Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, John
In response to your narrative, 
I think that formal mathematic logic is stronger than mere analogy.
Cheers
Jerry

Sent from my iPhone

> On Oct 25, 2017, at 5:04 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:
> 
> Thank you, John, for clearing the issue. I wholly agree.  By the way, using 
> the term 'universe' is fine with me.
> 
> Kirsti
> 
> John F Sowa kirjoitti 20.10.2017 00:03:
>> Kirsti and Gary R,
>>> Resorting to Quine cannot be taken as any starter.
>> My note was based on three lines by Peirce, which Quine summarized
>> in just one line.  If a reference to Quine is offensive, I'll
>> restate the issues in terms of passages by Peirce that Gary cited:
>> 1901 | Individual | CP 3.613
>>> ...whatever exists is individual, since existence (not reality)
>>> and individuality are essentially the same thing...
>> 1902 | Minute Logic: Chapter IV. Ethics (Logic IV) | CP 6.349
>>> Existence [...] is a special mode of reality, which, whatever other
>>> characteristics it possesses, has that of being absolutely determinate.
>> 1905 [c.] | The Basis of Pragmaticism | MS [R] 280:36-7
>>> ...the term existence is properly a term, not of logic, but of
>>> metaphysics; and metaphysically understood, an object exists, if
>>> and only if, it reacts with every other existing object of the same
>>> universe. But in the definition of a logical proper name, exist is
>>> used in its logical sense, and means merely to be a singular of
>>> a logical universe, or universe of discourse.
>> The first four lines of the 1905 passage discuss existence in
>> a metaphysical sense.  The last three lines state the equivalent
>> of Quine's dictum:
>> In Peirce's algebraic notation, "the definition of a logical proper
>> name" means that it appears as the name that follows a quantifier.
>> In his existential graphs, it means that the name is assigned to
>> the referent of a line of identity.
>> The last two lines say that "exist" means "to be a singular of
>> a logical universe, or universe of discourse".  If you object to
>> the word 'universe', replace it with the word 'domain'.
>> Quine stated exactly the same point in one line by saying "To be is
>> to be the value [referent] of a quantified variable."
>> I quoted the one-line version only because it's shorter and simpler.
>> But if you object to Quine, then use Peirce's definition.
>>> Existence means something very different to Quine than to CSP.
>> I agree.  Peirce distinguished the metaphysical sense from the
>> logical sense.  That enabled him to talk about a domain of
>> possibilities, which may be referenced by a quantified variable.
>> As a nominalist, Quine only allowed a single domain, which corresponds
>> to Peirce's metaphysical existence.  Therefore Quine equated existence
>> in the physical universe with reality.  Quine never used modal logic,
>> metalanguage, or higher-order logic.  And he was strongly opposed to
>> any talk about real possibilities.
>> Although mentioning Quine was a distraction, I think that this
>> discussion can help clarify the distinction between Peirce's
>> realism and Quine's nominalism.
>> In short, Peirce allowed multiple universes (or domains), but
>> Quine allowed only one universe (or domain).
>> John
> 
> 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[kirstima]

Thank you, John, for clearing the issue. I wholly agree.  By the way, 
using the term 'universe' is fine with me.


Kirsti

John F Sowa kirjoitti 20.10.2017 00:03:

Kirsti and Gary R,


Resorting to Quine cannot be taken as any starter.


My note was based on three lines by Peirce, which Quine summarized
in just one line.  If a reference to Quine is offensive, I'll
restate the issues in terms of passages by Peirce that Gary cited:

1901 | Individual | CP 3.613

...whatever exists is individual, since existence (not reality)
and individuality are essentially the same thing...


1902 | Minute Logic: Chapter IV. Ethics (Logic IV) | CP 6.349

Existence [...] is a special mode of reality, which, whatever other
characteristics it possesses, has that of being absolutely 
determinate.


1905 [c.] | The Basis of Pragmaticism | MS [R] 280:36-7

...the term existence is properly a term, not of logic, but of
metaphysics; and metaphysically understood, an object exists, if
and only if, it reacts with every other existing object of the same
universe. But in the definition of a logical proper name, exist is
used in its logical sense, and means merely to be a singular of
a logical universe, or universe of discourse.


The first four lines of the 1905 passage discuss existence in
a metaphysical sense.  The last three lines state the equivalent
of Quine's dictum:

In Peirce's algebraic notation, "the definition of a logical proper
name" means that it appears as the name that follows a quantifier.
In his existential graphs, it means that the name is assigned to
the referent of a line of identity.

The last two lines say that "exist" means "to be a singular of
a logical universe, or universe of discourse".  If you object to
the word 'universe', replace it with the word 'domain'.

Quine stated exactly the same point in one line by saying "To be is
to be the value [referent] of a quantified variable."

I quoted the one-line version only because it's shorter and simpler.
But if you object to Quine, then use Peirce's definition.


Existence means something very different to Quine than to CSP.


I agree.  Peirce distinguished the metaphysical sense from the
logical sense.  That enabled him to talk about a domain of
possibilities, which may be referenced by a quantified variable.

As a nominalist, Quine only allowed a single domain, which corresponds
to Peirce's metaphysical existence.  Therefore Quine equated existence
in the physical universe with reality.  Quine never used modal logic,
metalanguage, or higher-order logic.  And he was strongly opposed to
any talk about real possibilities.

Although mentioning Quine was a distraction, I think that this
discussion can help clarify the distinction between Peirce's
realism and Quine's nominalism.

In short, Peirce allowed multiple universes (or domains), but
Quine allowed only one universe (or domain).

John



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary F, John S, List,

In the second Lecture, Peirce is providing relatively informal explanations of 
the starting points for the EG. If these explanations were to be cast in a more 
rigorous way, how might we characterize each of the starting assumptions?

In his monograph, Don Roberts characterizes the first three conventions in the 
following way:

Conventions
CI. The sheet of assertion in all of its parts is a graph. 4.396-7.
C2. Whatever is scribed on the sheet of assertion is asserted to be true of the 
universe represented by that sheet. 4.397.
C3. Graphs scribed on different parts of the sheet of assertion are all 
asserted to be true. 4.433.

Peirce thinks of the EG as a part of pure mathematics. As such, we should be 
able to characterize each of the starting points as a definition, postulate or 
axiom.
Peirce provides the following explanations of each:


1. A definition is the logical analysis of a predicate in general terms. It 
has two branches, the one asserting that the definitum is applicable to 
whatever there may be to which the definition is applicable, the other (which 
ordinarily has several clauses), that the definition is applicable to whatever 
there may be to which the definitum is applicable. A definition does not assert 
that anything exists.

2. A postulate is an initial hypothesis in general terms. It may be 
arbitrarily assumed provided that (the definitions being accepted) it does not 
conflict with any principle of substantive possibility or with any already 
adopted postulate. By a principle of substantive possibility, I mean, for 
example, that it would not be admissible to postulate that there was no 
relation whatever between two points, or to lay down the proposition that 
nothing whatever shall be true without exception. For though what this means 
involves no contradiction it is in contradiction with the fact that it is 
itself asserted.

3. An axiom is a self-evident truth, the statement of which is superfluous 
to the conclusiveness of the reasoning, and which only serves to show a 
principle involved in the reasoning. It is generally a truth of observation, 
such as the assertion that something is true.

4. A diagram is an icon or schematic image embodying the meaning of a 
general predicate; and from the observation of this icon we are supposed to 
construct a new general predicate [CP 2.219-26; NEM 2.7].


John S has suggested that the first common notion concerning the character of 
the sheet of assertion is the only axiom in the system. In common parlance, we 
sometimes use the word “axiom” to refer to any sort of starting point for 
mathematical deduction. Peirce points out that this loose way of speaking can 
be misleading. It wasn’t clear to me whether John was using “axiom” in the 
broader or the stricter sense.
Does the first common notion fit the following criteria?

a) it is a self-evident truth;

b)the statement of the axiom is superfluous to the conclusiveness of the 
reasoning;

c) it only serves to show a principle involved in the reasoning;

d)it is generally a truth of observation, such as the assertion that 
something is true;

e) drawing on the Century Dictionary definition, we could add that an axiom 
is a matter of common knowledge—such as an item of knowledge drawn from another 
area of mathematics that is, relatively speaking, beyond doubt.
Let us ask the same question about the other common notions. If any do not fit 
these criteria for a common notion, then are they definitions or postulates?
Yours,
Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: g...@gnusystems.ca <g...@gnusystems.ca>
Sent: Saturday, October 21, 2017 6:18:49 AM
To: 'Peirce-L'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

Gary R, list,

I’ve just caught up with yesterday’s flurry of posts and would like to thank 
you for this one, along with Jon Alan Schmidt and Jeff Downard for their 
excellent contributions. (Jeff, I do agree with your revision of my hasty 
remark on the constitution of mathematical objects.) I don’t really have 
anything to add to the thread, except to say that we’ll be looking deeper into 
Peirce’s phenomenological “categories” when we reach the third of the Lowell 
lectures, and that should help to clarify the concepts of Firstness, Secondness 
and Thirdness. As Peirce remarked in that lecture, “you must have patience, for 
long time is required to ripen the fruit” of phenomenological inquiry.

In the meantime, though, we’re looking into Lecture 2, where Peirce takes up 
“the subject of necessary reasoning, mathematical reasoning, with a view to 
making out what its elementary steps are and how they are put together.” In 
doing this, he is following up on his promise to show that the “three great 
classes of argument, Deductions, Inductions, and Abductions … profess t

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}John - yes, I agree with your comment:

"It's a pity that Uexküll, Rosen, and Margulis had never read
Peirce."

But key biosemioticians of today have read all of them - i.e.,
Hoffmeyer, Kull, Emmeche etc.

And key physicists have also explored Peirce [Josephson and Koichiro
Matsuno, biophysics].

Edwina
 On Sat 21/10/17  4:59 PM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
 On 10/21/2017 12:49 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca [1] wrote: 
 > So my chapter leans more to the biological/biosemiotic side;  
 > but I think the essential ideas are the same. 
 I agree.  I subscribed to an email list on Rosen's ideas for a 
 while, but I stopped because it was generating too much email. 
 I am very sympathetic to the work on zoo- and bio-semiotics. 
 Uexküll is also important.  And I like to quote Lynn Margulis: 
 > The growth, reproduction, and communication of these moving, 
 > alliance-forming bacteria become isomorphic with our thought, 
 > with our happiness, our sensitivities and stimulations. 
 My only quibble is that she should have said 'homomorphic' (similar 
 form), not 'isomorphic' (equal form).  In any case, see "Gaia is a 
 tough bitch': 
https://www.edge.org/documents/ThirdCulture/n-Ch.7.html [2] 
 Note that on the same page I cited (EP 2:241) Peirce said that 
 the reader "will be inclined to see an anthropomorphic, or even 
 a zoomorphic, ... element in all our conceptions..." 
 It's a pity that Uexküll, Rosen, and Margulis had never read
Peirce. 
 John 


Links:
--
[1]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'g...@gnusystems.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[2]
http://webmail.primus.ca/parse.php?redirect=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.edge.org%2Fdocuments%2FThirdCulture%2Fn-Ch.7.html

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[John F Sowa]

On 10/21/2017 12:49 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
So my chapter leans more to the biological/biosemiotic side; 
but I think the essential ideas are the same.


I agree.  I subscribed to an email list on Rosen's ideas for a
while, but I stopped because it was generating too much email.

I am very sympathetic to the work on zoo- and bio-semiotics.
Uexküll is also important.  And I like to quote Lynn Margulis:

The growth, reproduction, and communication of these moving,
alliance-forming bacteria become isomorphic with our thought,
with our happiness, our sensitivities and stimulations.


My only quibble is that she should have said 'homomorphic' (similar
form), not 'isomorphic' (equal form).  In any case, see "Gaia is a
tough bitch':  https://www.edge.org/documents/ThirdCulture/n-Ch.7.html

Note that on the same page I cited (EP 2:241) Peirce said that
the reader "will be inclined to see an anthropomorphic, or even
a zoomorphic, ... element in all our conceptions..."

It's a pity that Uexküll, Rosen, and Margulis had never read Peirce.

John

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[gnox]

List,

 

As a supplementary note to what John says here about the cyclical nature of 
inquiry, I might mention that my chapter on the “meaning cycle” in Turning 
Signs (http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/mdl.htm) includes a dozen or so direct 
references to Peirce, which interested readers can find by searching that page 
for “peirce”. One difference: While John’s diagram was inspired by his years of 
work in the “artificial intelligence” field, my diagram 
(http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/mdl.htm#meancyc) was inspired mainly by Robert 
Rosen’s book Life Itself and his diagram of the “modelling relation.” So my 
chapter leans more to the biological/biosemiotic side; but I think the 
essential ideas are the same.

 

Gary f.

 

} This sentence to be reverbed. [gnox] {

http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway

 

-Original Message-
From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net] 
Sent: 21-Oct-17 11:14
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

 

On 10/20/2017 5:45 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:

> ​But ​John S found Peirce's tripartite diagram of the "main stages"

> of an inquiry inadequate and offered his own well-known cyclical 

> diagram as a corrective.

 

Peirce's three methods of reasoning are fundamental.  I was not correcting 
them.  I was just observing that Peirce himself implied that they would occur 
in a never-ending cycle of inquiry.  For example, note the end of his lecture 
on "Pragmatism as the logic of abduction" (EP 2:241):

> The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate 

> of perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and 

> whatever cannot show its passports at both these two gates is to be 

> arrested as unauthorized by reason.

 

Since every second of our waking lives involves new observations and performs 
some kinds of actions, there must be a cycle:

Observation -> Reasoning -> Action, and repeat.

 

Knowledge and habit imply memory.  I used a soup pot with the label "knowledge 
soup" to represent all the organized or disorganized contents of memory, 
conscious or unconscious.

 

A reasoning cycle may involve all three kinds, but one or two may be simplified 
or vestigial.  A well established habit may have the form of an implication:  
if p then q.  A new observation that matches p may trigger a deduction that 
predicts q and an immediate action.

 

But even the activation of a habit may leave a trace in memory that strengthens 
the habit for the future, or it may generalize the habit by causing p to match 
a broader range of patterns.  That generalization would be a kind of induction.

 

Peirce also said that deduction never produces anything new.  It must depend on 
premises derived by induction and abduction.  That's why I put deduction at the 
end of the cycle and induction and abduction at the beginning.

 

At the top of the cycle, I put the crystal labeled "theory".

That theory may be a simple rule of the form "If p then q", it may be a 
hypothesis generated by abduction, it may be a more elaborate conjunction of 
rules or axioms, or it may be the result of a hypothesis from abduction that 
causes some revision in a previous theory.

 

But there is nothing in that cycle that wasn't stated, hinted, or implied by 
Peirce's writings on reasoning, memory, habit, and logic.

 

However, I admit that I was also inspired by my years of working and writing 
about artificial intelligence.  The attached diagram soupcsp.gif labels the 
arrows of the diagram with various methods developed for AI systems.

 

Those arrows are not a correction of Peirce's ideas.  They cite methods that 
could be used to implement them.  Peirce himself wrote a pioneering article on 
"logical machines" in 1887, and soupcsp.gif shows that modern technology can 
still be mapped to his categories.

 

John


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[John F Sowa]

On 10/20/2017 5:45 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:

​But ​John S found Peirce's tripartite diagram of the "main stages"
of an inquiry inadequate and offered his own well-known cyclical
diagram as a corrective.


Peirce's three methods of reasoning are fundamental.  I was not
correcting them.  I was just observing that Peirce himself implied
that they would occur in a never-ending cycle of inquiry.  For
example, note the end of his lecture on "Pragmatism as the logic
of abduction" (EP 2:241):

The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the
gate of perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive
action; and whatever cannot show its passports at both these two
gates is to be arrested as unauthorized by reason.


Since every second of our waking lives involves new observations
and performs some kinds of actions, there must be a cycle:
Observation -> Reasoning -> Action, and repeat.

Knowledge and habit imply memory.  I used a soup pot with the label
"knowledge soup" to represent all the organized or disorganized
contents of memory, conscious or unconscious.

A reasoning cycle may involve all three kinds, but one or two may be
simplified or vestigial.  A well established habit may have the form
of an implication:  if p then q.  A new observation that matches p
may trigger a deduction that predicts q and an immediate action.

But even the activation of a habit may leave a trace in memory that
strengthens the habit for the future, or it may generalize the habit
by causing p to match a broader range of patterns.  That generalization
would be a kind of induction.

Peirce also said that deduction never produces anything new.  It must
depend on premises derived by induction and abduction.  That's why I
put deduction at the end of the cycle and induction and abduction at
the beginning.

At the top of the cycle, I put the crystal labeled "theory".
That theory may be a simple rule of the form "If p then q", it
may be a hypothesis generated by abduction, it may be a more
elaborate conjunction of rules or axioms, or it may be the result
of a hypothesis from abduction that causes some revision in a
previous theory.

But there is nothing in that cycle that wasn't stated, hinted, or
implied by Peirce's writings on reasoning, memory, habit, and logic.

However, I admit that I was also inspired by my years of working
and writing about artificial intelligence.  The attached diagram
soupcsp.gif labels the arrows of the diagram with various methods
developed for AI systems.

Those arrows are not a correction of Peirce's ideas.  They cite
methods that could be used to implement them.  Peirce himself wrote
a pioneering article on "logical machines" in 1887, and soupcsp.gif
shows that modern technology can still be mapped to his categories.

John

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[gnox]

Gary R, list,

 

I’ve just caught up with yesterday’s flurry of posts and would like to thank 
you for this one, along with Jon Alan Schmidt and Jeff Downard for their 
excellent contributions. (Jeff, I do agree with your revision of my hasty 
remark on the constitution of mathematical objects.) I don’t really have 
anything to add to the thread, except to say that we’ll be looking deeper into 
Peirce’s phenomenological “categories” when we reach the third of the Lowell 
lectures, and that should help to clarify the concepts of Firstness, Secondness 
and Thirdness. As Peirce remarked in that lecture, “you must have patience, for 
long time is required to ripen the fruit” of phenomenological inquiry.

 

In the meantime, though, we’re looking into Lecture 2, where Peirce takes up 
“the subject of necessary reasoning, mathematical reasoning, with a view to 
making out what its elementary steps are and how they are put together.” In 
doing this, he is following up on his promise to show that the “three great 
classes of argument, Deductions, Inductions, and Abductions … profess to tend 
toward the truth in very different senses, as we shall see.” 

 

I’ve been reading Peirce on this subject for years, but when I get a chance to 
study, in its original context, a Peirce text that I’m not familiar with, it 
always challenges and deepens my prior understanding of what Peirce was talking 
about. That’s why I’m so grateful to the SPIN project for making many of 
Peirce’s unpublished manuscripts, including those of the Lowell Lectures, 
available to us all, and providing a platform for open-source scholarship. As I 
continue to post pieces of Lowell 2, I’ll start including links to the online 
manuscript pages themselves, so readers can get a better idea of what they look 
like. And again, my whole transcription of Lowell 1 and 2 are on my website if 
you want to read them without interruption. Where I find Peirce’s train of 
thought hard to follow, I’ll post a comment on that section, and I hope others 
will do the same.

 

Gary f.

 

 <http://gnusystems.ca/Lowells.htm> http://gnusystems.ca/Lowells.htm }{ 
Peirce’s Lowell Lectures of 1903

https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-455-456-1903-lowell-lecture-ii

 

 

From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 20-Oct-17 17:45
To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

 

Gary f, Mike, Jon S, Edwina, John, Jeff, List,

 

Gary f wrote:

 

Gf: I think Jon’s post should clarify what is meant by a “real possibility.” 
But I’d like to add a point about the “universal categories”: they are not 
watertight compartments, or separate bins into which phenomena can be sorted. 
Any given phenomenon, such as an argument or a blueprint, can have its 
Firstness, its Secondness and its Thirdness. In fact you can’t have Thirdness 
that doesn’t involve Secondness, or Secondness that doesn’t involve Firstness.

I agree that in offering the complete quotation and his succinct and cogent 
comments, that Jon went very far in clarifying the notion of a "real 
possibility." And it would seem from his response that Mike is satisfied with 
that clarification. On the other hand, he seemingly completely disagrees with 
your take on the "universal categories," Gary, while I tend to strongly agree 
with you.

Indeed, I think that your comments on the categories help clarify especially 
what they can and cannot be expected to do. Peirce calls them mere hints and 
suggestions, and I think that is just about right. To make them "compartments" 
or "bins" has the effect of completely separating them from each other, 
something which in my opinion one can only do for the purposes of certain kinds 
of analysis. Peirce will say that in some facet of some phenomenon that 1ns, 
say, is predominant. While,, as you noted, when there is 3ns  present at all 
(say, in consideration of Reality) that it will involve 2ns, and that 2ns will 
involve 1ns. One might speak of a quality, a 1ns, say, some particular hue of 
red, but it is a mere abstraction until it is embodied in say a rose or an 
apple, and once it is embodied the other categories will come into play.

Elucidating the example I offered Mike of a blueprint, you wrote:

Gf: A blueprint is a First relative to the universe of real buildings, i.e. it 
is the mere idea of a building. A physically instantiated blueprint, like a 
“replica” of an existential “graph,” is a Second in the universe of 
representations, a token of a type. And it is a Third in its function as an 
iconic sign interpretable by the builders.

So, one might say that all three are involved in considering the categoriality 
of a blueprint. So, except that in my understanding every Sign in having an 
Interpretant aspect always involves Thirdness merely because it involves an 
Interpretant, in the example to follow, a 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[Edwina Taborsky]

 Mike - thanks for your comments and questions. See my replies below:
 On Fri 20/10/17  6:24 PM , Mike Bergman m...@mkbergman.com sent:
Hi Edwina, List,
You answered just as I thought you might:
 On 10/20/2017 4:16 PM, Edwina Taborsky   wrote:
  BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica,
sans-serif;font-size:12px; }   I'd say that Peirce's semiosis is
more basic than   and necessarily includes the three categories.
The three   categories are, in themselves, purely intellectual
constructs. But   Peirce, as a pragmatist, doesn't live in the
world of 'pure   intellect' but is concerned with and is
exploring the nature of   the cognitive world, which is to say,
the operation of Mind and   how Mind operates within/as Matter -
which includes all  matter   [Matter is effete Mind] - both
physical and biological...as well   as the operation of the human
mind.
---
 MB:So, let me ask a couple of more questions.
*Where may the ideas of spontaneous chance or of the
"surprising fact" be explained by/captured by/explicated by
semiosis?   
*How may semiosis provide an explanatory framework for the Big   
 Bang?   
*Where/how is the sense of continuity captured by Peircean   
 semiosis?   
*How does one explain abductive reasoning given the terminology  
  of semiosis?   
*How does one distinguish between perceptions (perceived
external actions) and our own actions (our pushing against the   
 door) using Peircean semiosis?
ET: All thought is triadic; all matter-as-matter - is triadic. The
semiosic process ..is the process of the triadic interaction and uses
the categorical modes.

1. Chance is a state/feeling of pure Firstness. ALL three parts of
the triad are in a mode of Firstness: a rhematic iconic qualisign.

2. I see the Big Bang as Mind transforming energy into Matter or
individual units. The transformations of Mind-Matter are semiosic
processes.

3. Continuity is Thirdness, a vital part of the semiosic process of
Mind-as-Matter.

4. Abductive reasoning has already been well explained in this
thread - Where Mind [3rdness]moves from its interaction with the
FACTS (Secondness] to hypothesis construction [which I would define
as Thirdness degenerate in the  first degree or 3-2] - which is then
tested within induction [2ndness] to form a rule/law [3rdness]

5. If I understand your question - you are asking about the
difference between a conceptual image and an action. The former could
be a rhematic indexical legisign  uses[all three modes - the quality,
the effect of the external act as perceived , the mental concept of
it ]...and an action, which could include all three or only two of
the modes...eg..a rhematic indexical sinsign - where you
spontaneously hit out at something you see.

My point is basically that the modal categories have no reality in
themselves but are a basic component of reality and existence; they
function, as modes of organization of mind/matter,  within the
semiosic triadic process. 


---
 MB: My suspicion is that, with much legerdemain, one might be
able to formulate responses to these questions in the terminology
of semiosis, But, even so, I further suspect these would be
derivatives of terminology (concepts) already found in the
universal categories. For example, to me, the ground of Firstness
is spontaneous chance. I'm not quite sure how to treat that in the
context of semiosis and sign terminology. I think I do know how to
address these questions using the universal categories.
 I personally see semiosis as more akin to information theory,   
 Spontaneous chance leads to new information structures, with
evolution favoring those representamen that provide the fastest free 
   energy consumption (which is equivalent to the greatest energy
dissipation or maximum entropy production), all of which occurs in   
 those localized cosmic conditions where there are very high free
energy spikes (topologically the spines of a porcupinefish); namely, 
   Earth for one. Approaching the limits to "truth" is the
evolutionary favoring of dissipative structures (representamen)
that maximize this entropy production in the fastest increment of
time. DNA and social networks are two approximate examples.

ET: No- I reject semiosis as information theory- within the common
understanding of information theory as
'concepts-about-this-and-that'. I see semiosis as the process of the
formation of matter/concepts...With that in mind, I see your point
about ..not the representamen/mediator as the agent of diversity
[which is your point] ..but the whole 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, John:

> On Oct 20, 2017, at 4:44 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> On 10/20/2017 3:26 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
>> My feeling is that CSP’s remarks are now out of date in the sense that many 
>> forms of mathematical reasoning are used in different structural forms - 
>> sets, groups, rings, vector spaces etc. with different modes of reasoning, 
>> even about addition and multiplication.
> 
> No.

I disagree.

CSP’s logic did not incorporate these structural forms of these mathematical 
theories, although rudimentary forms of these theories had been proposed in his 
time, but certainly not in the logical forms of mathematical structures used in 
the 21 st Century.

Compare CSP’s theories of graphs to role of today's graph theory which 
functions to bind several mathematical structures together.  CSP developed his 
theories of graphs by analogy / metaphor with chemical graphs, rather than 
geometry which underlies today’s mathematical structuralism that spans from 
points to categories (Lavere)

Cheers
Jerry


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

John:

Huh?

I think we are on totally different wavelengths. 

To me, following Tarski, any argument that explains everything, explains 
nothing. 

Let’s just drop this thread.

Cheers
Jerry


> On Oct 20, 2017, at 3:16 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Jerry, List:
> 
> That is not what you claimed, nor what I requested as evidence.  Again, for 
> Peirce, all necessary reasoning is mathematical reasoning by definition; he 
> did not limit it to manipulation of "the mathematical symbol system."  
> Obviously not everyone adheres to this terminology.
> 
> In any case, your specific examples strike me as cases of induction, rather 
> than deduction.  Again, for Peirce, "in regard to the real world, we have no 
> right to presume that any given intelligible proposition is true in absolute 
> strictness."
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon S.
> 
> On Fri, Oct 20, 2017 at 3:03 PM, Jerry LR Chandler 
> > wrote:
> 
>> On Oct 20, 2017, at 2:53 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > > wrote:
>> 
>> Jerry C., List:
>> 
>> JLRC:  Of course, the qualified phrase, ‘… of the nature of…’ leaves the 
>> meaning vague.
>> 
>> There is no such qualification in the sentence that I quoted from CP 
>> 5.148--"all necessary reasoning ... is mathematical reasoning.” 
> 
> CSP:  Now all necessary reasoning, whether it be good or bad, is of the 
> nature of mathematical reasoning ... all necessary reasoning, be it the 
> merest verbiage of the theologians, so far as there is any semblance of 
> necessity in it, is mathematical reasoning. (CP 5.147-148, EP 2:206, 1903)
>> Peirce then adds, "Now mathematical reasoning is diagrammatic."  So the 
>> unstated conclusion of this little syllogism is that all necessary reasoning 
>> is diagrammatic.
>> 
>> JLRC:  My feeling is that CSP’s remarks are now out of date in the sense 
>> that many forms of mathematical reasoning are used in different structural 
>> forms - sets, groups, rings, vector spaces etc. with different modes of 
>> reasoning, even about addition and multiplication.
>> 
>> Can you offer some specific examples of mathematical reasoning that are not 
>> also correctly characterized as necessary reasoning? 
> I can give you examples of reasoning that is necessary but not mathematical.
> 
> Example: origins of rainbows.  (extensive scientific hypothesizes are 
> necessary to invoke the spectra.)
> Example: chemical analysis and chemical transformations.  It is what it is. 
> Example: seeds sprout to give rise to plants.  
> Example: eggs hatch to give baby chickens.
> And so forth. 
> 
> Mathematical reasoning is constrained to the mathematical symbol system, is 
> it not?
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Jerry  
>> The initial framing of pure hypotheses is indeed more retroductive than 
>> deductive--Daniel Campos has written about this quite a bit--but it is still 
>> always done with a view to working out the necessary consequences.  For 
>> example, engineering modeling is all about representing a contingent (and 
>> uncertain) situation in such a way that a deterministic analysis will 
>> adequately capture the actual behavior.
>> 
>> Regards,
>> 
>> Jon S.
>> 
>> On Fri, Oct 20, 2017 at 2:26 PM, Jerry LR Chandler 
>> > wrote:
>> Thanks, Jon!
>> 
>> OK, the passages speak for themselves.
>> 
>> Of course, the qualified phrase, ‘… of the nature of…’ leaves the meaning 
>> vague.
>> 
>> My feeling is that CSP’s remarks are now out of date in the sense that many 
>> forms of mathematical reasoning are used in different structural forms - 
>> sets, groups, rings, vector spaces etc. with different modes of reasoning, 
>> even about addition and multiplication.  
>> 
>> Just the consequences of further inquiry…
>> 
>> Cheers
>> Jerry
>>> On Oct 20, 2017, at 2:15 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> Jerry C., List:
>>> 
>>> Here is the first passage that comes to my mind, probably because it was 
>>> the key text for my articles on "The Logic of Ingenuity."
>>> 
>>> CSP:  Of late decades philosophical mathematicians have come to a pretty 
>>> just understanding of the nature of their own pursuit. I do not know that 
>>> anybody struck the true note before Benjamin Peirce, who, in 1870, declared 
>>> mathematics to be "the science which draws necessary conclusions," adding 
>>> that it must be defined "subjectively" and not "objectively." A view 
>>> substantially in accord with his, though needlessly complicated, is given 
>>> in the article "Mathematics," in the ninth edition of the Encyclopaedia 
>>> Britannica. The author, Professor George Chrystal, holds that the essence 
>>> of mathematics lies in its making pure hypotheses, and in the character of 
>>> the hypotheses which it makes. What the mathematicians mean by a 
>>> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[Mike Bergman]

  
  
Hi Jon, List,
I see your point and stand corrected; your sense is what I
was trying to capture. Fundamental is the better term.
Thanks, Mike


On 10/20/2017 5:10 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
  wrote:


  Mike, List:


I am not sure that either "subsumes" or
  "synonymous/equivalent" is the right word here.  According to
  Peirce's overall architectonic, the Categories come from
  phenomenology/phaneroscopy (cf. CP 1.280), which is more
  fundamental than logic as semeiotic, which in turn is more
  fundamental than metaphysics.  In fact,
  phenomenology/phaneroscopy is the most fundamental of
  the positive sciences, so it is not surprising that the
  Categories permeate all of the others, including both semeiotic
  and metaphysics.  Note that in this context, "X is more
  fundamental than Y" means that Y depends on X for its
  principles, and not the other way around (cf. CP 1.180). 
  "Normative science rests largely on phenomenology and on
  mathematics; metaphysics on phenomenology and on normative
  science." (CP 1.186)


Regards,

  

  

  
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher,
  Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
  - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
  

  

  
  
  On Fri, Oct 20, 2017 at 3:36 PM,
Michael Bergman 
wrote:
Hi Edwina,

On 10/20/2017 2:45 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
  
  
  Mike - here, I strongly disagree with you, when you
  wrote:
  
Your comment ' we need to
  talk about signs when our discourse is
  representation'...is something that is very common in
  the semiological world, but is, I suggest, invalid in
  the Peircean world.

  
  Please. Forget the labels and the easy dismissal that I
  have engaged in some Saussurean fallacies here.
  
  All I am suggesting is to focus on the "nature of the
  object," which I don't think I or Peirce would say is the
  same as the "nature of the sign".
  
  What I have tried to suggest is that the more fundamental
  "Peircean" interpretation comes from the lens of the
  universal categories, which, by the nature of usage and
  wealth of terminology, subsumes the notion of semeiosis.
  1ns, 2ns and 3ns provide a richer pool of concepts for
  investigating metaphysical questions than does the
  terminology of representation (signs). Otherwise, why does
  Peirce ever use them?
  
  None of this is to say the I like the child better than
  the parent or vice versa, just that the universal
  categories are best suited to questions of metaphysics,
  semiosis to sign representations.
  
  As an exercise, please just answer this three-choice
  question:
  
  A. Peirce's semiosis subsumes the idea of his universal
  categories
  
  B. Peirce's universal categories subsume the idea of his
  semiosis
  
  C. Peirce's semiosis is synonomous with/equivalent to the
  universal categories.
  
  I don't believe that picking B requires me to burn at the
  stake. ;)
  
  Mike

Semiosis and signs
  are NOT about 'representation' but about the
  true nature of reality and actuality - both of which
  function only within semiosis, which is to say, within
  the triadic Sign. Therefore - metaphysics and the
  'true nature of Objects' is the real topic of
  discourse within any examination of Signs.
  
  That blueprint, as  a rhematic iconic sinsign - is its
  semiosic definition as AN OBJECT. Nothing to do with
  'representation' of the blueprint, but everything
  to do with defining its nature as an object.   With
  defining how it exists and how we interact with it.
  
  Edwina

 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Mike, List:

I am not sure that either "subsumes" or "synonymous/equivalent" is the
right word here.  According to Peirce's overall architectonic, the
Categories come from phenomenology/phaneroscopy (cf. CP 1.280), which is
more fundamental than logic as semeiotic, which in turn is more fundamental
than metaphysics.  In fact, phenomenology/phaneroscopy is the *most*
fundamental of the positive sciences, so it is not surprising that the
Categories permeate all of the others, including *both *semeiotic and
metaphysics.  Note that in this context, "X is more fundamental than Y"
means that Y depends on X for its principles, and not the other way around
(cf. CP 1.180).  "Normative science rests largely on phenomenology and on
mathematics; metaphysics on phenomenology and on normative science." (CP
1.186)

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Oct 20, 2017 at 3:36 PM, Michael Bergman  wrote:

> Hi Edwina,
>
> On 10/20/2017 2:45 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>
>> Mike - here, I strongly disagree with you, when you wrote:
>>
>> Your comment ' we need to talk about signs when our discourse is
>> representation'...is something that is very common in the semiological
>> world, but is, I suggest, invalid in the Peircean world.
>>
>
> Please. Forget the labels and the easy dismissal that I have engaged in
> some Saussurean fallacies here.
>
> All I am suggesting is to focus on the "nature of the object," which I
> don't think I or Peirce would say is the same as the "nature of the sign".
>
> What I have tried to suggest is that the more fundamental "Peircean"
> interpretation comes from the lens of the universal categories, which, by
> the nature of usage and wealth of terminology, subsumes the notion of
> semeiosis. 1ns, 2ns and 3ns provide a richer pool of concepts for
> investigating metaphysical questions than does the terminology of
> representation (signs). Otherwise, why does Peirce ever use them?
>
> None of this is to say the I like the child better than the parent or vice
> versa, just that the universal categories are best suited to questions of
> metaphysics, semiosis to sign representations.
>
> As an exercise, please just answer this three-choice question:
>
> A. Peirce's semiosis subsumes the idea of his universal categories
>
> B. Peirce's universal categories subsume the idea of his semiosis
>
> C. Peirce's semiosis is synonomous with/equivalent to the universal
> categories.
>
> I don't believe that picking B requires me to burn at the stake. ;)
>
> Mike
>
> Semiosis and signs are NOT about 'representation' but about the
>> true nature of reality and actuality - both of which function only within
>> semiosis, which is to say, within the triadic Sign. Therefore - metaphysics
>> and the 'true nature of Objects' is the real topic of discourse within any
>> examination of Signs.
>>
>> That blueprint, as  a rhematic iconic sinsign - is its semiosic
>> definition as AN OBJECT. Nothing to do with 'representation' of the
>> blueprint, but everything to do with defining its nature as an object.
>>  With defining how it exists and how we interact with it.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>
> --
> __
>
> Michael K. Bergman
> Cognonto Corporation
> 319.621.5225
> skype:michaelkbergman
> http://cognonto.com
> http://mkbergman.com
> http://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman
> __
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[Gary Richmond]

in the mathematical realm that *necessary reasoning* can be done,
> because the objects of pure mathematics have no being except what they are
> *defined* to have.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Mike Bergman [mailto:m...@mkbergman.com]
> *Sent:* 20-Oct-17 10:20
> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1:
> overview)
>
>
>
> Hi John, List,
>
>
>
> On 10/20/2017 7:15 AM, John F Sowa wrote:
>
> Since my name was mentioned in the list, I'll say why I believe that
> methods of reasoning -- induction, abduction, and deduction -- are
> kinds of arguments (third in the triad predicate-proposition-argument).
> And that all arguments are segments in a never-ending cycle of
> inquiry.  Therefore, all of that is Thirdness.
>
>
> John, your name was mentioned because you made this statement:
>
>
>
> Mike
>
> Might you or others on the list identify what "some" of those
> possibilities may be (with citations)
>
>
> Peirce rarely gave enough examples to illustrate and clarify his
> ideas.  But I would cite any engineering project or plan for the
> future.  If you translate those plans to logic or a computer
> program, the variables represent "real possibilities".
>
> But as mice and engineers know, the best laid plans "gang aft agley".
> Many possibilities that seemed real in the planning stage never get
> built, get modified, or get rejected as the project develops.
>
>
> I was (and am) questioning whether plans or computer variables are in any
> way Firstness; I maintain they are instantiations, even if they deal with
> an unrealized future, and are therefore Secondness. My original question to
> Gary (and, now, you) about "some [Firstness] possibilities" which we should
> be "most concerned to insist upon" remains.
>
> The points you then raise only mostly affirm what I was also saying, that
> the universal categories are a process. Calling them arguments is, I agree,
> a more clarifying definition.
>
> However, that being said, I also think that framing the process question
> into "starting" and "stopping" points miscontrues my process points; I made
> no such suggestion. The proper metaphor, which you also state, is the cycle.
>
> But, under a cyclic understanding, I do not see everything as being
> Thirdness. I agree and grant that arguments are in Thirdness -- Peirce
> makes this point often in discussing his categories applied to logic -- but
> the components of what might go into those arguments are drawn from all
> three categories, which I think is what Gary was attempting to point out.
>
> Mike
>
>
>
> -
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>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[John F Sowa]

On 10/20/2017 3:26 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
My feeling is that CSP’s remarks are now out of date in the sense that 
many forms of mathematical reasoning are used in different structural 
forms - sets, groups, rings, vector spaces etc. with different modes 
of reasoning, even about addition and multiplication.


No.  Versions of all those theories existed in Peirce's day.
Category theory is new, but it formalizes the notion of analogy
at the metalevel:  patterns of mathematical patterns.  And analogy
was a method of reasoning that Peirce discussed.

Turing machines and abstract automata are new.  But Peirce had
published an article about logical machines in 1887, he suggested
the use of electricity for wiring diagrams, and his 1887 article
was published in a bibliography of artificial intelligence (1963).

Computer systems have pushed the technology far beyond anything
Peirce could have imagined.  But he was already writing about his
wishes for using stereoscopic imagery and moves for representing
what we now call "virtual reality".

When TV programs replaced the old radio programs, people complained
that the images on TV weren't as rich as the ones they imagined
while listening to the radio.

In just over a week, we'll be celebrating the 79th anniversary
of Orson Welles's radio drama "War of the Worlds".  The mental
imagery of the listeners to that story caused people to panic.
Do you think they would have panicked if they had seen it on TV?

John

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Mike - 

My reason for defining your comments as semiological is because you
confined the Sign to 'representation' - which, in Peircean semiosis -
it most certainly is not.

 I think that for Peirce, 'everything is a sign' - that is, the
objects in our world do not exist per se, but only as a Sign. For
example, that blueprint exists as a rhematic iconic sinsign. Not as
an 'object' but as that triadic Sign in our interaction with it. If
that same piece of paper was in interaction with something else, such
as the rain, or a table - it would be another Sign. Possibly one of
pure Secondness.  But it is always in a relationship.

 The modal categories are a basic and necessary component of this
triad of relations.  In the rhematic iconic sinsign, the relation of
the representamen/mediation to the object is in a mode of Firstness;
that to the Interpretant is also in a mode of Firstness; and that of
the Repesentamen in itself- in a mode of Secondness. Without those
categorical modes - this semiosic process and the blueprint, would
not exist.

I'd say that Peirce's semiosis is more basic than and necessarily
includes the three categories. The three categories are, in
themselves, purely intellectual constructs. But Peirce, as a
pragmatist, doesn't live in the world of 'pure intellect' but is
concerned with and is exploring the nature of the cognitive world,
which is to say, the operation of Mind and how Mind operates
within/as Matter - which includes all  matter [Matter is effete Mind]
- both physical and biological...as well as the operation of the human
mind.

Edwina
 On Fri 20/10/17  4:36 PM , Michael Bergman m...@mkbergman.com sent:
 Hi Edwina, 
 On 10/20/2017 2:45 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: 
 > Mike - here, I strongly disagree with you, when you wrote: 
 >  
 >  
 > Your comment ' we need to talk about signs when our discourse is  
 > representation'...is something that is very common in the
semiological  
 > world, but is, I suggest, invalid in the Peircean world. 
 Please. Forget the labels and the easy dismissal that I have engaged
in  
 some Saussurean fallacies here. 
 All I am suggesting is to focus on the "nature of the object," which
I  
 don't think I or Peirce would say is the same as the "nature of the
sign". 
 What I have tried to suggest is that the more fundamental "Peircean"
 
 interpretation comes from the lens of the universal categories,
which,  
 by the nature of usage and wealth of terminology, subsumes the
notion of  
 semeiosis. 1ns, 2ns and 3ns provide a richer pool of concepts for  
 investigating metaphysical questions than does the terminology of  
 representation (signs). Otherwise, why does Peirce ever use them? 
 None of this is to say the I like the child better than the parent
or  
 vice versa, just that the universal categories are best suited to  
 questions of metaphysics, semiosis to sign representations. 
 As an exercise, please just answer this three-choice question: 
 A. Peirce's semiosis subsumes the idea of his universal categories 
 B. Peirce's universal categories subsume the idea of his semiosis 
 C. Peirce's semiosis is synonomous with/equivalent to the universal 

 categories. 
 I don't believe that picking B requires me to burn at the stake. ;) 
 Mike 
 >  
 > Semiosis and signs are NOT about 'representation' but about the  
 > true nature of reality and actuality - both of which function only
 
 > within semiosis, which is to say, within the triadic Sign.
Therefore -  
 > metaphysics and the 'true nature of Objects' is the real topic of 

 > discourse within any examination of Signs. 
 >  
 > That blueprint, as  a rhematic iconic sinsign - is its semiosic  
 > definition as AN OBJECT. Nothing to do with 'representation' of
the  
 > blueprint, but everything to do with defining its nature as an
object.  
 >   With defining how it exists and how we interact with it. 
 >  
 > Edwina 
 >  
 >  
 >  
 >  
 >  
 >  
 >  
 --  
 __ 
 Michael K. Bergman 
 Cognonto Corporation 
 319.621.5225 
 skype:michaelkbergman 
 http://cognonto.com [1] 
 http://mkbergman.com [2] 
 http://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman [3] 
 __ 


Links:
--
[1]
http://webmail.primus.ca/parse.php?redirect=http%3A%2F%2Fcognonto.com
[2]
http://webmail.primus.ca/parse.php?redirect=http%3A%2F%2Fmkbergman.com
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/parse.php?redirect=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.linkedin.com%2Fin%2Fmkbergman

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[Michael Bergman]

Hi Edwina,

On 10/20/2017 2:45 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

Mike - here, I strongly disagree with you, when you wrote:


Your comment ' we need to talk about signs when our discourse is 
representation'...is something that is very common in the semiological 
world, but is, I suggest, invalid in the Peircean world.


Please. Forget the labels and the easy dismissal that I have engaged in 
some Saussurean fallacies here.


All I am suggesting is to focus on the "nature of the object," which I 
don't think I or Peirce would say is the same as the "nature of the sign".


What I have tried to suggest is that the more fundamental "Peircean" 
interpretation comes from the lens of the universal categories, which, 
by the nature of usage and wealth of terminology, subsumes the notion of 
semeiosis. 1ns, 2ns and 3ns provide a richer pool of concepts for 
investigating metaphysical questions than does the terminology of 
representation (signs). Otherwise, why does Peirce ever use them?


None of this is to say the I like the child better than the parent or 
vice versa, just that the universal categories are best suited to 
questions of metaphysics, semiosis to sign representations.


As an exercise, please just answer this three-choice question:

A. Peirce's semiosis subsumes the idea of his universal categories

B. Peirce's universal categories subsume the idea of his semiosis

C. Peirce's semiosis is synonomous with/equivalent to the universal 
categories.


I don't believe that picking B requires me to burn at the stake. ;)

Mike



Semiosis and signs are NOT about 'representation' but about the 
true nature of reality and actuality - both of which function only 
within semiosis, which is to say, within the triadic Sign. Therefore - 
metaphysics and the 'true nature of Objects' is the real topic of 
discourse within any examination of Signs.


That blueprint, as  a rhematic iconic sinsign - is its semiosic 
definition as AN OBJECT. Nothing to do with 'representation' of the 
blueprint, but everything to do with defining its nature as an object. 
  With defining how it exists and how we interact with it.


Edwina









--
__

Michael K. Bergman
Cognonto Corporation
319.621.5225
skype:michaelkbergman
http://cognonto.com
http://mkbergman.com
http://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman
__

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jerry, List:

That is not what you claimed, nor what I requested as evidence.  Again, for
Peirce, all necessary reasoning is mathematical reasoning *by definition*;
he did not limit it to manipulation of "the mathematical symbol system."
Obviously not everyone adheres to this terminology.

In any case, your specific examples strike me as cases of induction, rather
than deduction.  Again, for Peirce, "in regard to the real world, we have
no right to presume that any given intelligible proposition is true in
absolute strictness."

Regards,

Jon S.

On Fri, Oct 20, 2017 at 3:03 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

>
> On Oct 20, 2017, at 2:53 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> Jerry C., List:
>
> JLRC:  Of course, the qualified phrase, ‘… of the nature of…’ leaves the
> meaning vague.
>
>
> There is no such qualification in the sentence that I quoted from CP
> 5.148--"all necessary reasoning ... is mathematical reasoning.”
>
>
> CSP:  Now all necessary reasoning, whether it be good or bad, is of the
> nature of mathematical reasoning ... all necessary reasoning, be it the
> merest verbiage of the theologians, so far as there is any semblance of
> necessity in it, is mathematical reasoning. (CP 5.147-148, EP 2:206, 1903)
>
> Peirce then adds, "Now mathematical reasoning is diagrammatic."  So the
> unstated conclusion of this little syllogism is that all necessary
> reasoning is diagrammatic.
>
> JLRC:  My feeling is that CSP’s remarks are now out of date in the sense
> that many forms of mathematical reasoning are used in different structural
> forms - sets, groups, rings, vector spaces etc. with different modes of
> reasoning, even about addition and multiplication.
>
>
> Can you offer some specific examples of mathematical reasoning that are
> not also correctly characterized as necessary reasoning?
>
> I can give you examples of reasoning that is necessary but not
> mathematical.
>
> Example: origins of rainbows.  (extensive scientific hypothesizes are
> necessary to invoke the spectra.)
> Example: chemical analysis and chemical transformations.  It is what it
> is.
> Example: seeds sprout to give rise to plants.
> Example: eggs hatch to give baby chickens.
> And so forth.
>
> Mathematical reasoning is constrained to the mathematical symbol system,
> is it not?
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>
> The initial framing of pure hypotheses is indeed more retroductive than
> deductive--Daniel Campos has written about this quite a bit--but it is
> still always done with a view to working out the necessary consequences.
> For example, engineering modeling is all about representing a contingent
> (and uncertain) situation in such a way that a deterministic analysis will
> adequately capture the actual behavior.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Fri, Oct 20, 2017 at 2:26 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <
> jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:
>
>> Thanks, Jon!
>>
>> OK, the passages speak for themselves.
>>
>> Of course, the qualified phrase, ‘… of the nature of…’ leaves the meaning
>> vague.
>>
>> My feeling is that CSP’s remarks are now out of date in the sense that
>> many forms of mathematical reasoning are used in different structural forms
>> - sets, groups, rings, vector spaces etc. with different modes of
>> reasoning, even about addition and multiplication.
>>
>> Just the consequences of further inquiry…
>>
>> Cheers
>> Jerry
>>
>> On Oct 20, 2017, at 2:15 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
>> wrote:
>>
>> Jerry C., List:
>>
>> Here is the first passage that comes to my mind, probably because it was
>> the key text for my articles on "The Logic of Ingenuity."
>>
>> CSP:  Of late decades philosophical mathematicians have come to a pretty
>> just understanding of the nature of their own pursuit. I do not know that
>> anybody struck the true note before Benjamin Peirce, who, in 1870, declared
>> mathematics to be "the science which draws necessary conclusions," adding
>> that it must be defined "subjectively" and not "objectively." A view
>> substantially in accord with his, though needlessly complicated, is given
>> in the article "Mathematics," in the ninth edition of the *Encyclopaedia
>> Britannica*. The author, Professor George Chrystal, holds that the
>> essence of mathematics lies in its making pure hypotheses, and in the
>> character of the hypotheses which it makes. What the mathematicians mean by
>> a "hypothesis" is a proposition imagined to be strictly true of an ideal
>> state of things. *In this sense, it is only about hypotheses that
>> necessary reasoning has any application; for, in regard to the real world,
>> we have no right to presume that any given intelligible proposition is true
>> in absolute strictness.* On the other hand, probable reasoning deals
>> with the ordinary course of experience; now, nothing like *a course of
>> experience* exists for ideal hypotheses. *Hence to say that mathematics
>> busies itself in drawing necessary conclusions, 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

> On Oct 20, 2017, at 2:53 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Jerry C., List:
> 
> JLRC:  Of course, the qualified phrase, ‘… of the nature of…’ leaves the 
> meaning vague.
> 
> There is no such qualification in the sentence that I quoted from CP 
> 5.148--"all necessary reasoning ... is mathematical reasoning.” 

CSP:  Now all necessary reasoning, whether it be good or bad, is of the nature 
of mathematical reasoning ... all necessary reasoning, be it the merest 
verbiage of the theologians, so far as there is any semblance of necessity in 
it, is mathematical reasoning. (CP 5.147-148, EP 2:206, 1903)


> Peirce then adds, "Now mathematical reasoning is diagrammatic."  So the 
> unstated conclusion of this little syllogism is that all necessary reasoning 
> is diagrammatic.
> 
> JLRC:  My feeling is that CSP’s remarks are now out of date in the sense that 
> many forms of mathematical reasoning are used in different structural forms - 
> sets, groups, rings, vector spaces etc. with different modes of reasoning, 
> even about addition and multiplication.
> 
> Can you offer some specific examples of mathematical reasoning that are not 
> also correctly characterized as necessary reasoning? 

I can give you examples of reasoning that is necessary but not mathematical.

Example: origins of rainbows.  (extensive scientific hypothesizes are necessary 
to invoke the spectra.)
Example: chemical analysis and chemical transformations.  It is what it is. 
Example: seeds sprout to give rise to plants.  
Example: eggs hatch to give baby chickens.
And so forth. 

Mathematical reasoning is constrained to the mathematical symbol system, is it 
not?

Cheers

Jerry

  
> The initial framing of pure hypotheses is indeed more retroductive than 
> deductive--Daniel Campos has written about this quite a bit--but it is still 
> always done with a view to working out the necessary consequences.  For 
> example, engineering modeling is all about representing a contingent (and 
> uncertain) situation in such a way that a deterministic analysis will 
> adequately capture the actual behavior.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon S.
> 
> On Fri, Oct 20, 2017 at 2:26 PM, Jerry LR Chandler 
> > wrote:
> Thanks, Jon!
> 
> OK, the passages speak for themselves.
> 
> Of course, the qualified phrase, ‘… of the nature of…’ leaves the meaning 
> vague.
> 
> My feeling is that CSP’s remarks are now out of date in the sense that many 
> forms of mathematical reasoning are used in different structural forms - 
> sets, groups, rings, vector spaces etc. with different modes of reasoning, 
> even about addition and multiplication.  
> 
> Just the consequences of further inquiry…
> 
> Cheers
> Jerry
>> On Oct 20, 2017, at 2:15 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > > wrote:
>> 
>> Jerry C., List:
>> 
>> Here is the first passage that comes to my mind, probably because it was the 
>> key text for my articles on "The Logic of Ingenuity."
>> 
>> CSP:  Of late decades philosophical mathematicians have come to a pretty 
>> just understanding of the nature of their own pursuit. I do not know that 
>> anybody struck the true note before Benjamin Peirce, who, in 1870, declared 
>> mathematics to be "the science which draws necessary conclusions," adding 
>> that it must be defined "subjectively" and not "objectively." A view 
>> substantially in accord with his, though needlessly complicated, is given in 
>> the article "Mathematics," in the ninth edition of the Encyclopaedia 
>> Britannica. The author, Professor George Chrystal, holds that the essence of 
>> mathematics lies in its making pure hypotheses, and in the character of the 
>> hypotheses which it makes. What the mathematicians mean by a "hypothesis" is 
>> a proposition imagined to be strictly true of an ideal state of things. In 
>> this sense, it is only about hypotheses that necessary reasoning has any 
>> application; for, in regard to the real world, we have no right to presume 
>> that any given intelligible proposition is true in absolute strictness. On 
>> the other hand, probable reasoning deals with the ordinary course of 
>> experience; now, nothing like a course of experience exists for ideal 
>> hypotheses. Hence to say that mathematics busies itself in drawing necessary 
>> conclusions, and to say that it busies itself with hypotheses, are two 
>> statements which the logician perceives come to the same thing ... Now the 
>> mathematician does not conceive it to be any part of his duty to verify the 
>> facts stated. He accepts them absolutely without question. He does not in 
>> the least care whether they are correct or not ... Thus, the mathematician 
>> does two very different things: namely, he first frames a pure hypothesis 
>> stripped of all features which do not concern the drawing of consequences 
>> from it, and this he does without inquiring 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jerry C., List:

JLRC:  Of course, the qualified phrase, ‘… of the nature of…’ leaves the
meaning vague.


There is no such qualification in the sentence that I quoted from CP
5.148--"all necessary reasoning ... is mathematical reasoning."  Peirce
then adds, "Now mathematical reasoning is diagrammatic."  So the unstated
conclusion of this little syllogism is that all necessary reasoning is
diagrammatic.

JLRC:  My feeling is that CSP’s remarks are now out of date in the sense
that many forms of mathematical reasoning are used in different structural
forms - sets, groups, rings, vector spaces etc. with different modes of
reasoning, even about addition and multiplication.


Can you offer some specific examples of mathematical reasoning that are not
also correctly characterized as necessary reasoning?  The initial framing
of pure hypotheses is indeed more retroductive than deductive--Daniel
Campos has written about this quite a bit--but it is still always done with
a view to working out the necessary consequences.  For example, engineering
modeling is all about representing a contingent (and uncertain) situation
in such a way that a deterministic analysis will adequately capture the
actual behavior.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Fri, Oct 20, 2017 at 2:26 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> Thanks, Jon!
>
> OK, the passages speak for themselves.
>
> Of course, the qualified phrase, ‘… of the nature of…’ leaves the meaning
> vague.
>
> My feeling is that CSP’s remarks are now out of date in the sense that
> many forms of mathematical reasoning are used in different structural forms
> - sets, groups, rings, vector spaces etc. with different modes of
> reasoning, even about addition and multiplication.
>
> Just the consequences of further inquiry…
>
> Cheers
> Jerry
>
> On Oct 20, 2017, at 2:15 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> Jerry C., List:
>
> Here is the first passage that comes to my mind, probably because it was
> the key text for my articles on "The Logic of Ingenuity."
>
> CSP:  Of late decades philosophical mathematicians have come to a pretty
> just understanding of the nature of their own pursuit. I do not know that
> anybody struck the true note before Benjamin Peirce, who, in 1870, declared
> mathematics to be "the science which draws necessary conclusions," adding
> that it must be defined "subjectively" and not "objectively." A view
> substantially in accord with his, though needlessly complicated, is given
> in the article "Mathematics," in the ninth edition of the *Encyclopaedia
> Britannica*. The author, Professor George Chrystal, holds that the
> essence of mathematics lies in its making pure hypotheses, and in the
> character of the hypotheses which it makes. What the mathematicians mean by
> a "hypothesis" is a proposition imagined to be strictly true of an ideal
> state of things. *In this sense, it is only about hypotheses that
> necessary reasoning has any application; for, in regard to the real world,
> we have no right to presume that any given intelligible proposition is true
> in absolute strictness.* On the other hand, probable reasoning deals with
> the ordinary course of experience; now, nothing like *a course of
> experience* exists for ideal hypotheses. *Hence to say that mathematics
> busies itself in drawing necessary conclusions, and to say that it busies
> itself with hypotheses, are two statements which the logician perceives
> come to the same thing* ... Now the mathematician does not conceive it to
> be any part of his duty to verify the facts stated. He accepts them
> absolutely without question. He does not in the least care whether they are
> correct or not ... Thus, the mathematician does two very different things:
> namely, he first frames a pure hypothesis stripped of all features which do
> not concern the drawing of consequences from it, and this he does without
> inquiring or caring whether it agrees with the actual facts or not; and,
> secondly, he proceeds to draw necessary consequences from that hypothesis.
> (CP 3.558-559, 1898; italics in original, bold  added)
>
>
> I suspect that if Peirce had written this paragraph a few years later,
> when he was being more careful about distinguishing existence and reality,
> he would have substituted something like "existing world" or "actual world"
> for "real world."  Here is another relevant passage.
>
> CSP:  Now all necessary reasoning, whether it be good or bad, is of the
> nature of mathematical reasoning ... all necessary reasoning, be it the
> merest verbiage of the theologians, so far as there is any semblance of
> necessity in it, is mathematical reasoning. (CP 5.147-148, EP 2:206, 1903)
>
>
> Peirce essentially *defined* the mathematical realm as encompassing all
> circumstances in which necessary reasoning can be done.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Mike - here, I strongly disagree with you, when you wrote:

"In Edwina's comments on this thread, she told me to go study the
Signs.  
  The problem is, semiosis, logic and many other Peircean concepts
are  
  subsumed under the universal categories, the most succinct
expression of  
  Peirce's architectonic, not the other way around. We need to talk
about  
  signs when our discourse is representation, we need to talk about
the  
  universal categories when our discourse is Peirce's metaphysics and
the  
  "true" nature of Objects. That includes the concepts of real,
existence,  
  identity and truth. 
  So, Edwina, in this case, I am not looking at "blueprint" through
the  
  lens of representation, I am looking at "blueprint" in terms of the
 
  nature of the object. When it comes to categorize the reality of
our  
  real world, I think this is the proper basis."

Your comment ' we need to talk about signs when our discourse is
representation'...is something that is very common in the
semiological world, but is, I suggest, invalid in the Peircean world.

Semiosis and signs are NOT about 'representation' but about the true
nature of reality and actuality - both of which function only within
semiosis, which is to say, within the triadic Sign. Therefore -
metaphysics and the 'true nature of Objects' is the real topic of
discourse within any examination of Signs. 

That blueprint, as  a rhematic iconic sinsign - is its semiosic
definition as AN OBJECT. Nothing to do with 'representation' of the
blueprint, but everything to do with defining its nature as an
object.  With defining how it exists and how we interact with it. 

Edwina

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Mike, List:

MB:  I am not looking at "blueprint" through the lens of representation, I
am looking at "blueprint" in terms of the nature of the object. When it
comes to categorize the reality of our real world, I think this is the
proper basis.


I am inclined to agree, but as I have suggested in the past, it seems to me
that Peirce ultimately maintained a subtle distinction between the
phenomenological/phaernoscopic Categories that describe three different
kinds of predicates and the metaphysical Universes that contain three
different kinds of subjects.  Of course, in accordance with his overall
architectonic, the latter would in some sense depend on the former.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Fri, Oct 20, 2017 at 2:22 PM, Michael Bergman  wrote:

> Hi Jon, Edwina, List,
>
> See below:
>
> On 10/20/2017 1:54 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>
>> Mike, List:
>>
>> I took Gary F.'s point to be that no phenomenon can be properly
>> categorized as /only /Firstness, /only /Secondness, or /only /Thirdness.
>>
>> CSP:  What I term /phaneroscopy /is that study which, supported by
>> the direct observation of phanerons and generalizing its
>> observations, signalizes several very broad classes of phanerons;
>> describes the features of each; shows that although they are so
>> inextricably mixed together that no one can be isolated, yet it is
>> manifest that their characters are quite disparate; then proves,
>> beyond question, that a certain very short list comprises all of
>> these broadest categories of phanerons there are; and finally
>> proceeds to the laborious and difficult task of enumerating the
>> principal subdivisions of those categories. (CP 1.286, c. 1904;
>> italics in original)
>>
>
> For there to be reality, there must be real things (objects), and, by
> contrast, everything else. What I objected to was the facile transition
> from idea to blueprint to whatever, with the object changing in each change
> of reference. In the context of the blueprint object, no matter what the
> phenomenology, nor the sign interpretation (see below), the referenced
> object, the ground, is the blueprint, completely and perfectly understood.
>
> However, I wonder if Mike's point is manifest in Peirce's later
>> discussions of the three Universes of Experience.
>>
>> CSP:  Of the three Universes of Experience familiar to us all, the
>> first comprises all mere Ideas, those airy nothings to which the
>> mind of poet, pure mathematician, or another /might /give local
>> habitation and a name within that mind. Their very airy-nothingness,
>> the fact that their Being consists in mere capability of getting
>> thought, not in anybody's Actually thinking them, saves their
>> Reality. The second Universe is that of the Brute Actuality of
>> things and facts. I am confident that their Being consists in
>> reactions against Brute forces, notwithstanding objections
>> redoubtable until they are closely and fairly examined. The third
>> Universe comprises everything whose being consists in active power
>> to establish connections between different objects, especially
>> between objects in different Universes. Such is everything which is
>> essentially a Sign -- not the mere body of the Sign, which is not
>> essentially such, but, so to speak, the Sign's Soul, which has its
>> Being in its power of serving as intermediary between its Object and
>> a Mind. Such, too, is a living consciousness, and such the life, the
>> power of growth, of a plant. Such is a living constitution -- a
>> daily newspaper, a great fortune, a social "movement." (CP 6.455,
>> 1908; italics in original)
>>
>> Only the /Idea/ of the building belongs to the first Universe as a real
>> possibility.  It is /represented /(in different ways) by both the blueprint
>> and the constructed building itself, which themselves belong to the second
>> Universe of Brute Actuality.  The relations among these different objects
>> that facilitate such mediation belong to the third Universe of Signs.  In
>> multiple drafts of "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God," Peirce
>> also directly associated the second Universe with Matter and the third
>> Universe with Mind.
>>
>
> EXACTLY SO. In fact, this same kind of relationship can be seen in dozens
> of examples (actually, more than 60) of the universal categories drawn from
> Peirce's writings [1].
>
> In Edwina's comments on this thread, she told me to go study the Signs.
> The problem is, semiosis, logic and many other Peircean concepts are
> subsumed under the universal categories, the most succinct expression of
> Peirce's architectonic, not the other way around. We need to talk about
> signs when our discourse is representation, we need to talk about the
> universal categories when our discourse is Peirce's metaphysics and the
> "true" nature of Objects. That includes the concepts of 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Thanks, Jon!

OK, the passages speak for themselves.

Of course, the qualified phrase, ‘… of the nature of…’ leaves the meaning vague.

My feeling is that CSP’s remarks are now out of date in the sense that many 
forms of mathematical reasoning are used in different structural forms - sets, 
groups, rings, vector spaces etc. with different modes of reasoning, even about 
addition and multiplication.  

Just the consequences of further inquiry…

Cheers
Jerry


> On Oct 20, 2017, at 2:15 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Jerry C., List:
> 
> Here is the first passage that comes to my mind, probably because it was the 
> key text for my articles on "The Logic of Ingenuity."
> 
> CSP:  Of late decades philosophical mathematicians have come to a pretty just 
> understanding of the nature of their own pursuit. I do not know that anybody 
> struck the true note before Benjamin Peirce, who, in 1870, declared 
> mathematics to be "the science which draws necessary conclusions," adding 
> that it must be defined "subjectively" and not "objectively." A view 
> substantially in accord with his, though needlessly complicated, is given in 
> the article "Mathematics," in the ninth edition of the Encyclopaedia 
> Britannica. The author, Professor George Chrystal, holds that the essence of 
> mathematics lies in its making pure hypotheses, and in the character of the 
> hypotheses which it makes. What the mathematicians mean by a "hypothesis" is 
> a proposition imagined to be strictly true of an ideal state of things. In 
> this sense, it is only about hypotheses that necessary reasoning has any 
> application; for, in regard to the real world, we have no right to presume 
> that any given intelligible proposition is true in absolute strictness. On 
> the other hand, probable reasoning deals with the ordinary course of 
> experience; now, nothing like a course of experience exists for ideal 
> hypotheses. Hence to say that mathematics busies itself in drawing necessary 
> conclusions, and to say that it busies itself with hypotheses, are two 
> statements which the logician perceives come to the same thing ... Now the 
> mathematician does not conceive it to be any part of his duty to verify the 
> facts stated. He accepts them absolutely without question. He does not in the 
> least care whether they are correct or not ... Thus, the mathematician does 
> two very different things: namely, he first frames a pure hypothesis stripped 
> of all features which do not concern the drawing of consequences from it, and 
> this he does without inquiring or caring whether it agrees with the actual 
> facts or not; and, secondly, he proceeds to draw necessary consequences from 
> that hypothesis. (CP 3.558-559, 1898; italics in original, bold  added)
> 
> I suspect that if Peirce had written this paragraph a few years later, when 
> he was being more careful about distinguishing existence and reality, he 
> would have substituted something like "existing world" or "actual world" for 
> "real world."  Here is another relevant passage.
> 
> CSP:  Now all necessary reasoning, whether it be good or bad, is of the 
> nature of mathematical reasoning ... all necessary reasoning, be it the 
> merest verbiage of the theologians, so far as there is any semblance of 
> necessity in it, is mathematical reasoning. (CP 5.147-148, EP 2:206, 1903)
> 
> Peirce essentially defined the mathematical realm as encompassing all 
> circumstances in which necessary reasoning can be done.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
>  - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> 
> On Fri, Oct 20, 2017 at 1:36 PM, Jerry LR Chandler 
> > wrote:
> Gary:
>> On Oct 20, 2017, at 12:48 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard > > wrote:
>> 
>> Gary F., Mike, List,
>> 
>> Should we expand the claim about mathematical objects? Gary F says:  "That 
>> includes mathematical and other imaginary objects, which may be intelligible 
>> without being perceptible by the senses. Indeed it is only in the 
>> mathematical realm that necessary reasoning can be done, because the objects 
>> of pure mathematics have no being except what they are defined to have."
> 
> I concur with Jeffrey’s definition, which,I think, is widely accepted.
> 
> In addition, I am curious about your Peircian grounding of the assertion:
>> it is only in the mathematical realm that necessary reasoning can be done,
> 
> Do you have specific passages in mind?
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Jerry
> 
> -
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[Michael Bergman]

Hi Jon, Edwina, List,

See below:

On 10/20/2017 1:54 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:

Mike, List:

I took Gary F.'s point to be that no phenomenon can be properly 
categorized as /only /Firstness, /only /Secondness, or /only /Thirdness.


CSP:  What I term /phaneroscopy /is that study which, supported by
the direct observation of phanerons and generalizing its
observations, signalizes several very broad classes of phanerons;
describes the features of each; shows that although they are so
inextricably mixed together that no one can be isolated, yet it is
manifest that their characters are quite disparate; then proves,
beyond question, that a certain very short list comprises all of
these broadest categories of phanerons there are; and finally
proceeds to the laborious and difficult task of enumerating the
principal subdivisions of those categories. (CP 1.286, c. 1904;
italics in original)


For there to be reality, there must be real things (objects), and, by 
contrast, everything else. What I objected to was the facile transition 
from idea to blueprint to whatever, with the object changing in each 
change of reference. In the context of the blueprint object, no matter 
what the phenomenology, nor the sign interpretation (see below), the 
referenced object, the ground, is the blueprint, completely and 
perfectly understood.





However, I wonder if Mike's point is manifest in Peirce's later 
discussions of the three Universes of Experience.


CSP:  Of the three Universes of Experience familiar to us all, the
first comprises all mere Ideas, those airy nothings to which the
mind of poet, pure mathematician, or another /might /give local
habitation and a name within that mind. Their very airy-nothingness,
the fact that their Being consists in mere capability of getting
thought, not in anybody's Actually thinking them, saves their
Reality. The second Universe is that of the Brute Actuality of
things and facts. I am confident that their Being consists in
reactions against Brute forces, notwithstanding objections
redoubtable until they are closely and fairly examined. The third
Universe comprises everything whose being consists in active power
to establish connections between different objects, especially
between objects in different Universes. Such is everything which is
essentially a Sign -- not the mere body of the Sign, which is not
essentially such, but, so to speak, the Sign's Soul, which has its
Being in its power of serving as intermediary between its Object and
a Mind. Such, too, is a living consciousness, and such the life, the
power of growth, of a plant. Such is a living constitution -- a
daily newspaper, a great fortune, a social "movement." (CP 6.455,
1908; italics in original)


Only the /Idea/ of the building belongs to the first Universe as a real 
possibility.  It is /represented /(in different ways) by both the 
blueprint and the constructed building itself, which themselves belong 
to the second Universe of Brute Actuality.  The relations among these 
different objects that facilitate such mediation belong to the third 
Universe of Signs.  In multiple drafts of "A Neglected Argument for the 
Reality of God," Peirce also directly associated the second Universe 
with Matter and the third Universe with Mind.


EXACTLY SO. In fact, this same kind of relationship can be seen in 
dozens of examples (actually, more than 60) of the universal categories 
drawn from Peirce's writings [1].


In Edwina's comments on this thread, she told me to go study the Signs. 
The problem is, semiosis, logic and many other Peircean concepts are 
subsumed under the universal categories, the most succinct expression of 
Peirce's architectonic, not the other way around. We need to talk about 
signs when our discourse is representation, we need to talk about the 
universal categories when our discourse is Peirce's metaphysics and the 
"true" nature of Objects. That includes the concepts of real, existence, 
identity and truth.


So, Edwina, in this case, I am not looking at "blueprint" through the 
lens of representation, I am looking at "blueprint" in terms of the 
nature of the object. When it comes to categorize the reality of our 
real world, I think this is the proper basis.


Thanks, Mike

[1] http://www.mkbergman.com/2077/how-i-interpret-c-s-peirce/; the table 
at bottom is an updated and corrected version of an earlier one. Many on 
this list, including Edwina and Gary, helped point out those earlier 
errors, and there likely still remain some. ;)




Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
 - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 



On Fri, Oct 20, 2017 at 12:30 PM, Mike Bergman 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jerry C., List:

Here is the first passage that comes to my mind, probably because it was
the key text for my articles on "The Logic of Ingenuity."

CSP:  Of late decades philosophical mathematicians have come to a pretty
just understanding of the nature of their own pursuit. I do not know that
anybody struck the true note before Benjamin Peirce, who, in 1870, declared
mathematics to be "the science which draws necessary conclusions," adding
that it must be defined "subjectively" and not "objectively." A view
substantially in accord with his, though needlessly complicated, is given
in the article "Mathematics," in the ninth edition of the *Encyclopaedia
Britannica*. The author, Professor George Chrystal, holds that the essence
of mathematics lies in its making pure hypotheses, and in the character of
the hypotheses which it makes. What the mathematicians mean by a
"hypothesis" is a proposition imagined to be strictly true of an ideal
state of things. *In this sense, it is only about hypotheses that necessary
reasoning has any application; for, in regard to the real world, we have no
right to presume that any given intelligible proposition is true in
absolute strictness.* On the other hand, probable reasoning deals with the
ordinary course of experience; now, nothing like *a course of experience*
exists for ideal hypotheses. *Hence to say that mathematics busies itself
in drawing necessary conclusions, and to say that it busies itself with
hypotheses, are two statements which the logician perceives come to the
same thing* ... Now the mathematician does not conceive it to be any part
of his duty to verify the facts stated. He accepts them absolutely without
question. He does not in the least care whether they are correct or not ...
Thus, the mathematician does two very different things: namely, he first
frames a pure hypothesis stripped of all features which do not concern the
drawing of consequences from it, and this he does without inquiring or
caring whether it agrees with the actual facts or not; and, secondly, he
proceeds to draw necessary consequences from that hypothesis. (CP
3.558-559, 1898; italics in original, bold  added)


I suspect that if Peirce had written this paragraph a few years later, when
he was being more careful about distinguishing existence and reality, he
would have substituted something like "existing world" or "actual world"
for "real world."  Here is another relevant passage.

CSP:  Now all necessary reasoning, whether it be good or bad, is of the
nature of mathematical reasoning ... all necessary reasoning, be it the
merest verbiage of the theologians, so far as there is any semblance of
necessity in it, is mathematical reasoning. (CP 5.147-148, EP 2:206, 1903)


Peirce essentially *defined* the mathematical realm as encompassing all
circumstances in which necessary reasoning can be done.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Oct 20, 2017 at 1:36 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> Gary:
>
> On Oct 20, 2017, at 12:48 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:
>
> Gary F., Mike, List,
>
> Should we expand the claim about mathematical objects? Gary F says:  "That
> includes mathematical and other imaginary objects, which may be
> intelligible without being perceptible by the senses. Indeed it is *only* in
> the mathematical realm that *necessary reasoning* can be done, because
> the objects of pure mathematics have no being except what they are
> *defined* to have."
>
> I concur with Jeffrey’s definition, which,I think, is widely accepted.
>
> In addition, I am curious about your Peircian grounding of the assertion:
>
> it is *only* in the mathematical realm that *necessary reasoning* can be
> done,
>
> Do you have specific passages in mind?
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Mike, List:

I took Gary F.'s point to be that no phenomenon can be properly categorized
as *only *Firstness, *only *Secondness, or *only *Thirdness.

CSP:  What I term *phaneroscopy *is that study which, supported by the
direct observation of phanerons and generalizing its observations,
signalizes several very broad classes of phanerons; describes the features
of each; shows that although they are so inextricably mixed together that
no one can be isolated, yet it is manifest that their characters are quite
disparate; then proves, beyond question, that a certain very short list
comprises all of these broadest categories of phanerons there are; and
finally proceeds to the laborious and difficult task of enumerating the
principal subdivisions of those categories. (CP 1.286, c. 1904; italics in
original)


However, I wonder if Mike's point is manifest in Peirce's later discussions
of the three Universes of Experience.

CSP:  Of the three Universes of Experience familiar to us all, the first
comprises all mere Ideas, those airy nothings to which the mind of poet,
pure mathematician, or another *might *give local habitation and a name
within that mind. Their very airy-nothingness, the fact that their Being
consists in mere capability of getting thought, not in anybody's Actually
thinking them, saves their Reality. The second Universe is that of the
Brute Actuality of things and facts. I am confident that their Being
consists in reactions against Brute forces, notwithstanding objections
redoubtable until they are closely and fairly examined. The third Universe
comprises everything whose being consists in active power to establish
connections between different objects, especially between objects in
different Universes. Such is everything which is essentially a Sign -- not
the mere body of the Sign, which is not essentially such, but, so to speak,
the Sign's Soul, which has its Being in its power of serving as
intermediary between its Object and a Mind. Such, too, is a living
consciousness, and such the life, the power of growth, of a plant. Such is
a living constitution -- a daily newspaper, a great fortune, a social
"movement." (CP 6.455, 1908; italics in original)


Only the *Idea* of the building belongs to the first Universe as a real
possibility.  It is *represented *(in different ways) by both the blueprint
and the constructed building itself, which themselves belong to the second
Universe of Brute Actuality.  The relations among these different objects
that facilitate such mediation belong to the third Universe of Signs.  In
multiple drafts of "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God," Peirce
also directly associated the second Universe with Matter and the third
Universe with Mind.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Oct 20, 2017 at 12:30 PM, Mike Bergman  wrote:

> Hi Gary F., List,
>
> I separately responded to Jon on his quotes, so will not discuss further
> here.
>
> On 10/20/2017 10:45 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
>
> Mike,
>
>
>
> I think Jon’s post should clarify what is meant by a “real possibility.”
> But I’d like to add a point about the “universal categories”: they are not
> watertight compartments, or separate bins into which phenomena can be
> sorted. Any given phenomenon, such as an argument or a blueprint, can have
> its Firstness, its Secondness *and* its Thirdness. In fact you can’t have
> Thirdness that doesn’t involve Secondness, or Secondness that doesn’t
> involve Firstness.
>
> I would say, in contrast, that it is EXACTLY the process of sorting things
> into the bins of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness that Peirce was,
> throughout many all of his writings, trying to instruct us. I very often
> hear common themes of categorization and natural classes in Peirce's
> writings, don't you? Sure, there are always edge cases, and the inspections
> of those are partly what helps bring clarity and understanding to our
> thinking, so should be highly valued. And, of course, we may not always
> categorize them correctly (but should try to).
>
> A blueprint is a First relative to the universe of real buildings, i.e. it
> is the mere idea of a building. A physically instantiated blueprint, like a
> “replica” of an existential “graph,” is a Second in the universe of
> representations, a token of a type. And it is a Third in its function as an
> iconic sign interpretable by the builders.
>
> With all due respect, I could not disagree more, and I think this shows
> the muddied thinking around the universal categories. A blueprint and a
> physical building are both Secondness, period. There is certainly Firstness
> associated with a building, such as design and form and possible materials,
> but not a blueprint. A blueprint is its own Secondness. To my
> understanding, nothing material or in existence can ever be in Firstness;
> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Gary:

> On Oct 20, 2017, at 12:48 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard  
> wrote:
> 
> Gary F., Mike, List,
> 
> Should we expand the claim about mathematical objects? Gary F says:  "That 
> includes mathematical and other imaginary objects, which may be intelligible 
> without being perceptible by the senses. Indeed it is only in the 
> mathematical realm that necessary reasoning can be done, because the objects 
> of pure mathematics have no being except what they are defined to have."

I concur with Jeffrey’s definition, which,I think, is widely accepted.

In addition, I am curious about your Peircian grounding of the assertion:
> it is only in the mathematical realm that necessary reasoning can be done,

Do you have specific passages in mind?

Cheers

Jerry
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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[Edwina Taborsky]

 which may be
intelligible without being perceptible by the senses. Indeed 
   it is only in the mathematical realm that necessary  
reasoning can be done, because the objects of pure
mathematics have no being except what they are defined to
have. 
Gary f. 
From: Mike Bergman [mailto:m...@mkbergman.com] 
 Sent: 20-Oct-17 10:20
 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
 Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality   
 (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview) 
Hi John, List, 
On 10/20/2017 7:15 AM, John F Sowa wrote:   
 

Since my name was mentioned in the list, I'll say why I
believe that 
 methods of reasoning -- induction, abduction, and
deduction -- are 
 kinds of arguments (third in the triad
predicate-proposition-argument). 
 And that all arguments are segments in a never-ending
cycle of 
 inquiry.  Therefore, all of that is Thirdness.  

   John, your name was mentioned because you made this
statement:
 Mike 
Might you or others on the list   identify what "some"
of those 
   possibilities may be (with citations) 
 
 Peirce rarely gave enough examples to illustrate and
clarify his 
 ideas.  But I would cite any engineering project or plan
for the 
 future.  If you translate those plans to logic or a
computer 
 program, the variables represent "real possibilities". 
 But as mice and engineers know, the best laid plans
"gang aft agley". 
 Many possibilities that seemed real in the planning
stage never get 
 built, get modified, or get rejected as the project 
   develops.   
   I was (and am) questioning whether plans or computer
variables   are in any way Firstness; I maintain they are
instantiations,   even if they deal with an unrealized
future, and are therefore   Secondness. My original question
to Gary (and, now, you) about   "some [Firstness]
possibilities" which we should be "most   concerned to insist
upon" remains.
   The points you then raise only mostly affirm what I was
also   saying, that the universal categories are a process.
Calling   them arguments is, I agree, a more clarifying
definition.
   However, that being said, I also think that framing the   
   process question into "starting" and "stopping" points 
 miscontrues my process points; I made no such suggestion. The
  proper metaphor, which you also state, is the cycle.
   But, under a cyclic understanding, I do not see everything
as   being Thirdness. I agree and grant that arguments are in 
 Thirdness -- Peirce makes this point often in discussing his 
 categories applied to logic -- but the components of what
  might go into those arguments are drawn from all three  
categories, which I think is what Gary was attempting to point
  out.
   Mike
--  __ Michael K. Bergman
Cognonto Corporation 319.621.5225 skype:michaelkbergman
http://cognonto.com http://mkbergman.com
http://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman
__ 

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary F., Mike, List,


Should we expand the claim about mathematical objects? Gary F says:  "That 
includes mathematical and other imaginary objects, which may be intelligible 
without being perceptible by the senses. Indeed it is only in the mathematical 
realm that necessary reasoning can be done, because the objects of pure 
mathematics have no being except what they are defined to have."


An amendment might take the following form:  the objects of pure mathematics 
have a character that is determined by the definitions, postulates, common 
notions and diagrams in which the various conceptions are framed.


--Jeff





Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: g...@gnusystems.ca <g...@gnusystems.ca>
Sent: Friday, October 20, 2017 8:45:37 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

Mike,

I think Jon’s post should clarify what is meant by a “real possibility.” But 
I’d like to add a point about the “universal categories”: they are not 
watertight compartments, or separate bins into which phenomena can be sorted. 
Any given phenomenon, such as an argument or a blueprint, can have its 
Firstness, its Secondness and its Thirdness. In fact you can’t have Thirdness 
that doesn’t involve Secondness, or Secondness that doesn’t involve Firstness.

A blueprint is a First relative to the universe of real buildings, i.e. it is 
the mere idea of a building. A physically instantiated blueprint, like a 
“replica” of an existential “graph,” is a Second in the universe of 
representations, a token of a type. And it is a Third in its function as an 
iconic sign interpretable by the builders.

We certainly can’t define these categories as arguments. An argument is a 
phenomenon, and so is a process such as an inquiry; both are phenomena in which 
Thirdness is predominant. But the categories are elements of any and all 
phenomena that can be “before the mind” (any kind of “mind”) in any way. That 
includes mathematical and other imaginary objects, which may be intelligible 
without being perceptible by the senses. Indeed it is only in the mathematical 
realm that necessary reasoning can be done, because the objects of pure 
mathematics have no being except what they are defined to have.

Gary f.

From: Mike Bergman [mailto:m...@mkbergman.com]
Sent: 20-Oct-17 10:20
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)


Hi John, List,

On 10/20/2017 7:15 AM, John F Sowa wrote:
Since my name was mentioned in the list, I'll say why I believe that
methods of reasoning -- induction, abduction, and deduction -- are
kinds of arguments (third in the triad predicate-proposition-argument).
And that all arguments are segments in a never-ending cycle of
inquiry.  Therefore, all of that is Thirdness.

John, your name was mentioned because you made this statement:



Mike

Might you or others on the list identify what "some" of those
possibilities may be (with citations)

Peirce rarely gave enough examples to illustrate and clarify his
ideas.  But I would cite any engineering project or plan for the
future.  If you translate those plans to logic or a computer
program, the variables represent "real possibilities".

But as mice and engineers know, the best laid plans "gang aft agley".
Many possibilities that seemed real in the planning stage never get
built, get modified, or get rejected as the project develops.

I was (and am) questioning whether plans or computer variables are in any way 
Firstness; I maintain they are instantiations, even if they deal with an 
unrealized future, and are therefore Secondness. My original question to Gary 
(and, now, you) about "some [Firstness] possibilities" which we should be "most 
concerned to insist upon" remains.

The points you then raise only mostly affirm what I was also saying, that the 
universal categories are a process. Calling them arguments is, I agree, a more 
clarifying definition.

However, that being said, I also think that framing the process question into 
"starting" and "stopping" points miscontrues my process points; I made no such 
suggestion. The proper metaphor, which you also state, is the cycle.

But, under a cyclic understanding, I do not see everything as being Thirdness. 
I agree and grant that arguments are in Thirdness -- Peirce makes this point 
often in discussing his categories applied to logic -- but the components of 
what might go into those arguments are drawn from all three categories, which I 
think is what Gary was attempting to point out.

Mike


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U

Is chemistry at the foundation of pragmatism? was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List: 

For CSP, What are the roles of chemical predicates in establishing the factual 
basis for  existence and reality?

> On Oct 20, 2017, at 10:26 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> For to what else does the entire teaching of chemistry relate except to the 
> "behavior" of different possible kinds of material substance? And in what 
> does that behavior consist except that if a substance of a certain kind 
> should be exposed to an agency of a certain kind, a certain kind of sensible 
> result would ensue, according to our experiences hitherto.   (CP 5.457, EP 
> 2:356-357, 1903)

Please carefully inquire into the potential meanings of these sentences.

How should the meaning of “the entire teaching of chemistry” be related to 
inquiry in general? Constraints?

Can one substitute “natural sorts and kinds” for “different possible kinds”?

What are the distinctive meanings among physical behavior, chemical behavior, 
and psychological behavior in the metaphysical context of “substance”?

What are the constraints of meaning for the phrase “exposed to agency” in the 
context of body, mind and spirit?

How is the phrase “a certain kind of sensible result” related to pragmaticism?

In what sense is phrase “according to our experiences, hitherto” related to the 
potential future of inquiry?

How do these pages (EP 2:356-357) relate to CSP’s  philosophy of phenomenology?

Any help anyone can offer?

Cheers

Jerry





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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[Mike Bergman]

  
  
Hi Gary F., List, 

I separately responded to Jon on his quotes, so will not discuss
  further here.


On 10/20/2017 10:45 AM,
  g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:


  
  
  
  
Mike,
 
I think Jon’s post should clarify what is meant
by a “real possibility.” But I’d like to add a point about
the “universal categories”: they are not watertight
compartments, or separate bins into which phenomena can be
sorted. Any given phenomenon, such as an argument or a
blueprint, can have its Firstness, its Secondness and
its Thirdness. In fact you can’t have Thirdness that doesn’t
involve Secondness, or Secondness that doesn’t involve
Firstness.
  


I would say, in contrast, that it is EXACTLY the process of sorting
things into the bins of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness that
Peirce was, throughout many all of his writings, trying to instruct
us. I very often hear common themes of categorization and natural
classes in Peirce's writings, don't you? Sure, there are always edge
cases, and the inspections of those are partly what helps bring
clarity and understanding to our thinking, so should be highly
valued. And, of course, we may not always categorize them correctly
(but should try to).
 

  

 
A blueprint is a First relative to the universe
of real buildings, i.e. it is the mere idea of a building. A
physically instantiated blueprint, like a “replica” of an
existential “graph,” is a Second in the universe of
representations, a token of a type. And it is a Third in its
function as an iconic sign interpretable by the builders.
  


With all due respect, I could not disagree more, and I think this
shows the muddied thinking around the universal categories. A
blueprint and a physical building are both Secondness, period. There
is certainly Firstness associated with a building, such as design
and form and possible materials, but not a blueprint. A blueprint is
its own Secondness. To my understanding, nothing material or in
existence can ever be in Firstness; they are characters or
attributes, not instances. We also have a Thirdness about a
building, but that relates to methods for constructing buildings,
limits and laws that govern how and within what constraints it can
be built, or inclusion of buildings as a type of architectural
artifact. 

Thanks, Mike


  

 
We certainly can’t define these
categories as arguments. An argument is a phenomenon, and so
is a process such as an inquiry; both are phenomena in which
Thirdness is predominant. But the categories are elements of
any and all phenomena that can be “before the mind” (any
  kind of “mind”) in any way. That includes
mathematical and other imaginary objects, which may be
intelligible without being perceptible by the senses. Indeed
it is only in the mathematical realm that necessary
  reasoning can be done, because the objects of pure
mathematics have no being except what they are defined
to have.
 
Gary f.
 

  
From: Mike Bergman
[mailto:m...@mkbergman.com] 
Sent: 20-Oct-17 10:20
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality
(was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)
  

 
Hi John, List,
 

  On 10/20/2017 7:15 AM, John F Sowa wrote:


  Since my name was mentioned in the list,
I'll say why I believe that 
methods of reasoning -- induction, abduction, and deduction
-- are 
kinds of arguments (third in the triad
predicate-proposition-argument). 
And that all arguments are segments in a never-ending cycle
of 
inquiry.  Therefore, all of that is Thirdness. 


  John, your name was mentioned because you made this statement:
  
  
  

  
Mike 


  
Might you or others on the list
  identify what "some" of those 
  possibilities may be (with citations) 
  
  
Peirce rarely gave enough examples to illustrate and clarify
his 
ideas.  But I would cite any engineering project or plan for
the 
future.  If you translate those plans to logic or a computer

 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[Mike Bergman]

  
  
Hi Jon,
My goodness, Bingo! Thank you. This is exactly what I was
seeking. I also appreciate the year stamp [1903].
  
I have ascribed, based on my reading of Peirce, that the
possible attributes (properties, characters) of things belong in
Firstness. By this reading, whether we know it directly or not,
a "real possible" is something that can be empirically
determined, at some possible time by some possible agent, as
being a true character or not. If so, it is a "real possible";
if not, not. Thus, a "soft" diamond, though a possible
character, is not real, since the real character of a diamond is
to be "hard". (I suppose, too, one might surmise that the possibilities
"most concerned to insist upon" are those characters most
closely tied to the essence of an object, such as sparkle or
hardness for a diamond.)
  
These quotes really help me better understand. If you see anything
further I have missed, I welcome further commentary. Otherwise,
I will take the bit out of my teeth.
Best, Mike


On 10/20/2017 10:26 AM, Jon Alan
  Schmidt wrote:


  Mike, List:



  MB:  BTW, can you provide a citation of the quote in
question?



I believe that Gary R. had the following quote in mind as
  Peirce's most explicit affirmation of real possibilities.



  CSP:  Another doctrine which is involved in Pragmaticism
as an essential consequence of it, but which the writer
defended in North American Review, Vol. CXIII, pp.
449-472, 1871, before he had formulated, even in his own
mind, the principle of pragmaticism, is the scholastic
doctrine of realism. This is usually defined as the opinion
that there are real objects that are general, among the
number being the modes of determination of existent
singulars, if, indeed, these be not the only such objects.
But the belief in this can hardly escape being accompanied
by the acknowledgment that there are, besides, real vagues,
and especially real possibilities. For possibility being the
denial of a necessity, which is a kind of generality, is
vague like any other contradiction of a general. Indeed,
  it is the reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism
  is most concerned to insist upon. The article of
January 1878 endeavored to gloze over this point as unsuited
to the exoteric public addressed; or perhaps the writer
wavered in his own mind. He said that if a diamond were to
be formed in a bed of cotton-wool, and were to be consumed
there without ever having been pressed upon by any hard edge
or point, it would be merely a question of nomenclature
whether that diamond should be said to have been hard or
not. No doubt this is true, except for the abominable
falsehood in the word MERELY, implying that symbols are
unreal. Nomenclature involves classification; and
classification is true or false, and the generals to which
it refers are either reals in the one case, or figments in
the other. For if the reader will turn to the original maxim
of pragmaticism at the beginning of this article, he will
see that the question is, not what did happen, but
whether it would have been well to engage in any line of
conduct whose successful issue depended upon whether that
diamond would resist an attempt to scratch it, or
whether all other logical means of determining how it ought
to be classed would lead to the conclusion which,
to quote the very words of that article, would be "the
belief which alone could be the result of investigation
carried sufficiently far." Pragmaticism makes the
ultimate intellectual purport of what you please to consist
in conceived conditional resolutions, or their substance;
and therefore, the conditional propositions, with their
hypothetical
  antecedents, in which such resolutions consist, being of
the ultimate nature of meaning, must be capable of being
true, that is, of expressing whatever there be which is such
as the proposition expresses, independently of being thought
to be so in any judgment, or being represented to be so in
any other symbol of any man or men. But that amounts to
  saying that possibility is sometimes of a real kind.
(CP 5.453, EP 2:354, 1903; italics in original, 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[gnox]

Mike,

 

I think Jon’s post should clarify what is meant by a “real possibility.” But 
I’d like to add a point about the “universal categories”: they are not 
watertight compartments, or separate bins into which phenomena can be sorted. 
Any given phenomenon, such as an argument or a blueprint, can have its 
Firstness, its Secondness and its Thirdness. In fact you can’t have Thirdness 
that doesn’t involve Secondness, or Secondness that doesn’t involve Firstness.

 

A blueprint is a First relative to the universe of real buildings, i.e. it is 
the mere idea of a building. A physically instantiated blueprint, like a 
“replica” of an existential “graph,” is a Second in the universe of 
representations, a token of a type. And it is a Third in its function as an 
iconic sign interpretable by the builders.

 

We certainly can’t define these categories as arguments. An argument is a 
phenomenon, and so is a process such as an inquiry; both are phenomena in which 
Thirdness is predominant. But the categories are elements of any and all 
phenomena that can be “before the mind” (any kind of “mind”) in any way. That 
includes mathematical and other imaginary objects, which may be intelligible 
without being perceptible by the senses. Indeed it is only in the mathematical 
realm that necessary reasoning can be done, because the objects of pure 
mathematics have no being except what they are defined to have.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Mike Bergman [mailto:m...@mkbergman.com] 
Sent: 20-Oct-17 10:20
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

 

Hi John, List,

 

On 10/20/2017 7:15 AM, John F Sowa wrote:

Since my name was mentioned in the list, I'll say why I believe that 
methods of reasoning -- induction, abduction, and deduction -- are 
kinds of arguments (third in the triad predicate-proposition-argument). 
And that all arguments are segments in a never-ending cycle of 
inquiry.  Therefore, all of that is Thirdness. 


John, your name was mentioned because you made this statement:





Mike 



Might you or others on the list identify what "some" of those 
possibilities may be (with citations) 


Peirce rarely gave enough examples to illustrate and clarify his 
ideas.  But I would cite any engineering project or plan for the 
future.  If you translate those plans to logic or a computer 
program, the variables represent "real possibilities". 

But as mice and engineers know, the best laid plans "gang aft agley". 
Many possibilities that seemed real in the planning stage never get 
built, get modified, or get rejected as the project develops. 


I was (and am) questioning whether plans or computer variables are in any way 
Firstness; I maintain they are instantiations, even if they deal with an 
unrealized future, and are therefore Secondness. My original question to Gary 
(and, now, you) about "some [Firstness] possibilities" which we should be "most 
concerned to insist upon" remains.

The points you then raise only mostly affirm what I was also saying, that the 
universal categories are a process. Calling them arguments is, I agree, a more 
clarifying definition.

However, that being said, I also think that framing the process question into 
"starting" and "stopping" points miscontrues my process points; I made no such 
suggestion. The proper metaphor, which you also state, is the cycle.

But, under a cyclic understanding, I do not see everything as being Thirdness. 
I agree and grant that arguments are in Thirdness -- Peirce makes this point 
often in discussing his categories applied to logic -- but the components of 
what might go into those arguments are drawn from all three categories, which I 
think is what Gary was attempting to point out.

Mike




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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Mike, List:

MB:  BTW, can you provide a citation of the quote in question?


I believe that Gary R. had the following quote in mind as Peirce's most
explicit affirmation of real possibilities.

CSP:  Another doctrine which is involved in Pragmaticism as an essential
consequence of it, but which the writer defended in *North American Review*,
Vol. CXIII, pp. 449-472, 1871, before he had formulated, even in his own
mind, the principle of pragmaticism, is the scholastic doctrine of realism.
This is usually defined as the opinion that there are real objects that are
general, among the number being the modes of determination of existent
singulars, if, indeed, these be not the only such objects. But the belief
in this can hardly escape being accompanied by the acknowledgment that
there are, besides, real *vagues*, and especially real possibilities. For
possibility being the denial of a necessity, which is a kind of generality,
is vague like any other contradiction of a general. *Indeed, it is the
reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most concerned to insist
upon.* The article of January 1878 endeavored to gloze over this point as
unsuited to the exoteric public addressed; or perhaps the writer wavered in
his own mind. He said that if a diamond were to be formed in a bed of
cotton-wool, and were to be consumed there without ever having been pressed
upon by any hard edge or point, it would be merely a question of
nomenclature whether that diamond should be said to have been hard or not.
No doubt this is true, except for the abominable falsehood in the word
MERELY, implying that symbols are unreal. Nomenclature involves
classification; and classification is true or false, and the generals to
which it refers are either reals in the one case, or figments in the other.
For if the reader will turn to the original maxim of pragmaticism at the
beginning of this article, he will see that the question is, not what
*did *happen,
but whether it would have been well to engage in any line of conduct whose
successful issue depended upon whether that diamond *would *resist an
attempt to scratch it, or whether all other logical means of determining
how it ought to be classed *would *lead to the conclusion which, to quote
the very words of that article, would be "the belief which alone could be
the result of investigation carried *sufficiently far*." Pragmaticism makes
the ultimate intellectual purport of what you please to consist in
conceived conditional resolutions, or their substance; and therefore, the
conditional propositions, with their hypothetical
antecedents, in which such resolutions consist, being of the ultimate
nature of meaning, must be capable of being true, that is, of expressing
whatever there be which is such as the proposition expresses, independently
of being thought to be so in any judgment, or being represented to be so in
any other symbol of any man or men. *But that amounts to saying that
possibility is sometimes of a real kind.* (CP 5.453, EP 2:354, 1903;
italics in original, bold added)


Here the general example of a real possibility is any conditional
proposition that is true independent of anyone thinking it to be so, and
the specific example is the hardness of a diamond.  If it *were *to be
scratched, it *would *resist the attempt; so its hardness is *real*, even
if it is never *actually *scratched.  Peirce goes on in subsequent
paragraphs to discuss subjective and objective modality before returning to
the diamond.

CSP:  Let us now take up the case of that diamond which, having been
crystallized upon a cushion of jeweler's cotton, was accidentally consumed
by fire before the crystal of corundum that had been sent for had had time
to arrive, and indeed without being subjected to any other pressure than
that of the atmosphere and its own weight. *The question is, was that
diamond really hard? It is certain that no discernible actual fact
determined it to be so. But is its hardness not, nevertheless, a real fact?*
To say, as the article of January 1878 seems to intend, that it is just as
an arbitrary "usage of speech" chooses to arrange its thoughts, is as much
as to decide against the reality of the property, since the real is that
which is such as it is regardless of how it is, at any time, thought to be.
Remember that this diamond's condition is not an isolated fact. There is no
such thing; and an isolated fact could hardly be real. It is an unsevered,
though presciss part of the unitary fact of nature. Being a diamond, it was
a mass of pure carbon, in the form of a more or less transparent crystal
(brittle, and of facile octahedral cleavage, unless it was of an unheard-of
variety), which, if not trimmed after one of the fashions in which diamonds
may be trimmed, took the shape of an octahedron, apparently regular (I need
not go into minutiae), with grooved edges, and probably with some curved
faces. Without being subjected to any considerable pressure, it could be
found to be 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[Mike Bergman]

  
  
Hi John, List,


On 10/20/2017 7:15 AM, John F Sowa
  wrote:

Since
  my name was mentioned in the list, I'll say why I believe that
  
  methods of reasoning -- induction, abduction, and deduction -- are
  
  kinds of arguments (third in the triad
  predicate-proposition-argument).
  
  And that all arguments are segments in a never-ending cycle of
  
  inquiry.  Therefore, all of that is Thirdness.
  


John, your name was mentioned because you made this statement:


  Mike
  
  Might you or
others on the list identify what "some" of those

possibilities may be (with citations)

  
  
  Peirce rarely gave enough examples to illustrate and clarify his
  
  ideas.  But I would cite any engineering project or plan for the
  
  future.  If you translate those plans to logic or a computer
  
  program, the variables represent "real possibilities".
  
  
  But as mice and engineers know, the best laid plans "gang aft
  agley".
  
  Many possibilities that seemed real in the planning stage never
  get
  
  built, get modified, or get rejected as the project develops.


I was (and am) questioning whether plans or computer variables are
in any way Firstness; I maintain they are instantiations, even if
they deal with an unrealized future, and are therefore Secondness.
My original question to Gary (and, now, you) about "some [Firstness]
possibilities" which we should be "most concerned to insist upon"
remains.

The points you then raise only mostly affirm what I was also saying,
that the universal categories are a process. Calling them arguments
is, I agree, a more clarifying definition.

However, that being said, I also think that framing the process
question into "starting" and "stopping" points miscontrues my
process points; I made no such suggestion. The proper metaphor,
which you also state, is the cycle.

But, under a cyclic understanding, I do not see everything as being
Thirdness. I agree and grant that arguments are in Thirdness --
Peirce makes this point often in discussing his categories applied
to logic -- but the components of what might go into those arguments
are drawn from all three categories, which I think is what Gary was
attempting to point out.

Mike


  
  Meanwhile, I believe that most Peirce
scholars see abduction as a 1ns

when it is considered within a tripartite inquiry (what Peirce
calls

"a complete inquiry") such that:


a) 1st, 1ns, abduction (a hypothesis is formed)


b) 2nd, 3ns, deduction (there is an analysis of the implications

of the hypothesis were it valid in the interest of constructing

tests of it


c) 3rd, 2ns, induction (the actual experiment testing of the

hypothesis occurs)

  
  
  Those numbers go beyond what Peirce said.  And they suggests that
  
  there is a starting point and a stopping point.  Peirce emphasized
  
  perception and purposive action.   If you start with perception
  
  and end with action, the order of reasoning would be observation,
  
  induction, abduction, deduction and action.
  
  
  But every action is a test of some prediction (deduction),
  
  which leads to new observations, which lead to a new inductions,
  
  which leads to an abduction, which revises previous theories
  
  (hypotheses), which leads to new deductions (prediction), which
  
  leads to new action (testing), which leads to new observations...
  
  
  The whole cycle is an endless inquiry, which may be considered
  
  a sequence of arguments -- all of which are a kind of Thirdness.
  
  Furthermore, there may be cycles within cycles, as the inquiry
  
  goes into side issues, corollaries, revisions, debates...
  
  
  As an illustration of the cycle, see the attached soup1.jpg.
  
  
  John
  


-- 
__

Michael K. Bergman
Cognonto Corporation
319.621.5225
skype:michaelkbergman
http://cognonto.com
http://mkbergman.com
http://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman
__ 
  


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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}John, list

I agree with John's order: Observation [which can only be done
within Secondness] as the 'surprising FACT' [5.188] is observed
within induction, then comes the novel hypothesis of abduction..."a
retroductive  inference is only justified by its explaining an
observed fact" 1.89.

And, as pointed out, semiosis/argument is a process.

Edwina
 On Fri 20/10/17  8:15 AM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
 Since my name was mentioned in the list, I'll say why I believe that

 methods of reasoning -- induction, abduction, and deduction -- are 
 kinds of arguments (third in the triad
predicate-proposition-argument). 
 And that all arguments are segments in a never-ending cycle of 
 inquiry.  Therefore, all of that is Thirdness. 
 > Meanwhile, I believe that most Peirce scholars see abduction as a
1ns 
 > when it is considered within a tripartite inquiry (what Peirce
calls 
 > "a complete inquiry") such that: 
 >  
 > a) 1st, 1ns, abduction (a hypothesis is formed) 
 >  
 > b) 2nd, 3ns, deduction (there is an analysis of the implications 
 > of the hypothesis were it valid in the interest of constructing 
 > tests of it 
 >  
 > c) 3rd, 2ns, induction (the actual experiment testing of the 
 > hypothesis occurs) 
 Those numbers go beyond what Peirce said.  And they suggests that 
 there is a starting point and a stopping point.  Peirce emphasized 
 perception and purposive action.   If you start with perception 
 and end with action, the order of reasoning would be observation, 
 induction, abduction, deduction and action. 
 But every action is a test of some prediction (deduction), 
 which leads to new observations, which lead to a new inductions, 
 which leads to an abduction, which revises previous theories 
 (hypotheses), which leads to new deductions (prediction), which 
 leads to new action (testing), which leads to new observations... 
 The whole cycle is an endless inquiry, which may be considered 
 a sequence of arguments -- all of which are a kind of Thirdness. 
 Furthermore, there may be cycles within cycles, as the inquiry 
 goes into side issues, corollaries, revisions, debates... 
 As an illustration of the cycle, see the attached soup1.jpg. 
 John 

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[John F Sowa]

Since my name was mentioned in the list, I'll say why I believe that
methods of reasoning -- induction, abduction, and deduction -- are
kinds of arguments (third in the triad predicate-proposition-argument).
And that all arguments are segments in a never-ending cycle of
inquiry.  Therefore, all of that is Thirdness.


Meanwhile, I believe that most Peirce scholars see abduction as a 1ns
when it is considered within a tripartite inquiry (what Peirce calls
"a complete inquiry") such that:

a) 1st, 1ns, abduction (a hypothesis is formed)

b) 2nd, 3ns, deduction (there is an analysis of the implications
of the hypothesis were it valid in the interest of constructing
tests of it

c) 3rd, 2ns, induction (the actual experiment testing of the
hypothesis occurs)


Those numbers go beyond what Peirce said.  And they suggests that
there is a starting point and a stopping point.  Peirce emphasized
perception and purposive action.   If you start with perception
and end with action, the order of reasoning would be observation,
induction, abduction, deduction and action.

But every action is a test of some prediction (deduction),
which leads to new observations, which lead to a new inductions,
which leads to an abduction, which revises previous theories
(hypotheses), which leads to new deductions (prediction), which
leads to new action (testing), which leads to new observations...

The whole cycle is an endless inquiry, which may be considered
a sequence of arguments -- all of which are a kind of Thirdness.
Furthermore, there may be cycles within cycles, as the inquiry
goes into side issues, corollaries, revisions, debates...

As an illustration of the cycle, see the attached soup1.jpg.

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[Mike Bergman]

  
  
Hi Gary, John, List,
Thanks again, Gary, for your detailed and informative
response. I am, however, not yet ready to take the bit out of my
teeth.
First, let's talk about this:


  Meanwhile,
  I believe that most Peirce scholars see abduction as a 1ns
  when it is considered within a tripartite inquiry (what
  Peirce calls "a complete inquiry") such that:
  

  1st, 1ns, abduction (a
  hypothesis is formed)


  |> 2nd, 3ns, deduction
  (there is an analysis of the implications of the
  hypothesis were it valid in the interest of
  constructing tests of it


  3rd, 2ns, induction (the
  actual experiment testing of the hypothesis occurs)

  


  
Why the need to form a hypothesis? Where do the possibles
come from? The need for the hypothesis comes from, in my
understanding, a "surprising fact" (we found a unicorn in some
unexplored territory) or for the reasons of purposeful inquiry
when we are questioning what we think we already know (such as
Penzias and crew searching for microwaves; we know there is more
spectrum we don't directly perceive). As I said before, these
are grounded in Thirdness (actually, all categories) to help
form our purposeful abductive inquiries in Firstness. I like and
agree with these sources as you put it:


  
  
  

  2nd, 1ns, a well-prepared
  scientist makes a guess (an 'aha' moment perhaps;
  abduction as a kind of instinct);

  
  

  |> 1st, 3ns, Out of the
  wealth of his knowledge and experience, considering a
  scientific problem (involving "a surprising array of
  fact"--1907); 

  
  3rd, 2ns, the scientist formulates it in such a way that in
the next step of inquiry its implications for testing may be
deduced; that is, he makes of it a bona fide hypo

  
That makes sense to me as a pretty good listing of sources
for retroduction.
But, I think one of the main weaknesses I see in most
discussion of Peirce's universal categories is to ignore the
dynamism of the process; semiosis, after all, is a process
definition. I think the application of categories are the same.
Why the need to form a hypothesis?
Second, with regard to blueprints and plans:

So,
here's an example of a 'may-be' which could be realized: the
blue print of my dream house may some day result in that
house being built (even, as John suggested, the design will
probably be changed any number of times as new, perhaps
aesthetic or economic, abductions are considered during it's
actual construction. If all the conditions (financial,
design, etc.) are met, it 'would-be' the case that some time
in the future that possible structure would really come to
exist. I think Peirce gave this sort of example himself; a
recipe for apple pie as well (I've forgotten the context(s).

  
I don't buy it, and I don't think these are examples of
Firstness. A plan or blueprint is, after all, instantiated. The
plan exists, whether on paper or in my head. Sure, the actual house
construction is still a possible, but the plan is not Firstness.
I don't believe anything instantiated is anything but
Secondness. I think the possibility of microwave radiation
telling us about the Big Bang or the possibility of finding blue
chrysanthemums from China may be possible; both are Firstness to
me. But which, if either, may be seen as "real" sufficient to be
"most concerned to insist upon" still sounds pretty opaque to
me. That is why finding the source of this quote is important. I
still think the question of what Firstness possibilities may be
real, and which may not, is still open.
  
Last, I was NOT suggesting that Peirce thought or was maintaining
that all Firstness is real; quite the opposite. To wit, without
criteria or some guidance, I still see no criteria by which one
can discern real from not in the possibilities of Firstness.
This may seem a bit of esoteric regarding Peirce's universal
categories, but my sense remains there is still something
important to tease out here.
Best, Mike
  
On 10/19/2017 11:54 AM, Gary Richmond wrote:

  
  

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[John F Sowa]

Kirsti and Gary R,

Resorting to Quine cannot be taken as any starter. 


My note was based on three lines by Peirce, which Quine summarized
in just one line.  If a reference to Quine is offensive, I'll
restate the issues in terms of passages by Peirce that Gary cited:

1901 | Individual | CP 3.613

...whatever exists is individual, since existence (not reality)
and individuality are essentially the same thing...


1902 | Minute Logic: Chapter IV. Ethics (Logic IV) | CP 6.349

Existence [...] is a special mode of reality, which, whatever other
characteristics it possesses, has that of being absolutely determinate.


1905 [c.] | The Basis of Pragmaticism | MS [R] 280:36-7

...the term existence is properly a term, not of logic, but of
metaphysics; and metaphysically understood, an object exists, if
and only if, it reacts with every other existing object of the same
universe. But in the definition of a logical proper name, exist is
used in its logical sense, and means merely to be a singular of
a logical universe, or universe of discourse.


The first four lines of the 1905 passage discuss existence in
a metaphysical sense.  The last three lines state the equivalent
of Quine's dictum:

In Peirce's algebraic notation, "the definition of a logical proper
name" means that it appears as the name that follows a quantifier.
In his existential graphs, it means that the name is assigned to
the referent of a line of identity.

The last two lines say that "exist" means "to be a singular of
a logical universe, or universe of discourse".  If you object to
the word 'universe', replace it with the word 'domain'.

Quine stated exactly the same point in one line by saying "To be is
to be the value [referent] of a quantified variable."

I quoted the one-line version only because it's shorter and simpler.
But if you object to Quine, then use Peirce's definition.


Existence means something very different to Quine than to CSP.


I agree.  Peirce distinguished the metaphysical sense from the
logical sense.  That enabled him to talk about a domain of
possibilities, which may be referenced by a quantified variable.

As a nominalist, Quine only allowed a single domain, which corresponds
to Peirce's metaphysical existence.  Therefore Quine equated existence
in the physical universe with reality.  Quine never used modal logic,
metalanguage, or higher-order logic.  And he was strongly opposed to
any talk about real possibilities.

Although mentioning Quine was a distraction, I think that this
discussion can help clarify the distinction between Peirce's
realism and Quine's nominalism.

In short, Peirce allowed multiple universes (or domains), but
Quine allowed only one universe (or domain).

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[kirstima]

Ontology/ epistemology taken as it has been does not apply to Peirce.

Kirsti

John F Sowa kirjoitti 19.10.2017 15:53:

Jon AS, Edwina, Jerry LRC, Gary R, Mike, and Ben,

Jon

By Peirce's definitions--at least, the ones that he carefully
employed late in his life--the verb "exist" may only be used to
talk about actual things that "react with the other like things
in the environment" (CP 6.495).


Yes.  That's why I avoided the word 'exist'.  In my note, I did not
use the words 'exist', 'existence', 'real', or 'reality'.  I assumed
logic in a way that could be represented in either Peirce's algebraic
notation or his existential graphs.  In his Gamma graphs, Peirce used
lines of identity in areas that represented possibilities.

One can use English sentences without the word 'exist' and map
them to logic in a way that the variables or the lines of identity
show what kinds of things are assumed.  But assumption does not
imply existence.

Edwina

thanks for a great post. I think that we don't pay enough
attention to relations.


Thanks.  And note that Frege may have published the first complete
notation for first-order logic in 1879.  But Peirce was the first to
introduce higher-order logic by quantifying over relations in 1885.

Jerry

I suggest that John’s reliance on Quine’s sentence to relate
metaphysical terms is highly problematic.  The sentence is merely
a rhetoric trick to divert the reader’s attention...


Yes!  Exactly!  I'm sure that Quine's rhetorical trick is one that
Peirce would have loved:  diverting attention away from the words
is essential.  That step cuts through a mass of verbiage to clarify
the implicit logical assumptions.

Quine was a strict nominalist, who used his trick to get rid of
assumptions he did not like.  But I used it to support Peirce's
much richer ontology, which uses logic in ways that Quine did not
approve:  metalanguage, higher-order logic, and modal logic.

Jerry
Consider the word “Love” for example.  Or, almost any human feeling. 
... the logics of molecular biology and medicine. which require

recursive compositions of terms to operate in multiple metalanguages.


Good examples.  Write sentences about those topics in English and
translate them to your choice of logic.  Q's dictum will show which
assumed entities are referenced by quantified variables.

Gary

according to Peirce existence is not "properly" a term of logic,
but of metaphysics.

1905 [c.] | The Basis of Pragmaticism | MS [R] 280:36-7

...the term existence is properly a term, not of logic, but of
metaphysics; and metaphysically understood, an object exists, if
and only if, it reacts with every other existing object of the same
universe. But in the definition of a logical proper name, exist is
used in its logical sense, and means merely to be a singular of a
logical universe, or universe of discourse.


That is exactly what I was trying to say.

Note the word 'But', which separates what Peirce said about the
metaphysical sense and the logical sense.  By applying Quine's
dictum to the logic, we can determine what is contained in the
logical universe (AKA domain of discourse).

Instead of saying that the possibilities exist, we can say that
they are contained in a special domain of discourse.  That does
not imply existence in the physical environment.

Gary

As for the reality of possibles, Peirce holds that  "...it is the
reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most concerned
to insist upon."  Here one can begin to see how the last branch
of logic rather melds into metaphysical inquiries.


Mike

Might you or others on the list identify what "some" of those
possibilities may be (with citations)


Peirce rarely gave enough examples to illustrate and clarify his
ideas.  But I would cite any engineering project or plan for the
future.  If you translate those plans to logic or a computer
program, the variables represent "real possibilities".

But as mice and engineers know, the best laid plans "gang aft agley".
Many possibilities that seemed real in the planning stage never get
built, get modified, or get rejected as the project develops.

Ben

My question is: Why does not the verb "to realize" work or
function to "talk about actual things and real relations"?


I doubt that having a verb is relevant to the issues.  Peirce
was a logician, who allowed logic to refer to multiple universes
(or domains) of discourse.  When he applied his logic to issues
expressed in ordinary language, he always kept that logical
distinction in mind.

As Peirce himself said, he found that existential graphs clarified
his way of thinking about all the issues in his philosophy.  The
exercise of mapping his language to logic can help us understand
what he was trying to say.

John



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[kirstima]

Hah! To the point Ben!

Kirsti

Ben Novak kirjoitti 19.10.2017 14:30:

Dear List:

Jon A. writes in his first post on this string: "Some of the
difficulty here is likely due to the fact that there is no verb form
of "reality," which could then be used to talk about both _actual
_things and _real _relations."

My question is: Why does not the verb "to realize" work or f'unction
to "talk about actual things and real relations"?

Ben Novak

BEN NOVAK
5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142
Telephone: (814) 808-5702

_"All art is mortal, __not merely the individual artifacts, but the
arts themselves._ _One day the last portrait of Rembrandt_ _and the
last bar of Mozart will have ceased to be—__though possibly a
colored canvas and a sheet of notes may remain—__because the last
eye and the last ear accessible to their message __will have gone."
_Oswald Spengler

On Thu, Oct 19, 2017 at 12:46 AM, Mike Bergman 
wrote:


Hi Gary, List,

I like your analysis and I see its logic. I (and others on the list)
have at times been confused as to whether abduction was in Firstness
or Thirdness. I still feel that abduction is applied to the
"surprising fact" that causes us to question the generals in
Thirdness, so is *grounded* there, but the results of abductive
logic informs the possibilities to be considered anew in the next
sequence of inquiry, so informs what to consider in Firstness. By
this thought, abduction is really a bridge between Thirdness and
Firstness in a dynamic process.

In that context, then, "some possibilities" which we should be "most
concerned to insist upon" are those that prove to be the most
pragmatic responses to our inquiry. I think that is the point you
are making here. In that context, then, virtually any "conditional
proposition" worthy of pragmatic consideration could/would be
instantiated in some pragmatic reality. Even unicorns fit under this
umbrella, since we know of no natural reason to discount a
horse-like animal with a single frontal horn. Under this
formulation, any reasonable "conditional proposition" could be seen
as real.

While I like some of the nugget of this argument, I think it
ultimately begs the question. What caught my attention in the CSP
quote you surfaced seems to suggest more: a "most concerned"
criterion that seems to go farther than any "conditional
proposition".

I get it that possibles, once instantiated or as a character of what
gets instantiated, can be deemed to exist (and are obviously real).
But I'm also not sure I am comfortable with a notion that any
possible is real simply because it is possible. My sense is there is
more here.

BTW, can you provide a citation of the quote in question?

Thanks!

Mike

On 10/18/2017 11:08 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:

Mike, List,

Thanks for your generous comments and support. It did take a bit of
research to come up with the citations to support the argumentation
of that post, so I'm glad you found it of interest.

I do think that this matter of the distinction Peirce makes between
existence (2ns) and reality (all 3 categories-- from the standpoint
of what I've termed the_ vector of involution_, commencing at 3ns,
which involves 2ns & 1ns, 2ns involving 1ns) is semiotically of
considerable importance and, so, ought not be swept under the carpet
of a piece of logic which would equivocate existence and reality in
a logico-grammatical sleight of hand ("quantified variables") which
makes _everything_ "exist" by the conceptual trick of having "is"
stand for not only existence, but also reality. While the problem is
difficult, as Jon S has suggested, I do not think that Quine's (and
Sowa's) strictly logical solution is adequate.

You quoted me, then asked:

GR: As for the reality of _possibles_, Peirce holds that ". . . it
is the reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most
concerned to insist upon." Here one can begin to see how the last
branch of logic rather melds into metaphysical inquiries.

MB: Might you or others on the list identify what "some" of those
possibilities may be (with citations).

I think yours is a very good question, that it is undoubtedly
important to point out what "'some' of the possibilities may be."
But I believe that the first question we ought try to answer is why
Peirce says that "it is the reality of some possibilities that
pragmaticism is most concerned to insist upon."

My preliminary thoughts on the matter: If pragmatism is the logic of
abduction, as Peirce asserts in 1903, then I would think that "some"
of those possibilities will be particular abductions and hypotheses
which might prove fruitful, which, upon reflection and/or testing,
show themselves to be valid, perhaps even finally useful. As Peirce
writes:

Pragmaticism makes the ultimate intellectual purport of what you
please to consist in conceived conditional resolutions, or their
substance; and therefore, the conditional propositions, with their
hypothetical antecedents, in which such resolutions consist, 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[Gary Richmond]

Mike, list,

You wrote:

*I like your analysis and I see its logic. I (and others on the list) have
at times been confused as to whether abduction was in Firstness or
Thirdness. I still feel that abduction is applied to the "surprising fact"
that causes us to question the generals in Thirdness, so is *grounded*
there, but the results of abductive logic informs the possibilities to be
considered anew in the next sequence of inquiry, so informs what to
consider in Firstness. By this thought, abduction is really a bridge
between Thirdness and Firstness in a dynamic process.*

I will have to think hard about your very intriguing thought that
"abduction is a bridge between 3ns and 1ns in a dynamic process."

Meanwhile, I believe that most Peirce scholars see abduction as a 1ns when
it is considered within a tripartite inquiry (what Peirce calls "a complete
inquiry") such that:

*1st, 1ns, abduction (a hypothesis is formed)*

*|> 2nd, 3ns, deduction (there is an analysis of the implications of the
hypothesis were it valid in the interest of constructing tests of it*

*3rd, 2ns, induction (the actual experiment testing of the hypothesis
occurs)*

In the terms of categorial vector analysis, the pattern in which deduction
mediates between abduction and induction (commencing of course at
abduction) is that which I call the *vector of process* (the same vector
occurs in Peirce's categorial analysis of biological evolution, btw).

However, a year or so ago there was a discussion here concerning the
vectorial structure of abduction itself, that is, as a form of inference.
Some thought that it too followed the vector of process (so commencing at
1ns), while I, with Peirce's famous "bean" analysis as prime evidential
support, held that it followed a different vector, namely what I call
the *vector
of representation*, commencing at thirdness, mediated at 1ns, and
concluding at 2ns, so:

*2nd, 1ns, a well-prepared scientist makes a guess (an 'aha' moment
perhaps; abduction as a kind of instinct);*

*|> 1st, 3ns, Out of the wealth of his knowledge and experience,
considering a scientific problem (involving "a surprising array of
fact"--1907); *

*3rd, 2ns, the scientist formulates it in such a way that in the next step
of inquiry its implications for testing may be deduced; that is, he makes
of it a bona fide hypothesis.*

I have more and more come to see this as the formof retroduction, inference
from effect to cause, although Peirce not infrequently uses 'retroduction'
as a synonym for 'abduction'. But note this remark:

I have on reflexion decided to give this kind of reasoning the name of
*retroduction* to imply that it turns back and leads from the consequent of
an admitted consequence, to its antecedent. Observe, if you please, the
difference of meaning between a *consequent* the thing led to, and a
*consequence*, the general fact by virtue of which a given antecedent lead
to a certain *consequent *(MS [R] 857: 4-5).


Late in his career (in the N.A.) Peirce makes this point regarding
retroduction (having just referenced Darwin):

 . . . it is quite indubitable, as it appears to me, that every step in the
development of primitive notions into modern science was in the first
instance mere guess-work, or at least mere conjecture. *But the stimulus to
guessing, the hint of the conjecture, was derived from experience. The
order of the march of suggestion in retroduction is from experience
to hypothesis *(emphasis added).


The final sentence above gives credence I think to my putting 3ns first in
considering abductive inference (some might argue that 2ns ought be first,
but there are arguments against that position which I won't bother you with
now). You continued:

*In that context, then, "some possibilities" which we should be "most
concerned to insist upon" are those that prove to be the most pragmatic
responses to our inquiry. I think that is the point you are making here. In
that context, then, virtually any "conditional proposition" worthy of
pragmatic consideration could/would be instantiated in some pragmatic
reality. Even unicorns fit under this umbrella, since we know of no natural
reason to discount a horse-like animal with a single frontal horn. Under
this formulation, any reasonable "conditional proposition" could be seen as
real.*


Any thought, indeed even a dream, has a kind of reality. But the
"conditional propositions" which arise spontaneously out of a life of
scientific work in, say, a specialized area of science will, to the
pragmatist, have a compelling likeliness to be true. This is also a matter
of the economy of research. One might imagine that unicorns exist and spend
decades hunting all over the world to find one and, well, in effect simply
be wasting his time. As Peirce comments in a 1910 letter to Paul Carus:

As for the validity of the hypothesis, the retroduction, there seems at
first to be no room at all for the question of what supports it, since from
an actual fact it only infers a 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[John F Sowa]

Jon AS, Edwina, Jerry LRC, Gary R, Mike, and Ben,

Jon

By Peirce's definitions--at least, the ones that he carefully
employed late in his life--the verb "exist" may only be used to
talk about actual things that "react with the other like things
in the environment" (CP 6.495).


Yes.  That's why I avoided the word 'exist'.  In my note, I did not
use the words 'exist', 'existence', 'real', or 'reality'.  I assumed
logic in a way that could be represented in either Peirce's algebraic
notation or his existential graphs.  In his Gamma graphs, Peirce used
lines of identity in areas that represented possibilities.

One can use English sentences without the word 'exist' and map
them to logic in a way that the variables or the lines of identity
show what kinds of things are assumed.  But assumption does not
imply existence.

Edwina

thanks for a great post. I think that we don't pay enough
attention to relations.


Thanks.  And note that Frege may have published the first complete
notation for first-order logic in 1879.  But Peirce was the first to
introduce higher-order logic by quantifying over relations in 1885.

Jerry

I suggest that John’s reliance on Quine’s sentence to relate
metaphysical terms is highly problematic.  The sentence is merely
a rhetoric trick to divert the reader’s attention...


Yes!  Exactly!  I'm sure that Quine's rhetorical trick is one that
Peirce would have loved:  diverting attention away from the words
is essential.  That step cuts through a mass of verbiage to clarify
the implicit logical assumptions.

Quine was a strict nominalist, who used his trick to get rid of
assumptions he did not like.  But I used it to support Peirce's
much richer ontology, which uses logic in ways that Quine did not
approve:  metalanguage, higher-order logic, and modal logic.

Jerry
Consider the word “Love” for example.  Or, almost any human feeling. 
... the logics of molecular biology and medicine. which require
recursive compositions of terms to operate in multiple metalanguages. 


Good examples.  Write sentences about those topics in English and
translate them to your choice of logic.  Q's dictum will show which
assumed entities are referenced by quantified variables.

Gary

according to Peirce existence is not "properly" a term of logic,
but of metaphysics.

1905 [c.] | The Basis of Pragmaticism | MS [R] 280:36-7

...the term existence is properly a term, not of logic, but of
metaphysics; and metaphysically understood, an object exists, if
and only if, it reacts with every other existing object of the same
universe. But in the definition of a logical proper name, exist is
used in its logical sense, and means merely to be a singular of a
logical universe, or universe of discourse.


That is exactly what I was trying to say.

Note the word 'But', which separates what Peirce said about the
metaphysical sense and the logical sense.  By applying Quine's
dictum to the logic, we can determine what is contained in the
logical universe (AKA domain of discourse).

Instead of saying that the possibilities exist, we can say that
they are contained in a special domain of discourse.  That does
not imply existence in the physical environment.

Gary

As for the reality of possibles, Peirce holds that  "...it is the
reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most concerned
to insist upon."  Here one can begin to see how the last branch
of logic rather melds into metaphysical inquiries.


Mike

Might you or others on the list identify what "some" of those
possibilities may be (with citations)


Peirce rarely gave enough examples to illustrate and clarify his
ideas.  But I would cite any engineering project or plan for the
future.  If you translate those plans to logic or a computer
program, the variables represent "real possibilities".

But as mice and engineers know, the best laid plans "gang aft agley".
Many possibilities that seemed real in the planning stage never get
built, get modified, or get rejected as the project develops.

Ben

My question is: Why does not the verb "to realize" work or
function to "talk about actual things and real relations"?


I doubt that having a verb is relevant to the issues.  Peirce
was a logician, who allowed logic to refer to multiple universes
(or domains) of discourse.  When he applied his logic to issues
expressed in ordinary language, he always kept that logical
distinction in mind.

As Peirce himself said, he found that existential graphs clarified
his way of thinking about all the issues in his philosophy.  The
exercise of mapping his language to logic can help us understand
what he was trying to say.

John

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[gnox]

Ben,

 

The problem there is that “realize” is a transitive verb (takes an object) — 
unlike “be” or “exist.” You can say that “something exists” as a grammatically 
complete utterance, but you cant say “Something realizes.”

 

Gary f.

 

From: Ben Novak [mailto:trevriz...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 19-Oct-17 07:31
To: PEIRCE-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

 

Dear List:

 

Jon A. writes in his first post on this string: "Some of the difficulty here is 
likely due to the fact that there is no verb form of "reality," which could 
then be used to talk about both actual things and real relations."

 

My question is: Why does not the verb "to realize" work or f'unction to "talk 
about actual things and real relations"?

 

Ben Novak




 

Ben Novak

5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142

Telephone: (814) 808-5702


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[Ben Novak]

Dear List:

Jon A. writes in his first post on this string: "Some of the difficulty
here is likely due to the fact that there is no verb form of "reality,"
which could then be used to talk about both *actual *things and *real *
relations."

My question is: Why does not the verb "to realize" work or f'unction to
"talk about actual things and real relations"?

Ben Novak


*Ben Novak*
5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142
Telephone: (814) 808-5702

*"All art is mortal, **not merely the individual artifacts, but the arts
themselves.* *One day the last portrait of Rembrandt* *and the last bar of
Mozart will have ceased to be—**though possibly a colored canvas and a
sheet of notes may remain—**because the last eye and the last ear
accessible to their message **will have gone." *Oswald Spengler

On Thu, Oct 19, 2017 at 12:46 AM, Mike Bergman  wrote:

> Hi Gary, List,
>
> I like your analysis and I see its logic. I (and others on the list) have
> at times been confused as to whether abduction was in Firstness or
> Thirdness. I still feel that abduction is applied to the "surprising fact"
> that causes us to question the generals in Thirdness, so is *grounded*
> there, but the results of abductive logic informs the possibilities to be
> considered anew in the next sequence of inquiry, so informs what to
> consider in Firstness. By this thought, abduction is really a bridge
> between Thirdness and Firstness in a dynamic process.
>
> In that context, then, "some possibilities" which we should be "most
> concerned to insist upon" are those that prove to be the most pragmatic
> responses to our inquiry. I think that is the point you are making here. In
> that context, then, virtually any "conditional proposition" worthy of
> pragmatic consideration could/would be instantiated in some pragmatic
> reality. Even unicorns fit under this umbrella, since we know of no natural
> reason to discount a horse-like animal with a single frontal horn. Under
> this formulation, any reasonable "conditional proposition" could be seen as
> real.
>
> While I like some of the nugget of this argument, I think it ultimately
> begs the question. What caught my attention in the CSP quote you surfaced
> seems to suggest more: a "most concerned" criterion that seems to go
> farther than any "conditional proposition".
>
> I get it that possibles, once instantiated or as a character of what gets
> instantiated, can be deemed to exist (and are obviously real). But I'm also
> not sure I am comfortable with a notion that any possible is real simply
> because it is possible. My sense is there is more here.
>
> BTW, can you provide a citation of the quote in question?
>
> Thanks!
>
> Mike
>
> On 10/18/2017 11:08 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
>
> Mike, List,
>
> Thanks for your generous comments and support. It did take a bit of
> research to come up with the citations to support the argumentation of that
> post, so I'm glad you found it of interest.
>
> I do think that this matter of the distinction Peirce makes between
> existence (2ns) and reality (all 3 categories-- from the standpoint of what
> I've termed the* vector of involution*, commencing at 3ns, which involves
> 2ns & 1ns, 2ns involving 1ns) is semiotically of considerable importance
> and, so, ought not be swept under the carpet of a piece of logic which
> would equivocate existence and reality in a logico-grammatical sleight of
> hand ("quantified variables") which makes *everything* "exist" by the
> conceptual trick of having "is" stand for not only existence, but also
> reality. While the problem is difficult, as Jon S has suggested, I do not
> think that Quine's (and Sowa's) strictly logical solution is adequate.
>
> You quoted me, then asked:
>
>
> GR: As for the reality of *possibles*, Peirce holds that  ". . . it is
> the reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most concerned to
> insist upon." Here one can begin to see how the last branch of logic rather
> melds into metaphysical inquiries.
>
> MB: Might you or others on the list identify what "some" of those
> possibilities may be (with citations).
>
> I think yours is a very good question, that it is undoubtedly important to
> point out what "'some' of the possibilities may be." But I believe that the
> first question we ought try to answer is why Peirce says that "it is the
> reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most concerned to insist
> upon."
>
> My preliminary thoughts on the matter: If pragmatism is the logic of
> abduction, as Peirce asserts in 1903, then I would think that "some" of
> those possibilities will be particular abductions and hypotheses which
> might prove fruitful, which, upon reflection and/or testing, show
> themselves to be valid, perhaps even finally useful. As Peirce writes:
>
> Pragmaticism makes the ultimate intellectual purport of what you please to
> consist in conceived conditional resolutions, or their substance; and
> therefore, the conditional 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[Mike Bergman]

  
  
Hi Gary, List,
I like your analysis and I see its logic. I (and others on
the list) have at times been confused as to whether abduction
was in Firstness or Thirdness. I still feel that abduction is
applied to the "surprising fact" that causes us to question the
generals in Thirdness, so is *grounded* there, but the results
of abductive logic informs the possibilities to be considered
anew in the next sequence of inquiry, so informs what to
consider in Firstness. By this thought, abduction is really a
bridge between Thirdness and Firstness in a dynamic process.
In that context, then, "some possibilities" which we should
be "most concerned to insist upon" are those that prove to be
the most pragmatic responses to our inquiry. I think that is the
point you are making here. In that context, then, virtually any
"conditional proposition" worthy of pragmatic consideration
could/would be instantiated in some pragmatic reality. Even
unicorns fit under this umbrella, since we know of no natural
reason to discount a horse-like animal with a single frontal
horn. Under this formulation, any reasonable "conditional
proposition" could be seen as real.
While I like some of the nugget of this argument, I think it
ultimately begs the question. What caught my attention in the
CSP quote you surfaced seems to suggest more: a "most concerned"
criterion that seems to go farther than any "conditional proposition".
I get it that possibles, once instantiated or as a character
of what gets instantiated, can be deemed to exist (and are
obviously real). But I'm also not sure I am comfortable with a
notion that any possible is real simply because it is possible.
My sense is there is more here.
BTW, can you provide a citation of the quote in question?
Thanks!
  
Mike


On 10/18/2017 11:08 PM, Gary Richmond
  wrote:


  
Mike, List,


Thanks for your generous comments and
  support. It did take a bit of research to come up with the
  citations to support the argumentation of that post, so I'm
  glad you found it of interest.


I do think that this matter of the
  distinction Peirce makes between existence (2ns) and reality
  (all 3 categories-- from the standpoint of what I've termed
  the vector of involution, commencing at 3ns, which
  involves 2ns & 1ns, 2ns involving 1ns) is semiotically of
  considerable importance and, so, ought not be swept under the
  carpet of a piece of logic which would equivocate existence
  and reality in a logico-grammatical sleight of hand
  ("quantified variables") which makes everything
  "exist" by the conceptual trick of having "is" stand for not
  only existence, but also reality. While the problem is
  difficult, as Jon S has suggested, I do not think that Quine's
  (and Sowa's) strictly logical solution is adequate.


You quoted me, then asked:

  
  
  GR: As for the reality
of possibles, Peirce holds that  ". . . it is the
reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most
concerned to insist upon." Here one can begin to see how the
last branch of logic rather melds into metaphysical
inquiries.
  
  
  MB: Might you or others on the list
identify what "some" of those possibilities may be (with
citations).

I think yours is a very good question,
  that it is undoubtedly important to point out what "'some' of
  the possibilities may be." But I believe that the first
  question we ought try to answer is why Peirce says that "it is
  the reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most
  concerned to insist upon."
My preliminary thoughts on the matter:
  If pragmatism is the logic of abduction, as Peirce asserts in
  1903, then I would think that "some" of those possibilities
  will be particular abductions and hypotheses which might prove
  fruitful, which, upon reflection and/or testing, show
  themselves to be valid, perhaps even finally useful. As Peirce
  writes:



  Pragmaticism makes the ultimate
intellectual purport of what you please to consist in
conceived conditional resolutions, or their substance; and
therefore, the conditional propositions, with their
hypothetical antecedents, in which such resolutions consist,
being of the ultimate nature of meaning, must be capable of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[Gary Richmond]

Mike, List,

Thanks for your generous comments and support. It did take a bit of
research to come up with the citations to support the argumentation of that
post, so I'm glad you found it of interest.

I do think that this matter of the distinction Peirce makes between
existence (2ns) and reality (all 3 categories-- from the standpoint of what
I've termed the* vector of involution*, commencing at 3ns, which involves
2ns & 1ns, 2ns involving 1ns) is semiotically of considerable importance
and, so, ought not be swept under the carpet of a piece of logic which
would equivocate existence and reality in a logico-grammatical sleight of
hand ("quantified variables") which makes *everything* "exist" by the
conceptual trick of having "is" stand for not only existence, but also
reality. While the problem is difficult, as Jon S has suggested, I do not
think that Quine's (and Sowa's) strictly logical solution is adequate.

You quoted me, then asked:


GR: As for the reality of *possibles*, Peirce holds that  ". . . it is the
reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most concerned to insist
upon." Here one can begin to see how the last branch of logic rather melds
into metaphysical inquiries.

MB: Might you or others on the list identify what "some" of those
possibilities may be (with citations).

I think yours is a very good question, that it is undoubtedly important to
point out what "'some' of the possibilities may be." But I believe that the
first question we ought try to answer is why Peirce says that "it is the
reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most concerned to insist
upon."

My preliminary thoughts on the matter: If pragmatism is the logic of
abduction, as Peirce asserts in 1903, then I would think that "some" of
those possibilities will be particular abductions and hypotheses which
might prove fruitful, which, upon reflection and/or testing, show
themselves to be valid, perhaps even finally useful. As Peirce writes:

Pragmaticism makes the ultimate intellectual purport of what you please to
consist in conceived conditional resolutions, or their substance; and
therefore, the conditional propositions, with their hypothetical
antecedents, in which such resolutions consist, being of the ultimate
nature of meaning, must be capable of being true, that is, of expressing
whatever there be which is such as the proposition expresses, independently
of being thought to be so in any judgment, or being represented to be so in
any other symbol of any man or men. *But that amounts to saying that
possibility is sometimes of a real kind.* (Issues of Pragmatism, EP2:354,
emphasis added).


This, I believe, is how inquiry progresses, how we approach "the truth of
certain matters," that 'truth," or, better, knowledge, sometimes bringing
about, for example, technologies which are of benefit to us. Perhaps it is
yet possible to imagine that we might evolve our humane consciousness, the
final frontier of evolution as Peirce saw it. But this has little--if
any--hope of happening if we cannot conceive powerful abductions,
hypotheses, *possibilities*. . . This, I would maintain, *is* the work of
individuals.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Wed, Oct 18, 2017 at 9:33 PM, Mike Bergman  wrote:

> Hi Gary, List,
>
> Excellent response. However, the snippet below caught my eye:
>
> As for the reality of *possibles*, Peirce holds that  ". . . it is the
> reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most concerned to insist
> upon." Here one can begin to see how the last branch of logic rather melds
> into metaphysical inquiries.
>
> Might you or others on the list identify what "some" of those
> possibilities may be (with citations).
>
> Thanks, Mike
>
> On 10/18/2017 7:54 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
>
> As for the reality of *possibles*, Peirce holds that  ". . . it is the
> reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most concerned to insist
> upon." Here one can begin to see how the last branch of logic rather melds
> into metaphysical inquiries.
>
>
> --
> __
>
> Michael K. Bergman
> Cognonto Corporation319.621.5225 
> <(319)%20621-5225>skype:michaelkbergmanhttp://cognonto.comhttp://mkbergman.comhttp://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman
> __
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[Mike Bergman]

  
  
Hi Gary, List,
Excellent response. However, the snippet below caught my eye:


  As for
the reality of possibles, Peirce holds that  ". . .
it is the reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is
most concerned to insist upon." Here one can begin to see
how the last branch of logic rather melds into metaphysical
inquiries.
  
  

  
Might you or others on the list identify what "some" of those
  possibilities may be (with citations).
Thanks, Mike


On 10/18/2017 7:54 PM, Gary Richmond
  wrote:


  As for the
reality of possibles, Peirce holds that  ". . . it is
the reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most
concerned to insist upon." Here one can begin to see how the
last branch of logic rather melds into metaphysical inquiries.
  
  


-- 
__

Michael K. Bergman
Cognonto Corporation
319.621.5225
skype:michaelkbergman
http://cognonto.com
http://mkbergman.com
http://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman
__ 
  


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PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[Gary Richmond]

Jon S, John S, list,

Jon S wrote in reflecting on John S conclusion in a discussion of the
language and logic used to discuss "existence" and "reality":

Jon: By Peirce's definitions--at least, the ones that he carefully employed
late in his life--the verb "exist" may only be used to talk about actual
things that "react with the other like things in the environment" (CP
6.495).


 Exactly so. Existence is reactive (act/react), dual, 2ns, hic et nunc,
once for all, singular, determinate, etc. One sees this in such late
definitions as this which contrast existence and reality:

1901 | Individual | CP 3.613

…whatever exists is individual, since existence (not reality) and
individuality are essentially the same thing…

and

1902 | Minute Logic: Chapter IV. Ethics (Logic IV) | CP 6.349

Existence […] is a special mode of reality, which, whatever other
characteristics it possesses, has that of being absolutely determinate.

And so, as you remarked:

 Jon: This is precisely why he famously argued for the *Reality *of God,
rather than the *existence *of God.  Some of the difficulty here is likely
due to the fact that there is no verb form of "reality," which could then
be used to talk about both *actual *things and *real *relations.  The
latter indeed include generals and possibilities--even those that are
*real *despite never becoming *actual *(i.e., instantiated), and therefore
do not *exist.*


Besides the difficulty you commented on, viz., "that there is no verb form
of 'reality'," another problem is that according to Peirce existence is not
"properly" a term of logic, but of metaphysics.

1905 [c.] | The Basis of Pragmaticism | MS [R] 280:36-7

…the term *existence* is properly a term, not of logic, but of metaphysics;
and metaphysically understood, an object *exists*, if and only if, it
reacts with every other existing object of the same universe. But in the
definition of a logical proper name, *exist* is used in its logical sense,
and means merely to be a singular of a logical universe, or universe of
discourse.

This seems to me somewhat different from John S's logical analysis since,
in the quotation above, Peirce says that *exist* "used in its logical
sense. . . means merely to be a singular of a. . . universe of discourse."
This makes good sense to me.


As metaphysics has been introduced in the quotation directly above, I'd
also like to say a few words about it in considering, or better,
emphasizing *reality* (all the following quotations are from EP2, so
represent Peirce's late thinking on this topic).

"Metaphysics is the science of Reality. Reality consists in regularity.
Real regularity is active law. Active law is efficient reasonableness, or
in other words is truly reasonable reasonableness. Reasonable
reasonableness is Thirdness as Thirdness."

But "active laws" are, Peirce argues, symbols, which he goes on to say are
"the only things in the universe that have importance." (One recalls that
for Peirce *man* is a symbol, the *universe* itself is a symbol, the Greek
language is a symbol, the works of Shakespeare are a symbol, etc.) The
knowledge of such laws allow us to make predictions of what may happen* in
futuro*.

" Nobody can doubt that we know laws upon which we can base predictions to
which actual events still in the womb of the future will conform to a
marked extent, if not perfectly. To deny reality to such laws is to quibble
about words. Many philosophers say they are "mere symbols." Take away the
word mere, and this is true. They are symbols; and symbols being the only
things in the universe that have any importance, the word "mere" is a great
impertinence."


But while metaphysics may be a matter of 3ns, *reality*, in Peirce's view,
involves all three categories, and notably in the quotation below, 2ns,
compulsion, a matter of most assuredly of *hic et nunc*. But compulsion,
2ns, while existentially experienced, is not sufficient for a full
description of reality which requires regularity (habit).

"[R]eality is compulsive. But the compulsiveness is absolutely hic et nunc.
It is for an instant and it is gone. Let it be no more and it is absolutely
nothing. The [existential aspect of] reality only exists as an element of
the regularity. And the regularity is the symbol. Rea[lity, therefore, can
only be regarded as the limit of the endless series of symbols."


Or stated somewhat differently:

" Generality is, indeed, an indispensable ingredient of reality; for mere
individual existence or actuality without any regularity whatever is a
nullity. Chaos is pure nothing."


As for the reality of *possibles*, Peirce holds that  ". . . it is the
reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most concerned to insist
upon." Here one can begin to see how the last branch of logic rather melds
into metaphysical inquiries.

As Peirce delves further into the character of metaphysics, as important as
he sees it to be as the last of the philosophic (cenoscopic) sciences, it
is, in his view, in