are particular. But is a 
symbol- let's say a rhematic symbolic legisign - is it particular? Or is it 
an 'iconic image of a universal'...a possible example would be the Sign of 
'O' where that letter is the general term for oxygen.


Edwina

- Original Message - 
From: "Jerry LR Chandler" <jerry_lr_chand...@me.com>

To: "Peirce List" <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Cc: "Määttänen Kirsti" <kirst...@saunalahti.fi>
Sent: Tuesday, March 01, 2016 11:02 AM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, 
Inquiry



List, Kirsti:

Interesting perspective!

May I extend your insight a bit? In a more general tone, it is not merely 
the meaning of daily communication, but the meanings of daily communications 
as well as logical, mathematical, chemical and other forms of scientific 
communication.


The critical obstacle to the consistency of meanings of communication across 
multiple disciplines was his views of chemistry.  He sought to remodel the 
logic and mathematics of his day in such a way as to be consistent with his 
personal experiences in the chemical laboratory, the language of elements, 
molecules and valence, and the diagrammatic logic of chemistry.  Chemistry 
was his scientific “mother tongue”.


He had some success in mathematics of relatives and logical diagrams. But, 
the inconsistencies of the meaning of chemical language, chemical symbols 
and chemical diagrams with the meaning of daily communication remains today.


Eventually (ca. 1930’s), Tarski introduced the concept and logic of 
“meta-languages” which facilitates improved communications among the logical 
disciplines and provides pathways for comparing the meanings of logical 
terms.  Tarski’s method of communication within meta-languages allows for 
MULTIPLE exact meaning for logical terms, depending on constraints and 
contexts. (see Malatesta, The Primary Logic (1999?)


An example of the meaning I seek to communicate here is the logic of 
relatives as counts or numbers.
The meaning of the concept of an integer can be context dependent - as a 
simple count of objects, as an ordinal number and as atomic numbers, 
representing both an ordinal and cardinal numbers as well as the mereology 
of the electrical counts of both the positive and negative charges.


While this example is only one of many possible examples of the logic of 
relatives, it is a critical one because the meaning of a number is central 
to nearly all scientific units of measurement - such as in quantum physics, 
quantum chemistry and thermodynamics.


I think that we agree that the nature of meaning is one of the central 
issues in all of philosophy.  As you note, CSP’s approach to meaning 
develops slowly over the course of decades as he struggles to incorporate 
the meaning of chemical facts into a broader perspective, relying on 
metaphors related to chemical phenomenology.  Today, we understand, at a 
very deep level, how his chemical premises were insufficient to bridge the 
“meaning gap”.  Chemical symbols and chemical propositions are necessarily 
particular.


Cheers

Jerry



On Mar 1, 2016, at 7:39 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:

List, Jerry, Stephen,

It seems to be commonly assumed that CSP created a theory of signs. - 
Well, amongst other things, he did. - But it was not what he was after. - 
He was after a theory, or rather a method and methodogy of finding out 
meanings.
By the end of 1800, there was a kind of mania to classification - and 
standardisation. - CSP was not immunune to that.
Still, to reave what he achieved, the focus has to remain in his later 
works, after 1900.

It was not about signs, it was about meaning.
Kirsti

Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 27.2.2016 23:12:

List, Stephen:

On 2/26/2016 5:38 PM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:
> I see abduction as guessing (and approved by CP), induction as having 
> some
> evidence but less than deduction which is fallible but the best we can 
> do
> to prove something. I have been cautioned against writing brief notes 
> to

> the list. Cheers, S
>

Have you considered the difference that distinguishes constrained
guessing from mere indexing the possibilities in one’s mind and
randomly choosing a member of the index as a guess?
Is that you mental image of CSP’s usage of the term “abduction” in logic?
If so, then I suggest you are missing a critical component of CSP’s
description of how to interpret signs in relation to its deictic
actions.
In CSP’s view, a sign necessarily has both denotative and connotative
actions; the capabilities of the observer may constrain his (her)
interpretative capacities to one set of indices or another set 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, Inquiry

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Kirsti:

Interesting perspective!

May I extend your insight a bit? In a more general tone, it is not merely the 
meaning of daily communication, but the meanings of daily communications as 
well as logical, mathematical, chemical and other forms of scientific 
communication. 

The critical obstacle to the consistency of meanings of communication across 
multiple disciplines was his views of chemistry.  He sought to remodel the 
logic and mathematics of his day in such a way as to be consistent with his 
personal experiences in the chemical laboratory, the language of elements, 
molecules and valence, and the diagrammatic logic of chemistry.  Chemistry was 
his scientific “mother tongue”.

He had some success in mathematics of relatives and logical diagrams. But, the 
inconsistencies of the meaning of chemical language, chemical symbols and 
chemical diagrams with the meaning of daily communication remains today.

Eventually (ca. 1930’s), Tarski introduced the concept and logic of 
“meta-languages” which facilitates improved communications among the logical 
disciplines and provides pathways for comparing the meanings of logical terms.  
Tarski’s method of communication within meta-languages allows for MULTIPLE 
exact meaning for logical terms, depending on constraints and contexts. (see 
Malatesta, The Primary Logic (1999?)

An example of the meaning I seek to communicate here is the logic of relatives 
as counts or numbers.
The meaning of the concept of an integer can be context dependent - as a simple 
count of objects, as an ordinal number and as atomic numbers, representing both 
an ordinal and cardinal numbers as well as the mereology of the electrical 
counts of both the positive and negative charges. 

While this example is only one of many possible examples of the logic of 
relatives, it is a critical one because the meaning of a number is central to 
nearly all scientific units of measurement - such as in quantum physics, 
quantum chemistry and thermodynamics. 

I think that we agree that the nature of meaning is one of the central issues 
in all of philosophy.  As you note, CSP’s approach to meaning develops slowly 
over the course of decades as he struggles to incorporate the meaning of 
chemical facts into a broader perspective, relying on metaphors related to 
chemical phenomenology.  Today, we understand, at a very deep level, how his 
chemical premises were insufficient to bridge the “meaning gap”.  Chemical 
symbols and chemical propositions are necessarily particular.

Cheers

Jerry


> On Mar 1, 2016, at 7:39 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:
> 
> List, Jerry, Stephen,
> 
> It seems to be commonly assumed that CSP created a theory of signs. - Well, 
> amongst other things, he did. - But it was not what he was after. - He was 
> after a theory, or rather a method and methodogy of finding out meanings.
> By the end of 1800, there was a kind of mania to classification - and 
> standardisation. - CSP was not immunune to that.
> Still, to reave what he achieved, the focus has to remain in his later works, 
> after 1900.
> It was not about signs, it was about meaning.
> Kirsti
> 
> Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 27.2.2016 23:12:
>> List, Stephen:
>>> On 2/26/2016 5:38 PM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:
>>> > I see abduction as guessing (and approved by CP), induction as having some
>>> > evidence but less than deduction which is fallible but the best we can do
>>> > to prove something. I have been cautioned against writing brief notes to
>>> > the list. Cheers, S
>>> >
>> Have you considered the difference that distinguishes constrained
>> guessing from mere indexing the possibilities in one’s mind and
>> randomly choosing a member of the index as a guess?
>> Is that you mental image of CSP’s usage of the term “abduction” in logic?
>> If so, then I suggest you are missing a critical component of CSP’s
>> description of how to interpret signs in relation to its deictic
>> actions.
>> In CSP’s view, a sign necessarily has both denotative and connotative
>> actions; the capabilities of the observer may constrain his (her)
>> interpretative capacities to one set of indices or another set of
>> indices, depending on the prior experiences.  The nature of the index
>> assigned to a sinsign is a personal choice of the individual observer
>> of the sign, is it not?  And, the form of the index itself may include
>> ethical and moral values, can it not?
>> In one field of inquiry, the indices from the sinsign, qualisigns and
>> legisigns may generate a discrete set of abductive choices.  CSP named
>> these choices the dicisigns.  The choices are, in modern terminology,
>> cybernetic choices in that they form a circular argument with a
>> bounded set of symbols, legisigns and sinsigns.  These choices can
>> also be expressed as logical diagrams in CSP assertions about logical
>> systems.
>> Cheers
>> Jerry
> 


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PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, Inquiry

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Stephen:

> 
> On 2/26/2016 5:38 PM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:
> > I see abduction as guessing (and approved by CP), induction as having some
> > evidence but less than deduction which is fallible but the best we can do
> > to prove something. I have been cautioned against writing brief notes to
> > the list. Cheers, S
> >

Have you considered the difference that distinguishes constrained guessing from 
mere indexing the possibilities in one’s mind and randomly choosing a member of 
the index as a guess?

Is that you mental image of CSP’s usage of the term “abduction” in formal 
logics?

If so, then I suggest you have missed the basic elements of CSP’s description 
of how to interpret signs in relation to its deictic actions.

In CSP’s view, a sign necessarily has both denotative and connotative actions; 
the capabilities of the observer may constrain his (her) interpretative 
capacities to one set of indices or another set of indices, depending on the 
prior experiences.  The nature of the index assigned to a sinsign is a personal 
choice of the individual observer of the sign, is it not?  And, the form of the 
index itself may include ethical and moral values, can it not? 

In one field of inquiry, the indices from the sinsign, qualisigns and legisigns 
may generate a discrete set of abductive choices.  CSP named these choices the 
dicisigns.  The choices are, in modern terminology, cybernetic choices in that 
they form a circular argument with a bounded set of symbols, legisigns and 
sinsigns.  These choices can also be expressed as logical diagrams in CSP 
assertions about logical systems.

Cheers

Jerry
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, Inquiry

[kirstima]

List, Jerry, Stephen,

It seems to be commonly assumed that CSP created a theory of signs. - 
Well, amongst other things, he did. - But it was not what he was after. 
- He was after a theory, or rather a method and methodogy of finding out 
meanings.


By the end of 1800, there was a kind of mania to classification - and 
standardisation. - CSP was not immunune to that.


Still, to reave what he achieved, the focus has to remain in his later 
works, after 1900.


It was not about signs, it was about meaning.

Kirsti

Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 27.2.2016 23:12:

List, Stephen:



On 2/26/2016 5:38 PM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:
> I see abduction as guessing (and approved by CP), induction as having some
> evidence but less than deduction which is fallible but the best we can do
> to prove something. I have been cautioned against writing brief notes to
> the list. Cheers, S
>


Have you considered the difference that distinguishes constrained
guessing from mere indexing the possibilities in one’s mind and
randomly choosing a member of the index as a guess?

Is that you mental image of CSP’s usage of the term “abduction” in 
logic?


If so, then I suggest you are missing a critical component of CSP’s
description of how to interpret signs in relation to its deictic
actions.

In CSP’s view, a sign necessarily has both denotative and connotative
actions; the capabilities of the observer may constrain his (her)
interpretative capacities to one set of indices or another set of
indices, depending on the prior experiences.  The nature of the index
assigned to a sinsign is a personal choice of the individual observer
of the sign, is it not?  And, the form of the index itself may include
ethical and moral values, can it not?

In one field of inquiry, the indices from the sinsign, qualisigns and
legisigns may generate a discrete set of abductive choices.  CSP named
these choices the dicisigns.  The choices are, in modern terminology,
cybernetic choices in that they form a circular argument with a
bounded set of symbols, legisigns and sinsigns.  These choices can
also be expressed as logical diagrams in CSP assertions about logical
systems.

Cheers

Jerry



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