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-- Forwarded message --
From: "David Nyman"
Date: 18 May 2017 6:34 p.m.
Subject: Re: Question about physical supervenience
To: "everything-list"
Cc:
On 18 May 2017 at 14:56, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 18 May 2017, a
On Thu, May 18, 2017 at 6:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> A model could be accurate or inaccurate.
>
>
> >
> This makes no sense with the technical sense of model by the logician.
>
If logicians can make no sense out
of
the words
"
accurate
"
or
"
inaccurate
" then logicians
On 19 May 2017 00:55, "Russell Standish" wrote:
On Wed, May 17, 2017 at 08:42:22AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:>
>
> On 16 May 2017, at 10:20, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> >On Tue, May 16, 2017 at 09:47:14AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>
> >>On 16 May 2017, at 04:44, Russell Standish wrote:
> >>
On Wed, May 17, 2017 at 08:42:22AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:>
>
> On 16 May 2017, at 10:20, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> >On Tue, May 16, 2017 at 09:47:14AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>
> >>On 16 May 2017, at 04:44, Russell Standish wrote:
> >>
> >>>On Mon, May 15, 2017 at 11:41:04AM -0700,
On 5/18/2017 2:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 17 May 2017, at 20:42, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 5/17/2017 3:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Exactly. I might try to add some possible mathematical precision,
but I need to think a bit on this. Later. Up to now, the B of Bp & p
is interpreted by its
On 18 May 2017 at 14:56, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 18 May 2017, at 14:31, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
>
> On 17 May 2017 at 19:37, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 5/17/2017 2:35 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>>> The problem comes only if you attempt to "reverse interpret" these
>>> transformations, i
On 18 May 2017, at 14:31, David Nyman wrote:
On 17 May 2017 at 19:37, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 5/17/2017 2:35 AM, David Nyman wrote:
The problem comes only if you attempt to "reverse interpret" these
transformations, in the computationalist framework, *as
computation per se* and hence,
On 17 May 2017 at 19:37, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
> On 5/17/2017 2:35 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> The problem comes only if you attempt to "reverse interpret" these
>> transformations, in the computationalist framework, *as computation per
>> se* and hence, by assumption, as having a supervenienc
On 18 May 2017, at 01:15, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, May 17, 2017 at 5:31 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
> A model is the math version of a reality.
A model could be accurate or inaccurate.
This makes no sense with the technical sense of model by the logician.
Accuracy is defined by usin
On 17 May 2017, at 23:16, David Nyman wrote:
On 17 May 2017 at 19:49, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 5/17/2017 5:08 AM, David Nyman wrote:
As a (very) rough and partial analogy, if I am on deck, and you are
observing me from aloft, I can grasp that you are in a position to
command an entire do
On 17 May 2017, at 20:49, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 5/17/2017 5:08 AM, David Nyman wrote:
As a (very) rough and partial analogy, if I am on deck, and you are
observing me from aloft, I can grasp that you are in a position to
command an entire domain of such personally "unprovable" facts
On 17 May 2017, at 20:42, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 5/17/2017 3:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Exactly. I might try to add some possible mathematical precision,
but I need to think a bit on this. Later. Up to now, the B of Bp &
p is interpreted by its computational rendering, but "B" is really
On Wed, May 17, 2017 at 5:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> A model is the math version of a reality.
>
A model could be accurate
or inaccurate.
> >
> A theory
>
A theory c
ould
also be accurate
or inaccurate.
>
is a finite object
A theory is a "finite object" but a mo
On 17 May 2017 20:05, "Brent Meeker" wrote:
On 5/17/2017 2:07 AM, David Nyman wrote:
To the extent that it ought to be possible for any program to
represent any other program by a suitable time-based transformation
applied by an external observer, then yes.
I think there's a subtlety here.
On 17 May 2017 at 19:49, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
> On 5/17/2017 5:08 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
> As a (very) rough and partial analogy, if I am on deck, and you are
> observing me from aloft, I can grasp that you are in a position to command
> an entire domain of such personally "unprovable" fac
On 5/17/2017 2:07 AM, David Nyman wrote:
To the extent that it ought to be possible for any program to
represent any other program by a suitable time-based transformation
applied by an external observer, then yes.
I think there's a subtlety here. If we're speaking about *physica
On 5/17/2017 5:08 AM, David Nyman wrote:
As a (very) rough and partial analogy, if I am on deck, and you are
observing me from aloft, I can grasp that you are in a position to
command an entire domain of such personally "unprovable" facts about
me, despite my not being in a position to acc
On 17 May 2017 at 19:37, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
> On 5/17/2017 2:35 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> The problem comes only if you attempt to "reverse interpret" these
>> transformations, in the computationalist framework, *as computation per
>> se* and hence, by assumption, as having a supervenienc
On 5/17/2017 3:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Exactly. I might try to add some possible mathematical precision, but
I need to think a bit on this. Later. Up to now, the B of Bp & p is
interpreted by its computational rendering, but "B" is really
provability, and not computation. Up to here, that
On 5/17/2017 2:35 AM, David Nyman wrote:
The problem comes only if you attempt to "reverse interpret" these
transformations, in the computationalist framework, *as computation
per se* and hence, by assumption, as having a supervenience relation
with consciousness. This then introduces an amb
On 17 May 2017 2:34 p.m., "Bruno Marchal" wrote:
>
> >
>
> On 17 May 2017, at 14:08, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
> >>
>>
>> On 17 May 2017 11:27 a.m., "Bruno Marchal" wrote:
>
> >>>
>>>
>>> On 17 May 2017, at 12:06, David Nyman wrote:
>>>
>
>
On 17 May 2017 8:06 a.m., "Bruno
On 17 May 2017, at 14:08, David Nyman wrote:
On 17 May 2017 11:27 a.m., "Bruno Marchal" wrote:
On 17 May 2017, at 12:06, David Nyman wrote:
On 17 May 2017 8:06 a.m., "Bruno Marchal" wrote:
On 16 May 2017, at 17:34, David Nyman wrote:
On 16 May 2017 at 08:07, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 17 May 2017 11:27 a.m., "Bruno Marchal" wrote:
On 17 May 2017, at 12:06, David Nyman wrote:
On 17 May 2017 8:06 a.m., "Bruno Marchal" wrote:
On 16 May 2017, at 17:34, David Nyman wrote:
On 16 May 2017 at 08:07, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 15 May 2017, at 22:44, David Nyman wrote:
>
On 17 May 2017, at 12:06, David Nyman wrote:
On 17 May 2017 8:06 a.m., "Bruno Marchal" wrote:
On 16 May 2017, at 17:34, David Nyman wrote:
On 16 May 2017 at 08:07, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 15 May 2017, at 22:44, David Nyman wrote:
On 15 May 2017 at 15:56, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On
On 17 May 2017, at 11:35, David Nyman wrote:
On 17 May 2017 7:42 a.m., "Bruno Marchal" wrote:
On 16 May 2017, at 10:20, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, May 16, 2017 at 09:47:14AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 16 May 2017, at 04:44, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, May 15, 2017 at 11:41:0
On 17 May 2017 8:06 a.m., "Bruno Marchal" wrote:
On 16 May 2017, at 17:34, David Nyman wrote:
On 16 May 2017 at 08:07, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 15 May 2017, at 22:44, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
>
> On 15 May 2017 at 15:56, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>> On 15 May 2017, at 12:38, David Nyman w
On 17 May 2017 7:42 a.m., "Bruno Marchal" wrote:
On 16 May 2017, at 10:20, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, May 16, 2017 at 09:47:14AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>> On 16 May 2017, at 04:44, Russell Standish wrote:
>>
>> On Mon, May 15, 2017 at 11:41:04AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>>
>>>
On 16 May 2017, at 23:32, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, May 16, 2017 at 2:44 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
>> There is no mathematical reason time or space or
anything else can't be continuous, nor can mathematics find
anything special about the numbers 1.6*10^-35 or
5.4*10^-43 , bu
On 17 May 2017 5:44 a.m., "Russell Standish" wrote:
On Tue, May 16, 2017 at 03:49:37PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> Is that not also true of consciousness supervening on a computers
> execution of a program? What it is conscious "of" depends on its
> relation to the environment - e.g. what the
On 16 May 2017, at 17:34, David Nyman wrote:
On 16 May 2017 at 08:07, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 15 May 2017, at 22:44, David Nyman wrote:
On 15 May 2017 at 15:56, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 15 May 2017, at 12:38, David Nyman wrote:
I've been thinking a bit about physical supervenience in
On 16 May 2017, at 10:20, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, May 16, 2017 at 09:47:14AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 16 May 2017, at 04:44, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, May 15, 2017 at 11:41:04AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
We had extended arguments starting from "Why isn't
the-rock-that
On Tue, May 16, 2017 at 03:49:37PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> Is that not also true of consciousness supervening on a computers
> execution of a program? What it is conscious "of" depends on its
> relation to the environment - e.g. what the programmer intended to
> represent. So, while unlik
On 5/15/2017 7:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, May 15, 2017 at 11:41:04AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
We had extended arguments starting from "Why isn't
the-rock-that-computes everything conscious?" I think your analysis
above needs to be extended to cover that. You seem to take
"perc
On Tue, May 16, 2017 at 2:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> T
>> here is no mathematical reason time or space or anything else can't be
>> continuous
>> ,
>> nor can mathematics find anything special about the
>>
>> numbers 1.6*10^-35
>>
>> or
>>
>> 5.4*10^-43
>>
>> , but phys
On Tue, 16 May 2017 at 12:44 pm, Russell Standish
wrote:
> On Mon, May 15, 2017 at 11:41:04AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
> >
> > We had extended arguments starting from "Why isn't
> > the-rock-that-computes everything conscious?" I think your analysis
> > above needs to be extended to cover that
On 16 May 2017 at 08:07, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 15 May 2017, at 22:44, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
>
> On 15 May 2017 at 15:56, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>> On 15 May 2017, at 12:38, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>> I've been thinking a bit about physical supervenience in the
>> computationalist context
On Tue, May 16, 2017 at 09:47:14AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 16 May 2017, at 04:44, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> >On Mon, May 15, 2017 at 11:41:04AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
> >>
> >>We had extended arguments starting from "Why isn't
> >>the-rock-that-computes everything conscious?" I
On 16 May 2017, at 04:44, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, May 15, 2017 at 11:41:04AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
We had extended arguments starting from "Why isn't
the-rock-that-computes everything conscious?" I think your analysis
above needs to be extended to cover that. You seem to take
On 15 May 2017, at 22:44, David Nyman wrote:
On 15 May 2017 at 15:56, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 15 May 2017, at 12:38, David Nyman wrote:
I've been thinking a bit about physical supervenience in the
computationalist context and have come to the conclusion that I
don't really understand i
On 16 May 2017, at 04:17, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, May 15, 2017 at 7:06 PM, David Nyman
wrote:
>> Physics prevents the above paradoxes because all of these
thought experiments assume that space or time or both are
infinitely divisible, but quantum physics says there is a smallest
On Mon, May 15, 2017 at 11:41:04AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> We had extended arguments starting from "Why isn't
> the-rock-that-computes everything conscious?" I think your analysis
> above needs to be extended to cover that. You seem to take
> "perception" as a given attribute of the mach
On Mon, May 15, 2017 at 7:06 PM, David Nyman wrote:
>> Physics prevents the above paradoxes because all of these
>> thought experiments assume that space or time or both are infinitely
>> divisible, but quantum physics says there is a smallest length (1.6*10^-35
>> meter) and a smallest time (
On 15 May 2017 at 21:35, John Clark wrote:
> On Mon, May 15, 2017 at 6:38 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>
> >
>> I've been thinking a bit about physical supervenience in the
>> computationalist context and have come to the conclusion that I don't
>> really understand it.
>>
>
> If X superveniens Y t
On 15 May 2017 at 19:41, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
> On 5/15/2017 3:38 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>
> I've been thinking a bit about physical supervenience in the
> computationalist context and have come to the conclusion that I don't
> really understand it. So let's consider CT + YD. YD means acceptin
On 15 May 2017 at 15:56, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 15 May 2017, at 12:38, David Nyman wrote:
>
> I've been thinking a bit about physical supervenience in the
> computationalist context and have come to the conclusion that I don't
> really understand it. So let's consider CT + YD. YD means accep
On Mon, May 15, 2017 at 6:38 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>
> I've been thinking a bit about physical supervenience in the
> computationalist context and have come to the conclusion that I don't
> really understand it.
>
If X superveniens Y then there can NOT be a change in X without a change in
Y;
On 5/15/2017 3:38 AM, David Nyman wrote:
I've been thinking a bit about physical supervenience in the
computationalist context and have come to the conclusion that I don't
really understand it. So let's consider CT + YD. YD means accepting
the replacement of all or part of my brain with a dig
On 15 May 2017, at 12:38, David Nyman wrote:
I've been thinking a bit about physical supervenience in the
computationalist context and have come to the conclusion that I
don't really understand it. So let's consider CT + YD. YD means
accepting the replacement of all or part of my brain wit
I've been thinking a bit about physical supervenience in the
computationalist context and have come to the conclusion that I don't
really understand it. So let's consider CT + YD. YD means accepting the
replacement of all or part of my brain with a digital prosthesis. Now,
whatever theory the docto
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